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Abstract
I investigate the structure of an argument that culture cannot be maintained
in a population if each individual acquires a given cultural variant from a sin-
gle person. I note two puzzling consequences of the argument: It appears to
conflict with (a) many models of cultural transmission and (b) real-world cases
of cultural transmission. I resolve the first puzzle by showing that one of the
models central to the argument is conceptually analogous and mathematically
equivalent to one used to investigate the evolution of sexual reproduction. This
analogy clarifies what assumptions are crucial to the argument concerning cul-
tural transmission. I resolve the second puzzle by arguing that probabilistic
models of epistemological coherence can be reinterpreted as models of mutual
support between cultural variants. I develop a model of cultural transmission
illustrating this proposal. I suggest that real-world cases that seem to conflict
with the original argument may in fact be instances in which mutually sup-
porting cultural variants are learned from different individuals.
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1 Introduction
I investigate the structure of an argument that culture cannot be maintained in a
population if each individual acquires a given cultural variant from a single per-
son. I note two puzzling consequences of the argument: It appears to conflict with
(a) many models of cultural transmission and (b) real-world cases of cultural trans-
mission. I resolve the first puzzle by showing that one of the models central to the
argument is conceptually analogous and mathematically equivalent to one used to
investigate the evolution of sexual reproduction. This analogy clarifies what as-
sumptions are crucial to the argument concerning cultural transmission. I resolve
the second puzzle by arguing that probabilistic models of epistemological coher-
ence can be reinterpreted as models of mutual support between cultural variants.
I develop a model of cultural transmission illustrating this proposal. I suggest that
real-world cases that seem to conflict with the original argument may in fact be in-
stances in which mutually supporting cultural variants are learned from different
individuals.
Section 2 describes arguments based on models of cultural transmission in (En-
quist et al., 2010), and section 3 describes two implications of Enquist et al.’s results
that may seem puzzling. Section 4 explains why the evolution of sexual repro-
duction is an interesting problem in evolutionary biology, and describes Muller’s
ratchet, a kind of model that motivates one of the proposed evolutionary advan-
tages of sexual reproduction. This is the model that bears mathematical and con-
ceptual parallels to one of Enquist et al.’s models. Section 5 then reinterprets ideas
from probabilistic models of coherence in epistemology as ideas about cognitive
transitions from one cultural variant to another.
I’ll assume that there are at least minor differences in beliefs, knowledge, behav-
ior, attitudes, inclinations, etc. between people within a society, and that such char-
1
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acteristics—“cultural variants”—in one person sometimes promote similar vari-
ants in another.1 Such processes are called “cultural transmission” or “social learn-
ing”. “Individual learning”, by contrast, occurs when a person learns something
on their own, whether through observation of the environment, trial and error, rea-
soning, or some combination.
2 One Cultural Parent Makes No Culture
In this section I summarize arguments made by Enquist, Strimling, Eriksson, La-
land, Sjostrand (2010) (henceforth “ESELS”). These authors argue that if a particu-
lar cultural variant is always acquired from a single individual—a single “cultural
parent”—then it’s very difficult for the cultural variant to be maintained in a pop-
ulation. Culture would usually disappear. Thus the maintenance of culture in hu-
man populations seems to depend on the fact that we routinely learn from multiple
individuals.
Suppose that a cultural variant � is either present or not, and assume that cul-
tural transmission is imperfect: When individual � learns from individual �, there
is a chance that � will fail to learn. Suppose then that each individual learns with
probability Ǣ, from a randomly chosen member of a population in which those with� have relative frequency �ֱ at time Ǧ. We’ll assume that learning occurs in discrete
timesteps, or cultural “generations”.
ESELS note that the frequency of those with � will be Ǣֱ�ա, which decreases to
zero unless transmission is perfect.2 Figure 1 illustrates this process. In each gen-
1This concept of a cultural variant does not carry the same connotations as the term “meme”,
which tends to suggest discreteness, near-perfect replicability, or goal-directedness (cf. Richerson
and Boyd 2005; Godfrey-Smith 2009).
2I ignore possible effects of random drift in cultural transmission processes throughout this
paper.
2
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Gray: no cultural variant
Single cultural parents
Black: has cultural variant
Solid: successful transmission Dashed: unsuccessful
Figure 1: Cultural transmission from randomly chosen “parents” in discrete gen-
erations, with time moving from top to bottom. A cultural variant can only be ac-
quired from those who have it (black circles), but transmission (arrows) sometimes
fails (dashed arrows).
eration, a fraction Ǣ of those with the cultural variant � succeed in transmitting it,
so the frequency of � decreases over time. ESELS consider several variations on
this model, including (1) models in which multiple learning trials from the same
cultural parent are allowed, (2) models in which cultural parents can be chosen
because they appear to be successful (“biased transmission”), (3) models in which
social learning is combined with individual learning, and (4) models in which pos-
session of a cultural variant confers a fitness advantage that makes the bearer more
likely to be available to be chosen as a cultural parent. I won’t review all of these
models in detail. I note that ESELS showed that that option (1) merely slows down
the eventual loss of culture. Option (2) can maintain culture, but only under some
parameter values. With option (3), it turns out that under plausible parameter val-
ues, culture can only be maintained if individual learning alone could have main-
tained it. I turn now to option (4).
Suppose that having the cultural variant � provides a fitness benefit. For exam-
3
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ple, perhaps it makes survival more likely, thus allowing an individual more time
to influence others. Let � ≥ 1 be the ratio between the fitness of those with the cul-
tural variant and the fitness of those without it. Under these assumptions, ESELS
argue that if the frequency in the current generation is �, the average frequency �࿅
in the next generation is: �࿅ = Ǣ��Ǣ�� + (1 − Ǣ�) . (1)
Here Ǣ�� is the frequency of successful cultural transmission: �� represents fre-
quency of � among chosen cultural parents, and Ǣ is the probability of successful
transmission of �. (1−Ǣ�) is the frequency of transmissions that don’t occur, either
because the (randomly) chosen parent lacks �, or because the cultural transmission
nevertheless failed.
The frequency of � in the population will keep changing until an equilibrium
is reached in which �࿅ = �. ESELS show that this equilibrium ̂� is:
̂� = �Ǣ − 1Ǣ (� − 1) (2)
ESELS argue that the equilibrium is nonzero only for parameter values that are
rare in nature. For example, if the probability Ǣ of successful transmission 0.9—a
very high value—the ratio between fitnesses of those with and without � must be
greater than about 1.112 in order for culture to be maintained. This is an unusually
large fitness advantage.
On the other hand, ESELS show that allowing individuals to learn from two or
more cultural parents can easily maintain culture, even without a fitness advantage.
The reason is that even if a chosen cultural parent lacks the cultural variant �, or
fails to transmit it, there is the the possibility that another randomly chosen cultural
parent will successfully transmit � (figure 2). Having a “backup” teacher allows
learners to recover, often, from a failure of cultural transmission. In this model, for
4
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Dashed: unsuccessful
Gray: no cultural variant
Multiple cultural parents
Red: has cultural variant
Solid: successful transmission
Figure 2: Each diagonal arrow represents cultural transmission from a second cul-
tural parent. See caption for figure 1 for the meaning of other components.
� randomly chosen cultural parents, the frequency �࿅ in the next generation is:3
�࿅ = 1 − (1 − Ǣ�)֙ (3)
ESELS show that there is a nonzero equilibrium if and only if Ǣ� > 1. On this model,
culture will be maintained as long as the probability of transmission is not too low,
and the number of cultural parents is high enough. For example, if each learner
has two cultural parents, the probability of successful transmission need only be
slightly greater than 1/2. Note that this model implies, in effect, that maintenance
of culture requires robustness resulting from multiple processes with at least poorly
correlated errors (Wimsatt, 2007).
3The frequency of successful transmissions is equal to the probability �(�џ ∨ ⋯ ∨ �֙) of suc-
cessful transmission �օ from any of the � cultural parents. Since successful transmission from more
than one parent is not ruled out, the probability of at least one successful transmission is equal to∑օ֙=џ �(�օ) minus a complex function of probabilities of conjunctions of the �օ’s. A routine tech-
nique is to simplify such a calculation using De Morgan’s law, transforming the above disjunction
into �(¬(¬�џ&⋯&¬�֙)). The frequency is then equal to (3), since the events �օ are independent.
5
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3 Two puzzles
There are two implications of ESELS’ argument that may initially seem puzzling.
First, many mathematical models of cultural change seem to allow single-parent
culture to be maintained. What is the crucial difference in ESELS’ model that pre-
vents this? Consider, for example Rogers’ (1988) model, which concerns two be-
haviors, each of which is better adapted to a different environment. Some individ-
ual chose a behavior based on individual learning. Others simply copy the behav-
ior of a randomly chosen individual. Rogers shows that at equilibrium, the fitness
of social learners is equal to that of individual learners. If we think of the lack of
cultural variant � in ESELS’ models as a a kind of null cultural variant (which ES-
ELS call �), the loss of � from a population corresponds to fixation of its absence,
i.e. fixation of �. However, in Rogers’ models, neither of the two cultural vari-
ants represented goes to fixation, under a wide range of parameter values. Rogers’
model and ESELS’ models clearly depend on different assumptions. What are the
assumptions in ESELS’ model that allow culture to disappear? A closely related
question is this: Why not simply switch these labels in ESELS’ model? Then it
would be inevitable that culture would spread with single-parent transmission! I
address these questions in in section 4.
The second implication of ESELS’ argument is that it seems to conflict with real-
world cases of single-parent transmission. Is it really true, empirically, that culture
is rarely maintained through single-parent transmission? To take an example from
the cultures of modern industrialized societies, from how many people did you
learn long division? How many people taught your teacher? Granted, this isn’t
much of an argument: Rather than collecting real data, I’m appealing to anecdotal
evidence. Nevertheless, there is some reason to wonder whether, or how, the real
world might conflict with ESELS’ conclusions. I address these questions in section
6
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F
F
F
asexual reproduction
M
sexual reproduction
M
Figure 3: Biological descendant relations in a species limited to two offspring per
egg-producing organism.
5.
4 Muller’s ratchet
In this section I describe a widely-investigated question concerning the evolution
of sexual reproduction. I then describe Muller’s ratchet, a class of models that are
central to one of several proposed answers to the question. I draw inferences con-
cerning ESELS argument concerning single-parent culture from the close concep-
tual and mathematical parallels between a recent formulation of Muller’s ratchet
and one of ESELS’ models described above.
Sexually reproducing species evolved from asexual species, and in some species,
both kinds of reproduction occur. Even in the case of organisms that simply leave
their eggs behind, producing eggs requires significant energy and material resources,
which limits the number of offspring that females or asexual organisms can pro-
duce. An argument due to Maynard Smith (1978) showed that asexual organisms
can have twice as many grand-offspring as sexually reproducing females, with no
additional energy expenditure. This is illustrated in figure 3. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that each egg-producing organism can produce two offspring in a population
of asexual reproducers. Each organism will then produce four grand-offspring.
If one organism has a new mutation that causes offspring to reproduce sexually,
7
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and produces one male and one female, they must mate to produce offspring, pro-
ducing only two offspring between them. This argument can be generalized (May-
nard Smith, 1978). The upshot is that since sexual reproduction reduces the number
of descendants of an organism by half, it must generate an enormous fitness benefit
in order for it to have been selected for. There are a number of proposed explana-
tions of the benefit of sexual reproduction that are under active investigation (Otto
and Lenormand, 2002). I focus only on Muller’s ratchet, a class of models that show
that in the absence of sexual reproduction and recombination, deleterious (disad-
vantageous) mutations will accumulate in a population and eventually cause its
extinction.
Muller’s ratchet is based on the biologically plausible assumptions that ben-
eficial mutations are rare, that strongly deleterious mutations will quickly be se-
lected out of a population, and that backmutations that undo a mildly deleteri-
ous mutation are improbable. Over time, lineages accumulate different numbers
of mildly deleterious mutations. Since the evolutionary costs of these mutations
are small, lineages with the fewest deleterious mutations will occasionally be lost
due to random genetic drift. At that point, all members of the population have
more deleterious mutations than those fitter members that were lost, so there is
almost no possibility of creating descendants with fewer deleterious mutations.
We say that Muller’s ratchet has clicked. This process gradually leads to the accu-
mulation of deleterious mutations, and ultimately, to the extinction of the popula-
tion. Sexual reproduction with recombination provides an escape from the ratchet,
though. Recombination combines different segments of two individuals’ chromo-
somes in order to produce an offspring’s chromosomes. This allows some offspring
to have fewer deleterious mutations than either of their parents, thus preventing
the inevitable decline of fitness in the population as a whole that would result from
Muller’s ratchet.
8
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Most Muller’s ratchet models (e.g. Haigh 1978) divide the population into classes
of organisms, each with a different number of deleterious mutations. Waxman and
Loewe’s (2010) “truncated Ratchet” model instead has only two classes: The class of
individuals with the fewest deleterious mutations, and a class containing all other
individuals. A click of the ratchet is the loss of the fittest class, and a subset of
the other class then becomes the new fittest class. Let � be the per-organism prob-
ability of a deleterious mutation; 1 − � is then the probability that an individual
will remain in the fittest class. Let � be the average fitness cost from deleterious
mutations due to being in the less fit class of organisms, and 1 − � the fitness of
the members of the fitter class. The probability that a deleterious mutation will be
undone by a backmutation is so small that it’s reasonable to treat it as zero, and we
ignore beneficial mutations as well.
Waxman and Loewe then derive the following frequency �࿅ of the fittest class
in the next generation, starting from the frequency � in the current generation:
�࿅ = (1 − �)�(1 − �) + �(1 − �)� (4)
(It’s not completely straightforward to interpret the components of this formula.)
By equating � and �࿅, Waxman and Loewe derive the equilibrium frequency ̂� of
the fittest class: ̂� = � − ��(1 − �) (5)
I want to compare ESELS’ model with selection and Waxman and Loewe’s model.
Both sets of models have a parameter representing the probability of error-free
transmission. In ESELS’ model, this is Ǣ, the probability of transmitting the cul-
tural variant � without error. In Waxman and Loewe, 1 − � is the probability of
reproduction without a deleterious mutation. Both sets of models also have a pa-
rameter representing the fitness difference between two states. ESELS’ � is the ra-
tio between the fitnesses of a cultural variant � and its absence, �. Waxman and
9
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Loewe instead represent the relationship between fitnesses of the fittest and less fit
classes with a difference parameter � . We can equate the two sets of parameters,
with ESELS’ parameters on the left, and Waxman and Loewe’s on the right:
ESELS Waxman and LoeweǢ = 1 − �� × (fitness of �) = 1
(fitness of �) = 1 − �
When we equate the parameters, it turns out that Waxman and Loewe’s truncated
ratchet is mathematically equivalent to ESELS’ single-parent model with fitness:
Equation (1) is equivalent to equation (4), and equation (2) is equivalent to equation
(5). This close relationship between ESELS’ model and Waxman and Loewe’s trun-
cated ratchet shows that failing to learn from a single cultural parent is so closely
analogous to acquiring a deleterious mutation in an asexual species, that both re-
lationships can be modeled in the same way. Similarly, in either model, the loss of
beneficial characteristics can be avoided by allowing information to be transmitted
from (at least) two parents.
Importantly, the emphasis in Muller’s ratchet models on relations between cer-
tain probabilities highlights similar relations in the ESELS models. As in other
Muller’s ratchet models, Waxman and Loewe’s model makes the probability of a
deleterious mutation (small, but positive) and no mutation (large) significantly dif-
ferent. Importantly, Muller’s ratchet models set the probability of undoing a dele-
terious mutation equal to zero. Analogously, in ESELS’ single-parent model with
with fitness, transmission of a beneficial trait � has a significant probability of fail-
ure, and there is no chance of undoing the loss of � from a lineage. This is what
creates an inevitable loss of culture, just as Muller’s ratchet creates an inevitable
loss of fitter variants. By comparison, Rogers’ (1988) model gives equal probability
10
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to learning either of two cultural variants. Models of that kind are appropriate for
cultural variants that can easily replace each other in a given cultural context. ES-
ELS’ models, on the other hand, seem most appropriate for cultural variants that
are difficult to learn in the first place, and that are readily lost without any replace-
ment.
5 Coherence
I noted above that it seems somewhat plausible that there are cases of single-parent
transmission. In this section I suggest that probabilistic coherence measures in-
spired by C.I. Lewis’s (1946) concept of congruence can, with a slight reinterpreta-
tion, be used to understand how a kind of single-parent cultural transmission—or
at least the illusion of single-parent cultural transmission—can maintain culture
indefinitely.
C.I. Lewis defined his coherence measure, known as congruence, as follows:
A set of statements, or a set of supposed facts asserted, will be said to be
congruent if and only if they are so related that the antecedent probability
of any one of them will be increased if the remainder of the set can be
assumed as given premises. (Lewis, 1946, p. 338)
Two propositions �џ and �ӝ are thus congruent iff:
�(�џ|�ӝ) > �(�џ)�(�ӝ|�џ) > �(�ӝ) .
For two propositions, this relationship can also be captured by requiring that Shogenji’s
(1999) coherence measure �(�џ&�ӝ)�(�џ)�(�ӝ)
be greater than 1.
11
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Lewis’s congruence does not fit all intuitions about the role of coherence in jus-
tification (Olsson, 2005). Olsson (2005) has shown, for coherence measures such
as Shogenji’s, that greater coherence does not consistently imply a higher probabil-
ity of truth of the propositions considered. However, my concern below will not
be with truth-conduciveness. I’ll treat the probabilities above as probabilities of
believing one proposition given believing the other, or more generally, as proba-
bilities of acquiring one cultural variant given the other. This is in effect translates
a justificatory relation into a cognitive or behavioral relation.
In real human cultural transmission, we don’t only learn isolated bits of infor-
mation. Research suggests that we remember and can use what we learn more
effectively if it is systematically related to other things we learn (Bransford and
National Research Council, 2000). Roughly, it helps if different things we learn are
related and mutually supporting.4 I’ll suggest that we can capture some aspects of
this property of human learning with Lewis’s congruence notion, and with vari-
ous extensions of it. In what follows, I’ll focus on the simple case of two cultural
variants �џ and �ӝ that influence each others’ adoption.
First note that ESELS’s arguments can be applied simultaneously to two cultural
variants �џ and �ӝ: If either cultural variant is transmitted only by single cultural
parents, it will eventually be lost from the population. This is true whether the two
variants are both learned from the same parent, or from distinct randomly chosen
parents. Research on learning mentioned above, however, raises the possibility
that some cultural transmission of coherent beliefs might help prevent the loss of
culture. If �џ and �ӝ are congruent, so that each raises the probability of believing
the other, could this prevent the loss of culture? It appears that it can only slow
4Proviso: The research summarized in (Bransford and National Research Council, 2000) seems
to focus only on formal schooling in industrialized societies. Henrich et al. (2010) argue that many
experimental results from industrialized populations do not generalize to all humans.
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down the loss of culture, if both beliefs must be acquired from the same cultural
parent. I’ll explain why.
Suppose that a learner can acquire all or some of the cultural variants possessed
by a randomly chosen cultural parent, where the probability of acquiring any one of
the cultural variants is the same, Ǣ. Suppose also that it’s possible for an individual
to infer (etc.—see below) a missing cultural variant �օ if one has the other cultural
variant. We can capture the probability of such an inference by:
�(�џ|�ӝ) = �(�ӝ|�џ) = Ǥ > 0 . (6)
This is like congruence, or Shogenji’s coherence being greater than 1, since we’re
assuming that the probability of spontaneously acquiring �џ, i.e. �(�џ|¬�ӝ), is zero
(note �(�џ|�ӝ) > �(�џ) iff �(�џ|�ӝ) > �(�џ|¬�ӝ)).5 . These conditional probabil-
ities in effect link �џ and �ӝ, so that if a person fails to acquire one of them, but
acquires the other, she’ll be able to acquire the first anyway, with probability Ǥ. We
can call Ǥ a ”generalized inference probability”, since if �џ and �ӝ are beliefs that
would cause each other to be held due to rational inference, Ǥ is the probability of
inferring one from the other, even though there may be other reasons that adopting
one cultural variant would cause the other to be adopted.
Let’s focus on the best case for using such internal inference processes to main-
tain culture: Let Ǥ be near 1. Then most individuals with either cultural variant will
have the other. Those who have only one of �џ and �ӝ will nevertheless be able to
produce cultural offspring who have both cultural variants. However, with largeǤ, �џ and �ӝ are functioning almost as a unit. The process is roughly the same as
what would happen in ESELS’ single-parent model if we increased the transmis-
sion probability Ǣ: It would take longer for culture to disappear, but it would still
do so, eventually.
5Elsewhere I spell out this point in more detail. Feel to contact the author for a longer exposition.
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Suppose, however, that equation (6) holds, but that the cultural parent for each
of the two cultural variants is chosen independently for each cultural “child”. Dif-
ferent cultural variants are acquired from different cultural parents. Thus the prob-
ability of acquiring one cultural variant (e.g. �џ) given the other (�ӝ) is Ǥ. And as-
sume that the parent-to-child transmission probability for each variant is Ǣ. Then
the probability of acquiring �џ is similar to probability of acquiring � from either
of two cultural parents in equation (3). Let � be the relative frequency of �џ in the
population, and � the relative frequency of �ӝ. Then the frequencies �࿅ of �џ and �࿅
of �ӝ in the next generation are:
�࿅ = 1 − (1 − Ǣ�)(1 − ǤǢ�) = Ǣ� + ǤǢ� − ǤǢӝ�� (7)�࿅ = 1 − (1 − Ǣ�)(1 − ǤǢ�) = Ǣ� + ǤǢ� − ǤǢӝ�� (8)
The first equation, for example, is based on the following reasoning (cf. note 3).
One can acquire �џ directly from the cultural parent chosen to transmit �џ, with
probability Ǣ�, or fail to do so with probability 1 − Ǣ�. Similarly, one can acquire�џ with probability Ǥ from �ӝ if �ӝ was acquired—which happens with probabilityǢ�. So failing to succeed by this path is 1− ǤǢ�. The probability of successful trans-
mission of �џ is then is the probability of failing to fail to acquire �џ by one of the
two probabilistically independent paths.
The dynamics of this model are not identical to those of the simple two-parent
transmission model characterized by equation (3). However, we can simplify the
new model, because iterating equations (7) and (8) quickly causes�џ and�ӝ to have
the same frequency. To see this note that
|�࿅ − �࿅| = | Ǣ� + ǤǢ� − Ǣ� − ǤǢ� | = Ǣ(1 − Ǥ) |� − �| .
But Ǣ(1 − Ǥ) must lie between 0 and 1, so the difference between the frequency �
of �џ and the frequency � of �ӝ shrinks in every generation.6 Thus for the long
6In simulations with a variety of values of Ǣ and Ǥ, � and � come together within 10 or 20 gener-
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term effects of cultural transmission of �џ and �ӝ when the inference probabilityǤ is the same in both directions, we can ignore the difference between their initial
frequencies, and model the change in either frequency as:
�࿅ = 1 − (1 − Ǣ�)(1 − ǤǢ�) (9)
When Ǥ is high, this equation shares with (3) the property that when one fails to
learn a cultural variant from a single chosen cultural parent, another parent is rel-
atively likely to transmit that variant. In this case, however, the transmission from
the second parent is indirect, via the other cultural variant �ӝ (cf. figure 2).
The frequency of �џ (or �ӝ) is at equilibrium when �࿅ − � = 0, i.e. when
0 = (Ǣ� + ǤǢ� − ǤǢӝ�ӝ) − � = �([ǤǢ + Ǣ − 1] − ǤǢӝ�) (10)
The right hand side is equal to zero either when � = 0,7 or when (ǤǢ+Ǣ−1)−ǤǢӝ� =0, i.e. when � has the value: ̂� = ǤǢ + Ǣ − 1ǤǢӝ . (11)
For example, this equilibrium frequency is approximately 0.9 when Ǣ = Ǥ = 0.83.
This equation also shows that the equilibrium is greater than zero iff ǤǢ+Ǣ > 1, i.e.
iff Ǥ > 1 − ǢǢ . (12)
Thus there is a nonzero equilibrium whenever the internal inference probability
is greater than the ratio between the probabilities of direct transmission failure
and success, which holds whenever Ǣ and Ǥ are not too small. When Ǣ and Ǥ are
equal, they must be greater than about 0.62 for the cultural variants to stabilize at
ations, even with initial values � = 0.01 and � = 0.99.
7When � = 0, equation (9) is misleading. If (7) and (8) are allowed to iterate, it’s possible for one
cultural variant, say �ӝ, to begin with frequency � = 0 and still reach a non-zero equilibrium.
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a nonzero value.8
I suggest, then, the fact that some cultural variants—perhaps long division—seem
to be maintained by transmission from single cultural parents, may be due to the
fact that these variants are supported by transmission of other variants from other
cultural parents. Long division, for example, is not learned in a vacuum. A variety
of closely related mathematical concepts are usually learned first, and subsequent
use in other contexts provides additional support for it. Thus it may be that stu-
dents are able to infer, or at least be reminded of, missing steps in long division
when forgotten because of what they learned from multiple cultural parents.
The preceding model considered only two related cultural variants, but real
learning and real culture surely involve more complex relations of support be-
tween variants learned. Lewis’s (1946) concept of congruence, perhaps formalized
as Angere’s (2008) �ճ, allows for probabilistic support involving more proposi-
tions. Shogenji’s (1999) measure of coherence does as well, but in a different way.
Schupbach (2011) extends Shogenji’s measure to make it sensitive to additional re-
lations of probabilistic support. Fitelson’s (2003; 2004) coherence measure reflects
more relations of probabilistic support between conjunctions of propositions in a
given set. It may be that one of these coherence measures, or a related one, though
not designed to capture the degree to which a set of cultural variants allow restora-
tion of one from others, will be useful for characterizing such a property.
Although classic treatments of the role of coherence in epistemology discuss it
in probabilistic terms (Lewis, 1946; BonJour, 1985), the paradigmatic relations un-
derlying the probabilities were usually thought to be, or to be similar to, logical or
explanatory relations (cf. also Lehrer 2000). This makes sense given that coherence
8It can be shown that when �џ and �ӝ have different inference and direct transmission probabil-
ities, a nonzero equilibrium exists iff Ǥǥ > (1−Ǣ)(1−ǣ)/Ǣǣ, where Ǥ and ǥ are inference probabilities
and Ǣ and ǣ are corresponding transmission probabilities (proof available upon request).
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was intended to provide justification for beliefs. In giving ideas from epistemo-
logical models of coherence in a role in cultural transmission, we have to allow a
broader basis for the relevant probabilities, though. When a person comes to adopt
cultural variant �џ because they have previously adopted variant �ӝ, this could be
because both cultural variants are beliefs, and they have noticed that �ӝ helps to
justify �џ. This justificatory relationship might be mediated by a great deal of cul-
tural background belief, however. However, other sorts of relationships between
beliefs may provide the basis for the probabilistic relationship between acquisition
of cultural variants. It may be that given the cultural background that the person
has already adopted, there is some nonlogical resonance felt between �џ and �ӝ.
6 Conclusion
Enquist et al. (2010) argued that culture will usually disappear unless individuals
learn from multiple “cultural parents”. The conceptual and mathematical analogy
of one of ESELS’ models to Waxman and Loewe’s truncated Muller’s ratchet model
clarified that ESELS’ models make the assumptions, unusual among cultural trans-
mission models, that transmission probabilities very assymetric, and that once a
person loses a cultural variant, it can never come back among cultural “descen-
dants”. This crucial assumption makes ESELS’ models relevant to cultural vari-
ants that are difficult to learn socially—so that they may not be learned at all—and
difficult to learn individually. Modeling relations between cultural variants using
ideas from probabilistic measures of coherence in epistemology provides a way of
modeling the influence of one cultural variant on another. This allows the learning
of �ӝ from single parents to help maintain �џ in the population, even if �џ is it-
self only learned from single parents. Coherence in this sense captures what might
be called “inferential robustness”: the ability to infer or otherwise learn cultural
17
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variants through multiple, redundant paths (Wimsatt, 2007). This way of thinking
about coherence may also be relevant to epistemology.
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Going against the Grain: Functionalism and Generalization in 
Cognitive Science 
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Abstract: Functionalism is widely regarded as the central doctrine in the philosophy 
of cognitive science, and is invoked by philosophers of cognitive science to settle 
disputes over methodology and other puzzles. I describe a recent dispute over 
extended cognition in which many commentators appeal to functionalism. I then 
raise an objection to functionalism as it figures in this dispute, targeting the 
assumption that generality and abstraction are tightly correlated. Finally, I argue that 
the new mechanist framework offers more realistic resources for understanding 
cognitive science, and hence is a better source of appeal for resolving disagreement 
in philosophy of science. 
 
Word count: 4,985 words including abstract, headings, footnotes, and references. 
 
1 Introduction. Functionalism is the doctrine that mental or cognitive states are functional states, 
whose identity conditions are articulable in terms of their characteristic inputs, outputs, and relations 
to other intermediate states. Functionalism was established as a central doctrine in the philosophy of 
cognitive science in the 1960s (Putnam 1967a, b, Fodor 1968), and though it has become less central 
to much contemporary discussion (Chemero & Silberstein 2008) it retains the notoriety of an 
orthodoxy in philosophy of mind (Buechner 2011) and in contemporary philosophy of cognitive 
science (Eliasmith 2002, Clark 2008, Sprevak 2009, Chalmers 2011). This remains true even though 
functionalism has been an embattled doctrine for decades (Block & Fodor 1972, Block 1980, Shagrir 
2005, Godfrey-Smith 2008), has proliferated versions and variations (Levin 2013, Maley & Piccinini 
MS), and even though the canonical argument for functionalism—the argument from multiple 
realizability—has been subjected to a variety of criticisms (Batitsky 1998, Bechtel & Mundale 1999). 
This is all, importantly, to say nothing of other views that happen, unhappily, to be called 
“functionalism” in biology or in pre-behaviorist psychology (Cummins 1975, Sober 1985, Chemero 
2009) but which have different intellectual lineages. My discussion concerns only Putnam’s machine 
functionalism and derivative views. The persistence of functionalism is hardly a special case. It is the 
fate of many “received views,” such as the belief-desire model of intentional action or the deductive-
nomological model of explanation, to remain central to a literature despite decades of convincing 
criticism so long as there is no sufficiently dominant successor. The new mechanist view of 
explanation (Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000, Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, Craver 2007) has 
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recently achieved this status in the philosophies of the biological sciences, supplanting the deductive-
nomological model and other law-subsumption models as a received view of explanation in those 
sciences. This is not to say that new mechanism is correct or uncontroversial, only that it has 
replaced other models of explanation as the primary target of interpretation and criticism. 
Bearing in mind the tenacity of received views, my aim in this paper is not to simply poke 
more holes in the sinking ship of functionalism. Rather, I aim to promote an alternative vessel for 
philosophers of mind and cognitive science to pilot through choppy waters. To this end I will raise a 
“grain” objection to functionalism, based on the relationship between generalization and “fineness-
of-grain.” This objection is not a knock-down argument against all varieties or uses of functionalism. 
However, it needn’t be, since functionalism is a sinking ship, and since my objection does apply to 
versions of functionalism that figure in notorious, recent disputes in the philosophy of cognitive 
science. I shall take as my example the controversy over extended cognition, especially its recent 
high-profile epicycle concerning the relation between extended cognition and functionalism (Rupert 
2004, Clark 2008, Sprevak 2009). In the last section I will argue that new mechanism provides better 
resources for understanding variation between models in cognitive science, and for understanding 
the practice of generalization. In particular, mechanism is not vulnerable to the grain objection. I do 
not claim, of course, that mechanism is free from criticism or worries or that I have made clear what 
was once obscure. My aim, rather, is to motivate a change of focus in discussions of cognitive 
science from functionalism to mechanism. 
 
2 Functionalism and Extended Cognition. Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) notoriously 
claim that cognition (like meaning) ain’t all in the head. They argue that in certain cases the use of 
external props in some activities—a computer processor while playing some video games, one’s 
notebook in carrying out one’s plans for the day, perhaps one’s partner in remembering past 
events—is such that those props should be considered parts of one’s own cognitive economy, 
similarly to parts of one’s brain. This claim has become known as the hypothesis of extended 
cognition (HEC). The most famous example concerns Otto, an older gentleman with a bad memory 
who uses a notebook to help him remember facts and plans.1 In their argument, Clark and Chalmers 
appeal to what has become known as the “parity principle,” which states that 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it 
done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of a cognitive 
process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. 
(Clark & Chalmers 1998, 8) 
                                                     
1 The Otto example is originally an illustration not of extended cognition but of the extended mind, which is a distinct 
claim. Although this distinction is essential for charitably evaluating Clark and Chalmers’ arguments, it is almost always 
ignored in the critical literature (even by Clark). Since I am not evaluating HEC here, I will ignore the distinction for ease 
of exposition. 
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One way to interpret this principle is as a corollary of functionalism: cognitive states are individuated 
by their functional relations (to inputs, outputs, and each other), and it is immaterial whether their 
realizers are located inside the brain or outside the body.2 Thus, activities should count as cognitive 
processes if those body-external processes exhibit the same functional relationships (to inputs, 
outputs, and cognitive states) as other processes that we already happily consider cognitive 
processes. Of course, understood this way the parity principle only justifies a commitment to 
extended cognition if the functional relations are specified so that body-external activities and props 
do satisfy those specifications, and many cognitive and psychological processes can be specified in a 
variety of ways. Robert Rupert argues that Otto’s notebook in the famous example cannot serve as a 
memory in part because it fails to satisfy the most fruitful functional description of human memory. 
Cognitive psychologists have documented many features of human memory—for example 
susceptibility to interference effects, generation effects, and conformity to the Rescorla-Wagner law 
(see Rupert 2004, 413–419). Since Otto’s external “memory” does not exhibit these effects the parity 
principle does not license the attribution to Otto of extended cognitive processes (Rupert 2004). 
Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa (2001) argue for the same conclusion because Otto’s use of his 
notebook must be described via inter alia relations to perceptual and motor intermediaries (he flips 
through the notebook, reads it, &c.), whereas canonical examples of internal memory are not related 
to perceptual and motor activities in the same way. 
Mark Sprevak calls these objections the RAA (for Rupert, Adams, and Aizawa) objections. 
Sprevak suggests that “All varieties of functionalism contain a parameter that controls how finely or 
coarsely functional roles should be specified (how much should be abstracted and ignored)” 
(Sprevak 2009, 510). He observes that RAA trade on fine-grained differences between Otto’s use of 
his notebook and canonical examples of memory. A coarse-grained functional description of 
memory might simply describe the relations between past perceptions and actions and future 
behaviour, but not describe memory as e.g. exhibiting interference or generation effects, or as 
obeying the Rescorla-Wagner law. Fine-grained functional descriptions may specify these relations, 
but are objectionable because they conflict with the common intuition that there could be Martians 
who have cognitive processes but whose cognitive architecture is distinctly different from ours. Such 
Martians, unlike us, may not exhibit interference or generation effects, and may even store 
information by manipulating ink-marks on paper inside of their brains, and retrieve it by reading the 
marks back with photosensitive organs. The “Martian intuition” is that while this is an alien form of 
memory, it is memory nonetheless. Since such Martians have memory, and their memory may have 
the same fine-grained functional description as Otto’s use of his notebook, the parity principle 
demands that we consider Otto’s a case of extended cognition. Thus Sprevak argues that 
functionalism implies HEC. 
Unfortunately for the defenders of HEC, however, Sprevak argues that coarse-grained 
functional descriptions are no more acceptable, for the parity principle is less restrictive than Clark 
and Chalmers anticipate. Since we can imagine far-fetched Martian minds, the parity principle 
                                                     
2 This is accepted by most of Clark and Chalmers’ critics (Adams & Aizawa 2001, Rupert 2004, Sprevak 2009), and is 
almost certainly not the best interpretation of the parity principle. 
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licenses a radical form of HEC. For example, we might imagine Martian minds that are embedded 
with factual information that must be retrieved with effort, so that this process has functional parity 
with the activity of looking up information in a library. Such possibilities seem to license radical 
cases of extended cognition: that contents of volumes in a library are beliefs of any person in the 
library, or that being in possession of a graphing calculator gives one a knowledge of integral 
calculus (517–518). These consequences, Sprevak argues, are absurd, and justify a reductio of radical 
HEC and, since it entails radical HEC, of functionalism. 
 
3 Going against the Grain. The dispute over HEC is not seen by its partisans as an idle 
philosophical discussion, but as a battle for the soul of cognitive science. If HEC is true, it is 
claimed, it has dramatic consequences for the way cognitive scientists conduct their research. Hence, 
both defenses and criticisms of HEC draw on empirical results and claims about theory-choice in 
science (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998, Rupert 2004, Adams & Aizawa 2008, Clark 2008, Rowlands 
2010). The fact that so many of the arguments concerning HEC trade on interpretations of 
functionalism reveals the belief of many that functionalism provides a suitable framework for 
understanding cognitive scientific models. Disagreements about HEC force a discussion of what 
precisely the laws of cognitive science are—both what their proprieties are with respect to 
generalization, and what phenomena should be investigated and accommodated in order to 
construct those laws. In Putnam-style functionalism, functional descriptions (i.e. via Ramsey 
sentences, cf. Lewis 1972) operate as laws characterizing mental states. Putnam’s proposal aspires 
explicitly to generalization over diverse kinds of system—e.g. about pain in primates and also in 
cephalopods. The arguments that arise in connection with the RAA objections to HEC concern 
whether descriptions of e.g. memory generalize over head-internal vehicles and extended vehicles 
(like Otto’s notebook-use). 
Like Clark and Sprevak, Hilary Putnam is wary of psychological chauvinism (human-
specificity). A type-physicalist account of pain (Place 1956, Smart 1959), like the simplistic 
conjecture that pain is the activation of C-fibers, denies without motivation that animals that lack C-
fibers have pain-states. In Putnam’s canonical argument for functionalism, functionalism achieves 
generality by proposing abstracted descriptions that omit physiological and other details. Sprevak’s grain 
parameter makes this maneuver more explicit by proposing a continuum of descriptions that are 
increasingly abstract, in the sense of omitting detail, and therefore increasingly general. (Some may 
object to the use of the word “abstract” as the complement of “detailed,” rather than of “concrete.” 
However, Sprevak uses the word this way and there is ample precedent for his doing so (Levy & 
Bechtel 2013).) Consider a toy functional description of pain: pain is caused by tissue damage, and 
causes stress, increased metabolic activity, and evasion of the damaging stimulus. This description 
denotes processes in a variety of complex organisms, including cephalopods (which lack C-fibers). 
Elements can be added to this description to make it more fine-grained, and to denote processes in 
progressively more restricted classes of organisms. For example, if pain also tends to cause excited 
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vocalization, then creatures like cephalopods which do not vocalize will not satisfy this more fine-
grained description of pain. 
However, Sprevak’s grain parameter is not an effective way of capturing variation between 
cognitive models. In the space of models that cognitive scientists actually produce, generality-
specificity and abstraction-detail are independent dimensions of variation. By way of example, I shall 
mention two cognitive models in which generality and abstraction are dissociated. The first, the 
motor theory of speech perception (Liberman et al. 1967, Liberman & Mattingly 1985), is quite 
abstract but highly specific to humans. The motor theory claims that “perceiving speech is 
perceiving gestures,” and more specifically that the recognition of phonemes and words in natural 
language is mediated by processing in the motor system, namely motor processing that also governs 
the articulation of speech in the vocal tract. There are animals other than humans that can identify 
phonemes and words—dogs commonly learn to recognize some words, and chinchillas have been 
trained to distinguish natural language phonemes (Kuhl & Miller 1978)—but since they do not have 
the relevant vocal capacities they most likely exhibit this capacity exclusively by recognizing auditory 
patterns, whereas humans do not. Nevertheless, the motor theory is quite abstract—it specifies that 
speech perception depends on structures that govern vocalization. While there are more detailed 
claims about how this dependency manifests in humans (e.g. McGurk & MacDonald 1976), all of 
them are consistent with the motor theory.  
On the other hand, feature-detector models of vision (e.g. Barlow 1953, Hubel & Wiesel 
1962) are detailed, but general. Even normalization-based models of feature-detection in particular 
(Heeger 1992, Carandini & Heeger 1994), which are described by Mazviita Chirimuuta (2014), are 
quite general. These models describe sensitivity to contrasts, edges, &c. in early stages of visual 
processing, and unify evidence about the receptive fields of individual neurons as well as 
computational models of their response dynamics. On Heeger’s normalization model, neurons in 
visual cortex respond linearly to excitatory input from the lateral geniculate nucleus, but inhibit each 
other “laterally” according to an equation. The terms of the equation stand for properties and 
activities of individual neurons and populations of neurons. This model can be integrated into 
conjectures about the gross architecture of visual cognition (Marr 1982), and features in the 
“standard model” of primary visual cortex (Rust & Movshon 2005). However, even without 
supplementation with other models of visual processing the normalization model makes quantitative 
predictions about neuronal activity and has a well-specified physiological interpretation. 
Nevertheless, despite the level of detail in contemporary feature-detector models, they do not apply 
only to humans. Early evidence for normalization was gathered largely from cats and frogs, and the 
models may generalize to all vertebrate vision. 
I am sympathetic to Sprevak’s conclusion that functionalism is false, however functionalism 
is in worse shape than he acknowledges. His argument presupposes that we can manipulate 
abstraction from detail like the mesh of a sieve to sift the chauvinistic cognitive models from the 
liberal models. However, the motor theory of speech perception and feature-detector models of 
visual processing illustrate the double dissociation between abstraction from detail and generality 
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over diverse kinds of cognitive systems. If the grain parameter is supposed to track degrees of 
abstraction from detail, then it fails to simultaneously track generalizability in cognitive models. If it 
is meant to track both, it fails to accurately capture the variation in cognitive models. Either way it 
incorporates false presuppositions about the character of the variety in cognitive models. 
 
4 Generality without Laws. The problems with functionalism that are made explicit in the “grain” 
objection are inherited from the covering-law view of explanation and generalization that was 
popular throughout the twentieth century. On that conception, generalization is achieved by 
subsuming many phenomena under a common description (expressing a “covering law”). However, 
the covering-law view has in recent years been supplanted by the new mechanist view of 
explanation, at least in the biological sciences. The mechanists hold that many scientific 
explanations, including a preponderance of explanations in the biological sciences, are achieved by 
specifying models of mechanisms. The extension of the mechanist view to cognitive science requires 
the suppression of certain controversial assumptions developed for biological contexts (especially 
certain assumptions of Craver 2007, see Weiskopf 2011, Chirimuuta 2014), but not all mechanists 
make these assumptions (cf. Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000, Bechtel 2008). 
Let us suppose that the primary explananda of cognitive science are intelligent behaviors or 
cognitive capacities. Intelligent behavior is behavior that is sensitive to the circumstances of an 
organism and that can be rationalized by its relation to a goal of the organism; cognitive capacities 
are those that are exhibited in intelligent behavior. A cognitive mechanism, then, is a structure of 
component entities and component operations that are organized such that they produce intelligent 
behavior (adapted from Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000, Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, Craver 
2007). The entities that figure in cognitive mechanisms are things like representations, modules, 
brain areas, populations of neurons, or idealized “neurons” in artificial neural networks. 
Characteristic operations in cognitive mechanisms are processing operations on or between those 
entities: transformations of representations, computational interactions between modules and brain 
areas, activation and inhibition of neuron populations, and interactions between artificial neurons as 
specified by connection weights. The organization of these entities and operations into mechanisms 
is usually represented by graphs, but can be specified more or less completely by groups of equations 
or descriptions of relations between components. Cognitive models are models of how mechanisms 
produce cognitive capacities (possibly or actually), and functional roles can be assigned to 
components of the models according to how those components contribute to the mechanism’s 
production of that capacity (roughly as described in Cummins 1975). Cummins-style functional 
roles, however, are not functional descriptions; they describe a component’s contribution to a 
capacity rather than conferring identity conditions in virtue of relations to input, outputs and 
intermediate states, and are thus independent from Putnam-style functionalism (see Craver 2001 for 
a discussion of Cummins-functions and neo-mechanism). 
If the mechanist framework is to overcome functionalism’s difficulties with generalization, it 
must provide an alternative to the covering-law framework, or even a covering-model framework 
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(Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, Craver 2007, 66–70). After all, it is now widely believed that the 
biological and social sciences have no true laws. William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen (2005) 
suggest that mechanistic explanations are generalizable not because the target systems are identical in 
the relevant respects, but because they are similar: 
The need to invoke similarity relations to generalize mechanistic explanations seems 
to be a limitation of the mechanistic account. But in fact it may be the mechanistic 
account that provides a better characterization of how explanations are generalized 
in many sciences. Laws are generalized by being universally quantified and their 
domain of applicability is specified by the conditions in their antecedents. On this 
account, no instance better exemplifies the law than any other. But in actual 
investigations of mechanisms, scientists often focus on a specific exemplar when first 
developing their accounts. (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, 438) 
The claim that generalization is based on similarity to exemplars is less satisfying than the picture of 
subsumption under a covering law. Bechtel and Abrahamsen’s claims do little to constrain the 
practice of licit generalization, and their observation that scientists “seem to have an intuitive sense” 
of how to generalize is distinctly unsatisfying (ibid). However, given the lack of universal or 
exceptionless laws in the biological sciences, a more complicated conception of generality is needed. 
The need to be more specific about “similarity”-based generalization is not a drawback of the 
mechanist framework, but a demand for further research by philosophers of science. 
The mechanist framework offers richer resources than functionalism for constrained 
similarity-comparisons. First, mechanism models are more structured than functional descriptions. 
Functional descriptions might be structured according to independent predicates or conjuncts inside 
the scope of the quantifier in a Ramsey sentence. In comparing two mechanisms, one can appeal to 
similarities and differences between the sets of entities, of operations, their properties, or in their 
organization. Importantly, the result of such comparisons is not a judgment that mechanisms 
described by different models are simply the same or different, but that they are similar in certain 
respects and dissimilar in others. Frequently, a model may apply but with modifications, with the 
consequence that insights are gained both for the new and for the original target systems. For 
example, the two visual streams hypothesis (Milner & Goodale 2006) was developed for primate 
visual systems, primarily with data from humans and macaques, but comparisons of primates and 
other organisms such as frogs enrich the model (see e.g. Goodale & Humphrey 1998, 183–185) and 
provide a framework around which similar models can be developed for most vertebrates 
(Jeannerod & Jacob 2005, 301). Generalization here is achieved through comparisons to exemplars 
with acknowledgement of differences, not subsumption under a common description. This is 
mechanistic generalization by, if you like, functional similarity, but not functional identity in 
Putnam’s sense. Since similarity-based generalization like this does not presuppose that generality 
and abstraction from detail are correlated. Thus the motor theory of speech perception and the 
normalization model of visual feature-detection are not anomalies in the mechanist framework. 
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It might be possible to provide similarity-based generalizations of functionally-individuated 
kinds, but such a strategy is not pursued by those who appeal to functionalism in order to settle 
other questions in philosophy of cognitive science. For example, the strategy is not pursued by 
Adams and Aizawa, Rupert, or Sprevak in their criticism of HEC, who instead seek categorical 
descriptions of mental or cognitive processes. Clark and Chalmers appeal to a relatively abstract 
specification of memory to argue that Otto’s notebook functions as a part of his memory. RAA 
appeal to relatively detailed specifications of memory to argue that he does not. An ecumenically-
minded theorist might suggest that alternative specifications—some detailed and some abstract—
delineate various dimensions of similarity and difference between paradigmatic memory and Otto’s 
notebook-augmented memory. However, such a proposal must specify how membership is decided 
for the set of admissible descriptions for a term. The main products of cognitive scientific research 
(apart from philosophical research) are models, not functional descriptions. The mechanist 
framework provides a more natural resource for appeal in philosophy of cognitive science than an 
unarticulated successor to functionalism. In general the place for functionalism as a resource for 
appeal in philosophy must be reevaluated.  
 
5 Conclusion. My intention in this paper was to show that the assumptions of functionalism are 
inappropriate for thinking clearly about cognitive science. To this end I described some discussion 
of the RAA objections to HEC, and claimed that Sprevak’s “grain parameter” makes explicit an 
assumption that features in the motivating arguments for functionalism: that abstraction from detail 
and generality are correlated features of cognitive models. This assumption is false, so functionalism 
is an inappropriate framework for characterizing cognitive models and for settling disputes about 
cognitive science, like the dispute over HEC, that turn on generality. I suggested, following a 
suggestion by Bechtel and Abrahamsen, that where the functionalist framework hides the 
complexity in cognitive scientists’ practice of generalization, the mechanist literature provides a more 
fruitful framework for exploring that complexity. I have not argued that mechanism settles whether 
HEC is true or false. However, if disagreements about HEC are to be a battle for the soul of 
cognitive science, the proper battleground is over what kinds of mechanisms are cognitive ones, not 
over functionalist descriptions of mental states (cf. Walter 2010). The mechanist framework does 
not provide us with resources for determining the identity conditions of cognitive phenomena like 
belief and memory, as the functionalist framework does. However, cognitive scientists do not take 
conformity to their models as a criterion of exhibiting a phenomenon. For example, psychologists 
do not claim that exhibiting interference effects is a necessary condition on memory. That a system 
does not exhibit interference effects implies that memory models that do exhibit such effects must 
be modified in order to be generalized to that target system, not that the target system lacks genuine 
memory. It is therefore peculiarly contentious for philosophers to appeal to these models in order to 
settle the identity conditions for cognitive phenomena under the guise of being scientific. The 
contentious nature of this form of argument is no doubt obscured by the common belief that 
functionalism is an orthodoxy of cognitive science.   
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Abstract
The Doomsday argument and anthropic arguments are illustrations of a paradox.
In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since
they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, the paradox constitutes a challenge
to Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made to avoid these
conclusions, but some versions of the paradox cannot be dissolved within the framework
of orthodox Bayesianism. I show that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic
reasoning allows for a more adequate representation of ignorance in Bayesian reasoning,
and explains away these puzzles.
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1 Introduction
The Doomsday paradox and the appeal to anthropic bounds to solve the cosmological con-
stant problem are two examples of puzzles of probabilistic confirmation. These arguments
both make ‘cosmic’ predictions: the former gives us a probable end date for humanity, and
the second a probable value of the vacuum energy density of the universe. They both seem
to allow one to draw unwarranted conclusions from a lack of knowledge, and yet one way
of formulating them makes them a straightforward application of Bayesianism. They call
for a framework of inductive logic that allows one to represent ignorance better than what
can be achieved by orthodox Bayesianism, so as to block these conclusions.
1.1 The Doomsday paradox
The Doomsday argument is a family of arguments about humanity’s likely survival.1 There
are mainly two versions of the argument discussed in the literature, both of which appeal
to a form of Copernican principle (or principle of typicality or mediocrity). A first version
of the argument endorsed by, e.g., John Leslie (1990) dictates a probability shift in favor
of theories that predict earlier end dates for our species, assuming that we are a typical—
rather than atypical—member of that group.
The other main version of the argument, often referred to as the ‘delta-t argument’,
was given by Richard Gott (1993) and has provoked both outrage and genuine scientific
interest.2 It claims to allow one to make a prediction about the total duration of any process
of indefinite duration based only on the assumption that the moment of observation is
randomly selected. A variant of this argument, which gives equivalent predictions, reasons
1See, e.g., (Bostrom, 2002, §6-7), (Richmond, 2006) for reviews.
2See, e.g., (Goodman, 1994) for opprobrium and (Wells, 2009; Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2006) for
praise.
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in terms of random sampling of one’s rank in a sequential process (Gott, 1994).3 The
argument goes as follows:
Let r be my birth rank (i.e., I am the rth human to be born), and N the total number
of humans that will ever be born.
1. Assume that there is nothing special about my rank r. Following the principle of
indifference, for all r, the probability of r conditional on N is p(r|N) =
1
N
.
2. Assume the following improper prior probability distribution4 for N : p(N) =
k
N
. k
is a normalizing constant, whose value doesn’t matter.
3. This choice of distributions p(r|N) and p(N) gives us the prior distribution p(r):
p(r) =
∫ N=∞
N=r
p(r|N)p(N) dN =
∫ N=∞
N=r
k
N2
dN =
k
r
.
4. Then, Bayes’s theorem gives us
p(N |r) =
p(r|N) · p(N)
p(r)
=
r
N2
,
which favors small N .
To find an estimate with a confidence α, we solve p(N ≤ x|r) = α for x, with p(N ≤
x|r) =
∫ x
r
p(N |r) dN . Upon learning r, we are able to make a prediction about N with a
3The latter version doesn’t violate the reflection principle—entailed by conditionalization—according
to which an agent ought to have now a certain credence in a given proposition if she is certain she will have
it at a later time (Monton and Roush, 2001).
4As Gott (1994) recalls, this choice of prior is fairly standard (albeit contentious) in statistical analysis.
It’s the Jeffreys prior for the unbounded parameter N , such that p(N) dN ∝ d lnN ∝
dN
N
. This means
that the probability for N to be in any logarithmic interval is the same. This prior is called improper
because it is not normalizable, and it is usually argued that it is justified when it yields a normalizable
posterior.
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95%-level confidence. Here, we have p(N ≤ 20r|r) = 0.95. That is, we have:
p(N > 20r|r) < 5%.
This result should strike us as surprising: we shouldn’t be able to learn something from
nothing! Indeed, according to that argument, we can make a prediction for N based only
on knowing our rank r and on not knowing anything about the probability of r conditional
on N , i.e., on being indifferent—or equally uncommitted—about any value it may take.
If N is unbounded (possibly infinite), an appeal to our typical position (reflected in the
choice of likelihood in the argument above) shouldn’t allow us to make any prediction at
all about N , and yet it does.
1.2 Anthropic reasoning in cosmology
Another probabilistic argument that claims to allow one to make a prediction from a lack of
knowledge is commonly used in cosmology, in particular to solve the cosmological constant
problem (i.e., explain the value of the vacuum energy density ρV ). This parameter presents
physicists with two main problems:5
1. The time coincidence problem: we happen to live at the brief epoch—by cosmological
standards—of the universe’s history when it is possible to witness the transition from
the domination of matter and radiation to vacuum energy (ρM ∼ ρV ).
2. There is a large discrepancy—of 120 order of magnitudes—between the (very small)
observed values of ρV and the (very large) values suggested by particle-physics mod-
els.
5See (Carroll, 2000; Sola`, 2013) for an overview of the cosmological constant problem.
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Anthropic selection effects (i.e., our sampling bias as observers existing at a certain time
and place and in a universe that must allow the existence of life) have been used to explain
both problems. In the absence of satisfying explanations, anthropic selection effects make
the coincidence less unexpected, and account for the discrepancy between observations and
possible expectations from available theoretical background. But there is no known reason
why having ρM ∼ ρV should matter to the advent of life.
Weinberg and his collaborators (Weinberg, 1987, 2000; Martel et al., 1998), among
others, proposed anthropic bounds on the possible values of ρV . Furthermore, they argued
that anthropic considerations may have a stronger, predictive role. The idea is that we
should conditionalize the probability of different values of ρV on the number of observers
they allow: the most likely value of ρV is the one that allows for the largest number of
galaxies (taken as a proxy for the number of observers).6 The probability measure for ρV
is then as follows:
dp(ρV ) = ν(ρV ) · p⋆(ρV ) dρV ,
where p⋆(ρ) dρV is the prior probability distribution, and ν(ρV ) the average number of
galaxies which form for ρV .
By assuming that there is no known reason why the likelihood of ρV should be special at
the observed value, and because the allowed range of ρV is very far from what we would ex-
pect from available theories, Weinberg and his collaborators argued that it is reasonable to
assume that the prior probability distribution is constant within the anthropically allowed
range, so that dp(ρV ) can be calculated as proportional to ν(ρV ) dρV (Weinberg, 2000, 2).
Weinberg then predicted that the value of ρV would be close to the mean value in that
range (assumed to yield the largest number of observers). This “principle of mediocrity”,
as Vilenkin (1995) called it, assumes that we are typical observers.
6This assumption is contentious (see, e.g., (Aguirre, 2001) for an alternative proposal).
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Thus, anthropic considerations not only help establish the prior probability distribution
for ρV by providing bounds, but they also allow one to make a prediction regarding its ob-
served value. The initial uniform distribution is turned into a prediction—a sharply peaked
distribution around a preferred value—for ρV . This method has yielded predictions for ρV
only a few orders of magnitudes apart from the observed value.7 This improvement—from
120 orders of magnitude to only a few—has been seen by their proponents as vindicating
anthropically-based approaches.
1.3 The problem: Ex nihilo nihil fit
The two examples of this section—the Doomsday argument and anthropic reasoning—
share a similar structure: 1) a uniform prior probability distribution reflects an initial
state of ignorance or indifference, and 2) an appeal to typicality or mediocrity is used to
make a prediction. This is puzzling: these two assumptions (of indifference and typicality)
are meant to express neutrality, and yet from them alone we seem to be getting a lot of
information. But assuming neutrality alone should not allow us to learn anything!
If anthropic considerations were only able to provide us with one bound (either lower
or upper bound), then the argument used to make a prediction about the vacuum energy
density ρV would be formally identical to Gott’s 1993 ‘delta-t argument’: without knowing
anything about, say, a parameter’s upper bounded, a uniform prior probability distribution
over all possible ranges and the appeal to typicality of the observed value favors lower values
for that parameter.
I will briefly review several approaches taken to dispute the validity of the results
obtained from these arguments. We will see that, because dropping the assumption of
typicality isn’t enough to avoid these paradoxical conclusions, it is a more adequate rep-
7The median value of the distribution obtained by such anthropic prediction is about 20 times the
observed value ρobsV (Pogosian et al., 2004).
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -38-
Y. Bene´treau-Dupin Blurring Out Cosmic Puzzles 7 of 20
resentation of ignorance or indifference that we should pursue. I wish to show that, when
dealing with events we are completely ignorant about, one can use an imprecise, Bayesian-
friendly framework that better handles ignorance, and avoids the paradoxical, uncomfort-
able consequences of the Doomsday argument, and better models the limited role anthropic
considerations can play for the cosmological constant problem.
2 Typicality, indifference, neutrality
2.1 How crucial to those arguments is the assumption of typicality?
The appeal to typicality is central to Gott’s ‘delta-t argument’, Leslie’s version of the
Doomsday argument, and Weinberg’s prediction. This assumption has generated much
of the philosophical discussion about the Doomsday paradox in particular. Nick Bostrom
(2002) offered a challenge to what he calls the Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA), according
to which “one should reason as if one were a random sample from the set of all observers
in one’s reference class.” In order to avoid the consequence of the Doomsday argument,
Bostrom suggested to adopt what he calls the Self-Indicating Assumption (SIA): “Given
the fact that you exist, you should (other things equal) favor hypotheses according to which
many observers exist over hypotheses on which few observers exist.” (op. cit.) But as he
noted himself (Bostrom, 2002, 122-126), this SIA is not acceptable as a general principle.
Indeed, as Dieks (1992) summarized:
Such a principle would entail, e.g., the unpalatable conclusion that armchair
philosophizing would suffice for deciding between cosmological models that pre-
dict vastly different chances for the development of human civilization.The in-
finity of the universe would become certain a priori.
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The biggest problem with Doomsday-type arguments resting on the SSA is that their
conclusion depends on the choice of reference class. What constitutes “one’s reference class”
seems entirely arbitrary or ill-defined: is my reference class that of all humans, mammals,
philosophers, etc.? Anthropic predictions can be the object of a similar criticism: the value
of the cosmological constant most favorable to the existence of life (as we know it) may not
be the same as that most favorable to the existence of intelligent observers, which might
be definable indifferent ways.
Relatedly, Dieks (1992) and Radford Neal (2006) showed that a careful examination of
the role of indexical information in the formulation of the Doomsday argument allows one to
avoid its unpleasant conclusion. In particular, Neal (2006) argued that conditionalizing on
non-indexical information (i.e., all the information at the disposal of the agent formulating
the Doomsday argument, including all their memories) reproduces the effects of assuming
both SSA and SIA. Indeed, conditionalizing on the probability that an observer with all
their non-indexical information exists (which is higher for a later Doomsday, and highest if
there is no Doomsday at all) blocks the consequence of the Doomsday argument, without
invoking such ad hoc principles, and avoids the reference-class problem.
Although full non-indexical conditioning cancels out the effects of Leslie’s Doomsday
argument (and, similarly, anthropic predictions), it is not clear that it also allows one to
avoid the conclusion of Gott’s version of the Doomsday argument. Neal (2006, 20) dismisses
Gott’s argument because it rests only on an “unsupported” assumption of typicality. There
are indeed no good reasons to endorse typicality a priori (see, e.g., Hartle and Srednicki,
2007). One might then hope that not assuming typicality would suffice to dissolve these
cosmic puzzles. Irit Maor et al. (2008) showed for instance that without it, anthropic
considerations don’t allow one to really make predictions about the cosmological constant,
beyond just providing unsurprising boundaries, namely, that the value of the cosmological
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constant must be such that life is possible.
My approach in this paper, however, will not be to question the assumption of typicality
in either of these cosmic puzzles. Indeed, in Gott’s version of the Doomsday paradox, we
would obtain a prediction even if we didn’t assume typicality. Consider the formulation
of Gott’s argument using an improper prior (§1.1 infra). Now, instead of assuming, a
flat probability distribution for our rank r conditional on the total number of humans
N
(
p(r|N) = 1
N
)
, let’s assume a non-uniform distribution. For instance, let’s assume a
distribution that favors our being born in humanity’s timeline’s first decile (i.e., one that
peaks around r = 0.1 × N). We would then obtain a different prediction for N than if
we had assumed one that peaks around r = 0.9 × N . This reasoning, however, yields an
unsatisfying result if taken to the limit: if we assume a likelihood probability distribution
for r conditional on N sharply peaked at r = 0, we would still obtain a prediction for N
upon learning r, (see Fig. 1).8
Therefore, in Gott’s Doomsday argument, we would obtain a prediction at any confidence-
level, whatever assumption we make as to our typicality or atypicality, and we would even
obtain one if we assume N →∞. Thus, assuming typicality or not will not allow us to avoid
the conclusion of Gott’s Doomsday argument. Consequently, it is toward the question of
a probabilistic representation of ignorance that I will now turn my attention.
2.2 A neutral principle of indifference?
One could hope that a more adequate prior probability distribution—one that better re-
flects our ignorance and is normalizable—may prevent the conclusion of these cosmic puz-
zles (especially Gott’s Doomsday argument). The idea that a uniform probability distri-
bution is not a satisfying representation of ignorance is nothing new; this discussion is
8Tegmark and Bostrom (2005) used a similar reasoning to derive an upper bound on the likelihood of
a Doomsday catastrophe.
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Figure 1: Posterior probability distributions for N conditional on r, obtained for r = 100
and assuming different likelihood distributions for r conditional on N (i.e., with different
assumptions as to our relative place in humanity’s timeline), which each peaks at different
values τ = r
N
. The lowermost curve corresponds to a likelihood distribution that peaks at
τ → 0, i.e., if we assume N →∞.
as old as the principle of indifference itself.9 Indeed, a uniform probability distribution
is unable to fulfill invariance requirements that one should expect of a representation of
ignorance or indifference. As argued by John Norton (2010), a representation of ignorance
or indifference
- cannot be additive (and therefore does not obey the laws of probability),
- cannot be represented by the degrees of a one-dimensional continuum, such as the
reals in [0, 1],
- must be invariant under redescription,
9See, e.g., (Syversveen, 1998) for a short review on the problem of representing non-informative priors.
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- must be invariant under negation: if we are ignorant or indifferent as to whether or
not α, we must be equally ignorant as to whether or not ¬α.10
For instance, in the case of the cosmological constant problem, if we adopt a uniform
probability distribution for the value of the vacuum energy density ρV over an anthropically
allowed range of length µ, then we are committed to assert, e.g., that ρV is 3 times more
likely to be found in a any range of length µ3 than in any other range of length
µ
9 . But such
an assertion is not compatible with complete ignorance as to what value ρV is more likely
to have, hence the requirement of non-additivity for a representation of ignorance.
These criteria for a representation of ignorance or indifference cast doubt on the pos-
sibility for a probabilistic logic of induction to overcome these limitations.11 I will argue
that an imprecise model of Bayesianism, in which our credences can be fuzzy, will be able
to explain away these problems, without abandoning Bayesianism altogether.
3 Dissolving the puzzles with imprecise credence
3.1 Imprecise credence
It has been argued (see, e.g., Levi, 1974; Walley, 1991; Joyce, 2010) that Bayesian credences
need not have sharp values, and that there can be imprecise credences (or ‘imprecise
probabilities’ by misuse of language). An imprecise credence model recognizes “that our
beliefs should not be any more definitive or unambiguous than the evidence we have for
them.” (Joyce, 2010, 320)
Joyce defended an imprecise model of Bayesianism in which credences are not rep-
resented merely by a range of values, but rather by a family of (probabilistic) credence
10For an extended discussion about criteria for a representation of ignorance—with imprecise probabili-
ties in particular—see (de Cooman and Miranda, 2007, §4-5).
11The same goes for improper priors, as was argued, e.g., by Dawid et al. (1973).
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functions. In this imprecise probability model,
1. a believer’s overall credal state can be represented by a family C of cre-
dence functions [ci] (. . . ). Facts about the person’s opinions correspond
to properties common to all the credence functions in her credal state.
2. If the believer is rational, then every credence function in C is a probability.
3. If a person in credal state C learns that some event D obtains (. . . ), then
her post-learning state will be CD = {c(.|D) = c(X)
c(D|X)
c(D)
, c ∈ C}.
4. A rational decision-maker with credal state C is obliged to prefer one
action A to another A∗ when A’s expected utility exceeds that of A∗
relative to every credence function in C. (Joyce, 2010, 288, my emphasis)
An analogy is sometimes given to illustrate this model: the overall credal state C acts as
a committee whose members (each being analogous to a credence function ci) are rational
agents who do not all agree with each other and who all update their credence in the same
way, by conditionalizing on evidence they all agree upon. In this analogy, the properties
of the jury’s opinion (the overall credal state C) are those common to all the committee
members’ opinions.
This model allows one to simultaneously represent sharp and imprecise credences, but
also comparative probabilities. It can accommodate sharp credences, and then the usual
condition of additivity. But it can also accommodate less sharply defined relationships
when credences are fuzzy. It does so by means of a family of credence functions, each of
which is treated as in orthodox Bayesianism.
This model is interesting when it comes to representing ignorance or indifference: it
allows us to represent the credal state of ignorance by a set of functions that disagree with
each other. In order to reframe our cosmic puzzles, two cases must be distinguished:
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- in an unbounded case (i.e., here, Gott’s Doomsday argument),12 an imprecise prior
credal set with an infinite number of probability distributions, each normalizable,
will not allow one to obtain any prediction,
- in a bounded case (i.e., here, anthropic predictions for ρV ), it is possible to construct
an imprecise prior credal set with probability distributions that each favors a different
value for ρV such that the invariance criteria given above in §2.2 are fulfilled.
3.2 Blurring out Gott’s Doomsday argument: Apocalypse Not Now
Let us see how we can reframe Gott’s Doomsday argument with an imprecise prior credence
for the total number of humans N , or more generally for the length of any process of
indefinite duration X. Let our prior credence in X, C(X), be represented by a family of
credal functions {cγ}, each normalizable and defined on R
>0. Thus, we avoid improper
prior distributions. If all we assume is that X is finite but can be indefinitely large, then all
we can say is that C(X) is monotonically decreasing and that limX→∞(C(X)) = 0. Let us
then represent our prior credence C(X) consist in the following set of functions {cγ}, all of
which decrease but not at the same rate (i.e., similar to a family of Pareto distributions):
cγ(X) =
kγ
Xγ
,
with γ > 1 and kγ a normalizing constant: kγ =
1∫
∞
0
dX
Xγ
. The limiting case γ → 1 corre-
sponds to X →∞, but γ = 1 must be excluded to avoid a non-normalizable distribution.
If we don’t want to assume anything about dC(X)dX (other than it being negative), this
prior set must be such that it contains functions of decreasing rates that are arbitrarily
small. That is, ∀X ∈ R>0, ∀ǫ ∈ R<0, ∃cγ ∈ C s.t.
dcγ(X)
dX
> ǫ. This requirement applies
12The results from (Neal, 2006) to counter Leslie’s Doomsday argument still apply in the imprecise
framework.
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not to any of the functions in C but to the set as a whole. It is what will block the
conclusion of the Doomsday argument.13
Let us see how such a prior credal set avoids the conclusion of Gott’s Doomsday paradox.
As in the Bayesian version of the argument given in §1.1, the principle of indifference gives
us an expression for the likelihood of our rank r conditional on the total number of humans
N , and with our choice of prior for N , we obtain expressions for the prior for r and the
posterior for N conditional on r.
The credal functions cγ(r) in the set of distributions for the prior credence in r, C(r)
can be expressed as follows:
cγ(r) =
∫ N=∞
N=r
p(r|N) · cγ(N) dN =
∫ N=∞
N=r
kγ
Nγ+1
dN.
Bayes’ theorem then yields an expression for posterior credal functions:
cγ(N |r) =
p(r|N) · cγ(N)
cγ(r)
=
kγ
Nγ+1 ·
∫ N=∞
N=r
kγ
Nγ+1
dN
.
To find a prediction for N with a 95%-level confidence, we solve C(N ≤ x|r) = 0.95
for x, with C(N ≤ x|r) =
∫ x
r
C(N |r) dN . Now, as γ → 1, the prediction for x such
that C(N ≤ x|r) = 95% diverges. In other words, this imprecise representation of prior
credence in N , reflecting our ignorance about N , does not yield any prediction about N
(see figure 2).
Any of the credal functions cγ in the credal set as defined here would yield a prediction
if taken individually. However, it is clear that this prediction would rest solely on an
arbitrary choice of prior that doesn’t reflect our initial state of ignorance. Without the
possibility for my prior credence to be represented not by a single probability distribution
13In order to avoid too sharply peaked distributions (at X → 0), further constraints can be placed on the
variance of the distributions (namely, an lower bound on the variance), without it affecting my argument.
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Figure 2: Posterior probability distributions for N conditional on r, obtained for r =
1.2 · 1011 and assuming different prior distributions for N (i.e., with different assumptions
as to the total number of humans there will ever be).
but by an infinite set of probability distributions, I cannot avoid obtaining an arbitrarily
precise prediction.
Other distributions that decrease at different rates (i.e., not as inverse powers of N)
could have been included in the prior credal set {cγ}, as long as they fulfill the criteria listed
at the beginning of this section. However, no other distribution we could include would
change this conclusion. In order to represent our credence about the length of a process
of indefinite duration, it is necessary that our prior credal set includes the functions cγ
defined earlier, and that is sufficient to avoid the conclusions of the Doomsday argument.
Chicago, IL -47-
Y. Bene´treau-Dupin Blurring Out Cosmic Puzzles 16 of 20
3.3 Blurring out anthropic predictions
We are ignorant about what value of the vacuum energy density ρV we should expect
from our current theories. We now want to express the fact that, in the absence of a
prior credence that tells us something about what we should expect, we shouldn’t be in a
position to confirm or not the assumption of typicality on which anthropic predictions for
the cosmological constant rest.
If we substitute imprecise prior and posterior credences in the formula from (Weinberg,
2000, see §1.2 infra), we have:
dC(ρV ) = ν(ρV ) · C⋆(ρV ) dρV ,
with C⋆(ρV ) a prior credal set that will exclude all values of ρV outside the anthropic
bounds, and ν(ρV ) the average number of galaxies which form for ρV , which as in §1.2
peaks around the mean value of the anthropic range. In order for the prior credence C⋆ to
express our ignorance, it should be such that it doesn’t favor any value of ρV .
With the imprecise model, such a state of ignorance can be expressed by a set of
probability distributions {c⋆i(ρV )}, all of which normalizable over the anthropic range and
such that ∀ρV , ∃c⋆i, c⋆j ∈ C⋆ such that ρV is favored by c⋆i and not by c⋆j .
14 Such a
prior credal set will not favor any value of ρV . Moreover, in order to fulfill the criterion
of invariance under negation (according to which C⋆(ρV ) = C⋆(¬ρV ), see §2.2), one could
define a credal set representing ignorance to be such that ∀ρV , ∀c⋆i ∈ C⋆, ∃c⋆j ∈ C⋆ such
that c⋆i = 1− c⋆j .
15
With a prior credal set C⋆ thus defined, even with a distribution ν(ρV ) peaked around
14This can be obtained, for instance, by a family of Gamma distributions, each of which giving an
expected value at a different point in the anthropically allowed range. As in §3.1, In order to avoid
dogmatic functions, a lower bound can be placed on the variance of all the functions in C⋆.
15But such a symmetry requirement need not be required in all cases; unwarranted conclusions can be
avoided without necessarily assuming this condition.
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the mean value of that anthropic range, the prediction C(ρV ) becomes very imprecise all
over the anthropic range. But more importantly, we won’t have C(ρobsV ) > C⋆(ρ
obs
V ), i.e.,
there will be no agreement among all the distributions c⋆i ∈ C⋆ that learning the actual
value ρobsV will provide a confirmatory boost for our assumption of typicality.
The imprecise model can then provide us with a way to express our ignorance such
that our assumption of typicality is neither confirmed nor disconfirmed. And yet, that
same approach doesn’t prevent Bayesian induction altogether. Indeed, all the functions
in C⋆ being probability distributions that can be treated as in orthodox Bayesianism, any
of them can be updated and, in principle, converge toward a sharper credence, provided
sufficient updating.
4 Conclusion
These cosmic puzzles show that, in the absence of an adequate representation of igno-
rance, a logic of induction will inevitably yield unwarranted results. Our usual methods of
Bayesian induction are ill-equiped to allow us to address both puzzles. I have shown that
the imprecise credence framework allows us to treat both arguments in a way that avoids
their undesirable conclusions. The imprecise model rests on Bayesian methods, but it is
expressively richer than the usual Bayesian approach that only deals with single probability
distributions (i.e., sharp credence functions).
Philosophical discussions about the value of the imprecise model usually center around
the difficulty to define updating rules that don’t contradict general principles of condition-
alization (especially the problem of dilation). But the ability to solve such paradoxes of
confirmation and avoid unwarranted conclusions should be considered as a crucial feature
of the imprecise model and play in its favor.
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COARSE-GRAINING AS A ROUTE TO MICROSCOPIC PHYSICS: THE
RENORMALIZATION GROUP IN QUANTUM FIELD THEORY
BIHUI LI
ABSTRACT. The renormalization group (RG) has been characterized as merely a
coarse-graining procedure that does not illuminate the microscopic content of quantum field
theory (QFT), but merely gets us from that content, as given by axiomatic QFT, to
macroscopic predictions. I argue that in the constructive field theory tradition, RG techniques
do illuminate the microscopic dynamics of a QFT, which are not automatically given by
axiomatic QFT. RG techniques in constructive field theory are also rigorous, so one cannot
object to their foundational import on grounds of lack of rigor.
Date: June 24, 2014.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The renormalization group (RG) in quantum field theory (QFT) has received some
attention from philosophers for how it relates physics at different scales and how it makes
sense of perturbative renormalization (Huggett and Weingard 1995; Bain 2013). However, it
has been relatively neglected by philosophers working in the axiomatic QFT tradition, who
take axiomatic QFT to be the best vehicle for interpreting QFT. Doreen Fraser (2011) has
argued that the RG is merely a way of getting from the microscopic principles of QFT, as
provided by axiomatic QFT, to macroscopic experimental predictions. Thus, she argues, RG
techniques do not illuminate the theoretical content of QFT, and we should stick to
interpreting axiomatic QFT. David Wallace (2011), in contrast, has argued that the RG
supports an effective field theory (EFT) interpretation of QFT, in which QFT does not apply
to arbitrarily small length scales. Like Wallace, physicists generally regard the RG to be
foundationally significant, as recent QFT textbooks indicate (Zee 2010; Duncan 2012).
My main objective is to question Fraser’s claims that the RG is only a way to get from
the microscopic principles of QFT to macroscopic predictions, and that it has no significance
for the theoretical content of QFT. Unlike Wallace, I do this without endorsing an EFT
interpretation of QFT. Instead, I elucidate the foundational significance of the RG by
describing its role in determining whether various Lagrangians could possibly describe QFTs
living on continuous spacetime—that is, whether these Lagrangians are well-defined in the
ultraviolet (UV) limit. This problem is an important one in the foundations of QFT and it is
the central aim of constructive field theory, which attempts to construct interacting models of
QFT satisfying certain axioms. The existence of the UV limit is relevant to whether we should
interpret a particular Lagrangian as describing an EFT or as potentially applicable to all length
scales, so if the RG helps determine the existence of this limit, then the RG is significant for
the interpretation of QFT.
2
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To forestall the objection that RG methods are not rigorous enough for philosophical
attention, I look at the RG as used in constructive field theory, a tradition that philosophers
take to be rigorous. Many in this tradition use RG methods to determine whether various
Lagrangians have a well-defined UV limit. The rigor of these RG methods as compared to the
RG methods that physicists typically use lies in the employment of well-controlled
approximations rather than ill-controlled approximations.
My plan is as follows. In the next section, I provide more specifics on the various
theoretical approaches to QFT and flesh out the claims that I have attributed to Fraser. In
Section 3, I sketch the formalism of perturbative QFT, describing the problems that
constructive QFT aims to solve. In Section 4, I sketch the “physicists’ version” of the RG as a
pedagogical attempt to show how the RG can answer the question of whether a UV limit for a
given Lagrangian exists. In Section 5, I explain how constructive field theory tries to resolve
the problems with perturbative QFT and how it attempts to fill in the mathematical gaps in the
physicists’ version of the RG. In doing so, I sketch how constructive field theory uses RG
methods to try to construct models of QFT that exist in continuous spacetime. I conclude by
musing on what the argument of this paper implies about the relationship between the various
theoretical strands of QFT.
2. THE DEBATE SO FAR
In the early days of QFT, physicists ran into a host of mathematical pathologies such
as divergences in their perturbation expansions. To get around these, they deployed
calculational methods such as perturbative renormalization without fully understanding why
these methods worked.
Axiomatic QFT grew out of attempts to make the mathematical character of QFT
clearer. One variant of axiomatic QFT is algebraic QFT, which I will not discuss here.
3
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Instead, I focus on the Wightman axioms or the Osterwalder-Schrader (OS) axioms, which
specify the properties that a theory’s Wightman functions or Schwinger functions,
respectively, must satisfy to define a QFT.1 However, these properties are insufficient to define
a QFT’s dynamics. For more dynamical details, we turn to constructive QFT (CQFT),2 which
attempts to construct specific interacting models of QFT that satisfy the OS axioms. Such
models, if they exist, automatically satisfy the Wightman axioms, according to the
Osterwalder-Schrader reconstruction theorem (Rivasseau 1991). CQFT takes its models of
interest to be those characterized by Lagrangians that physicists use. One of the aims of
CQFT is to find out if these Lagrangians correspond to non-trivial QFTs in the UV limit.
A QFT that satisfies either set of axioms must have a UV limit: effective field theories
violate the axiom of postivity in the OS axioms. A typical approach in CQFT is to start with a
lattice QFT or an effective field theory with a momentum cutoff, and then to figure out what
happens to the Lagrangian at a fixed momentum scale when the lattice spacing is taken to
zero, or when the cutoff is taken to infinity. If the model that results when this limit is taken is
trivial (all the coupling constants in the Lagrangian go to zero) or ill-defined (some coupling
constant becomes infinite in the limit), then one concludes that there does not exist a
non-trivial model of that QFT in continuum spacetime.
The RG was first developed in an unrigorous manner within perturbative QFT. It
provides an account of how the dynamics of QFTs change with length or energy scale. These
changes are manifested as changes in the value of the coupling parameters in a theory’s
Lagrangian. Part of the importance of the RG lies in how it explains the empirical success of
perturbative renormalization. The RG provides a physical picture of why one has to change
the values of coupling parameters in order to avoid divergences. As mentioned earlier,
physicists have generally regarded the RG to be foundationally and interpretively significant.
1The Schwinger and Wightman functions are important because any observable can be computed from them.
2Also known as constructive field theory.
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In contrast, there is a refrain among philosophers along the lines sketched by Fraser
(2011, 131):
RG methods make a significant contribution to the articulation of the empirical
content of QFT and to clarifying the nature of the relationship between the
empirical and the theoretical content. However, RG methods do not shed light
on the theoretical content of QFT. For this reason, appeal to RG methods does
not decide the question of which set of theoretical principles are appropriate
for QFT. . . The reason that constructive field theorists are able to exploit RG
methods—even though they reject elements of the theoretical content of
LQFT—is that RG methods concern the empirical structure of the theory
rather than the theoretical content.
In a similar vein, Kuhlmann, Lyre, and Wayne (2002) characterize the RG as providing “a
deductive link between fundamental QFT and experimental predictions”. This echoes the
thought, latent in Fraser’s writings, that there is some “fundamental QFT” given prior to using
the RG, presumably by some axiomatic form of QFT, and that all the RG does is link this
fundamental theory to experimental predictions. Fraser takes this thought to undercut
Wallace’s argument that RG methods support a particular interpretation of QFT.
This pattern of reasoning is common in the philosophy of physics: for foundational or
interpretive purposes, we should focus on only the “fundamental principles” of a theory, given
by its axioms, because these constitute the entire theoretical content of the theory. Methods to
extract predictions from these principles add no new theoretical content, only pragmatic
filigree.
However, as I shall argue, RG methods do have foundational significance because they
are one of the main ways in which CQFT proves the existence or non-existence of models of
QFT satisfying the OS axioms. Thus, they bear on the interpretively relevant question of
5
Chicago, IL -57-
whether certain models of QFT can exist in continuous spacetime. Furthermore, there exist
rigorous ways to implement the RG, and these are used in CQFT.
3. PERTURBATIVE QUANTUM FIELD THEORY
CQFT arose out of a need to mathematically justify perturbative QFT. In much of
QFT, perturbative renormalization is a key technique for deriving finite results for empirically
measurable quantities like scattering cross-sections. A first pass at calculating these quantities
leads to divergent terms in the relevant perturbation expansions. Perturbative renormalization
adjusts the coupling parameters so as to remove these divergent terms. However, this
procedure, as presented in introductory QFT textbooks, is carried out on a purely formal
basis. While the procedure is justified in one sense by its empirical success, they are not
justified by a mathematical understanding of the nature of the perturbative expansion. One of
the aims of CQFT is to justify these rules mathematically. In the rest of this section, I offer a
brief sketch of perturbative renormalization in a simple case so as to illustrate the room for
justification that CQFT tries to provide.
One quantity of central importance in QFT is the partition function, which is defined
in terms of the Lagrangian L(φ) as follows:
(1) Z =
∫
Dφe
∫
L(φ)d4x
Here I have assumed four dimensions for the purpose of the example. The “D” indicates that
this integral is a functional integral, sometimes called a Feynman path integral. Intuitively, the
integration ranges over the space of “possible functions” φ, for some value of “possible”.3
Path integrals also feature in expressions for the Green’s functions, which are closely related
to experimental measurements.
3As we will see later, one of the first tasks of constructive field theory is to give a precise meaning to the measure
Dφ.
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These path integrals can be given a straightforward finite, analytic expression when
the action involved is that of a free scalar field with no interactions. In this case,
L = 1
2
((
∂φ2
)2
−m2φ2
)
. For interacting fields, physicists typically use perturbation theory to
evaluate the path integrals. Since the path integral for the free field has a known analytic
expression, the perturbations are applied using the free field case as a reference—we consider
the interaction as a small perturbation to the free field Lagrangian. The following example
illustrates how this is done in a simple case.
Suppose a small interaction − λ
4!
φ4 is added to the free field Lagrangian, so that
L = 1
2
((
∂φ2
)2
−m2φ2
)
− λ
4!
φ4. This is the Lagrangian of the so-called φ4 theory, which
describes a self-interacting scalar field. The partition function is
Z =
∫
Dφe
∫
d4x
((
(∂φ2)
2
−m2φ2
)
− λ4!φ
4
)
.
Assuming λ to be small, we then convert the e−
λ
4!φ
4
factor into a Taylor series in λ:
(2)
Z=
∫
Dφ
(
1−
λ
4!
∫
x1
φ2 (x1)dx1+
1
2
(
λ
4!
)2∫
x1,x2
φ4 (x1)φ
4 (x2)dx1dx2+ · · ·
)
e
∫
d4x
(
(∂φ2)
2
−m2φ2
)
where I have included only the first two terms of the Taylor series to illustrate the general rule.
Unlike in the free field case, when evaluating path integrals such as the above, some of
the individual terms in the Taylor series are infinite. These divergences make it difficult to
directly compute experimentally measurable quantities such as scattering cross-sections from
the path integral. In many cases, the divergences can be removed by the process of
perturbative renormalization. This process starts with regularization, a way of eliminating the
influence of high-momenta processes which cause the divergences, and, for some methods of
regularization, the addition of counterterms to compensate for regularization. Regularization
is typically followed by renormalization, which consists of rewriting the Lagrangian and
7
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expressions for quantities like cross-sections in terms of “renormalized” coupling parameters
rather than the “bare” parameters that we started with. These methods have proven to be
empirically successful for theories like quantum electrodynamics.
Even though perturbative renormalization removes the term-by-term divergences that
occur in (2), they leave unresolved other issues. It is suspected that expansions like (2) do not
converge and are at best asymptotic. An asymptotic series can be useful if we know which
function the series is asymptotic to, but perturbative QFT on its own does not provide this
information. Part of the CQFT program involves showing that some properties of the
non-perturbative solutions to the equations of motion guarantee that certain methods of
summing asymptotic perturbative expansions will lead to a unique solution. I will not discuss
this part of the CQFT program. The part I will discuss in Section 5.2 involves using the RG to
evaluate (1). Here the problem of divergent perturbation series manifests itself as the so-called
large field problem, which will also be addressed in Section 5.2.
The other problem with perturbative QFT that CQFT tries to resolve is a proper
definition of the measure of (1). Again, we will see in Section 5.2 how this is done in CQFT.
For now, I move on to discussing how the RG is important not just as a way to calculate
empirical quantities, but also to determine whether a given Lagrangian exists in the UV limit.
4. THE RENORMALIZATION GROUP
The RG explains perturbative renormalization non-perturbatively. It gives an account
of changing coupling parameters that is not based wholly on formal perturbative series and
perturbative renormalization. The RG is widely used in the non-rigorous variants of QFT used
by physicists and in constructive field theory. For convenience, I follow Wallace (2011) in
calling the former “conventional QFT”. While the constructive field theory treatment of the
RG plugs many mathematical gaps in conventional QFT, the important conceptual insights are
8
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already present in the conventional treatment. The conventional understanding of fixed points
and RG flows suffices to help us understand how RG techniques give us not just macroscopic
information, but also information about the existence of a UV limit. Here, I sketch the RG as
typically presented conventionally, explain its significance for foundational questions, and
point to the places where a constructive treatment might fill in some gaps. I leave the
constructive treatment to Section 5.2.
The RG is a particularly effective way of computing the partition function (1).
Intuitively, the operation of an RG transformation is often described as integrating out
high-momentum degrees of freedom to obtain an effective action over the remaining low
momenta. Formally, this transformation is often written as follows:
(3)
∫
DφL
∫
DφHe
iS[φH ,φL] =
∫
DφLe
iSΛ[φL],
where φL indicate field configurations whose Fourier transforms have support over momenta
less than Λ, and φH indicate field configuations whose Fourier transforms have support over
momenta more than Λ. SΛ[φL] is known as the effective action because it “acts like the full
action” S[φH ,φL] but involves fewer degrees of freedom. It behaves like the full action when
we describe our system with a reduced set of variables, that is, with only φL instead of
φL+φH . This strategy of using effective actions at lower momentum scales to help evaluate
the full integral is important in constructive field theory and in less rigorous work within QFT.
Roughly speaking, RG methods proceed by doing many such integrations over infinitesimal
momentum shells. This is a more effective way of computing the partition function compared
to methods that try to integrate over all momenta at once, because many of the expansions that
we have found to be helpful in evaluating the partition function are effective only at fixed
momentum scales.
9
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Denote the transformation (3), taking a more fine-grained action to a more
coarse-grained action, by R . The more times we iterate R on the action S, the larger the range
of momenta we can integrate over. Each application of R changes the coupling parameters of
terms in the action.4 That is, each R moves S along a trajectory in the space of actions.
Sometimes this flow can end up in a fixed point: a point where the transformation maps the
action defined by that point in the space of actions to itself. That is, a fixed point is a point S
where R S= S.
The existence of a fixed point is important for determining if a given Lagrangian has a
UV limit. A continuum theory exists if at an arbitrary fixed momentum scale ΛL, the effective
action SΛL that we calculate using RG transformations converges as the momentum cutoff
goes to infinity. That is, suppose we have calculated SΛL by iterating R many times on an
initial action SΛUV , where ΛUV is a momentum scale higher than ΛL. We then see what
happens to the SΛL that we calculate with iterated R s as we increase ΛUV . The theory
associated with SΛL has a UV limit if there is some S for which limΛUV→∞ SΛL = S. That is, it
has a UV limit if, as we raise ΛUV and have to repeat R more and more times in order to
compute SΛL from increasingly fine-grained actions, we get a stable result for SΛL , showing
the existence of a fixed point. In this way, the existence of fixed points of a certain sort can
help us answer the question about whether various models of QFT can exist in contiuous
spacetime.
Importantly, even though it is true that R only takes us from a more fine-grained,
microscopic action to a more coarse-grained, macroscopic action, it is nevertheless the case
that we can use R to determine whether a UV limit exists, by way of the fixed point analysis
just described. This reveals the mistake in Fraser’s claim that R , as a coarse-graining
4This includes the possibility that terms that didn’t exist before gain a non-zero coefficient under the transforma-
tion.
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procedure, can only be a tool to get from the microscopic principles to macroscopic
predictions and not a way to illuminate the microscopic content of the theory.
Indeed, in general, the methods used in constructive field theory to determine whether
a given Lagrangian exists in the continuum limit all rely on some kind of multiscale analysis
for problems with spacetime dimension D≥ 3 (Douglas 2011). The phase space analysis of
Glimm and Jaffe (1987) is another example of such a multiscale analysis. The importance of
the RG and phase space analysis in finding continuum solutions of QFT shows that the fact
that a mathematical method implements some kind of scaling does not imply that it is merely
a way to get from an already given microscopic physics to a merely “phenomenological”
macroscopic physics.
5. CONSTRUCTIVE FIELD THEORY AND THE RENORMALIZATION GROUP
While we saw in the previous section how the RG as expressed in conventional QFT
sheds light on the existence of UV limits, constructive field theory distinguishes itself from
other means of finding a UV limit by its greater rigor. This rigor consists in:
(1) Making sure that the relevant functional integrals are well-defined;
(2) In computing the functional integrals, making sure that the approximations and
expansions used are well-controlled.
I illustrate point 1 in Section 5.1 and point 2 in Section 5.2.
5.1. Functional Integrals in Constructive Field Theory. I now sketch the constructive field
theory approach to defining functional integrals. For simplicity, I consider the φ4 theory (with
dimension unspecified for now). Constructive field theorists like to operate with Euclidean
functional integrals because this allows them to use the theory of Gaussian integrals. Much of
the work in defining (1) draws from this probability theory basis. In Euclidean field theory, we
can regard the real-valued fields φ(x) as random variables on the d-dimensional Euclidean
11
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space Rd . These random variables are associated with a Gaussian measure that is perturbed
by an interaction term. The Gaussian measure is associated with the properties of free
particles, and the interaction term with interactions between particles.
The Gaussian random field φ(x) has a mean given by
∫
φ(x)dµC(φ) = 0 and a
covariance given by
∫
φ(x)φ(y)dµC(φ) = (−∆+m
2)−1(x,y)≡C(x,y). We can formally write
C(x,y) =
∫
Rd
eip(x−y)
p2+m2
dp, which will help us understand ultraviolet regularization later. The
Schwinger functions 〈F(φ)〉 can be formally written as
(4) 〈F(φ)〉=
1
Z
∫
F(φ)e−V (φ)dµC(φ),
where Z =
∫
e−V (φ)dµC(φ). In the case of φ
4 theory, V (φ) = λ
∫
Rd
φ(x)4dx, where λ is a
coupling parameter.
The first task of constructive field theory is to modify the above expression for 〈F(φ)〉
so that it is well-defined. The measure dµC(φ) is generally not well-defined before the
following steps: ultraviolet regularization, infrared regularization, and, in four dimensions, the
addition of counterterms.5 Ultraviolet regularization is required to ensure that the product of
distributions φ(x)4 is well-defined. This is usually done through a momentum cutoff or lattice
regularization. For brevity’s sake, I outline only the momentum cutoff method. The
momentum cutoff is imposed by alteringC(x,y) toCε(x,y) =
∫
Rd
eip(x−y)
p2+m2
e−ε|p|
2
dp, ε > 0.
Infrared regularization imposes a finite volume Λ over which the integral for V (φ) is to be
carried out. So V (φ) becomes VΛ(φ) = λ
∫
Λ φ(x)
4dx. Finally, if d = 4, we have to add a
counterterm δVΛ,ε to VΛ, so we have VΛ,ε =VΛ +δVΛ,ε in the exponent instead.
6
5In two or three dimensions, the φ4 model is superrenormalizable and no counterterms are needed.
6I leave out the details of the form of δVΛ,ε for brevity. See Watanabe (2000) for details.
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The upshot of all this is that the formal expression (4) is turned into a well-defined
expression:
(5) 〈F(φ)〉Λ,ε =
1
ZΛ,ε
∫
F(φ)e−VΛ,ε(φ)dµCε(φ).
The task of constructive field theory is to show that this expression has a well-defined limit as
ε → 0 and Λ → ∞. If this limit exists, then the Lagrangian in question has a UV limit.
Multiscale methods allow one to evaluate the integral by decomposing it into momentum
scale-indexed parts. This decomposition allows for each scale-indexed part to be evaluated
using certain kinds of expansions, without running into problems with the expansions failing
when they try to cover too large a momentum range. The RG is one such multiscale method,
and we will now see how it works in constructive field theory.
5.2. Applying the Renormalization Group Rigorously. In Section 4 we saw a sketch of the
physical ideas behind the RG. Constructive field theorists implement the same ideas using
more rigorous mathematics. As with more cavalier implementations of the RG, the existence
of a UV limit in constructive field theory is linked to the existence of fixed points of RG
transformations. However, many RG methods used in conventional QFT fail to account for
the large field problem. Many non-perturbative approaches to the RG make use of
non-perturbative approximations that we do not know how to place error bounds on.7
Constructive field theory tries to find the UV limit using approximations that are better
controlled than those of conventional QFT. One way to do this is via the exact renormalization
group (ERG).8 The term “exact” in this context indicates that the RG is implemented
7For example, this a defect of the “functional renormalization group” tradition, as Gurau, Rivasseau, and Sfondrini
(2014) point out.
8Note of caution: some who work in the tradition of the functional renormalization group take themselves to
be using the “exact” renormalization group, which they take to a term referring to Wilson’s non-perturbative
understanding of RG flows (Rosten 2012; Bagnuls and Bervillier 2001). However, as explained previously, the
lack of precise error bounds on their approximations sets them apart from the constructive field theory tradition.
13
Chicago, IL -65-
non-perturbatively and that the approximations involved are well-controlled. Benfatto,
Cassandro, Gallavotti, Nicolo´, Olivieri, Presutti, and Scacciatelli (1980), Gawe¸dzki and
Kupiainen (1983), Gawe¸dzki and Kupiainen (1985), Brydges, Dimock, and Hurd (1995), and
Abdesselam (2007) are examples of how the ERG is used in constructive field theory. I now
sketch an RG analysis based on integrating out fluctuations over slices of momentum space,
showing how one may determine whether a given Lagrangian has a UV limit in this way.9
As mentioned in Section 4, the basic idea of the RG is to integrate the functional
integral over momentum slices. This avoids the failures of various kinds of expansions when
one integrates over a large range of momenta in one step. In the constructive field theory
framework this integration can take place by dividing the covarianceCε into parts that
correspond to momentum slices. NotatingCε as D for convenience, we have
D=
N
∑
k=0
Dk,
with independent Gaussian variables φk(x) that each have mean 0 and covariance Dk. Each φk
corresponds to a fluctuation field of momentum scale Lk. The slices of measure Dk are defined
as follows:
Dk(x,y) =
∫
Rd
eip(x−y)
p2+m2
(χ(L−k)−χ(L−(k−1)p))dp, k = 1,2, . . . ,N,
D0(x,y) =
∫
Rd
eip(x−y)
p2+m2
χ(p)dp,
where χ(p) = e−p
2
serves as a cutoff function. The Dk serve the purpose of scale
decomposition because each Dk effectively isolates the range of momenta between L
k−1 and
Lk.
9Besides momentum slice integration, another way of implementing the RG in constructive field theory is the
block spin transformation, where one treats the quantum field in a lattice setting.
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Defining H(φ)≡ HN(φ) = e
−VΛ,ε(φ), φk,0 = ∑
k
j=0φ j, and Dk,0 = ∑
k
j=0D j,
k = 0,1, . . . ,N, we can define the operation of scaling out higher momenta as follows:
(6) Hk−1(φk−1,0) =
∫
dµDk(φk)Hk(φk+φk−1,0), k = N,N−1, . . . ,1.
Hk−1 is simply the coarse-grained version of Hk, with the higher momenta integrated out. In
an RG analysis, we would want to iterate this operation of integrating out higher momenta.
Before iterating it, however, we rescale the field φk−1,0 so that it has a wavelength comparable
to φk’s. The rescaled field is defined as φ˜k(x) = L
−k(d−2)/2φk(L
−kx). We also rescale the
covariance Dk, the details of which I omit for brevity.
10 Then we define the rescaled Hk by
H˜k(φ˜k,0) = Hk(φk,o).
This gives us the RG transformation
H˜k−1(φ˜k−1,0) =
∫
dµD˜k(φ˜k)H˜k(φ˜k(·)+L
−(d−2)/2φ˜k−1,0(L
−1·)).
While we have been using the notation H(φ) = e−VΛ,ε(φ) for convenience, we can think
of the RG transformation as acting on the action V . Each transformation consists of the
following steps:
(1) Rescaling of the fields;
(2) Integrating over a momentum slice;
(3) Taking the logarithm of H˜k−1 to get the V needed for the next transformation.
The problem of finding a well-defined Lagrangian in the ultraviolet limit then reduces to
seeing if V converges in the limit of infinitely many RG transformations: in the limit of
10See Watanabe (2000) for details.
15
Chicago, IL -67-
k→ ∞. The convergence of V in this way corresponds to the existence of the fixed point we
are looking for, as explained in Section 4.
Constructive field theory differs from other ways of implementing the RG in how well
it controls the approximations that are involved. For bosonic interactions, the step of taking
the logarithm of H˜k−1 is not well-defined for certain values of φ. This is the large field
problem. Constructive field theory deals with this by carrying out the transformation only for
small fields. The steps of integrating out fluctuations in a momentum slice and taking the
logarithm are carried out only for small fields. This means that we can use a cluster expansion
for the former step and a Mayer expansion for the latter step. Both these expansions would
not be well-controlled in the large field region. There are various methods for controlling the
large field region. Because of their complexity, I can only list them here without going into
the details: the domination procedure (Feldman, Magnen, Rivasseau, and Se´ne´or 1987),
polymer systems (Pordt 1994), and using the fact that “large fields” occur with a relatively
small probability (Balaban, Imbrie, and Jaffe 1984).
6. CONCLUSION
I have argued against a view that the RG in QFT is merely a way to get from the
fundamental physics given by axiomatic QFT to macroscopic experimental predictions.
Rather, the RG is also an important method in constructive field theory to figure out whether
certain Lagrangians have well-defined UV limits that satisfy the axioms that we think a QFT
ought to satisfy. Furthermore, the RG as employed in constructive field theory is not of
questionable rigor.
The view that I criticise is one in which axiomatic QFT provides the theoretical
content of QFT while the RG provides a way to get from this theoretical content to
macroscopic empirical predictions. On this view, for interpretive purposes we need only focus
16
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on axiomatic QFT. However, constructive field theory provides an important means of access
to more of the theoretical content of QFT, with the RG providing a means of access even to
the microscopic physics of QFT. This suggests that axiomatic QFT is at best a kind of partial
characterization of the theoretical content of QFT. Indeed, mathematical physicists have long
acknowledged that constructive QFT provides additional dynamical information that a pure
axiomatic approach does not (Wightman 1976; Horuzhy 1990). If so, we should not too
hastily dismiss the interpretive significance of computational methods that do not explicitly
appear in the axioms of QFT, for these methods may be able to tell us if certain dynamics can
occur in continuous spacetime.
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Abstract
Mechanisms are usually viewed as inherently hierarchical, with lower levels
of a mechanism influencing, and decomposing, its higher-level behaviour. In
order to adequately draw quantitative predictions from a model of a mech-
anism, the model needs to capture this hierarchical aspect. The recursive
Bayesian network (RBN) formalism was put forward as a means to model
mechanistic hierarchies (Casini et al., 2011) by decomposing variables. The
proposal was recently criticized by Gebharter (2014) and Gebharter and
Kaiser (2014), who instead propose to decompose arrows. In this paper,
I defend the RBN account from the criticism and argue that it offers a better
representation of mechanistic hierarchies than the rival account.
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Introduction
Mechanisms are usually viewed as inherently hierarchical, with lower levels of a
mechanism influencing, and decomposing, its higher-level behaviour. In order to
adequately draw quantitative predictions from a model of a mechanism, the model
needs to capture this hierarchical aspect. The recursive Bayesian network (RBN)
formalism was put forward as a means to model mechanistic hierarchies (Casini
et al., 2011). The formalism is an extension of the Bayesian network (BN) for-
malism, already used to model same-level causal relations probabilistically (Pearl,
2000). In RBNs, higher-level variables decompose into lower-level causal BNs.
This proposal was recently criticized by Gebharter (2014) and Gebharter and
Kaiser (2014), on two main grounds: descriptive adequacy—it is unclear when the
formalism is applicable to real mechanisms—and conceptual adequacy—RBNs
do not allow one to draw interlevel inferences for explanation and intervention. To
overcome these alleged limitations, Gebharter (2014) and Gebharter and Kaiser
(2014) have made the alternative proposal that decomposition involves arrows
rather than variables. In particular, Gebharter (2014) proposes an alternative for-
malism, also extending the BN formalism, namely multilevel causal models (ML-
CMs). Instead, Gebharter and Kaiser (2014) make an informal proposal, which as
we shall see, does not coincide with MLCMs.
Decomposing variables and decomposing arrows are two very natural options
for representing mechanistic hierarchies, if one’s starting point is already a prob-
abilistic interpretation of causality. In this paper, I argue that the former option is
superior to the latter. I proceed as follows. In §1 I present and illustrate RBNs
and MLCMs. In §2 I argue against decomposing arrows. MLCMs lead to coun-
terintuitive notions of mechanistic decomposition and mechanistic explanation;
and Gebharter and Kaiser (2014)’s informal proposal goes only halfway towards
a solution. Finally, in §3 I defend RBNs from the criticism. RBNs do allow in-
terlevel causal explanation, via the uncoupling of interlevel causal relations into
a constitutional step and a causal step. RBNs also allow reasoning about inter-
level interventions; believing otherwise depends on either wrongly assuming that
changes cannot transmit along the constitutional downward-directed arrows, or
on demanding that the RBN formalism represent intervention variables, which
the formalism is not meant to represent.
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1 The two formalisms
Both RBNs and MLCMs are extensions of the BN formalism. A BN consists
of a finite set V = {V1, . . . ,Vn} of variables, each of which takes finitely many
possible values, together with a directed acyclic graph (DAG) whose nodes are
the variables in V , and the probability distribution P(Vi|Pari) of each variable Vi
conditional on its parents Pari in the DAG. Here is an example:
✒✑
✓✏
V1 ✲✒✑
✓✏
V2 ❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❥
✲✒✑
✓✏
V4
✒✑
✓✏
V3
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟✯
✲✒✑
✓✏
V5
DAG and probability function are linked by theMarkov Condition (MC):
MC. For any Vi ∈ V = {V1, . . . ,Vn}, Vi ⊥ NDi | Pari.
In words, each variable is probabilistically independent of its non-descendants,
conditional on its parents. The above figure implies for instance that V4 is in-
dependent of V1 and V5 conditional on V2 and V3. In the BN jargon, V2 and V3
‘screen off’ V4 from V1 and V5. A BN determines a joint probability distribution
over its nodes via P(v1 · · · vn) =
∏n
i=1 P(vi|pari) where vi is an assignment Vi = x
of a value to Vi and pari is the assignment of values to its parents induced by the
assignment v = v1 · · · vn.
In a causally-interpreted BN, the arrows in the DAG are interpreted as direct
causal relations and the network can be used to infer the effects of interventions as
well as to make probabilistic predictions (Pearl, 2000). In this case, MC is called
the Causal Markov Condition (CMC).
1.1 Recursive Bayesian networks
RBNs represent hierarchies by decomposing variables (Casini et al., 2011). One
of the motivations behind this choice is that scientists often talk of properties at
different levels that stand in a constitutive relation with one another.1 Another
1 Famously, Craver (2007) has proposed a criterion for identifying constitutive relations,
namely the ‘mutual manipulability’ of higher- and lower-level properties that stand in the relation.
Casini et al. (2011) refer to Craver’s intuition to further motivate RBNs. Arguments against the
compatibility between Craver (2007)’s account of constitution and interventionism (Woodward,
3
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motivation—which was only implicit in (Casini et al., 2011)—is that decompos-
ing variables has the additional advantage of making ‘interlevel causation’ intelli-
gible, by uncoupling (problematic) cases of interlevel downward or upward cau-
sation into two (less-problematic) steps, a constitutional, across-level step and a
causal, same-level step (Craver and Bechtel, 2007). RBNs make this idea formally
precise, thereby adding an additional justification to it.
Mechanistic hierarchy is interpreted via the notion of ‘recursive decomposi-
tion’ of variables. An RBN is a BN defined over a finite set V of variables whose
values may themselves be RBNs. A variable is called a network variable if one or
more of its possible values is an RBN and a simple variable otherwise. A standard
BN is an RBN whose variables are all simple. An RBN x that occurs as the value
of a network variable in RBN y is said to be at a lower level than y; variables in y
are the direct superiors of variables in x while variables in the same network are
peers.2 If an RBN contains no infinite descending chains—i.e., if each descend-
ing chain of networks terminates in a standard BN—then it is well-founded. Only
well-founded RBNs are considered here.
Consider a toy RBN on V = {C, S }, whereC represents whether some tissue in
an organism is cancerous, taking the possible values 1 and 0, while S is survival
after 5 years, taking the possible values yes and no. The corresponding BN is:
✒✑
✓✏
C ✲✒✑
✓✏
S
P(C), P(S |C)
Figure 1.1.1
2003), on which Craver’s account is based, have been offered by Leuridan (2012) and Baumgart-
ner and Gebharter (2014). Two remarks are in order. First: in the light of Gebharter and Kaiser
(2014, 3.5.3)’s own endorsement of Craver (2007)’s interpretation of constitution, these arguments
may be negatively relevant to both RBNs and Gebharter and Kaiser (2014)’s proposal. Although
this issue is certainly worth considering, I do not discuss it further here. I should however point
out that RBNs do not define constitution. They only characterize it, probabilistically—and not
even in interventionist terms (cf. fn. 4). Interventions are only used to reason about interlevel
causation. Second: Gebharter (2014)’s MLCM formalism does not interpret hierarchy in terms
of constitution—let alone constitution in one specific sense. It is thus immune to this critique.
However, instead of being an advantage, this threatens to undermine MLCMs’ ability to represent
mechanistic hierarchies (see §2).
2A variable can have several superiors. If a variable appears more than once in an RBN,
the network should not imply incompatible things about it. Consistency is discussed in detail in
(Williamson, 2005, §§10.4–10.5).
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Suppose S is a simple variable but C is a network variable, with each of its two
values denoting a lower-level (standard) BN that represents a state of the mecha-
nism for cancer. I will ignore many of the factors, such as DNA damage response
mechanisms, also responsible for cancer, and only focus on the unregulated cell
growth that results from mutations in factors that control cell division, usually la-
belled ‘growth factor’, in short GF. WhenC is assigned value 1 we have a network
c1 representing a functioning control mechanism, with a probabilistic dependence
(and a causal connection) between growth factor G and cell division D.
✒✑
✓✏
G ✲✒✑
✓✏
D
Pc1(G), Pc1(D|G)
Figure 1.1.2
On the other hand, when C is assigned value 0 we have a network c0 represent-
ing a malfunction of the growth mechanism, with no dependence (and no causal
connection) between G and D.
✒✑
✓✏
G ✒✑
✓✏
D
Pc0(G), Pc0(D)
Figure 1.1.3
Since these two lower-level networks are standard BNs, the RBN is well-founded
and fully described by the three networks.3
If an RBN is to be used to model a mechanism, it is natural to interpret the
arrows at the various levels of the RBN as signifying causal connections. Just
as standard causally-interpreted BNs are subject to the CMC, a similar condition
applies to causally-interpreted RBNs, called the Recursive Causal Markov Condi-
tion (RMC). Let us indicate with NIDi the set of non-inferiors-or-descendants of
Vi and with DSupi the set of direct superiors of Vi. Then, RCMC says that
3Note that, as this example shows, an RBN may be used to represent several states of one and
the same mechanism—in this case, the RBN represents a functioning state as well as a malfunc-
tioning state. However, it need not be so used—it is also possible to build an RBN that represents
just one mechanism state by having the network variable take a unique possible value.
5
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RCMC. For any Vi ∈ V = {V1, . . . ,Vn}, Vi ⊥ NIDi | DSupi ∪ Pari.
In words, each variable in the RBN is independent of those variables that are nei-
ther its effects (i.e., descendants) nor its inferiors, conditional on its direct causes
(i.e., parents) and its direct superiors. RCMC adds to CMC the condition that vari-
ables at different levels also stand in relations that fulfil a MC, namely variables
at any level are probabilistically independent of non-inferiors or peers given their
direct superiors. Intuitively, if one knows the value of C, knowledge of the value
of constituent variables G or D doesn’t add anything to one’s ability to infer to,
say, the causes of C (here, none) or to the effects of C (here, S ). Since the screen-
ing off that holds in virtue of RMC depends on constitutional rather than causal
facts, not all dependencies identified by the RCMC can be causally interpreted.
Notice that, while some authors treat CMC as a necessary truth, others argue
against its universal validity (see, e.g., Williamson, 2005). Here a similar stance
is adopted with respect to RCMC. RCMC is a modelling assumptions in need of
testing or justification, rather than as a necessary truth. From this, it follows that
whether or not the formalism allows one to adequately represent a mechanism
is an empirical matter, rather than a matter of stipulation. For instance, whether
or not C adequately screens off S from G and D depends, among other things,
on the assumption that G and D affect S only via C. If this is not true, because
S or G participate in other mechanisms for S , RCMC is violated. Recovering
RCMC would then require including other network variables that cause S , and
that decompose into, among other variables, G and/or D.
Inference in RBNs proceeds via a formal device called a flattening. Let V =
{V1, . . . ,Vm} (m ≥ n) be the set of variables of an RBN closed under the inferior-
ity relation: i.e., V contains the variables in V , their direct inferiors, their direct
inferiors, and so on. Let N = {V j1 , . . . ,V jk} ⊆ V be the network variables in V.
For each assignment n = v j1 , . . . , v jk of values to the network variables we can
construct a standard BN, the flattening of the RBN with respect to n, denoted by
n↓, by taking as nodes the simple variables in V plus the assignments v j1 , . . . , v jk
to the network variables, and including an arrow from one variable to another if
the former is a parent or direct superior of the latter in the original RBN. The con-
ditional probability distributions are constrained by those in the original RBN—in
the RBN where V ji is the direct superior of Vi, P(Vi|Pari ∪ DSupi) = Pv ji (Vi|Pari).
Notice that MC holds in the flattening because the RCMC holds in the RBN.
Only, since the arrows in the flattening that link variables to their direct inferiors
are constitutional, CMC is not satisfied.4
4 It should now be clear that the role of RCMC—and of RBNs more generally (see fn. 1)—is
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The flattenings suffice to determine a joint distribution over the variables inV
via P(v1 · · · vm) =
∏m
i=1 P(vi|paridsupi) where the probabilities on the right-hand
side are determined by a flattening induced by v1 · · · vm.
5 In the cancer example,
for assignment c1 of network variable C we have the flattening c
↓
1
:
✒✑
✓✏
c1 ✲
❄
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❥
✒✑
✓✏
S
✒✑
✓✏
G ✲✒✑
✓✏
D
Figure 1.1.4
with probability distributions P(c1) = 1 and P(S |c1) determined by the top level
of the RBN, and with P(d1|g1c1) = Pc1(d1|g1) determined by the lower level (sim-
ilarly for g0 and d0). The flattening with respect to assignment c0 is c
↓
0
:
✒✑
✓✏
c0 ✲
❄
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❥
✒✑
✓✏
S
✒✑
✓✏
G ✒✑
✓✏
D
Figure 1.1.5
Again, P(d1|c0) = Pc0(d1) etc. In each case the required conditional distributions
are determined by the distributions given in the original RBN.
Having determined a joint distribution, the causally-interpreted RBN may, in
just the same way as can a standard causal BN, be used to draw quantitative in-
ferences for explanation and intervention, inferences that may involve variables
at the same level as well as—so we claimed in (Casini et al., 2011, §2)—across
levels.
not to define constitutional relations. With respect to the flattening, the choice of calling some
arrows ‘causal’ and other arrows ‘constitutional’ is not dictated by MC. Any use of RCMC to
find out what does (not) constitute what presupposes a prior distinction between the variables
at the different levels. Yet, given the distinction between the levels, RCMC does characterize
constitutional relations in terms of certain probabilistic dependencies and independencies.
5Pv jl (Vi | Pari) may be obtained from observed frequencies in a dataset. Instead, P(Vi |
PariDSupi) can be obtained in either of two main ways. Either one determines the corresponding
observed frequencies from the original dataset, or one selects from all functions that satisfy the
probabilistic constraints imposed by the RBN the function Q with maximum entropy (Williamson,
2010), and sets P(Vi | PariDSupi) = Q(Vi | PariDSupi).
7
Chicago, IL -79-
1.2 Multilevel causal models
According to Gebharter (2014), RBNs fail to allow interlevel causal inferences,
due to the lack of an explicit representation of interlevel causal arrows, over
which causal influence propagates. These objections, I maintain, are based on
the (mis)interpretation of RBNs. I postpone this discussion to §3.
Gebharter’s proposed formalism purports to remedy these alleged deficiencies
by decomposing causal arrows rather than variables. More precisely, mechanistic
hierarchy has for him to do with ‘marginalizing out’ variables when moving from
a lower-level graph to a higher-level graph.
Let us indicate a causal model as 〈V, E, P〉, where 〈V, E〉 is a DAG, defined over
a variable set V and a set of edges E among them, and P an associated probability
distribution. Let X ↔ Y indicate that two variables X and Y are effects of a latent
common cause, i.e., a cause of X and Y not represented within the graph of some
variable set V . Also, let us indicate with P∗ ↑ V the ‘restriction’ of the probability
distribution P∗ to variable set V . The restriction of a lower-level causal model
〈V∗, E∗, P∗〉 to a higher-level causal model 〈V, E, P〉 is so defined (2014, 147):
Restriction. 〈V, E, P〉 is a restriction of 〈V∗, E∗, P∗〉 if and only if
a V ⊂ V∗, and
b P∗ ↑ V = P, and
c for all X,Y ∈ V:
c.1 if there is a directed path from X to Y in 〈V∗, E∗〉 and no vertex on
this path different from X and Y is in V , then X → Y is in 〈V, E〉,
and
c.2 if X and Y are connected by a common cause path pi in 〈V∗, E∗〉
or by a path pi free of colliders containing a bidirected edge in
〈V∗, E∗〉, and no vertex on this path pi different from X and Y is in
V , then X ↔ Y is in 〈V, E〉, and
d no path not implied by c is in 〈V, E〉.
That is, the lower-level structure 〈V∗, E∗, P∗〉 represents the mechanism for the
higher-level structure 〈V, E, P〉 iff 〈V, E, P〉 is the restriction of 〈V∗, E∗, P∗〉 uniquely
determined when V∗ is restricted to V . The restriction is such that all and only the
directed paths and common cause paths in 〈V∗, E∗〉 are preserved by 〈V, E〉, and
the probabilistic information of P∗ is consistent with P upon marginalizing out
variables in {V∗ \ V}.
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A “multi-level causal model” (MLCM) is then so defined (2014, 148):
MLCM. 〈M1 = 〈V1, E1, P1〉, . . . ,Mn = 〈Vn, En, Pn〉〉 is a multi-level causal model
if and only if
a M1, . . . ,Mn are causal models, and
b every Mi with 1 < i ≤ n is a restriction of M1, and
c M1 satisfies CMC.
That is, a MLCM is an ordered set of causal models 〈M1 = 〈V1, E1, P1〉, . . . ,Mn =
〈Vn, En, Pn〉〉, where the bottom-level, unrestricted causal modelM1 satisfies CMC.
(Instead, higher-level models may or may not satisfy CMC.) Each causal model
in the MLCM, for Gebharter, represents a mechanism.
The information on the hierarchical relations among the nested mechanisms
in the MLCM is contained in a “level graph”, which is so defined (2014, 149):
Level graph. A graphG = 〈V, E〉 is called anMLCM 〈M1 = 〈V1, E1, P1〉, . . . ,Mn =
〈Vn, En, Pn〉〉’s level graph if and only if
a V = {M1, . . . ,Mn}, and
b for all Mi = 〈Vi, Ei, Pi〉 and M j = 〈V j, E j, P j〉 in V: Mi → M j is in G
if and only if Vi ⊂ V j and there is no Mk = 〈Vk, Ek, Pk〉 in V such that
Vi ⊂ Vk ⊂ V j holds.
A level graph G = 〈V, E〉 is constructed from a MLCM by adding dashed (non-
causal) arrows between any two models Mi and M j, Mi → M j, if and only if Vi
is the largest proper subset of V j in MLCM, so that Mi is, so to say, the smallest
restriction of M j. Here is an example of level graph from (Gebharter, 2014, 150):
Figure 1.2.1
9
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Notice that the ordering among graphs is not strict, so there may be pairs of
graphs (e.g.: M2 and M3; M4 and M3) that do not stand in a restriction relation.
Below is a more concrete illustration from (Gebharter, 2014, 151), the repre-
sentation of a water dispenser mechanism, on two levels,
Figure 1.2.2
such that M1 contains the following direct causal relations: the room temperature
T activates (and is measured by) a sensor S ; S , together with the status of a
tempering button, B, cause the heater to be on or off, H; H in turn causes the
temperature of the water dispensed, W.6
2 Criticism of MLCMs
It is debatable whether hierarchies, as represented by the level graphs in figures
1.2.1 and 1.2.2, are mechanistic—whether they represent mechanistic decompo-
sitions, and grant mechanistic explanations.
6Gebharter contrasts the virtues of this MLCM with an RBN of the ‘same’ mechanism (2014,
142-3). However, this is somewhat misleading. Gebharter’s RBN is defined over a larger variable
set, which includes a network binary variable D, superior to S and H, caused by T and B, and
causing W. It is obvious that his RBN cannot represent the same mechanism as his MLCM.
On the assumption that the RBN is faithful, it should be possible to order the RBN’s flattening
(Gebharter, 2014, 144), call it M0, as prior with respect to M1—since M1’s variable set V1 is
{V0 \ D}. However, M1 is incompatible with the restriction of M0 obtained by marginalizing out
D, call this M1∗ . (M1∗ would contain S ↔ H, S ↔ W, H ↔ W and B → S . Instead, M1 contains
S → H, H → W and B → H.) Thus, rather than one model being a correct representation and
the other being a wrong representation of one and the same mechanism, the two models represent
different mechanisms, and are thus are not directly comparable. In the following, I shall defend
RBNs with reference to the toy model introduced in §1.1.
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First, it is not clear if MLCMs adequately represent mechanistic decomposi-
tions. High-level causal models in a MLCM, for instance models M2 in figure
1.2.1, are just more coarse-grain representations of one and the same mechanism,
viz. M1, such that some of the information in M1 is missing at the higher level,
as the term ‘restriction’ suggests. Is, for instance, T → S → H → W a mech-
anistic decomposition of T → W, although entities and properties involved are
the same at both levels, and only some activities (or relations) are different? Per-
haps this counts as a different, equally legitimate, notion of decomposition, call it
decomposition∗. The question is: How intuitive is decomposition∗?
Second, it is not clear if MLCMs adequately represent mechanistic explana-
tions. One may concede that there is a legitimate sense in which one explains the
relation between, say, the room temperature T and the water temperature W by
blowing up the process from the former to the latter and uncovering the mediating
role of the sensor S and the heater H. However, this sort of explanation is differ-
ent from the equally legitimate explanation whereby one redescribes the cancer
mechanism C in figure 1.1.1 into more fine-grain terms, and uncovers the role of
damage G and response D. G and D have an obvious mechanistic role. Instead,
S and H seem to have an etiological role. Perhaps S and H still explain mech-
anistically, according to some different notion of mechanistic explanation, call it
explanation∗. But just how intuitive is explanation∗?
The counterintuitive nature of decomposition∗ and explanation∗ is made more
explicit by a careful scrutiny of the level graph in figure 1.2.1. To begin with, con-
sider the ‘decompositions’ that correspond to restricting (i) V1 to V2, (ii) V1 to V3,
and (iii) V3 to V5. In all such cases, instead of opening a black box (as is common
in mechanistic explanation), one ‘creates’ a box, and does not, strictly speaking,
decompose anything. Let us consider (i). Here the decomposition is ‘filling a
blank’: the absence of probabilistic and causal dependencies among variables is
explained by direct causation, a hidden common cause structure, or combinations
thereof that involve new variables, too. The absence of probabilistic and causal
dependencies between X and Z in M2 is explained by the structure X ↔ Y ← Z
in M1 (more on this alleged case of ‘explanation’ below). Since there is no arrow
between X and Z in M2, and since mechanisms require causal dependencies, what
mechanism is X ↔ Y ← Z in M1 a decomposition of? Next, consider cases (ii)
and (iii). Here the decomposition is in fact ‘adding stuff’. For instance, Z ↔ W
in M5 is ‘decomposed’ into Y ← Z ↔ W in M3. But in what sense is a lower-
level mechanism that includes an isolated effect not included in the higher level a
decomposition of the higher level mechanism?
Relatedly, to some of the represented restrictions do not seem to correspond
11
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‘explanations’ either. Consider the restriction of M4 to M5. Here, the common
cause structure Z ↔ W is ‘explained’ by the absence of probabilistic or causal
dependence between Z and a new variable X, which is apparently disconnected
from whatever mechanism is responsible for Z ↔ W. An even more striking case
of lack of explanation is the ‘decomposition’ of X and Z in M2 into X ↔ Y ← Z
in M1. A first and more obvious issue, which is clearly non-intentional, is that the
presence of a bidirected arrow in M1 violates condition c of a MLCM, namely that
M1 satisfies CMC.
7 Still, even if condition c is satisfied, the more general problem
remains that, if decompositions are to explain, this sort of decomposition should
not be allowed at any level. Intuitively, hidden common cause structures such
as X ↔ Y are just that, hidden, and thus non-explanatory. They add a mystery
rather than remove it. A—drastic—solution that immediately comes to mind is to
forbid bidirected arrows at any level. This would entail, however, that restrictions
that marginalize out common causes are disallowed, too, which is undesirable
because—if one buys into the MLCM framework—the corresponding decompo-
sitions would seem (more) explanatory. One may of course impose further condi-
tions that distinguish good from bad restrictions. However, it is not obvious how
one should proceed in a non ad hoc way, in the absence of clear intuitions on the
explanatory value of bidirected causal arrows.
The above reasons lead to scepticism about the formalism’s capacity to rep-
resent mechanistic decompositions and explanations. Such worries are in part,
but not fully, mitigated by the (orthogonal) suggestion in (Gebharter and Kaiser,
2014) that levels be ontologically distinct and the requirement that hierarchical
relations are (partly) defined by constitutional part-whole relations.
In our approach one can generate a hierarchic causal model by replac-
ing such a causal arrow [between two variables X and Y] by another
causal structure. This causal structure should be on a lower ontolog-
ical level than X and Y , it should contain at least one constitutively
relevant part of X and at least one of Y , and there should be at least
one causal path going from the former to the latter at the micro- level.
(Gebharter and Kaiser, 2014, §3.6)
In the paper, Gebharter and Kaiser focus on modelling this sort of hierarchical
relation with reference to the inhibitory feedback mechanism for the regulation of
7Gebharter himself emphasizes that “the graph of a causal model that contains bidirected ar-
rows no longer determines the Markov factorization [...].” (2014, 146, fn. 8).
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the biosynthesis of fatty acids in Brassica napus. The mechanism may be repre-
sented as follows (see figure 1.2).
Figure 2
The product of a reaction pathway, in this case the 18:1-acyl carrier protein (P)
acts as a feedback signal, which inhibits an enzyme earlier in the pathway, in this
case the plastidic acetyl-CoA carboxylase (ACCase), whose operation promotes
the production of P itself via the transformation of the substrate acetyl-CoA (S ).
ACCase has two relevant properties: it is a (positive) cause of the concentration
of P (Eactive); and it is (in its P-bound state) an effect of the concentration of P
(EP−bound). EP−bound is in turn a (negative) cause of Eactive (because P-bound AC-
Case becomes inactive) and so on and so forth, in a cycle. In addition, Eactive is also
a negative cause on EP−bound, which is represented by a negative influence on S .
Between the binding of P to E and the inactivation of E a lower-level mechanism
takes place, namely the conformational change of the substrate binding site. The
binding B between functional groups of 18:1-acyl and the effector interaction site
of the enzyme causes an allosteric switch X, which in turn brings about changes
at sites S 2 and S 4 of the enzyme ACCase. This, then, prevents the substrate from
being able to bind to the enzyme.8
It is now demanded that the levels be ontologically distinct, partly by way
of decomposing properties, rather than just the relation EP−bound → Eactive, as
follows: B is a property of a part contained in the whole that has the property
EP−bound; and S 4 and S 2 are properties of parts contained in the whole that has
the property Eactive. Between parts and wholes there are relations of constitutive
8To get a causal model, Gebharter and Kaiser propose that the causal graph in figure 1.2 be
associated with a probability distribution over a variable set that unrolls the cycle, so as to get
a dynamic causal graph. This way of treating cycles is similar to the one adopted in the RBN
approach (Clarke et al., 2014), with the notable difference that MC is not satisfied here (see below).
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rather than causal relevance, in the sense of Craver (2007): a change in a part
results in a change in the whole, and vice versa. More precisely, constitutive
relations are represented by dashed two-headed arrows that stand at either side of
the decomposition relation. As a result, decomposing arrows should apparently
explain both causally and constitutionally.
Gebharter and Kaiser require that a causal arrow X → Y is decomposed by a
lower-level causal structure only if it contains at least one constitutively relevant
part of X and at least one of Y , and there is at least one causal path going from the
former to the latter at the microlevel (2014). This eliminates two counterintuitive
features of MLCMs, namely that mechanistic decompositions may ‘fill blanks’
(there must be a higher-level relation to begin with) and ‘add stuff’ (there must
be at least one lower-level causal path). Still, two questions arise, related to the
interpretation of the dashed bidirected arrows.
First, is this interpretation of mechanistic hierarchy compatible with MLCMs?
As Gebharter and Kaiser notice, “since the two-headed dashed arrows in our hi-
erarchic dynamic CM transport the influences of interventions in both directions,
CMC does not hold in such models”. Since M1 would contain bidirected arrows,
too, it would not satisfy CMC. This entails that the Brassica napus mechanism
cannot be represented by the MLCM formalism.
Second, does the causal model in (Gebharter and Kaiser, 2014, §3.5) of-
fer an adequate formal representation of a mechanistic hierarchy, alternative to
MCLMs? I think that a positive answer would require that constitutional relations
be ascribed distinctive formal properties. Although constitutional relations are
characterized informally by part-whole relations, they don’t come with distinc-
tive probabilistic features, as one would expect from a probabilistic representation
of mechanistic hierarchies. In contrast, RBNs do offer a probabilistic character-
ization of constitution: properties at different levels that stand in a constitutional
relation relate to other properties as described by RCMC.9
3 Defense of RBNs
Still, the shortcomings of MLCMs would be a small consolation for the RBN ad-
vocate, if RBNs did not survive the objections raised by Gebharter (2014) and
Gebharter and Kaiser (2014). In this section I will consider, and try to rebut, such
objections one by one. RBNs interpret mechanistic hierarchy via the operation of
9To reiterate a point already made in fn. 4, RCMC does not itself distinguish the levels, and
thus it cannot be used to define constitution. Still, it does characterize it.
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‘recursive decomposition’, which in turn depends on RCMC. Two kinds of ob-
jections are raised against RCMC. First, about empirical adequacy: it is unclear
when RCMC holds, so it is unclear if the formalism is applicable to real mech-
anisms. Second, about conceptual adequacy: RCMC prevents RBNs from being
useful for interlevel reasoning for explanation and intervention. Let us begin with
the first objection:
it is neither obvious that RCMC holds in general, nor is it clear how
one could distinguish cases in which it holds from cases in which it
does not. (Gebharter and Kaiser, 2014, §3.5.3)
Agreed, RCMC may not hold in general. But Casini et al. (2011) don’t claim that
it does. When does it hold, then? What RCMC adds to CMC, which is not called
into question here, is RMC. RMC has to do with the (in)dependencies among
variables at different levels. In the cancer example, RMC depends on C screening
off G and D from S .
Gebharter and Kaiser then argue that the RBN approach would be unable to
adequately model the EP−bound → Eactive mechanistic decomposition:
it is not clear how the submechanism represented by EP−bound →
Eactive could be analyzed in Casini et al.’s (2011) approach. They
would need to add a network variable N between EP−bound → Eactive
(EP−bound → N → Eactive). But then and because there is no interme-
diate (macro-level) cause N between EP−bound and Eactive, it is unclear
what this network variable N should represent at the mechanism’s
macro-level. (Gebharter and Kaiser, 2014, §3.5.3)
I do not dispute that there may be cases where it is hard or implausible to find
network variables that stand for lower-level causal structures. However, this is an
empirical problem, and not necessarily a problem with the formalism. RBNs are
meant to represent a natural decomposition strategy of functional properties into
structural properties. The structural properties may be then regarded as functional
with respect to other structural properties, and so on and so forth. When does
a network variable N exist? This depends on identifying properties at different
levels, which in turn depends on a meaningful distinction between the levels.
I propose a few conditions for distinguishing between variables in a consti-
tutional relation.10 First, between the whole and its parts are mereological rela-
tions, such that properties of the whole can be explained by their probabilistic
10I don’t claim that the list is exhaustive or that each of the listed conditions is necessary.
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dependence on the structure of (causal relations among) its parts’ properties. Sec-
ond, properties at the different levels have different explanatory roles, such that
they typically enter into causal explanations involving different sets of properties.
Third, there is a difference in epistemic conditions, such that the way one ob-
serves, or intervenes on, a variable at some higher level does not coincide with
the the way one observes, and intervenes on, one of its constituting variables at
the lower level.11 When a distinction between variables informed by the above
conditions is possible, the distinction between the levels seems legitimate.12
A network variable N exists insofar as the lower-level BN is the decomposi-
tion of one functional property, which, according to the aforementioned criteria,
corresponds to a whole’s property that has its own explanatory role and epistemic
autonomy. These conditions seem satisfied by many descriptions of mechanisms
in science. For instance, tissues are made of cells. Scientists talk of the cancerous
state of a tissue as having an explanatory role with respect to survival. One may
observe the state of a tissue or change it, for instance by replacing the whole tis-
sue. One may use this knowledge to then infer to the probability of survival. This
does not require knowing, or (surgically) intervening on, the state of GF. 13
Finally, let us come to the objection that RBNs do not support interlevel rea-
soning for explanation and for prediction of the results of interventions:
[Casini et al.’s] approach does (i) not allow for a graphical represen-
tation of how a mechanism’s macro variables are causally connected
to the mechanism’s causal micro structure, which is essential when it
comes to causal explanation, and it (ii) leads to the fatal consequence
that a mechanism’s macro variables’ values cannot be changed by
any intervention on the mechanism’s micro structure whatsoever [. . . ]
(Gebharter, 2014, 139)
Explanation first. Since there are no arrows between variable at different levels
screened off by network variables, Gebharter claims that it is unclear over which
causal paths probabilistic influence propagates between such higher- and lower-
level variables (cf. 2014, 143-4). I reply that it is true, there are no such arrows.
11Baumgartner and Gebharter (2014) develop this intuition into a ‘fat-handedness’ criterion for
constitution. (Ironically, there an argument is proposed to defend an interpretation of mechanistic
hierarchy based on decomposing variables rather than arrows.)
12The conditions only provide a useful heuristics. They do not belong to the RBN formalism.
Still, RBNs give a probabilistic characterization of constitution, thanks to RCMC (cf. fn. 4).
13For more realistic examples, see (Casini et al., 2011), (Clarke et al., 2014) and (Casini, 2014).
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But this is because, by assumption, screened off variables influence each other, if
at all, only via the network variables. So, when RCMC is satisfied, the probabilis-
tic influence propagates constitutionally (rather than causally) across the dashed
arrows in the flattenings, and causally across the same-level solid arrows.
Let us now consider the second objection. With reference to the example in
figures 1.1.4 and 1.1.5, I claimed that one may, for instance, reason about the result
of a lower-level intervention on D on the probability of the higher-level variable
S . Given the observed value of P(s1), calculated as
P(s1) = P(c0)P(s1|c0) + P(c1)P(s1|c1),
one may ask: What is the effect of setting D = d1 on the probability of observing
S = s1? To answer, one calculates as follows. First, one removes the arrow
G → D from c1, so that both flattenings have the same structure below.
✒✑
✓✏
ci ✲
❄
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❥
✒✑
✓✏
S
✒✑
✓✏
G ✒✑
✓✏
D
Figure 3.1
Then, one calculates P(s1||d1) = P(s1d1)/P(d1), where:
P(s1d1) = P(c0s1d1) + P(c1s1d1) = P(c0)P(s1|c0)Pc0(d1) + P(c1)P(s1|c1)Pc1(d1);
P(d1) = P(c0)Pc0(d1) + P(c1)Pc1(d1).
Gebharter objects that “according to the RBN approach, intervening on a
mechanism’s microvariables does not have any probabilistic influence on any
one of the macrovariables whatsoever” (2014, 145) because if one were to use
an intervention variable I to intervene on a lower-level variable, the intervention
“would—and this can directly be read off the BN’s associated graph’s topology
[...]—not have any probabilistic influence on any macrovariable at all” (ibid.). In
the cancer example: an intervention IR on Rwould not have any effect on S . There
is either one of the following problems with this objection.
First, it is true that ci screens off D from S , and thus there is no D → S causal
arrow. However, concluding that interventions on R can make no difference to S
would be wrong. The lack of causal connections in the flattening does not block
17
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changes along constitutional arrows. It is important to stress that, although the
dashed arrows point downwards in the flattening, this is due to technical reasons
only, having to do with the condition for MC to hold across levels. Still, one
may use the downward-pointing arrows to reason—constitutionally—in both di-
rections. Here, changing D makes a constitutional difference to C, which makes a
causal difference to S . The overall difference is calculated with the RBN.
Second, there may be a more basic interpretive problem regarding how inter-
ventions are represented in RBNs. True, RCMC says that S is independent of any
variable that is not an effect or an inferior (here, none), conditional on its direct
causes (here, C) and direct superiors (here, none). But notice that RCMC is as-
sumed to hold true of variables inV = {M, S ,G,D}, and not of such an expanded
V+ = {M, S ,G,D, ID}. The reason for this is not ad hoc. RBNs are meant to
represent decompositions of (properties of) wholes into (properties of) their parts.
They are not meant to represent parts that do not belong to any whole—which
is what ID is. The graph topology cannot represent such parts. As a result, one
cannot read off the graph topology that such interventions variables have no effect.
More generally, in an RBN, everything one gets at lower levels must be the result
of (recursively) decomposing the top level.
This should not be seen as a limitation, but as a means to achieve some
end. In the RBN formalism one cannot represent interventions as variables—
unless the variables describe properties of either the top level mechanism or of
submechanisms at some lower level, obtained by way of (recursive) decomposi-
tions. But this would mean that the intervention is not external to the mechanism,
contrary to the original intention. One can, instead, straightforwardly represent
interventions as (new) values of either top-level variables or lower-level variables
into which network variables (recursively) decompose. The two ways correspond
to two well-known ways for representing interventions. Woodward (2003)’inter-
ventionist semantics, which represents interventions as variables, is an example
of the former. Pearl (2000)’s do-calculus, which represents interventions as val-
ues of variables, is an an example of the latter. Although both representations are
legitimate, only the latter is suitable to the task for which RBNs were developed,
namely to represent mechanistic decompositions.
Conclusion
Decomposing variables and decomposing arrows are two very natural options for
representing mechanistic hierarchies by means of BNs. These two options have
18
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -90-
been made precise by two formalisms, RBNs and MLCMs. I argued that RBNs
are better than MLCMs at analysing mechanistic hierarchies and interpreting the
interlevel reasoning that depends on them. Still, one might think that the two for-
malisms are not in competition against one another. Perhaps RBNs and MLCMs
represent two different ways in which mechanistic decompositions cab obtain?
Since ‘marginalizing out’ and ‘recursively decomposing’ are very different no-
tions, I want to caution against interpreting the two formalisms as two species of
the same genus. Having said this, I do not exclude that there is a sound way to
formalize the intuition in (Gebharter and Kaiser, 2014), and thus develop an al-
ternative analysis of mechanistic hierarchy with respect to RBNs. In that case, it
would be interesting to see how this alternative relates to RBNs.
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Abstract
A primary goal of quantum computer science is to find an explanation for the fact that
quantum computers are more powerful than classical computers. In this paper I argue that
to answer this question is to compare algorithmic processes of various kinds, and in so
doing to describe the possibility spaces associated with these processes. By doing this we
explain how it is possible for one process to outperform its rival. Further, in this and
similar examples little is gained in subsequently asking a how-actually question. Once
one has explained how-possibly there is little left to do.
Word count: 4,927.
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1 Introduction
There is a distinction that is sometimes made in the scholarship on scientific explanation
between explaining why and explaining how-possibly. In the ontic context, where the
explanations one gives aim at describing salient features of actual physical systems, the
former is sometimes also called how-actually explanation.1 That how-actually explanation
actually explains is uncontroversial; however it is less clear just what if any explanatory merit
there is in explaining how some event possibly came about. Partly for this reason, the
literature on how-possibly explanation is comparatively sparse, and the few who have
commented on the topic are of varying opinion with regard to its virtues. While some view
how-possibly explanation as genuinely explanatory, others have argued that how-possibly
‘explanation’ is better thought of as a mere heuristic device and not as constituting genuine
explanation at all. Still others have thought of how-possibly explanation as a kind of
incomplete how-actually explanation—a stepping stone on the way to the how-actually
explanation that one ultimately seeks.
Below I will consider a question which I will argue sheds light on this issue. It is drawn
from the science of quantum computation. Quantum computation is a fruitful merger of the
fields of physics and computer science, and one of the goals of this science is to determine the
source of the power of quantum computers; i.e., to search for the explanation of the fact that
quantum computers can in general (and sometimes dramatically) outperform classical
computers. What I will argue is the following: to answer this question is to compare
algorithmic processes of various kinds, and in so doing to describe the possibility spaces
1For more on the distinction between ontic, epistemic, and modal forms of explanation,
see Salmon (1984).
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associated with these processes. By doing this we explain how it is possible for one process to
outperform its rival. Further, and importantly, in examples like these little if anything is
gained in subsequently asking a how-actually question. Once one has answered the
how-possibly question there is little left to do.
I will close by suggesting that the search for the explanation of the power of quantum
computation is just one example of a species of how-possibly question that is likely to be
found in many other sciences as well.
2 How-possibly Explanation
The first mention of how-possibly explanation is likely that of Dray (1957). Dray’s primary
goal in that book is to assess the adequacy of the ‘covering law model’ of explanation for
characterising historical explanation. The model is so-called because it involves the
subsumption of a particular set of initial conditions under a law or a set of laws (Hempel and
Oppenheim, 1948). Dray’s verdict is that the covering law model fails to capture many
interesting senses of historical explanation. One of the ways in which it is inadequate,
according to Dray, is that the covering law model insists that any explanation of a given fact
must show why, necessarily, that fact had to occur, since the statement of the fact to be
explained must be deductively entailed by the statements of the relevant laws and initial
conditions.2 Dray insists, however, that not all historical explanations are why-necessarily
explanations.
An announcer broadcasting a baseball game from Victoria B.C., said: “It’s a long
2This is the case for Hempel and Oppenheim’s Deductive-Nomological (D-N) model of
explanation. Statistical explanations require only inductive support (Hempel, 1965). For our
purposes we need only detain ourselves with the former.
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fly ball to centre field, and it’s going to hit high up on the fence. The centre
fielder’s back, he’s under it, he’s caught it, and the batter is out.” Listeners who
knew the fence was twenty feet high couldn’t figure out how the fielder caught the
ball. Spectators could have given the unlikely explanation. At the rear of centre
field was a high platform for the scorekeeper. The centre fielder ran up the ladder
and caught the ball twenty feet above the ground (from Maclean’s Magazine, as
cited in Dray 1957, 158).
What is explained here, for Dray, is not exactly why the ball landed in the centre fielder’s
glove. Rather, what is dispelled is the initial puzzlement on the part of the listener upon
hearing about the catch. This puzzlement is removed once she is told of the scorekeeper’s
ladder, for the ladder explains how the catch was possible: it opens up a range of possibilities
that would not have been present without it. Of course one can still ask: “why, exactly, did the
ball land in his glove?” However to do so, for Dray, is to ask a logically different question.
The how-possibly question is answered once we have been told about the ladder.
Hempel and Oppenheim’s covering law model, with its exclusive emphasis on
why-necessarily questions, was, for many years, the ‘received view’ on scientific explanation.
But although similar conceptions continue to be defended, there is no longer a near consensus,
and indeed many have taken a pluralistic attitude (or at any rate remained agnostic), on the
question of whether an all-encompassing model of scientific explanation exists.3 Despite this,
how-possibly explanation has received comparatively little attention (as compared with, say,
causal explanation). But it has received some. There are those, for instance, who reject
outright the very idea of how-possibly explanation—Reiner (1993, 68) goes so far as to call
3See, for instance, Woodward (2003), who productively focuses his energies on
explicating one particular type of explanation.
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its promotion and proliferation a “sociological risk”—however the majority of the debate
surrounding how-possibly explanation centres around the sense and extent to which it (in
Dray’s or perhaps some other formulation4) is explanatory.
Thus even Hempel grants to Dray that there is some sense in which a how-possibly account
explains. Nevertheless, he argues, upon hearing it the questioner will invariably desire to be
told why the event necessarily occurred if he is to be fully satisfied (Hempel, 1965, 429). For
Hempel, the role of how-possibly explanation is primarily pragmatic: it motivates the
questioner to ask a further why-necessarily question. For Resnik (1991, 143), on the other
hand, how-possibly explanation and how-actually explanation are of the same kind, and differ
only in the degree to which they are empirically supported. That is, a how-possibly
explanation is a how-actually explanation that enjoys no more than speculative supporting
evidence, yet nevertheless displays other explanatory virtues like fruitfulness. Salmon’s
(1989, 137) conception is similar.
Forber (2010), in contrast, views how-possibly and how-actually explanation as different in
kind. What Resnik refers to as how-possibly explanation is, for Forber, no more than an
4Dray’s account is sometimes thought to rely overmuch on psychology: for Dray, recall,
one explains how-possibly to dispel a questioner’s puzzlement at having witnessed or been
told of some event. One can do away with this psychological element, however, by
explicating surprise in epistemic terms; i.e., as a prima facie tension between the fact to be
explained and the questioner’s body of knowledge absent some additional piece of
information. This latter is what is provided by a how-possibly explanation. Other approaches
to modifying Dray’s view so that it is more conformant to ontic conceptions of explanation
have also been considered (see Persson, 2012).
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incomplete how-actually explanation.5 Explaining how-possibly, for Forber, is not this but a
kind of formal inquiry: given a set of relevant background assumptions, one deduces (e.g., via
computer simulation) a particular set of outcomes reachable from them. For instance, let the
assumptions consist of known biological laws relevant to a particular population, plus a
specification of a set of variable parameters, and let the different outcomes represent various
genotypes associated with that population. Then, when one runs such a simulation, the
different paths by which it arrives at a particular outcome carve up the possibility space for
that outcome—they represent a set of how-possibly explanations corresponding to it.6
Explaining how-actually, in contrast, is a form of empirical inquiry: its aim is to determine
which of these possible explanations is the actual one.
A further mode of how-possibly explanation, described by Persson, “aims to establish the
existence of a mechanism by which X could be, and was, generated without filling in all the
details” (Persson, 2012, 275). Key to Persson’s conception is the empirical determination of
some actually existing mechanism responsible for X. It is thus distinct from Resnik’s
conception of how-possibly explanation as inadequately supported how-actually explanation.
It is also distinct from Forber’s conception of how-possibly explanation, which recall is not a
form of empirical inquiry at all. Nevertheless it is how-possibly and not how-actually
explanation because, although one describes an actual mechanism responsible for X,
5One could be forgiven for thinking this merely a dispute over labels. In Forber’s defence,
his view is more in the spirit of Dray’s original account, who recall, viewed how-possibly and
how-actually questions as logically different.
6Forber distinguishes between global and local how-possibly explanations. The former
utilise highly idealised background assumptions. The latter are directed at real populations
and utilise richer, empirically grounded, assumptions.
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -98-
information is missing from our description of the mechanism which would allow us to
determine the precise (typically causal) pathway by which X was brought about. Thus one has
not given an account of how the event actually occurred.
In the modes of explaining how-possibly identified so far, the questioner is required, or at
any rate it is perfectly sensible for her, to continue on to ask the how-actually question. Thus
for Hempel she (at least in interesting cases; see Hempel 1965, 429) will not be fully satisfied
until she answers the how-actually question. On Resnik’s conception, how-possibly questions
are just how-actually explanations that have not been adequately confirmed, and it goes
without saying that we should try and confirm them. For Persson it is not confirming but
“filling in” of the mechanism which remains to be done. On Forber’s conception, explaining
how-possibly is in no way inferior to explaining how-actually, yet both play an essential role
in our inquiries into phenomena. For Dray, pace Hempel, sometimes one is thoroughly
satisfied with a how-possibly explanation. Nevertheless it is perfectly sensible to go on and
ask exactly how the centre fielder caught the ball once he was at the top of the ladder.
The kind of how-possibly explanation I describe in the next section bears certain
resemblances to both Persson’s and Forber’s conceptions. As in Persson’s conception it
involves the description of some mechanism actually responsible for producing an outcome.
Unlike in Persson’s conception, in this case there are no relevant details of the mechanism left
to fill in. On the other hand, the way the mechanism explains, as in Forber’s conception, is
that it carves out a particular possibility space for an outcome. But unlike all of the
conceptions reviewed above, once one has answered the how-possibly question in this case, it
is doubtful that a how-actually explanation can give us anything more of substance.7
7Which of these conceptions is right? With Persson I would maintain these are all
legitimate senses of explaining how-possibly. Which one is ‘correct’ will be relative to the
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3 Explaining Quantum Speedup
A basic distinction, in Computational Complexity Theory, is between those computational
problems amenable to an efficient solution in terms of time and/or space resources, and those
that are not. Easy (or ‘tractable’, ‘feasible’, ‘efficiently solvable’, etc.) problems have
solutions which involve resources bounded by a polynomial in the input size, n (n is typically
the number of bits used to represent the input). Hard problems are those which are not easy;
i.e., they require resources that are ‘exponential’ in n, i.e., that grow faster than any
polynomial in n (Nielsen and Chuang, 2000, p. 139).8 For example, a problem which requires
≈ nc time steps to solve in the worst case (for some constant c) is polynomial in n and thus
tractable according to this definition. A problem that requires ≈ cn steps, on the other hand, is
exponential in n therefore intractable according to this definition.
‘Quantum speedup’ refers to the fact that some computational problems can be solved
exponentially faster with a quantum computer than with any known classical computer.9 For
example, the fastest known classical algorithm for factoring the product of two unknown
primes is exponential in n. Shor’s quantum algorithm, astoundingly, solves the problem in
polynomial time (Nielsen and Chuang, 2000, 216). But while the fact of quantum speedup is
almost beyond doubt,10 its source is still a matter of debate within the scientific community.
specific question asked.
8The term ‘exponential’ is being used rather loosely here. Functions such as nlog n are
called ‘exponential’ since they grow faster than any polynomial function, but they do not grow
as fast as a true exponential such as 2n.
9Research into quantum computing is still largely in the theoretical stage. However there
is good reason to be optimistic that practical implementations will be realised eventually (see
Aaronson, 2013, Ch. 15).
10There is currently no proof that the class of problems efficiently solvable by quantum
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void SelectionSort(int intsToSort[], int lengthOfList) {
// Declare list indices:
int i, j, indexOfLowestNum;
// For each position in the list,
for (i = 0; i < lengthOfList − 1; i++) {
// provisionally assert that it points to the lowest number,
indexOfLowestNum = i;
// and then for each of the other list positions,
for (j = lengthOfList − 1; j > i; j−−) {
// if the number pointed to by it is less than the number
// pointed to by indexOfLowestNum,
if (intsToSort[j] < intsToSort[indexOfLowestNum]) {
// then make this the new provisional minimum index.
indexOfLowestNum = j;
}
}
// At the end of the ith iteration, put the number that is in the
// indexOfLowestNum position into the ith position (and vice versa).
Swap(&intsToSort[i], &intsToSort[indexOfLowestNum]);
}
}
Figure 1: A set of instructions (in C) implementing the ‘SelectionSort’ solution to the problem
of sorting a list of given integers.
According to Fortnow (2003), for instance, the explanation of quantum speedup lies in the
ability of quantum systems to exhibit ‘interference’. For Ekert and Jozsa (1998), on the other
hand, it is their ability to exhibit ‘entanglement’.
We will consider these explanations in a little more detail later. For now let us ask: what
kind of question is one asking when one asks to have quantum speedup explained? It is
clearly an ontic question, for it aims to identify particular characteristics of physical systems.
It is also a how question, if anything is, for it asks, specifically, for the distinctive mechanism
by which quantum computers operate. It remains to consider whether it is a how-possibly or a
how-actually question.
Consider figure 1. Depicted there is an instance of the ‘SelectionSort’ algorithm for sorting
computer is larger than the class efficiently solvable by classical computer, however other
results make the truth of this statement very likely (see Aaronson, 2013, Ch. 10).
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a given list of integers. If given, say, the numbers (25, 12, 13, 19, 8), then after a certain time a
computer running this code will produce: (8, 12, 13, 19, 25). Now if we examine the
algorithm, we notice that in the worst case (indeed, in any case) there will be n − 1
comparisons in the first iteration, n− 2 comparisons in the second, n− 3 in the third, and so on
(where n is the number of list items). This gives a total of n(n − 1)/2 comparisons; thus our
total worst-case running time is proportional to n2. SelectionSort is not the only algorithm for
sorting integers. Both faster and slower algorithms exist. For instance, the ‘MergeSort’
algorithm has a worst-case running time ∝ n log(n) (Mehlhorn and Sanders, 2008).
Suppose we are comparing the running times of various algorithms. I feed some random
permutation of a list of n integers to my algorithm (which implements SelectionSort) and you
feed one to yours (which implements MergeSort). After a time we both obtain the list in sorted
order. Yours finishes after k ≤ n log(n) steps. Mine finishes after n log(n) < l ≤ n2 steps. What
is the explanation for this difference in performance? Well, one way to explain it is just to
point to the differences in the code for the two algorithms. But what does this code represent?
Certainly it does not represent some one particular linear causal sequence of transitions, for
the if as well as the for loops encode conditional statements. Rather, it represents a space of
possibilities: a set of pathways by which the computer can arrive at a particular result. It turns
out that the pathways available to a computer implementing MergeSort allow a solution to be
reached in fewer time steps than the pathways available to one implementing SelectionSort.
Something similar can be said when comparing different classes of machine. Consider, for
instance, figure 2. ‘State transition diagrams’ such as these are essentially just another way of
representing algorithms, although the representation they afford is somewhat ‘closer to the
hardware’, so to speak. The machine depicted is an example of a deterministic finite
automaton (DFA). It is not the only kind of computing machine. There are also, for instance,
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q0start q1
a
0
1
1
0
0
1
Figure 2: A state diagram representation of a deterministic finite automaton (DFA). Binary
strings of variable length are input to the automaton. They are ‘accepted’ if the machine is
found to be in the state a after the last character has been read. This particular machine will
accept any string ending in ‘10’.
nondeterministic finite automata, deterministic and nondeterministic ‘pushdown’ automata,
and deterministic and nondeterministic Turing machines, to name a few. To define these
various classes of machine, we describe the possible states and state transitions which they are
capable of. For example, DFAs are characterised by a finite set of states, deterministic
transitions between states, and the lack of any form of external storage (see Martin, 1997).
Given our characterisations of different types of machine, we can inquire about the set of
problems computable by the machines of a particular class. It turns out, for example, that
DFAs are severely limited with respect to the class of problems they are capable of solving,
while Turing machines, in contrast, are capable of solving any effectively calculable function.
We can similarly ask about the resources required to solve particular classes of computational
problems by machines of a particular sort. We can ask, for instance, about the class of
problems solvable by a deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time, about those
solvable by a nondeterministic Turing machine in exponential time, and so on. Answering
these and other similar questions will involve appealing to the states and to the state
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transitions which are possible for a particular class of machine. This state space, we will say,
allows us to construct such a machine to realise an algorithm that will solve the problem in a
given amount of time.
The question, “what is the source of quantum speedup?”, is a question of just this sort.
Quantum computers are just another type of computational machine, and just as for Turing
machines and DFAs, quantum computers have associated with them a particular space of
states and a particular way of transitioning between states. In order to answer the question
“what is the source of quantum speedup?”, therefore, we will appeal precisely to the quantum
mechanical state space and to the allowable transitions within it, and we will consider these in
comparison to the space of states and state transitions possible for a classical computer. And
when we do so we will be explaining how-possibly.
We see this, in fact, when we examine the approaches that those in the scientific community
have taken to answering this question. Consider Fortnow (2003), for example, who develops
an abstract mathematical framework for representing both the computational complexity
classes associated with classical and with quantum computing. In Fortnow’s framework, both
kinds of computation are represented by transition matrices which determine the allowable
transitions between possible configurations of a particular kind of machine. To represent the
quantum case, Fortnow allows matrix entries to be negative as well as positive, while for the
classical case they may only be positive. As a result, in the quantum case matrix entries will
sometimes cancel each other out when summed; not so in the classical case. Fortnow shows
that this suffices to capture the computational complexity classes associated with classical and
quantum computing. According to Fortnow, this means that the fundamental difference
between quantum and classical computation is that in quantum computation there can
sometimes be interference between computational paths: “The strength of quantum
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computing lies in the ability to have bad computation paths eliminate each other thus causing
some good paths to occur with larger probability” (Fortnow, 2003, p. 606).11 Ekert and Jozsa
(1998), on the other hand, argue that the fact that quantum systems can sometimes be in
entangled states yields a state space for combined quantum systems that is exponentially
larger than the state space associated with combined classical systems.12 And while it is
possible to, in a roundabout way, simulate this larger state space with a classical computer, the
resource cost of doing so scales exponentially (ibid., 1771).13
11In the ‘many worlds’ interpretation (Hewitt-Horsman, 2009), of course, all of these paths
would be actual and not merely possible. Perhaps. But I do not think it prudent to hinge one’s
views on scientific explanation on a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics (further,
see Cuffaro 2012 for some strong reasons to be skeptical of the many worlds view in the
context of quantum computing). This is moot in any case. When a quantum computer finds
itself in a state like |ψ〉 = |000〉i| f (000)〉o + |001〉i| f (001)〉o + · · · + |111〉i| f (111)〉o we do not, in
order to make sense of Fortnow’s analysis, need to take the terms in this superposition to
represent either actual or possible computational paths. Rather, what is important is only that
the possible states of a quantum computer, unlike those of a classical computer, include
superpositions like |ψ〉 which have interfering terms.
12A system of two or more particles is said to be entangled when one cannot describe one
of the particles in the system without referring to all of the others.
13There is disagreement here between Fortnow and Ekert and Jozsa. Does this undermine
my view? I would say not. We have here two potential how-possibly explanations of quantum
speedup. Further empirical research, presumably, will help to decide which of these
how-possibly explanations is correct. One might investigate, for instance, whether cases exist
in which a quantum algorithm is efficiently classically simulable despite the fact that it utilises
entangled states.
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But is this really explaining how-possibly? Isn’t it the case, one might object, that an
algorithm like SelectionSort just is a description of how a system actually goes about solving
a problem, and likewise that a description of the state space and state transitions associated
with a particular class of system just is a description of the actual resources used by those
systems? These mechanisms are actually being employed, are they not? Of course this is true.
In the same way, Dray’s centre fielder actually used the ladder to make the catch that he did.
But that is not a how-actually explanation, and neither are these. For Dray the role played by a
description of the ladder in the explanation of the fielder’s catch is to dispel the questioner’s
puzzlement regarding how the catch was possible, without explaining exactly how it happened
(or why it was necessary). But why does the ladder dispel her puzzlement? It does so because
pointing out that a ladder was present opens up a whole new range of possibilities for the
questioner that simply weren’t there before. Likewise in the cases we are considering: the
algorithms, or the state spaces, as the case may be, explain by explicitly specifying the set of
possibilities open to them.
But is the how-possibly explanation fully satisfactory? Shouldn’t we feel the urge to
continue our investigation until we have found the actual path taken by the computer through
its state space? Let us consider what this would mean in the case of the performance
comparison between SelectionSort and MergeSort. In this case we would presumably
(assuming the precise input value was known) produce a how-actually explanation by giving a
detailed description of the state of the computer after each time step, and in this way we
would see exactly how it was that mine took l steps and yours took k. And yet, without
referencing the possibility spaces carved out by each algorithm—the alternatives encoded in
the conditional statements—it is hard to see how such an answer can be very informative with
respect to the actual question that was asked. At best it is to answer a very different question
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than the one originally asked. But in the context of a discussion of the performance
characteristics of different types of computer it is not clear what an answer to such a question
will add to our understanding of these processes. Such an answer, in that context, seems to do
little more than restate the original question. The information about the performance
characteristics of my and your computer is most crucially contained in the description of their
possibility spaces. Such questions are therefore most appropriately answered by appealing to
those possibility spaces; i.e., they are most appropriately answered with how-possibly
explanations.
4 Conclusion
The kind of how-possibly explanation I have described in this paper bears certain
resemblances to both Forber’s and to Persson’s conceptions of explaining how-possibly. As in
Persson’s conception, an explanation of the comparative performance characteristics of
quantum and classical computers involves, I have argued, a description of the actual
mechanisms associated with these machines. The description of a mechanism serves to carve
out a particular possibility space for a machine, and as on Forber’s view, this possibility space
plays a crucial role in a how-possibly explanation of the computationally relevant
characteristics of particular observed outcomes. I have further argued that, unlike other
interesting examples previously given in the literature on this form of explanation, once one
has answered this how-possibly question it is doubtful that continuing on to ask a
how-actually question can yield anything more of substance.
The kind of how-possibly question I have described here is characteristic, not only of the
inquiry into the source of quantum speedup, but of the science of computability and
computational complexity generally—and not just this. Algorithmic processes abound in
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nature: in biological systems, in cognitive systems, and also in physical systems, to name but
a few. Questions regarding their comparative performance characteristics likewise abound.
And I would argue, if I had the space, that all of these questions are most appropriately
answered by explaining how-possibly.
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Abstract 
Models based on causal capacities, or independent causal influences/mechanisms, 
are widespread in the sciences. This paper develops a natural mathematical 
framework for representing such capacities by extending and generalizing 
previous results in cognitive psychology and machine learning, based on 
observations and arguments from prior philosophical debates. In addition to its 
substantial generality, the resulting framework provides a theoretical unification 
of the widely-used noisy-OR/AND and linear models, thereby showing how they 
are complementary rather than competing. This unification helps to explain many 
of the shared cognitive and mathematical properties of those models. 
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1. Introduction 
In many scientific domains, one finds models focused on causal influences that function (at 
least somewhat) independently of one another. For example, cognitive models are typically 
expressed in terms of distinct cognitive processes that have no direct influence on one another’s 
functioning, and so can proceed independently, whether sequentially or in parallel. As just one 
instance, many theories of categorization posit that people first perceive the relevant stimulus, 
then judge its similarity to various known categories, and finally use those similarity judgments 
to generate a behavioral response. These processes obviously matter for one another; the output 
of the perceptual process, for example, is the input to the similarity judgment process. But in 
essentially all similarity-based cognitive theories of categorization, the functioning of one 
process is assumed to be largely independent of the functioning of the other processes. The 
“inner workings” of the perceptual process are assumed to be irrelevant to the way that similarity 
judgments are made; the only influence of the former on the latter is the particular information 
that it outputs. 
 More generally, scientific models and theories frequently divide the world into distinct 
processes (typically, causal ones) such that the operation of one process has minimal dependence 
on—in the best case, true independence from—the operations or states of other processes. 
Probably the clearest articulation of this picture is based on the notion of causal capacities 
(Cartwright 1989, 1999, 2007; Martin 2008; see also Heil 2005), but similar ideas can be found 
in many writings on mechanisms (in the spirit of Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000). In this 
paper, I focus on such independent causal influences; for convenience, I will refer to them as 
‘capacities’, but this term should be understood broadly. The basic idea is that capacities are just 
those causal powers that a cause C has purely by virtue of being a C; causal capacities are 
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“something they [the causes] can be expected to carry with them from situation to situation” 
(Cartwright 1989, 145). That is, capacities inhere in C rather than arising from the particular 
situation, and so their operation should be relatively unaffected by other processes in the system. 
This (almost) independence is exactly what enables the construction of “nomological machines” 
(Cartwright 1999, 2007) that generate the regularities—some contingent, some law-like—that we 
observe and manipulate.  
The philosophical literature on causal capacities and mechanisms has largely focused on 
questions that are metaphysical (e.g., are they basic/fundamental features of the world?) or 
epistemological (e.g., can we discover capacities from observational or experimental data?). I 
here consider a representational question: is there a natural, privileged representational 
framework for systems in which the causal influences
1
 are independent
2
 of one another (i.e., each 
does not depend on the values, operations, or status of the others)? There is enormous variety in 
the world, and so any representational framework inevitably simplifies or is sometimes not 
applicable. My interest here is in a representational framework that applies to the “standard” or 
“ordinary” cases, and so can function as a default framework; I use the terms ‘natural’ and 
‘privileged’ to refer to such a framework. One might think that there obviously can be no such 
                                                
1
 For simplicity, I assume that each independent influence corresponds to a single cause, as 
multiple (interactive) causes can be merged into a single, multidimensional, factor. 
2
 This independence should not be confused with (a) statistical independencies that can be used 
to (sometimes) infer causal structures from data (Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000); or (b) 
the idea of ‘modularity’ to refer to causal connections that can be separately intervened upon 
(Hausman and Woodward 1999, 2004; Cartwright 2002). 
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privileged representation, as the independence property seems too weak for this task, but that 
response turns out to be mistaken.  
 
2. The Mathematics of (a Special Case of) Causal Capacities 
2.1. The Noisy-OR/AND Model 
Assume that we have a set of (possible) causes C1, …, Cn and a target effect E. The 
functioning of Ci’s capacity is supposed to inhere in Ci, and so the causal strength or influence of 
Ci should be representable without reference to the states of the other variables. In particular, Ci’s 
impact on E should not depend on the state or causal strength of Cj, and it should be monotonic 
in Ci; in particular, even if the quantitative impact is not constant across values of E (due to, e.g., 
saturation of E), the valence should not depend on E’s value. Finally, for mathematical 
tractability, I assume that each variable’s possible values can be represented as numbers, though 
each variable can have its own scale; this is a trivial assumption when the variables are binary 
(i.e., two-valued), but is non-trivial in other cases (e.g., there is no privileged way to map red, 
green, and blue to numbers). 
Consider the special case situation in which all factors—causes and the effect—can be 
represented as binary variables. For this case, a privileged mathematical framework (with origins 
in 19
th
 century mathematics) has been developed in machine learning and cognitive psychology 
(Good 1961; Srinivas 1993; Heckerman and Breese 1994, 1996; Cheng 1997; Glymour 1998; 
Cozman 2004). Suppose that we have a single generative (binary) cause C1 of the (binary) effect 
E, and so E occurs when (and only when) C1 is present and the capacity of C1 is active, where w1 
is the strength of that capacity. Thus, we immediately derive P(E) = w1 × δ(C1), where δ(X) = 1 if 
X is present, 0 if X is absent. If we have a second generative cause C2 of E, then E occurs when 
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(and only when) either C1 or C2 generates it, where the ‘or’ is non-exclusive. Thus, we have P(E) 
= w1δ(C1) + w1δ(C2) – w1δ(C1)w2δ(C2); that is, the probability of E is just the sum of the 
probabilities that it is caused by one cause, minus the probability that both caused it (in order to 
account for that case being “double-counted” in the sum of the first two terms). More generally, 
if we have n distinct, independent generative causes, then the resulting expression for P(E) is the 
“noisy-OR” model (Good 1961; Kim and Pearl 1983; Pearl 1988; Srinivas 1993; Heckerman and 
Breese 1994; Cheng 1997; Glymour 1998): 
  (1) 
In a noisy-OR model, E is an OR-function of the different causes, but with cause-specific 
“noise” (understood instrumentally) that probabilistically makes that cause’s capacity inactive. 
Thus, the probability that E occurs is just the probability that at least one present cause has an 
active capacity. Moreover, equation (1) is uniquely privileged: it is the only equation for purely 
generative binary causes with distinct causal capacities (i.e., independent causal influences) that 
satisfies various natural properties (Cozman 2004). 
Of course, not all causes are generative; we are often interested in causes that prevent the 
effect from occurring. If a preventive cause P interferes with the functioning of only one specific 
generative cause G,
3
 then P has the (mathematical) impact of reducing G’s causal strength and so 
we can combine their causal capacities. We cannot do the same for preventers that apply to all 
generators equally; such preventers operate as (noisy, probabilistic) “switches” that control 
whether any generative cause can be active at all. That is, E occurs when (and only when) at least 
                                                
3
 An ambiguity lurks here between “prevention as blocking” and “prevention as reducing,” but I 
postpone discussion of this ambiguity until later in this section. 
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one generative cause’s capacity is active and none of the preventive causes’ capacities is active. 
This relationship is captured by a “noisy-OR/AND” model, since the generative causes combine 
in a noisy-OR function, whose result is then combined with a noisy-AND function for the 
preventive causes (i.e., the effect occurs only if a generator is active AND P1 is not active AND 
… Pm is not active):  
  (2) 
This equation provides (arguably) the most natural representation of causal capacities, both 
generative and preventive, that exert independent causal influence (Srinivas 1993; Heckerman 
and Breese 1994, 1996; Lucas 2005). Moreover, there is substantial empirical evidence that 
humans preferentially represent causal systems as functioning according to equation (2) (Cheng 
1997; Holyoak and Cheng 2011; Danks 2014).
4
 
 
2.2. Resolving Ambiguities 
Although there is great value in this mathematical framework, the restriction to binary 
variables is significant, as there are many cases in which the influence of a causal capacity 
depends in part on the factor’s magnitude or intensity, or the effect can exhibit fine degrees of 
meaningful variation. Before generalizing the noisy-OR/AND model to many-valued variables, 
however, we must clarify two key conceptual (though not mathematical) ambiguities.  
                                                
4
 The connection between psychological theory and capacities is unsurprising, as Cheng’s (1997) 
causal power theory in cognitive psychology was explicitly modeled on Cartwright’s (1989) 
capacity account of causation. 
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Mathematically speaking, binary variables are simply those with two possible values. When 
talking about causal capacities, however, a more specific interpretation is typically intended: 
factors can be “present” vs. “absent” or “on” vs. “off”; capacities can be “active” vs. “inactive”. 
These interpretations provide a natural value ordering, as shown by the standard practice of 
mapping “present” to the value of 1 and “absent” to the value of 0.
5
 More generally, we typically 
understand the “absent” or 0 value to be the lower bound of the possible values for that variable. 
At the same time, the zero value in the context of causal capacities almost always serves as the 
baseline value: it is the value that E would have if nothing influenced it. This second role of the 
zero value is clear in the mathematics of the noisy-OR/AND model, as P(E = 0 | all generative 
causes are absent) = 1. That is, the standard model of (binary) causal capacities assumes that 
absence is the appropriate “uncaused” state for E.
6
  
These two different roles for zero—lower bound and baseline value—are conceptually 
distinct and empirically distinguishable. For example, in most terrestrial environments, the 
baseline value for Oxygen in Room (i.e., the value it has when represented causes are all inactive) 
is “present,” not “absent.” We can represent this different baseline value in the noisy-OR/AND 
model, but only through a mathematical trick (namely, a very strong, always-present generative 
cause). A better solution would be to allow the lower bound and baseline to diverge. This 
                                                
5
 This particular mapping could obviously be reversed without any change in substantive content, 
though ‘lower bound’ and ‘upper bound’ would need to be swapped in what follows.  
6
 One might worry that “uncaused states” are impossible. However, if causes function 
independently, then it is at least theoretically possible for none to be active at a moment in time. 
More generally, any model with independent causal influences yields a baseline value, even if it 
is only ever theoretically (rather than empirically) realized. 
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generalization does not matter for cases with only binary variables, as any model with variables 
whose baseline is 1 can be translated into a model in which all baselines are 0. Outside of this 
special case, however, the baseline value plays a distinct mathematical role, and so any model of 
causal capacities that allows for more-than-binary variables (such as the one developed in 
Section 3) must distinguish conceptually between the lower bound value and the baseline value.  
The multiple roles played by zero point towards the other important ambiguity in the 
standard noisy-OR/AND model of causal capacities. Because the zero value is both the lower 
bound and the baseline, there are two different ways to prevent, or make E less likely. First, the 
preventer could stop generative causes from exerting their usual influence. These blockers serve 
to keep the effect variable closer to its baseline value, as they (potentially) eliminate causal 
influences that drive the effect away from baseline. Preventive causes in the noisy-OR/AND 
model are usually understood in this way. A second way of “preventing” is to move E towards its 
lower bound. These reducers are the natural opposite of standard generative causes, as they shift 
E downwards while generators shift E upwards. The important distinction here is whether the 
preventer influences the effect directly (i.e., is a reducer), or indirectly through the elimination of 
other causal influences (i.e., is a blocker).  
As a practical example, suppose Heart Rate is our effect variable. There are many generative 
causes that increase heart rate, such as stress or exercise. Beta blockers and other anxiety-
reducing medications function as blockers, as they prevent (some of) those generative causes 
from having any influence while not suppressing Heart Rate below its natural baseline (for that 
individual). In contrast, most anesthetics are reducers of Heart Rate, as they actively slow the 
heart, potentially even below its natural baseline, depending on exactly which causes are active. 
Of course, if we model Heart Rate as simply “low” or “high” (where “low” is the baseline), then 
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these two different types of drugs will appear indistinguishable. The importance of 
distinguishing reducers from blockers becomes apparent only when we move to situations in 
which the lower bound and baseline values need not coincide. 
Before turning to the fully general mathematical framework for causal capacities, we must 
address a potential ambiguity about a capacity’s “causal strength” wi. The standard interpretation 
in the noisy-OR/AND model is that wi expresses the probability that the capacity is “active,” 
where an active cause deterministically produces the effect (unless a suitable blocker is also 
active). This interpretation is inappropriate when causes are more than binary, as “probability of 
activation” neglects the (presumed) importance of the magnitude of the cause variable.
7
 Instead, 
we will understand wi (for generators and reducers) for a capacity Ci to be the expected change in 
E’s value when Ci increases by one unit and every other factor is at its baseline value. That is, wi 
is computed by starting in the state in which every causal factor is at baseline, and then 
determining the expected change in E when C increases by one unit.
8
 This interpretation implies 
that wi depends on Ci’s scale, but this should be expected given the predictive function of causal 
strengths. Notice that, if all causes and the effect are binary, then the expected change and 
probability of activation interpretations of wi are mathematically identical. The expected change 
                                                
7
 We can retain the “probability of activation” interpretation if the effect is the only many-valued 
variable, in which case the natural representations are noisy-ADD or noisy-MAX functions 
(Heckerman and Breese 1996). 
8
 If causal strength depends on C’s value, then the choice to measure from C’s baseline is 
potentially a substantive one. However, since we assume causes have independent monotonic 
influences, we can always transform the scale for C so that E is a linear function of C’s value.  
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interpretation, however, also naturally applies to systems in which some factors can take on 
more-than-two values, and so I use it in the next section. 
 
3. A General, Privileged Mathematical Representation 
Now that we have done the necessary conceptual clarification, we can develop a general, 
privileged mathematical representation of causal capacities when the causes and effect need not 
be binary. Throughout, I use lower-case letters to denote the value of a variable; for example, e is 
the value of the effect E. Without loss of generality, we can assume E’s baseline value is zero 
and e ∈ [–L, U], where at least one of L, U is greater than zero (else E is always zero). Note that 
the baseline can be the same as the lower bound (L = 0, U > 0); same as the upper bound (L > 0; 
U = 0); or a strictly intermediate value (L, U > 0). As noted above, three different types of causal 
capacities must be incorporated into the mathematical framework: generators Gi and reducers Rj 
that (probabilistically) increase and decrease the value of E, respectively; and blockers Bk that 
(probabilistically) prevent any other causal capacities from influencing E. For all three types of 
causes, their values must also be able to range over more than just {0, 1}. For mathematical 
convenience, we represent the “inactive” state of each cause by 0, so that the influence on E 
(when only C is active) is the product of C’s magnitude (i.e., its distance from zero) and its 
causal strength (i.e., the expected change in E given that the cause increased by one unit).
9
 
Consider first the case with only generators Gi with values gi. In this situation, E can only be 
pushed upwards from the baseline, and so e ∈ [0, U]. The natural mathematical framework 
                                                
9
 Recall from fn. 8 that the independent causal influences have all been transformed so that they 
are linear (in C) influences of E, and so this product for a single generator or reducer is always 
less than the relevant upper or lower bound, respectively. 
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simply uses normalization to convert this case to (a continuous version of) the noisy-OR model: 
(i) “normalize” E and the causal strengths to the [0, 1] interval; (ii) use the uniquely privileged 
(Cozman 2004) noisy-OR model; and then (iii) transform the result back to the [0, U] interval. 
The noisy-OR/AND model was defined in equations (1) and (2) in terms of the probability of E 
given its causes, but we can (and should, in the present context) instead regard those equations as 
providing the expectation of E. The natural, privileged mathematical representation for the 
expectation of E in this situation is thus:
10
 
 
Since reducers are naturally understood as “negative generators,” we can model the impact of a 
set of reducers Rj with values rj in the same way, though their “normalization” is relative to L 
rather than U. The resulting expectation of E is simply the difference between these (normalized 
and combined) influences: 
 
Finally, blockers Bk with values bk fill the role of preventers in the noisy-OR/AND model of 
equation (2): the (probabilistic) activation of their causal capacities prevents the expression of 
any other causal capacities, and so they act as a probabilistic “switch” on the previous equation. 
The causal strengths of the blocking capacities are thus best understood as “increase (per unit 
change in the blocker) in probability of complete blocking.” The resulting full mathematical 
equation is: 
                                                
10
 I show below that this equation is well-behaved even when U = +∞.  
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  (3) 
Equation (3) is the natural generalization of the noisy-OR/AND model to cases with many-
valued variables and distinct baseline and lower bound for E. It thus provides the privileged 
mathematics of causal capacities for precisely the same reasons as the noisy-OR/AND model for 
the special case of binary variables. To see that it provides such a generalization, consider the 
special case that was the focus of the previous section: L = 0, U = 1, and all of the causal factors 
are restricted to {0, 1}. Since L is equal to the baseline, there are no “reducing” causal capacities: 
for any putative reducer R, the expected change in E from a unit change in R (when all other 
causes are absent) is always zero, and so wR is always zero. And since the causal factors are 
restricted to {0, 1}, the bk and gi variable values can be replaced with delta functions. The 
resulting equation (when we substitute in U and L) is simply equation (2), the noisy-OR/AND 
model. That is, the equations and claims of the previous section are all special cases of the 
generalization provided here. 
Equation (3) provides a privileged mathematics for arbitrary variable ranges and causal 
capacities, in the sense (previously articulated) that it captures the plausible, intuitive features of 
“standard” cases, and therefore can serve as a natural default representational framework. It is 
particularly interesting to consider another special case. Suppose E ∈ [–∞, +∞] and (for the 
moment) that there are no blockers. It is not obvious how to use equation (3) in this situation, 
since direct substitution of L and U yields infinities throughout the equation. If we instead 
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consider the limit of equation (3) as L and U go to infinity, we find that the expectation of E is 
given by:
11
 
  (4) 
That is, the natural mathematical equation for (the expectation of) E in this special case is simply 
a linear function of the causal capacities. Having seen equation (4), it is straightforward to 
incorporate blockers, as that initial product term will simply act to globally attenuate the linear 
impact (on the expectation of E) of the generators and reducers. 
Equation (3) provides a measure of unification to equations (2) and (4): despite their 
substantial mathematical differences, both noisy-OR/AND and linear models are special cases of 
the more general, privileged mathematical characterization of causal capacities. That is, this 
framework suggests that noisy-OR/AND and linear models have the same conceptual and 
mathematical basis, and the different models arise simply based on whether the variables are 
binary or continuous/real-valued. In particular, this unification helps to explain why so many 
mathematical results that hold for linear models also hold for noisy-OR/AND models, and vice 
versa. For example, the conditions for model parameter identifiability are essentially the same 
for noisy-OR/AND models (Hyttinen, Eberhardt, and Hoyer 2011) and linear models (Hyttinen, 
Eberhardt, and Hoyer 2012). Similarly, we find basically the same conditions and statistical tests 
                                                
11
 Proof sketch: For the generators in equation (3), separate the fraction terms into differences 
and expand the product to yield: U [1 – (1 – ∑(wigi / U) + C)] = [∑wigi – UC], where C is the 
rest of the product expansion. Every term in C has at least U
2
 in the denominator, and so as U → 
+∞, UC → 0. Thus, as U → +∞, we are left with only the sum. The same reasoning yields the 
sum for reducers. 
Chicago, IL -123-
for discovering an unobserved common cause of multiple observed effects given either a noisy-
OR/AND model (Danks and Glymour 2001; Pearl 1988) or a linear model (Spirtes et al. 2000). 
This overlap in the models’ mathematical properties is much less surprising given that they 
(arguably) derive from a single, more general equation (though their properties are not identical, 
since the different variable value ranges do sometimes matter). 
This mathematical connection can also provide us with insights into human cognition. I 
earlier noted that the noisy-OR/AND model emerged partly from work in cognitive psychology 
on one “natural” way that people seem to represent causal strengths in the world, at least when 
we have binary causes and effects (Cheng 1997; Danks 2014; Holyoak and Cheng 2011). At the 
same time, there are competing theories of human causal learning—variants of the Rescorla-
Wagner model and its long-run counterpart, the conditional ΔP theory (Danks 2003)—in which 
people represent causal capacities as combining linearly (Danks 2007). Relatedly, there is a long 
history of psychological research on function approximation that has shown that people find 
linear functions easier to learn (e.g., McDaniel and Busemeyer 2005; DeLosh, Busemeyer, and 
McDaniel 1997; and references therein), and even have a significant bias in favor of 
understanding the world in terms of linear functions (Kalish, Griffiths, and Lewandowsky 2007). 
Equation (3) provides a measure of theoretical unification for these disparate psychological 
results: noisy-OR/AND and linearity are not theoretical competitors, but rather different aspects 
of the same general assumptions or preferences about causal capacities. That is, we need not ask 
whether noisy-OR/AND or linearity is correct, since each is the natural representation for a 
particular domain of variable values.
12
 
                                                
12
 This observation suggests that people in causal learning experiments might systematically shift 
between noisy-OR/AND and linearity based solely on the variable value ranges. Unfortunately, 
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4. Conclusions 
The philosophical literature on causal capacities has principally asked metaphysical and 
epistemological questions, rather than representational ones. At the same time, the psychological 
and machine learning literature on causal capacities has largely focused on the special case of 
binary causal factors and a binary effect. By generalizing beyond that special case, we thereby 
obtain a natural, privileged framework for representing causal capacities that independently 
influence some effect.
13
 Moreover, this generalized framework provides further conceptual 
clarification about causal capacities, as it reveals distinctions (e.g., between the lower bound and 
the baseline value) that have previously been relatively little-explored in the psychological and 
machine learning literatures. This mathematical framework also has significant practical and 
theoretical impacts, as it provides a natural way to unify disparate equations—in particular, the 
noisy-OR/AND and linear models—that have previously been viewed (in machine learning and 
cognitive science) as competitors, or at least independent of one another. The widespread use and 
value of such models is eminently explainable when we understand them as deriving from the 
                                                                                                                                                       
cover stories for those experiments almost never explicitly provide value ranges, and we do not 
know what participants infer about the possible variable values. Anecdotally, though, this type of 
switching would explain some otherwise puzzling empirical data. 
13
 One open question is whether there are also privileged equations for P(E). As a promising first 
step, we can prove: if there is one generative cause and the initial P(E) is uniform over [–L, U], 
then the “update” equation  naturally satisfies 
all of the desiderata provided throughout the paper (including the desired expectation). It is 
unknown whether other results of this type can be obtained. 
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same fundamental framework and equation. This privileged framework provides a precise, 
formal representation that can significantly constrain and inform our attempts to better 
understand causal capacities.  
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Abstract
Recent advancements in the brain sciences have enabled researchers to determine, with
increasing accuracy, patterns and locations of neural activation associated with various
psychological functions. These techniques have revived a longstanding debate regard-
ing the relation between the mind and the brain: while many authors now claim that
neuroscientific data can be used to advance our theories of higher cognition, others
defend the so-called ‘autonomy’ of psychology. Settling this significant question re-
quires understanding the nature of the bridge laws used at the psycho-neural interface.
While these laws have been the topic of extensive discussion, such debates have mostly
focused on a particular type of link: reductive laws. Reductive laws are problematic:
they face notorious philosophical objections and they are too scarce to substantiate
current research at the interface of psychology and neuroscience. The aim of this ar-
ticle is to provide a systematic analysis of a different kind of bridge laws—associative
laws—which play a central, albeit often overlooked, role in scientific practice.
1 Introduction
In a now classic paper, Jerry Fodor (1974, p. 97) questioned the evidence
for theoretical reductionism by noting that “the development of science has
witnessed the proliferation of specialized disciplines at least as often as it has
witnessed their reduction to physics, so the widespread enthusiasm for reduction
can hardly be a mere induction over its past successes.” Four decades later,
∗Both authors contributed equally to this work.
†We are grateful to Bruce Pennington and Kateri McRae for constructive comments on
various versions of this essay.
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Fodor’s assessment remains accurate; indeed, it has been reinforced. Rather
than being progressively reduced to physics, the special sciences have sprawled
into a number of burgeoning subfields. Yet, at the same time, we have also
witnessed the rise of interdisciplinary studies. If, as Fodor holds, the special
sciences are relatively ‘autonomous,’ what explains the recent proliferation of
fields such as neurolinguistics, moral psychology, and neuroeconomics?
The relation between different scientific fields has been extensively debated
in philosophy and the particular case of psychology and neuroscience has gath-
ered enormous attention. As reported in Bourget and Chalmers (2013), the
dominant position is now non-reductive physicalism—the thesis that, although
mental states are realized by brain states, mental kinds cannot, in general, be
reduced to neural kinds. As we shall discuss below, this position fails to address
an important issue, namely, why studying the brain can inform our understand-
ing of the mind. The failure to provide an answer to this question is especially
troublesome given the current trend in cognitive neuroscience, where advance-
ments in neuroimaging have begun to affect theories of higher cognition, such as
language processing and decision making (Gazzaniga 2009; Mather et al. 2013;
Glimcher and Fehr 2014). If theorists are right that the mapping of mental kinds
onto neural kinds is too problematic to substantiate any meaningful interaction
at this interface, is neuroscience simply promising something that cannot be
achieved? Or does the constant use of neural data in fields such as neurolin-
guistics and neuroeconomics, show that philosophical critique misunderstands
the relation between cognitive and neural levels?
In this article, we argue that the tension between meta-theory and scien-
tific practice stems from the failure to distinguish between different types of
bridge laws, that is, principles that link kinds across domains. On the one
hand, theorists have generally been concerned with reductive laws, which are
indeed problematic. On the other hand, bridge laws currently employed in cog-
nitive neuroscience are not reductive; they are associative statements that are
categorically distinct from the contingent type-identities typically employed in
derivational reduction and other more recent reductive approaches. The aim
of this essay is to provide an account of associative bridge laws. Despite their
widespread use in neuropsychology, these links have never been systematically
discussed. We begin by introducing the role of type-identities in traditional
models of derivational reduction and rehearse some well-known problems (§2).
Next, we illustrate how bridge laws are employed in neuroscientific studies of
higher-cognition (§3) and elucidate the main differences between reductive and
associative bridge laws (§4). We conclude by presenting some implications of
our analysis for extant debates in the philosophy of mind and science (§5).
2 Bridge Laws in Theory Reduction
Philosophers of science originally became interested in bridge laws because of
their central role in theory reduction. In what became a locus classicus, Nagel
(1961) characterized reduction as a deductive derivation of the laws of a reduced
2
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theory S from the laws of a reducing theory P . Such derivation requires that
the natural kinds of S be expressed in terms of the natural kinds of P .1 For
instance, suppose that we want to show that law LS : S1x → S2x, expressed
in the language of theory S, can be reduced to (that is, derived from) law
LP : P1x → P2x, expressed in the language of theory P .
2 What we need is a
series of bridge laws that translate the relevant S-predicates into P -predicates:
(B1) S1x↔ P1x
(B2) S2x↔ P2x
How should the ‘↔’ connective be interpreted in these reductive bridge laws?
Fodor (1974) makes a number of important points. First,↔ must be transitive:
if kind S1 is reduced to T1, and in turn, T1 is reduced to P1, then S1 is thereby
reduced to P1. Second, ↔ cannot be read as ‘causes,’ for causal relations tend
to be asymmetric—causes bring about their effects, but effects generally do
not bring about their causes—whereas bridge laws tend to be symmetric: if an
S1-event is a P1-event, then a P1-event is also an S1-event. Given these two
features, bridge laws are most naturally interpreted as expressing contingent
event identities. Thus understood, B1 can be read as stating that S1 is type-
identical to P1. As Fodor notes, reductive bridge laws express a stronger position
than token physicalism, the view that all events that fall under the laws of some
special science are physical events. Statements such as B1 and B2 presuppose
type physicalism, according to which every kind that figures in the laws of a
science is type-identical to a physical kind.3
The well-known problem with type-physicalism is that natural kinds seldom
correspond neatly across levels. Although one could make a case that heat is re-
ducible to mean molecular kinetic energy, or action-potentials to nerve impulses,
the reigning consensus in philosophy of science is that there are too few contin-
gent event identities to make derivational reduction a plausible inter-theoretic
model (Horst 2007). In most cases, there seem to be no physical, chemical, or
macromolecular kinds that correspond to biological, psychological or economic
kinds in the manner required by the reductionist scheme. This, simply put,
is the multiple-realizability argument against the classical model of derivational
reduction (Putnam 1967; Fodor 1974). The basic idea is that instead of laws
such as B1 and B2, what we usually find are linking laws such as B3, which
capture the instantiation of higher-level kinds in a variety of lower-level states:
(B3) S1x↔ P1x ∨ . . . ∨ Pnx
1In what follows we shall not enter the longstanding metaphysical debate on the notion of
natural kind. For present purposes, we treat natural kinds as predicates that fall under the
laws or generalizations of a (branch of) science (Fodor 1974).
2For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the languages of the two theories do not overlap,
i.e., the natural kinds of S do not belong to P , and vice versa.
3To be clear, our focus here is not on physicalism per se; the relevant claim is whether the
kinds of one science can be reduced to the kinds of another more ‘fundamental’ science, not
necessarily to physics.
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The demise of derivational reduction had a deep and lasting effect on the con-
ceptualization of the psycho-neural interface. Despite its problems, the Nagelian
model provided a clear account of how neural data could, at least in principle,
inform theories of higher cognition. To illustrate, suppose we want to know
whether some psychological kind C is engaged in task T , as we often do when
testing competing cognitive-level hypotheses. If we had a bridge law which
maps C onto a neural kind N , we could infer the presence (or absence) of C in
T from neural evidence of the presence (or absence) of N . Hence, the reductive
model suggests a specific goal for cognitive neuropsychology, namely, to look for
neural-level implementations of psychological processes. The failure of Nagelian
reduction, however, implies that this account of the psycho-neural interface is
misguided or, at best, overly simplistic.
In response to the multiple-realizability argument, philosophers pursued two
alternative routes. Some reacted by developing reductive accounts that, al-
legedly, do not require problematic bridge laws (Hooker 1981; Bickle 1998; Kim
1999, 2005). However, it has been persuasively argued that any form of bona
fide reductionism requires some kind of bridge laws (Marras 2002; Fazekas 2009).
Following a different path, many philosophers of mind embraced an antireduc-
tionist or functionalist approach, according to which mental states are individ-
uated by their causal roles, independently of their physical realization (Fodor
1974, 1997). While this move besets the problems raised by multiple realizabil-
ity, it fails to explain how, if cognitive kinds are not type-identical to neural
kinds, neural data can bear on the study of cognition.
Part of the problem with the extant debate, we surmise, is that reductionists
and antireductionists alike share an overly restrictive view of the psycho-neural
interface. Researchers belonging to both camps often talk as if the only potential
contributions of neuroscience to psychology are:
(i) To establish correlations between cognitive- and neural-level events, i.e., to
find the brain locations where particular mental functions are computed.
(ii) To discover the neural-level mechanisms that compute cognitive processes,
i.e., to establish how the brain actually computes specific mental functions.
Let us begin by focusing on (ii), the more substantial and ambitious en-
deavor. Reductionists tend to stress the remarkable successes in discovering
neural mechanisms of sensory systems, such as early vision, pain, taste, and
other basic sensations (Bickle 2003; Kim 2006). Antireductionists, in contrast,
rightly emphasize that comparable achievements cannot be claimed for language
processing, decision making, and other functions of higher cognition. It is un-
surprising, then, that many researchers deem the pursuit of project (ii) hopeless
(Fodor 1999) or, at best, drastically premature (Gallistel 2009; Coltheart 2013),
at least when applied to central cognitive systems. On the traditional view of
the interface based on (i) and (ii) this skepticism is reasonable. Although per-
ceptual functions are potentially multiply realizable, empirical research reveals
that they are implemented by relatively modular and localized neural struc-
tures, widely shared across individuals and species. In contrast, systems of
4
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higher cognition are implemented by relatively flexible, distributed, and non-
modular neural structures. Thus, in the case of higher cognition, the pursuit
of project (ii) is jeopardized by multiple realizability and the lack of explana-
tory reductions. But, note, if (ii) is hopeless, (i) becomes pointless, for seeking
mind-brain correlations that do not contribute to an explanation of how neural
mechanisms compute cognitive functions becomes a mere vindication of token
physicalism. In short, from this perspective, project (ii) becomes unrealistic and
project (i), by itself, can hardly advance studies of higher cognition.4
Despite this bleak picture, it is undeniable that interdisciplinary fields at the
psycho-neural interface, such as neurolinguistics and neuroeconomics, have re-
cently achieved remarkable success, often by using neural-level data to advance
cognitive level theories.5 Neither reductive nor antireductive models can appro-
priately account for this. Still, these studies presuppose that it is possible to
map the cognitive level onto the neural level for, otherwise, how can neural data
be used to bear on cognitive-level theorizing? In order to account for the success
of these interdisciplinary studies, we need a novel account of bridge laws that
takes seriously their non-reductive character. To explore the nature of these
links, we shall focus on one of the main techniques which scientists use to make
neural data and theories bear on cognitive level hypotheses: reverse inference.
3 Bridge Laws and Reverse Inferences
In order to discriminate between competing cognitive hypotheses, neuroscien-
tists often ‘reverse infer’ the engagement of a cognitive state or process, in a
given task, from particular locations or patterns of brain activation (Henson
2005; Poldrack 2006; Del Pinal and Nathan 2013; Hutzler 2013; Machery 2013).
These reverse inferences presuppose the availability of bridge laws; yet, contrary
to a widespread assumption, the required links are not reductive, they are what
we call associative bridge laws. In this section, we examine the role of bridge
laws in two kinds of inferences employed in neuroimaging studies: location-
based and pattern-based reverse inferences. More specifically, we focus on stud-
ies of decision-making—a paradigmatic domain of higher-cognition—aimed at
discriminating between the processes which underlie behavioral generalizations.
To begin, consider the following psychological generalizations, somewhat
simplified for the sake of illustration, where s ranges over ‘normal’ adults:
4Those familiar with this debate will no doubt have seen various objections along these
lines. For instance, the picture of the psycho-neural interface assumed in the following quotes is
clearly constrained by (i) and (ii). “If the mind happens in space at all, it happens somewhere
north of the neck. What exactly turns on knowing how far north?” (Fodor 1999). “Finding
a cell that recognizes one’s grandmother does not tell you very much more than you started
with: after all, you know you can recognize your grandmother. What is needed is an answer
to how you, or a cell [...] does it” (Mayhew 1983, cited in Coltheart (2013)).
5To appreciate the magnitude of this growth, consider that in 2009, when the first canonical
textbook was published (Glimcher et al. 2009), courses and research on neuroeconomics were
regularly taught and pursued in just handful of economics and psychology departments. By
the time the second edition appeared, just four years later (Glimcher and Fehr 2014), over
one hundred institutions regularly taught and pursued research in neuroeconomics.
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(GM ) If s is faced with the option of performing an action a that will result in
the death of fewer people than would die if s were not to perform a, s will
choose a unless doing so requires using a person directly as a means.
(GN ) A set E contains some items that are new to s and others that s has
previously encountered. If s is randomly presented with item e ∈ E and
has to decide whether she has previously encountered e, s can reliably
distinguish between old and new items.
GM and GN can be refined in various ways, but neither is particularly original
nor controversial. Both capture distinctive capacities of higher-cognition which
are in need of explanation. We shall refer to the level at which we isolate these
types of psychological generalizations as Marr-level 1.6
Given a Marr-level 1 generalization, one can then explore the underlying
cognitive processes: such conjectures are usually referred to as Marr-level 2
hypotheses. First, consider two competing explanations of GM :
(M) In moral decision making, subjects generally follow consequentialist rules.
However, in cases which involve using another person directly as a means,
consequentialist rules are overridden by negative emotions.
(M∗) In moral decision making, subjects generally follow consequentialist rules.
However, in cases which involve using another person directly as a means,
consequentialist rules are overridden by deontological rules.
Note that M and M∗ are very different explanations of GM . Whereas M ex-
plains the behavioral pattern as a conflict between rules and emotions, M*
explains the same pattern as a conflict between consequentialist and deontolog-
ical rules. In short, while M posits a conflict between rules and emotions, M*
posits a conflict between different types of rules. Next, consider two competing
explanations of GN , recently advanced in episodic memory research:
(N) Recognition decisions are based on two processes which draw on two dis-
tinct sources of information: recollection of specific details and non-specific
feelings of familiarity. Recollection is used by default but, when such in-
formation is unavailable, subjects employ familiarity.
(N∗) Recognition decisions are based on two processes which draw on two dis-
tinct sources of information: recollection of specific details and non-specific
feelings of familiarity. However, neither is the default process: the source
of information employed depends on specific contextual cues.
6In an influential discussion, Marr (1982) argued that information-processing systems
should be investigated at three complementary levels. Hypotheses at Marr-level 1 pose the
computational problem: they state the task computed by the system. Hypotheses at Marr-
level-2 state the algorithm used to compute Marr-level 1 functions: they specify the basic
representations and operations of the system. Finally, hypotheses at Marr-level 3 specify how
Marr-level 2 algorithms are implemented in the brain: they purport to explain how these
basic representations and operations are realized at the neural level.
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While N and N∗ agree on the basic components underlying recognition deci-
sions, they posit different interactions. According to N , subjects generally use
recollection information to decide whether items are old, and only rely on in-
tuitions of familiarity when such information is unavailable. In contrast, N*
predicts that certain contextual cues will induce subjects to make familiarity-
based recognition decisions even if recollection information is available.
M -M∗ and N -N∗ are competing Marr-level 2 hypotheses about the cogni-
tive processes which underlie some Marr-level 1 generalization. To adjudicate
between them, researchers use reverse inferences, which require two preliminary
steps. First, the competing processes must be functionally decomposed, for en-
tire processes such as M and M* are too coarse-grained to be directly mapped
onto patterns or regions of neural activation. Next, the subcomponents of the
competing processes for which there are bridge laws must be identified. To
illustrate, let us assume that, in task T , cognitive process M posits the engage-
ment of subprocess m1, whereas M
∗ posits the engagement of subprocess m∗
1
,
and that m1 6= m
∗
1
. Further, suppose that we have the following bridge laws
connecting m1 and m
∗
1
with regions or patterns of neural activation n1 and n
∗
1
:
(A1) m1 ⊗ n1
(A2) m
∗
1
⊗ n∗
1
Note that ‘⊗’ is different from the ‘↔’ connective figuring in reductive bridge
laws. We shall discuss the basic properties of such relation in §4 below. The
important point here is simply that ‘⊗’ stands for an associative relation that
allows one to reliably infer the presence of one relata from the other.
To illustrate the application of statements such as A1 and A2, consider some
bridge laws used to discriminate between M and M∗. Assume that m1 stands
for processes involving negative emotions such as fear, and that m∗
1
stands for
ruled-based processes such as following simple instructions. Researchers have es-
tablished a close connection between processes involving negative emotions and
activation in certain neural regions such as the amygdala and the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC).7 This connection is captured by A1. Researchers
have also established a connection between rule-based and controlled reasoning
and activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC).8 A2 captures this
connection by associating m∗
1
with activation in the DLPFC.
7In general, the amygdala is critically involved in conditioned and unconditioned fear re-
sponse in animals, including humans. For example, patients with selective damage to the
amygdala show no physiological response to a previously fear-conditioned stimulus, although
they can explicitly remember the conditioning experience (Kandel et al. 2013, Ch. 48).
8Miller and Cohen (2001) present several studies that support the key role of the DLPFC
in cognitive control and rule-guided processes. A relevant set of experiments are based on the
famous Stroop task, in which subjects are instructed to name the color of the ink of words as
they appear on a screen. Famously, reaction times and error rates increase dramatically when
subjects read color-terms that differ from the color of their ink. Miller and Cohen present
imaging studies which show that, in the misleading cases, subjects who manage to follow the
correct rule and name the word’s ink color showed increased activation in DLPFC, compared
to subjects who fail the task.
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Given A1 and A2, one can devise neuroimaging experiments to discriminate
between M and M∗. For example, Greene and colleagues (2001) scanned sub-
jects making moral decisions in two sets of tasks that involve choosing whether
to sacrifice one innocent person to save five, as in the famous trolley problems.
The relevant difference is that in one set of tasks all the choices that would save
five people involve using another person directly as a means (personal cases),
whereas in the other set subjects can save five by sacrificing one indirectly,
that is, without using the person as a means (impersonal cases).9 Greene and
colleagues found that, relative to impersonal cases—and to structurally anal-
ogous non-moral control tasks—personal cases result in differential activation
of the amygdala and VMPFC, and less activation of DLPFC. Given that A1
associates amygdala activation with negative emotions, and that A2 associates
DLPFC activation with rule-based and controlled reasoning, this finding favors
M over M*. This is because, according to M , in personal cases, decisions not
to sacrifice one person to save five are based on negative emotions. In addition,
M predicts that areas involved in rule-based reasoning should be more active
in impersonal compared to personal cases. In contrast, M∗ incorrectly predicts
that personal and impersonal cases should engage rule-based areas equally, since
both cases involve applying different types of rules.
Critics of the relevance of neuroimaging experiments for psychology often
assume—more or less explicitly—that all bridge laws currently employed in
reverse inferences associate cognitive processes to locations of neural activation.
However, as we shall discuss below, this is a mistake: in some cases, the relevant
bridge laws map cognitive states or processes to particular patterns of neural
activation. Indeed, pattern-based inferences, which are rapidly becoming one of
the main ways of studying cognition, have significant implications for the psycho-
neural interface. A powerful example is provided by recent studies relevant to
the recognition hypotheses N and N∗, to which we now turn.
In pattern-based recognition studies, ‘pattern classifiers’ are trained to deter-
mine the multi-voxel patterns associated with recollection processes and famil-
iarity processes. Specifically, classifiers are trained in tasks where experimenters
can control which cognitive process is engaged. For instance, in one experiment,
which will serve as our main example, subjects were exposed to singular and
plural words such as ‘shoe’ and ‘shoes’ (Norman et al. 2009). These subjects
were then scanned while performing recognition tasks involving previously ex-
amined items (e.g., a shoe) and unrelated lures (e.g., a bicycle). The recognition
tasks are divided in two sets: recollection blocks and familiarity blocks. In rec-
ollection blocks, subjects are instructed to recall specific details of the mental
image formed during the study phase, and to only answer ‘yes’ if they are suc-
cessful. In contrast, in familiarity blocks subjects are instructed to answer ‘yes’
if the word is familiar and to ignore any details they might recollect from the
study phase. After training, classifiers can determine whether some multi-voxel
9In the classic version of the trolley problem, personal cases are exemplified by the ‘foot-
bridge’ scenario, where five people are saved by throwing a corpulent person on the track.
Impersonal cases are exemplified by the ‘switch’ scenario, where five people are saved by
pulling a lever that diverts the trolley onto a parallel track where it will kill a single person.
8
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pattern of neural activation is an instance of recollection or familiarity. What
makes this method especially interesting is that the reliability of the classifiers
can be established within the experiment itself. This can be done by saving a
subset of the recollection and familiarity blocks for later testing (so they are not
used at the training stage), and then determining the rate at which the classifier
correctly categorizes the corresponding neural patterns. This part of the study,
in which experimenters control which process is engaged, establishes the bridge
laws that will then be used in reverse inferences.
Having established the relevant bridge laws which map recollection and fa-
miliarity onto multi-voxel patterns, one can then test competing hypotheses N
and N* regarding the dynamics underlying recognition-decisions in cases where
the engagement of the sub-processes cannot be directly controlled. For example,
in a second phase of the study, subjects were scanned while trying to determine
whether some word is old or new, while being exposed to previously studied
items (‘shoe’ and ‘ball’), unrelated lures (‘horse’ and ‘box’), and previously un-
studied switch-plurality lures (‘balls’). Experimenters then examined the subset
of the items for which subjects made correct positive recognition decisions. Note
that these are cases where both recollection and familiarity information was
available to subjects. Hence, according to hypothesis N , the classifier should
categorize the corresponding voxel patterns as recollection patterns (since this
is the default). In contrast, N* predicts that the classification should be more
variable, involving—at least in some cases—familiarity patterns. Experimental
results support N∗ over N : when both types of information are available, var-
ious contextual cues determine whether subjects use familiarity or recollection
as the basis of their recognition decision (Norman et al. 2009).
4 Associative Bridge Laws
The previous examination of reverse inferences allowed us to place associative
bridge laws such as A1 and A2 in their context of use. The aim of this section
is to make explicit the characteristic features of these linking statements. As
we shall see, unlike their reductive counterparts, associative bridge laws are
probabilistic and context-sensitive relations that do not identify their relata,
either at the type-level or at the token-level.
4.1 Probabilities
The first main feature of associative bridge laws is their probabilistic nature.
To clarify, consider a recent debate about the ‘selectivity’ of brain regions and
reverse arguments. Several critics have emphasized that the success of a reverse
argument depends on the degree of selectivity of the relevant brain regions (Uttal
2002; Ross 2008; Phelps 2009; Anderson 2010; Coltheart 2013). Suppose that
some bridge law maps neural activation in n1 onto the engagement of cognitive
process m1. According to critics, this linkage allows one to legitimately reverse
infer the engagement of m1 from the activation of n1 only provided that region
9
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n1 activates for the cognitive process of interest, in this case n1, and no other.
This is because, the objection runs, if n1 also activates when m2, m3, and m4
are engaged, one cannot reverse infer to m1 merely on the neural evidence of n1
activation. The problem is that there is widespread consensus among cognitive
neuroscientists that very few brain regions are maximally selective in the sense
just described. From this perspective, then, it looks like most reverse inferences
are actually invalid, as they rely on an unjustified maximal selectivity.
This is a substantial worry that ought to be addressed with care. First, note
that while few brain regions are indeed maximally selective, most brain regions
are not mapped onto cognitive functions by a single bridge law. Most brain
regions are covered by multiple bridge laws which associate them with a variety
of cognitive functions. Consequently, when we reverse infer the engagement of
a cognitive function from the activation of a neural region, the inference falls
short of absolute certainty. Confidence that one has identified the correct bridge
law is a matter of degree, which is determined by the conditional probability
that cognitive process m1 is engaged, given activation in n1.
10 As an illustra-
tion, consider, again, the example of moral decision making. As neuroscientists
know, the amygdala is also activated by processes that are not related to neg-
ative emotions in any obvious way; consequently, amygdala activation does not
deductively entail the engagement of fear or similar emotions. However, it does
not follow that inferences from amygdala activation to the presence of negative
emotions are invalid; what follows is simply that such inferences are inductive
or probabilistic. The case of the amygdala is not the exception, it is the norm:
most brain regions are associated with various cognitive processes or states.
Furthermore, this point is not restricted to location-based inferences, but also
applies to pattern-based ones. The multi-voxel patterns are, at best, a reliable
guide for inferring (via bridge laws) the engagement of the associated cognitive
state or process.
With all of this in mind, we can now turn to an influential critique of the
probabilistic nature of reverse inferences. Several authors have argued that,
since the application of a given bridge law in some task is determined by a
conditional probability, most interesting reverse inferences turn out to be un-
acceptably weak (Miller 2008; Phelps 2009; Legrenzi and Umilta 2011). This
objection underlies many skeptical claims about the use of reverse inferences and
has led to the explicit suggestion that genuine progress at the psycho-neural in-
terface requires reductionist bridge laws (Ross 2008; Anderson 2010). No doubt,
in some cases, such accusations are justified: some proposed reverse inferences
10This conditional probability is determined by the following straightforward application of
Bayes’ theorem:
P (m1|n1) =
P (n1|m1)P (m1)
P (n1|m1)P (m1) + P (n1|¬m1)P (¬m1)
(1)
Note that the prior P (m1) is conditioned on the task used in the reverse argument. Impor-
tantly, Equation (1) shows that the degree of belief in a reverse inference depends not only
the prior P (m1) but also on the selectivity of the neural response—i.e., on the ratio of the
process-specific activation, P (n1|m1), to the overall likelihood of activation in that area across
all tasks which do not involve m1, i.e., P (n1|¬m1).
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are indeed questionable, to say the least. Yet, this observation falls short of
a general critique, for the significance of the lack of (maximal) selectivity on
the validity of reverse inferences has been substantially exaggerated. This is
because critics often overlook another important characteristic of associative
bridge laws, namely, their context sensitivity.
4.2 Context-Sensitivity
In an influential article, Poldrack (2006) noted that the conditional probability
that a cognitive state m1 is associated to a neural state or process n1 should be
determined relative to a particular task. However, to avoid unnecessary com-
plications, Poldrack intentionally ignored this task-relativity in the rest of his
analysis. This deliberate omission, however, had the unfortunate consequence
that several ensuing discussions also ignored the task-relativity of bridge laws
in reverse inferences. This resulted in a misleading objection.
Consider the selectivity of the amygdala, which plays a central role in several
studies in neuroethics and neuroeconomics. Although the amygdala is typically
involved in processes involving fear and other negative emotions, it is also in-
volved in many other cognitive processes that are usually unmentioned in studies
such as Greene et al. (2001). Such processes include the perception of odor in-
tensity, sexually arousing stimuli, and trust from faces (Phelps 2006; Lindquist
et al. 2012), as well as the processing of faces from other races, and the per-
ception of biological motion and sharp contours (Phelps 2009). It has also been
claimed that the main function of the amygdala is to process novel or emo-
tionally salient stimuli—not fear-related stimuli per se (Lindquist et al. 2012).
Based on these considerations, Phelps (2009) argues that amygdala activation in
a given psychological task could signal the engagement of any of these cognitive
processes. Consequently, reverse inferences such as the ones used by Greene and
colleagues overestimate the conditional probability that negative emotions are
engaged, given amygdala activation.
What Phelps and other critics (e.g., Klein 2011) overlook is that the proba-
bility that a particular bridge law applies, given the activation of a brain region,
should be determined relative to relevant features of the context invoked by the
reverse argument. Specifically, in the case under consideration, the success of the
reverse argument does not depend on the assumption that we can reliably infer
the engagement of negative emotions from differential activation in the amyg-
dala. What the argument requires is that the engagement of negative emotions
can be inferred from the pattern of neural activation observed in the particular
task under consideration.11 In other words, the inference is from differential
amygdala-activation in personal scenarios to the engagement of negative emo-
tions. Once the inference is framed in these terms, we can see that most other
11For a discussion of task-relativity in reverse inferences, see Hutzler (2013) and Del Pinal
and Nathan (2013). In a related discussion, Machery (2013) defends the relativity of the
cognitive-level hypotheses being tested. Despite significant differences, here we can treat all
these approaches on a par, for they address the ‘lack of selectivity’ objection by emphasizing
the inherent relativity of reverse inferences.
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cognitive processes that also involve the amygdala are not plausible explana-
tions for such differential activation, and can thus be ruled out. Consider, for
instance, the tasks used by Greene and colleagues (2001). Personal cases do
not differ from impersonal ones with respect to stimuli related to odor, facial-
processing, sexuality, sharp-contours, or the comparative novelty of the tasks.
Hence, relative to personal cases, the conditional probability of the engagement
of negative emotions, given amygdala activation, is significantly higher than is
suggested by the objection presented above.12
The critiques against reverse inference based on lack of selectivity—which are
typically raised against location-based inferences—become even less persuasive
when directed against pattern-based inferences. Yet, we should explicitly stress
that, just like location-based ones, pattern-based inferences are also context-
sensitive. For instance, the recognition experiments discussed in the previous
section employ bridge laws that associate particular multi-voxel patterns with
recollection and familiarity processes. In tasks that contrast recollection- and
familiarity-based recognition judgments, each set of multi-voxel patterns can be
used by a classifier to reliably identify instances in which recollection or famil-
iarity are engaged. However, these inferences are especially useful because, as
noted in §3, the reliability of the classifier can be established, directly and pre-
cisely, in an experimental setting. In general, pattern-based inferences are more
reliable than location-based ones; still, both are context-sensitive in essentially
the same way.
4.3 Non-Identity
Unlike their reductive counterparts, associative bridge laws do not presuppose
any kind of identity—a priori, a posteriori, necessary, or contingent. To wit, in
the moral decision making case, the bridge law mapping amygdala activation
to the engagement of negative emotions presupposes neither the type-identity
nor the token-identity of these two events. As we saw, the amygdala is differ-
entially activated by a variety of cognitive processes that have little or nothing
to do with negative emotions, and it might turn out that some unambiguously
fear-or-distress-related processes are not accompanied by increased amygdala
activation. We should make it very clear that we are not recommending any
departure from token-physicalism. Our point is simply that associative bridge
laws are so metaphysically uncommitted that they would also be consistent with
violations of token-physicalism.
A similar point applies to pattern-based inferences. Bridge laws used in
the recognition case do not presuppose that recollection or familiarity processes
are (type- or token-) identical to their associated multi-voxel patterns. For one
12We surmise that the task relativity of reverse inferences is systematically overlooked be-
cause methodological discussions (e.g., Poldrack 2006; Phelps 2006) often consider only arbi-
trary ‘empty’ tasks which do not eliminate any processing possibilities (that is, any bridge
laws) for the brain region of interest. Hence, reverse inferences seem intuitively weak. However,
once we consider the tasks relevant to each reverse inference, we can eliminate some subset of
bridge laws which cover the brain regions of interest, thereby increasing their strength.
12
Chicago, IL -141-
thing, the patterns are only highly reliable—but not infallible—indicators of
the corresponding processes. Furthermore, and more importantly, even if we
had perfect correlations, multi-voxel patterns are not plausible candidates for
such identities. Voxel patterns are representations that average over the activa-
tion of thousands of neurons, but do not specify the actual neural mechanisms
that compute cognitive-level processes. This, of course, is not to say that the
possibility of a type-identity can be ruled out a priori : one might believe that,
eventually, the neural mechanisms that carry out, say, recollection processes will
be identified. However, this reduction is neither required nor presupposed by
the use of pattern-based inferences to discriminate among competing hypotheses
of the processes underlying recognition tasks.
To appreciate the main features of associative bridge laws, it is useful to
contrast them with various recent attempts that deal with multiple realizability
by weakening Nagelian bridge laws. David Lewis (1969) famously argued that
reductive type-identities are not meant to hold across the board. On his view,
the bridge laws reducing mental states to brain states are implicitly restricted
to a specific domain. For example, while pain tout court cannot be reduced to a
single brain state, human pain, octopus pain, martian pain, etc. can each be re-
duced to a different type of brain state. Lewis’ argument has been subsequently
developed and refined by various philosophers (Hooker 1981; Enc¸ 1983; Church-
land 1986; Kim 1992) all of whom pointed out the conditional nature of virtually
all contingent event identities.13 Whether or not the context-relativization of
bridge laws is ultimately successful (which has been the subject of heated dis-
cussion), it is irrelevant to the present approach. Associative bridge laws do
not require restricted conditional identities of any kind. This is especially evi-
dent in the case of pattern-based inferences: the particular voxel patterns used
to infer the engagement of each sub-type of recognition process—that is, the
bridge laws—are not even stable across individuals, let alone all human beings,
and can only be used reliably in specific experimental contexts. In the experi-
ments considered above, the voxel patterns were used to infer the engagement
of familiarity or recollection in a task where these processes were the only un-
known variables. If a third task (say, a face-recognition process) were added,
the pattern-classifier would have to be re-trained. In this case, there would be
no guarantee that the patterns that were previously associated with familiarity
and recollection could still be used, in the new experimental settings, to reliably
predict those same processes.
For similar reasons, associative bridge laws should also be distinguished from
recent attempts to weaken Nagelian bridge laws by replacing type-identity with
a condition of connectability based on co-referentiality. Klein (2009) argues that
a higher-level science S is N -connectable to a lower-level science S′ if and only
if S′ has the resources to introduce new terms, in its own vocabulary, which
are co-referential with the predicates of S that are absent in S′. Determining
13To cite a textbook example, the standard identification of temperature with mean molec-
ular kinetic energy in classical equilibrium thermodynamics is left completely unscathed, the
arguments runs, by the observation that temperature is differently realized in gases, solids,
vacuums, and other mediums.
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the co-referentiality of terms is a substantial endeavor that, however, we can
set aside. The important point is that whether or not terms such as ‘amyg-
dala activation’ and ‘fear’ are co-referential—and there seems to be no reason
to assume that they are, given that one is often found without the other—is
irrelevant to our account, for the co-referentiality of terms is not a precondition
for their successful employment in reverse inferences.
In sum, the bridge laws which figure in location-and pattern-based reverse
arguments do not assume any kind of identity between neural and cognitive
states or processes. In order to play a role at the psycho-neural interface, as-
sociative bridge laws only need to allow us to reliably (reverse) infer, in certain
experimentally controlled settings, the engagement of a cognitive state or pro-
cess from particular locations or patterns of neural activation.
5 Implications
In the previous section, we analyzed the characteristic features of associative
bridge laws by drawing on the way they are employed in scientific practice and
contrasting them with their reductive counterparts. We now turn to their im-
plications for various ongoing debates about inter-level relations in philosophy
of mind and science. Specifically, we begin by discussing functional locationism
and multiple realizability. We conclude by revisiting the traditional intrerpre-
tation of Marr-levels and its relation to the alleged ‘automony’ of psychology.
5.1 Avoiding Radical Locationism
Many scholars, including prominent scientists and philosophers, argue that cog-
nitive neuroscientists assume an unreasonably strong version of functional loca-
tionism (Van Orden and Paap 1997; Fodor 1999; Uttal 2001; Coltheart 2013;
Satel and Lilienfeld 2013). Some have gone as far as labeling current cognitive
neuroscience the ‘new phrenology’ (Uttal 2002). This critique often presupposes
a reductive model of inter-level relations at the psycho-neural interface. To wit,
if one combines the assumptions that said links are reductive and that most
reverse inferences are still grounded in lesion studies and location-based neural
data, it becomes reasonable to conclude that cognitive neuropsychologists are in
the business of type-identifying cognitive functions with neural locations, bla-
tantly ignoring multiple realizability and the failures of derivational reduction.
While the charge of excessive functional locationism is sometimes warranted, it
does not apply to properly conducted reverse inferences (Del Pinal and Nathan
2013). Furthermore, it does not reflect the current trend in cognitive neuro-
science, at least if the increasing importance of pattern-based inferences is a
reliable indicator (Poldrack 2008, 2011).
As illustrated by our examples, most reverse arguments do not associate the
engagement of entire cognitive processes with specific locations of neural acti-
vation. The general strategy is to decompose the competing processes into their
subcomponents and to consider those subcomponents that can be mapped, via
14
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bridge laws, to neural locations or patterns, from which we can reliably reverse
infer the engagement of one of the cognitive processes, relative to a specific task.
In the moral case, only one of the competing processes predicted the engage-
ment of negative emotions in personal tasks, which is why differential amygdala-
activation provided evidence in favor of M over M*. The point to stress is that,
for the argument to go through, one need not assume the functional localiza-
tion of the entire moral decision-making processes. Pattern-based inferences are
even less plausible targets for the charge of unjustified functional locationism.
Classifiers use multi-voxel patterns to infer the engagement of recollection or
familiarity in particular recognition tasks. Note that classifiers are given no
location-related information, which allows for the set of patterns assigned to,
say, recollection to be implemented in different neural locations. Interestingly,
recent studies suggest that key components of recognition processes are, indeed
functionally localized (Norman et al. 2010). Yet the reverse inference does not
presuppose any link between neural patterns and locations of activation. To be
sure, there remain several controversial issues regarding the foundations of cog-
nitive neuropsychology, including the substantial question of how to formalize
the context- or hypothesis-relativity of reverse inferences (Del Pinal and Nathan
2013; Hutzler 2013; Machery 2013). Yet, the wholesale dismissal of the entire
cognitive neuropsychology of higher cognition as a ‘sophisticated new phrenol-
ogy in disguise’ does not withstand serious scrutiny.
5.2 Accommodating Multiple Realizability
As discussed in §2, the natural kinds of a ‘higher’ science cannot, in general, be
reduced to kinds of a ‘lower’ science because natural kinds seldom correspond
across domains in the way required by reductive bridge laws. A complete assess-
ment of multiple realizability and reduction lies beyond the scope of this article.
Our point is simply that multiple-realizability, coupled with a reductive concep-
tion of bridge laws, generates serious problems for understanding the fruitfulness
of the interdisciplinary work currently pursued in current neuroscience.
Associative bridge laws are perfectly consistent with the multiple-realizability
of psychological kinds. Amygdala activation signals the engagement of processes
involving negative emotions but, as discussed at length, it can also be triggered
by other cognitive processes, such as the perception of sharp contours and un-
usual stimuli. In addition, processes involving negative emotions could be im-
plemented in other neural locations. Still, as long as we can order these manifold
inter-level interactions in a probabilistic way, and provided that we factor in the
relevant task, neuroimaging data can be used in particular reverse arguments
to discriminate among competing higher-order cognitive hypotheses. Similarly,
pattern-based inferences are also compatible with multiple realizability, even in
its most radical forms. In the example presented above, multi-voxel patterns can
be used by classifiers to determine the engagement of recollection or familiarity-
based recognition processes. The patterns are extracted and the classifiers are
trained in specific tasks and for each subject individually. For instance, that
some multi-voxel pattern is accurately categorized as a recollection process by
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a classifier trained for a subject does not entail that the same pattern would be
so categorized by a classifier trained on a different subject. Likewise, the fact
that a classifier trained for a subject in a particular recollection/familiarity task
is reliable, does not mean that it would still reliably distinguish between these
processes in a different type of task—e.g., one that uses visual objects instead of
words. In short, the successful use of these multi-voxel patterns and classifiers
to discriminate between theories of the dynamics of recognition processes does
not depend on whether they are stable across subjects or even, within certain
limits, across tasks. Hence, the assumption that recollection and familiarity pro-
cesses are multiply realizable leaves the applicability of context-sensitive reverse
inferences completely unscathed.
5.3 Revisiting Marr-Levels and Reductionism
Let us conclude by discussing the third and most general implication of our
account. The classic reductive model of interlevel relations and Marr’s influ-
ential division of the study of cognition into three levels are, strictly speaking,
independent. Early eliminative materialists such as Paul Churchland (1981)
endorse reductionism while rejecting Marr-levels, whereas many philosophers
recognize the usefulness of Marr-levels but eschew reductionism (Bechtel and
Mundale 1999). However, the two views mutually support each other. To wit,
a standard reductionist response to multiple realizability is to argue that an-
tireductionists set up a straw man by selecting relata on the cognitive side that
are too coarse-grained to be reduced (Kim 1992; Shapiro 2000).14 The general
idea underlying this response is that, as cognitive functions are progressively
broken down into smaller subcomponents, it becomes more likely that we will
reach a level where (local) reductive bridge laws can be established. Note how
this picture of functional decompositions and local reductions fits in naturally
with a standard interpretation of Marr-levels, according to which it only makes
sense to ask about the lower-level implementation of functions once the cognitive
processes that compute them have been laid out in algorithmic detail.
We do not deny that hypotheses regarding the neural implementation of
cognitive-level processes constitute a significant portion of cognitive neuroscience.
Indeed, astonishing progress has been made in the study of how certain percep-
tual and motor functions are carried out in the brain. However, we believe that
this model of the psycho-neural interface as essentially addressing Marr-level 3
hypotheses is inadequate, as it leaves out much of the cognitive neuroscience
of higher cognition. On the reductive account of Marr-levels, psychology and
neuroscience only begin to meaningfully interact once we can ask how cognitive
processes are implemented in neural hardware. This ignores a different—but
14For instance, a cognitive function such as ‘language processing’ is too coarse-grained to be
directly associated to stable neural locations, as attempted by Poldrack (2006), to determine
the reliability of inferences from activation in certain regions of Broca’s area to the engagement
of language processing. Still, the appropriate relata might be found, the reductionist insists,
if we focus on subcomponents of language processes. For example, Pylkannen and colleagues
(2011) have attempted to find, with some success, the neural correlates of certain semantic
compositional operations, a key aspect of semantic processing.
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equally important—type of psycho-neural interaction: using neural data to se-
lect among competing cognitive processes even when we have no clue how they
could be neurally implemented (Del Pinal and Nathan 2013). This possibility
of delving into the neural level only to ‘come back up’ to select hypotheses at
the cognitive level is too often ignored by critics.
Our account of associative bridge laws also clarifies why, contrary to reduc-
tionist assumptions, it is often easier to employ neural data when Marr-level 2
hypotheses are not (yet) fully developed. For example, syntactic and seman-
tic theories in linguistics are quite refined, but neuroimaging studies have been
notoriously difficult to apply in this area. Linguists often face the task of deter-
mining whether a certain process is syntactic or semantic, with different models
yielding different predictions. Take the case of ‘it is raining,’ used to mean
that it is raining at the place of utterance. To account for this implicit loca-
tion restriction, some models assume that a syntactic variable is inserted in the
sentence prior to semantic interpretation (Stanley 2000); other models assume
that the meaning of ‘raining’ is enriched to include the specification of a location
(Recanati 2011). The former explanation appeals to a syntactic process; the lat-
ter to a semantic one. If we found bridge laws mapping syntactic and semantic
operations onto distinct locations or patterns of neural activation, we could try
to discriminate between the two models by scanning subjects while processing
such sentences. Unfortunately, establishing the relevant bridge laws is proving
to be a daunting task: since semantic and syntactic processes usually work in
tandem, they are extremely hard to disentangle. As a consequence, we can-
not, at present, use neural data to discriminate between syntactic and semantic
models of ellipsis. In contrast, models of moral and economic decision making
are still comparatively undeveloped. As Camerer and colleagues (2005) argue
in great detail, one of the main divisions in current studies of decision making is
between hypotheses that assume more rational processes, and hypotheses that
assume an essential involvement of emotions. This division is illustrated by our
discussion of moral decision making, and also emerges in several neuroeconomic
debates, such as in competing explanations of the endowment effect (Knutson
et al. 2008). This contrast is significant for the use of reverse inferences because
we have bridge laws that map emotions and controlled rule-guided behavior onto
distinct brain regions (Miller and Cohen 2001; Greene 2009). Consequently, we
can often test these decision-making hypotheses using reverse inference. How-
ever, as this branch of science progresses and mixed models that incorporate
both rational and emotional components become more common, it may become
more difficult to use our current bridge-laws to discriminate amongst them in
neuroimaging studies.
The occasional difficulty in finding bridge laws that discriminate between
advanced Marr-level 2 models—compared to the relative ease with which such
laws often discriminate more elementary models—is hard to reconcile with the
traditional reductive interpretation of Marr’s framework. Hypotheses that have
an advanced functional decomposition are better suited for implementation;
hence, from the reductive perspective, they should also be better candidates for
interaction and integration with the neural level. Furthermore, since few of our
17
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current hypotheses regarding capacities such as language or decision-making are
ready for Marr-level 3 implementation, it is hardly surprising that those who
accept the reductive interpretation of Marr levels typically endorse the rela-
tive autonomy of the psychology of higher cognition. In contrast, our dynamic
account makes better sense of the current limitations and achievements of in-
terdisciplinary research at the border of psychology and neuroscience. Once
again, our approach is compatible with the possibility that science will eventu-
ally discover the neural implementation of higher-level cognitive processes. Yet,
abandoning the reductive perspective suggests other significant ways in which
neural data can be employed to advance psychology.
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Physicalism, Introspection, and Psychophysics: The Carnap/Duncker Exchange 
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Leibniz Universität Hannover 
October 2014 
 
In 1932, Rudolf Carnap published his article “Psychology in a Physical Language.” 
The article prompted a critical response by the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker. 
The exchange is marked by mutual lack of comprehension. In this paper I will 
provide a contextualized explication of the exchange. I will show that Carnap’s 
physicalism was deeply rooted in the psychophysical tradition that also informed 
Gestalt psychological research. By failing to acknowledge this, Carnap missed out on 
the possibility to enter into a serious debate and to forge an alliance with a like-
minded psychologist at the time. I conclude by suggesting that the kind of 
physicalism practiced by Gestalt psychologists deserves to be taken seriously by 
current philosophy of psychology. 
 
In the early 1930s, Rudolf Carnap laid down his project of overcoming metaphysics by means of 
linguistic analysis (Carnap 1931a) and specified a universal (physical) language as the language 
of choice (Carnap 1931b). It is well known that Carnap’s 1931b article gave rise to what is often 
referred to as the “protocol-language debate” within the Vienna Circle (Neurath 1932; Carnap 
1932b). While there is some impressive historical and philosophical scholarship about this debate 
(e.g., Uebel 2007), one strand of it has not received much attention, namely the ways in which 
Carnap’s views about the physicalizability of protocol sentences were related to research in 
experimental psychology at the time. This is especially surprising given the fact that Carnap, in 
his article “Psychology in a Physical Language” (1932a) attempted to spell out the implications 
of this view for psychology. This article was met by a critical response by the psychologist Karl 
Duncker (1932), which in turn prompted a reply from Carnap (1932c). The exchange is 
characterized by a surprising degree of mutual incomprehension, with Duncker suggesting that 
Carnap’s critique of (introspective) psychology was attacking a strawman and Carnap saying that 
Duncker had completely missed his point. 
In this article I will explicate and contextualize the exchange between Carnap and Duncker. I will 
shed some light on the reasons why the two talked past each other and I will show that Duncker 
did put his finger on the fact that (1) Carnap’s position failed to address scientific practice, and 
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that (2) Carnap did indeed attack several strawmen. I will lay out that Carnap’s turn to a physical 
language was motivated by his aim to provide an objective foundation for protocol sentences 
(section 2), and argue that the way in which Carnap executed his project of physicalizing 
protocol-sentences was deeply informed by psychophysics (section 3). I will then (in section 4) 
turn to Carnap’s 1932a article “Psychology in a Physical Language,” where he claims to be 
addressing the implications of his views for psychology. Section 5 details Duncker’s response 
and Carnap’s answer. Finally, in section 6, I will draw out two underlying issues in this debate, 
i.e., (a) the status of introspection in psychological research, and (b) the question what (if any) 
metaphysical presuppositions were made by psychophysical research. 
 
2. Overcoming Metaphysics and the Problem of Experience 
In his famous article “Overcoming Metaphysics” Carnap laid out the very lean conception of 
philosophy characteristic of the Vienna Circle (Carnap 1931a). According to it, philosophy was 
neither to engage in metaphysical speculations about age-old topics, nor in naturalistic treatments 
of them. Rather, it was essentially reduced to providing meta-analyses of existing discourses in 
order to clean them of “pseudo-sentences;” sentences that look grammatically like sentences, but 
are in fact meaningless. The method of choice (logical analysis of language) was to proceed by 
translating every sentence that is formulated in the so-called “material mode of speech” into a 
sentence in the “formal mode of speech” (a sentence about a sentence). This method was to 
reveal whether a given statement was logically consistent and empirically meaningful. 
In response to the question of what it takes for a statement to be empirically meaningful, Carnap 
introduced a version of the well-known verificationist criterion of meaning that we still associate 
closely with the doctrine of logical positivism. According to it a word a is meaningful only if (1) 
empirical indicators for a are known, (2) it is known what protocol sentences the sentence S(a) 
can be derived from, and (3) the path towards verifying S(a) is known (Carnap 1931a, 224). 
Carnap’s verificationist semantics for words emphasized the empirical truth conditions for 
sentences in which the words occur. These empirical truth conditions were provided by 
“observational” or “protocol-sentences” and he stated that while there was to date no agreement 
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about the form or content of such sentences, they were commonly thought to refer to something 
that is “given” (Carnap 1931a, 222). 
This raised the question of what were criteria of meaningfulness of protocol sentences 
themselves? Was their meaningfulness ensured by a primitive notion of the “given,” i.e., by the 
subjective experience that is – in the material mode – reported by protocol sentences? Or was 
there a more ‘public’ way of stating the truth conditions for protocol sentences? It is this question 
that Carnap addressed in his “Physical Language as the Universal Language of Science” (Carnap 
1931b), where he argued that both protocol sentences and “system sentences” (i.e., sentences 
capable of being derived from, and verified, by protocol sentences) are part of an overarching 
language: the universal language of science. By the requirement of universality, Carnap meant 
that such a language “can describe every state of affairs” (Carnap 1963 [1932a] 400). But in 
addition he argued that such a language should also be intersubjective, i.e., it should be usable by 
everybody in the same way. It is in this second respect that Carnap’s aim in this work differed 
from the one proposed in his 1928 Aufbau, where he had wanted the universal language to be that 
of subjective experience. It was because of the requirement of intersubjectivity that Carnap turned 
to the physical language as the universal language (see Uebel 2007).1 
Carnap’s thesis that (seemingly subjective) protocol sentences were translatable into the 
(intersubjective) language of physics was ostensibly part of a larger thesis, namely that all 
sentences are translatable into sentences of the physical language. Surprisingly, Carnap did not 
present an argument for this larger thesis, except to suggest that its truth was obvious, at least in 
the case of “the inorganic sciences” (chemistry, geology, astronomy) and even biology since they 
were (in the material mode) dealing with physical objects. However, since his main target was the 
physicalizability of protocol sentences, a separate argument was required, and he attempted to 
provide one in sections 4 of his “Physical Language.” 
 
 
                                                          
1 In his “Physical Language” article he still maintained that protocol-sentences were the most basic sentences of 
science that could not themselves be doubted (438), but in response to Neurath’s critique, he revised this position to 
say that any scientific sentence within a physicalist system could function as a protocol sentence (“Über 
Protokollsätze” 224) and no sentence could function as an ultimate epistemic basis (225). 
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3. The Psychophysical Underpinnings of Physicalized Protocol Sentences 
Carnap’s argument for the translatability of protocol sentences into physical sentences took the 
form of an empirical claim: He posited that it is possible to find a quantitative equivalent for 
every qualitative (protocol) sentence, and he noted that this is not a logical necessity but simply a 
contingent empirical fact, such that there is a functional dependency between protocol sentences 
and physical sentences. (In the material mode, it is an empirical fact about the way in which our 
experience is structured in relation to the physical world). From this, Carnap derived the claim 
that it is possible to find a corresponding physical sentence for every protocol sentence, a fact that 
provides the basis of the very possibility of practicing an intersubjective physics. 
It is clear that Carnap expected the physical sentences in question to be sentences about the brain, 
but realized that neuroscience at the time did not deliver sentences that directly corresponded to 
sentences about experiences. For this reason, he decided to describe the relevant brain states in 
terms of behavioural dispositions, specifically, the disposition to display particular behaviours in 
response to particular stimuli. This was made explicit in his subsequent “Psychology in a 
Physical Language,” but is already apparent in the way he explains his position in his 1932b 
paper. For example, he states that it is possible to establish empirical correlations between the 
qualitative statements of protocol sentences and the quantitative determination (in a physical 
language) of the conditions under which they are uttered. For example, when examining color 
vision, he argued, one has to vary “the physical conditions (e.g., the combination of various 
frequencies of oscillations) and discover the conditions to which S reacts with the protocol 
statements containing the qualitative terms in question” (Carnap 1963 [1932]; 408). Then he 
states “The discovery of the set of these physical terms corresponding to a definite qualitative 
term will be called the ‘physicalizing” … of this qualitative term” (ibid.). 
Unfortunately, Carnap does not provide a reference for this, but it is striking that there was in fact 
a research program that did just what Carnap was describing: i.e., vary physical stimulus 
conditions and measure responses. This research program, psychophysics, had famously been 
founded by Fechner (1860) and continues to be active until today (Heidelberger 2004). At the 
time of Carnap’s work in the 1930s, famous proponents of this research were members of the 
Berlin/Frankfurt school of Gestalt psychology, with whom Carnap was at least indirectly 
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acquainted (Feest 2007).2 I therefore suggest that Carnap was aware of psychophysical research 
and that his proposal to translate protocol sentences into sentences about behavioural dispositions 
was in fact inspired by this tradition.3 With this claim I do not wish to refute the common 
assumption that the position advocated here Carnap is a kind of logical or analytical 
behaviourism. My thesis, rather, is that Carnap’s articulation of this form of behaviourism (i.e., 
what Carnap called the “physicalizing” of qualitative terms), relied on a contingent empirical 
fact. And the way in which he imagined the empirical investigation of this fact was practiced by a 
particular (at the time quite dominant) approach within psychology. The implication I want to 
highlight here is that specific attempts to translate a psychological sentence (Mr A is angry) into 
physical sentence (Mr. A exhibits particular behaviors) are going to build on psychophysical 
research, which in turn will necessarily involve first-person data. 
 
4. Physical Language, Physicalized Observation Sentences and Psychology 
In his article “Psychology in a Physical Language” Carnap explored the implications of his 
physicalism for psychology as a science, specifically focusing on the question of the kinds of 
observation sentences were admissible in psychology. His targets were “observations of the 
mental states of others” (section 3) and “self-observations” (section 7). 
With regard to observation-statements about the mental states of others (e.g., “Mr A is angry”), 
Carnap argued that insofar as such sentences are meaningful at all, they are only meaningful if 
they can be translated into statements about physical behaviours (about Mr. A’s disposition to 
behave in certain ways). This allows for the derivation of sentences that state truth conditions for 
the sentence in question (about Mr. A’s actual behaviour), though (as Carnap lays out) to treat 
them as such requires an additional premise, namely that in general people display the behaviors 
in question when angry. Carnap uses this to argue that if we want to test a particular sentence 
about the content of someone’s mind, we have to (a) appeal to a general sentence about the kinds 
of physical conditions that need to be in place when we use the term “anger” and (b) point to a 
                                                          
2 When discussing (both in his 1928 Aufbau and in his 1932 article about physical language) the question what are 
the units of experience that protocol language typically describes, he opted for those identified by Gestalt 
psychology. 
3 Even if this historical thesis does not hold up, I maintain that psychologists at the time would have recognized the 
similarity (and that’s all that matters for my subsequent argument). 
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particular set of physical conditions as instantiating the general conditions in question. Carnap 
then contrasts this (“rational”) mode of justification with one where the emotional state of Mr. A 
is ascertained in a more “intuitive” way. He argues, however, that such intuitive sentences are 
either meaningless or can be translated into one that states the physical conditions that provide it 
with meaning. In section 7, he picks up on this claim and says that the same is true of sentences 
about our own mental states: For example, when we utter a sentence like “I am nervous right 
now,” this sentence is either meaningless or its meaning is provided by empirical truth conditions 
in a physical language (shaky hands, sweaty palms, etc.).  
One might wonder whether (and if so, how) these considerations were relevant to the research 
practices of experimental psychology, as Carnap seems to suggest. In a nutshell, he had two 
answers to this: First, he claimed that by failing to appreciate his point about the semantics of 
psychological sentences, psychologists were prone to falling into a kind of psychophysical 
dualism (which is apparent, for example, when I say that I am in physical state X and in addition 
in mental state Y). Second, he cautioned against attributing a special kind of epistemic 
significance to first-person experiences (of other minds or of one’s own mind), pointing out 
instead that in science one always deals with sentences about experiences, which should be 
treated as the behavioural outputs of complicated detection devices under particular physical 
conditions: “In principle, there is at most a gradual epistemic difference between the utterances of 
a fellow human being and a barometer” (p.124; translation by me). (see also p. 140 for similar 
statements). 
Carnap repeatedly comments on the confused state of the then current psychology (for example 
“understanding” and “introspective” psychology), but he never quite says who is actually 
committing the above two errors. It is possible that he had in mind Wilhelm Dilthey, who had 
argued for understanding as a first-person mode of access to the subject matter of the human 
sciences. But Carnap’s critique is a little confusing by virtue of the fact that Carnap also throws 
in a different psychological approach (again without mentioning any names), which studies 
“purposeful behaviour.” I suggest that here Carnap had in mind the American neo-behaviorist 
Edward Chace Tolman, whom Carnap probably met at Vienna Circle meetings (or at least knew 
about via Egon Brunswick).4 Tolman emphasized the goal-directed nature of much behaviour and 
                                                          
4 Tolman’s book, Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men also appeared in 1932. 
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essentially introduced proto-cognitive mental states to explain them. With respect to this 
explanatory practice, Carnap argues that it is acceptable as long as we realize that talk about 
purposes can be fully physicalized, i.e., translated into a language that specifies lawful 
regularities between specific stimuli and behavioural dispositions. It bears stressing that Dilthey’s 
approach was quite different from Tolman’s, insofar as the former talked about a mode of 
empirical access (understanding), whereas the latter talked about an explanatory concept 
(purpose). Hence, we can note that Carnap’s critique of psychology was fairly broad. 
While this does not come out in Carnap’s article, one other likely target of Carnap’s attack on 
psychology was the psychologist Karl Bühler, who was based in Vienna at the time. In 1927, just 
a few years before Carnap’s “Psychology in a Physical Language”, Bühler had published a book 
about what he had termed the “crisis of psychology” (Bühler 1927). In this book, Bühler 
specifically attacked the physicalism of Gestalt psychologists like Wertheimer, Köhler, and 
Koffka. According to Christoph Limbeck (2014), Carnap presented his ideas about a physicalist 
psychology in Bühler’s colloquium on two separate occasions in the summer of 1930, where they 
gave rise to heated discussions.5 In the light of the hypothesis that Carnap’s critique of 
contemporary psychology may have been directed at Bühler’s 1927 book, and the light of the fact 
that Bühler, in this book, specifically opposed what he took to be the “physicalism” of the Berlin 
school of Gestalt psychology, it is not surprising that members of this school took an interest in 
Carnap’s position. 
 
5. The Carnap/Duncker Exchange 
Carnap’s 1932a article prompted a reply by Carl Duncker, a younger member of the Berlin 
school of Gestalt psychologists. This reply (and Carnap’s subsequent response) demonstrates a 
deep mutual incomprehension. This is especially surprising in the light of my above thesis that 
Carnap’s physicalism was informed by the psychophysical tradition, and that Gestalt 
psychological research has to be placed in that tradition. In this section, I provide a brief 
overview of the exchange, followed (in section 6) by an elaboration of my thesis.  
                                                          
5
 I would like to thank Christoph Limbeck for drawing my attention to this! 
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Even though it is clear, especially at the beginning of his article, that Duncker had misunderstood 
some of Carnap’s points, he did object to Carnap’s characterization of the two supposed problems 
of psychology, namely the danger of falling into a mind-body dualism and the tendency to 
attribute too much epistemic significance to introspective data. Carnap had argued that these two 
problems could be avoided if one took the general stance of behaviorism: “The position 
advocated here is essentially in agreement with the psychology known as ‘behaviorism’” (Carnap 
1932a, 124, translation by me).6 Duncker argued that Gestalt psychological findings and 
methodology were more congenial to what Carnap was aiming at.  
As mentioned above, Carnap claimed that his analysis of psychological sentences as translatable 
into physical ones could help psychologist avoid the inference that the two types of sentences 
referred to two separate kinds of “things.” Duncker responded with utter incomprehension, 
stating that he was not aware of many contemporary psychologists who made substantial 
metaphysical assumptions about mind and body (Duncker 1932, 165), and that Gestalt 
psychologists were in fact physicalists, though he did not think that this had any implications for 
the goals or methods of non-behaviorist psychology (ibid. 176). He backed this up by claiming 
that psychophysics also viewed organisms as detection devices, like Canap, and that they endorse 
a principle of isomorphism between mental and physical processes (Duncker 1932, 174). 
However, Duncker also used some careless formulations, which seemingly contradicted his anti-
metaphysical stance. For example, he asserted that it was possible to conceptualize anger both as 
a behavioural disposition and as an inner experience. For Carnap these assertions showed 
Duncker to be falling in exactly the metaphysical trap that Carnap had warned about (Carnap 
1932b, 186/7). Accordingly, Carnap responded with some surprise about Dunker’s claim to be a 
physicalist, noting that he and Duncker clearly had in mind very different notions of physicalism: 
Carnap’s physicalims was about the translatability of psychological language into physical 
language, whereas Duncker’s physicalism was about finding the physical basis of introspectively 
accessible experience. 
This brings us to Carnap’s second critique of psychology, namely that of introspective methods. 
Carnap’s rejection of introspection was closely related to his above-mentioned point about the 
dangers of being misled into a dualist metaphysical position. It was not aimed at the usage of this 
                                                          
6 Here Carnap mentions that J. B. Watson’s Der Behaviorismus had been translated into German in 1930.  
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method as such, but at certain interpretations of its results, with its inherent danger of reifying the 
object of introspection, a point he reiterates in his reply to Duncker. In his response, Duncker 
stated that (a) Gestalt psychology (like all of psychophysics) relied on some kinds of self-reports 
since it was not clear how psychophysical laws could be formulated otherwise, but (b) that one 
did not have to be a behaviorist to reject the assumption that psychology aims at the “absolute 
content of a quale” (Duncker 1932, 167). Moreover, (c) when psychophysicists investigated (for 
example) color vision, they were not interested in the subjective experience of the color as such, 
but in their “order properties” (“Ordnungseigenschaften”). For example, if an individual 
experienced inverted qualia, this was irrelevant for the language of science, so long as that person 
responded to all the same stimuli in the same way as a person with ‘normal’ experiences. All of 
these points then lead up to Dunckers’s somewhat exasperated question: “I ask once again, which 
‘interpretation’ of introspection is Carnap arguing against?”(Duncker 1932, 169). 
Summing up, Duncker held that an endorsement of introspection was compatible with a lean 
metaphysics and with the notion of biological organisms as physical detection devices. Yet, at the 
same time, he held that introspection was an indispensable tool for the empirical investigation of 
such devices. Carnap, in his reply, repeated that he did not care what tools psychologists used, so 
long as the resulting sentences could be stated in a physical language. Thus, he took Duncker’s 
conjectures to be irrelevant to his point. 
 
6. Some Underlying Issues 
In this section, I will argue that while it is true that Duncker misunderstood Carnap’s point, it is 
also the case that Carnap was not receptive to the implications of Duncker’s remarks, namely (a) 
that Carnap’s physicalism did not have much practical relevance to at least some non-behaviorist 
psychology as it was being practiced at the time (or to the extent that it did, Carnap had failed to 
engage with the targets of his critique), and (b) that Carnap’s physicalism was rooted in 
psychological research and hence he was well advised to engage with the foundations of that 
research. 
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6.1 The Heuristic Function of Introspection 
Clearly, one issue at play in the exchange between Darnap and Duncker was a version of the 
distinction between discovery and justification, with Carnap declaring scientific methodology 
irrelevant to the epistemological status of psychological claims such as “Mr A is angry.” At that 
point in time, questions surrounding the production and epistemic status of first-person 
experiential reports had been debated within experimental psychology for well over half a 
century, following the work of Fechner, Brentano, G.E. Müller, and many others. The fact that 
Carnap simply ignored these debates must have seemed bizarre to a practicing scientist like Karl 
Duncker. Now, Carnap might have replied that those very discussions were themselves rooted in 
metaphysical assumptions, and that it was precisely for this reason that he was aiming at a purely 
formal analysis of scientific language rather than the metaphysical presuppositions of scientific 
practice. But the question is whether Carnap was entitled to this stance, since – as I argued above 
– his very conception of the physicalization of protocol sentence took for granted the project of 
psychophysics, that is, the project of discovering functional relationships between physicalist and 
mentalist descriptions. It is this fact that Duncker is also alluding to when arguing that even 
though experimental psychology mainly varies physical stimuli, this activity is heuristically 
guided by introspection (Duncker 173). This can be illustrated if we go back to Carnap’s claim 
(see section 4 above) that the empirical conditions of application for a psychological sentence 
(such as “Mr. A is angry”) were provided not only by an individual displaying the relevant 
behaviors, but also by an empirical law that described the types of behaviors typically displayed 
by angry people. Such laws, Carnap tells us, are the result of inductive generalizations. What 
Duncker is pointing out (on my construal) is that such generalizations are based on self-reports, 
and that therefore human subjectivity cannot be eliminated from the research process. 
Again, Carnap might have replied that it was precisely the (merely) heuristic nature of 
introspection that rendered it irrelevant to serious logical analysis, and moreover, that even in the 
actual research (as he and Duncker agreed) only the introspective reports (not the introspective 
experiences themselves) counted. But even if we grant this, I would like to suggest that some of 
the unproductive harshness of this exchange could have been avoided if Carnap had 
acknowledged his debts to the psychophysical tradition. This might have helped him understand 
why Duncker was so irritated by Carnap’s positive assessment of methodological behaviorism, 
since after all behaviorism, by virtue of not talking about mental states at all (physicalized or not) 
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radically rejected the very method that Carnap’s physicalism was built on, namely that of treating 
experiential reports as relevant scientific data. I will now argue that it might also have helped him 
provide a more nuanced description of the kinds of mind-body parallelisms available at the time. 
 
6.2 Varieties of Mind-Body Parallelisms 
As indicated above, Duncker rejected Carnap’s claim that contemporary psychology’s use of the 
material mode was leading it down the road to mind-brain dualism. But what did Duncker have in 
mind here? 
Carnap’s turn to the analysis of language was motivated by his aim to avoid metaphysics. While 
this specific program of antimetaphysics is particularly well known, the mid- to late 19th century 
had seen a lot of debates about banning metaphysics from scientific and philosophical discourses. 
In this vein, already Fechner, in his 1860 Elements of Psychophysics, had formulated an account 
of the psychophysical relationship that aimed to steer clear of fruitless debates between 
materialists and idealists at the time. His response was to argue that mental and physical 
properties were token identical, but depending on one’s perspective, one could only ever 
empirically apprehend one or the other and never both at the same time (Fechner 1860; 
Heidelberger 2004ab). While this type of position was often referred to as a kind of “parallelism” 
(see also Heidelberger 2003), a more apt description might be “dual-aspect theory,” since this 
term does not suggest the existence of distinct substances or properties, but merely of distinct 
perspectives. It was precisely this notion that underwrote Fechner’s empirical project of 
psychophysics. As Heidelberger (2003) explains, it is possible to distinguish between three layers 
of Fechner’s parallelism: an empirical hypothesis about the functional relationship between 
physical and psychological descriptions, a dual-aspect theory of the mind/body relationship, and 
a cosmological thesis, according to which even inorganic processes have a mental side to them. I 
have argued above that Carnap not only shared Fechner’s empirical hypothesis, but also his 
methodology of how to investigate this functional relationship (by varying stimuli and recording 
responses). While he clearly did not agree with Fechner’s mind-body theory (let alone with his 
cosmological thesis), it bears stressing that Fechner’s mind-body theory was not a kind of 
substance dualism. Rather, it was a dual aspect theory which scholars like Duncker may well 
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have taken to lay the foundations for the very possibility of the psychophysical research that 
Carnap implicitly appealed to, when casting protocol sentences in terms of behavioural 
dispositions. 
Now, it is clear that for Carnap, the linguistic description of behavioural dispositions (expressed 
in a physical language) merely ensured the meaningfulness of psychological sentences, whereas 
for Fechner they expressed psychophysical laws, i.e., laws that describe the empirical relationship 
between two types of the magnitudes: experiences and physical stimuli. But given that Carnap’s 
semantic analysis also exploited (or at least assumed) the empirical relationship in question, it is 
well worth pointing out that Fechnerian psychophysics attempted to account for the existence of 
the empirical relationship without positing separate substances or even properties. By stating that 
the correspondence between the two languages was a crude empirical fact, Carnap may have been 
able to avoid metaphysical speculation, but there is also a sense in which this appeal is somewhat 
unsatisfactory. Moreover, it remains to me an open question to what extent Carnap’s thinking 
about this was implicitly informed by some version of the dual-aspect theory that had 
underwritten Fechner’s psychophysical research. Whether or not this was the case, I argue that 
for Duncker this may have been an intuitive way to think about the matter, which would account 
for his difficulties in comprehending Carnap’s point. 
 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued that Carnap’s account of protocol sentences (including those of psychology) was 
deeply informed by the psychophysical research tradition of the mid-19th to early 20th centuries. 
In the light of this, I have provided an analysis of the exchange between Carnap and Duncker, in 
which Duncker questioned Carnap’s contention that the methodological approach of behaviorism 
within psychology was congenial to his approach, arguing instead that Gestalt psychology came 
much closer to Carnap’s outlook. I substantiated Duncker’s assessment by providing a reading of 
Duncker’s analysis that highlights the following two points: First, Gestalt-psychological research 
(and psychophysical research more generally), while giving a lot of weight to first-person 
experiential reports, did not necessarily invest them with epistemic certainty or treat them as 
being about irreducible qualia. Second, researchers in the psychophysical tradition (including 
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Gestalt psychologists) were not necessarily committed to a mind-brain dualism, even if they 
aimed to formulate psycho-physical laws.  
Given that Carnap’s formal analysis relied on (or at least presupposed the possibility of) this 
research, I argue that it was unwise for Carnap to reject as irrelevant Duncker’s points, both 
because it unnecessarily alienated a potential psychological ally and because it prevented Carnap 
from acknowledging the extent to which he and Duncker shared similar philosophical roots. It 
also prevented him from recognizing that his project of physicalizing protocol sentences (in the 
formal mode) relied on research that granted some epistemic authority to subjective experience 
(in the material mode). 
In conclusion I argue that the way in which Carnap tried to insulate his philosophical project, as 
concerned with the “epistemological status” of psychological sentences, from the question of how 
such sentences are established was part of a general trend away from being concerned with 
scientific practice. While philosophy of psychology in the 19th century had still been fairly 
practice-oriented (as evidenced, for example, in Fechner’s 1860 Elements of Psychophysics or 
Brentano’s 1874 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint), the philosophical turn to formal 
analysis (along with the rise of behaviorism in the US), for some decades eclipsed the fact that 
much of psychology continued to make some use of first-person reports. As a result philosophers 
of psychology have only recently started to turn their renewed attention to questions about the 
meaning, role and justification of first-person reports in psychology’s research practices. In this 
context, the physicalist analyses of introspection, as they were provided by advocates of Gestalt 
psychology, are still well worth considering. (Feest 2014) 
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CETERIS PARIBUS LAWS AND MINUTIS RECTIS LAWS
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Abstract. Special science generalizations admit of exceptions. Among the class of non-
exceptionless special science generalizations, I distinguish (what I will call) minutis rectis
(mr) generalizations from the more familiar category of ceteris paribus (cp) generalizations.
I argue that the challenges involved in showing that mr generalizations can play the law
role are underappreciated, and quite different from those involved in showing that cp gen-
eralizations can do so. I outline some potential strategies for meeting the challenges posed
by mr generalizations.
1. Introduction
Many philosophers of science speak as though all non-exceptionless scientific generalizations
that (appear to) play at least some aspects of the law role (counterfactual support, inductive
confirmation, predictive/explanatory import) tolerably well can be classed as ceteris paribus
(cp) laws. The following are representative quotations:
“A nonstrict law is a generalization that contains a ceteris paribus qualifier
that specifies that the law holds under ‘normal or ideal conditions,’ [. . . ]. The
generalizations one finds in the special sciences are mostly of this kind. In
contrast, a strict law is one that contains no ceteris paribus qualifiers; it is
exceptionless not just de facto but as a matter of law.” (Lepore and Loewer
1987, 632)
“cp lawfulness is just a species of nomological necessity, the other species
of nomological necessity being strict lawfulness. What distinguishes the two
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species is just that cp laws can have . . . exceptions and strict laws can’t”
(Fodor 1991, 31–32)
“Special science laws . . . are usually taken to ‘have exceptions’, to be ‘non-
universal’ or ‘to be ceteris paribus laws’.” (Reutlinger et al. 2011)
In each of these quotations, the notion of a non-exceptionless law is run together with that
of a cp law. It is easy to find further confirmation that this running-together is widespread
(see, e.g., Schurz 2002, 351, Schrenk 2007, 221, Woodward 2002, 303–304).
The identification of non-exceptionless ‘laws’ with cp laws can hardly be a matter of
stipulative definition. The notion of a cp law has a richness that significantly outstrips the
bare notion of a law that admits of exceptions. For one thing, the notion of a cp law is
associated with a distinctive account of how exceptions arise.
A cp law is supposed to be endowed with an implicit or explicit clause that specifies that
it holds ‘other things being equal’, where this latter notion is usually parsed in terms of the
obtaining of ‘normal’ or even ‘ideal’ conditions (see Cartwright 1983, 46, Schurz 2002), and
explicated in terms of the absence of significant difference-making interference from outside
the system that the law in question seeks to characterize (see, e.g., Fodor 1989, 69n, Schurz
2002, 366-370). Exceptions are taken to arise due to the non-satisfaction of this cp clause.1
After reviewing the notion of a cp law (Section 2), I will argue (Section 3) that it is
a mistake to equate non-exceptionless laws with cp laws: there is a distinct type of non-
exceptionless law – which I will call a minutis rectis (mr) law – which admits of exceptions
that aren’t explained by the non-satisfaction of a cp clause. I will argue (Section 4) that mr
laws pose a distinctive set of philosophical challenges. Finally (Section 5), I will examine
some potential responses to these challenges.
1I’m skating over some differences between the various characterizations of cp laws that appear in the
literature (for an overview, see Reutlinger et al. 2011). Some (e.g. Schurz 2002) distinguish different types of
cp law. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the notion of a minutis rectis law that I will distinguish
below is not a type of (or variant on the notion of a) cp law.
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A terminological point: talk of cp (and mr) ‘laws’ is rather awkward in the context of
a discussion of whether, and to what extent, the exception-ridden generalizations of the
special sciences play various aspects of the law-role. I’m sympathetic to the objections that
some philosophers (e.g. Woodward 2005, Woodward and Hitchcock 2003a,b) have to such
law-speak. Nevertheless, because law-speak is so common in the literature, I shall not try to
forgo it in what follows, and I shall drop the jarring scare-quotes when I use it.
2. Ceteris Paribus Laws
In ecology, one standard equation used for predicting population growth is the Logistic
Equation (LE):
(LE)
dn
dt
= rcn
(
1−
n
K
)
Here n is the number of individuals in the population, dn
dt
is the growth rate of the population
(the change in n, with respect to time t), rc is the intrinsic per capita growth rate of the
population (the growth rate that obtains in the absence of intra-species competition for
resources), K is the carrying capacity (the maximum sustainable population size).
LE implies that when the population n of a species in a particular habitat is very small
(so that there is little intra-specific competition for resources), the actual population growth
rate dn
dt
is close to the intrinsic per capita growth rate rc multiplied by the number n of
individuals. But, as the population grows, the actual growth rate declines linearly (due to
increasing competition). This decline continues until the carrying capacity K is reached, at
which point population growth is 0.
It is an open question whether ecological generalizations – such as LE – should be called
‘laws’ at all. But they do appear to play certain aspects of the law role to at least some
degree. Ecologists apply LE to certain populations (especially populations that aren’t subject
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to significant inter -species competition or predation) in order to make predictions, and to
give explanations.2
LE holds only ceteris paribus because there are possible background conditions under
which it is violated (even when applied to populations concerning which, in normal cir-
cumstances, it is predictively accurate). For example, it will not hold in the event of the
population being subject to a cull, or in the event of a natural disaster that destroys (a large
part of) the population. While LE may give accurate predictions about population growth
after some such events, it won’t accurately predict growth during such episodes. It simply
doesn’t include variables that represent such events.
Culls, etc., produce circumstances in which other things are not equal: interfering factors
are present, so LE doesn’t even approximately hold. An ecologist presumably wouldn’t
seek to model such factors, since they are not ecological factors. They interfere with the
sorts of system that the ecologist seeks to model (viz. ecosystems), but come from ‘outside’
such systems. Perhaps this means that ecological generalizations will in-principle remain cp
generalizations (compare Davidson 1970, 94, Fodor 1989, 69n).
There have been several attempts (e.g. Lepore and Loewer 1987, Fodor 1989, 1991, Wood-
ward and Hitchcock 2003a,b, Woodward 2005) to show that generalizations like LE, despite
holding only cp, can support counterfactuals, and sustain predictions and causal-explanatory
relationships and thus play the law role to a non-negligible degree.
2Tsoularis and Wallace (2002) survey some successful applications of LE in ecology. Ecologists sometimes
appeal to more complex equations than LE. The following discussion also applies to these more complex
equations. In general, ecologists have an armory of equations (or systems of equations – i.e. models)
for predicting population growth and other phenomena. Different models are more or less predictively
successful with respect to different populations. The fact that such equations (or models) apply only to some
populations – and even then only approximately – may disincline you to call them ‘laws’. I’m sympathetic.
(Though note that there is a nuanced literature in (philosophy of) ecology about whether there are genuine
ecological laws: see, e.g., Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003, Lawton 1999, Turchin 2001.) And since this story is
repeated throughout the special sciences, you may be disinclined to admit the existence of special science
laws at all (except, perhaps, in a few special cases). Again, I’m sympathetic. To reiterate: the question
with which I’m concerned is not whether such generalizations deserve to be called ‘laws’, but whether and
to what extent they are able to do things like predict, explain, and support counterfactuals. As we’ll see,
LE is the sort of thing that Woodward and Hitchcock (2003a,b) and Woodward (2005) call an ‘invariant
generalization’. I have no objection to their alternative terminology.
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Woodward and Hitchcock (2003a,b) argue that generalizations like LE support causal-
explanatory relations because they are invariant under a range of hypothetical interventions.3
For example, if we were to intervene upon the intrinsic growth rate rc of the population (e.g.
by genetic engineering to increase fertility), upon the carrying capacity K (by improving or
depleting the environment), or upon the population size n (by carrying out a cull), then the
actual growth rate, dn
dt
, – after the intervention episode – would accord with LE.
The reason that LE ‘supports’ these interventionist counterfactuals is that, in evaluating
them, we are considering the ‘closest worlds’ in which such interventions occur (see Hitchcock
2001, 283; compare Lewis 1979, Woodward 2005). In these worlds significant interfering
factors like natural disasters don’t occur.
In virtue of the fact that LE supports these interventionist counterfactuals (when it comes
to the populations that it models well) it follows directly, on the account of Woodward and
Hitchcock (2003a,b), that the variables on the RHS of LE causally explain the actual growth
rate of the population dn
dt
. So, on their account, the cp nature of LE doesn’t stand in the
way of its playing important aspects of the law role.4
3. Minutis Rectis Laws
Not all exceptions to scientific generalizations arise due to the non-fulfilment of (explicit or
implicit) cp clauses. This is best illustrated w.r.t. a law that admits of exceptions, but that
plausibly is not a cp law, viz. the Second Law of Thermodynamics (SLT), which states that
the total entropy of an isolated system increases over time, until equilibrium is reached, after
which it doesn’t decrease.
SLT admits of possible exceptions. Given an initial non-equilibrium state of an isolated
system, it is possible (though very ‘unlikely’) that the micro-state should be one that leads
to a later state that is further from equilibrium. An example of SLT-violation, which is
nevertheless possible (i.e. consistent with the fundamental dynamical laws), is an isolated
3Woodward (2005) gives a precise definition of the technical notion of an ‘intervention’. For present purposes,
it will suffice to think of interventions as ideal experimental manipulations of variables.
4The same is true on the accounts given by Lepore and Loewer (1987) and Fodor (1989, 1991), though I
focus on Woodward and Hitchcock’s account here.
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system comprising an ice cube in hot water, in which the ice cube grows larger and colder,
while the surrounding water becomes hotter.
Such exceptions to SLT do not arise due to failures of a cp condition to hold. SLT is not
aptly construed as a cp law. Rather than a cp clause, SLT includes a precise specification
of its scope of application: it applies to thermodynamically isolated systems (including the
universe as a whole). Unlike LE, there’s no possibility of interference from outside the
systems that SLT characterizes.
Perhaps the claim that SLT is not a cp law can be disputed. Someone might, for instance,
attempt to construe its appeal to an ideal isolated system as somehow amounting to a cp
clause (compare Schurz 2002, 369–370). I don’t need to insist that it’s not a cp law. What
I do wish to insist is that there is a type of possible exception to it that has nothing to do
with the violation of any cp clause. That is, there is a class of exception that is not due to
the failure of its idealizations to hold. Even assuming an ideal isolated system, exceptions
to SLT may arise just as a consequence of certain unlikely microphysical realizations of the
system’s initial thermodynamic state.5
Laws that admit of this type of exception are what I am calling ‘minutis rectis (mr)’ laws:
that is, laws that hold only when the properties that they concern are realized in the right
way. SLT holds only minutis rectis because the macro-states that it concerns are multiply
realizable by points in the underlying phase space. In a non-equilibrium system, the majority
of points in that space (measure ≈ 1) are on entropy-increasing trajectories. However, there
are a very few (measure ≈ 0) that are on entropy-decreasing trajectories. SLT only holds if
the initial macro-state of an isolated system is realized ‘in the right way’ – viz. by one of
the ‘usual’ points in phase space that is on a non-entropy-decreasing trajectory.
Though I have illustrated the distinction between the notion of a cp law and that of an
mr law w.r.t. a law that’s an mr law but plausibly isn’t a cp law – namely SLT – many
special science generalizations hold both only cp and only mr. Such laws admit of exceptions
5It would be inapt to construe SLT as including an implicit cp condition that supposes away such microphys-
ical realizations. That would be to construe SLT’s implicit form as something like ‘the total entropy of an
isolated system is non-decreasing over time, except when the initial microstate is such that it is decreasing’.
But this comes close to rendering SLT empty when clearly it isn’t (compare Earman and Roberts 1999, 465).
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even when their cp clauses are satisfied. Even when there is no disruptive interference from
outside the systems that such generalizations characterize (so that their cp conditions are
satisfied), they may still be violated just as a consequence of the properties that they concern
being realized in the ‘wrong’ way.
LE is an example of a cp generalization that also holds only mr. I have already argued that
it holds only cp. Rather trivially it also holds only mr. LE will break down if members of
a population to which it normally applies start en masse to exhibit SLT-violating behavior:
for example, if neurotransmitters suddenly stop diffusing across their synapses, or oxygen
stops diffusing in their blood streams. In such a case, the growth rate of the population will
not be predicted by LE. Not for nothing does Lawton (1999, 178) say that SLT is one of the
“three deep universal laws that underpin all ecological systems”!
There may also be more interesting reasons why LE holds only mr. For example, the
geographical distribution of a population can make a difference to its actual growth rate.
Indeed, given that population growth can be extremely sensitive to precise initial conditions
(see, e.g., May 1974), even very small perturbations of the precise, individual-by-individual
initial geographical distribution of members of a population can potentially make a difference
to whether the population grows according to LE or sharply declines (even where the pop-
ulation is well below the carrying capacity). The latter situation – in which the population
is initially precisely distributed in one of those rare ways that leads to dramatically LE-
violating behavior – would be analogous to a thermodynamic system’s being at one of those
rare points in phase space that leads to SLT-violating behavior. A population’s having a cer-
tain size, n, is multiply realizable by different precise individual-by-individual geographical
distributions. Only if the geographical distribution is ‘right’ will LE approximately hold.
4. Why It Matters
The distinction between cp and mr generalizations matters because the mr nature of a gen-
eralization poses problems for its ability to support counterfactuals and causal-explanatory
relations in a way that its cp nature does not.
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Consider Woodward and Hitchcock’s claim that generalizations like LE are invariant (i.e.,
support counterfactuals about what would happen) under interventions. The argument that
this is so rests upon the idea that the closest worlds in which we intervene upon (say) the
population size are not worlds in which the cp condition is violated: in such worlds there is
(e.g.) no natural disaster that wipes out the population immediately after the intervention.
So, post-intervention, the growth rate is modeled by LE. Given Woodward’s notion of an
intervention (Woodward 2005, 98) and Lewis’s suggested similarity measure over possible
worlds (Lewis 1979, 472), this all seems plausible.
Yet the mr nature of LE appears to undercut its ability to support interventionist coun-
terfactuals. Even concerning a population that is usually well-modeled by LE, it seems ex-
tremely doubtful that it is true that ‘If the size of the population had been intervened upon,
the post-intervention micro-state wouldn’t have been one that leads to entropy-decreasing
behavior’. After all, it seems that the post-intervention micro-state just might have been
one of those rare entropy-decreasing ones.
It is also doubtful that, even where a population size is well below the carrying capacity,
it is true that ‘If the size of the population had been intervened upon, the resulting precise
geographical distribution would not have been such as to lead to a severe decline in the
population’. After all, it’s not possible (even metaphysically speaking) to intervene on the
size of the population without impacting on the precise individual-by-individual distribution
(fewer or more individuals can’t be distributed in the same individual-by-individual way)
and, in light of the dramatic effects that slight changes in initial conditions can have on
ecosystems, the post-intervention distribution just might have been one of those rare ones
that leads to a dramatic decline in numbers.6
It is very doubtful that the truth of either of the counterfactuals considered in the previous
two paragraphs follows from the Woodwardian notion of an intervention or the Lewisian
notion of similarity among possible worlds. But if such counterfactuals aren’t true, then it
6If we build into the antecedent of the counterfactual a specification of exactly how the intervention would
occur (and what the resulting precise geographical distribution would be), then we might get a true counter-
factual. But this is not the sort of interventionist counterfactual to which Woodward and Hitchcock appeal
in their account of causal explanation.
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appears that we can’t reason that, if the population size had been intervened upon, then the
growth rate would have subsequently followed LE.
Likewise with SLT. Consider the counterfactual ‘If I had placed this ice cube into that
glass of hot water, then it would have melted quickly’. SLT’s mr nature appears to undercut
its ability to support this counterfactual. We can’t (it seems) say that if the ice cube had
been placed in the hot water, then the resulting system would not have been in one of those
rare micro-states that fails to lead to melting. The post-intervention system might have
been in such a micro-state, and this undercuts the assertion that the ice cube would have
melted. The Lewisian notion of similarity doesn’t appear to make a world in which the
specified post-intervention macro-state is realized by a non-entropy-increasing micro-state
more dissimilar to the actual world than one in which it is realized by an entropy-increasing
micro-state (compare Ha´jek (ms)).
If mr laws aren’t able to sustain such counterfactuals about what would happen under
interventions (i.e. if they’re not invariant generalizations), then this threatens to undermine
their ability to underwrite causal-explanatory relations and their predictive power. This
indicates that philosophical vindications – such as Woodward and Hitchcock’s – of the causal-
explanatory and predictive power of cp laws are not ipso facto vindications of mr laws.
5. Potential Solutions
There is a range of approaches that one might take in attempting to address the problems
posed by mr laws.
First, one might consider modifying the Lewisian similarity metric so that worlds in which
(e.g.) I intervene on a thermodynamic system and the post-intervention system conforms to
SLT come out closer than those in which the post-intervention system does not so conform.
We might similarly take conformity to special science laws, like LE, to make for similarity
to the actual world.
For example, in response to a worry raised by Elga (2001) about whether Lewis’s similarity
metric delivers an asymmetry of counterfactual dependence, Dunn (2011) suggests modifying
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Lewis’s metric so that, other things being equal, worlds obeying SLT and also the various
special science laws come out closer to the actual world than those that don’t. Such a
proposal would seem to ensure that counterfactuals like ‘If I had placed the ice cube in
the hot water, then it would have melted quickly’ come out true, so that SLT supports the
counterfactuals needed to underwrite causal/explanatory and predictive relations after all.
One concern about this approach is that it appears to force upon us the truth of counter-
factuals like ‘If I had put the ice cube in the hot water, then the resulting system wouldn’t
have been in one of the rare entropy-decreasing microstates’. This counterfactual seems less
plausible. But perhaps there is some room for maneuver: perhaps, for instance, one could
maintain that the assertion of the latter counterfactual results in a context shift and a corre-
sponding change in the standards of similarity (compare Lewis 1979), with the consequence
that this second counterfactual utterance asserts a false proposition (while, in the original,
ordinary context, the first asserted a true one). I shan’t explore the prospects for such a
response here.
A second option might be to modify the Woodwardian notion of an intervention so that
(e.g.) manipulations of a population size that result in the population being geographically
distributed ‘in the wrong way’, don’t count as ‘interventions’ in the relevant, technical sense.
A worry about this strategy is that it is not clear that the ‘wrong’ sort of interventions could
be specified in a systematic and non-ad-hoc way. Simply specifying the relevant ‘interven-
tions’ in terms of precisely those counterfactual outcomes that one wants to avoid (as in ‘the
“intervention” on population size must not be such as to result in a precise geographical
distribution that leads to a violation of LE’) is ad hoc and unsystematic. Similarly, in the
thermodynamic case, one might wonder whether there is a useful notion of ‘intervention’
such that manipulations of a system’s macro-state that happen to result in its being in
a micro-state on an entropy-decreasing trajectory fail to count as interventions. I shan’t
explore this strategy further here.
A third option would be to argue that ‘deterministic’ mr laws are mere approximations
to probabilistic laws. For example, it is tempting to say that, while SLT is a mr law, it is
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an approximation to a probabilistic law that is not a mr law. Statistical mechanics (SM)
furnishes us with an exceptionless, probabilistic version of SLT.
In SM probabilities are generated by applying a uniform probability distribution (on the
Lebesgue measure) to the region of phase space associated with the initial macro-state of an
isolated system. Since the measure of points in this phase-space on non-entropy-decreasing
trajectories is extremely high, and the measure of points on entropy-decreasing trajectories
is extremely low, the result of applying the uniform distribution is an overwhelmingly high
probability that entropy does not decrease over time (compare Albert 2000, Loewer 2001,
Frigg and Hoefer 2014).
Although the probabilistic version of SLT implied by SM does not support counterfactuals
like ‘If I had placed the ice cube in the glass of hot water, then it would have melted quickly’,
it does support counterfactuals like ‘If I had placed the ice cube in the hot water, then the
probability that it would have melted quickly would have been very much higher than if
(say) I had returned the ice cube to the freezer’. This appears to be precisely the sort of
counterfactual that is relevant to probabilistic prediction, causation, and explanation.
I’m sympathetic to this proposal. It is worth noting, however, that this line of response
involves construing the probabilities of SM objectively. Otherwise, it’s hard to see how they
could underwrite objective relations of probabilistic causation and explanation. Yet the view
that the probabilities of SM are objective has become popular (see, e.g., Albert 2000, 2012,
Frigg and Hoefer 2014, Loewer 2001, 2012).
Perhaps similar reasoning can be applied to other high-level laws – like LE – that appear
to hold only mr. It might be argued that they too are merely approximations to probabilistic
laws that don’t hold only mr. Rather ambitiously, Albert (2000, 2012) and Loewer (2001,
2008, 2012) argue that SM itself actually entails probabilistic approximations of the laws
of the special sciences. While this ‘Statistical Mechanical Imperialism’ has been criticized
(Callender 2011, Frisch 2014, Weslake 2014), one might nevertheless think that there are
probabilistic approximations to special science mr laws (perhaps derivable in some other
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way). If so, then these probabilistic laws may be able to support the counterfactuals relevant
to probabilistic causal explanation and prediction.
For instance, in ecology the geographical distribution of populations is often modeled via a
probability distribution (e.g. the Poisson distribution) over a habitat (see, e.g., Vandermeer
and Goldberg 2013, 126-142). Perhaps, in general, we can get strict(er) probabilistic versions
of special science generalizations via the imposition of probability distributions over the
underlying state-spaces in which the properties that they concern are realized.
A lot of work needs to be done to show that this will work out. It’s reasonable to wonder
whether we can always replace deterministic special science generalizations that hold only mr
with strict(er) probabilistic laws by imposing probability distributions over underlying state
spaces. It’s also reasonable to wonder whether we can always interpret the resulting proba-
bilities objectively. That these are serious questions for both science and metaphysics shows
the depth of the challenges posed by the mr nature of many special science generalizations.
6. Conclusion
The notion of a non-exceptionless law shouldn’t be equated with that of a cp law. There
is another important category of non-exceptionless law that ought to be distinguished, viz.
mr laws. The mr nature of special science generalizations poses distinctive challenges for
those aiming to show that special science generalizations can support counterfactuals, causal
explanations, and predictions. Distinguishing the two categories of non-exceptionless law
brings these challenges to light, but also allows us to identify possible avenues for addressing
them.
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Abstract 
Focusing on Shannon information, this article shows that, even on the basis of the same 
formalism, there may be different interpretations of the concept of information, and that 
disagreements may be deep enough to lead to very different conclusions about the 
informational characterization of certain physical situations. On this basis, a pluralist view 
is argued for, according to which the concept of information is primarily a formal concept 
that can adopt different interpretations that are not mutually exclusive, but each useful in a 
different specific context. 
1. Introduction 
In the Book 11 of his Confessions, St. Augustine asks himself: “What, then, is time? If no one asks me, 
I know what it is. But if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not.” Something similar happens 
today with information. Both in everyday life and in science, the word ‘information’ is so pervasive 
that we all believe we know what we mean by it. However, as soon as we are asked for its precise 
meaning, the opinions substantially diverge. 
As many recognize, information is a polysemantic concept that can be associated with different 
phenomena (Floridi 2010). In this conceptual tangle, the first distinction to be introduced is between a 
semantic and a non-semantic view of information. According to the first view, information is 
something that carries semantic content (Bar-Hillel and Carnap 1953; Bar-Hillel 1964), and which is 
therefore strongly related with semantic notions such as reference, meaning and representation. In 
general, semantic information is carried by propositions that intend to represent states of affairs; so, it 
has “aboutness”, that is, it is directed to other things. And although it is still controversial whether false 
factual content may qualify as information, semantic information is strongly linked with the notion of 
truth.  
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Non-semantic information, also called ‘mathematical’ or ‘statistical’, is concerned with the 
statistical properties of a given system and/or the correlations between the states of two systems, 
independently of the meanings of those states. The classical locus of mathematical information is the 
paper where Shannon (1948) introduces a precise formalism designed to solve certain specific 
technological problems. Shannon’s theory is purely quantitative, it ignores any issue related to 
informational content: “[the] semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering 
problem. The significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible 
messages” (Shannon 1948, 379). 
Although Shannon’s theory is the traditional formalism to quantify information, it is not the only 
one. For instance, Fisher information measures the dependence of a random variable X on an unknown 
parameter θ upon which the probability of X depends (Fisher 1925), and algorithmic information 
measures the length of the shortest program that produces a string on a universal Turing machine 
(Chaitin 1987). In quantum information theory, von Neumann entropy gives a measure of the quantum 
resources necessary to faithfully encode the state of the source-system (Schumacher 1995). 
It might be supposed that, when confined to a formal framework, the meaning of ‘information’ is 
clear: given the mathematical theory, information is what this theory describes. However, this is not the 
case. Even on the basis of the same formalism, there may be different interpretations of the concept of 
information, and disagreements may be deep enough to lead to different conclusions in certain physical 
situations. Although disagreements may arise regarding any formalism, we will focus on Shannon’s 
theory since it is the most widespread formalism, even applicable in the quantum context (Rovelli 1996; 
Timpson 2003). Finally, we will argue for a pluralist view according to which, once mathematically 
characterized, the concept of information is a formal concept that can adopt different interpretations not 
mutually exclusive, each useful in a different context. 
2. Shannon’s Theory 
According to Shannon’s theory (Shannon 1948), transmission of information requires a source S, a 
receiver R and a channel CH. If S has a range of possible states 
1
,...,
n
s s  –letters–, whose respective 
probabilities of occurrence are 
1
( ),..., ( )
n
p s p s , the amount of information generated at the source by 
the occurrence of 
i
s  is defined as ( ) log(1 ( ))
i i
I s p s= . When ‘log’ is the logarithm to the base 2, the 
resulting unit of measurement is called ‘bit’ (if the natural logarithm is used, the unit is the nat, and in 
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the case of the logarithm to the base 10, the unit is the Hartley). Since S produces long sequences of 
states –messages–, the average amount of information generated at the source is defined as: 
1
( ) ( ) log(1 ( ))
n
i i
i
I S p s p s
=
=∑  
Analogously, if the possible states of R are 
1
,...,
m
r r , with respective probabilities 
1
( ),..., ( )
m
p r p r , the 
amount of information received at the receiver by the occurrence of jr  is ( ) log(1 ( ))j jI r p r= , and the 
average amount of information received at the receiver is: 
1
( ) ( ) log(1 ( ))
m
j j
j
I R p r p r
=
=∑  
The relationship between ( )I S  and ( )I R  can be represented as: 
       ( ; )I S R : mutual information 
       E : equivocation 
       N : noise 
where ( ; ) ( ) ( )I S R I S E I R N= − = − is the information generated at S and received at R, E is the 
information generated at S but not received at R, and N is the information received at R but not 
generated at S (always average amounts). E and N are measures of the dependence between S and R 
and, therefore, are functions not only of S and R, but also of the channel CH, defined by the matrix 
( )j ip r s   , where ( )j ip r s  is the conditional probability of the occurrence of jr  given the occurrence 
of 
i
s , and the elements in any row must sum to 1. Thus, N and E are computed as: 
1 1
( ) ( ) log(1 ( ))
n m
i j i j i
i j
N p s p r s p r s
= =
=∑ ∑         
1 1
( ) ( ) log(1 ( ))
m n
j i j i j
j i
E p r p s r p s r
= =
=∑ ∑  
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i j j i i jp s r p r s p s p r= . 
One of the most relevant results in Shannon’s theory is the noiseless coding theorem, according 
to which the value of ( )I S  is equal to the average number of bits necessary to code a letter of the 
source using an ideal code: ( )I S  measures the optimal compression of the source messages. In fact, the 
messages of N letters produced by S fall into two classes: one of approximately ( )2NI S  typical messages, 
and the other of atypical messages. When N →∞ , the probability of an atypical message becomes 
negligible; so, the source can be conceived as producing only ( )2NI S  possible messages. This suggests a 
I(S)  I(R) 
I(S,R) E N 
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natural strategy for coding: each typical message is coded by a binary sequence of length ( )NI S , in 
general shorter than the length N  of the original message. 
Given this formalism, it seems that there is nothing controversial in the concept of Shannon 
information: it would be what Shannon’s theory describes. However, matters are not so simple. 
During the last years, it has been usual to hear in the philosophy of physics (not in the physics) 
community that the problem of the interpretation of information is dissolved because the word 
‘information’ is an abstract noun. Timpson (2004, 2008) insists that what is produced at the source and 
that we desire to transmit is not a token-sequence but a type-sequence; but types are abstract and, so, 
they are not part of the spatio-temporal content of the world. Therefore, according to this view 
information is not a substance, not even a physical entity, because it is not an entity at all: there is 
nothing the word ‘information’ refers to. 
Despite the diffusion of this position, one may suspect that information is even more abstract than 
a type. In fact, types are not items to be measured in bits. Moreover, the information of very different 
types may be the same, since the only relevant aspect in Shannon information is that the actual 
sequence is one selected from a set of possible sequences. And it is not even the case that we always 
want to transmit the same type-sequence: the states of the receiver may be completely different, even in 
a type sense, than the states of the source: the success of information transmission depends on the 
decision about the expected correlations, embodied in the fidelity function, between the source states 
and the receiver states. In brief, Timpson unwittingly reintroduces semantic issues −analogous to those 
related with the difference between proposition, sentence and utterance− in the discussion about 
Shannon information, a field where semantics plays no role at all.  
Of course, these briefs comments are not a full analysis of Timpson’s very articulated position, 
which deserves a specific article. Nevertheless, they open the way to focus on the different views about 
Shannon information that are still present in philosophical and physical discussions. 
3. Epistemic and Physical Interpretations of Information 
A concept usually connected with the notion of information is that of knowledge: information provides 
knowledge, modifies the state of knowledge of those who receive it. Some believe that the link between 
information and knowledge is a feature of the everyday notion of information, which must be carefully 
distinguished from the Shannon’s technical concept (Timpson 2004). However, the idea of knowledge 
is present also in the philosophical and the physical discourse about information. 
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In fact, it is common to find authors who even define information in terms of knowledge. For 
instance, on the basis of Shannon’s theory as the underlying formalism for his proposal, Dretske says: 
“information is a commodity that, given the right recipient, is capable of yielding knowledge.” (1981, 
47). According to MacKay, information is linked to an increase in knowledge on the receiver’s side: 
“Suppose we begin by asking ourselves what we mean by information. Roughly speaking, we say that 
we have gained information when we know something now that we didn't know before; when ‘what we 
know’ has changed.” (1969, 10). 
This presence of the notion of knowledge is not confined to authors who try to supply a semantic 
content to statistical information. Some philosophers of physics are also persuaded that the core 
meaning of the concept of information, even in its technical sense, is linked to the concept of 
knowledge (Myrvold, personal communication). And physicists frequently speak about what we know 
or may know when dealing with information. For instance, Rovelli (1997) insists that quantum 
mechanics is a theory about information because it talks about the relations between what different 
observers “know” about a quantum system. Zeilinger even equates information and knowledge when 
he says that “We have knowledge, i.e., information, of an object only through observation” (1999, 633) 
or, with Bruckner, “For convenience we will use here not a measure of information or knowledge, but 
rather its opposite, a measure of uncertainty or entropy” (2009, 681-82). Even in a traditional textbook 
about Shannon’s theory one can read that information “is measured as a difference between the state of 
knowledge of the recipient before and after the communication of information.” (Bell 1957, 7), and that 
it must be relativized with respect to the background knowledge available before the transmission: “the 
datum point of information is then the whole body of knowledge possessed at the receiving end before 
the communication.” (Bell 1957, 7). 
It is worth stressing that, from the epistemic perspective, the possibility of acquiring knowledge 
about a source by consulting the state of a receiver is rooted in the nomic character of the regularities 
underlying the whole situation. In fact, the conditional probabilities that define the channel do not 
represent merely de facto correlations; they are determined by a network of lawful connections between 
the states of the source and the states of the receiver. 
A different view about information is the one that detaches the concept from the notion of 
knowledge and considers information as a physical magnitude. This is the position of many physicists 
and most engineers, for whom the essential feature of information is its capacity to be generated at one 
point of the physical space and transmitted to another point; it can also be accumulated, stored and 
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converted from one form to another, like other physical magnitudes such as energy. In this case, the 
capability of providing knowledge is not a central issue, since the transmission of information can be 
used only for control purposes, such as controlling a device at the receiver end by modifying the state 
of the source. According to this view, it is precisely because of the physical nature of information that 
the dynamics of its flow is constrained by physical laws and facts: “Information handling is limited by 
the laws of physics and the number of parts available in the universe” (Landauer 1991, 29; see also 
Bennett and Landauer 1985). 
In general, the physical interpretation of information comes strongly linked with the idea 
expressed by the well-known dictum ‘no information without representation’: the transmission of 
information between two points of physical space necessarily requires an information-bearing signal, 
that is, a physical process propagating from one point to the other. Landauer is an explicit defender of 
this position when he claims that “Information is not a disembodied abstract entity; it is always tied to 
a physical representation. It is represented by engraving on a stone tablet, a spin, a charge, a hole in a 
punched card, a mark on a paper, or some other equivalent.” (1996, 188). This view is also adopted by 
some philosophers of science; for instance, Kosso states that “information is transferred between states 
through interaction.” (1989, 37). The need of a carrier signal is natural in the light of the generic idea 
that physical influences can only be transferred through interactions. 
In the context of this physical interpretation, information tends to be compared with energy, 
which was born in the specific field of mechanics as a pragmatic notion related with the resources we 
can draw from a mechanical system, but ended up being conceived as a highly wide reaching concept: 
at present the word ‘energy’ refers to an item that pervades the whole world of physics. On this basis, 
information is conceived by many physicists as a physical entity with the same ontological status as 
energy; it has also been claimed that its essential property is the power to manifest itself as structure 
when added to matter (Stonier 1990, 1996). 
4. Epistemic versus Physical Interpretations of Information 
If the difference between the epistemic and the physical interpretations of information is clear from a 
conceptual viewpoint, it turns out to be even more clear when the concept of information is applied to 
particular situations. 
Let us consider a source S that transmits information to two physically isolated receivers RA and 
RB via a certain physical link. In this case, the correlations between the states of the two receivers are 
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not accidental, but functions of the physical dependence of RA and RB on S. Nevertheless, there is no 
physical interaction between the receivers. The informational description of this situation is completely 
different from the viewpoints given by the two interpretations of the concept of information. According 
to the physical interpretation, it is clear that no information is being transferred between RA and RB 
since there is no physical signal traveling between them. However, from an epistemic interpretation, 
nothing prevents us from admitting the existence of an informational link between the two receivers. In 
fact, we can define a communication channel between RA and RB because it is possible to learn 
something about RB by looking at RA and vice versa: “from a theoretical point of view [. . .] the 
communication channel may be thought of as simply the set of depending relations between [a system] 
S and [a system] R. If the statistical relations defining equivocation and noise between S and R are 
appropriate, then there is a channel between these two points, and information passes between them, 
even if there is no direct physical link joining S with R.” (Dretske 1981, 38). The receiver RB may even 
be farther from the source S than RA, so that the events at RB may occur later than those at RA. 
Nevertheless, this is irrelevant from the epistemic view of information: although the events at RB occur 
later, RA carries information about what will happen at RB. 
Somebody might consider that the difference in the informational characterization of the situation 
described above is a mere curiosity with no philosophical interest. However, this kind of disagreements 
has also relevant consequences in the characterization of central notions in the philosophy of science. 
For instance, there is an important philosophical tradition that explains scientific observation in terms 
of information. In order to elucidate the notion of observation without resorting to perceptual matters, 
Shapere proposes that x is directly observed if information is received by an appropriate receptor and 
that information is transmitted from the entity x to the receptor without interference (Shapere 1982). 
Brown agrees with Shapere in stressing that observing an item I consists in gaining information about I 
by examining another item I* (Brown 1987). Kosso (1989) also adheres to this tradition with his 
“interaction-information” account of scientific observation. 
In general (with the exception of Kosso, who relies on Shannon’s theory), in the discussions 
about scientific observation the concept of information is not sufficiently specified in formal terms, so 
the interpretation of the concept is even less considered. However, the way in which information is 
conceived leads to very different consequences regarding the view about observation. This turns out to 
be particularly clear in the so-called ‘negative experiments’, which were originally devised as a 
theoretical tool for analyzing the quantum measurement problem (see Jammer 1974). Nevertheless, 
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they can be regarded independently from quantum mechanics: in a negative experiment it is assumed 
that an event has been observed by noting the absence of some other event. This is the case of neutral 
weak currents, which are observed by noticing the absence of charged muons. But the conceptual core 
of negative experiments can be understood by means of a very simple example. Let us consider a tube 
in whose middle point a classical particle is emitted towards one of the ends of the tube; a detection 
device is placed at one of the ends, say A, in order to know in which direction the particle was emitted. 
Since there is a perfect anticorrelation between both ends of the tube, by looking at the right end A, we 
can know the state at the left end B. Nevertheless, the instantaneous propagation of a signal between A 
and B is physically impossible. If after an appropriate time –depending on the velocity of the particle 
and the length of the tube– the device at A indicates no detection, we can conclude that the particle was 
emitted toward the left end B. But, have we observed the direction of the emitted particle? From an 
informational account of scientific observation, the answer depends on the interpretation of the concept 
of information adopted. On the basis of an epistemic interpretation, a communication channel between 
the two ends of the tube can be defined, which allows us to observe the presence of the particle at B, 
even though there is no signal between B to A. The physical view leads us to a concept of observation 
narrower than the previous one: by looking at the detector we observe the state at A, but we do not 
observe the state at B; such a state is inferred. 
As it has been repeatedly noticed, Shannon information is not tied to classical physics: any type 
of physical system can be used to design the informational situation (Timpson 2003, 2004; Dwell 2003). 
Therefore, Shannon’s theory can in principle be applied to the quantum domain, in particular, to EPR-
type experiments, characterized by theoretically well-founded correlations between two spatially 
separated particles. During many years it was repeated that information cannot be sent between both 
particles because the propagation of a superluminal signal from one particle to the other is impossible: 
there is no information-bearing signal that can be modified at one point of space in order to carry 
information to the other spatially separated point. But the fact that the physical interpretation of 
information underlies that claim was usually not noticed. On the contrary, the epistemic interpretation, 
which only requires correlations, would face no problem in defining an informational channel between 
the two EPR-particles. 
Disagreements increase when quantum information comes into play. Teleportation is one of the 
paradigmatic phenomena in this field. Broadly speaking, an unknown quantum state is transferred from 
Alice to Bob with the assistance of a shared pair prepared in an entangled state and of two classical bits 
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sent from Alice to Bob (the description of the protocol can be found in any text on the matter). 
Although the situation is usually not strictly described in informational terms (not Shannon’s nor 
quantum informational terms), the idea is that the very large (strictly infinite) amount of information 
required to specify the teletransported state is transferred from Alice to Bob by sending only two bits. 
When addressing this problem, many physicists try to find a physical link between Alice and Bob that 
could play the role of carrier of information. For instance, Penrose (1998) and Jozsa (1998, 2004) claim 
that information may travel backwards in time: “How is it that the continuous ‘information’ of the spin 
direction of the state that she wishes to transmit […] can be transmitted to Bob when she actually sends 
him only two bits of discrete information? The only other link between Alice and Bob is the quantum 
link that the entangled pair provides. In spacetime terms this link extends back into the past from Alice 
to the event at which the entangled pair was produced, and then it extends forward into the future to 
the event where Bob performs his.” (Penrose 1998, 1928). According to Deutsch and Hayden (2000), 
the information travels hidden in the classical bits. These physicists do not explicitly acknowledge that 
the problem derives from the physical interpretation of information to which they strongly adhere, and 
that an epistemic view would not commit them to find a physical channel between Alice and Bob. 
Of course, an elucidation of the concept of information does not dissolve all the conundrums 
involved in teleportation (see Timpson 2006), or in the phenomenon of entanglement that underlies it. 
Nevertheless, such elucidation would help us to find a way out of the problems derived from the 
informational characterization of teleportation. One may wonder how essential the need of a spatio-
temporal link is in the physical interpretation of information. Or one may reconstruct the situation in 
Shannon terms to conclude that the information effectively transmitted (the mutual information) is 
really not very large, to the extent that the receiver cannot retrieve the whole information generated at 
the source. Or one may even decide to leave aside the physical interpretation in favor of an epistemic 
view that recovers the relation between information and knowledge. 
5. A Pluralist Approach to Information 
Up to this point, the epistemic and the physical interpretations of Shannon information were presented 
as rival; nevertheless, this is not necessarily the case. 
Although the physical interpretation has been the most usual in the traditional textbooks used in 
engineer’s training, this has changed in recent times: in general, present-day textbooks explain 
information theory in a formal way, with no mention of sources, receivers or signals, and the basic 
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concepts are introduced in terms of random variables and probability distributions over their possible 
values. Only when the formalism has been presented, is the theory applied to the traditional case of 
communication. For instance, in their extensively used book Cover and Thomas emphasize that: 
“Information theory answers two fundamental questions in communication theory […]. For this reason 
some consider information theory to be a subset of communication theory. We will argue that it is much 
more. Indeed, it has fundamental contributions to make in statistical physics […], computer sciences 
[…], statistical inference […] and to probability and statistics.” (1991, 1) 
The idea that the concept of information is completely formal is not new. Already Khinchin 
(1957) and Reza (1961) conceived information theory as a new chapter of the theory of probability. 
From this perspective, Shannon information not only is not a physical magnitude, but it also loses its 
nomic ingredient: the mutual information between two random variables can be defined even if there is 
no lawful relationship between them and their conditional probabilities express only de facto 
correlations.  
If the concept of information is purely formal and belongs to a mathematical theory, the word 
‘information’ does not belong to the language of empirical sciences −or to ordinary language−: it has 
no extralinguistic reference in itself. Its “meaning” has only a syntactic dimension. According to this 
view, the generality of the concept of Shannon information derives from its exclusively formal nature; 
this generality is what makes it a powerful formal tool for empirical science, applicable to a variety of 
fields.  
From this formal perspective, the relationship between the word ‘information’ and the different 
views of information is the logical relationship between a mathematical object and its interpretations, 
each one of which endows the term with a specific referential content. The epistemic view, then, is only 
one of the different possible interpretations, which may be applied in psychology and in cognitive 
sciences by using the concept of information to conceptualize the human abilities of acquiring 
knowledge (see e.g. Hoel, Albantakis and Tononi 2013). The epistemic interpretation might also serve 
as a basis for the philosophically motivated attempts to add a semantic dimension to a formal theory of 
information (MacKay 1969; Nauta 1972; Dretske 1981) 
In turn, the physical view, which makes information a physical magnitude carried by signals, is 
clearly the appropriate interpretation in communication theory, in which the main problem consists in 
optimizing the transmission of information by means of physical carriers whose energy and bandwidth 
is constrained by technological and economic limitations. But this is not the only possible physical 
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interpretation: if S is not interpreted as a source with states but a macrostate compatible with many 
equiprobable microstates, ( )I S  represents the Boltzmann thermodynamic entropy of S. Furthermore, in 
computer sciences a communicational information may be defined, such that, if S is interpreted as a 
binary string of finite length, ( )I S  can be related with the algorithmic complexity of S. The 
understanding of the relationship between the formal concept of information and its interpretations 
serves for assessing the usually obscure extrapolations from communication theory to thermodynamics 
or computing. 
Summing up, this pluralist view about information rejects the question about “the” meaning of 
information: “The word ‘information’ has been given different meanings by various writers in the 
general field of information theory. [...] It is hardly to be expected that a single concept of information 
would satisfactorily account for the numerous possible applications of this general field.” (Shannon 
1993, 180). 
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SHOULD A HISTORICALLY MOTIVATED ANTI-REALIST BE A STANFORDITE?
ABSTRACT: Suppose one believes that the historical record of discarded scientific theories
provides good evidence against scientific realism.  Should one adopt Kyle Stanford’s 
specific critique of realism?  I present reasons for answering this question in the negative.
In particular, Stanford’s challenge, based on the problem of unconceived alternatives, 
cannot use many of the prima facie strongest pieces of historical evidence against 
realism: (i) superseded theories whose successors were explicitly conceived, and (ii) 
superseded theories that were not the result of elimination-of-alternatives inferences.
1. Introduction.
 Scientific realism’s opponents have long appealed to the history of science as evidence 
for their position.  The most important recent development in this tradition is probably 
Kyle Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA), which supposedly explains
his New Induction (NI) over the history of science.  According to the PUA, “our 
cognitive constitutions or faculties are not well-suited to exhausting the kinds of spaces 
of serious alternative theoretical possibilities from which our fundamental theories of 
nature are drawn” (2006, 45).  In other words, in ‘fundamental’ scientific theorizing, 
scientists lack the cognitive ability to devise all plausible hypotheses that would explain 
the evidence available to them.  The NI states that historical scientists often failed to 
exhaust the space of scientifically respectable hypotheses that would explain the evidence
available to them at that historical time; therefore, present scientists are probably failing 
similarly.  For example, General Relativity can explain all the data that was available to 
Newton, but Einstein’s theory was not conceived until the early 20th Century.  Stanford 
claims this creates a problem for realism, because many scientific theories are inferred 
via an elimination-of-alternatives inference (also known as ‘disjunctive syllogism’) 
(2006, 28).  In an eliminative inference, a supposedly exhaustive list of hypotheses (H1 ∨ 
H2 ∨ … ∨ Hn) is proposed, and all are eliminated (¬H2, … ¬Hn) except one (H1); we 
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conclude the single remaining hypothesis is correct.  But the NI gives us reason to believe
that, for ‘fundamental’ domains of scientific theorizing, the list of hypotheses probably 
does not contain a true hypothesis, so the disjunction is probably untrue. Therefore, in 
those fundamental domains such an argument would be unsound, and thus we lack 
sufficient evidence to believe scientific theory H1 is true.  Call this the PUA-based 
argument against realism.
Many critics of Stanford’s position reject anti-realism.  This paper takes a 
different perspective: suppose one is moved by the ‘dustbin of history,’ and wishes to be a
historically motivated anti-realist.  Should one accept Stanford’s particular version of this
view?  I present evidence for a negative answer: the PUA-based argument against realism
omits much of the best historical evidence against scientific realism, and as a result, 
delivers an unnecessarily restricted version of anti-realism.  In particular, many discarded
theories that are prima facie strong evidence against realism involve either conceived 
alternatives or non-eliminative (‘projective’) inferences.  Section 2 describes historical 
examples of such conceived alternatives, and section 3 lists theories that were inferred 
projectively, but were later discarded.   Along the way, I argue that the most natural 
attempts to accommodate these cases within the PUA either fail on their own terms or 
contravene Stanford’s other commitments.
Now, Stanford might reply that he can accept my claims in §§2-3 without 
contradiction.  I accept that the NI and PUA, considered in isolation, are consistent with 
the points in §§2-3.  However, Section 4 argues that some of Stanford’s other central 
claims are in tension with those points.  In particular, if a Stanfordite accepts the main 
contentions of §§2-3, then she must reject Stanford’s claims about the importance of the 
2
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PUA, and relinquish the existence of an epistemic distinction between projective 
inferences and eliminative ones—a distinction Stanford needs for his instrumentalism to 
be piecemeal or selective instead of global. 
2. Conceived Alternatives
I grant that the NI provides evidence against realism.  However, if a historically 
motivated anti-realist restricts her evidence to cases where the alternatives to the 
prevailing theory were unconceived, then she omits some of the prima facie best 
historical evidence for anti-realism.  Much of the most compelling evidence for 
historically based anti-realism involves cases where the successor theory was conceived 
explicitly—and explicitly rejected at that earlier time as inferior to the now-discarded 
theory.  
2.1.  Examples  
One set of interrelated examples appears in Book I of Ptolemy’s Almagest.  In I.5, 
Ptolemy argues that the Earth must be at the center of the universe, by assuming for 
reductio that it is not, and deducing claims that contradict accepted observations 
(specifically, an observer anywhere on the Earth always sees half of the zodiac).  In I.7, 
he considers the hypothesis that the Earth is moving from one place to another, and 
argues that it is impossible, given the arguments in I.5 (for if it were moving from one 
place to another, it could not be at the center all the time).  The absence of stellar parallax
is further evidence that the earth does not move from one place to another.  Later in I.7, 
Ptolemy considers the hypothesis that the Earth rotates on its axis.  He admits that this 
3
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hypothesis is consistent with the celestial phenomena, but argues that no version of this 
hypothesis is consistent with terrestrial phenomena.
These three hypotheses—that the Earth has a translational motion, rotates daily, 
and is not at the center of the universe—were explicitly conceived by Ptolemy.  He 
rejected each of them because he thought the balance of the evidence told against them.  
This shows that even when scientists evaluate a hypothesis that later scientists will come 
to believe superior, the earlier scientists can reject it.  The NI cannot appeal to such cases 
as evidence against realism, since they involve conceived alternatives that are later 
accepted.
These hypotheses are not isolated instances.  The hypothesis that the heat of a 
body consists in the motion of that body’s parts was in the same situation from the early-
to-mid 1700’s until about 1840.1  The view that heat was the motion of component 
corpuscles was defended by several luminaries of the Scientific Revolution.  However, as
the 1700’s progressed, this hypothesis came to be regarded as inferior to the view that 
heat was material by many of the leading researchers at the time.2  These material caloric 
theorists had certainly considered the view that heat was motion of the constituent 
particles, since they had read the mechanical philosophers, but they rejected it.  
1 The cut-off date of 1840 comes from (Brush 1976, 27), but the decline was gradual: (Metcalfe 
1859) criticizes the hypothesis that heat is the motion of constituent parts.
2 Defenders of caloric sometimes admitted that the evidence did not demonstrate that heat was 
material.  Joseph Black is typical: “Such an idea [viz., material caloric] of the nature of heat is, 
therefore, the most probable of any I know; … It is, however, altogether a supposition” (Black 
1803, 33).  However, Black also says that the mechanical theory is “totally inconsistent with the 
phenomena” (80).
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Enlightenment caloric theorists brought several arguments against the mechanical view of
their predecessors (Brush 1976, 28-30); perhaps most compelling was the fact that heat 
can diffuse across a vacuum, but the motion of particles cannot be transmitted across a 
space that contains no particles.
There are further examples, such as the mutability of species.  Linnaeus, for 
example, concisely argues that “no new species are produced” (1964 [1735], 18), arguing
against the successor hypothesis that new species are created.  Several other candidates 
for further examples are considered in (Hook 2002), a collection on Gunther Stent’s 
notion of a ‘premature’ hypothesis; (Barber 1961) contains a classic list of hypotheses 
that were considered, rejected, and later accepted.  In sum: restricting focus to the 
problem of unconceived alternatives shrinks the body of evidence available in support of 
historically-motivated anti-realism—for each of these cases involves conceived 
alternatives to the then-dominant theory. 
2.2. Objection: These successor theories are unconceived, and thus are examples of the 
PUA 
A Stanfordite might claim that these historical episodes do instantiate the PUA.  I can 
imagine two possible grounds for this: (a) at the earlier time, the eventual successor 
theories were not conceived in full detail.  (b) The above presentation treats theories too 
atomistically; if instead the unit of analysis was the whole set of related hypotheses 
brought to bear on the phenomena, then these cases instantiate the PUA, since the whole 
set of successor theories was not conceived at the earlier time.  
5
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A Stanfordite who urges (a) points out that e.g. Ptolemy does not consider 
Newton’s specific model of the Universe in all its detail, and therefore concludes that 
Ptolemy’s case is part of the inductive base for the NI.  A similar objection could be 
leveled at material caloric theorists’ explicit consideration of the view that heat is motion:
the scientific revolutionaries’ view is less specific than the theory that would later 
supplant the material caloric theory, viz. the kinetic theory.  Thus, the successor theory 
had not been truly conceived (since the predecessor lacked the successor’s full detail), 
and therefore this case is also part of the NI’s inductive base.  
First, I agree that these conceived,-rejected,-then-accepted theories were often not
originally conceived in the complete detail of the actual successor.  However, this is not 
evidence that the NI can use these cases as part of its inductive base.  For a realist about 
the successor theory would say that the previously rejected theory (e.g. ‘The Earth rotates
diurnally’) was nonetheless true—even if the earlier version is not maximally specific.  
Therefore, Stanford’s PUA-based argument against realism would founder, since the list 
of alternative hypotheses considered at the earlier time does contain a true (though not 
maximally detailed) hypothesis.  Furthermore, for certain examples, this lack-of-
specificity objection rests on a factual error.  For example, Daniel Bernoulli had proposed
a theory similar to the modern kinetic theory of gases in 1738 (Brush 1976, 20), a century
before the kinetic theory was widely accepted.
A Stanfordite who instead appeals to (b) could stress that some of Ptolemy’s 
arguments against the Earth’s diurnal rotation use (parts of) Aristotelian physics for 
premises.  Thus, the appropriate ‘alternative’ hypothesis here is not the bare claim that the
Earth rotates (which she grants was conceived), but rather the conjunction of this claim 
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and the relevant parts of Newtonian or general relativistic dynamics.  And those larger 
conjunctions were unconceived by Ptolemy, so this more holistically-conceived theory 
would be part of the inductive base for the NI.  
This deserves two replies.  First, although Ptolemy’s arguments against the Earth’s
diurnal rotation appeal to Aristotelian physics, his other arguments do not.  For example, 
the arguments from lack of stellar parallax and the fact that every observer sees half the 
zodiac are independent of Aristotelian physics.  Second, more generally, this objection is 
in tension with Stanford’s professed aversion to confirmational holism. The ‘alternatives’ 
that were unconceived in this response are not individual hypotheses, but whole 
conglomerations of theories.  I will not weigh the pros and cons of confirmational holism 
here, but Stanford himself expresses anti-holist sentiments (2006, §2.2).
 
3. The Problem of Unconceived Unrepresentativeness
This section argues that many famous examples of discarded historical hypotheses 
resulted from projective inferences, not eliminative ones.3  These projective inferences 
were often problematic because inquirers did not realize their samples were 
unrepresentative of the total population in relevant ways; some variable that was not 
previously recognized as relevant was in fact relevant.  To mimic Stanford’s terminology, 
we might call this the ‘Problem of Unconceived Relevant Variables,’ or the ‘Problem of 
3 The view that all inductive inference actually has the form of disjunctive syllogism has been 
defended (Montague 1906, 281).  One could argue that the inference from ‘All A’s observed thus 
far have been B’ to ‘All A’s are B’ in effect eliminates any more complex explanation of why the 
observed A’s have been B, without explicitly listing all these more complex alternatives.  Stanford
himself mentions a similar possibility (2010, 234).
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Unconceived Unrepresentativeness.’  Stanford’s PUA-based argument against realism 
sidelines these cases, since they do not involve eliminative inferences—even though they 
are prima facie excellent evidence for a historically based case against realism. 
3.1. Examples
One example of such a case is the Galilean velocity-addition law, which was superseded 
by the Lorentz transformation at the beginning of the 20th Century.  
The Galilean velocity-addition law is:
′ x = x− vt
(where v is the relative velocity between the observer and the moving object). The 
corresponding Lorentz Transformation is:
′ x =
x− vt
1−
v2
c2
Length contraction can be derived from this.  The Galilean velocity-addition law (and its 
corollary, that the length of a rigid body is independent of its frame of reference) was 
presumably, for most scientists from the 17th to the end of the 19th century, seen as the 
conclusion of a projective argument (Newton says as much in the General Scholium, at 
least if being “rendered general by induction” is (a type of) projection).  So it is a 
discarded theory that is not the result of an eliminative inference, and thus one that a 
Stanfordite cannot appeal to as part of the inductive base for the NI. 
A second example is the classical hypothesis that the ‘fixed’ stars are eternal. This
was widely held, presumably on projective grounds, until there was sufficient data to 
demonstrate that what we call ‘novas’ were not changes in the Earth’s upper atmosphere. 
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The discovery of superconductivity provides a third example of this type.  Before Heike 
Kamerlingh Onnes discovered Mercury’s superconducting state in 1911, scientists 
projectively inferred that a body’s heat capacity is proportional to its temperature, and its 
electrical resistivity is proportional to temperature cubed.  Onnes observed that below a 
certain critical temperature, both quantities quickly approached zero.
Another straightforward example is the projective inference that since classical 
mechanics worked at many scales, it works at all scales—an inference invalidated by 
quantum phenomena.  (This is not the claim that the laws of motion were themselves 
inferred projectively; rather, the claim is that the inference from ‘the laws of classical 
mechanics hold for middle-sized dry goods and the solar system’ to the conclusion ‘The 
laws of classical mechanics will also hold for smaller spatial scales’ is projective.)
3.2 Objection: These cases are evidence for the NI  
An objector might suggest that these are simply paradigm examples of the PUA in action:
Enlightenment scientists didn’t conceive that the length of a moving body is inversely 
proportional to √(1 – v2/c2).  19th C scientists didn’t conceive that, for certain materials, 
there is some temperature below which that material’s heat capacity decreases very 
rapidly to zero, instead of linearly.  Of course, I grant that historical scientists did not 
conceive of these currently accepted hypotheses.  However, Stanford cannot hold that 
these cases are part of the NI’s inductive base without relinquishing some of his other 
commitments; in particular, he must either (a) claim that projective inferences are subject 
to the PUA, or (b) hold that these apparently projective inferences are actually 
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eliminative inferences in disguise.  Stanford cannot accept either, without giving up other 
core claims.
Suppose a Stanfordite accepts (a), allowing that these are projective inferences, 
but claiming that projective inferences can be part of the NI’s inductive base.  I will argue
that Stanford cannot do this without frustrating his desire to draw a significant epistemic 
difference between projective and eliminative inferences (2010; 2011; 2006, 39).  For 
example, Stanford writes: “a consensus in favor of a given theoretical scientific belief 
should be regarded with considerably more suspicion when the evidence we have in 
support of that belief is exclusively or even just centrally abductive in character,” as 
opposed to projective (2010, 234). (Terminological note: ‘abductive evidence’ constitutes
the premises of an eliminative inference.)  This is the core of what we could call 
Stanford’s ‘selective instrumentalism’: “the limited skepticism thus motivated [by the NI]
should certainly not extend to every scientific claim or hypothesis and may even have 
different force as applied to the scientific exploration of different domains” (2006, 37; my
emphasis).4  And Stanford uses this distinction when he justifies his belief that 
microscopic organisms exist5 by appealing to the fact that we have “evidence of a non-
eliminative character” of their existence (2006, 35; see also 33). The fact that microscopic
organisms are not eliminatively inferred would not be evidence for their existence, unless
we should be realists about (empirically successful, widely adopted) theoretical claims 
that are projectively inferred.6  But if the PUA applies to projective inferences, then we 
should not be realists about the conclusions of projective arguments.  So Stanford can 
4 See (Magnus 2010) for discussion of Stanford’s piecemeal strategy.
5 This is important to Stanford, for it distinguishes his instrumentalism from Constructive 
Empiricism.
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only follow (a) by giving up his ‘limited,’ selective, or “piecemeal” instrumentalism 
(2006, 48).  And if he does that, then his view collapses back into the classical PI (or 
something similar) (Magnus 2010, §3)—at least in terms of how much ‘suspicion’ we 
should cast over our current scientific theories.
Suppose a Stanfordite instead pursues (b), claiming that the above examples are 
actually eliminative inferences in disguise.  Then there are two possibilities: either all 
apparently projective inferences are actually eliminative inferences, or there is something 
special about these apparently projective inferences that makes them eliminative 
inferences in disguise.  If all apparently projective inferences are actually eliminative 
inferences, then again the distinction between projective and eliminative inference 
disappears, and with it Stanford’s piecemeal, limited skepticism.  So there must be 
something about these particular apparently projective inferences that make them 
eliminative.  However, this appears untenable for Stanford as well.  For he says that since
one can “reframe” any projective inference as an eliminative one (2010, 234), the way to 
draw the line between projective and eliminative inference is by distinguishing those 
inferences that are “amenable to construal as a kind of inductive projection” from those 
that are not (2010, 235).  That is, Stanford thinks we should view inferences that cannot 
be couched as projective inferences with ‘considerably more suspicion’ than those that 
6 Stanford makes similar remarks about the ‘hypothesis of organic fossil origins’: “the 
vulnerability of the hypothesis of organic fossil origins to any serious version of the challenge 
posed by the PUA has been most dramatically reduced by the fact that we have managed to 
supplement the fundamentally abductive sorts of evidence long available in support of it with 
compelling further evidence that depends instead on a more straightforward sort of inductive 
projection” (2010, 221).
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can.  This seems to rule out the ‘eliminative inference in disguise’ route for the 
Stanfordite, since all that is required for an inference to be projective in the sense 
Stanford considers epistemically important is that the inference can be framed as 
projective—and the above examples fit that bill. 
3.3. Objection: this is merely the general problem of induction, thus not a specific 
problem for scientific knowledge  
When discussing eliminative inference in scientific reasoning, Stanford brackets 
Cartesian skeptical hypotheses, even though many skeptical arguments are eliminative.  
His reason for doing so is that Cartesian skepticism is a problem in general epistemology,
whose purported provenance is not specifically about scientific theorizing.  But, he says, 
the arguments against scientific realism are supposed to pose a special problem for 
scientific knowledge, not for all knowledge (2006, 12-13).  So, perhaps a Stanfordite 
would level a parallel objection against the problem of unconceived unrepresentativeness:
it is just the hoary philosophical problem of induction.  The problem of induction is an 
important problem in general epistemology, like Cartesian skepticism—but it is not a 
special problem for science, just as Cartesian skepticism is not a special problem for 
science.  But (to repeat) historically-motivated anti-realism is supposed to be a special 
problem for science.
First reply: what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.  The PUA-based 
argument against realism may suffer from an exactly analogous problem, since 
disjunctive syllogism is ubiquitous: if Chrysippus is to be believed, even dogs use it.  
This inference form is not restricted to scientific inquiries, and having doubts about the 
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disjunction premise in a disjunctive syllogism is not restricted to scientific contexts, 
either.  
Second, whether the problem of induction is a special problem for science 
depends on the exact meaning of ‘the problem of induction.’  If the problem of induction 
is restricted to the question ‘Can we give a non-circular justification of our belief that the 
future will resemble the past?’, then it is not a special problem for science.  But the above
cases of the Galilean transformation etc. do not merely extrapolate future events from 
past ones.  Rather, they instantiate a more abstract pattern of inductive generalization: 
given that a limited sample of a certain kind of entity is a certain way, infer that all such 
entities are that way.  These traits are not merely inferred to be uniform over time, but 
rather over a wide variety of other variables (including scale, velocity, or temperature).  
And this is a paradigmatically scientific inference: inferring from our very limited 
observations in the lab or field that some pattern holds for any sample of DNA, or any 
energetically closed system, or any two massive bodies in the universe etc., is a 
stereotypically scientific inference.  (Of course, reasoning from a limited sample to a total
population is of course not the exclusive province of science.  But again, neither is 
disjunctive syllogism.)  
Furthermore, and more importantly, the degree or scale of 
generalization in scientiic contexts—at least for the kind of 
fundamental theories and mechanisms at issue in the realism debate—
is typically much wider in scientiic inferences than everyday 
inferences.  Howard Stein expresses this point clearly when describing 
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his initial encounter with Newton’s argument for universal gravitation 
in the Principia: 
“The empirical evidence available to Newton all concerned what 
one can reasonably describe as, irst, “ordinary” behavior of 
“ordinary” terrestrial bodies (which of course contains no sign 
whatever of any such universal mutual attraction), and second, 
crucially, the changes of position… of eleven bright objects in the
sky, and the changes in visible shape and/or luminousness … of a
few of these.  To say that these are, prima facie, scanty grounds 
for the astoundingly far-reaching conclusion Newton came to will
surely be seen as no overstatement.” (2014(?!), 2; my emphasis)
<<This is maybe not the best quotation, because this is 
stressing the scantiness of the evidence, not the breadth of the 
conclusion; maybe break this ‘commonsense vs scientiic 
inductions’ point into (a) logically stronger conclusions (b) less 
evidence [given the logical strength of the conclusion] for the 
conclusion; Stein’s feeling is about (b).>>
 
The point is that our everyday inductive practices do not typically 
make conclusions about every massive body in the universe, the shape
of every gene, or every species in the history of the planet.  Our 
workaday inductions are typically to much weaker conclusions.  
[[There’s the old logical problem that EVERY generalization is about 
everything: All Fs are Gs = Everything is the universe is such that 
either it is F and G or it’s not F.  But]]
In sum, however we construe ‘The problem of induction,’ this objection fails.  If 
‘the problem of induction’ only refers to the problem of justifying beliefs about the future
on the basis of beliefs about the past, then the historical cases presented above are not 
part of the problem of induction that belongs to general epistemology.  However, if ‘the 
problem of induction’ refers to any inference from a limited sample to a total population, 
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then such sample-based reasoning is central to much scientific inference—and the cases 
discussed in this section instantiate this type of reasoning. 
4. Can’t the Stanfordite accept the PI?
The previous two sections aimed to show that a proponent of the NI cannot appeal to 
many of the ‘Greatest Hits’ in the standard historically-motivated anti-realist’s catalogue, 
without giving up other central Stanfordite commitments.  A Stanfordite might respond 
that she can agree with everything in the previous two sections.  After all, Chapters 6 and 
7 of (2006) defend (something like) the PI from realist criticisms.  And Stanford himself 
says: “I view the problem of unconceived alternatives not as competing with the 
traditional challenges of underdetermination and the pessimistic induction so much as 
bringing out what was most significant and compelling about those challenges to begin 
with” (2006, 45).  I agree that the PUA and the NI are consistent with the PI: historically 
based anti-realists can make new inductions, but keep the old.  However, I do not agree 
that the PUA captures ‘what was most significant about the PI to begin with.’ 
Furthermore, accepting the PI is inconsistent with Stanford’s piecemeal instrumentalism.
  
4.1.  Stanford over-values the PUA-based argument against realism
Stanford believes the PUA poses the most important problem for scientific realism.  He 
writes: “the problem of unconceived alternatives… lies at the heart of any serious 
objection to scientific realism” (200; my emphasis).  This is not an isolated moment of 
over-exuberance, since we find similar remarks elsewhere: “it is our vulnerability to the 
problem of unconceived alternatives … that is most significant to the debate over 
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scientific realism” (23; my emphasis), and “the problem of unconceived alternatives 
poses the most serious challenge to believing the claims of contemporary scientific 
theories” (39; my emphasis).  In short, Stanford considers the PUA-based argument 
against realism the best argument against realism.
Let us consider Stanford’s claims in turn.  First, let us examine the assertion that 
the PUA ‘lies at the heart of any serious objection to scientific realism.’  If so, then if the 
PI is a serious objection to scientific realism, then the PUA is at the heart of the PI.  I do 
not know precisely what Stanford means by ‘X is at the heart of any Y,’ but presumably it 
entails ‘X is a necessary condition for Y.’  So, if the PUA disappeared, then there would 
be no serious objections to scientific realism—including the PI.  I think this is incorrect.  
Sections 2-3 presented classes of historical cases that are evidence for the PI but not 
evidence for the NI.  This shows that there is some evidence against realism that is 
independent of the PUA.  So, one might infer directly that this evidence is suffices to 
demonstrate that the PUA is not necessary for ‘any serious objection to realism.’  
However, a Stanfordite could conceivably reply that any historically based argument 
against realism that omitted every historical case that did not instantiate the PUA is not 
‘serious’ (perhaps on the grounds that it would simply leave out too many important cases
from the dustbin of history).  Now, I take no position on whether there are enough cases 
in the historical record that instantiate the problem of conceived alternatives, or the 
problem of unconceived unrepresentativeness, to pose a ‘serious’ challenge to realism—
primarily because I do not wish to argue about what the threshold number for ‘serious’ is.
Nonetheless, this Stanfordite reply can still be answered.  To say that the PUA is a
necessary condition for any serious objection to realism means that if the PUA 
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disappeared, then all the serious objections to realism would also disappear.  So let us 
imagine that, for historical episodes that actually involved unconceived successor 
theories, all the later successor theories had instead been conceived at the earlier time.  
For example, imagine that quantum mechanics had been explicitly formulated in 1750.  
Now the question is: can a serious objection to realism be posed in this hypothetical 
alternative history?  And the answer appears to be yes: as Magnus (2006) and Saatsi 
(2009, 359) have pointed out, given the evidence available to scientists in 1750, 
Newtonian mechanics is better confirmed than general relativity and quantum mechanics.
(No independent evidence available in 1750 suggests that the laws of motion are 
drastically different at scales outside what was detectable in 1750.)  So scientists in 1750 
(if they are rational) would have still accepted Newtonian mechanics, even if the PUA 
were removed.  If something similar holds for many other historical cases that actually 
involved unconceived successor theories, then the PUA is not necessary for a serious 
objection to realism (unless there is no serious, historically based objection to realism—a 
route obviously unavailable to the Stanfordite).
Let us now turn to Stanford’s claims that the PUA is the “most significant” or 
“most serious” challenge to realism.  I believe it may be irresoluble whether the PUA or 
the PI is more important, since there may be no standard of significance or seriousness to 
decide the question shared between the disputants.  But since Stanford makes this claim, I
address it.  I see at least two reasons to resist it.  First, if an argument leaves out much of 
the prima facie evidence for a conclusion, and correspondingly settles for a more 
restricted conclusion (the moral of sections 2-3), then that argument is prima facie less 
important than a related argument that draws upon more of the relevant evidence, and 
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accordingly establishes a wider conclusion.  Second, one could argue that ‘problem of 
conceived alternatives’ cases, like the geo-eccentric hypothesis, are a more serious 
problem for realism than cases that instantiate the PUA.  Why? Cases like the Earth’s 
diurnal rotation and Daniel Bernoulli’s kinetic theory of gases show that even when we 
explicitly consider the correct theory—i.e. the truth is ‘staring us in the face’—we can 
still reject it.  In my opinion, that makes us look even more epistemically inept than an 
inability to conceive of the true theory, when the true theory is conceptually distant from 
our current list of live options.  To be clear, I do not think these two reasons conclusively 
establish that the PI is definitely more significant than the PUA (whatever ‘significance’ 
comes to). However, they do present a challenge that a Stanfordite must answer, if she 
wishes to maintain that the PUA presents the most significant challenge to realism.
4.2. Accepting the PI is inconsistent with Stanford’s piecemeal instrumentalism  
The argument for the claim in above sub-heading is straightforward, since all the pieces 
were presented in 3.1 above.  Stanford wants his criticism of realism to be selective or 
piecemeal.  This is achieved by casting “considerably more suspicion” on widely 
accepted, empirically successful fundamental theories that are eliminatively inferred than 
those that are projectively inferred.  Yet §3 showed that many theories that are evidence 
for the PI’s inductive base were projectively inferred.  Thus, anyone who accepts the PI 
as a persuasive argument against realism cannot (in the absence of special pleading) 
simultaneously endorse Stanford’s brand of piecemeal skepticism about scientific 
theories.  
18
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5. Conclusion
A historically motivated anti-realist who only appeals to the PUA and NI needlessly 
limits both the evidence for her view, and the scope of her anti-realist conclusion, since 
she omits all historical cases where either the successors were conceived, or the theories 
were the result of projective inferences.  The most natural attempts to incorporate such 
cases into the PUA-based argument against realism fall afoul of Stanford’s other 
commitments.
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Why I Am Not a Methodological Likelihoodist∗
By Greg Gandenberger
March 14, 2014
Abstract
Methodological likelihoodism is the view that it is possible to provide an
adequate self-contained methodology for science on the basis of likelihood
functions alone. I argue that methodological likelihoodism is false by argu-
ing that an adequate self-contained methodology for science provides good
norms of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses, articulating minimal require-
ments for a norm of this kind, and proving that no purely likelihood-based
norm satisfies those requirements.
Introduction
One of the guiding ideas in the philosophy of induction is that “saving the
phenomena is a mark of truth” (Norton, 2005, 11). In other words, a hypothesis
is confirmed to the extent that it correctly predicts what is observed; as Milne
puts it, “prediction and confirmation are two sides of the same coin” (1996, 23).
Likelihoodism provides principles of evidential relevance and evidential fa-
voring that accord with this idea. Its primary principle of evidential favoring
is the Likelihood Principle, which says that the evidential meaning of a datum
∗Thanks to Jake Chandler, Branden Fitelson, Clark Glymour, Satish Iyengar, Michael
Lew, Edouard Machery, John Norton, Teddy Seidenfeld, and Jim Woodward for discussions
that contributed to the development of this paper.
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E for a set of hypotheses H depends only on how well each of those hypothe-
ses predicts that datum—more precisely, on the likelihood function Pr(E|H)1
considered as a function of H ∈ H, up to a constant of proportionality. Its
primary principle of evidential favoring is the Law of Likelihood, according to
which E favors H1 over H2 when and to the degree that the log-likelihood ratio
L = log[Pr(E|H1)/Pr(E|H2)] is greater than zero.
2
Methodological likelihoodists such as Edwards (1972), Royall (1997), and
Sober (2008) go beyond simply accepting the Likelihood Principle and the
Law of Likelihood: they claim that it is possible to provide an adequate self-
contained3 methodology for science on the basis of likelihood functions alone.
They aim to provide a methodology that combines the main advantages of
Bayesian and frequentist methodologies without their respective disadvantages.
Like Bayesian and unlike frequentist methods, likelihoodist methods conform
to the Likelihood Principle, for which there are strong arguments (Ganden-
berger, forthcoming). Like frequentist and unlike Bayesian methods, likelihood-
ist methods avoid appeals to prior probabilities, which are often contentious.
1Amore subtle account is needed when the sample space is continuous, so that Pr(E|H) = 0
for a typical datum; see (Hacking, 1965, 57, 66–70), (Berger and Wolpert, 1988, 32–6), and
(Pawitan, 2001, 23–4). In principle, this complication can be ignored in the context of any
real experiment: real measurement techniques have finite precision, so real sample spaces are
always discrete.
2The Law of Likelihood is often stated in terms of likelihood ratios rather than log-
likelihood ratios. Nothing substantive hangs on this difference. Strictly speaking, the Law of
Likelihood should be understood as the claim that evidential favoring increases monotonically
with the likelihood ratio. Different monotonic functions of the likelihood ratio produce differ-
ent permissible measurement scales. I use a logarithmic scale for ease of interpretation: zero
indicates evidential neutrality; positive values indicate that the evidence favors H1 over H2
while negative values indicate the opposite; and the degree of evidential favoring provided by
a pair of independent data is simply the sum of the degrees of evidential favoring provided by
each datum individually. The base of the logarithms is immaterial.
3The claim that this methodology is self-contained is not meant to exclude methodological
pluralism a la (Sober, 2008, 3, 356–8). Methodological likelihoodists need not believe that
methods based on likelihood functions alone are appropriate for all scientific problems. How-
ever, they must believe that they are appropriate for some scientific problems, and not merely
in the sense that they are appropriate when they would give the same answer as a reasonable
Bayesian or frequentist method or in the sense that their outputs are useful as inputs for
some other method, such as Bayesian updating. A common pluralist view that qualifies as
a form of methodological likelihoodism is that Bayesian methods are appropriate when prior
probabilities are “available” in some sense, while likelihoodist methods are appropriate when
they are not, and that they are often unavailable in science (see e.g. Sober 2008, 32).
2
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The purpose of this paper is to argue that methodological likelihoodism should
nevertheless be rejected.
My argument against methodological likelihoodism rests on the following
premises.
Premises
(1) An adequate self-contained methodology for science provides good norms
of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses.
(2) If there are good norms of commitment based on likelihood functions alone,
then some rule of the following form is among them, where T is your total
relevant evidence:4
ProportionRelativeAcceptance to (a Function of) theEvidence
(PRAFE): AcceptH1 overH2 to the degree f(L) = f(log[Pr(T |H1)/Pr(T |H2)]),
where f is some nondecreasing function such that f(0) = 0 and
f(a) > 0 for some a.
(3) A good norm of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses is compatible with the
following rules:
(3A) Do not prefer H1 to H2 and H3 to H4 if H1 is logically equivalent
to H4 and H2 is logically equivalent to H3 (where preferring one
hypothesis to another is equivalent to accepting the former over the
latter to a positive degree).
(3B) Accept (H1 or H2) over H3 to a degree greater than that to which
you accept H1 over H3 when the following conditions are met:
i. H1 and H2 are mutually exclusive,
4The notion of relevant evidence can be formalized in terms of sufficient statistics (see
Halmos and Savage 1949).
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ii. the degree to which you accept H1 over H3 is well-defined, and
iii. the degree to which you accept H2 over H3 is well-defined and
is not −∞.
(4) A good norm of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses is compatible with the
following rule:
(4A) Do not prefer H1 to ∼ H1 and ∼ H2 to H2 if H1 and H2 are logically
equivalent given your total evidence.
(3) and (4) each entails that no rule of the form given by (PRAFE) is a good
norm of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses. Thus, the conjunction of (1), (2),
and either (3) or (4) entails that methodological likelihoodism is false.
I argue for (1)–(4) in Sections 1–4, respectively. I prove that (3) and (4) entail
that no rule of the form given by (PRAFE) is a good norm of commitment vis-
a`-vis hypotheses in Appendices A and B, respectively. In Section 5 I respond
to attempts to defend likelihoodist methods with reliabilist arguments.
1 Premise (1): An adequate self-contained method-
ology for science provides good norms of com-
mitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses
Science should help guide our commitments vis-a`-vis hypotheses. It is not
enough to say something about how the data are related to the hypotheses;
we need to be able to “detach” the evidence and say something about the hy-
potheses themselves in light of the data. It would be odd for the author of a
scientific paper to say that he or she does not care about evaluating the hy-
potheses he or she considers, but only wishes to assess how the data bear on
4
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them as evidence.5
Some methodological likelihoodists, such as Edwards,6 at least suggest that
purely likelihood-based methods can be used to guide our commitments vis-
a`-vis hypotheses. Others, such as Royal and Sober, are careful not to claim
more for purely likelihood-based methods than that they correctly characterize
data as evidence (e.g. Royall 1997, 3; Sober 2008, 32). But what are we to
do with a characterization of data as evidence if not to use it to guide our
commitments? And how are we to use it to guide our commitments without
appealing to information not given by the likelihood function?
Royall and Sober provide no explicit answers to these questions. Royall
takes the value of a correct characterization of data as evidence for granted.7
Sober does not take it for granted, but he does not provide a clear argument
for it either. He says that it is not enough to show that the Law of Likelihood
“conforms to, and renders precise and systematic, our use of the informal con-
cept” of evidential favoring: “what matters,” he writes, “is whether [the Law of
Likelihood] isolates an epistemologically important concept” (Sober, 2008, 35).
I agree that it is not enough to vindicate methodological likelihoodism to show
that the Law of Likelihood captures our informal concept of evidential favoring.
But, depending on one’s views about epistemological importance, it may also
not be enough to show that the Law of Likelihood isolates an epistemologically
important concept. The Law of Likelihood could be epistemologically impor-
tant because, for instance, it is useful for explaining the so-called conjunction
5Of course, not every scientific paper should include an evaluation of the hypotheses con-
sidered therein. There may be relevant data from other sources, and the author of the paper
may wish to leave the evaluation to his or her readers. These points are compatible with my
claim that hypothesis evaluation is ultimately indispensable.
6Edwards states the Law of Likelihood in terms of support (1972, 30), but he describes it
as providing the basis for a system of inference (e.g. 1972, 7) and relative degrees of belief
(e.g. 1972, 28) without explanation or argument.
7Royall begins his (1997) with the bare assertion that the “most important task” of statis-
tics “is to provide objective quantitative alternatives to personal judgement for interpreting
the evidence produced by experiments and observational studies” (xi). I have found no argu-
ment for this claim in his writings.
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fallacy.8 It would not follow that the Law of Likelihood provides useful guid-
ance for our commitments vis-a`-vis hypotheses, as methodological likelihoodism
requires.
Sober seems to take himself to show that the Law of Likelihood does isolate
an epistemologically important concept. However, he does not explain how he
takes himself to do so. It is a plausible guess that he takes himself to do so in his
use of the Law of Likelihood to address seemingly well-formed and important
question such as the following (Sober, 2008, 107–8):
• Are the imperfect adaptations that organisms exhibit evidence that they
were not produced by an intelligent designer?
• Is the fact that bears in cold climates have longer fur than bears in warm
climates evidence that fur length evolved by natural selection as an adap-
tive response to ambient temperature?
• Are the similarities that species exhibit evidence that they stem from a
common ancestor?
The Law of Likelihood can indeed be used to provide defensible answers to
these questions (see Gandenberger forthcoming, Gandenberger unpublished).
However, the following questions remain: what are we to do with answers to
these questions if not to use them to guide our commitments vis-a`-vis the rele-
vant hypotheses? And how are we to use them to provide such guidance without
appealing to information not given by the likelihood function?
8As an example of the conjunction fallacy, most people give a higher probability to the
statement that a character named Linda is a feminist bank teller then to the proposition that
Linda is a bank teller. Because the population of feminist bank tellers is necessarily a subset of
the population of bank tellers, these judgments are probabilistically incoherent. One possible
explanation for this phenomenon is that people are responding to the fact that the vignette
told about Linda favors the statement that she is a feminist bank teller over its negation (or
confirms it) more than it favors the statement that she is a bank teller over its negation. See
Tentori et al. (2013) for empirical evidence that seems to support this explanation.
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Methodological likelihoodists have two options: (1) claim that science need
not provide guidance for our commitments vis-a`-vis hypotheses, or (2) provide
good norms of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses that are based on likelihood
functions alone. Option (1) flies in the face of the commonsense idea that
we do science in order to learn about the world (at least in some attenuated
sense)9 or to improve our ability to predict and control some part of it. It
would be difficult to justify allocating time and tax dollars to science if all
it could do were to generate data and hypotheses and tell us how that data is
related to those hypotheses as evidence, without thereby giving us any guidance
about what to believe or do. Traditionally, philosophers of science have sought
a theory of evidence or confirmation so that they could use that theory to
evaluate hypotheses in a principled way. The idea that characterizations of
data as evidence are valuable in themselves is an unfortunate byproduct of this
pursuit.
I take up option (2) in the next section.
2 Premise (2): If there are good purely likelihood-
based norms of commitment, then (PRAFE)
is among them
I argued in the previous section that making good on methodological likelihood-
ism requires providing a good purely likelihood-based norm of commitment.
A reasonable starting point for an attempt to provide such a norm is Hume’s
dictum that a wise person proportions his or her belief to his or her (total)
evidence (1825, 111, paraphrased). We can increase the plausibility of this
9It is compatible with my claim in the section, for instance, that we do science only to
learn approximate truths about observable phenomena, as some scientific anti-realists claim
(e.g. Van Fraassen 1980).
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already plausible dictum by generalizing it in two ways. First we can replace
“belief” with “acceptance.” The word “acceptance” here could be understood
in a purely doxastic way, as indicating “what one holds in one’s head,” so
to speak. Alternatively, it could be understood in a “behavioristic” way, as
indicating something about what one would do in certain circumstances. I aim
to show that my generalization of Hume’s dictum has disastrous consequences on
either interpretation, thereby casting doubt on the possibility of a good purely
likelihood-based norm of commitment of either the doxastic or the behavioristic
kind. I assume only that degrees of acceptance correspond to a qualitative
preference ordering in the following way: accepting H1 over H2 to a positive
degree indicates that one prefers H1 to H2, doing so to degree zero indicates
that one has no preference between H1 and H2, and doing so to a negative
degree indicates that one prefers H2 to H1.
We can generalize Hume’s dictum in a second way by saying merely that a
wise person proportions his or her acceptance to some function of the evidence,
where that function satisfies the following mild constraints:
• it is nondecreasing, so that an increase in absolute value for evidential
favoring without a change in sign10 never leads to a decrease in degree of
acceptance;
• it is calibrated in the sense that neutral evidence (log[Pr(T |H1)/Pr(T |H2) =
0, i.e. Pr(T |H1) = Pr(T |H2)) leads to neutrality of acceptance (neither
preferring H1 to H2 nor vice versa);
• it is nontrivial in the sense that it would lead one to accept H1 over H2
given sufficiently strong evidence favoring the former over the latter.
10The phrase “without a change in sign” is necessary because I do not assume that the
function f is symmetric about zero. One might wish to add this assumption, but I do not need
it.
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Generalizing Hume’s dictum in these two ways leads to the following class
of purely likelihood-based norms of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses, where T
is one’s total relevant evidence.
Proportion Relative Acceptance to (a Function of) the Evidence
(PRAFE): AcceptH1 overH2 to the degree f(L) = f(log[Pr(T |H1)/Pr(T |H2)]),
where f is some nondecreasing function such that f(0) = 0 and
f(a) > 0 for some a.
I cannot think of a more plausible yet nontrivial way to map the degrees of
evidential favoring that the Law of Likelihood provides onto real-valued degrees
of relative acceptance. There are no rival proposals in the literature to consider
because methodological likelihoodists either deny that their methods provide
guidance for belief or action (e.g. Royall and Sober) or suggest that they do
provide such guidance but fail to provide a definite account (e.g. Edwards). If
methodological likelihoodists wish to claim that there are good purely likelihood-
based norms of commitment of a different form, then they need to say explicitly
what those norms are and how they are good. In the meantime, (PRAFE)’s
generality and intuitive plausibility warrant the claim that if there are good
purely likelihood-based norms of commitment, then they include some norm of
the form it provides.
Methodological likelihoodists may not be able to escape the difficulties for
(PRAFE) that I present below even if there are purely likelihood-based norms
of commitment more plausible than (PRAFE). I have argued for a particular
kind of norm only because some constraints are necessary for proving definite
results. But the problematic results for (PRAFE) that I present do not seem
to depend on any quirk of (PRAFE) that could easily be removed, but rather
from the fact that likelihood functions (unlike probability distributions) respect
neither entailment relations among hypotheses nor logical equivalence among
9
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hypotheses given one’s evidence. For that reason, it seems likely that any purely
likelihood-based norm of commitment would suffer from similar problems.
3 Premise (3): A good norm of commitment is
compatible with (3A) and (3B)
I have argued that an adequate self-contained methodology for science provides
good norms of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses and that if there are any purely
likelihood-based norms of this kind then a norm of the form given by (PRAFE)
is among them. It follows that methodological likelihoodism is false if no norm
of the form given by (PRAFE) is a good one. In this section I argue that no
norm of the form given by (PRAFE) is a good one because any norm of this
kind can force one to violate either (3A) or (3B):
(3A) Do not prefer H1 to H2 and H3 to H4 if H1 is logically equivalent to H4
and H2 is logically equivalent to H3 (where preferring one hypothesis to
another means accepting the former over the latter to a positive degree).
(3B) Accept (H1 or H2) over H3 to a degree greater than that to which you
accept H1 over H3 when the following conditions are met:
i. H1 and H2 are mutually exclusive,
ii. the degree to which you accept H1 over H3 is well-defined, and
iii. the degree to which you accept H2 over H3 is well-defined and is not
−∞.
These rules are compelling. Take (3A). This rule seems innocuous in applica-
tions. For instance, it says not to prefer “all ravens are black” to “some ravens
are white” while at the same time preferring “some white things are ravens”
10
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to “all non-black things are non-ravens.” (Note that “some white things are
ravens” is logically equivalent to “some ravens are white” and “all non-black
things are non-ravens” is logically equivalent to “all ravens are black.”) After
all, one’s preference between a pair of propositions should not depend on the
form in which those propositions are stated.
Moreover, (3A) is completely trivial under various possible formalization
of the notion of relative acceptance. For instance, if we interpret the degree
to which one accepts A over B as one’s log-odds log[Pr(A)/Pr(B)], then (3A)
follows from the fact that probabilities do not change under substitution of
logical equivalents.11 In fact, (3A) follows from any formalization that allows
substitution of logical equivalents.
Now take (3B). Roughly speaking, this rule directs one to accept a disjunc-
tion over an alternative claim more than one accepts one of its disjuncts over
that claim, provided that one is not willing to dismiss the other disjunct com-
pletely relative to that claim. The restriction to cases in which the degree to
which one accepts H2 over H3 is not −∞ rules out cases in which one completely
rejects H2 relative to H3. Again, this rule seems innocuous in applications. For
instance, it directs one to accept “either all ravens are black or some white and
the rest of black” over “some ravens are red” to a degree greater than that to
which one accepts “all ravens are black” over “some ravens are red,” provided
that the degree to which one accepts “all ravens are black” over “some ravens
are red” is well-defined and the degree to which one accepts “some ravens are
white and the rest are black” over “some ravens are red” is well-defined and
11It is arguably permissible in some sense for subjective degrees of belief to vary under
substitution of logical equivalents. For instance, one would hardly blame a person of average
mathematical ability who was attempting to assess the size of a cubic box for assigning
different probabilities to the proposition that each side of the box is 27 inches long and the
proposition that the box has volume 19, 683 in.3 (Rescorla, unpublished, 18–9), even though
those hypotheses are equivalent. But this case does involve a failure to be fully rational; it
is just a failure of logical omniscience rather than a failure of probability assessment. Thus,
though excusable, it is not rationally permissible in any strong sense.
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is not −∞. This application of (3B0 seems obligatory. After all, “either all
ravens are black or some are white and the rest are black” encompasses more
possibilities than “all ravens are black,” so it makes sense to accept the former
over some third claim to a greater degree than letter, provided that one gives
any credence at all to the additional possibilities it encompasses.
Like (3A), (3B) would hold under a variety of possible formalizations of the
notion of relative acceptance. For instance, if we again interpret the degree to
which one accepts A over B as one’s log- odds log[Pr(A)/Pr(B)], then (3B) fol-
lows from the axioms of probability. Probabilities obey finite additivity, meaning
that Pr(H1 or H2) = Pr(H1) + Pr(H2) when H1 and H2 are mutually exclu-
sive. It follows that log[Pr(H1 or H2)/Pr(H3)] > log[Pr(H1)/Pr(H3)] when
Pr(H2)/Pr(H3) > 0 and H1 and H2 are mutually exclusive. An analogous ar-
gument would work under any analogous interpretation that uses an additive
(or superadditive)12 calculus.
It is possible to give a very simple argument that (PRAFE) forces one to
violate (3B) without assuming (3A). However, this argument makes an objec-
tionable assumption. Suppose you were to run a completely uninformative ex-
periment: you have me flip a coin with unknown bias p for heads but to report
“heads” regardless of how it lands. Then Pr(E|p = p∗) = 1 for all 0 ≤ p∗ ≤ 1.
The Law of Likelihood entails that that outcome is neutral between any pair of
H1 : 0 ≤ p < 1/3, H2 : 1/3 ≤ p < 2/3, and H3 : 2/3 ≤ p < 1. But it also implies
that it is neutral between (H1 or H2) and H3. This combination of claims is not
problematic as long as we are only talking about evidential favoring. But us-
ing (PRAFE) to translate talk about evidential favoring into talk of acceptance
yields violations of (3B).
12A superadditive calculus f such as the Dempster-Shafer calculus (Dempster, 1968)) is
one whose axioms guarantee only that f(H1 or H2) ≥ f(H1) + f(H2) when H1 and H2 are
mutually exclusive.
12
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If you find this argument against (PRAFE) convincing, then so much the
better for my thesis. I do not place much weight on it because it has a weak
point. One could claim that the size of the interval for p that a hypothesis posits
is relevant to its assessment, either as part of the total relevant evidence with
respect to that hypothesis or as a factor apart from the evidence that should
play some role in a rule such as (PRAFE) for translating degrees of favoring
into degrees of acceptance. I suspect that this claim is unsustainable, but I
would rather make it moot than argue against it. I do so by providing a more
elaborate argument in which I apply (PRAFE) only to intervals of equal sizes in
two different parameterizations of the hypothesis space and use (3B) to generate
a violation of (3A).
That argument is given in Appendix A. Here is roughly how it goes. I con-
struct a hypothetical experiment the outcome of which is evidentially neutral
between hypotheses A, B, and C according to the Law of Likelihood. By stipu-
lation, that outcome is one’s only evidence about those hypotheses. (PRAFE)
thus requires you to be neutral between hypotheses A, B, and C. (3B) thus
requires you to prefer (A or B) over C. I then consider an alternative set of
hypotheses A′, B′, and C ′ between which the outcome is also evidentially neu-
tral according to the Law of Likelihood. By an analogous argument, (PRAFE)
and (3B) require you to prefer (A′ or B′) over C ′. It thereby requires you to
violate (3A). For the hypotheses are constructed so that (A or B) is logically
equivalent to C ′ and (A′ or B′) is logically equivalent to C. Thus, (PRAFE)
forces you to violate either (3A) or (3B).
Because (PRAFE) can force13 you to violate either (3A) or (3B), the fact that
(3A) and (3B) are compelling warrants the claim that (PRAFE) is not a good
norm of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses. It follows from this claim together
13“(PRAFE) can force you to violate...” should be understood as shorthand for “any norm
of the form given by (PRAFE) can force you to violate...”
13
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with the claims I argued for in the previous two sections that methodological
likelihood is false.
4 Premise (4): A good norm of commitment is
compatible with (4A)
In this section I argue that (PRAFE) is not a good norm of commitment for a
second reason: it can force one to violate (4A):
(4A) Do not prefer H1 to ∼ H1 and ∼ H2 to H2 if H1 and H2 are
logically equivalent given your total evidence.
(4A) is compelling. It is similar to (3A) in that it requires degrees of ac-
ceptance to respect a certain kind of logical equivalence. Is stronger than (3A)
in that requires only logical equivalence given one’s evidence. It is weaker than
(3A) in that it has implications only for preferences between hypotheses and
their negations.
Like (3A) and (3B), (4A) seems innocuous in applications. It prohibits
someone who knows that no ravens are red from preferring “all ravens are either
black or red” to its negation while dispreferring “all ravens are black” to its
negation. For someone who knows that no ravens are red, these hypotheses
have the same content and thus should be assessed alike.
Like (3A), (4A) is completely trivial under any formalization of relative
acceptance that allows substitution of logical equivalents.
I prove that (PRAFE) can force one to violate (4A) in Appendix B. Here
is roughly how the proof goes. Let H1 be the conjunction of some proposition
A with E, and let H2 be just the proposition A. Suppose that E is one’s
total relevant evidence. I show that for any constant a, one can construct a
probability distribution over A and E such that the log-likelihood ratios of H1
14
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against ∼ H1 and ∼ H2 against H2 both exceed a. Thus, given any norm of the
form given by (PRAFE) there is a possible experimental outcome that would
lead one to prefer H1 over ∼ H1 and ∼ H2 over H2. In this way, (PRAFE) can
force you to violate (4A).
Because (PRAFE) can force you to violate (4A), the fact that (4A) is com-
pelling warrants the claim that (PRAFE) is not a good norm of commitment
vis-a`-vis hypotheses. It follows from this claim together with the claims I argued
for in Sections 1 and 2 that methodological likelihoodism is false.
It is worth noting that one could avoid violating (4A) by adopting a restricted
version of (PRAFE) that applies only to statistical hypotheses—that is, hy-
potheses that are simply about the stochastic properties of the data-generating
mechanism. H1 in my proof—the conjunction of some proposition A with E
itself—is not a statistical hypothesis because it makes a direct statement about
the outcome produced by the data-generating mechanism. Some likelihoodists
do restrict the Law of Likelihood in this way (e.g. Hacking 1965, 59 and Ed-
wards 1972, 57). However, they seem to do so not for any principled reason
but simply because they have statistical applications in mind. It is not clear
that the restriction has any principled basis. Moreover, it has the unfortunate
consequence of restricting the scope of the Law of Likelihood substantially. For
instance, it would not allow one to apply the Law of Likelihood to high-level,
substantive scientific theories, as Sober does with the theory of evolution and
the theory of intelligent design (Sober, 2008). In addition, it does not address
the fact that (PRAFE) can force one to violate either (3A) or (3B). Thus, re-
stricting the Law of Likelihood to statistical hypotheses has a high cost and
is insufficient to avoid the major difficulties for methodological likelihoodism
presented in this paper.
15
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5 Against a reliabilist response
The fact that (PRAFE) can force one to violate either (3A) or (3B) and (4A)
disqualifies it from consideration as a general principle of rationality. One might
attempt to rescue methodological likelihoodism by lowering one’s standards.
Perhaps no purely likelihood-based norms of commitment are among the canons
of rationality, but such norms are nevertheless useful in practice when deployed
judiciously. This move may not appeal to most philosophers, but similar moves
are common among statisticians (e.g. Chatfield 2002, Kass 2011, and Gelman
2011).
The idea that (PRAFE) is useful when deployed judiciously is plausible only
if it has some redeeming quality that at least partially compensates for the fact
that it is inconsistent with the conjunction of (3A) and (3B) and with (4A).
What could that redeeming quality be? Here are four candidates from Royall
(2000, 760):
(I) intuitive plausibility,
(II) consistency with other axioms and principles,
(III) objectivity, and
(IV) desirable operational implications.
I am willing to grant (I)-(III) for the sake of argument. Those virtues are not
sufficient, even jointly, to vindicate methodological likelihoodism. It still needs
to be shown that methods based on likelihood functions alone can provide useful
guidance for our commitments vis-a`-vis hypotheses.
(IV) is prima facie more promising. It refers to the purported fact that purely
likelihood-based methods are guaranteed to perform well in certain senses in
the indefinite long run if used over and over again with varying data. Appeals
16
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to guarantees about long-run performance are the hallmark of frequentism, but
Bayesians cite such results as well, perhaps most often in the form of convergence
theorems (e.g. Doob 1949). The exact significance of various facts about long-
run operating characteristics is a matter of dispute, but there is no disputing
the basic idea that we want techniques that we can reasonably expect to yield
good results.
Unfortunately for this line of response, likelihoodist appeals to (IV) generate
many problems. The most damning of these problems is that the operating
characteristics that likelihoodists appeal to are not operating characteristics of
purely likelihood-based methods. Instead, they are operating characteristics of
methods that use likelihood functions in a frequentist way.
Let me explain. By definition, purely likelihood-based methods are not
sensitive to differences between experimental outcomes that are not reflected
in the likelihood function. One such fact concerns the distinction between fixed
and random hypotheses. Fixed hypotheses are specified without reference to the
data, while random hypotheses are specified in terms of the data. For instance,
the hypothesis that the mean of the distribution that produced the data is zero
is a fixed hypothesis, while the hypothesis that it is the sample average (the sum
of the data values divided by the number of data values) is a random hypothesis,
because the value of the sample average depends on the data while the value of
the number zero does not.
By contrast, frequentist methods violate the likelihood principle by being
sensitive to the distinction between fixed and random hypotheses. A frequentist
may draw different conclusions about the hypothesis that the mean of a distri-
bution is zero depending on whether he or she set out to test the hypothesis
that the mean is zero or set out to test the hypothesis that the mean is the
sample average, which turned out to be zero.
17
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Whether sensitivity to the distinction during fixed and random hypothe-
ses is a good feature for a method to have or not is a topic for another oc-
casion. The key points for present purposes are (1) such sensitivity cannot
be present inpurely likelihood-based methods, and (2) it is necessary for the
long-run operating characteristics that likelihoodists erroneously cite in sup-
port of their methods. I will illustrate these claims for the universal bound,
which is the fact that the probability of a likelihood ratio of at least k for
any given fixed, false hypothesis against the true hypothesis is at most 1/k
(i.e., PrH0(Pr(E|H1)/Pr(E|H0) ≥ k) < 1/k) (Royall, 2000, 762-3). The same
point holds for other results can concerning the performance characteristics of
methods based on likelihood functions, including both the tighter bounds that
Royall derives for specific distributions (2000) and likelihood ratio convergence
theorems (Hawthorne, 2012).
An example14 due to (Armitage, 1961) is a counterexample to a generalized
version of the universal bound that applies to fixed as well as random hypotheses.
I will simply describe the main features of the Armitage example here; see (Cox
and Hinkley, 1974, 50–1) for details. The example involves taking observations
until the sample average x¯ is at least a specified distance away from zero. That
distance decreases as the number of observations increases. It does so at a rate
that is fast enough that the experiment is guaranteed to end in finite time,15
but slow enough to ensure that according to the Law of Likelihood its final
outcome strongly favors the hypothesis that the true mean equals x-bar over the
hypothesis that it equals zero. For any k, there is an experiment of this kind such
that PrH0(Pr(E|H1)/Pr(E|H0) ≥ k) is 1—a maximally severe violation of the
universal bound. I have argued elsewhere (Gandenberger, unpublished) that this
example should not be regarded as a counterexample to the Law of Likelihood
14Strictly speaking, Armitage provides a class of examples rather than a single example. I
am using the word “example” as a convenient shorthand.
15Technically, the experiment ends “almost surely” (i.e., with probability one) in finite time.
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itself. However, it is a counterexample to attempts to use the universal bound
to support the use of purely likelihood-based methods.
Likelihood functions do not distinguish between fixed and random hypothe-
ses, so purely likelihood-based methods cannot distinguish between them either.
Thus, results such as the universal bound that hold only for fixed hypotheses do
not support the use of purely likelihood-based methods. Methodological like-
lihoodists who wish to claim that purely likelihood-based methods are useful
when deployed judiciously need to find some other support for that view.
6 Conclusion
Methodological likelihoodism is true only if (PRAFE) is a good purely likelihood-
based norm of commitment. (PRAFE) is not a good purely likelihood-based
norm of commitment because it can force one to violate both the combination
of (3A) and (3B) and (4A). Therefore, methodological likelihoodism is false.
The results concerning long-run operating characteristics that methodological
likelihoodists sometimes cite in support of their methods do not help their cause
because those results concern frequentist methods that use likelihood functions
rather than purely likelihood-based methods.
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A Proof that (PRAFE) can force one to violate
either (3A) or (3B)
Proof
Suppose a mad genius has mixed water and wine in a bottle. You know only
that the ratio r of water to wine is in the interval (1/2, 2]. The mad genius
knows the value of r but refuses to tell it to you. He does agree to perform
three independent rolls of a three-sided die with weights that depend on r as
shown in the following table (ignore the final column for the moment).
If r is in the
interval...
...then
Pr(1)=
...then
Pr(2)=
...then
Pr(3)=
If r′ is in the
interval...
(1/2, 1] 1/2 1/3 1/6 [1, 2)
(1, 3/2] 1/6 1/2 1/3 (2/3, 1]
(3/2, 2] 1/3 1/6 1/2 (1/2, 2/3]
For instance, if r is in the interval (1/2, 1], then the mad genius will report
the results of three rolls of a three-sided die such that the probability of 1 is
1/2, the probability of 2 is 1/3, and the probability of 3 is 1/6.
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Suppose the mad genius reports the outcomes 1, 2, and 3. This outcome
has the same probability (1/2)(1/3)(1/6) = 1/36 under each of the hypotheses
H1 : 1/2 < r ≤ 1, H2 : 1 < r ≤ 3/2, and H3 : 3/2 < r ≤ 2. It is your total
relevant evidence, so (PRAFE) says to accept each of those hypotheses over
each of the others to degree zero (i.e., to be neutral among them). Thus, (3B)
says to prefer (H2 or H3) : 1 < r ≤ 2 to H1 : 1/2 < r ≤ 1 to a degree greater
than zero.
Now consider the ratio r′ of wine to water instead of the ratio r of water
to wine. Before the die roll, you have no information about r′ except that it
is in the interval [1/2, 2). The table above gives the probability distributions
for the die roll outcomes under each possible value of r′. The outcome {1, 2, 3}
has the same probability (1/2)(1/3)(1/6) = 1/36 under each of the hypotheses
H ′1 : 1/2 ≤ r
′ < 2/3, H ′2 : 2/3 ≤ r
′ < 1, and H ′3 : 1 ≤ r
′ < 2. Moreover,
it has the same probability under each of the hypotheses H∗1 : 1/2 ≤ r
′ < 1,
H∗2 : 1 ≤ r
′ < 3/2, and H∗3 : 3/2 ≤ r
′ < 2. For if H∗1 : 1/2 ≤ r
′ < 1 is
true, then either 1/2 ≤ r′ < 2/3 or 2/3 ≤ r′ < 1. Either way, the probably
of the outcome is 1/36. Thus, if H∗1 is true, then the probably the outcome
is 1/36. If H∗2 : 1 ≤ r
′ < 3/2 is true, then 1 ≤ r′ < 2, so the probably the
outcome is 1/36. Likewise for H∗3 . The die roll is your total relevant evidence,
so (PRAFE) says to accept each of the hypotheses H∗1 , H
∗
2 , and H
∗
3 over each
of the others to degree zero (i.e., to be neutral among them). Thus, (3B) says
to prefer (H∗2 or H
∗
3 ) to H
∗
1 to a degree greater than zero.
But now we have violated (3A). (H2 or H3) : 1 < r ≤ 2 is equivalent to H
∗
1 :
1/2 ≤ r′ < 1, and H1 : 1/2 < r ≤ 1 is equivalent to (H
∗
2 or H
∗
3 ) : 1 ≤ r
′ < 2.
Yet we have accepted (H2 or H3) over H1 and (H
∗
2 or H
∗
3 ) over H
∗
1 . Therefore,
(PRAFE) can force you to violate either (3A) or (3B).
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Discussion
Two objections to this proof are worth discussing. First, statisticians distinguish
between “simple” and “complex” statistical hypotheses. A simple statistical
hypothesis says that the data- generating mechanism follows a particular prob-
ability distribution. A complex statistical hypothesis is a disjunction of simple
statistical hypotheses. The Law of Likelihood applies in the first instance only
to simple statistical hypotheses. It might seem that the hypotheses we consider
here are complex statistical hypotheses. After all, they are disjunctions of more
specific hypotheses about the value of r. One could claim that for this reason
(PRAFE), properly understood, does not apply to those hypotheses.
That response to the example will not work. The hypotheses we have con-
sidered are disjunctions of hypotheses that posit particular values for r. But
H1, H2, H3, H1’, H
′
2, H
′
3, H
∗
2 , and H
∗
3 are not disjunctions of hypotheses that
posit different probability distributions for the outcome of the die roll. They
are instead disjunctions of hypotheses that all imply the same probability dis-
tribution for the outcome of the die roll. A likelihoodist who denied that we can
say Pr(A|H) = a because Pr(A|Hi) = a for all Hi in some partition of H would
be in deep trouble. It is this assumption that allows us to ignore irrelevant
partitions of our hypotheses, which can always (or at least virtually always) be
found. (For instance, we routinely ignore the fact that the hypothesis H that a
given coin is fair can be partitioned into the hypothesis H1 that the coin is fair
and the moon is made of green cheese and the hypothesis H2 that the coin is
fair and the moon is not made of green cheese. In the same way, we can ignore
the fact that the hypothesis 1/2 < r ≤ 1, for instance, can be partitioned into
hypotheses of the form r = 1/2 + ǫ for 0 < ǫ ≤ 1/2.)
Now, H∗1 is a disjunction of hypotheses not all which posit the same probabil-
ity distribution for the outcome of the die roll. But we can arrive at a likelihood
24
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for H∗1 on {1, 2, 3} in several ways. One way, used in the proof, is to interpret
likelihoods as probabilities entailed by hypotheses and to use disjunction elimi-
nation to derive that H∗3 entails Pr({1, 2, 3}) = 1/36. But Bayesians and some
likelihoodists want to interpret likelihoods as conditional probabilities.
There are at least two ways to get a likelihood for H∗1 under this inter-
pretation. One way is to invoke a version of the law of total probability: if
B = (B1 or B2), then Pr(A|B) = Pr(A|B1) Pr(B1|B) + Pr(A|B2) Pr(B2|B).
Thus,
Pr({1, 2, 3}|H∗1 ) = Pr({1, 2, 3}|H
′
1) Pr(H
′
1|H
∗
1 ) + Pr({1, 2, 3}|H
′
2) Pr(H
′
2|H
∗
1 )
= 1/36Pr(H ′1|H
∗
1 ) + 1/36Pr(H
′
2|H
∗
1 )
= 1/36[Pr(H ′1|H
∗
1 ) + Pr(H
′
2|H
∗
1 )]
= 1/36Pr(H ′1 or H
′
2|H
∗
1 )
= 1/36Pr(H∗1 |H
∗
1 )
= 1/36
Now, some likelihoodists would reject this argument. The result does not
depend on the values of Pr(H ′1|H
∗
1 ) and Pr(H
′
2|H
∗
1 ), but the argument does
mention those values and thus assumes that they exist. Some likelihoodists
would reject that assumption.
For a likelihoodist who interprets likelihoods as conditional probabilities and
rejects the existence of probabilities that are not objectively well-defined, there
is still another way to get a likelihood for H∗1 : invoke the Principal Principle.
The Principal Principle (Lewis, 1981) says that one’s credence for A given a
proposition which entails that the chance of A is x and no inadmissible infor-
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mation16 should be x: Cr(A|H) = x where H entails Ch(A) = x and contains
no inadmissible information. If we interpret Pr({1, 2, 3}|H∗1 ) as a credence,
then it follows that Pr({1, 2, 3}|H∗1 ) = Pr({1, 2, 3}|H
′
1 or H
′
2) = 1/36, because
(H ′1 or H
′
2) entails Ch({1, 2, 3}) = 1/36 by a disjunction elimination. If we in-
terpret Pr({1, 2, 3}|H∗1 ) as a chance rather than a credence, then we do not need
the Principal Principle but only the transparently obvious chance-chance prin-
ciple which says that Ch(A|H) = x where H entails Ch(A) = x and contains
no inadmissible information.
Second, one could claim that the outcomes of the die rolls are not part of
one’s total relevant evidence with respect to the hypotheses under consideration.
One’s total relevant evidence with respect to those hypotheses is the empty
set. After all, one’s assessment of those hypotheses makes no difference to
one’s assessment of the probability of that outcome. This claim is somewhat
reasonable, but it does not help. We could simply ask what the probability is of
one’s total relevant evidence with respect to the hypotheses under consideration
in the empty set is under each of those hypotheses. For each hypothesis, that
probability is simply the probability that the outcome of the die roll is 1, putting
us back where we started.
Now, a natural response to this maneuver is to claim that (PRAFE) applies
only to non-empty bodies of relevant evidence (or to non-neutral bodies of ev-
idence if evidence can be both relevant and neutral). One could, for instance,
adapt the approach to ignorance that Norton (2008) develops by assigning the
same non-numerical degree of relative acceptance I to all pairs of contingent
hypotheses in cases of neutral evidence. However, this response faces at least
two difficulties. First, it creates unnatural discontinuities. On this proposal,
we are not required to formulate any commitments about the hypotheses H1,
16See (Lewis, 1981) for a discussion of admissibility. Roughly speaking, information is
in admissible if it speaks to the outcome of a chance process rather than to its stochastic
properties.
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H2, and H3 in light of the evidence in the example as it stands—not even a
commitment of neutrality. But suppose we modified the example slightly by
adding some tiny quantity ǫ to the probability of 1 under each possible value
of r and subtracting it from the probability of 3 under each possible value of r.
Then we would be required to formulate commitments, namely minute prefer-
ences for H2 over H1 and over H3. The idea that neutral evidence requires no
commitments while arbitrarily slightly non-neutral evidence requires completely
definite commitments is hard to accept.
Second, this response sets up a game of cat-and-mouse that seems unlikely to
end well for the methodological likelihoodist. An example involving exactly neu-
tral evidence is needed to illustrate a conflict among (PRAFE), (3A), and (3B)
only because I made those principles very weak so that they would command
nearly universal assent. Similar but slightly stronger principles would conflict
in cases of non-neutral evidence. For instance, (3B) says to accept (H1 or H2)
over H3 to a degree greater than that to which you accept H1 over H3 under
the relevant conditions. Presumably, in each case in which (3B) applies, there is
some definite amount by which the former should exceed the latter. In the case
at hand, for instance, there is some positive number t such that it is at least
permissible to accept (H2 or H3) over H1 to degree t. One could use this mar-
gin t to generate the same kind of argument in a similar case with sufficiently
slightly non-neutral evidence.
B Proof that (PRAFE) can force one to violate
(4A)
(4A) Do not prefer H1 to ∼ H1 and ∼ H2 to H2 if H1 and H2 are logically
equivalent given your total evidence.
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Proof
Let X1 and X2 record the outcomes of independent coin flips. If the first coin
lands heads, then X1 = 1. Otherwise X1 = 0. Likewise, if the first coin lands
heads, then X2 = 1. Otherwise X2 = 0. Let E be the evidence X1 = 1, H1 the
hypothesis X1 = X2 = 1, and H2 the hypothesis X2 = 1. Suppose that E is
the only information one has about X1 and X2.
Fix the function f such that (PRAFE) says to accept H1 over H2 to degree
f(L) = f(Pr(T |H1)/Pr(T |H2)). By the formulation of (PRAFE), there’s some
constant a such that f(a) > 0 (and thus f(x) > 0 for all x > a, since f is
nondecreasing). I will show in a moment the following:
(*) For any a, there is a joint distribution for X1 and X2 such that
Pr(E|H1)/Pr(E| ∼ H1) > a and Pr(E| ∼ H2)/Pr(E|H2) > a.
Thus, (PRAFE) forces one to prefer H1 to ∼ H1 and ∼ H2 to H2. But given
E, H1 and H2 are equivalent. Therefore, (PRAFE) forces one to violate (4A).
I will now prove (*) by showing how to construct for any a a joint distribution
over X1 and X2 such that such that Pr(E|H1)/Pr(E| ∼ H1) > a and Pr(E| ∼
H2)/Pr(E|H2) > a. Let a be some value greater than 1/2 of x such that
f(a) > 0 for all x > a. Choose a b > (2a−1)/(2a+1). Then assign probabilities
to outcomes according to the following table.
X1\X2 0 1
0 1−b
4
b 1+3b
4
1 1−b
4
1−b
2
3−3b
4
1−b
2
1+b
2
1
Here is a derivation of the relevant likelihood ratios.
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Pr(E|H1)
Pr(E| ∼ H1)
=
Pr(E & H1)
Pr(H1)
Pr(∼ H1)
Pr(E & ∼ H1)
=
Pr(X1 = X2 = 1)
Pr(X1 = X2 = 1)
Pr(∼ (X1 = X2 = 1))
Pr(X1 = 1 & X2 = 0)
=
1− Pr(X1 = X2 = 1)
Pr(X1 = 1 & X2 = 0)
=
1− (1− b)/2
(1− b)/4
=
4
1− b
− 2
=
4− 2 + 2b
1− b
= 2
1 + b
1− b
This quantity is monotonically increasing in b. Thus, it follows that if b >
(2a− 1)/(2a+ 1),17 then
Pr(E|H1) Pr(E| ∼ H1) > 2
1 + (2a− 1)/(2a+ 1)
1− (2a− 1)/(2a+ 1)
= 2
2a+ 1 + 2a− 1
2a+ 1− 2a+ 1
= 2
4a
2
= 4a
> a
And now the other likelihood ratio.
17b > (2a−1)/(2a+1) is always permissible, because a > 1/2 implies 0 < (2a−1)/(2a+1) <
1, and 0 < b < 1 implies that the distribution in the table above is consistent with the axioms
of probability.
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Pr(E| ∼ H2)
Pr(E|H2)
=
Pr(E & ∼ H2)
Pr(∼ H2)
Pr(H2)
Pr(E & H2)
=
Pr(X1 = 1 & X2 = 0)
Pr(X2 = 0)
Pr(X2 = 1)
Pr(X1 = X2 = 1)
=
(1− b)/4
(1− b)/2
(1 + b)/2
(1− b)/2
= 1/2
1 + b
1− b
This quantity is monotonically increasing in b. Thus, it follows that if b >
(2a− 1)/(2a+ 1), then
Pr(E| ∼ H2)
Pr(E|H2)
> 1/2
1 + (2a− 1)/(2a+ 1)
1− (2a− 1)/(2a+ 1)
= 1/2
2a+ 1 + 2a− 1
2a+ 1− 2a+ 1
= 1/2
4a
2
= a
Discussion
Note that restricting (PRAFE) so that it applies only to mutually exclusive hy-
potheses does not block this proof. (PRAFE) is applied only to the comparison
between H1 and ∼ H1 and the comparison between H2 and ∼ H2. Those pairs
of hypotheses are of course mutually exclusive. H1 and H2 are not mutually
exclusive, but (PRAFE) is not applied to the comparison between H1 and H2
directly.
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Title: Why (a Form of) Function Indeterminacy is Still a Problem for Biomedicine, 
and How Seeing Functional Items as Components of Mechanisms Can Solve it 
 
Abstract: During the 1990s, many philosophers wrestled with the problem of function 
indeterminacy. Although interest in the problem has waned, I argue that solving the 
problem is of value for biomedical research and practice. This is because a solution to the 
problem is required in order to specify rigorously the conditions under which a given 
item is “dysfunctional.” In the following I revisit a solution developed originally by 
Neander (1995), which uses functional analysis to solve the problem. I situate her 
solution in the framework of mechanistic explanation and suggest two improvements.  
 
Keywords: Biological function; function indeterminacy; mechanistic explanation; 
philosophy of biology; philosophy of medicine 
 
1. Biomedicine Needs a Solution to the Problem of Indeterminacy 
 
The central organizing principle of biomedical intervention is that of fixing dysfunctional 
items. This is not to say that biomedical practitioners do not do other things besides fixing 
dysfunctions. Sometimes, instead of fixing dysfunctional items, practitioners simply 
remove those items from the body, or they supplement their activity, or they inhibit their 
activity so as to restore proper physiological functioning. Yet the idea of fixing 
dysfunctions is an organizing principle of biomedicine in the sense that it illuminates 
most of the other sorts of goals that biomedical practitioners have (with the exception of 
goals such as cosmetic surgery, or pain relief during labor). For example, when 
practitioners choose to remove, supplement, or inhibit dysfunctional items, rather than fix 
them, they typically do so because of various limitations on the ability to fix them. 
Moreover, the idea of repairing dysfunctions is also an organizing principle because it 
works as a heuristic for biomedical research. This is because researchers often do not feel 
that they entirely understand a pathological process until they know what they would 
need to do, in theory, in order to fix it.  
 
Biomedicine is limited in its ability to fix dysfunctions because of various epistemic, 
technical, and sociopolitical obstacles. At least one of those obstacles, however, is 
conceptual, or, if you will, “metaphysical.” The ability to carry out the ideal of fixing 
dysfunctions requires, in the first place, that we are able to clearly articulate the 
conditions under which an item is functional and the conditions under which it is 
dysfunctional. Yet this is precisely what, according to one version of the function 
indeterminacy problem, is precluded (e.g., Dretske 1986; Neander 1995). Consider a 
well-worn but lucid example: the heart beats. In doing so, it circulates the blood. In doing 
so, it brings nutrients to cells and removes waste. In doing so, it contributes to survival 
and, ultimately, to reproductive success. Yet which of these activities constitutes the 
function of the heart? Any one of them would be licensed by standard theories of 
biological function, and in particular, theories that tie function to selection history or 
current adaptiveness (see Garson 2015). (I will refer to both groups of theories as 
“evolutionary” theories of function because they tie function to evolutionary 
considerations, despite the fact that one set of theories focuses more on history and 
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another on present-day activity. I am not here concerned with Cummins-type (or “causal 
role”) functions, in which the function of a trait simply consists in its contribution to 
some systemic capacity of interest to an investigator. This theory will come into play 
later. I will also justify this exclusion later.) The problem arises most clearly for 
evolutionary theories, though a version of the problem could arise for causal role theories 
as well. I will refer to this as the “hierarchical” version of the problem of functional 
indeterminacy for reasons to be explained in the next section.  
 
Here is where the problem comes in for biomedicine. Suppose that one succumbs to the 
temptation of pluralism, and asserts that there is no principled and context-independent 
way of selecting one of those descriptions of the heart’s function (e.g., in terms of 
beating, circulating blood, bringing nutrients to cells, etc.) as the uniquely correct 
description of its function. Any of those activities, one might hold, may constitute the 
heart’s “function,” depending on factors such as disciplinary interest, convention, or 
personal predilection. The pluralist solution runs into trouble when we realize that these 
different function ascriptions can conflict with one another. Specifically, it is possible for 
the heart to carry out one of these activities and not the other. For example, suppose that 
the heart beats, but, due to a massive brain hemorrhage, the heart cannot circulate enough 
blood to keep the individual alive. Should we say that the heart is failing to perform its 
function of circulating blood (or not at the appropriate rate)? Or should we say, instead, 
that the heart is functioning successfully because it is performing its function of beating, 
despite the fact that, due to the hemorrhage, the activity is not associated with its normal 
contribution to survival?  
 
Intuitively – if you and I share the same intuitions – we should say that the heart is 
functioning. It just cannot make its normal contribution to fitness because some other 
item is dysfunctional, namely, the ruptured artery. After all, the heart is only “doing its 
job,” but the artery isn’t doing its job. Deciding whether or not the heart is functioning in 
this situation is like trying to locate blame in a large corporation. But in saying this, we 
are privileging one activity over another as having a greater claim to constituting the 
function of the heart: the claim that the function of the heart is to beat is “privileged” in a 
way that the claim that the function of the heart is to circulate blood is not. Moreover, it 
seems to be privileged in some principled, context-independent way. This is precisely 
what the pluralist solution forbids. So, how can we justify this assertion that the one 
function ascription (“the heart beats”) is more correct than another (“the heart circulates 
blood”)?  
 
Keep in mind that our solution – that in the case of the hemorrhage, the heart is 
“functional” and not “dysfunctional” – is not only intuitively correct. To maintain 
otherwise would be counterproductive or contrary to the needs to biomedicine. This is 
because, when we say that an item is dysfunctional, we indicate that the item in question 
is a prime target for direct biomedical intervention, such as repair or replacement. But if 
the heart cannot circulate blood effectively because of a ruptured artery in the brain, we 
presumably want to fix the artery, not the heart! 
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As a consequence, any attempt to articulate clearly the conditions under which an item is 
dysfunctional entails, as a necessary condition, a solution to the problem of function 
indeterminacy. In other words, if one can articulate clearly the conditions under which an 
item is dysfunctional, then one can use those conditions to state, in a principled and 
context-independent way, which of the multiple function ascriptions legitimized by 
evolutionary considerations is uniquely correct (or at least one can reduce the plurality of 
reasonable function ascriptions down to a small number of equally correct ascriptions). 
Conversely, if one possesses a solution to the problem of function indeterminacy, then 
(presumably) one could apply that to resolve such conflicts in the biomedical context. 
How shall we proceed?  
 
In the following I will do three things. First, I will revisit a solution proposed by Neander 
(1995). In short, in her view, in order to identify the (determinate) function of any given 
item, we can utilize the framework of functional analysis. The (determinate) function of 
an item is identified with its “most specific function,” which turns out to be its causal role 
within a certain mechanism. Next, I will describe that solution using the framework of 
multi-level mechanistic explanation as it has been developed over the last two decades 
(Section 2). Finally, I suggest two improvements to that solution (Section 3), one minor 
and one more substantial. The first is to replace talk of the “most specific function” with 
the “differentiated function” of the item. The second is to draw attention to two 
dimensions of indeterminacy, a “horizontal” dimension and a “vertical” dimension, and 
to suggest how mechanistic modeling can resolve both types.  
 
 
2. Seeing Functional Items as Components in a Nested Hierarchy of Mechanisms 
 
The central idea of the solution to the problem of indeterminacy that I will present here 
advances Neander’s (1995) solution by anchoring it more firmly within the literature of 
the new mechanism tradition (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson 2010; Glennan 1996, 2005; 
MDC 2000; Craver 2001; Darden 2006; Craver and Darden 2013). It then develops it in 
two ways. In short, we can solve the indeterminacy problem by construing the functional 
item as a component within a mechanism, or, more precisely, within a nested hierarchy of 
mechanisms.  
 
More specifically, the hierarchical version of the problem of indeterminacy stems from 
the fact that for any given item and any given function, there is a hierarchy of activities 
that explains why the performance of the function is (or was) associated with some 
biological advantage for the organism. Quite fortunately – and this is the key to solving it 
– that hierarchy of activities is mirrored by a corresponding hierarchy of mechanisms. 
Moreover, these mechanisms are nested, one within the other. For example, suppose A 
and A′ are two activities “adjacent” to one another on the functional hierarchy, where A′ 
is “higher” than A (see Figure 1). Suppose A is the activity of beating, and A′ the activity 
of circulating blood. On the corresponding mechanistic hierarchy, there is a mechanism, 
M, for A, and another mechanism, M′, for A′. In this case (and simplifying 
tremendously), M is comprised of the heart, and M′ is comprised of the circulatory 
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system, which includes, in addition to the heart, the brain and blood vessels. M and M′ 
are nested in the sense that M can be construed as a component part of M′. 
 
 
Figure 1. Functional and mechanistic hierarchies 
 
 
With this framework in mind, we can solve the function indeterminacy problem by 
identifying the function of any particular item as its differentiated contribution to the 
activity of the mechanism of which it is a component – that is, the mechanism in which it 
is most “immediately” contained. For example, in this framework, it would be correct to 
say that the function of the heart is to beat, since that is its specific contribution to the 
activity A′ (blood circulation) of the mechanism M′ (circulatory system) in which it is 
“immediately” contained. To put the point differently, and somewhat more methodically: 
in order to identify the function of an item, we first construct our functional hierarchy. 
This hierarchy will be determined, in part, by our theory of function and in part by the 
empirical facts. We then construct a corresponding mechanistic hierarchy. Then, 
beginning at the uppermost level of the mechanistic hierarchy, and we work our way 
“downwards,” level by level, until we reach the level at which the item in question 
emerges as an unanalyzed component (Neander 1995, 129). This is the “bottom-out” 
level as far as our analysis is concerned. Then the indeterminate function of the item can 
be rendered determinate by identifying it with the contribution that the item makes to the 
activity of the mechanism of which it is a component.  
 
The same solution can, if necessary, be cast in a more historical vein, for example, in 
terms of the selected effects theory of function. The solution simply requires that instead 
of analyzing the trait’s current contribution to fitness, we attempt to reconstruct, 
historically, how it may have contributed to fitness in the past. As noted above, I do not 
wish to take a stance, in this context, on which evolutionary approach to function is 
preferable, the approach that focuses on history or the approach that focuses on current-
day performance (and, within each set of theories, which version of the theory is 
superior). The point is that the mechanistic framework could be adapted easily to suit the 
needs of either.  
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It would be natural at this point for one to wonder how this solution differs from the 
Cummins’ type causal role theory of function (Cummins 1975), or its more recent 
variants, such as the mechanistic causal role theory of function (e.g., Craver 2001, 2013). 
In Cummins’ theory, the function of a trait consists in its contribution to some systemic 
capacity picked out by an investigator. In the mechanistic causal role version of this 
theory, the function of a trait consists in its contribution, in tandem with the other parts of 
the system, to a systemic capacity of interest, and the whole system is described using the 
framework of mechanistic explanation. Isn’t what I’ve presented just the solution that the 
Cummins-type theory, on its own, would entail?  
 
The main difference is that in the view presented here, the function of the item is first 
identified by utilizing an evolutionary framework, and specifically, by considering the 
item in light of its selection history or its current contribution to fitness. That 
evolutionary framework provides a rationale for selecting a certain hierarchy of activities 
(pumping -> circulating blood -> bringing nutrients to cells -> helping creature survive 
and reproduce) as constituting the heart’s (indeterminate) function. (Of course, which 
specific sequence of activities we identify depends partly on which specific theory of 
function we select within that family of theories, a topic on which, again, I wish to 
remain neutral at present.) A problem with this solution, of course, is that it creates the 
hierarchical version of the problem of function indeterminacy. We then apply a 
mechanistic framework to resolve that problem in a principled way. The hierarchy of 
functions that has been identified by evolutionary considerations is converted into a 
framework for identifying the relevant hierarchy of mechanisms, and we then look for the 
function of the item qua mechanistic causal role. Mechanistic considerations merely help 
us to make the transition from an indeterminately-specified function to a determinately-
specified one. They do not supplant evolutionary considerations.  
 
Even if this solution differs from the causal role theory of functions, one might wonder 
why the solution offered here is preferable. Why not just drop the evolutionary 
framework and go straightaway to a Cummins-type framework? The reason is that 
utilizing the evolutionary framework allows us to avoid certain recalcitrant problems 
associated with the Cummins-type theory, in particular, the problems of overbreadth and 
normativity. The first is the classic problem of overbreadth (e.g., Millikan 1989, 294; 
Kitcher 1993, 390). In Cummins’ view, as in the mechanistic causal role view, the choice 
of a “top level” function for a given system is largely a matter of caprice. (I mean this in 
the sense that there is no objective, mind-independent fact of the matter regarding what 
the “top-level” function of any given system is, and not in the sense that it is somehow 
unmotivated or unjustifiable in any given case.) A consequence of this is that Cummins’ 
framework licenses wildly counterintuitive function ascriptions (for example, Cummins’ 
(1975, 752) own example that the function of the appendix could be to produce 
appendicitis. Incidentally, he raises this as a problem for Nagel’s theory, but does not 
suggest how his own theory would resolve it). Alternatively, theories of function that tie 
function to evolutionary considerations have the implication that there is an objective fact 
of the matter regarding what the function of a given item (albeit indeterminate) actually 
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is, and it yields function ascriptions that are (typically) in line with biologically-informed 
intuitions. At least some philosophers find that to be a welcome implication.  
 
Additionally, Cummins-type theories have a notoriously difficult time explaining the 
normativity of functions, by which I mean the fact that it is possible for something to 
possess a function without being able to perform that function (e.g., Neander 1991, 181-
2; though see Hardcastle 2002; Cummins et al. 2010). That is because, on Cummins’ 
view, the function of a trait is a disposition (Cummins 1975, 758). If a trait loses the 
disposition to perform a certain activity, then, at least on the classic view, it loses the 
function itself. In that case, how can a trait dysfunction? These two problems 
(overbreadth and normativity) provide some motivation for retaining an evolutionary 
perspective for thinking about function, but supplementing, rather than supplanting, that 
perspective with considerations drawn from mechanistic explanation.   
 
 
3. Hierarchical and Sequential Aspects of Function Indeterminacy  
 
Up until this point, I have largely described Neander’s solution, or re-described it 
slightly. Yet I propose to extend that solution in two ways. The first is fairly minor and 
the second more substantial. First, for Neander, the correct way of describing the function 
of an item (in cases of conflict, e.g., in the biomedical context) is in terms of what she 
calls the item’s “most specific function.” But I would prefer to speak of the item’s 
“differentiated function” (which is to be distinguished from the developmental process of 
“differentiation,” as in, e.g., cell differentiation). The phrase, “most specific function,” 
contains an ambiguity that can be clarified using the framework of mechanistic 
explanation.  
 
As she recognizes, the “most specific function” of an item can be described in at least 
two ways (Neander 1995, 118-119). From one perspective, we can describe the activity 
that the item produces without indicating how the activity contributes to the mechanism 
of which it is a part (for example, “the function of the heart is to beat”). From another 
perspective, we can merely indicate that the activity contributes to the activity of the 
mechanism of which the item is a part, without specifying the “intrinsic” nature of the 
activity (for example, “the function of the heart is to help circulate blood”). Craver (2001, 
65) makes the same distinction, and describes these in terms of the “isolated activity” and 
“contextual role” of an item. It seems to me that, from the biomedical perspective, the 
former ascription (“the heart beats”) is the more informative of the two, because the latter 
is overly generic: it does not differentiate the function of the heart from that of the other 
components of the circulatory system. Moreover, since we are envisioning the heart as a 
component within a mechanism for circulating blood, the fact that the heart contributes to 
blood circulation will be implicit in the models that we use to represent the mechanism. 
Instead of describing the item’s “most specific function,” then, I will describe the item’s 
“differentiated function.” Talking of the “differentiated function” of the heart brings to 
the front and center of attention that the heart is part of a system in which each part has a 
distinct, and different, causal role. It draws attention to what the heart does that differs 
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from what the other components do. The “differentiated function” of the heart, for 
example, is to beat, not to help circulate blood.  
 
Secondly, Neander describes the “most specific function” of the item as the activity that 
it can perform “more or less on its own”, rather than “in collaboration with other 
components” (118). Applied to the heart, the idea would be that the most specific 
function of the heart is to beat, rather than to circulate blood or to deliver nutrients to 
cells. However, in what sense is it true to say that the heart beats “more or less on its 
own?” Suppose that the function of the heart is to beat, but the heart stops beating, or 
stops beating at the appropriate rate, because, due to a lesion in the medulla, it is not 
receiving the proper impulses from the brain. Is the heart dysfunctional? Intuitively, it is 
not dysfunctional; rather, it has been placed in an abnormal circumstance in which it 
cannot perform its function. It has, as it were, merely been deprived of the right inputs, 
similar to an unplugged electrical toy. But it seems both counterintuitive, and 
counterproductive, to say that the heart is dysfunctional if it stops beating just because it 
is not receiving the right inputs. (Of course, there is one sense in which the heart beats 
“more or less on its own,” namely, that in which it may continue to beat very briefly after 
removal from the body, as after pithing a frog. But that phenomenon is pretty short-
lived!)  
 
So, there is no obvious sense in which beating is something the heart can do more or less 
on its own. It requires the right sorts of inputs from other sources. This suggests that, 
when we are attempting to articulate clearly the conditions under which an item is 
dysfunctional, it is not enough simply to point to its causal role within a hierarchy of 
mechanisms. Rather, we must also provide at least a “mechanism sketch” of the way in 
which the item interacts with others, at the same level, to produce the activity of the 
mechanism of which it is a part. We must adopt, not only a hierarchical (or vertical) 
perspective, but a sequential (or horizontal) perspective on the mechanism as well. In 
order to state clearly the conditions under which an item is dysfunctional, that item’s 
performing a function (e.g., the heart’s beating) must be seen as one stage in a productive 
sequence of activities that are collectively responsible for yielding the activity of the 
mechanism as a whole (blood circulation). In light of such a mechanism sketch, we have 
the tools to specify that the item is question is dysfunctional not only when it cannot 
perform its differentiated function, but when it cannot perform its differentiated function 
even when the other parts of the system have performed their own characteristic 
activities in their appropriate sequence (see Garson and Piccinini 2014). Thus, a full 
specification of the conditions under which an item is dysfunctional can be made so long 
as we have some characterization of both the hierarchical and the sequential aspects of 
the mechanism in which the item is embedded.  
 
To give a simple example: suppose we want to provide a mechanistic explanation for 
how the gut digests food. We would analyze it into several parts, such as the mouth, 
tongue, esophagus, stomach, small and large intestine, and anus, each with its 
differentiated function. Using the solution to the indeterminacy problem developed here, 
we could say that the function of the stomach is to break down food and transfer it to the 
duodenum. (Note that the stomach has several functions, for example, to protect the inner 
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organs from the highly corrosive acids it contains. Nothing in the solution to functional 
indeterminacy precludes the possibility that one trait or organ possesses several distinct 
functions, each associated with its own indeterministic “hierarchy.”) Suppose, however, 
at a given moment, the stomach is not digesting any food. That does not mean that it is 
dysfunctional. After all, it is possible that the animal is fasting and there is no food to 
digest. Functions are “situation specific” (Kingma 2010). It is only dysfunctional if it is 
not breaking down food and all of the preceding stages (e.g., functions) in the sequence 
of digestion have taken place (culminating with food being delivered by the esophagus to 
the stomach).  
 
A concern one might have with the introduction of this “horizontal” approach to defining 
dysfunction is that it appears, on the surface, to involve circularity. That is, we are trying 
to explain how it is that a trait can dysfunction (e.g., the stomach) and in so doing, we are 
appealing to the functions of the other parts of the system (e.g., the fact that the 
esophagus has discharged its function of bringing food to the stomach). But there is no 
circularity here. We first use the “vertical” approach to identify the determinate function 
of any given trait. That approach does not involve any apparent circularity because in 
order for me to identify the (determinate) function of the stomach (namely, to pass food 
along to the duodenum), I don’t have to have already identified the (determinate) 
functions of the other parts of the system. It is enough that I have identified their 
indeterminate functions.  
 
Once we have used that vertical method to identify the determinate functions of several 
components of a system, we can then deploy the “horizontal” perspective to identify 
precisely the conditions under which any given component is dysfunctional. At this stage 
(that is, in trying to understand when a part of the system is dysfunctional) we are free to 
make use of our knowledge of the determinate functions of the other parts of the system. 
What we are not allowed to do is to identify the determinate function of a component of a 
system by appealing to the determinate functions of the other parts of the system. What 
we are also not allowed to do is to identify the conditions under which an item is 
dysfunctional by appealing to the conditions under which some other item is 
dysfunctional. The approach I have outlined here avoids both sorts of circularity. In this 
way, the tools of mechanistic explanation help solve both of these aspects of the 
indeterminacy problem and allow us to state clearly when a given item is dysfunctional. 
More generally, this analysis suggests the importance of philosophical work on 
integrating considerations drawn from the traditional body of philosophical literature on 
biological function, and those drawn from the philosophical literature on mechanism.  
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Abstract
The special relativity principle presupposes that the states of the phys-
ical system concerned can be meaningfully characterized, at least locally,
as such in which the system is at rest or in motion with some velocity
relative to an arbitrary frame of reference. In the first part of the pa-
per we show that electrodynamic systems, in general, do not satisfy this
condition. In the second part of the paper we argue that exactly the
same condition serves as a necessary condition for the persistence of an
extended physical object. As a consequence, we argue, electromagnetic
field strengths cannot be the individuating properties of electromagnetic
field—contrary to the standard realistic interpretation of CED. In other
words, CED is ontologically incomplete.
PSA 2014: 24th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (Chicago, IL)
1 Introduction
The problem we address in this paper is on the border-line between physics and
metaphysics. We begin with the observation that the special relativity principle
(RP) is about the comparison of the behaviors of physical systems in different
states of inertial motion relative to an arbitrary inertial frame of reference.
Therefore, it is a minimal requirement for the RP to be a meaningful statement
that the states of the system in question must be meaningfully characterized
as such in which the system as a whole is at rest or in motion with some
velocity relative to an arbitrary frame of reference. Thus, to apply the RP to
classical electrodynamics (CED), it has to be meaningfully formulated when
an electrodynamic system—charged particles plus electromagnetic field—is at
rest or in motion relative to an inertial frame of reference. In the first part of
the paper we formulate a minimal condition a solution of the Maxwell–Lorentz
equations must satisfy in order to describe such an electrodynamic configuration.
Then we prove that the solutions of the Maxwell–Lorentz equations, in general,
do not satisfy these conditions.
1
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In the second part of the paper, we discuss the conceptual relationship be-
tween the problem of motion and the problem of persistence. We argue that
persistence presupposes—zero or non-zero—velocity. One can formulate a nec-
essary condition for the persistence of an object, in terms of its individuating
properties. This condition implies that the object must be in motion with some
instantaneous velocity; or, in case of an extended object, its local parts must
be in motion with some local and instantaneous velocities. At this point the
problem of persistence connects to the problem discussed in the first part of the
paper. As it is proved in Section 3, electromagnetic field does not satisfy this
condition. Therefore, we conclude, electromagnetic field cannot be regarded as
a real physical entity persisting in space and time; or, the field strengths cannot
be regarded as fundamental quantities individuating electromagnetic field, that
is, electrodynamics cannot be regarded as an ontologically complete description
of electromagnetic phenomena.
2 The RP Is about the Behaviors of Physical
Systems in Different States of Motion
The RP is one of the fundamental principles which must be satisfied by all laws
of physics describing any physical phenomena. Without entering into the more
technical formulation of the principle (see e.g. Gömöri and Szabó 2013), we
would like to focus on one particular aspect, which is already clearly there in
Galileo’s first formulation:
Shut yourself up with some friend in the main cabin below decks on
some large ship, and have with you there some flies, butterflies, and
other small flying animals. Have a large bowl of water with some
fish in it; hang up a bottle that empties drop by drop into a wide
vessel beneath it. With the ship standing still, observe carefully how
the little animals fly with equal speed to all sides of the cabin. The
fish swim indifferently in all directions; the drops fall into the vessel
beneath; and, in throwing something to your friend, you need throw
it no more strongly in one direction than another, the distances being
equal; jumping with your feet together, you pass equal spaces in
every direction. When you have observed all these things carefully
(though doubtless when the ship is standing still everything must
happen in this way), have the ship proceed with any speed you like,
so long as the motion is uniform and not fluctuating this way and
that. You will discover not the least change in all the effects named,
nor could you tell from any of them whether the ship was moving
or standing still. In jumping, you will pass on the floor the same
spaces as before, nor will you make larger jumps toward the stern
than toward the prow even though the ship is moving quite rapidly,
despite the fact that during the time that you are in the air the
floor under you will be going in a direction opposite to your jump.
In throwing something to your companion, you will need no more
force to get it to him whether he is in the direction of the bow or
the stern, with yourself situated opposite. The droplets will fall as
before into the vessel beneath without dropping toward the stern,
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although while the drops are in the air the ship runs many spans.
The fish in their water will swim toward the front of their bowl
with no more effort than toward the back, and will go with equal
ease to bait placed anywhere around the edges of the bowl. Finally
the butterflies and flies will continue their flights indifferently toward
every side, nor will it ever happen that they are concentrated toward
the stern, as if tired out from keeping up with the course of the ship,
from which they will have been separated during long intervals by
keeping themselves in the air. And if smoke is made by burning
some incense, it will be seen going up in the form of a little cloud,
remaining still and moving no more toward one side than the other.
The cause of all these correspondences of effects is the fact that the
ship’s motion is common to all the things contained in it [italics
added], and to the air also. That is why I said you should be below
decks; for if this took place above in the open air, which would
not follow the course of the ship, more or less noticeable differences
would be seen in some of the effects noted. (Galilei 1953, 187)
What is important for our present concern is that the principle is about the com-
parison of the behaviors of physical systems—flies, butterflies, fishes, droplets,
smoke—in different states of inertial motion relative to an arbitrary inertial
frame of reference. In Brown’s words:
The principle compares the outcome of relevant processes inside the
cabin under different states of inertial motion of the cabin relative
to the shore. It is simply assumed by Galileo that the same initial
conditions in the cabin can always be reproduced. What gives the
relativity principle empirical content is the fact that the differing
states of motion of the cabin are clearly distinguishable relative to
the earth’s rest frame. (Brown 2005, 34)
The RP describes the relationship between two situations: one is in which the
system, as a whole, is at rest relative to one inertial frame, say K, the other
is in which the system shows the similar behavior, but being in a collective
motion relative to K, co-moving with some K ′. In other words, the RP assigns
to each solution F of the physical equations, stipulated to describe the situation
in which the system is co-moving as a whole with inertial frame K, another
solution MV(F ), describing the similar behavior of the same system when it is,
as a whole, co-moving with inertial frame K ′, that is, when it is in a collective
motion with velocity V relative to K, where V is the velocity of K ′ relative to
K. And it asserts that the solution MV(F ), expressed in the primed variables
of K ′, has exactly the same form as F in the original variables of K.
Consequently, the following is a minimal requirement for the RP to be a
meaningful statement:
Minimal Requirement for the RP (MR) The states of the system in
question—described by the solutions F—must be meaningfully characterized as
such in which the system as a whole is at rest or in motion with some velocity
relative to an arbitrary frame of reference.
Let us show a well-known electrodynamic example in which a particles +
electromagnetic field system satisfies this condition. Consider one single charged
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particle moving with constant velocity V = (V, 0, 0) relative to K and the
coupled stationary electromagnetic field (Jackson 1999, 661):
MV(F )


Ex(x, y, z, t) =
qX0(
X20 + (y − y0)
2
+ (z − z0)
2
)3/2
Ey(x, y, z, t) =
γq (y − y0)(
X20 + (y − y0)
2
+ (z − z0)
2
)3/2
Ez(x, y, z, t) =
γq (z − z0)(
X20 + (y − y0)
2
+ (z − z0)
2
)3/2
Bx(x, y, z, t) = 0
By(x, y, z, t) = −c
−2V Ez
Bz(x, y, z, t) = c
−2V Ey
̺(x, y, z, t) = qδ (x− (x0 + V t)) δ (y − y0) δ (z − z0)
(1)
where (x0, y0, z0) is the initial position of the particle at t = 0, X0 =
γ (x− (x0 + V t)) and γ =
(
1− V
2
c2
)
−
1
2
. In this case, it is no problem to charac-
terize the particle + electromagnetic field system as such which is, as a whole, in
motion with velocity V relative to K; as the electromagnetic field is in collective
motion with the point charge of velocity V (Fig. 1) in the following sense:1
E(r, t) = E(r−Vδt, t− δt) (2)
B(r, t) = B(r−Vδt, t− δt) (3)
that is,
−∂tE(r, t) = DE(r, t)V (4)
−∂tB(r, t) = DB(r, t)V (5)
where DE(r, t) and DB(r, t) denote the spatial derivative operators (Jacobians
1It must be pointed out that velocity V conceptually differs from the speed of light c.
Basically, c is a constant of nature in the Maxwell–Lorentz equations, which can emerge in
the solutions of the equations; and, in some cases, it can be interpreted as the velocity of
propagation of changes in the electromagnetic field. For example, in our case, the stationary
field of a uniformly moving point charge, in collective motion with velocity V, can be con-
structed from the superposition of retarded potentials, in which the retardation is calculated
with velocity c; nevertheless, the two velocities are different concepts. To illustrate the differ-
ence, consider the fields of a charge at rest (9), and in motion (1). The speed of light c plays
the same role in both cases. Both fields can be constructed from the superposition of retarded
potentials in which the retardation is calculated with velocity c. Also, in both cases, a small
local perturbation in the field configuration would propagate with velocity c. But still, there
is a consensus to say that the system described by (9) is at rest while the one described by
(1) is moving with velocity V (together with K′, relative to K.) A good analogy would be a
Lorentz contracted moving rod: V is the velocity of the rod, which differs from the speed of
sound in the rod.
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Figure 1: The stationary field of a uniformly moving point charge is in collective
motion together with the point charge
for variables x, y and z); that is, in components:
−∂tEx(r, t) = Vx∂xEx(r, t) + Vy∂yEx(r, t) + Vz∂zEx(r, t) (6)
−∂tEy(r, t) = Vx∂xEy(r, t) + Vy∂yEy(r, t) + Vz∂zEy(r, t) (7)
...
−∂tBz(r, t) = Vx∂xBz(r, t) + Vy∂yBz(r, t) + Vz∂zBz(r, t) (8)
The uniformly moving point charge + electromagnetic field system not only
satisfies condition MR, but it satisfies the RP: Formula (1) with V = 0 describes
the static field of the particle when they are at rest in K :
F


Ex(x, y, z, t) =
q (x− x0)(
(x− x0)
2
+ (y − y0)
2
+ (z − z0)
2
)3/2
Ey(x, y, z, t) =
q (y − y0)(
(x− x0)
2
+ (y − y0)
2
+ (z − z0)
2
)3/2
Ez(x, y, z, t) =
q (z − z0)(
(x− x0)
2
+ (y − y0)
2
+ (z − z0)
2
)3/2
Bx(x, y, z, t) = 0
By(x, y, z, t) = 0
Bz(x, y, z, t) = 0
̺(x, y, z, t) = qδ (x− x0) δ (y − y0) δ (z − z0)
(9)
By means of the Lorentz transformation rules one can express (1) in terms of
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the ‘primed’ variables of the co-moving reference frame K ′:
E′x(x
′, y′, z′, t′) =
q′ (x′ − x′0)(
(x′ − x′0)
2
+ (y′ − y′0)
2
+ (z′ − z′0)
2
)3/2
E′y(x
′, y′, z′, t′) =
q′ (y′ − y′0)(
(x′ − x′0)
2
+ (y′ − y′0)
2
+ (z′ − z′0)
2
)3/2
E′z(x
′, y′, z′, t′) =
q′ (z′ − z′0)(
(x′ − x′0)
2
+ (y′ − y′0)
2
+ (z′ − z′0)
2
)3/2
B′x(x
′, y′, z′, t′) = 0
B′y(x
′, y′, z′, t′) = 0
B′z(x
′, y′, z′, t′) = 0
̺(x′, y′, z′, t′) = qδ (x′ − x′0) δ (y
′ − y′0) δ (z
′ − z′0)
(10)
and we find that the result is indeed of the same form as (9).
So, in this well-known particular textbook example the RP is meaningful
and satisfied. This picture is in complete accordance with the standard realistic
interpretation of electromagnetic field:
In the standard interpretation of the formalism, the field strengths B
and E are interpreted realistically: The interaction between charged
particles are mediated by the electromagnetic field, which is onto-
logically on a par with charged particles and the state of which is
given by the values of the field strengths. (Frisch 2005, 28)
In this example, the charged particle and the coupled electromagnetic field
constitute a physical system which—just like Galileo’s flies, butterflies, fishes,
droplets, and smoke—can be subject to the RP. The states F andMV(F ) can be
meaningfully characterized as such in which both parts of the physical system,
the particle and the electromagnetic field, are at rest or in motion with some
velocity relative to an arbitrary frame of reference. We will show, however, that
this is not the case in general.
3 How to Understand the RP for a General
Electrodynamic System?
What meaning can be attached to the words “a coupled particles + electromag-
netic field system is in collective motion with velocity V” (V = 0 included)
relative to a reference frame K, in general? One might think, we can read off
the answer to this question from the above example. However, focusing on the
electromagnetic field, the partial differential equations (4)–(5) imply that
E(r, t) = E0(r−Vt) (11)
B(r, t) = B0(r−Vt) (12)
with some time-independent E0(r) and B0(r). In other words, the field must
be a stationary one, that is, a translation of a static field with velocity V. But,
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(11)–(12) is certainly not the case for a general solution of the equations of CED;
the field is not necessarily translating with a collective velocity. The behavior
of the field can be much more complex. Whatever this complex behavior is, it
is quite intuitive to assume that the following general principle must hold:
Mereological Principle of Motion (MPM) If an extended object as a
whole is at rest or is in motion with some velocity relative to an arbitrary ref-
erence frame K, then all local parts of it are in motion with some local instan-
taneous velocity v(r, t) relative to K.
Combining MPM with MR, we obtain the following:
Local Minimal Requirement for the RP (LMR) The states of the ex-
tended physical system in question must be meaningfully characterized as such
in which all local parts of the system are at rest or in motion with some local
instantaneous velocity relative to an arbitrary frame of reference.
Consequently, in case of electrodynamics, a straightforward minimal require-
ment for the RP to be a meaningful statement is that (2)–(3) must be satisfied
at least locally with some local and instantaneous velocity v(r, t): it is quite
natural to say that the electromagnetic field at point r and time t is moving
with local and instantaneous velocity v(r, t) if and only if
E(r, t) = E (r− v(r, t)δt, t− δt) (13)
B(r, t) = B (r− v(r, t)δt, t− δt) (14)
are satisfied locally, in an infinitesimally small space and time region at (r, t), for
infinitesimally small δt. In other words, the equations (4)–(5) must be satisfied
locally at point (r, t) with a local and instantaneous velocity v(r, t):
−∂tE(r, t) = DE(r, t)v(r, t) (15)
−∂tB(r, t) = DB(r, t)v(r, t) (16)
In other words, if the RP, as it is believed, applies to all situations in electro-
dynamics, there must exist a local instantaneous velocity field v(r, t) satisfying
(15)–(16) for all possible solutions of the following system of Maxwell–Lorentz
equations:
∇ ·E (r, t) =
n∑
i=1
qiδ
(
r− ri (t)
)
(17)
c2∇×B (r, t)− ∂tE (r, t) =
n∑
i=1
qiδ
(
r− ri (t)
)
vi (t) (18)
∇ ·B (r, t) = 0 (19)
∇×E (r, t) + ∂tB (r, t) = 0 (20)
miγ
(
vi (t)
)
ai(t) = qi
{
E
(
ri (t) , t
)
+ vi (t)×B
(
ri (t) , t
)
−c−2vi (t)
(
vi (t) ·E
(
ri (t) , t
))}
(21)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
Chicago, IL -259-
where, γ(. . .) =
(
1− (...)
2
c2
)
−
1
2
, qi is the electric charge and mi is the rest mass
of the i-th particle. That is, substituting an arbitrary solution2 of (17)–(21)
into (15)–(16), the overdetermined system of equations must have a solution for
v(r, t).
However, one encounters the following difficulty:
Theorem 1. There is a dense subset of solutions of the coupled Maxwell–
Lorentz equations (17)–(21) for which there cannot exist a local instantaneous
velocity field v(r, t) satisfying (15)–(16).
Proof. The proof is almost trivial for a locus (r, t) where there is a charged
point particle. However, in order to avoid the eventual difficulties concerning
the physical interpretation, we are providing a proof for a point (r∗, t∗) where
there is assumed no source at all.
Consider a solution
(
r1 (t) , r2 (t) , . . . , rn (t) ,E(r, t),B(r, t)
)
of the coupled
Maxwell–Lorentz equations (17)–(21), which satisfies (15)–(16). At point
(r∗, t∗), the following equations hold:
−∂tE(r∗, t∗) = DE(r∗, t∗)v(r∗, t∗) (22)
−∂tB(r∗, t∗) = DB(r∗, t∗)v(r∗, t∗) (23)
∂tE(r∗, t∗) = c
2∇×B(r∗, t∗) (24)
−∂tB(r∗, t∗) = ∇×E(r∗, t∗) (25)
∇ ·E(r∗, t∗) = 0 (26)
∇ ·B(r∗, t∗) = 0 (27)
Without loss of generality we can assume—at point r∗ and time t∗—that oper-
ators DE(r∗, t∗) and DB(r∗, t∗) are invertible and vz(r∗, t∗) 6= 0.
Now, consider a 3× 3 matrix J such that
J =


∂xEx(r∗, t∗) Jxy Jxz
∂xEy(r∗, t∗) ∂yEy(r∗, t∗) ∂zEy(r∗, t∗)
∂xEz(r∗, t∗) ∂yEz(r∗, t∗) ∂zEz(r∗, t∗)

 (28)
with
Jxy = ∂yEx(r∗, t∗) + λ (29)
Jxz = ∂zEx(r∗, t∗)− λ
vy(r∗, t∗)
vz(r∗, t∗)
(30)
2Without entering into the details, it must be noted that the Maxwell–Lorentz equations
(17)–(21), exactly in this form, have no solution. The reason is that the field is singular
at precisely the points where the coupling happens: on the trajectories of the particles. The
generally accepted answer to this problem is that the real source densities are some “smoothed
out” Dirac deltas, determined by the physical laws of the internal worlds of the particles—
which are, supposedly, outside of the scope of CED. With this explanation, for the sake of
simplicity we leave the Dirac deltas in the equations. Since our considerations here focuses on
the electromagnetic field, satisfying the four Maxwell equations, we must only assume that
there is a coupled dynamics—approximately described by equations (17)–(21)—and that it
constitutes an initial value problem. In fact, Theorem 1 could be stated in a weaker form, by
leaving the concrete form and dynamics of the source densities unspecified.
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by virtue of which
Jxyvy(r∗, t∗) + Jxzvz(r∗, t∗) = vy(r∗, t∗)∂yEx(r∗, t∗)
+vz(r∗, t∗)∂zEx(r∗, t∗) (31)
Therefore, Jv(r∗, t∗) = DE(r∗, t∗)v(r∗, t∗). There always exists a vector field
E#λ (r) such that its Jacobian matrix at point r∗ is equal to J . Obviously,
from (26) and (28), ∇ · E#λ (r∗) = 0. Therefore, there exists a solution of the
Maxwell–Lorentz equations, such that the electric and magnetic fields Eλ(r, t)
and Bλ(r, t) satisfy the following conditions:
3
Eλ(r, t∗) = E
#
λ (r) (32)
Bλ(r, t∗) = B(r, t∗) (33)
At (r∗, t∗), such a solution obviously satisfies the following equations:
∂tEλ(r∗, t∗) = c
2∇×B(r∗, t∗) (34)
−∂tBλ(r∗, t∗) = ∇×E
#
λ (r∗) (35)
therefore
∂tEλ(r∗, t∗) = ∂tE(r∗, t∗) (36)
As a little reflection shows, if DE#λ (r∗), that is J , happened to be not in-
vertible, then one can choose a smaller λ such that DE#λ (r∗) becomes invertible
(due to the fact that DE(r∗, t∗) is invertible), and, at the same time,
∇×E#λ (r∗) 6= ∇×E(r∗, t∗) (37)
Consequently, from (36) , (30) and (22) we have
−∂tEλ(r∗, t∗) = DEλ(r∗, t∗)v(r∗, t∗) = DE
#
λ (r∗)v(r∗, t∗) (38)
and v(r∗, t∗) is uniquely determined by this equation. On the other hand, from
(35) and (37) we have
−∂tBλ(r∗, t∗) 6= DBλ(r∗, t∗)v(r∗, t∗) = DB(r∗, t∗)v(r∗, t∗) (39)
because DB(r∗, t∗) is invertible, too. That is, for Eλ(r, t) and Bλ(r, t) there is
no local and instantaneous velocity at point r∗ and time t∗.
At the same time, λ can be arbitrary small, and
lim
λ→0
Eλ(r, t) = E(r, t) (40)
lim
λ→0
Bλ(r, t) = B(r, t) (41)
Therefore solution
(
r1λ (t) , r
2
λ (t) , . . . , r
n
λ (t) ,Eλ(r, t),Bλ(r, t)
)
can fall into an
arbitrary small neighborhood of
(
r1 (t) , r2 (t) , . . . , rn (t) ,E(r, t),B(r, t)
)
.4
3
E
#
λ
(r) and Bλ(r, t∗) can be regarded as the initial configurations at time t∗; we do not
need to specify a particular choice of initial values for the sources.
4Notice that our investigation has been concerned with the general laws of Maxwell–Lorentz
electrodynamics of a coupled particles + electromagnetic field system. The proof of the
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Thus, the meaning of the concept of “electromagnetic field moving with a
local instantaneous velocity v(r, t) at point r and time t”, that we obtained
by a straightforward generalization of the example of the stationary field of a
uniformly moving charge, is untenable. We do not see other available rational
meaning of this concept. Such a concept, on the other hand, would be a nec-
essary conceptual plugin to the RP. In any event, lacking a better suggestion,
we must conclude that the RP is a statement which is meaningless for a general
electrodynamic situation.
4 No Persistence without Motion
There is a long debate in contemporary metaphysics whether and in what sense
instantaneous velocity can be regarded as an intrinsic property of an object at
a given moment of time (Butterfield 2006; Arntzenius 2000; Tooley 1988; Haw-
ley 2001, 76–80; Sider 2001, 34–35). There seems to be, however, a consensus
that
[. . .] the notion of velocity presupposes the persistence of the ob-
ject concerned. For average velocity is a quotient, whose numerator
must be the distance traversed by the given persisting object: oth-
erwise you could give me a superluminal velocity by dividing the
distance between me and the Sun by a time less than eight minutes.
So presumably, average velocity’s limit, instantaneous velocity, also
presupposes persistence. (Butterfield 2005, 257)
In this section we argue that the opposite is also true: the notion of persistence
requires the existence of instantaneous velocity.
It is common to all theories of persistence—endurantism vs. perdurantism—
that a persisting entity needs to have some package of individuating properties,
in terms of which one can express that two things in two different spatiotemporal
regions are identical, or at least constitute different spatiotemporal parts of the
same entity. Butterfield writes:
I believe that [the criteria of identity] are largely independent of the
endurantism–perdurantism debate; and in particular, that enduran-
tism and perdurantism [...] face some common questions about cri-
teria of identity, and can often give the same, or similar, answers to
them. [...] [A]ll parties need to provide criteria of identity for ob-
jects, presumably invoking the usual notions of qualitative similarity
and-or causation (Butterfield 2005, 248–289)
Without loss of generality we may assume that each of these individuating
properties can be characterized as such that a certain quantity fi takes a cer-
tain value. Consider a primitive example: the redness of the ball in Fig. 2 can
theorem was essentially based on the presumption that all solutions of the Maxwell–Lorentz
equations, determined by any initial state of the particles + electromagnetic field system,
corresponded to physically possible configurations of the electromagnetic field. It is sometimes
claimed, however, that the solutions must be restricted by the so called retardation condition,
according to which all physically admissible field configurations must be generated from the
retarded potentials belonging to some pre-histories of the charged particles (Jánossy 1971, p.
171; Frisch 2005, p. 145). There is no obvious answer to the question of how Theorem 1 is
altered under such additional condition.
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the world line along which the ball
persists (endures/perdures)
Figure 2: A ball is individuated by its redness, spottedness, etc.
be characterized as such that the wavelength of light reflected from the instan-
taneous surface of the ball is around 650 nm. Or, more abstractly, just imagine
a quantity the spatiotemporal distribution of which takes value 1 in a region
where redness is instantiated—for example, on the locus of the ball—and takes
value 0 otherwise.
Now, in order to express the fact of persistence, consider a given n-tuple of
individuating quantities {fi}
n
i=1 that is supposed to trace out the trajectory or
spacetime tube along which the entity persists. The different theories of per-
sistence disagree in the actual content of the package {fi}
n
i=1, these differences
are not important from the point of view of our present concern. The following
necessary condition is however common to all intuitions:
fi(r, t) = fi(r− v (t) δt, t− δt) (42)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
for all (r, t) where the object is present, at least for a small, infinitesimal, interval
of time δt (Fig. 2), with some instantaneous velocity v (t). Without loss of
generality we may assume that all functions in {fi}
n
i=1 are smooth (if not, we
can approximate them by smooth functions). Expressing (42) in a differential
form, we have5
−∂tfi(r, t) = Dfi(r, t)v(t) (43)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
In other words, the entity is in motion with some instantaneous velocities v(t).
Let us call (43) the equations of persistence.
So far we considered the situation when the persistence can be formulated in
terms of individuating quantities {fi}
n
i=1 characterizing the entity in question
as a whole. Generally, however, this is not necessarily the case. An extended
object may persist, even if its holistic properties do not satisfy equations (43).
Following however the same intuition by which we formulated the Mereological
Principle of Motion, we propose the following thesis:
5For the sake of simplicity we may assume that all fi are scalar functions, and Dfi is simply
grad fi.
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Figure 3: Persistence of an extended object requires the persitence of its local
parts
Mereological Principle of Persistence (MPP) If an extended object, as
a whole, persists, then its all local parts persist.
Accordingly, the persistence of an extended object requires the following
condition for the spatial distributions:
fi(r, t) = fi(r− v (r, t) δt, t− δt) (44)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
or
−∂tfi(r, t) = Dfi(r, t)v(r, t) (45)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
for all (r, t) where the extended object is present; where v(r, t) is a local and
instantaneous velocity field characterizing the motion of the local part of the
extended entity at the spatiotemporal locus (r, t) (Fig 3). Let us call (45) the
equations of persistence for an extended object.
5 The Ontological Incompleteness of CED
As we have seen in Theorem 1, the distributions of the two fundamental elec-
trodynamic field strengths, E(r, t) and B(r, t), do not satisfy the equations of
persistence (45). Therefore, the electromagnetic field individuated by the field
strengths cannot be regarded as a persisting physical object; in other words,
electromagnetic field cannot be regarded as being a real physical entity existing
in space and time. This seems to contradict to the usual realistic interpretation
of CED.
If electromagnetic field is a real entity persisting in space and time, then it
cannot be individuated by the field strengths. That is, there must exist some
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quantities other than the field strengths, perhaps outside of the scope of CED,
individuating the local parts of electromagnetic field. This suggests that CED
is an ontologically incomplete theory.
How to conceive properties, different from the field strengths, which are ca-
pable of individuating the electromagnetic field? One might think of them as
some “finer”, more fundamental, properties of the field, not only individuat-
ing it as a persisting extended object, but also determining the values of the
field strengths. However, the following easily verifiable theorem shows that this
determination cannot be so simple:
Theorem 2. Let {fi}
n
i=1 be a package of quantities for which there exist a
local instantaneous velocity field v(r, t) satisfying the equations of persistence
(45) in a given spacetime region. If a quantity Φ is a function of the quantities
f1, f2, . . . , fn in the following form:
Φ(r, t) = Φ (f1(r, t), f2(r, t), ..., fn(r, t))
then Φ also obeys the equation of persistence
−∂tΦ(r, t) = DΦ(r, t)v(r, t)
with the same local instantaneous velocity field v(r, t), within the same spacetime
region.
Therefore, E(r, t) and B(r, t) cannot supervene pointwise upon some more
fundamental individuating quantities satisfying the persistence equations. How-
ever, they might supervene in some non-local sense. For example, imagine that
E(r, t) and B(r, t) provide only a course-grained characterization of the field,
but there exist some more fundamental fields e(r, t) and b(r, t), such that
E(r, t) =
ˆ
Ω
e (r′, t′) d4(r, t)
B(r, t) =
ˆ
Ω
b (r′, t) d4(r, t)
where Ω is a neighbourhood of (r, t) (Fig. 4). In this case, the more fundamental
quantities e(r, t) and b(r, t) may satisfy the equations of persistence, while
E(r, t) and B(r, t), supervening on e(r, t) and b(r, t), may not.
Acknowledgment
The research was partly supported by the OTKA Foundation, No. K100715.
References
Arntzenius, Frank. 2000. “Are There Really Instantaneous Velocities?” The
Monist 83:187–208.
Brown, Harvey R. 2005. Physical Relativity – Space-Time Structure from a
Dynamical Perspective. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.
Chicago, IL -265-
For example:
Figure 4: A non-local form of supervenience
Butterfield, Jeremy. 2005. “On the Persistence of Particles”, Foundations of
Physics 35:233–269.
Butterfield, Jeremy. 2006. “The Rotating Discs Argument Defeated”, British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57:1–45.
Frisch, Mathias. 2005. Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and Non-Locality, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Galilei, Galileo. 1953. Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems,
Ptolemaic & Copernican, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gömöri, Márton, and László E. Szabó. 2013. “Formal Statement of the Special
Principle of Relativity”, Synthese, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0374-1
Hawley, Katherine. 2001. How Things Persist, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Jackson, John David. 1999. Classical Electrodynamics (Third edition). Hobo-
ken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
Jánossy, Lajos. 1971. Theory of Relativity Based On Physical Reality, Budapest:
Akadémiai Kiadó.
Sider, Theodore. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tooley, Michael. 1988. “In Defence of the Existence of States of Motion”,
Philosophical Topics 16:225–254.
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -266-
A New Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence
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Abstract
The Problem of Old Evidence has troubled Bayesians ever since Clark
Glymour first presented it in 1980. Several solutions have been proposed,
but all of them have drawbacks and none of them is considered to be the
definite solution. In this article, I propose a new solution which combines
several old ideas with a new one. It circumvents the crucial omniscience
problem in an elegant way and leads to a considerable confirmation of the
hypothesis in question.
1 Introduction
The Problem of Old Evidence is easy to state. If the probability of the evidence,
P (E), is 1, then the likelihood P (E|H) is also 1, and hence
P ∗(H) := P (H|E) =
P (E|H)P (H)
P (E)
= P (H) . (1)
Consequently E does not confirm H according to standard Bayesian Confirmation
Theory, i.e. if conditionalization is used to compute the posterior probability. This
observation conflicts with the practice of science, as Glymour (1980) has forcefully
pointed out.1 Note that using conditionalization here is somewhat dubious as, in
this case, nothing new is learned. So why should one even conditionalize?
In this article, I argue that something new happens in the course of the delibera-
tion. The basic idea is this: Once a scientist becomes aware of the logical fact that
the hypothesis under consideration entails the evidence (and that other available
∗Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1,
80539 Munich (Germany) – http://www.stephanhartmann.org – s.hartmann@lmu.de.
1See Earman (1992: ch. 5) for a critical discussion of a number of well-known responses to
the Problem of Old Evidence.
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theories do not entail E), she changes her belief about the disjunctive proposition
A: “There is an alternative theory that entails the evidence or the evidence is the
result of a chance mechanism.” This, in turn, prompts an increase of the posterior
probability of the hypothesis. Note that we are assuming that the scientist has
beliefs about the origin of the evidence: E is either a deductive consequence of H,
or it is a deductive consequence of an alternative to H, or it is the result of a
chance mechanism, where the first and second disjunct are not mutually exclusive.
Working out this idea in detail requires six elements:
(i) The scientist’s beliefs are always consistent with the claim that she knows
that the hypothesis H entails the evidence E. (This circumvents the crucial
omniscience problem.) Initially, however, she is not aware of this logical fact.
(ii) Only after doing the deductions, the scientist becomes aware of the logical
fact that H entails E (and that other available theories do not entail E). As
a result of this,
(iii) the scientist lowers the probability of the disjunctive proposition A. Before
the scientist becomes aware of the logical fact that H entails E, the scientist
considered it to be quite likely that H does not entail E.2 Instead she considers
it to be quite likely that a (so far unknown) alternative to H entails E (and
for which E is evidence) or that E is the result of a chance mechanism.
Note that after becoming aware of the fact that H entails E (and that other
available theories do not entail E), it is still possible that an alternative to H
also entails E. In fact, E could be entailed by any given number of theories.
(iv) The probability of the evidence is 1 − ǫ, and not 1 (Fitelson 2004). This
reflects the fact that E is a contingent proposition. Note, though, that ǫ can
be arbitrarily small, and so this is not a strong restriction for all practical
purposes. In fact we will calculate the limit ǫ→ 0 at the end and it will turn
out to be finite.
(v) The probability of the evidence does not change in the course of deliberation.
More specifically, it is not affected by our deliberations about H or by the
possible existence of an alternative to H. This poses a constraint on the
likelihoods before and after becoming aware of the logical fact that H entails
E (and that other available theories do not entail E).
2One could also argue that the scientist should be agnostic about the deductive relationship
between H and E before she becomes aware of the logical fact that H entails E. We do not
consider this possibility here because there is no agreement on how to model ignorance in a
Bayesian framework. Cf. Norton (2008, 2011).
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(vi) The scientist determines the posterior probability distribution by minimizing
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the posterior probability distribu-
tion and the prior probability distribution. Note that this procedure is more
general than conditionalization: It leads to standard conditonalization and
Jeffrey conditionalization if corresponding constraints concerning the poste-
rior probability of the evidence are added (see Diaconis and Zabell 1982).
More recently, Hartmann and Rafiee Rad (2014) have argued that minimiz-
ing the Kullback-Leibler divergence can also be used to model the learning of
an indicative conditional and that standard objections or problems such as
the Judy Benjamin Problem can be rebutted provided that the causal struc-
ture of the problem at hand is properly taken into account. Encouraged
by these success stories, we conjecture that minimizing the Kullback-Leibler
divergence between the posterior and the prior probability distribution is an
essential ingredient in any general Bayesian account of belief change.
Note that on our proposal one does not have to conditionalize on E (which arguably
does not make sense as the scientist does not learn E) or on the new proposition (af-
ter extending the language appropriately) that the hypothesis entails the evidence
(Garber 1983). It also avoids counterfactual reasoning as in Howson’s solution to
the Problem of Old Evidence (Howson 1991).
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our general
model which works for all cases where the probability of the evidence does not
change in the course of deliberation. Section 3 then considers the special case of
old evidence where the probability of the evidence is (close to) 1. We conclude, in
Section 4, with a short remark concerning the adequacy of the proposed solution.
2 The General Model
We introduce the two usual binary propositional variables.3 The variable H has
the values H: “The hypothesis is true”, and ¬H: “The hypothesis is false”. The
variable E has the values E: “The evidence obtains”, and ¬E: “The evidence does
not obtain”. We consider the case where it is a matter of fact that H entails
E. Additionally, we introduce the binary propositional variable AT which has the
values AT: “There is an alternative hypothesis that entails E”, and ¬AT: “There
is no alternative hypothesis that entails E” and the binary propositional variable
AC which has the values AC: “E is the result of a chance mechanism”, and ¬AC:
3Throughout this article we follow the convention, adopted e.g. in Bovens and Hartmann
(2003), that propositional variables are printed in (upper case) italic script, and that the in-
stantiations of these variables are printed in (upper case) roman script. Bovens and Hartmann
(2003) also introduce the bits of the theory of Bayesian Networks that we use in this article.
3
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A H E
Figure 1: The Bayesian Network for the Problem of Old Evidence.
“E is not the result of a chance mechanism”. Let A:= AT ∨ AC. We assume that
the scientist has beliefs about A, E and H and that it is a logical fact that H entails
E.
The Bayesian Network in Figure 1 encodes the probabilistic dependencies and
independencies between the three variables: The variable A directly influences the
variable H, the variable H directly influences the variable E, and A influences E
only through H: If the hypothesis is true (false), then our credence in E should
be equal to the likelihood P (E|H) (or P (E|¬H), respectively).
To complete the Bayesian Network, we have to fix the prior probability of the root
node A and the conditional probabilities of all other nodes, given the values of
their parents. First, we set
P (A) = a (2)
and assume that a ∈ (0, 1). The value of a will, in fact, be fairly large as the
scientist is not yet aware of the logical fact that H entails E. And so she strongly
believes that there is an alternative to H that entails E or that E is the result of
a chance mechanism.
Second, we set
P (H|A) = α , P (H|¬A) = 1 , (3)
with α ∈ (0, 1). If A is false, i.e. if there is no alternative to H that accounts for
E and if E is not the result of a chance mechanism, then the probability of H is
one. However, if AT (and therefore A) is true and there is an alternative to H
that entails E, then it is possible that H is true and entails E as well because there
may be several theories that entail E. Hence P (H|A) =: α > 0, where α measures
how strongly the scientist believes in H, even if there is an alternative theory that
entails E. It is important to note that α > 0 implies that the propositions A and
H are not mutually exclusive.
From eqs. (2) and (3) we calculate the prior probability of the hypothesis using
the Law of Total Probability:
P (H) = P (H|A)P (A) + P (H|¬A)P (¬A)
= α a+ a (4)
From this equation it follows that α is fairly small as a is fairly large and P (H) is
4
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not very large. Typical values could be a = .8 and α = .2, in which case we get
P (H) = .36, but our argument of course does not depend on these assignments.
Finally, we set
P (E|H) = 1 , P (E|¬H) = q , (5)
with q ∈ (0, 1). Here we assume that the beliefs of the scientist are consistent with
the logical fact that H entails E.4 She therefore assigns the conditional probability
P (E|H) the value 1 which makes sure that her beliefs are coherent.5 Setting
P (E|H) = 1 may be ad hoc for P (E) ≪ 1 as the scientist is not yet aware of the
logical fact that H entails E. However, if P (E) is close to 1 (which is the case in
the Problem of Old Evidence), then setting P (E|H) to 1 (or to a value close to 1)
is a consequence of having coherent beliefs as we will show in Section 3.
The prior probability distribution over A,H and E is then given by
P (A,H,E) = α a , P (A,¬H,E) = α a q
P (A,¬H,¬E) = α a q , P (¬A,H,E) = a . (6)
For all other instantiations of A,H and E, the prior probability vanishes. Here we
have used the convenient shorthand x := 1− x, which we will use throughout this
article. Here and in the remainder we also use the shorthand notation P (A,H,E)
for P (A ∧ H ∧ E).
With this, we calculate
P (E) = α a+ α a q + a
= 1− α a q . (7)
Next, the scientist becomes aware of the logical fact that H entails E (and that
other available theories do not entail E), which prompts her to change her beliefs.
More specifically, she reduces the probability of A and sets
P ′(A) = a′ < a, (8)
where P ′ is the posterior probability measure. Given that the scientist is now
aware of the logical fact that H entails E, she does not consider it so probable
anymore that there is an alternative theory that entails E or that E is the result
of a chance mechanism. Before becoming aware of the logical fact that H entails
E, she strongly believed that there is an alternative to H that entails E or that
4Note that it is perfectly fine to set P (E|H) = 1 even if P (E) = 1− ǫ. We might be uncertain
about whether E and/or H obtain, but we may nevertheless be convinced that E is always true
if H is true.
5Note that we are only considering deterministic theories here. For indeterministic theories,
P (E|H) < 1 and our model does not apply in the present form. We leave the confirmation-
theoretical analysis of old evidence for an indeterministic theory for another occasion.
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E is the result of a chance mechanism (although her degrees of belief have always
been consistent with the logical fact that H entails E). After becoming aware of
the logical fact that H entails E (and that other available theories do not entail
E), she still deems it possible that there is an alternative to H that entails E, but
she does not believe in it so strongly anymore.6
Note that the belief change expressed in eq. (8) does not result from conditional-
ization. It is more similar to what actually happens in (Jeffrey) conditionalization
when the probability of the evidence suddenly changes from one value to another.
In the case of (Jeffrey) conditionalization, this change is prompted by an experi-
ence. In the case considered in this article, it is prompted by the insight that H
entails E (and that other available theories do not entail E).
As H entails E, the scientist also sets
P ′(E|H) = 1 , (9)
which is in line with the corresponding assignment in the prior probability distri-
bution (see eq. (5)).
To proceed, we assume that the Bayesian Network depicted in Figure 1 remains
unchanged after the agent changed her beliefs about A. Hence, the posterior prob-
ability distribution has the following form:
P ′(A,H,E) = α′a′ , P ′(A,¬H,E) = α′ a′ q′
P ′(A,¬H,¬E) = α′ a′ q′ , P ′(¬A,H,E) = a′ , (10)
where we have replaced all variables with the corresponding primed variables.
Note that the value of a′ is already fixed (as the scientist sets it to a lower value
after becoming aware of the logical fact that H entails E and that other available
theories do not entail E)7, but the values of α′ and q′ have to be determined. We
do this by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence between P ′ and P taking
all relevant constraints on P ′ into account.
Here are two additional constraints on the posterior probability distribution (be-
sides eq. (8)). First, we assume that the probability of E remains unchanged in
the course of deliberation, i.e.
P ′(E) = 1− α′ a′ q′ ≡ P (E) = 1− α a q . (11)
6It could be objected that a′ should be greater than a because it is easy to construct alterna-
tives to H that also entail E after becoming aware of the logical fact that H entails E. Just add
an irrelevant conjunct to H or make a Goodman-style move. If one does so, then the probability
of H goes down. Hence, a scientist who has coherent beliefs and who reasons in this way will
hold the view that H is not confirmed.
7Note, though, that a′ has to satisfy inequality (13).
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Hence,
α a q − α′ a′ q′ = 0 . (12)
Next, we conclude from eq. (12) that α a q = α′ a′ q′ < a′. Hence, we obtain
a′ > αa q , (13)
as our third and final constraint on P ′. Inequality (13) tells us that the scientist
cannot reduce a′ to an arbitrarily low value. A rational agent should always take
the possible existence of an alternative theory that entails E or the possibility that
E resulted from a chance mechanism into account.
In this section we will only assume that the probability of E does not change after
the scientist becomes aware of the logical fact that H entails E (and that other
available theories do not entail E) and after she lowered the probability of A in
turn. In the next section, we will focus on the specific case that P (E) = P ′(E) is
close to 1, which is the situation in the Problem of Old Evidence.
We can now show the following theorem (proof in the Appendix).
Theorem: Consider the Bayesian Network in Figure 1 with the prior probability
distribution P from eq. (6). We furthermore assume that (i) the posterior proba-
bility distribution P ′ is defined over the same Bayesian Network, (ii) the posterior
distribution P ′ is constrained by eqs. (8), (12) and (13), and (iii) P ′ minimizes
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between P ′ and P . Let ∆ := P ′(H)− P (H). Then
∆ =
q
α + α q
· α (a− a′) (14)
Hence, ∆ > 0 if and only if a′ < a. And so we conclude that H is confirmed in
the considered situation although the probability of the evidence does not change
in the course of deliberation. Note that H is not directly confirmed by E. The
confirmation is indirect as we first become aware of the logical fact that H entails
E (and that other available theories do not entail E) and then, in turn, reduce
the probability of A. This, then, results in an increase in the probability of H if
we determine the posterior probability distribution by minimizing the Kullback-
Leibler divergence between the posterior probability distribution and the prior
probability distribution.
3 The Problem of Old Evidence
Let us now turn to the Problem of Old Evidence. So far we have only assumed
that the probability of E does not change in the course of deliberation. In the
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old-evidence situation, more specifically, the probability of E is close to 1. So let
us set
P (E) = 1− ǫ (15)
with ǫ≪ 1. Next, we observe from eq. (7) that
ǫ = α a q , (16)
which has to be small. To achieve this, we set
q = 1− η (17)
with η ≪ 1. Hence, ǫ = α η a < η ≪ 1. We do not have to impose any further
constraints on the values of a and α. Note that the choice (17) makes a lot of
sense: The scientist knows that P (E) is close to 1, independently of whether H is
true or false: It is simply a contingent fact that E obtains (note that ǫ and η can
be set to an arbitrarily small value and so our proposed solution of the Problem
of Old Evidence works, as we will see, for all practical purposes). However, the
scientist does not know whether or not H is true, and so she should set P (E|H) and
P (E|¬H) to 1 or to a value very close to 1 (again, there is no difference between
the two assignments for all practical purposes). It is important to note that setting
P (E|H) and P (E|¬H) to 1 (or to a value close to 1) does not mean that the scientist
knows that E is a deductive consequence of H: In the present case, the scientist
has to make these assignments simply in order to have coherent beliefs.8
To proceed, let us plot ∆ as a function of α for plausible values of a, a′ and q.
Figure 2 shows that one gets a considerable amount of confirmation (for α = .2,
for example, the probability rises by .15). It is also plausible, as Figure 2 suggests,
that one gets more confirmation for smaller values of α: if we strongly believe
that there is an alternative to H that entails E or that E is the result of a chance
mechanism and if we also strongly believe that H is false if there is an alternative
to H or if E is the result of a chance mechanism, then we will be quite impressed by
becoming aware of the logical fact that H entails E. Hence, ceteris paribus, smaller
values of α lead to more confirmation of H than larger values of α.
All this can also be seen analytically. To do so, we expand ∆ in a Taylor-series up
to zeroth order in η and obtain:
∆ = α (a− a′) +O(η) (18)
8Note that P (E) = 1 implies that P (E|Hi) = 1 for every element Hi of a partition H1,
H2,. . . with a non-vanishing prior probability. However, from P (E) = 1− ǫ we cannot infer that
P (E|Hi) = 1− ǫ
′ with ǫ′ ≪ 1. In the present case, however, the probability of H (as well as the
probability of ¬H) is neither very small nor very large. And so the scientist has to set P (E|H)
and P (E|¬H) to 1 (or to a value close to 1) in order to have coherent beliefs.
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Figure 2: ∆ as a function of α for a = .8, a′ = .6 and q = .99.
Hence, H is more confirmed, the smaller the value of α (for fixed values of a and
a′ > αη a).
Note that we can take the limit η → 0 from eq. (18) and obtain
∆ = α (a− a′). (19)
This result is approached as P (E) approaches 1, so that our assumption that
P (E) = 1− ǫ was only a mathematical trick that we had to make to proceed with
the calculation. Interestingly, however, eq. (19) can also be obtained if one uses
Jeffrey conditionalization in a straightforward way. To do so, we calculate the
posterior probability of H after learning that the probability of A shifted:
P ∗(H) = P (H|A)P ∗(A) + P (H|¬A)P ∗(¬A)
= α a′ + a′ . (20)
With eq. (4), we obtain
∆∗ := P ∗(H)− P (H)
= α (a− a′) . (21)
Note that this calculation assumes that α is fixed and therefore does not change
in the course of deliberation.9 In hindsight, this assumption is justified as it turns
out that α changes only slightly (details in the Appendix). It was, however, not
at all clear from the beginning that this is the case, and so we were not justified
to use Jeffrey conditionalization in the first place. Conditionalization and Jeffrey
conditionalization often work, but they do not always work. The more general
procedure to rationally change one’s beliefs is to use the method of minimizing
the Kullback-Leibler divergence taking into account the new information as a con-
straint on the posterior probability distribution.
9This can be seen by comparing eqs. (20) and (34).
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In closing, let us note that our solution to the Problem of Old Evidence also shows
that old evidence typically disconfirms the theory that preceded H. For example,
the advanced perihelion of Mercury (= E) disconfirms Newtonian Mechanics (=
H’). As P (E) = 1− ǫ, we set (as before) P (E|H′) and P (E|¬H′) to 1 or to a value
close to 1. The scientist then becomes aware of the logical fact that H’ does not
entail E. She therefore increases the probability of A, i.e. she sets a′ > a: It is
now more probable that there is an alternative to H’ that entails E or that E is
the result of a chance mechanism. In fact, she has to set a′ = 1 as she is now
certain that there is either another theory that entails E or that E is the result
of a chance mechanism. Hence, according to eq. (19), H’ is disconfirmed and
P ′(H′) < P (H′). We conjecture that it will be difficult to plausibly show this in
Howson’s counterfactual approach (Howson 1991).
4 Concluding Remark
Our argument crucially depends on the assumption that scientists believe the
proposition A with a certain probability and that they change the corresponding
probability once they become aware of the logical fact that H entails E (and that
other available theories do not entail E). This is an empirical assumption, and it
has be be investigated in detail whether it is true or false for concrete examples.
We leave this for another occasion.
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A Appendix: Proof of the Theorem
Let P and P ′ be two probability distributions. The Kullback-Leibler divergence
DKL(P
′||P ) between P ′ and P is defined as
DKL(P
′||P ) :=
n∑
i=1
P ′(Si) log
P ′(Si)
P (Si)
. (22)
Here S1, . . . , Sn be the possible values of a random variable S over which proba-
bility distributions P ′ and P are defined.
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Using eqs. (6) and (10), we obtain:
DKL(P
′||P ) :=
∑
A,H,E
P ′(A,H,E) log
P ′(A,H,E)
P (A,H,E)
= α′ a′ log
α′ a′
α a
+ α′ a′ q′ log
α′ a′ q′
α a q
(23)
+α′ a′ q′ log
α′ a′ q′
α a q
+ a′ log
a′
a
= a′ log
a′
a
+ a′ log
a′
a
+ a′
(
α′ log
α′
α
+ α′ log
α′
α
)
(24)
+α′ a′
(
q′ log
q′
q
+ q′ log
q′
q
)
(25)
Next, we minimize
L := DKL(P
′||P ) + λ(α a q − α′ a′ q′) (26)
with respect to α′ and q′. Here λ is a Lagrange multiplier, and the expression in
the bracket takes the constraint from eq. (12) into account.
To find the minimum, we first differentiate L with respect to q′ and obtain:
∂L
∂q′
= α′ a′
(
log
(
q′
q′
q
q
)
+ λ
)
(27)
Setting this expression equal to zero and noting that a′ > 0 and α′ < 1, we obtain
q′ =
q
q + q eλ
. (28)
With this, L simplifies to
L = a′ log
a′
a
+ a′ log
a′
a
+ a′
(
α′ log
α′
α
+ α′ log
α′
α
)
−α′ a′ log(q + q eλ) + αλ a q (29)
Next, we differentiate this expression with respect to α′ and obtain
∂L
∂α′
= a′ log
(
α′
α′
α
α
(q + q eλ)
)
. (30)
Setting this expression equal to zero and noting that a′ > 0, we obtain
α′ =
α
α + α (q + q eλ)
. (31)
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Inserting eqs. (28) and (31) into eq. (12), we obtain
eλ =
(α + α q) a
a′ − α a q
. (32)
Note that the denominator in eq. (32) is always greater than zero because of the
constraint expressed in eq. (12).
Inserting eq. (32) into eqs. (28) and (31), after a short calculation we obtain
α′ =
α
a′
·
a′ − α a q
α + α q
, q′ =
(a′ − α a q) q
a′ q + α a q
. (33)
This completes the calculation of the posterior probability distribution.
Let us now explore under which conditions the posterior probability of H, i.e.
P ′(H) is greater than the prior probability of H, i.e. P (H). That is, let us ask
under which conditions H is confirmed. To do so, we calculate
P ′(H) = α′ a′ + a′ . (34)
Hence, using eq. (4), we finally obtain
∆ := P ′(H)− P (H)
= α′ a′ − α a+ (a− a′)
=
q
α + α q
· α (a− a′) , (35)
which completes the proof of the theorem.
Let us finally consider α′ and q′ for the old evidence situation. We will show that
α′ ≤ α and q′ ≤ q for a > a′. Setting a′ = α η a + δ with δ > 0 (see eq. (13)), we
obtain
α′
α
=
δ
(α η a+ δ)(α + α η)
=
δ
δ + α η (a− α η a− δ)
=
δ
δ + α η (a− a′)
≤ 1 . (36)
Similarly,
q′
q
=
δ
(α η a+ δ) η + α η a
=
δ
δ + η (a− α η a− δ)
=
δ
δ + η (a− a′)
≤ 1 . (37)
Hence, for η ≪ δ and a > a′, we find that α′ . α and q′ . q.
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A New Interpretation of the Representational
Theory of Measurement
Conrad Heilmann∗
Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science
Abstract
On the received view, the Representational Theory of Measurement reduces measurement
to the numerical representation of empirical relations. This account of measurement has
been widely criticised. In this paper, I provide a new interpretation of the Represen-
tational Theory of Measurement that sidesteps these debates. I propose to view the
Representational Theory of Measurement as a library of theorems that investigate the
numerical representability of qualitative relations. Such theorems are useful tools for
concept formation which, in turn, is one crucial aspect of measurement for a broad range
of cases in linguistics, rational choice, metaphysics, and the social sciences.
1 Introduction
The Representational Theory of Measurement (RTM) is one of the main accounts of mea-
surement (Swistak, 1990; Boumans, 2008; Cartwright and Chang, 2008). It characterises
measurement as a mapping between two relational structures, an empirical one and a
numerical one (Krantz et al., 1971; Suppes et al., 1989; Luce et al., 1990).
RTM is much criticised. Its critics, such as those that endorse a realist or operational-
ist conception of measurement, focus mainly on the fact that RTM advances an abstract
conception of measurement that is not connected to empirical work as closely as it should
be: it reduces measurement to representation, without specifying the actual process of
measuring something, and problems like measurement error and the construction of reli-
able measurement instruments are ignored (Michell, 1990; Decoene et al., 1995; Michell,
1995; Boumans, 2007; Reiss, 2008).
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In this paper, I do not engage with these worries, but rather sidestep them by propos-
ing to interpret RTM in a different way. I will not assess RTM as a candidate theory of
measurement, but propose the following two-step interpretation: firstly, RTM should be
viewed as simply providing a library of mathematical theorems. Secondly, RTM theorems
have a particular structure that makes them useful for investigating problems of concept
formation. More precisely, I propose to view theorems in RTM as providing us with
mathematical structures which, if sustained by specific conceptual interpretations, can
provide insights into the possibilities and limits of representing concepts numerically. If
we adopt this interpretation, there is no reason why RTM theorems should be restricted
to specifying the conditions under which only empirical relations can be represented nu-
merically. Rather, we can view the theorems as providing insights into how to numerically
represent any sort of qualitative relation between any sort of object. Indeed, those objects
can include highly idealised or hypothetical ones. On this view, RTM is no longer viewed
as candidate for a full-fledged theory of measurement, but rather as a tool that can be
used in discussing the formation of concepts, which in turn is often a particularly difficult
part of measurement, especially in the social sciences.
This new interpretation of RTM has a number of advantages. Firstly, it allows us to
use RTM theorems in the investigation of abstract concepts. All this means is that since
we move from an empirical relational structure to a more general qualitative relational
structure, we can also ask what kind of qualitative relations between imagined or idealised
objects could be represented numerically. This is helpful in areas of inquiry in which
there no developed empirical concepts and where there is a lack agreement on a number
of basic questions (such as cases in linguistics, rational choice, metaphysics, and the social
sciences more generally). Secondly, the new interpretation gives more flexibility to engage
in ‘backwards engineering’ of foundations for quantitative concepts. In contexts in which
we operate with numbers that lack adequate conceptual and epistemic foundations, we
can investigate what kinds of qualitative relations between what kinds of objects would
need to exist in order to motivate the kind of numbers that are already in use. That is, we
can look at areas of inquiry that use quantities that are not derived from a measurement
process and investigate whether these quantities can be seen as numerical representations
of qualitative relations (and, in turn, whether such a representation can help in devising
a measurement process). Thirdly, the interpretation serves as a way to rehabilitate RTM
as a useful part of theoretical tools for measurement.
I proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces RTM in its received interpretation. Section
3 explains the new interpretation of RTM as representing qualitative instead of only
empirical relations. Section 4 discusses desiderata of the interpretation. Section 5 briefly
concludes.
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2 The Representational Theory of Measurement
Before RTM, measurement was mainly associated with the idea that (physical) quantities
are assigned numbers (Russell, 1903, 176). RTM has taken a more abstract stance,
substituting the idea of physical quantity or magnitude with properties or features of
objects or with relations between such properties or features (Swistak, 1990). Swistak
(1990, 7) also maintains that the ‘representational paradigm is the fundamental notion of
measurement which is in use in the contemporary theory of measurement’ and ascribes
the coining of the term ‘representational theory of measurement’ to Adams (1966). The
authoritative statement of RTM can be found in the three books Krantz et al. (1971),
Suppes et al. (1989) and Luce et al. (1990), which are building on earlier axiomatic
work by Ho¨lder, Helmhotz, Campbell, and others (for an overview, see Tal (2013)). In
their characterisation, a representational measurement procedure allows one to make two
formal statements,
‘a representation theorem, which asserts the existence of a homomorphism φ
into a particular numerical relational structure, and a uniqueness theorem,
which sets forth the permissible transformations φ 7→ φ′ that also yield ho-
momorphisms into the same numerical structure. A measurement procedure
corresponds in the construction of a φ in the representation theorem.’ (Krantz
et al. (1971, 12).
In the received interpretation of RTM, we thus speak of a homomorphism between an
empirical relational structure (ERS) and a numerical relational structure (NRS) charac-
terising a measurement. For example, for simple length measurement, we might want to
specify the ERS as 〈X, ◦,<〉, where X is a set of rods, ◦ is a concatenation operation,
and < is a comparison of length of rods. If the concatenation and comparison of rods
satisfy a number of conditions, there is a homomorphism into a NRS 〈R,+,≥〉, where R
denotes the real numbers, + addition operations, and ≥ comparison operations between
real numbers. As mentioned above, the existence of such homomorphism is asserted by
a representation theorem.
The exact characterisation of what kind of scale a given measurement procedure yields
is given by uniqueness theorems which specify the permissible transformations of the
numbers. More formally, uniqueness theorems assert that ‘. . . a transformation φ 7→ φ′ is
permissible if and only if φ and φ′ are both homomorphisms . . . into the same numerical
structure . . . ’ (Krantz et al., 1971, 12). Following Stevens (1946), a distinction is usually
made between nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio scales. Nominal scales allow only for
one-to-one transformations. Ordinal scales allow monotonic increasing transformations of
the form φ 7→ f(φ). Interval scales allow for affine transformations of the form φ 7→ αφ+
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β, α > 0. Ratio scales allow for multiplicative transformation of the form φ 7→ αφ, α > 0.
Particular variants of construction such scales have emerged, such as extensive, con-
joint, bisection and difference measurement (reviewed in Suppes (2002, 63ff.)). Repre-
sentations in extensive measurement specify procedures that make use of the addition
of magnitudes, such as in measuring physical magnitudes of mass and length. Bisection
measurement gives representations by using the operation of identifying a midpoint in
an interval. Conjoint measurement representations allow the combinations of magnitudes
or properties, such as when measuring the intensity and frequency of a phenomenon. In
difference measurement, representations capture the intensity of a particular property
or relation. The three books by Krantz et al. (1971), Suppes et al. (1989) and Luce
et al. (1990) contain a collection of mathematical results that pertain to these different
measurements.
In the received interpretation, RTM takes measurement to consist in constructing
homomorphisms of this kind:
‘[. . . ] measurement may be regarded as the construction of homomorphisms
(scales) from empirical relational structures of interest into numerical rela-
tional structures that are useful.’ (Krantz et al., 1971, 9)
I call this the received interpretation of RTM because on the one hand it is close to
the sparse interpretative remarks given in what is now the authoritative statement of
RTM, and on the other hand it also suggests that RTM constitutes a candidate theory
of measurement.
RTM as a candidate theory of measurement has been met with a fair share of criticism
in the literature. Since the purpose of this paper is to sidestep rather than to engage this
criticism, I will not go into detail about it. The critics focus mainly on the fact that RTM
advances an abstract conception of measurement that is not connected to empirical work
as closely as it should be: it reduces measurement to representation, without specifying
the actual process of measuring something, and problems like measurement error and the
construction of reliable measurement instruments are ignored (Michell, 1990; Decoene
et al., 1995; Michell, 1995; Boumans, 2007; Reiss, 2008). My proposed interpretation will
sidestep these criticisms.
From this can be concluded that some critics regard RTM to be limited in serving as a
theory of measurement. Where does this leave us with regards to RTM? I will not answer
this question directly, as I will not assess the merits of RTM as a full-fledged theory of
measurement in this paper. Rather, I argue in the following that a slightly modified
interpretation of RTM can help to make it useful for a number of crucial exercises in
several different fields.
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3 Qualitative Relational Structures
In this section, I outline the main elements of the new interpretation of RTM. The new
interpretation proceeds in two simple moves: firstly, I start from viewing RTM as a
library of mathematical theorems of a certain kind. Secondly, I change the standard in-
terpretation of the domain of the representation theorems: instead of empirical relational
structures, I will interpret them more generally as qualitative relational structures. With
these two moves completed, we can use the theorems in RTM in a greater variety of
contexts. Before elaborating on the latter, I will now explain the two moves in greater
detail.
Firstly, RTM is simply viewed as a library of theorems. That is to say, in the fol-
lowing, the term RTM will refer to the theorems in the three books that contain the
authoritative statement of RTM (Krantz et al., 1971; Suppes et al., 1989; Luce et al.,
1990). Interestingly, there is relatively little by way of ‘measurement’ interpretation of
the theorems in these three books, even though RTM is still considered to be one of the
main theories of measurement, if not the dominant one (Boumans, 2008). The interpreta-
tion of the mathematical structures as referring to measurement is by and large confined
to a few smaller sections in those three books (such as Chapter 1 of Krantz et al. (1971)
and some sections of Chapter 22 in Luce et al. (1990)). More importantly, the idea that
RTM is a full-fledged theory of measurement appears in the dozens of articles in which the
different theorems have been initially been presented (extensively referenced in Krantz
et al. (1971)). As perhaps the most poignant example of these articles, consider Davidson
et al. (1955), in which we find extensive discussion of how the proposed theorems might
make measurement in psychology and economics more ‘scientific’. On the one hand, this
suggests that the main proponents of RTM have undeniably intended it as a full-fledged
theory of measurement. At the same time, the theorems in the three volumes cited above
can also be seen separate from that. The first move of the new interpretation is to do just
that and hence to consider RTM as the collection of mathematical theorems of a certain
kind.
Secondly, from a mathematical point of view, the representation and uniqueness the-
orems in RTM simply characterise mappings between two kinds of structures, with one
of these structures being associated with properties of numbers, and the other with qual-
itative relations. In the case of simple length measurement, the concatenation operation
and the ordering relation are interpreted as actual comparisons between rods. Yet, since
the theorem just concerns the conditions under which the concatenation operation and
the ordering relation can be represented numerically, it is possible to furnish an even
more general interpretation of what hitherto has been called ERS, the empirical rela-
tional structure. This more general interpretation is to replace the specific idea of ERS
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structure with that of a QRS, a qualitative relational structure.
Reinterpreting the empirical relational structure 〈X, ◦,<〉 as a qualitative relational
structure (QRS) does not require any change, addition or reconsideration of the measure-
ment and uniqueness theorems in RTM. Indeed, all what is needed in order to apply the
latter is that there is:
• a set of well specified objects in the mathematical sense: that we have clear mem-
bership conditions for the set X. Mathematically, RTM theorems do not require
that the objects have empirical content.
• well-defined qualitative relations, such as ◦ and <. Mathematically, RTM theorems
do not require that these relations are interpreted empirically, i.e. that we can
concatenate physical objects, or compare objects empirically.
The new interpretation of RTM hence sees it only as a collection of theorems that
investigate how a QRS 〈X, ◦,<〉 can be mapped into a NRS 〈R,+,≥〉. It thus clearly
sidesteps any of the criticisms of RTM in its received interpretation, since these criticisms
were directed at RTM as a full-fledged theory of measurement, and focused on how RTM
theorems apply to empirical relations.
4 Advantages of the New Interpretation
The new interpretation allows us to apply RTM theorems to any concept that we might
care to investigate with regards to its potential for numerical representation. I will discuss
two desiderata, firstly investigating the numerical representability of concepts, and sec-
ondly investigating possibilities of backwards engineering of foundations, before turning
to defend the interpretation against two possible objections.
4.1 Numerical Representability of Concepts
With the new interpretation of RTM, we can also ask what kind of qualitative relations
between imagined or idealised objects could be represented numerically. This is helpful
in areas of inquiry in which there are no (or not yet developed) well-formed empirical
concepts, and where there is a lack agreement on a number of basic questions.
Interpreting RTM theorems as specifying conditions of mappings between QRS and
NRS, we can use them to speculate about possible numerical representations of abstract
properties of abstract concepts. What is required for this are simply concepts that specify
a well-defined set of objects and qualitative relations. There are some indications that
RTM theorems are already used in such a way in different areas of inquiry.
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Take the case of linguistic analysis of interadjective comparisons (Bale, 2008). in this
field, it is investigated how we can make sense of statements such as ’x is P -er than y is Q’,
with van Rooij (2011) applying RTM theorems to such statements to investigate whether
properties P and Q of objects x and y are numerically representable, what possible scale
properties such representations can fulfil, and hence in how far interadjective comparisons
can be meaningful. In short, he uses RTM theorems to investigate to what extent abstract
properties that are described by adjectives can be numerically represented, and in what
way they can be compared.
Another case can be found in recent philosophical investigations concerning the foun-
dations of rational choice. Traditionally, rational choice has used RTM-style theorems
in their received interpretation, investigating how preferences can be represented nu-
merically, under the assumptions that preferences are nothing but, or closely linked to,
observable choice behaviour (Davidson et al., 1955). Yet, with cases of preference reversal
and change, and investigations into how conflicting desires and beliefs can be captured by
preferences, recent philosophical literature in rational choice theory has used RTM theo-
rems without presupposing such close empirical links (see, for instance, Bradley (2009a),
Bradley (2009b), Dietrich and List (2009), List and Dietrich (2013)). These articles in-
vestigate the determinants and changes of preferences by depicting them in an abstract
way, leaving open how they are linked to observable or empirically testable entities or
events.
These cases show, that some fields have already – unwittingly, or implicitly – adopted
a more liberal interpretation of RTM theorems and tailored them to their needs. This
suggests that the new interpretation of RTM fits well with scientific practice in some
areas. At the same time, there are many more areas in which the new interpretation
could help to structure similar exercises.
Consider, for instance the notorious case of personal identity over time in metaphysics
(Noonan, 1989; Olson, 2002). As is well known, there is widespread disagreement over
how to characterise personal identity over time, and the relevant literature is strewn with
paradoxes and thought experiments that seem to pose insurmountable problems for any
theory of personal identity over time. At the same time, these theories have undoubtably
advanced our understanding of their subject. As a brief sketch how RTM theorems could
be helping in further investigating theories of personal identity over time, consider Parfit
(1984) who maintained to view persons as sets of temporal selves, and that personal
identity consists in connectedness, which in turn is determined by an appropriate degree
of psychological continuity between selves. To investigate to what extent the concept of
a degree of psychological continuity can be represented numerically, we can interpret a
QRS 〈X, ◦,<〉 in which X is a set of temporal selves, and ◦ and < are operations that join
and compare the psychological continuity of selves. That is, we can imagine that there is
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a collection of temporal selves all of which might take differing attitudes, and who might
overlap in various ways with each other. It is natural investigate these comparisons with
RTM theorems: do they satisfy certain conditions such that the QRS of temporal selves
and comparisons can be represented by some NRS? If so, we would be able to specify a
concept of psychological continuity that is numerically representable.
Following the new interpretation of RTM is therefore both in line with recent devel-
opments in fields such as linguistics and rational choice, as well as open up applications
of RTM theorems in other areas of inquiry.
4.2 Backwards Engineering of Foundations
A second advantage of the new interpretation of RTM is that it affords us greater flexibility
in ‘backwards engineering’ of foundations. All this means is that in contexts in which we
operate with numbers that lack adequate conceptual and epistemic foundations, we can
investigate what kinds of qualitative relations between what kinds of objects would need
to exist in order to motivate the kind of numbers that are already in use. That is, we
can look at areas of inquiry that use quantities that are not derived from a measurement
process and investigate whether these quantities can be seen as numerical representations
of qualitative relations (and, in turn, whether such a representation can help in devising a
measurement process). This holds especially for the social sciences, for which Cartwright
(2008) already has made the case that RTM theorems can be very useful, even though
she retained their received interpretation.
On the more general interpretation of RTM put forward here, we can jointly endorse
both RTM and the view that there may be concepts relevant for a given area of inquiry
that may not be directly observable. The new interpretation does allow for ‘backwards
engineering’ of conceptual and epistemic foundations in different steps. Suppose there is
some area of scientific inquiry in which numbers are currently used, yet there is ambi-
guity about how these numbers come about, i.e. what their conceptual foundations are
and what they express, such as in happiness measurement and time discount rates in
economics (and similar concepts in psychology, social science, and economics). The new
interpretation of RTM allows firstly to use RTM theorems for conceptual clarification, for
instance by asking in how far the concept of happiness can be represented numerically.
If it is possible to conceive of the concept of happiness as numerically representable in a
RTM theorem, then that is a key step in the investigation of the conceptual foundations.
Secondly, we can also investigate epistemic (or evidential) foundations, by adopting the
traditional interpretation of RTM, asking whether there are indeed empirical relations
that sustain both the concept of happiness and a theorem in RTM.
As another example for backwards engineering of foundations, I highlight the con-
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tentious issue of time discounting in economics. The idea of discounting the future – to
slightly devalue the utility of future events – was introduced into economic theory by
a number of different authors, but most importantly by Ramsey (1928) and Samuelson
(1937, 1939). These authors provided the idea of a discount rate with which future value
would be weighted, which became common practice in economics. Only much later, the
idea of discounting the future was investigated in a more thorough way, providing an
axiomatic basis for it, notably by Koopmans (1960). The result of these developments is
that time discounting is up until this day a contentious subject in economics, with many
applications requiring the use of time discount rate, but with considerable ambiguity and
controversy about descriptive and normative questions about time discounting remaining
(see Frederick et al. (2002) for an overview). Put simply, most economic theorists and
practitioners live by Ramsey’s (1928) dictum that time discounting is ‘a practice which
is . . . indefensible [. . . ] we shall, however, . . . include such a rate of discount in some of
our investigations.’
From the point of view of the new interpretation of RTM, this practice can be seen as
ascribing numbers (discount factors) to future prospects. Naturally, the question arises
whether these numbers are meaningful, i.e. whether they correspond to quantities or
empirical relations. However, since future prospects are not naturally empirical entities
(they are, at best, propositions), RTM in its received interpretation would be inapplicable
– or only applicable in as far as one can formulate future prospects as propositions that
can be subjected to observable choice behaviour. Yet, many descriptive and normative
questions about time discounting go beyond that, such as those that have to do with
future generations, and those for which it is impossible to sensibly formulate choice-ready
propositions, such as ‘branching cases’ considered in theories of personal identity over
time.
In this context, RTM theorems have been used by some authors in both economics
and philosophy, such as Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982); Ok and Masatlioglu (2007);
Heilmann (2008), to investigate how far time discounting factors can be seen as numerical
representations of concepts that are important about the future, such as impatience,
different types of uncertainty, and ethical judgements of various kinds. Yet, most of
these efforts have been bound by the received interpretation of finding corresponding
empirical structures. Investigating hypothetical scenarios and comparisons between them
is something that is only possible once the new interpretation of RTM is adopted.
More generally, any case in which one is confronted with the uses of numbers or the
supposition of quantitative concepts can potentially investigated with the tools of RTM
– if the new interpretation is adopted.
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4.3 Objections
I now turn to two objections against the new interpretation. Firstly, from the point of view
of proponents of RTM as a full-fledged theory of measurement, the new interpretation
might seem as ‘giving in too quickly’. While it is true that the new interpretation does
not endorse RTM as a full-fledged theory of measurement, it is not inconsistent with
it. Rather, it spells out in what way RTM provides a useful tool, regardless of what
general account of measurement they are invested in. Since numerical representability of
concepts is a difficult part in many areas of measurement, rehabilitating RTM as a tool
for those areas is a project that should appeal to the RTM supporter. Whether or not to
additionally claim that RTM is useful beyond the two uses spelled out in the preceding
sections is simply a different question that is independent from the new interpretation
advanced here. Indeed, interpreting the relations as necessarily having empirical content
is a special case of the more general interpretation I put forward here.
Secondly, it is possible to question whether the interpretation advanced here does
make a big difference to RTM and its use. I think such an objection underestimates
both the problems commonly associated with RTM in its received interpretation and
their possible consequences. Since RTM is widely and heavily criticised as a theory of
measurement (see Section 2), there is a real danger that it will be dispensed altogether.
The consequence of that would, in turn, be that exercises as described in Section 4.1
and 4.2, already carried out in some fields, would be without an account that underpins
them. Moreover, the additional perspectives to discuss the numerical representability of
properties of hypothetical entities (such as temporal selves in metaphysics) or reasons
to discount the future which cannot be easily grounded in empirical relations hang on
adopting the new interpretation.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I have proposed to interpret the Representational Theory of Measurement in
a new way, namely as a library of theorems that investigate the numerical representability
of qualitative relations. Such theorems are useful tools for concept formation which, in
turn, can be seen as one crucial aspect of measurement for a broad range of cases in
linguistics, rational choice, metaphysics, and the social sciences. I have suggested that
it is already part of scientific practice to use RTM theorems in such a way, and have
suggested that there are more cases to which they could be fruitfully be applied.
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Theory Testing and Implication in Clinical Trials
March 1, 2014
Abstract
John Worrall (2010) and Nancy Cartwright (2011) argue that randomized controlled
trials (RCTs) are “testing the wrong theory.” RCTs are designed to test inferences about
the causal relationships in the study population, but this does not guarantee a justified in-
ference about the causal relationships in the more diverse population in clinical practice.
In this essay, I argue that the epistemology of theory testing in trials is more complicated
than either Worrall’s or Cartwright’s accounts suggest. I illustrate this more complex
theoretical structure with case-studies in medical theory testing from (1) Alzheimer’s
research and (2) anti-cancer drugs in personalized medicine.
1 Introduction
John Worrall (2010) and Nancy Cartwright (2011) have both argued that there is a mismatch
between the theory being tested in a randomized controlled clinical trial (RCT) and the the-
ory that medical practitioners are actually interested in. Worrall describes this as the problem
of external validity: An RCT may support internally valid inferences about the causal rela-
tionships in the study population, but this does not guarantee a justified inference about the
causal relationships in the target population of interest—i.e., the usually more diverse patient
population that physicians actually encounter in the clinic. Since it is the causal relationship
between treatment and patient outcome in this more diverse population that we ultimately
care about, the RCT is “testing the wrong theory” (p.361). Or as Cartwright puts it: “an RCT
supports only an ‘it-works-somewhere’ claim,” but what we need are justified “it will work
for us” claims (p.1401).
There is something fundamentally correct in both Cartwright’s and Worrall’s arguments:
Many of the experimental components used in RCTs are designed to secure internal validity
at the expense of external validity. Yet, the epistemological relationship between translational
clinical trials (whether randomized or not) and the underlying scientific theories is more
complicated and, in some ways, more subtle than either of their accounts would suggest.
In this essay, I will illustrate this more complex theoretical structure through two examples,
drawn from trials in Alzheimer’s research and anti-cancer drugs for personalized medicine.
I argue that the more complicated epistemology vis-a-vis theory testing revealed in these
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cases illuminates howWorrall’s and Cartwright’s philosophical conclusion relies on an overly
narrow conception of what trials can show.
2 Testing the Wrong Theory
Let us begin, as Worrall does, by imagining an RCT that is evaluating some new intervention
S as a treatment for some condition C in a sample population P. Supposing that the trial
is positive, what can we now conclude? Worrall cautions that we should not conclude the
“dangerously vague” claim that “S is effective for treating C”. Rather, the trial’s result only
warrants a narrower claim that “S when administered in a very particular way to a very
particular set of patients for a particular length of time is more effective than some comparator
treatment” (Worrall, 2010, p.361).
In other words, if we assume that the trial is internally valid, then it only justifies the
claim that “S was effective for condition C in population P”. But the practicing physician
needs to know how or whether this effectiveness claim generalizes to the variations on these
parameters that she is likely to encounter in the clinic. Does the relationship between S andC
also hold for more elderly patients (who are typically excluded from trials)? Does it hold if we
modify the dose and schedule to accommodate patients with co-morbidities or concomitant
medications? Is S also an effective intervention for treating the related condition, C∗? All of
these questions speak to the problem of external validity: An RCT may demonstrate a causal
relationship between S and C in the studied population P. But what we want to know is
whether this relationship holds for S and C in the population P—where S, C, and P are the
respective sets of plausible variations on the intervention, condition, and patient populations
that the physician encounters in clinical practice.
And as Worrall goes on to point out, there are often reasons to doubt that P is a good
representative (or perhaps even a member) of the relevant clinical set P. For example, the
limited observation time in an RCT weakens inferences about the safety of treatments for
chronic diseases, such as diabetes or arthritis. Even though large RCTs for these conditions
will usually include a few years of follow-up, the general patient population is likely to be
taking these medications for decades, and the RCT has not provided any evidence about
such long-term effects. Similarly, some RCTs will include time-consuming procedures or
expensive diagnostics as a part of the treatment regimen. Insofar as these same procedures
or tests are unavailable to the clinician (due to excessive cost, timing, or feasibility), then the
results of the RCT can fail to provide clinically relevant evidence about how the intervention
should be used in practice.
Cartwright (2011) extends this line of argument with some additional analytic resources.
She draws a distinction between experimental “vouchers” and ”clinchers” (cf. Cartwright,
2007). A “voucher” is an experiment that renders its conclusion more probable, whereas a
“clincher” is an experiment that deductively implies its conclusion. As she defines it, an ideal
RCT “where all the requisite premises are met” is a clincher—and this is presumably why
the RCT sits atop the hierarchy of evidence-based medicine.
But what are these “requisite premises” on which the “clinching” depends? Cartwright
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enumerates three of them: (1) probabilistic dependence calls for causal explanation; (2) all
causal features in the study population P relevant to the outcome, except for the treatment,
are equally distributed between the treatment and control arms; and (3) the experimental
treatment S is the only plausible explanation for the observed difference in outcome between
the arms (p.1400).1
Let us set premise (1) aside here, since discussing the necessity (or not) of causal expla-
nations for probabilistic dependence will take us too far afield. Premises (2) and (3) deserve
some attention, however. As Cartwright acknowledges, RCTs are explicitly designed to sat-
isfy these two claims. Random treatment allocation, in particular, is typically justified for
exactly this reason: It controls for all known and unknown confounders in the study popu-
lation. Restrictive eligibility criteria, strict treatment protocols, allocation concealment, and
blinded outcome assessment are also characteristic features of the RCT—all of which are in-
troduced to eliminate the influence of bias, and thereby increase our confidence in premises
2 and 3.
But as Cartwright observes, these methodological steps also render the RCT less like
clinical practice. In the clinic, physicians will often modify a treatment’s dose or schedule,
or even switch patients from one drug to another, in the face of observed inefficacy, adverse
reactions, or side-effects. Patients are also neither blinded to their prescribed treatment nor
prescribed a treatment randomly. And just as Worrall argued, the clinical patient population
P is usually far more diverse than the study population P. Each of these differences between
the RCT and practice weaken the inference (i.e., generalizability) from causal claims about
what occurred in the study to causal claims about what will occur in the clinic.
To resolve this problem, Cartwright argues that we need justified claims about the causal
“capacities” of our treatment S—that is, theoretical warrant for thinking that S is a good
representative of S, C a good representative of C, and P a good representative of P. As she
puts it, we need the theoretical understanding of “why the treatment should have the power
to produce the outcome”. Unfortunately, all we get from an RCT is evidence that the S can
“work somewhere,” but this is not the same as having a justified theory of why we should
expect that “it will work for us” (p.1401).
3 External Validity and Underdetermination
As I suggested above, there is something fundamentally correct in Worrall’s and Cartwright’s
arguments. The RCT is typically designed to ensure internal validity—to “clinch” (to use
Cartwright’s term) the causal hypothesis that the experimental treatment S is efficacious
against condition C in the study’s population P. But as we just saw, the steps taken to guar-
antee the validity of this inference will often weaken its external validity. And this trade-off
1Cartwright does not use these variables in her formulation. I introduce them here to better accord with
the Worrall discussion above, but I trust it does no violence to her account. I have, however, weakened her
third premises. Her original wording—“the only explanation possible is that the treatment caused the outcome”
(p.1400, emphasis added)—is far too strong and inconsistent with any credible account of RCT methodology,
see for example Shadish et al. (2002) or Friedman et al. (2010).
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on internal versus external validity leads us to Worrall and Cartwright conclusions: RCTs are
not testing the right theory. They are not telling us what we need to know.
This conclusion is consonant with others in the medical literature who have called for
more “comparative effectiveness” trials. For example, Tunis et al. (2003) argue that too many
RCTs evaluate the new drug against a placebo comparator, even when there is already a
proven effective treatment available. But if the only evidence about some new drug, A, is
its superiority to placebo, this does not provide clinicians with sufficient knowledge about
whether they should be prescribing A over the old standard of care. It can also be traced back
to Schwartz and Lellouch (1967), who drew a distinction between pragmatic and explan-
tory trials. A pragmatic trial is conducted under conditions similar to clinical practice and
seeks to answer a question about medical decision-making, e.g., “Which treatment should
physicians use in practice?” Whereas an explanatory trial is conducted under “ideal” scien-
tific conditions and seeks to answer a question about scientific understanding, e.g., “What is
the true biological effect of drug S ?” Their philosophical point is similar to Worrall’s and
Cartwright’s: Different experiments can address different theories, so we should be conduct-
ing experiments that answer the questions we are actually interested in. If we want to answer
clinically relevant questions, then we should be conducting pragmatic trials that maximize
external validity.
I take it, however, that Worrall and Cartwright are not simply echoing Schwartz and
Lellouch. They seem to be saying something stronger—namely, that RCTs are testing the
“wrong theory.” But what should we make of this claim? It is certainly true that most RCTs
adopt some version of Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing, and are therefore, strictly speak-
ing, tests of a single hypothesis (or single theory, if you prefer). Yet, it would be a mistake
to think that an RCT has no further theoretical importance. This much follows trivially from
underdetermination: Multiple scientific theories are involved in the design of an experiment
and therefore multiple scientific theories are implicated by the evidence produced—e.g., the-
ories about the therapeutic class (of which the drug is just one member) and its relationship to
disease modification; theories about the diagnostic assays and their relationship to the disease
prognosis; theories of disease ontology and pathophysiology. A negative RCT, for example,
does not necessitate that the researchers reject any causal link between the treatment S and
the condition C. Perhaps S will be effective against C in a slightly different population P∗.
The essential point of underdetermination is that there are always auxiliary hypotheses or
other theoretical modifications that can be made to accommodate the evidence.2
Since it seems unlikely that Worrall and Cartwright would object to the relevance of
theoretical underdetermination in RCTs, perhaps we ought to interpret their conclusion dif-
ferently. Maybe what they are really arguing is that the inferences to these other theories
are not well-justified by the evidence produced in an RCT. Cartwright, in particular, has the
conceptual resources to still conclude that RCTs are not “clinchers”. At best, they are only
“vouchers” for most of the relevant theoretical claims.
2Worrall discusses Duhem’s problem earlier in the same article (Worrall, 2010, p.358), but overlooks its
relevance for his argument on theory testing. See also Anderson (2006), Howick (2009), and Hey and Weijer
(2013) for more details discussions of Duhem’s problem and its importance for understanding the methodology
of clinical trials.
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But if this is really their conclusion, much of the philosophical force of their argument is
lost. If the argument simply is the same as Schwarz and Lellouch’s or Tunis et al.’s—that we
need pragmatic trials to answer (or “vouch for”) clinically relevant questions—then I agree
entirely. But this does not seem consistent with much of what Worrall and Cartwright argue.
Even the most pragmatic trial is still just a “voucher” for clinical effectiveness. It is asking the
more clinically relevant question. Yet, if it differs in any way from the clinical setting, then
on Worrall’s and Cartwright’s view, it does not provide the right kind of evidential support.
Indeed, Cartwright emphasizes that “RCTs do not, without a series of strong assumptions,
warrant predictions about what happens in practice” (p.1400). AndWorrall concludes that we
should really be doing observational studies rather than RCTs (p.362). But these conclusions
seem untenable. Even setting aside the obvious objection toWorrall that observational studies
have their own biases and methodological limitations (and are just as subject to underdeter-
mination), it is much to strong to demand of an experiment that it provide direct evidence
or causal certainty before we can draw externally valid inferences from it. “Clinchers” may
be a worthy philosophical ideal, but it does not follow that this is a plausible experimental
benchmark. Demanding deductive causal certainty is to ask more of an experiment than it
can plausibly provide.
4 Trials and Theoretical Implication
So where does this leave us? I agree with Worrall and Cartwright that the external validity
of RCTs is limited (as it is for every experiment). Yet, the story of clinical trials and theory
testing is more complicated than either of their accounts would seem to suggest. In this
section, I will discuss two examples of theory testing in medical research, each of which
illuminates a number of different ways in which trials have a theoretical import beyond their
specific testing hypothesis.
4.1 The Amyloid Cascade
Much of Alzheimer’s research has been driven by a mechanistic theory of the amyloid cas-
cade, which posits that the characteristic neurodegeneration of Alzheimer’s disease is caused
by amyloid-β plaque accumulation in the brain. However, as Karran et al. (2011) describe,
even as various “amyloid-centric” approaches have failed (e.g., the drugs tramiprosate, taren-
flurbil, semagacestat all failed in development), the fundamental amyloid cascade theory has
not been rejected. It has only been modified. They now distinguish between three different
theoretical amyloid-centric strategies: reducing amyloid-β production, facilitating amyloid-β
clearance, and preventing amyloid-β aggregation (p.700).
The drug company, Genentech’s, anti-amyloid monoclonal antibody, crenezumab, is one
such amyloid-centric drug currently undergoing clinical trials. In fact, it is being tested in
two different Alzheimer’s trials: One is a long-term single arm trial in patients with mild to
moderate Alzheimer’s symptoms; the other is a double-blind RCT testing crenezumab as a
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neuroprotective agent in a genetically homogeneous population in Columbia.3 So what are
the theoretical implications of these trials?
For the single arm study, a negative result would provide evidence that crenezumab is not
an effective strategy for treating Alzheimer’s symptoms. It would also provide evidence that
similar monoclonal antibodies are unlikely to be effective, as well as further evidence for the
growing suspicion that once amyloid-β deposition has begun, removing amyloid-β is unlikely
to offer any therapeutic benefit (Golde et al., 2011). Whereas a positive result would confirm
both (a) that crenezumab and similar monoclonal antibodies may be viable strategies, and (b)
that an amyloid-β clearance strategy is effective.
Similarly, for the RCT in Columbia, a negative result would be evidence against crenezumab’s
effectiveness. It would also provide disconfirming evidence that preventing amyloid-β aggre-
gation offers any neurodegenerative protection. A positive result would confirm both of those
theories: preventing amyloid-β aggregation is a viable strategy and crenezumab, in particular,
is likely to be an effective treatment.
I am happy to grant a possible Cartwright objection here that neither of these trials
“clinch” any of these theoretical claims. But surely the more relevant question is whether
or not these trials provide sufficient evidence for informing clinical decision-making. And
on that point it is instructive to observe that part of the inclusion criteria for the Columbian
RCT is that all patient-subjects must be carriers of a specific gene mutation (PSEN1 E280A),
which is known to cause early-onset Alzheimer’s disease (cf. Belluck, 2012). Supposing that
this trial has a positive result, what are clinicians justified in concluding about other patient
populations at risk for Alzheimer’s? Worrall’s and Cartwright’s arguments imply that clini-
cians would still lack sufficient evidence for prescribing crenezumab outside of that specific
genetic population. But the theoretical warrant from these trials is not so weak. A success for
crenezumab lends evidential support for a range of theoretical propositions, some of which
would be sufficient to justify a clinician’s decision to prescribe an approved anti-amyloid
agent for her Alzheimer’s patients.
And it brings us to the heart of the issue: The directly tested theory in the Columbian
RCT could be thought of as resembling the narrow proposition, much as Worrall originally
construed it: “Crenezumab (S ) is effective for preventing the development of Alzheimer’s
disease (C) in the Columbian patient population possessing the PSEN1 E280A genetic mu-
tation (P).” But this does not exhaust the theoretical relevance of the trial. Whatever its final
result—but particularly if it is positive—researchers and clinicians will be in a better posi-
tion to draw valid (albeit inductive) inferences about future preventative strategies against
Alzheimer’s. Specifically, they would be justified in inferring potential efficacy for other
preventative anti-amyloid interventions (S); extrapolating the strategy for related conditions,
such as sporadic Alzheimer’s (C); or prescribing anti-amyloid medications for other patient
populations at high-risk for developing amyloid-related neurodegenerative diseases (P). To
be sure, these would all still be inferences with some degree of causal uncertainty, but it does
not follow from the lack of certainty that the inferences are unwarranted or unjustified. On
the contrary, if an anti-amyloid strategy is shown to be effective in an RCT, it would arguably
3See http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/results?term=Crenezumab&Search=Search, retrieved February 27, 2014.
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violate the physicians’ duty of care to withhold the treatment.
4.2 Personalized Cancer Medicine
In many ways, the amyloid cascade and Alzheimer’s case is an exemplar for the traditional
model of clinical translation, where the driving theories concern the experimental drug’s
effectiveness and the mechanism of disease. As we saw, a new Alzheimer’s drug that is suc-
cessfully vetted in trials is taken to confirm the particular drug’s effectiveness, the effective-
ness of the strategic class, and the underlying theories of disease pathophysiology. Whereas
the drug’s failure can be attributed to either a problem with one of these theories, a faulty
auxiliary hypothesis, or an operational error in one or more of the experiments.
The development of new personalized medicines (PM), however, is not well-characterized
by this model. The goal in PM is to equip the health-care system with an array of clinically
validated diagnostics, each of which would allow physicians to test their patients for the
presence or absence of a particular biomarker (e.g., a genetic mutation in their tumor spec-
imen), and then use these results to tailor decision-making about the appropriate course of
treatment. If successfully implemented, these biomarker diagnostics would potentially save
the health-care system billions of dollars and prevent needless patient suffering due to futile
interventions.
On its face, the epistemology of PM, in some ways, better accommodates Worrall’s and
Cartwright’s views. That is, PMs are designed to be effective in a very narrowly defined
patient population—i.e., only those patients with the specific biomarker. Thus, the study
population in RCTs for PM is far more likely to resemble the target population in clinical
practice. However, in contrast to the traditional model of medical research and drug devel-
opment, which hinges on effective therapeutic agents, the promise of PM largely depends
upon the development of high-quality biomarker diagnostics. And this further complicates
the theoretical implications of PM trials.
Consider the case of the alkylating agent, temozolomide. This drug was derived from the
older, widely-used (although quite toxic) cancer agent, dacarbazine, and works by attaching
an alkyl group to the cancer cell DNA, disrupting its growth and leading to cell death. Inter-
estingly, despite sharing the same mechanism of action, temozolomide and dacarbazine are
used in differenct cancers. Dacarbazine is approved for use against Hodgkin lymphoma and
melanoma; temozolomide is approved for use against anaplastic astrocytoma and glioblas-
toma multiforme.
Let us label this broadly defined mechanistic theory of using alkylating cancer drugs, T1:
T1 Alkylating agents (S 1 . . . S n) are a viable treatment strategy for some patient popula-
tions (P1 . . . Pn) with some cancers (C1 . . .Cn).
Thus, dacarbazine and temozolomide are two of the agents in the set S 1 . . . S n, and the vari-
ous cancers for which they have been approved are the members of the set C1 . . .Cn. One of
the challenges in cancer treatment is that the patient population that benefits from a particular
agent is not fully determined by their cancer-type. For example, not all patients with glioblas-
toma will benefit from temozolmide therapy. And this is where diagnostic biomarker assays
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come into play. Indeed, the theory underlying all of PM is that there are genetic markers in a
patient’s tumor which can predict whether or not they are likely to benefit from a treatment.
One of the proposed biomarkers for temozolomide is the DNA repair gene O-6-methylguanine-
DNA methyltransferase, typically abbreviated as “MGMT”. A landmark study by Hegi et al.
(2004) identified a positive correlation between patient tumor response to temozolomide ther-
apy and high levels of methylated MGMT expression in their tumor specimens. Their con-
clusion can be characterized by the more specific theoretical hypothesis, T2:
T2 Temozolomide chemotherapy (S g) is most likely to be effective against glioblastoma
tumors (Cg) for those patients whose tumor specimens express high levels of methy-
lated MGMT (Pg).
We can think of T2 as a sub-theory of T1, since it describes a relationship among a single
triad of the treatment-condition-population parameters. And although T1 is uncontroversial
and has already been taken up in clinical practice, T2 is still being rigorously evaluated in
trials.4 But just as we saw with the amyloid cascade theory and crenezumab, a positive or
negative result in any of these trials has theoretical implications for both T1 and T2.
Yet, many of these trials have an additional dimension of uncertainty derived from the pre-
dictivity of the diagnostic assay (or assays) used to assess the methylated MGMT biomarker.
There are multiple techniques that can be used to determine the level of methylated MGMT
in a specimen and these different techniques do not all discriminate the glioblastoma patients
in the same way. In effect, they each define the target population Pg differently. One re-
cent study, for example, compared the sensitivity and specificity of a methylation-specific
polymerase chain reaction (MS-PCR) assay, which amplifies the relevant CpG islands of the
tumor specimen’s DNA, against an immunohistochemistry staining (IHC) assay, which as-
sesses the reactivity of tumor cells against a specific antibody (Lechapt-Zalcman et al., 2012).
They found that although both assays positively predicted benefit from temozolomide ther-
apy, the agreement between them was only about 70%. That is, 30% of the samples tested
positive for methylated MGMT on one test, but negative on the other.
This makes the recommendation for clinical practice more problematic. What is the true
patient population for our theory T2? Is it the patients whose samples test positive on MS-
PCR or IHC? A clinician’s decision to recommend temozolomide now hinges, in part, on
their selection of assay.
Lechapt-Zalcman et al. (2012) attribute this discrepancy largely to false-positives with the
IHC, which on its face, would seem to suggest that MS-PCR is the better assay for defining
the population Pg (p.4553). But they also note that the accuracy of MS-PCR depends upon
high-quality cryopreserved tumor specimens, which is expensive and not widely available
in the clinical setting (p.4552). Thus, despite its being the less accurate of the two assays,
an IHC assay may be the more clinically useful diagnostic. And this brings us back to the
problem of external validity. If MS-PCR is too expensive and unlikely to be used in the
clinic, then the Worrall or Cartwright arguments would suggest that future trials ought to only
4At the time of this writing, 10 trials are registered on clinicaltrials.gov examining the implications of temo-
zolomide and MGMT for the treatment of glioblastoma.
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investigate IHC. Since IHC is the technique available to clinicians, then presumably, what
clinicians want is evidence about its capacity to delineate the responding patient population
Pg.
Unfortunately, even this seemingly reasonable suggestion still relies on an oversimplifi-
cation of the theoretical implications in these studies. To wit, we should observe that the
effective use of a diagnostic test depends on knowing its misclassification rate, i.e., the false-
positive and false-negative error rates. If a gold-standard diagnostic exists—that is, a diag-
nostic with perfect sensitivity and specificity—then these error rates are easy to determine.
One can simply compare the classification of the imperfect diagnostic, e.g., IHC, to the clas-
sification according to the gold-standard. Of course, in practice, there are no gold-standards.
Every diagnostic is imperfect. However, there are validated techniques for accurately esti-
mating the error rates of a test on the basis of multiple diagnostics. In essence, these are
robustness strategies, which use multiple independent (or sometimes conditionally depen-
dent) tests in order to arrive at estimates for the error rates of each individual diagnostic
(Joseph et al., 1995).
And indeed, relying on multiple diagnostics is precisely the strategy adopted in some of
the more recent temozolomide studies (cf. Lalezari et al., 2013). Given that IHC is known
to be inaccurate, researchers in these trials can use other, more accurate diagnostics (e.g.,
MS-PCR, pyrosequencing) in combination with IHC in order to derive better estimates for
the error rates when using a single IHC diagnostic test. These estimates can then be used by
clinicians, who may only have access to one diagnostic method, to make informed decisions
about their patient’s true biomarker status and potential benefit from temozolomide therapy.
The essential philosophical point here is that these rigorous biomarker studies do have
weaker external validity. They employ multiple diagnostics and robustness strategies, which
may be unavailable or unwieldy in clinical practice. Yet, their use of multiple diagnostics to-
ward a more robust theoretical understanding of the various individual techniques is precisely
what makes them informative for clinical practice. Contrary to Cartwright’s claim, these ex-
planatory (or “ideal”) trials are addressing the clinically relevant theoretical question—“What
is the accuracy of IHC for predicting response to temozolomide?” This is exactly the kind of
information that clinicians need to know in order to make the most of PM in cancer.
5 Conclusion
What theory or theories are tested in clinical trials? I have argued here that the answer to this
question is more complicated than suggested by either Worrall (2010) or Cartwright (2011) in
their critiques of RCTs. Their emphasis on the problem of external validity is helpful, insofar
as it draws greater attention to the need for studies that address clinically relevant questions.
But their stronger conclusion against the theoretical warrant provided by RCTs relies on a
significant oversimplification of trial epistemology.
As the problem of underdetermination entails, there are many theoretical implications of
trials. The focal testing hypothesis of the form “Treatment S is effective for condition C in
population P” is but one of the many theoretical claims that can be justifiably confimred,
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modified, or refuted in light of an trial’s result. RCTs also generate evidence that is rele-
vant for general theories about the viability of the mechanistic strategy, or the underlying
pathophysiological theories of the disease, or the theories concerning biomarkers, diagnostic
assays, and the predictive relationship that these bear to patient prognosis and treatment. All
of these moving theoretical parts are potentially implicated. To suggest otherwise assumes
an overly narrow and untenable view about what RCTs can show.
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Bell's loal ausality for philosophers
Gábor Hofer-Szabó
∗
Péter Vesernyés
†
Abstrat
This paper is the philosopher-friendly version of our more tehnial work (Hofer-Szabó and Veser-
nyés, 2014). It aims to give a lear-ut denition of Bell's notion of loal ausality. Having provided a
framework, alled loal physial theory, whih integrates probabilisti and spatiotemporal onepts,
we formulate the notion of loal ausality and relate it to other loality and ausality onepts. Then
we ompare Bell's loal ausality with Reihenbah's Common Cause Priniple and relate both to the
Bell inequalities. We nd a nie parallelism: both loal ausality and the Common Cause Priniple
are more general notions than aptured by the Bell inequalities. Namely, Bell inequalities annot
be derived neither from loal ausality nor from a ommon ause unless the loal physial theory is
lassial or the ommon ause is ommuting, respetively.
Key words: loal ausality, Bell inequality, ommon ause
1 Introdution
Loal ausality is the priniple that ausal proesses annot propagate faster than the speed of light.
This does not mean that in a physial theory subjet to this priniple no orrelation between spatially
separated events an exist; a orrelation an well be brought about by a ommon ause in the past of the
events in question. However, sine all ausal proesses propagate within the lightone, xing the past of
an event in a detailed enough manner, the state of this event will be xed one and for all, and no other
spatially separated event an ontribute to it any more.
In a nutshell, this is the idea whih beomes primary fous in John Bell's (2004) seminal papers
initiating a whole researh program in the foundations of quantum theory. In these papers Bell translated
the intuitive idea of loal ausality into a probabilisti language opening the door to treat the priniple
in a theoretial setting and to test its experimental validity via the Bell inequalities derived from the
priniple. The logial sheme of this translation was the following: if physial events are loalized
in the spaetime in a ertain independent way, then these events are to satisfy ertain probabilisti
independenies. This manual was highly intuitive, however, to apply it in a formally orret way one
had to wait until the advent of a mathematially well-dened and physially well-motivated formalism
whih is able to integrate spatiotemporal and probabilisti onepts. Without suh a framework one
ould not aount for the (otherwise intuitive) inferene from relations between spaetime regions to
probabilisti independenies between, say, random variables. The most elaborate formalism oering suh
a general framework is quantum eld theory, or its algebrai-axiomati form, algebrai quantum eld
theory (AQFT).
Thus, it omes as no surprise that AQFT has soon beome an important medium to pursue researh
on the Bell inequalities (Summers, 1987a,b; Summers and Werner, 1988; Halvorson 2007); relativisti
ausality (Buttereld 1995, 2007; Earman and Valente, 2014); or the losely related (see below) Common
Cause Priniple (Rédei 1997; Rédei and Summers 2002; Hofer-Szabó and Vesernyés 2012a, 2013a). In
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this paper we follow the route pioneered by the algebraists, but we do not go as far as AQFT. Our aim
is simply to establish a minimal framework whih is needed to formulate Bell's notion of loal ausality
in a strit fashion. Thus we will borrow only a part of AQFT to represent something whih we will all
a loal physial theory. A loal physial theory is a formal struture integrating the two most important
omponents of a general physial theory: spaetime struture and algebrai-probabilisti struture. Our
seondary aim in this paper is to larify the relation of Bell's loal ausality to suh other important
notions as loal primitive ausality, Common Cause Priniple and the Bell inequalities.
There is a renewed interest in a deeper oneptual and formal understanding of Bell's notion of loal
ausality. Travis Norsen illuminating paper on loal ausality (Norsen, 2011) or its relation to Jarrett's
ompleteness riterion (Norsen, 2009); the paper of Seevink and Unk (2011) aiming at providing
a 'sharp and lean' formulation of loal ausality; or Henson's (2013) paper on the relation between
separability and the Bell inequalities are all examples of this inquiry. Our researh runs parallelly in
some respet to these investigations and we will omment on the points of ontat underway.
In Setion 2 we x our mathematial framework, alled loal physial theory and list some important
relativisti ausality priniples. In Setion 3 we formulate Bell's notion of loal ausality in a loal physial
theory. In Setion 4 we ompare loal ausality with the Common Cause Priniple and relate both to
the Bell inequalities. We onlude the paper in Setion 5.
This paper is the philosopher-friendly version of our more detailed and more tehnial work (Hofer-
Szabó and Vesernyés, 2014). Many points (suh as loal ausality in a non-atomi loal physial theory;
loal ausality in stohasti dynamis; its omplex relation to other loality and ausality onepts, et.)
whih are treated in a more oneptual way here obtain a more detailed mathematial analysis there. We
will not refer to these results point-by-point in the paper.
2 What is a loal physial theory?
First we set the framework, alled loal physial theory, within whih probabilisti and spatiotemporal
notions an be treated in an integrated way.
Denition 1. A PK-ovariant loal physial theory is a net {A(V ), V ∈ K} assoiating algebras of events
to spaetime regions whih satises isotony, miroausality and ovariane dened as follows (Haag, 1992):
1. Isotony. Let M be a globally hyperboli spaetime and let K be a overing olletion of bounded,
globally hyperboli subspaetime regions ofM suh that (K,⊆) is a direted poset under inlusion
⊆. The net of loal observables is given by the isotone map K ∋ V 7→ A(V ) to unital C∗-algebras,
that is V1 ⊆ V2 implies that A(V1) is a unital C∗-subalgebra of A(V2). The quasiloal algebra A is
dened to be the indutive limit C∗-algebra of the net {A(V ), V ∈ K} of loal C∗-algebras.
2. Miroausality (also alled as Einstein ausality) is the requirement that A(V ′)′∩A ⊇ A(V ), V ∈ K,
where primes denote spaelike omplement and algebra ommutant, respetively.
3. Spaetime ovariane. Let PK be the subgroup of the group P of geometri symmetries of M
leaving the olletion K invariant. A group homomorphism α : PK → AutA is given suh that the
automorphisms αg, g ∈ PK of A at ovariantly on the observable net: αg(A(V )) = A(g ·V ), V ∈ K.
If the quasiloal algebra A of the loal physial theory is ommutative, we speak about a loal lassial
theory ; if it is nonommutative, we speak about a loal quantum theory. For loal lassial theories
miroausality fullls trivially.
A state φ in a loal physial theory is dened as a normalized positive linear funtional on the quasiloal
observable algebra A. The orresponding GNS representation πφ : A → B(Hφ) onverts the net of C∗-
algebras into a net of C∗-subalgebras of B(Hφ). Closing these subalgebras in the weak topology one
arrives at a net of loal von Neumann observable algebras: N (V ) := πφ(A(V ))
′′, V ∈ K. Von Neumann
2
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algebras are generated by their projetions, whih are alled quantum events sine they an be interpreted
as 0-1valued observables. The net {N (V ), V ∈ K} of loal von Neumann algebras also obeys isotony,
miroausality, and PK-ovariane, hene one an also refer to a net {N (V ), V ∈ K} of loal von Neumann
algebras as a loal physial theory. Although, the loal σ-algebras of lassial observable events provided
by the projetions of the loal abelian von Neumann algebras are not the most general σ-algebras, still
they provide us a rih enough set of examples for lassial theories.
One an introdue a number of important loality and ausality onepts into the above formalism. Here
we only list them in turn and assert their logial relations; for the motivation of these onepts see
(Earman and Valente, 2014).
Loal primitive ausality. For any globally hyperboli bounded subspaetime region V ∈ K, A(V ′′) =
A(V ).
A loal physial theory satisfying loal primitive ausality also satises the following two properties:
Loal determinism. For any two states φ and φ′ and for any globally hyperboli spaetime region V ∈ K,
if φ|A(V ) = φ
′|A(V ) then φ|A(V ′′) = φ
′|A(V ′′).
Stohasti Einstein loality. Let VA, VC ∈ K suh that VC ⊂ J−(VA) and VA ⊂ V ′′C . If φ|A(VC ) = φ
′|A(VC)
holds for any two states φ and φ′ on A then φ(A) = φ′(A) for any projetion A ∈ A(VA).
If a net satises Haag duality:
A(V ′)′ ∩ A = A(V ) (1)
for all bounded globally hyperboli subspaetime region V , whih is a stronger requirement than miro-
ausality, then it also satises loal primitive ausality. But miroausality alone does not entail loal
primitive ausality.
A global version of loal primitive ausality (entailed by the loal one) is
Primitive ausality. Let K(C) ⊆ K be a overing olletion of a Cauhy surfae C and let A(K(C)) be the
orresponding algebra. Then A(K(C)) = A.
A loal physial theory with primitive ausality satises
Determinism. If φ|A(KC) = φ
′|A(KC) for any two states φ and φ
′
on A then φ = φ′.
In the rest of the paper a loal physial theory obeys only isotony, miroausality, and PK-ovariane
by denition without any other loality and ausality onstraints. We turn now to Bell's notion of loal
ausality.
3 Bell's notion of loal ausality in a loal physial theory
Loal ausality has been playing a entral notion in Bell's inuential writings on the foundations of
quantum theory. To our knowledge it gets an expliit formulation three times: in (Bell, 1975/2004 , p.
54), (Bell, 1986/2004, p. 200), and (Bell, 1990/2004, p. 239-240). In this latter posthumously published
paper La nouvelle uisine, for example, loal ausality is formulated as follows:
1
A theory will be said to be loally ausal if the probabilities attahed to values of loal beables
in a spae-time region VA are unaltered by speiation of values of loal beables in a spae-
like separated region VB, when what happens in the bakward light one of VA is already
1
For the sake of uniformity we slightly hanged Bell's denotation and gures.
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suiently speied, for example by a full speiation of loal beables in a spae-time region
VC .  (Bell, 1990/2004, p. 239-240)
(For a reprodution of the gure Bell is attahing to this formulation see Fig. 1 with Bell's aption.) Bell
V
V V
C
A B
Figure 1: Full speiation of what happens in VC makes events in VB irrelevant for preditions about
VA in a loally ausal theory.
elaborates on his formulation as follows:
It is important that region VC ompletely shields o from VA the overlap of the bakward
light ones of VA and VB. And it is important that events in VC be speied ompletely.
Otherwise the traes in region VB of auses of events in VA ould well supplement whatever
else was being used for alulating probabilities about VA. The hypothesis is that any suh
information about VB beomes redundant when VC is speied ompletely. (Bell, 1990/2004,
p. 240)
The notions featuring in Bell's formulation has been target of intensive disussion in philosophy of siene.
Here we would like to give only a brief exposé of them.
The notion beable is Bell's neologism. (See Norsen 2009, 2011.) The beables of the theory are
those entities in it whih are, at least tentatively, to be taken seriously, as orresponding to something
real (Bell, 1990/2004, p. 234). The lariation of the beables of a given theory is indispensable in
order to dene loal ausality sine there are things whih do go faster than light. British sovereignty
is the lassial example. When the Queen dies in London (long may it be delayed) the Prine of Wales,
leturing on modern arhiteture in Australia, beomes instantaneously King (p. 236).
Beables are to be loal: Loal beables are those whih are denitely assoiated with partiular spae-
time regions. The eletri and magneti elds of lassial eletromagnetism, E(t, x) and B(t, x) are again
examples. (p. 234). Furthermore, loal beables are to speify ompletely region VC in order to blok
ausal inuenes arriving at VA from the ommon past of VA and VB. (For the question of omplete vs.
suient speiation see (Seevink and Unk, 2014).)
One an translate Bell's above terms in the following way. In a lassial eld theory beables are
haraterized by sets of eld ongurations. Taking the equivalene lasses of those eld ongurations
whih have the same eld values on a given spaetime region one an generate loal σ-algebras. Translating
σ-algebras into the language of abelian von Neumann algebras one an apture Bell's notion of loal
beables in the framework of a loal physial theory. More generally, one an use the term loal beables
both for abelian and also for non-abelian loal von Neumann algebras, hene treating loal lassial and
quantum theories on an equal footing.
How to translate the term omplete speiation? Complete speiation of eld ongurations
in a given spaetime region means that one speies the eld values to a presribed value in the given
spaetime region, that is one speies the orresponding loal equivalene lass of a single onguration.
In probabilisti language omplete speiation is translated into a probability measure having support
4
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on this loal equivalene lass of the single speied onguration. In the abelian von Neumann language
this orresponds to a hange of the original state that results in a pure state on the loal von Neumann
algebra in question with value 1 on the projetion orresponding to the loal equivalene lass of the
single speied onguration. We also would like this hange of states to be as loal as possible. Both
pureness and loality an be aptured in a general loal physial theory by some onditions imposed on a
ompletely positive map generating the hange of states. If the loal algebras of the net are atomi (whih,
by the way, is not the ase in a general AQFT), the hange of states an be generated by onditioning
the original state on an arbitrary atomi event (a minimal projetion) in the loal algebra. In this ase
omplete speiation of beables will mean a so-alled seletive measurement by an atomi event in a
loal algebra (Henson, 2013). With these notions in hand we an formulate Bell's notion of loal ausality
in loal physial theories:
2
Denition 2. A loal physial theory represented by a net {N (V ), V ∈ K} of von Neumann algebras
is alled (Bell) loally ausal, if for any pair A ∈ N (VA) and B ∈ N (VB) of projetions supported in
spaelike separated regions VA, VB ∈ K and for every loally normal and faithful state φ establishing a
orrelation, φ(AB) 6= φ(A)φ(B), between A and B, and for any spaetime region VC suh that
(i) VC ⊂ J−(VA),
(ii) VA ⊂ V ′′C ,
(iii) J−(VA) ∩ J−(VB) ∩
(
J+(VC) \ VC
)
= ∅,
(see Fig. 2) and for any atomi event Ck of A(VC) (k ∈ K), the following holds:
VA B
C
V
V
Figure 2: A region VC satisfying Requirements (i)-(iii).
φ(CkABCk)
φ(Ck)
=
φ(CkACk)
φ(Ck)
φ(CkBCk)
φ(Ck)
(2)
Remarks:
1. Again we stress that Denition 2 aptures loal ausality only for loal physial theories with atomi
loal von Neumann algebras.
2. In ase of lassial theories a loally faithful state φ determines a loally nonzero probability measure
p by p(A) := φ(A) > 0, A ∈ P(N (V )). By means of this (2) an be written in the following
'symmetri' form:
p(AB|Ck) = p(A|Ck)p(B|Ck) (3)
2
For a similar approah to loal ausality using σ-algebras see (Henson, 2013); for a omparison of the two approahes
see our (Hofer-Szabó and Vesernyés 2014).
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or equivalent in the 'asymmetri' form:
p(A|BCk) = p(A|Ck) (4)
sometimes used in the literature (for example in (Bell, 1975/2004 , p. 54)).
3. The role of Requirement (iii) in the denition is to ensure that VC shields o from VA the overlap
of the bakward light ones of VA and VB. Namely, a spaetime region above VC in the ommon
past of the orrelating events (see Fig. 3) may ontain stohasti events whih, though ompletely
VA B
C
V
V
Figure 3: A region VC for whih Requirement (iii) does not hold.
speied by the region VC , still, being stohasti, ould establish a orrelation between A and B in
a lassial stohasti theory (Norsen, 2011; Seevink and Unk 2011). If VC is a piee of a Cauhy
surfae Requirement (iii) oinides with Requirement (iv):
(iv) J−(VA) ∩ J−(VB) ∩ VC = ∅
visualized in Fig. 4. However, for algebras orresponding to overings of Cauhy surfaes Require-
VA B
C
V
V
Figure 4: A region VC for whih Requirement (iv) holds.
ment (iii) is weaker than Requirement (iv) sine it allows for regions penetrating into the top part
of the ommon past. For loal lassial theories Requirement (iii) is enough, but for loal quantum
theories Requirement (iv) should be used.
Of ourse the main question is how to ensure that a loal physial theory is loally ausal. Generally
the question is diult to answer; here we simply mention a suient ondition in ase of atomi loal
algebras:
6
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1. A loal lassial theory is loally ausal if the loal von Neumann algebras are atomi and satisfy
loal primitive ausality.
Proof. Due to isotony and loal primitive ausality N (VA) ⊂ N (V
′′
C ) = N (VC) and hene for any
atom Ck of N (VC): either (i) ACk = 0 or (ii) ACk = Ck. In ase of (i) both sides of (2) is zero, in
ase of (ii) (2) holds as follows:
φ(ABCk)
φ(Ck)
=
φ(BCk)
φ(Ck)
=
φ(ACk)
φ(Ck)
φ(BCk)
φ(Ck)
. (5)
2. A loal quantum theory is loally ausal if the loal von Neumann algebras are atomi and satisfy
loal primitive ausality, and if Requirement (iii) in the denition of loal ausality is replaed by
Requirement (iv).
Proof. Sine region VC is spatially separated from region VB, B ∈ N (VB) and an atomi event
Ck ∈ N (VC) will ommute due to miroausality. Using CkACk = r Ck (where r ∈ [0, 1] depends
on both A and Ck) we obtain:
φ(CkABCk)
φ(Ck)
=
φ(CkACkB)
φ(Ck)
= r
φ(CkB)
φ(Ck)
=
φ(CkACk)
φ(Ck)
φ(BCk)
φ(Ck)
. (6)
Looking at Point 2 the reader may justly ask: how an a loal quantum theory be loally ausal if loal
ausality implies various Bell inequalities, whih are known to be violated for ertain set of quantum
orrelations. Does Denition 2 orretly grasp Bell's intuition of loal ausality? We answer these
questions in the next setion.
4 Loal ausality, Common Cause Priniple and the Bell inequal-
ities
Loal ausality is losely related to Reihenbah's (1956) Common Cause Priniple. The Common Cause
Priniple (CCP) states that if there is a orrelation between two events A and B and there is no diret
ausal (or logial) onnetion between the orrelating events, then there always exists a ommon ause C
of the orrelation. Reihenbah's original lassial probabilisti denition of the ommon ause an readily
be generalized to the loal physial theory framework. (See (Rédei 1997, 1998), (Rédei and Summers
2002, 2007), (Hofer-Szabó and Vesernyés 2012, 2013) and (Hofer-Szabó, Rédei and Szabó 2013).)
Let {N (V ), V ∈ K} be a net representing a loal physial theory. Let A ∈ N (VA) and B ∈ N (VB)
be two events (projetions) supported in spaelike separated regions VA, VB ∈ K whih orrelate in a
loally normal and faithful state φ. The ommon ause of the orrelation is an event sreening o the
orrelating events from one another and loalized in the past of A and B. But in whih past? Here one
has (at least) three options. One an loalize C either (i) in the union J−(VA) ∪ J−(VB) or (ii) in the
intersetion J−(VA) ∩ J−(VB) of the ausal past of the regions VA and VB ; or (iii) more restritively in
∩x∈VA∪VB J−(x), that is in the spaetime region whih lies in the intersetion of ausal pasts of every
point of VA ∪ VB . We will refer to the above three pasts in turn as the weak past, ommon past, and
strong past of A and B, respetively (Rédei, Summers, 2007).
Depending on the hoie of the past we an dene various CCPs in a loal physial theory:
Denition 3. A loal physial theory represented by a net {N (V ), V ∈ K} is said to satisfy the
(Weak/Strong) CCP, if for any pair A ∈ N (VA) and B ∈ N (VB) of projetions supported in spae-
like separated regions VA, VB ∈ K and for every loally faithful state φ establishing a orrelation between
A and B, there exists a nontrivial ommon ause system, that is a set of mutually orthogonal projetions
{Ck}k∈K ⊂ N (VC), VC ∈ K summing up to the unit of the algebra, satisfying
φ(CkABCk)
φ(Ck)
=
φ(CkACk)
φ(Ck)
φ(CkBCk)
φ(Ck)
, for all k ∈ K (7)
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suh that the loalization region of VC is in the (weak/strong) ommon past of VA and VB .
A ommon ause is alled nontrivial if Ck 6≤ X with X = A,A⊥, B or B⊥ for some k ∈ K. If
{Ck}k∈K ommutes with both A and B, then we all it a ommuting ommon ause system, otherwise a
nonommuting one, and the appropriate CCP a Commutative/Nonommutative CCP.
The status of these six dierent notions of the CCP has been thoroughly srutinized in a speial loal
quantum theory, namely algebrai quantum eld theory (AQFT). Here we only give a brief overview.
The question whether the Commutative CCPs are valid in a Poinaré ovariant loal quantum theory
was rst raised by Rédei (1997, 1998). As an answer, Rédei and Summers (2002, 2007) have shown that
the Commutative Weak CCP is valid in Poinaré ovariant AQFT. Sine loal algebras in a Poinaré
ovariant AQFT are atomless (type III) von Neumann algebras, the question has been raised whether
Commutative Weak CCP is valid in loal quantum theories with loally nite dimensional, hene atomi
loal von Neumann algebras. Deiding the question, Hofer-Szabó and Vesernyés (2012a) have given an
example in the loal quantum Ising model where the Commutative Weak CCP is not valid. A natural
reation to these fats was to ask what role ommutativity plays in these propositions. Addressing this
question, Hofer-Szabó and Vesernyés (2013) have shown that allowing ommon auses not to ommute
with the orrelating events, the Nonommutative Weak CCP an be proven in loal (UHF-type) quantum
theories with nite dimensional loal von Neumann algebras.
Conerning the Commutative (Strong) CCP less is known. If one also admits projetions loalized
only in unbounded regions, then the Strong CCP is known to be false: von Neumann algebras pertaining
to omplementary wedges ontain orrelated projetions but the strong past of suh wedges is empty
(see (Summers and Werner, 1988) and (Summers, 1990)). In spaetimes having horizons, e.g. those
with RobertsonWalker metri, the ommon past of spaelike separated bounded regions an be empty,
although there are states whih provide orrelations among loal algebras orresponding to these regions
(Wald 1992). Hene, CCP is not valid there. Restriting ourselves to projetions in loal algebras on
Minkowski spaetimes the situation is not lear. We are of the opinion that one annot deide on the
validity of the (Strong) CCP in this ase without an expliit referene to the dynamis.
Now, what is the relationship between the various CCPs and Bell's loal ausality? The following list
of prima faie similarities and dierenes may help to expliate this relationship:
Similarities:
1. Both loal ausality and the CCPs are properties of a loal physial theory represented by a net
{N (V ), V ∈ K}.
2. The ore mathematial requirement of both priniples is the sreening-o ondition (2) or equiva-
lently (7).
3. The Bell inequalities an be derived from both priniples. (But see below.)
Dierenes:
1. In ase of loal ausality the sreening-o ondition (2) is required for every atomi event (satisfying
ertain loalization onditions). In ase of the CCP for every orrelation only a single subset of
events is postulated satisfying the sreening-o ondition (7).
2. In ase of loal ausality the sreening-o ondition is required only for atomi events. In ase of
the CCPs these atomi sreener-os of the algebra A(VC) are alled trivial, sine they sreen any
orrelation o. What one is typially looking for are nontrivial ommon auses.
3. In ase of loal ausality sreener-os are loalized 'asymmetrially' in the past of VA; in ase of
the CCP they are loalized 'symmetrially' in either the weak, ommon or strong past of VA and
VB .
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Let us ome bak to Point 1 of the Similarities, that is to the relation of loal ausality and the CCPs to
the Bell inequalities. In (Hofer-Szabó and Vesernyés, 2013b, Proposition 2) we have proven a proposition
whih laries the relation between the CCPs and the Bell inequalities. It asserts that the Bell inequalities
an be derived from the existene of a (loal, non-onspiratorial joint) ommon ause system for a set of
orrelations if ommon auses are understood as ommuting ommon auses. However, if we also allow
for nonommuting ommon auses, the Bell inequalities an be derived only for another state whih is
not idential to the original one. And indeed in (Hofer-Szabó and Vesernyés, 2013a,b) a nonommuting
ommon ause was onstruted for a set of orrelations violating the ClauserHorne inequality. Moreover,
this ommon ause was loalized in the strong past of the orrelating events.
Now, an analogous proposition holds for the relation between loal ausality and the Bell inequalities.
We assert here only the proposition without the proof sine the proof is step-by-step the same as that of
the proposition mentioned above.
Proposition 1. Let {N (V ), V ∈ K} be a loally ausal loal physial theory with atomi (type I)
loal von Neumann algebras. Let A1, A2 ∈ A(VA) and B1, B2 ∈ A(VB) be four projetions loalized in
spaelike separated spaetime regions VA and VB , respetively, whih pairwise orrelate in the loally
faithful state φ that is
φ(AmBn) 6= φ(Am)φ(Bn) (8)
for any m,n = 1, 2. Let furthermore {Ck}k∈K ⊂ N (VC), VC ∈ K be a maximal partition of the unit,
where the set {Ck}k∈K ontains mutually orthogonal atomi projetions satisfying Requirements (i)-(iii)
in Denition 2 of loal ausality. Then the ClauserHorne inequality
−1 6 φ{Ck}(A1B1 +A1B2 +A2B1 −A2B2 −A1 −B1) 6 0. (9)
holds for the state φ{Ck}(X) :=
∑
k φ(CkXCk). If {Ck} ommutes with A1, A2, B1 and B2, then the
ClauserHorne inequality holds for the original state φ:
−1 6 φ(A1B1 +A1B2 +A2B1 −A2B2 − A1 −B1) 6 0. (10)
The moral is the same as in the ase of the CCPs: the Bell inequalities an be derived in a loally ausal
loal physial theory only for a modied state φ{Ck}; it an be derived for the original state φ if the set
of atomi projetions {Ck} loalized in VC ommutes with A1, A2, B1 and B2. What is needed for this
to be the ase?
In loal lassial theories any element taken from any loal algebra will ommute, therefore the Bell
inequalities will hold in loal lassial theories. In loally ausal loal quantum theories, ommutativity
of {Ck} and the orrelating events is not guaranteed. If VC is spatially separated from VB (due to
Requirement (iv) in Denition 2), then {Ck} will ommute with B1 and B2 and hene (2) will be
satised. However, for nonommuting A1 and A2 one annot pik a maximal partition {Ck} ommuting
with both projetions, and therefore the theorem of total probability,
∑
k φ(CkAmCk) = φ(Am), will not
hold for the original state φ at least for one of the projetions A1 and A2 (it will hold only for the state
φ{Ck}). This fat bloks the derivation of Bell inequalities for the original state φ. (For the details see
(Hofer-Szabó and Vesernyés, 2013b, p. 410) In short, the Bell inequalities an be derived in a loally
ausal loal quantum theory only if all the projetions ommute.
Coming bak to the question posed at the end of the previous Setion, namely how a loal quantum
theory an be loally ausal in the fae of the Bell inequalities, we already know the answer: the Bell
inequalities an be derived from loal ausality if it is required that the 'beables' of the loal theory are
represented by ommutative loal algebras. This fat is ompletely analogous to the relation shown in
(Hofer-Szabó and Vesernyés, 2013b), namely that the Bell inequalities an be derived from a (loal,
non-onpiratorial, joint) ommon ause system if it is a ommuting ommon ause system. Thus, the
9
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -312-
violation of the Bell inequalities for ertain quantum orrelations is ompatible with loally ausal loal
quantum theories but not with loally ausal loal lassial theories. Loal ausality is a more general
notion than aptured by the Bell inequalities.
5 Conlusions
In this paper we have shown the following:
(i) Bell's notion of loal ausality presupposes a lear-ut framework in whih probabilisti and spa-
tiotemporal entities an be related. This aim an be reahed by introduing the notion of a loal
physial theory represented by an isotone net of algebras.
(ii) Within this general framework we have dened Bell's notion of loal ausality and shown suient
onditions on whih loal physial theories will be loally ausal.
(iii) Finally, we pointed out some important similarities and dierenes between loal ausality and
the CCPs and showed that in a loally ausal loal quantum theory one annot derive the Bell
inequalities from loal ausality just as one annot derive them from nonommuting ommon auses.
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DERIVING GENERAL RELATIVITY FROM STRING THEORY
NICK HUGGETT, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO
AND
TIZIANA VISTARINI, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
1. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to explain the significance of the conformal symmetry of string
theory. Along the way we will introduce the basics of string theory in a streamlined fashion,
drawing on familiar ideas from classical and quantum field theory. We will then explain how
general relativity is a ‘consequence’ of string theory: not merely in the sense that it contains
massless spin-2 particles – gravitons – but in the very strong sense that the coherent states
of the graviton obey the Einstein field equations – gravitons truly form the gravitational
field. This result follows from reimposing conformal symmetry in quantized string theory;
so in the final section of the paper we sketch some more esoteric considerations justifying
this assumption.
2. The Formalism
2.1. The Classical String. We will start with a classical relativistic string1, an object of
one spatial dimension and one temporal dimension – it’s best to think of it as a spacetime
object from the get go. Let us suppose that it is ‘closed’, meaning that its ends are joined
into a loop (figure 2.1 shows an open string – to close it, the timelike edges should be
identified). Our string is free, subject to internal tension, but (for now) under the influence
of no external forces, including gravity, so that it lives in Minkowski spacetime, with metric
ηµν . Suppose that the points of the string come labelled with ‘internal spacetime coordi-
nates’ τ and σ (later σ0 and σ1); while ‘external’ or ‘target’ spacetime has coordinates X
µ
(µ = 0, 1, . . . , D−1). Then we can describe the string worldsheet in spacetime by assigning
appropriate coordinates (X0, X1, . . . , XD−1) to each internal point (σ, τ); formally there
is a D-component vector field on the string. From the point of view of the string then,
motion in target space amounts to changes in this field. This picture will be important as
we progress, so bear it in mind.
So how do we expect this 2-dimensional object to behave? One’s mind turns to Hooke’s
law, but that is uncongenial to relativity – Lorentz contraction should not change the
tension in a string. What Hooke’s law tells us more generally is that a string will minimize
its length: again, not relativistically invariant, but close – the relativistic statement is that
a string will minimize its spacetime area. Thus the simplest classical, relativistic string
1Here we draw heavily on several recent text-books, especially [Becker et al. (2006), Kiritsis (2011),
Polchinski (2003), Zwiebach (2004)].
1
Chicago, IL -315-
DERIVING GENERAL RELATIVITY FROM STRING THEORY 2
X1
X0
X2
휏
휎
Xμ(휎,휏)
Figure 1. An open string in target space – if the timelike edges are iden-
tified then it becomes a closed string.
action is proportional to the invariant area S = −T ∫ dA. Explicitly, dA = √−g ·dXµdXν ,
or transforming into string coordinates, we obtain the famous Nabu-Goto action:
(1) SNG = −T
∫
dσ2
√
−det
(
ηµν
∂Xµ
∂σα
∂Xν
∂σβ
)
.
T is the tension in the string (though you can’t immediately see this from the form of the
action); it makes clear that the string does not satisfy Hooke’s law, because it is an invariant
constant. The action also shows that all that matters is the total length of the string, not
how parts might be stretched relative to one another – again un-Hooke-like behaviour. So,
for one thing, the dynamics has no way of identifying parts of the string over time (the
action has diffeomorphism symmetry with respect to the σs) – but the significance of this
behaviour is far greater.2
The square root in SNG is awkward, but a formal trick leads to the equivalent sigma (or
Polyakov) action:
(2) Sσ = −T
2
∫
d2σ
√−γγαβηµν ∂X
µ
∂σα
∂Xν
∂σβ
.
The ‘trick’ involves introducing a second ‘internal’ metric, γαβ on the string worldsheet –
to be carefully distinguished from the restriction of the spacetime metric to the string.
Now the un-Hooke-like behaviour of the string manifests itself in the fact that intervals
with respect to the internal metric have no physical significance. The action appears to
depend on how the string is stretched along its length – the derivatives are determined
by the distance in external space separating points on the worldsheet separated by an
infinitesimal distance in the string coordinates. But the behavior of the string that we
have been stressing means that such infinitesimal distances have no physical significance,
2Quick aside: in fact one can give a Hooke’s law treatment of the string, not in inertial coordinates,
but in ‘light cone’ coordinates, in which one spatial coordinate is ‘boosted to the speed of light’. Such
coordinates are used in most text-books at some point.
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -316-
DERIVING GENERAL RELATIVITY FROM STRING THEORY 3
and so it should make no difference if any is rescaled by an arbitrary factor. In short, the
action must be Weyl, or conformally invariant, and indeed it is: as can be readily checked,
the sigma action is unchanged by γαβ → eω(τ,σ)γαβ .3
A couple of short notes. First, the action is conformally invariant with respect to the
string metric, not the target space metric! For η the relevant symmetry is Poincare´ in-
variance. (The other symmetry of the action is diffeomorphism invariance with respect to
both the σs and Xs.) Second, although we have been stressing the connection of conformal
invariance to the un-Hooke-like behavior of a relativistic string, we did so mainly to illus-
trate how string theory is grounded in some very familiar physics. Conformal invariance
will be crucial in what follows, but all we need is the straight-forward mathematical fact
that Sσ has that symmetry – not any story about why. For now we have the following:
from the point of view of the string, string theory concerns a D-dimensional conformal
field, living on a 2-dimensional spacetime (i.e., the worldsheet). That picture was central
to the developments of the ‘second string revolution’ of the 1990s, and generally is the one
that we will adopt.
The symmetries can be used to set the worldsheet metric flat:
(3) Sσ =
T
2
∫
d2σX˙2 −X ′2,
where the derivative are with respect to the worldsheet coordinates.4 The corresponding
Hamiltonian is:
(4) H =
T
2
∫
dσ X˙2 +X ′2;
and minimizing with respect to Xµ yields a wave equation,
(5) X¨µ −X ′′µ = 0.
The general solution for a closed string is (after a little more work in classical wave physics):
(6) Xµ = Xµ0 + ℓ
2
sp
µτ + i
ℓs√
2
∑
n 6=0
1
n
(
αµne
−i2n(τ−σ) + α¯µne
−i2n(τ+σ)
)
,
where ℓS , the ‘characteristic string length’, is determined by the tension: ℓ
2
s = 1/T . This
equation describes an initial position, linear momentum, and left- and right-moving vi-
brations – the αn are the amplitudes of the modes of the string. Identifying the linear
momentum as the zeroth mode of the string will be useful.
3More carefully, we have been talking about Weyl symmetry; ‘conformal’ transformations are strictly
a sub-group of the diffeomorphisms, namely those whose only effect is to introduce a Weyl factor. This
point is, for instance, important for understanding why conformal symmetry remains in (3), even though
the Weyl symmetry has been gauge fixed.
4In the following the reader is especially referred to [Becker et al. (2006), §2.2-3]
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(7) αµ0 ≡
ℓs
2
pµ ≡ α¯µ0 .
Substituting the mode expansion of Xµ into the Hamiltonian (4) gives
(8) H =
∞∑
n=−∞
(α−n · αn + α˜−n · α˜n) = 0.
2.2. Immediate Consequences. Now, because of conformal symmetry, the variation of
the action with respect to rescaling the metric must vanish:
(9) 0 =
1√−h
δSσ
δhαβ
= −2Tπ(∂αX · ∂βX + 1
2
( −1 0
0 1
)
αβ
(X˙2 −X ′2)).
The four equations given by the possible values of α and β can be solved, and if the
expansion for Xµ is inserted, entail that:
(10) ∀m ∈ Z 0 = 1
2
∞∑
n=−∞
αm−n · αn ≡ Lm.
The Lm and L˜m are crucial objects in the formalism describing the string, the ‘Virasoro
generators’, and the constraints (10) play a vital role in the theory. Physically speaking,
from the worldsheet perspective, (9) gives Tαβ , the stress-energy tensor of the 2-dimensional
stringy spacetime, and the Virasoro generators are its modes. Geometrically speaking, they
are the generators of conformal transformations on the worldsheet.
As an example, consider the role of the constraints in determining the mass spectrum of
the string. Observed at scales well above its characteristic length, intuitively a string will
appear as a (spatially) point-like object – a particle – since its extension ‘can’t be seen’.
Since the string appears as a particle, its linear four-momentum must satisfy the usual
relation to its rest mass. Using (7):
−M2 = p2 = 2(α
2
0 + α˜
2
0)
ℓ2s
.(11)
But the m = 0 Virasoro constraint yields
(12) L0 =
1
2
∞∑
n=−∞
α−n · αn = 0 ⇒ α
2
0
2
= −
∞∑
n=1
α−n · αn,
and similarly for L˜0. So, using (8)
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -318-
DERIVING GENERAL RELATIVITY FROM STRING THEORY 5
−M2 = 4
ℓ2s
∞∑
n=1
(α−n · αn + α˜−n · α˜n) = 4
ℓ2s
H.(13)
In other words, it follows from the constraint that the ‘particle-mass’ of a string depends
on its vibrational modes – different vibrations give different ‘particles’. Moreover, the
Hamiltonian is proportional to the mass squared of an excited string, not (as might have
been expected in relativity) the mass.
2.3. Quantization. In this paper we employ both canonical and path integral quanti-
zation: either way, Xµ is a field on a 2-dimensional Minkowski spacetime – the string
worldsheet. Thus we start with equal-time commutation relations on the ‘field’:
(14) [Xµ(σ),Πν(σ′)] = iηµνδ(σ − σ′),
which entails via 6 that
(15) [αµm, α
ν
n] = mη
µνδm+n.
Hence the quantized αs are raising and lowering operators, as one should expect. Our
earlier analysis now shows that the quantized mass spectrum is discrete: it includes massless
photons and gravitons, and importantly, for later work, a new masless scalar, the ‘dilaton’
(as well as negative mass tachyon modes). For suitable string tensions, the modes can
reproduce the observed masses of meson families. However, the appropriate tension for
quantum gravity is much greater, so observed particles are not theorized to be mode
excitations of the string. (The mass spectrum of the standard model, is reproduced in a
more complex way – relying, for instance, on compactified dimensions or D-branes.)
(15) tells us that for m 6= 0 the Virasoro generators can be obtained by simply replacing
the αs in (10) with operators; while L0 requires normal ordering. Omiting all details, the
resulting commutation relations are found to be:
(16) [Lm, Ln] = (m− n)Lm+n + D
12
m(m2 − 1)δm+n,0,
the (classical) algebra of conformal generators, plus a ‘central charge’ term, which indi-
cates a quantum ‘anomaly’, a breakdown of classical conformal invariance. Restoring the
symmetry requires D = 26 and leads to the infamous compactified dimensions of string
theory. In what follows we explain another consequence of the anomaly.
3. General Relativity from String Theory
Consider the sigma-action, (2) but with a general Lorentzian metric:
(17) Sσ = − 1
α′
∫
d2σ
√−γγαβGµν∂αXµ∂βXν .
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α′ is (up to a factor) the reciprocal of the tension – in worldsheet perturbation theory, an
expansion parameter. Otherwise, the only change is ηµν → Gµν . At this point you may
think that G is free parameter, to be inserted by hand – that the ‘background’ metric is
independent of what the strings do. But you would be wrong – G has to satisfy the source-
free Einstein field equations (a result going back to [Friedan (1980)]; and conjectures going
back to the 1970s). String theory requires general relativity (to lowest order).
The proof runs as follows ([Callan et al. (1985)], see [Gasperini (2007)] for more detail):
Figure 2. A string worldsheet with a ‘hole’ through it. This surface rep-
resents the first order correction to the closed string propagator – time is
running left-to-right.
(1) The perturbative expansion of the interacting string propagator is a sum of tori –
with two legs – of increasing genus. Consider the first-order term in figure 3.
(2) Its contribution comes from a QFT defined by (17): from the point of view of
the string, a 2-dimensional QFT – a ‘non-linear sigma model’ – in which Gµν is a
(varying) self-coupling for the Xµ field.
(3) This QFT has a well-studied perturbation theory, and is known to be renormaliz-
able. (Here we have second perturbation expansion: one on the worldsheet, which
is itself a term in the expansion of the string propagator.)
(4) Renormalization means counter-terms, which means running terms, with a length
dependence. The renomalization group studies this dependence, describing the
behavior in terms of β−functions.
(5) Friedan studied this renormalization group behavior, showing perturbatively that
the β-function associated with Gµν is – remarkably – given by βG = Rµν +O(α
′),
the Ricci tensor plus higher order corrections.
(6) Now, recall that we are talking about a field theory on a string worldsheet, so
the length scale is with respect to the string metric, rather than the target space
metric; but conformal invariance means that the theory can have no dependence
on such a length! So the β-function vanishes, and by Friedan’s work, Rµν = 0, or
Gµν is ‘Ricci flat’ to lowest order. But that’s equivalent to the vacuum Einstein
field equations.
In short, the conformal invariance of string theory as a worldsheet QFT entails general
relativity for target space. Of course, spacetime is not Ricci flat, but happily the result
generalizes. To take a particularly salient example, suppose that strings live in a target
space with a Yang-Mills field, a string theory with familiar matter. The action has the
form:
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(18) Sσ ∼ 1
α′
∫
d2σdθ Gµν∂X
µ∂Xν +Aµa(X)∂X
µja + θψi∂ψi.
This action is for a ‘heterotic’ string, featuring both conformal symmetry and supersym-
metry between bose and fermi degrees of freedom: θ represents fermionic ‘coordinates’ in
addition to the bosonic σs. A is the background gauge field, and ψ the fermions to which
it couples (j their current). [Callan et al. (1985)] investigated this action, showing that to
lowest order Gµν is Ricci flat, and that the standard free Yang-Mills equations must be
satisfied. Moreover, they also showed that at first order in α′ the β-function for the target
metric has a term corresponding to the stress-energy of the Yang-Mills field.
(19) βG = Rµν − α
′
2
α′tr(F 2µν) +O(α
′) terms for the coupling to Gµν .
Thus, once again, worldsheet conformal symmetry, βG = 0, means that to order α
′, the
EFEs hold, even if when matter is present. However, we want to argue that these are
more than formal results (we express what seems to be the view of string theorists). For
the results do not simply show that strings tell matter and geometry backgrounds how to
behave: they in fact describe how fields built from string excitations are related, so that
the field equations are simply low energy descriptions of the string itself.
The reason is that ‘background’ fields do not represent new degrees of freedom in addition
to those of string theory: they are not distinct primitive entities. Instead they represent
the behavior of coherent states of string excitations: the quantum states, that is, which
describe classical field behavior. Thus when one includes a general metric in the action,
one has a quantum theory of perturbations around a coherent state corresponding to the
given classical metric. The result shows that there is not a free choice of background fields,
but that graviton and – in this case – Yang-Mills quanta coherent states must be related
appropriately: by the EFEs.
More precisely, there are two claims involved in the view that background fields represent
coherent states (both with evidence in their favor, [?, §3.6]): (i) that the string is an
adequate ‘theory of everything’, in the sense that the string spectrum includes quanta
for all desired background fields and (ii) that the terms in the action accurately capture
the effective behavior of those coherent states. Then by (i) the Gµν field is composed of
stringy excitations, and by (ii) it satisfies the EFEs, making it the gravitational field, and
the excitations gravitons. Thus, in the most literal sense, the general relativistic theory of
spacetime is a low energy effective theory of strings.
If this is correct, then in a central sense, string theory is background independent: the
metric arises from string interactions, rather than being stipulated a priori. Just like
general relativity, many solutions are possible, but matter and gravity have to satisfy a
mutual dynamics – except in string theory, there is no fundamental distinction between
the two, a significant ontological unification.
What is left of the charge of background dependence? One might take the view that
since the derivation starts with (2), which manifestly involves a Minkowski metric, at least
that much geometry is ‘background’ (even if interpreted as an inner product on Xµ fields).
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It would still follow that the really interesting geometry of the theory is dynamical, and just
an aspect of the same processes that constitute matter. But the situation is even better.
For addressing the question of background independence, one should instead start with the
more general action (17). The results above then show that the only possible metrics are
Ricci flat, and so the only ‘background’ assumptions involves selecting one such metric.
The idea that the geometry has to be ‘put in by hand’ hardly applies at all.5.
4. Towards a Philosophical Analysis of Conformal Symmetry
The connections to the dimensionality of spacetime, and to the EFEs that we have
sketched show that conformal symmetry is a key concept connecting string theory to phe-
nomenological spacetime. (By ‘phenomenological’ we mean space and time as they are
described by general relativity; and thus as they are envisioned in more-or-less direct ex-
perience, since the situations we normally experience fall within the domain of general
relativity.) We claim that conformal symmetry should therefore be an important focus of
philosophical attention in the study of string theory. [Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013)] argues
for the importance of philosophical analysis of the ‘empirical significance’ of such concepts
in theories of quantum gravity: in short, such analyses promise to illuminate how (and
even whether) aspects of spacetime can emerge from a theory which does not presuppose
them at the fundamental level, in some sense. (The paper also explains the value of such
analyses even for partial theories, such as bosonic string theory: the development of com-
plete theories must be preceded by the development of suitable concepts, typically found
in proto-form in incomplete theories.) This essay is a contribution to such an analysis,
which we continue to develop in this section. The key question now is whether conformal
symmetry is an independent postulate of string theory. We suggest not: the above results
do not require extra assumptions, but are essential to string theory.
The story so far is that the classical string action is conformally invariant, but that this
symmetry is broken by quantization. We have seen the effect of this ‘conformal anomaly’
in the central charge appearing in the Virasoro algebra, and in slightly more detail in the
derivation of the EFEs, above.6
5Jeffrey Harvey has noted that even classical relativity requires some background, say in the form of
asymptotic behaviour
6Now, the latter derivation was given in the context of renormalization, and so may appear to be a
consequence of perturbation theory; one might assume that string theory does not require general relativity
intrinsically, but only in order for a certain kind of approximation scheme to work. This would be a mistake
(see e.g., [Nakahara (2003)]). The short story is this. Consider a schematic path integral for a quantum
field:
(20)
∫
Dϕ e
i
∫
dx L[ϕ]
.
Manifestly, invariance of the Langrangian under a symmetry no longer suffices for a quantum symmetry:
path integrals – hence amplitudes – will only be unchanged if the measure of the path integral is also
invariant, and anomalies arise when it is not. Of course anomalies show up in the perturbative expansion
of a path integral, but path integrals themselves are not inherently perturbative. Much more could be said
on this subject, but not in this place.
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At this point one might wonder whether it is possible to abandon conformal symme-
try.7 Thinking through the symmetries of the action (2), what this means is that Weyl
transformations are no longer gauge symmetries, only diffeomorphisms are. Of course
that would make a nonsense of the development of the string given earlier in this paper
– indeed, it’s simply false of the action classically! But the point just made is that the
conformal anomaly means that the quantum system need not have the same symmetry.
In this case of course different choices of conformal factor in the Weyl transformation of
the internal metric, γαβ → eω(τ,σ)γαβ , will be physically different: hence ω(τ, σ) is a new
physical degree of freedom over the worldsheet, in addition to, and prima facie rather alike,
the Xµs. However, ω → ω + λ, a ‘translation’ in this new ‘dimension’, means a conformal
transformation on the world sheet, since eω+λ = eωeλ. Hence, if Weyl symmetry fails, so
does translation symmetry in this new ‘ω-dimension’. For this reason the ω field cannot be
just an additional target spacetime coordinate but requires a different interpretation, as a
scalar background field. As a matter of fact, it has the form of a background dilaton field,
Φ(X), the new string mode introduced earlier: more specifically (as we shall discuss) it is
a linear dilaton field.
We shall explore the consequences of the failure of Weyl symmetry by investigating the
dilaton – to summarize what we just said, its appearance is a direct consequence of violating
the symmetry. On the one hand the dilaton allows one to relax some of the consequences
of Weyl symmetry discussed so far. On the other, it will allow us to make good on our
claim that Weyl symmetry is not an independent postulate of string theory, in the sense
that it will in general signal a breakdown of perturbation theory.
To sketch the physics of the linear dilaton, we start with a new action including a back-
ground dilaton field Φ(X), as usual understood as representing physics around a coherent
state (here of the scalar dilaton):
(21)
1
4πα′
∫
Σ
d2σ
√−γ[(γabGµν(X) + α′RΦ(X)],
where R is still the Ricci scalar, and α
′
is still the expansion parameter of string pertur-
bation theory (the reciprocal of the tension).
As we discussed above, formally (at least) this is the action for a two-dimensional in-
teracting field theory. But the Xµ fields can be re-interpreted as target space coordinates;
moreover at low energy it can be rewritten as an effective low energy action over spacetime:
(22) SX =
1
2
∫
dDX
√
−Ge−2Φ[−2(D − 26)
3α′
+R+ 4∂µΦ∂
µΦ+O(α
′
)].8
Comparison of (21) and (22) shows that at low energy the perturbative expansion parameter
α
′
– (a function of) the string coupling – can be identified with e2Φ(X). This identification
indicates the link between the presence of a linear dilaton and the applicability of string
7The remainder of the section draws heavily on [Polchinski (2003)] §3.4, 3.7 and 9.9.
8[Polchinski (2003), §3.7].
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perturbation theory: where the former diverges, the latter breaks down. Below we will
indicate how controlling the divergences of the linear dilaton – hence the existence of string
perturbation theory – leads back to Weyl invariance; for now, in order to explain some of
the features of the linear dilaton, we will simply assume that result. More specifically, we
assume that the β-functions for the action (22) vanish:
(23) βΦ ≈ D − 26
6
+ α
′
(∇2Φ+∇ωΦ∇ωΦ) +O(α′2) = 0,
and
(24) βG ≈ α′(Rµν + 2∇µ∇νΦ) +O(α′2) = 0.
The latter is a third example of how string theory entails the EFEs, in this case when
gravity couples to a dilaton field. The simplest solution has a Minkowski target spacetime,
Gµν(X) = ηµν , in which case
(25) Rµν = 0 and Φ(X) = VµX
µ,
where Vµ is a constant, so that the dilaton has a simple linear dependence on spacetime.
But now (23) yields:
(26) D = 26− 6α′VµV µ.
Earlier we saw that in the absence of a dilaton field, Weyl symmetry requires that D = 26
– the ‘critical’ dimension. Now we see that in the presence of a dilaton field D can take on
other values, less than or greater than 26 (depending on whether the gradient of the dilaton
is spacelike or timelike). Thus the dilaton relaxes the consequences of Weyl invariance, as
we mentioned earlier. It is interesting to notice that the dimension now appears to be
a dynamical (though constant) feature of the theory, controlled by the (square of) the
gradient of the dilaton VµV
µ.
Now that we have introduced the linear dilaton, we need to indicate why controlling
dilaton divergences requires Weyl invariance. Why? Recall, when we attempted to break
Weyl symmetry the conformal factor ω became a linear dilaton field, Φ(X). Moreover, the
dilaton is related to the coupling, α
′ ∼ e2Φ(X), so that its behavior signals the breakdown of
perturbation theory. Thus violating Weyl symmetry requires that the dilaton divergences
be controlled – but we shall now sketch how that itself requires Weyl invariance, so the
attempt to violate the symmetry fails.
Consider a spacelike dilaton, Φ(X) = V1X
1. [Polchinski (2003), §9.9] notes that fixing
divergencies at large X1 can be achieved by introducing a ‘tachyon profile’, τ(x), into the
action as a background field:
(27) SX − 1
2
∫
dDX
√−ge−2Φ(gµν∂µτµ(X)∂ντ(X)− 1
α′
τ2(X)),
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where SX is the effective spacetime action (22). The equations of motion for the tachyon
are then
(28) −∂µ∂µτ(X) + 2V µ∂µτ(X)− 4
α′
τ(X) = 0,
whose solution is
(29) τ(x) = exp(q ·X1) where q =
√
(
D − 26
6α′
).
Once again the target space action can be rewritten as an equivalent worldsheet action,
this time of the form
(30) Sσ =
1
4πα′
∫
Σ
d2σ
√−γ[(γabηµν∂aXµ∂bXν + α′RV1X1 + τ0exp(q1 · x1)],
where the dependence on D of the action (31) is contained in
(31) q1 =
√
(
26−D
6α′
)−
√
(
2−D
6α′
).
For D ≤ 2, q1 is a positive quantity, so for X1 → +∞ the tachyon exponential gets large,
suppressing this limit in the path integral, yielding an effective repulsive potential. But it
is precisely for X1 → +∞ that the coupling
α
′ ∼ e2Φ(X) = e2Φ(X)=VµXµ
diverges. Hence the tachyon controls the theory for D ≤ 2. For D > 2, q1 is complex,
and the tachyon exponential is oscillatory, so the argument no longer holds. There’s a
dichotomy: either (as some have argued, [Polchinski (2003), 324]) some other mechanism
is in play that prevents X1 → +∞, or the theory breaks down. But either way, or if
D ≤ 2, the only hope for a linear dilaton – and hence the only hope for the violation of
Weyl symmetry – is a tachyon field, (28). But, according to [Polchinski (2003), 323], (28) is
the condition for Weyl invariance of the dilaton, and hence Weyl invariance is unavoidable
(unless the divergences can be controlled in another way).
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to sketch enough of string theory to sketch the signif-
icance of conformal symmetry. Of course this is a huge and complex subject, and we can
barely claim to have scratched the surface. However, we have indicated its crucial conse-
quences, and also its necessity. Thus we hope to have established our principal claim, that
conformal symmetry of string theory deserves to be a focus of attention in the philosophical
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study of quantum gravity – itself one of the most pressing subjects within philosophy of
physics.
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Abstract 
This paper shows that, under certain reasonable conditions, if the investigation of the 
behavior of a physical system is difficult, no scientific change can make it significantly 
easier. This impossibility result implies that complexity is then a necessary feature of 
models which truly represent the target system and of all models which are rich enough to 
catch its behavior and therefore that it is an inevitable element of any possible science in 
which this behavior is accounted for. I finally argue that complexity can then be seen as 
representing an intrinsic feature of the system itself. 
 
 
1. Introduction. The purpose of this paper is to show that, under certain reasonable 
conditions, if the investigation of the behavior of a physical system is difficult, no 
scientific change can make it significantly easier. This can be seen as some sort of 
impossibility result that says that some epistemic situation (in which investigating a system 
could be difficult for some agents and easy for others) cannot be met. It thereby shows that 
complexity is necessarily a feature of the model(s) (whatever it (they) turn(s) out to be) 
that truly represent(s) the target system, and of all models that are rich enough to catch its 
                                                        
1 I am grateful to John Norton, Hervé Zwirn, Jacques Dubucs, Mikaël Cozic, Alexei 
Grinbaum and Mauricio Suarez for past or recent discussions about various versions 
of this argument. Remaining shortcomings are mine. 
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behavior. The complexity of the model can then be seen as representing an intrinsic 
characteristic of the system itself.  
Though the idea supporting the claim is quite straightforward, it needs to be spelled out 
with great care since the validity of the argument hinges on its details. I first sketch this 
general idea in section 2 and present the thrust of the argument. Sections 3-5 are then 
devoted to the discussion of the steps and scope of the argument. I argue in particular that, 
in the described situations, complexity can be claimed to be an inevitable feature of any 
(mathematically possible) investigation of the corresponding systems. 
 
2. Statement of the Problem and Sketch of the Argument. Progresses in mathematics or 
physics often make easier scientific tasks that were difficult, if not impossible, to carry out. 
For example, to decide whether a proposition of propositional logic is a tautology, one may 
laboriously enumerate all the
 
2
k
 possible cases; but once the tree method is known, things 
become much easier. Such progresses may originate both in mathematical findings and in 
advances in the empirical sciences such as the development of new modeling schemes. The 
invention of the boundary layer by Prandtl seems to illustrate this latter case. Navier-
Stokes equations were derived in the mid-19th century but, because of their elliptic 
behavior, solving them was not possible for most practical problems like calculating the lift 
and drag on the first airplanes. By contrast, equations for the boundary layer were found to 
have parabolic behavior. This afforded significant analytical and computational 
simplification and the calculation of aerodynamic drag became possible for various 
situations. In such cases, the difficulty initially met by scientists is epistemic in the sense 
that it results from some lack of knowledge: Prandtl’s invention showed that the 
investigation was apparently complex but not intrinsically so. 
   Is complexity always epistemic – and can we always entertain the hope that it may be 
swept away by scientific progress? Conversely, if complexity is not always epistemic, in 
which cases should it be seen as an objective feature of an investigation? People familiar 
with logic and computer science know that it can sometimes be proved that some 
mathematical tasks are genuinely difficult or impossible to carry out. The purpose of this 
paper is to make a riskier step by presenting cases in which physical systems can reliably 
be described as inherently complex. 
   Complexity is a property of mathematical models or problems
2
. Accordingly, 
establishing that some complexity properties intrinsically characterize some physical 
systems seems to require, at the least, showing that the corresponding models are true 
representations of these systems – and thereby solving the realism/anti-realism problem in 
such cases. A particularity (oddity?) of the argument to follow is that no such thing is in 
fact needed: the complexity of the models will be shown to characterize systems faithfully 
even if these models are false. 
   To make things clearer from the start, I shall now present a short version of the 
argument. Here are the assumptions. One wants to investigate the target behavior B(Si) of 
systems Si, that is, of some set of systems of a common physical type S (e.g. Ising-like 
                                                        
2 See section 4 for more about this point. 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -328-
  3 
system) in different configurations (e.g. the numbers of spins, geometry and external fields 
may vary). A general model M (like “the” Ising model) yields the family of particular 
models Mi which is empirically adequate
3
 regarding behavior B(Si). Finally, solving 
models Mi corresponds to a mathematical problem Π having irreducible computational 
complexity K. Let us now make the hypothesis that there exists another family of models 
Mi* which is also empirically adequate regarding behavior Bi and corresponds to a simple 
mathematical problem Π*.The claim is that this latter hypothesis implies a contradiction. 
Indeed, if Π* is simple, it should be possible, when trying to solve models Mi, to solve the 
corresponding easy models Mi* instead. It then becomes possible to solve problem Π 
easily, which, by assumption, is impossible. Therefore, if there is another empirically 
adequate family of models Mi* for B(Si), then the corresponding mathematical problem 
cannot be significantly simpler than Π. 
   Overall, the argument involves the main following claims: 
(1) the investigation of the behavior of physical systems can be described as computational 
problems (in the computer science sense); 
(2) such computational problems can be irreducibly complex; 
(3) if a computational problem corresponding to the solution of a family of empirically 
adequate models is complex, then any other such family corresponds to an equally 
complex computational problem.  
 
I provide in section 2 evidence for claims (1) and (2) and discuss claim (3), which is the 
potentially controversial core of the philosophical argument, in section 3. 
 
2. Physical Investigations and Complex Computational Problems. In this section I 
argue that investigations about physical systems can sometimes be adequately described by 
means of irreducibly complex computational problems. A computational problem is an 
infinite collection of tasks of a common type such as “Given two numbers p and q, find the 
value of their sum p+q”. The instances of the problem are the specific tasks that are 
actually being carried out, e.g. “1+1”, “1+2”, “2+1”, etc. To theoretically study the 
behavior B(Si) of a system Si, scientists need to investigate the corresponding property 
P(Mi) of a model Mi standing for Si. Then, they tackle the following task Ti “Based on (a 
suitable description of) Mi, find (a description of) P(Mi)”. Since the physical parameters of 
S can indefinitely vary, the generic study of B(Si) corresponds to an infinite number of 
tasks Ti of a common type and therefore to a computational problem. For example, generic 
physical investigations like “given a Ising system composed of p×q×r spins, calculate its 
equilibrium properties” or “given the description of a classical gas of n particles at time t0, 
find its state at time t0+t ” correspond to computational problems. 
The next step requires showing that some computational problems having a physical 
                                                        
3 Empirical adequacy usually characterizes theories regarding all observable 
phenomena. I here use this notion for (family of) models regarding some specific 
behavior. 
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interpretation are intrinsically complex. Fortunately, computer scientists and physicists 
complete themselves this step by applying computational complexity theory (hereafter 
CCT) to physical problems. A problem is regarded as inherently difficult if any algorithm 
that solves its instances requires significant resources. CCT formalizes this intuition by 
robustly quantifying the resources needed to solve problems and by identifying a hierarchy 
of robust complexity classes (like NC, P, NP, EXP, etc.). For example, a decision problem 
is NP-complete if its solutions can be verified in polynomial time (it belongs to NP) and 
any problem in NP reduces to it in polynomial time; a problem is P-complete if it can be 
solved in polynomial time by a Turing machine (it belongs to P) and every problem in P 
reduces to it through an appropriate reduction.  
A crucial notion in defining complete classes is that of reduction. A reduction is an 
algorithm transforming one problem into another one. For example, multiplication reduces 
to addition (2x3 = 2+2+2) and, if you know how to add, you know how to multiply. 
Reductions can also be used to show that the reduced problems are not more difficult than 
the reducing problem – provided that the cost of the reduction is negligible. Typically, to 
prove that a problem is NP-complete, polynomial reductions are used. Overall, if a 
problem is complete for a complexity class, unless this whole class collapses to some 
lower class (which, in the NP-complete case, is believed to be unlikely), no algorithm can 
be found to solve it significantly more quickly – whatever our scientific progresses. 
It is a fact that some (major) physical problems have been proven complete for some 
complexity classes. I shall present two. The Ising-model has played for decades a central 
role in the development of modern statistical physics (Baxter, 1982). Whereas Onsager 
solved the two-dimensional case in 1944, its three-dimension version resisted 
investigations for decades till Baharona (1982) proved that evaluating its partition function 
is a NP-hard problem. More simple physical problems, like lattice gas models, can be 
complete for lower complexity classes. The investigation of lattice gases started in the 
70ies as attempts to solve the Boltzmann equation for extremely simplified gazes of 
particles with discrete velocities (Hardy et al., 1973). Further inquiries proved that lattice 
gazes could be used to simulate Navier-Stokes equations (Frisch et al, 1986) and exhibit 
physical behavior. Lattice methods are currently being used in computational fluid 
dynamics for various applications such as the investigation of air flowing over vehicles. 
They have been proven P-complete (Moore and Nordhal, 1997), which essentially means 
that sequential polynomial simulations are required to investigate them. 
We have reached so far the conclusion that, unless the complexity hierarchy partly 
collapses, the investigation of some physical models (e.g. Ising-like systems or billiard ball 
models) is irreducible complex (the degree of complexity being defined by the complexity 
class these models belong to). This conclusion calls for three remarks. 
First, the conclusion reached so far is not that, within some scientific practice, some 
physical models are actually investigated by solving some complex computational 
problems – otherwise, one could answer that these practices are complex ones and involve 
difficult tasks like computing Fourier transforms, inverting matrixes, finding optima, etc. 
but that maybe one is using sledgehammers to crack nuts and the difficulty may be 
bypassed by finding simpler techniques. But the claim is that the mathematical problem – 
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versus some practices solving it – is a complex one. Intuitively, saying that a problem is 
inherently complex means that solving it requires large resources, whatever the algorithm 
that is being used, which already involves quantifying over possible methods. For 
example, if P≠NP, no algorithm can solve a NP-complete problem in polynomial time. 
Further, any problem of a low class of complexity can be solved via a complete problem of 
a high class of complexity, since low complexity classes are included in higher complexity 
classes. For example, deciding whether a number is even can be performed by reducing 
this problem to 3-SAT (a NP-complete problem) and solving instances of 3-SAT. But 
evenness is a simple problem and the complexity of 3-SAT does not lie in the set of 
instances that can be used to solve instances of evenness. By contrast, the results described 
above indicate that solving the Ising-model is NP-complete, which means that no 
polynomial algorithm can solve all its instances. 
Second, when saying that some physical model has such or such complexity, I mean that 
all the instances of this model have a physical interpretation, which is the case for the Ising 
model and lattice gazes. If it were not so, the complexity of the computational problem 
may sometimes lie in a set of instances having no physical interpretation and then it would 
apparently but unduly characterize the physical problem. 
It may however be rightly objected that using a complex model to study the behavior of a 
system does not imply that no simpler model can be used for the same purposes nor that 
complexity characterizes the system itself. Therefore, the argument still falls short of 
proving the claim that the complexity of the model faithfully represents some property of 
the system. Accordingly, to substantiate the realist claim, there is the need for an additional 
semantic assumption about the felicitousness of the representational relation between the 
models Mi and the target systems so that the features of the mathematical models be 
“tacked” to the physical systems. As we shall now see, the sweet aspect of the argument is 
that truth is by no means required to complete this step and empirical adequacy, a notion 
usually considered as innocuous and deceptive by realists, is sufficient to do the job. 
 
3. The Core of the Argument. Let us now discuss the core of the argument. To put 
things briefly, it is assumed that an irreducibly model is used to study a system, that this 
model is empirically adequate and then it is shown by a reductio ad absurdum that it is not 
possible that another empirically adequate (possibly true!) and simple family of models 
does the same work.  
   Notations are as above. Pi (resp. Pi*) is the property of model Mi (resp. Mi*) that stands 
for behavior Bi and instances of problems Π (resp. Π*) are questions about these 
properties. 
 
Assumptions regarding our epistemic situation: 
 
- H1. Possibility of our practice. Target behavior Bi is in practice observable and models Mi 
can be in practice described (simplicity of modeling) and, when studying Bi, their content 
(once identified, see H3) can be meaningfully (simplicity of physical content description) 
ascribed to their target systems (simplicity of reference). 
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- H2. Semantic assumption. Family of models Mi is empirically adequate for behavior Bi. 
- H3. Mathematical complexity assumption. Computational problem Π has irreducible 
complexity K. 
 
Assumptions about the existence of another possible epistemic situation: 
 
- H4. Semantic assumption. Family of models Mi* is empirically adequate for behavior Bi. 
- H5. Mathematical complexity assumption. Computational problem Π* has complexity 
K* and K* is significantly lower than K in the CCT sense (e.g. Π* belongs to P and Π to 
NP). 
 
   H1 guarantees that we can easily ascribe the studied appearances to the target system and 
that the complex models we are using to investigate them are not ad hoc unduly intricate 
ways to investigate and refer to systems Si. H2 says that these models are empirically 
successful: property Pi catches behavior Bi, that is, Mi has an empirical substructure that is 
isomorphic to appearance Bi even if the underlying theoretical description is false. H3 adds 
that these models correspond to an irreducible class of complexity (in the CCT sense). H4 
says that another modeling practice is possible, which is not controversial, since any family 
of models isomorphic to models Mi will do. Strictly speaking, Px and Px* need not be the 
same properties since they catch target behavior Bi up to isomorphism (e.g. models Mi and 
Mi* may correspond to different reference frames). H4 and H5 jointly say that there exists 
another empirically adequate family of models that is in addition simpler to solve (in the 
CCT sense).  
   Here is now the reductio ad absurdum. Because of the empirical adequacy of the families 
of models Mi and Mj* for behavior Bi, questions about Mi (regarding Pi) have the same 
answers as those about the model Mj* (regarding Pj*) that represent the same systems – up 
to isomorphism. It is then tempting to use the instances of problem Π* to solve the 
instances of problem Π quickly. For any instance i of Π, one then needs to solve the 
associate instance j of Π*, that is, to solve model Mj* instead of model Mi. All it takes is to 
be able to identify for each Mi the corresponding Mj, or, in computational terms, to find a 
matching procedure that, given the description of Mi, translates it into the description of 
Mj* and thereby reduces problem Π to problem Π*. Since Pi and Pj* represent the same 
behavior Bi up to isomorphism, if Pj* is to be used to solve instances of Π, there may 
sometimes be the need to translate back the description of Pj* into the description of Pi. 
   Overall, the indirect way to solve models Mi (and problem Π) is composed of three steps, 
the matching procedure, the solution of models Mj* and, if necessary, the final return 
translation of the result. Here is now the catch. Since Π has irreducible complexity K and 
complexity cannot vanish in the air, one of these steps at least must also have complexity 
K. In brief, the original complexity constraint in the models that are actually being used has 
the following consequence: 
(a) Either, other empirically adequate models Mj* have the same complexity K; 
(b) Or their complexity is lower than K but matching models Mi with models Mj* 
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(if this is possible) has complexity K (e.g. if the original problem Π is NP-complete (resp. 
P-complete), then the translation procedure must be at least as costly, since Π* problem is 
comparatively easy). 
(c) Or models Mj* and the matching procedure have complexity lower than K but 
translating back the description of Pj* into the description of Pi has complexity K – though 
the two statements say the same thing, up to isomorphism. 
   Since we are investigating the possibility of the existence of a simple and empirically 
adequate family of models Mj*, we need to analyze whether situations (b) or (c) are 
possible.  
   Let us first discuss case (b). The situation is the following. The two families of well-
defined structures Mi and Mj* model the same family of systems and account for the same 
phenomena. Indeed, such correspondences between families of representations do exist in 
scientific practice, for example descriptions in Newtonian mechanics and Lagrangian 
mechanics, or descriptions in different reference frames, or standard representations and 
their Fourier transforms. The specificity of the situation is that one family of representation 
is (by assumption) intrinsically complex and the other simple. (Please note that when one 
makes a Fourier transform to make a calculation easier, one thereby proves that the 
original problem was not intrinsically difficult since you could transform it in a simpler 
problem). Finally, the investigated assumption is that matching the former to the latter is as 
difficult as solving the former, or even impossible: Is that latter assumption plausible? 
   Suppose that the simple family Mj* of models is in practice usable for modeling 
purposes, that is, that it is easily possible to match a non-theoretical characterization of 
system Si to the corresponding model (simplicity of modeling assumption). Then, it seems 
that one can always find a matching procedure between the two families of models: 
starting from models Mi, come back to its pre-theoretical identifying description (simplicity 
of reference, see hypothesis H1) and then remodel the system within the modeling 
framework of models Mj*. Going through the shared pre-theoretical description is a way to 
establish some translation between the two types of description. Now suppose that it is 
possible to faithfully describe this translation procedure algorithmically. Then there is a 
contradiction because the procedure is algorithmic and simple whereas it was supposed to 
have irreducible complexity K. 
   The other option is to suppose that the translation procedure, which can be cognitively 
carried out by modelers, is some mental operation that is irreducibly not algorithmic in the 
way it is carried out (even if it de facto computes the matching between models Mi and 
models Mj*). Then, we are compelled to accept that some mental modeling operation can, 
by some magic, quickly solve (all possible instances of) a complex (P-complete, NP-
complete, etc.) problem. As far as I know, there is no serious evidence in favor of this 
general possibility. 
   Overall, this means that if the complexity really lies in the matching procedure between 
families Mi and Mj, then there does exist simple models Mj but the modeling procedure to 
identify them must be as difficult as solving a problem with complexity K – for example 
solving a NP-complete problem if we are in the Ising case. Such a family of easy models 
then floats in the mathematical realm out of our modeling reach – and it can hardly 
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correspond to some possible-in-practice science.  
   It is worth insisting here: the modeling task does not lie in the invention of a new type of 
model. We can assume that models Mj are of a known type; what is here supposed to be 
difficult is the standardized application of this model type to physical situations of a 
known type, that is, finding particular versions of a general model that is known to 
correctly represent some type of situation. For example, the modeling task is not to invent 
the Ising model but to find the particular versions of the Ising model for particular systems 
of a common type (e.g. ferromagnetic systems having this or that geometry and number of 
atoms) of which we already know that the Ising-model is a good representation.  
   While the situation just described is implausible, I unfortunately have no clean, simple 
and final argument showing that it is logically, mathematically, or physically impossible. I 
even suspect that it is possible to cook up weird logical ad hoc constructs, possibly based 
on some costly transformations of the original problem Π, which make this situation 
possible. Typically, one may build into the modeling procedure the difficult steps of the 
solution of Mi and end up with some string of symbols computationally close to the 
solution of Mi; one may then claim that these strings are models Mj* and the trick is 
played. One may however doubt that the trick is acceptable, since all the complexity has 
been in practice transferred in the description of the family of models. Indeed, computer 
scientists do not seem to accept such descriptive procedures. Papadimitriou (a prominent 
computer scientist) notes: “There is a wide range of acceptable representations of integers, 
finite sets, graphs, and other such elementary objects. They may differ a lot in form and 
succinctness. However, all acceptable encodings are related polynomially. <…> In the 
course of this book, when we discuss a Turing machine that solves a particular 
computational problem, we shall always assume that a reasonably succinct input 
representation <…> is used” (1994, 26).  
   As philosophers of science, we may also add the acceptability constraint that the 
description of models Mj* should be made in a language that is suitable not only for 
investigating systems Si but also other classes of systems – as can be expected from a 
language a) that is used within some general scientific theoretical practice which goes 
beyond the particular study of the systems the complexity of which is being discussed and 
b) that is appropriate to describe natural kind predicates.  
   Overall, and even in the absence of a formal proof, it seems safe to conclude that the 
matching procedure between family of models Mj and Mj, if these models are to be given 
acceptable descriptions, can hardly have complexity K – especially if we are discussing 
models that have supra-polynomial complexity, like the Ising model (cases involving 
polynomial complexity are in a sense more difficult to treat because “acceptable” 
encodings are usually polynomially related). 
   There now remains the possibility that the complexity might lie in the translation 
between the descriptions of Pi and Pj* (case c above) but a critical discussion can be made 
along the same lines as above. Indeed, since models Mi, Mj* and the appearance say the 
same thing, up to isomorphism, the translation between the description of Pj* and Pi can go 
through the description of appearances. Then we would have a case of an easy family of 
models having some acceptable description (since the complexity is no longer supposed to 
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lie in the modeling procedure) but determining what the solution Pj* means about the 
isomorphic appearances it represents would be a complex problem. For similar reasons as 
above, this possibility also appears implausible and unacceptable. 
Let us wrap up. Situations (b) and (c) describe would-be situation in which there 
are two different ways of modeling, one tractable, the other not, but there is something like 
a computational gap between i) these two possible practices, either in terms of identifying 
the easy models or of translating their solutions; ii) between non theoretical descriptions of 
the target systems (and their appearances) and the description of the easy models (or of 
their solutions) – and of course, the more intrinsically complex the original problem, the 
larger this gap must be. The argument above shows that such situations are extremely 
implausible or “non acceptable”. The converse conclusion is that in such cases, it is 
extremely plausible that any acceptable empirically adequate family of models (including 
the true models) have the same complexity K as the models we are actually using. 
 
4. Discussion. I now want to clarify a few points about the content, validity and scope of 
the argument. 
   i) Strictly speaking, complexity characterizes computational problems (and models), so it 
cannot be directly and meaningfully ascribed to a physical system. The precise claim is 
that, in the discussed cases, all satisfactory representations of a system cannot but have this 
complexity property – which is a high-order property, since it describes a common feature 
of all possible algorithms that solve some models. 
   ii) It can however be claimed that the corresponding systems have been characterized 
intrinsically. Indeed, not only is the complexity property a feature of their true 
representation, it also characterizes all the representations that can be used to investigate 
the target behavior. This second stronger statement secures the intrinsicalness claim since 
it does not make it relative to any particular representation and shows that it is an essential 
feature of any possible investigation of the system (versus a somewhat accidental and 
neutral feature of the system or its representation). Indeed, if using the true representation 
of the system to investigate its behavior was difficult but the difficulty could be 
sidestepped by using proxy representations, complexity would be a true but shallow, 
without epistemic effect and somewhat contingent feature of the system. By contrast, the 
claim is that its nature is such that it is intrinsically difficult to investigate it, whatever the 
nature and “degree of truth” of the representation.  
   iii) The claim made is immune to progresses in computer or physics. Typically, if a 
system is said to be inherently complex, the advent of quantum computers will not make it 
theoretically easier – even if, for practical purposes, solving it may be much faster. Going 
from Marathons to Athens by car is quicker than running all the way but it does not make 
the distance shorter. In the same way, quantum computers may remove computational 
constraints for scientists but it will change neither the complexity hierarchy nor the interest 
for refining low complexity classes and seeing which models and problems belong to them.  
   iv) In the argument, I did not have to specify whether the would-be families of 
empirically adequate and simple models were to be derived from the same theory or result 
from some more substantial theoretical change. Therefore, the result describes the limits of 
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the progresses possibly generated both by findings in modeling and theoretical revolutions.  
   v) I did not have to root my realist claims about complexity in the supposed truth of some 
aspects of some representations. Thus, whereas most discussions of realist claims need to 
bring answers to anti-realist arguments (see for example Psillos, 1999), the present 
argument is noncommittal about but compatible with the validity of anti-realist arguments, 
like those in terms of pessimist induction, under-determination or skepticism about 
inference to the best explanation. Therefore, anti-realists may also have to bite the bullet 
and be realist about the complexity of, say, Ising-like systems. But conversely, as far as I 
can see, the argument is also noncommittal about existing realist arguments regarding 
scientific representations.  
   vi) Since irreducible complexity cannot vanish mysteriously, anyone willing to defeat the 
argument need to explain where the complexity of the original models has gone and why 
no translation between models doing the same work is possible; if this ever happen, we 
will definitely learn something valuable about possible sciences. 
   vii) I have however claimed that if such simple families do exist, they can hardly be part 
of an actual tractable scientific practice. Accordingly, even if the reader refuses to buy the 
realist claim, she may still have to buy the inevitabilist claim about what usable 
representations of such systems must be like in any possible-in-practice science. 
 
5. Conclusion Fluid dynamics problems tackled by Prandtl were difficult but boundary 
layer models made them tractable. If the above argument is valid, no such progress is to be 
expected when the family of models that represent some system is both empirically 
successful and corresponds to an intrinsically intractable problem. In such cases, 
complexity is presumably an unavoidable property of all its acceptable representations and 
therefore faithfully reflects an intrinsic and essential property of the system. 
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Spatially-Structurally Complex Phenomena 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the adequacy of causal graph theory as a tool for modeling biological 
phenomena and formalizing biological explanations. I point out that the causal graph 
approach reaches it limits when it comes to modeling biological phenomena that involve 
complex spatial and structural relations. Using a case study from molecular biology, DNA-
binding and -recognition of proteins, I argue that causal graph models fail to adequately 
represent and explain causal phenomena in this field. The inadequacy of these models is 
due to their failure to include relevant spatial and structural information in a way that does 
not render the model non-explanatory, unmanageable, or inconsistent with basic 
assumptions of causal graph theory. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades major advances have been made in formalizing causation and causal 
inference (Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000; Pearl 2000) and in using these formalisms 
to address traditional philosophical issues such as scientific discovery and the nature of 
scientific explanations (Woodward 2003, Hitchcock and Woodward 2003, Woodward and 
Hitchcock 2003). At the heart of these formal theories lie causal models that involve 
elements such as causal graphs, probability distributions, Bayesian nets, and structural 
equations which satisfy certain conditions, most prominently the Causal Markov Condition 
(more on this in Section 2). Causal models are appreciated because they allow for inferring 
causal relations from observed probabilistic correlations, for predicting the effects of 
manipulations and interventions, and because they can be used for representing and 
explaining causal relationships in very general, formal terms. 
Proponents of the causal modeling approach usually emphasize and exemplify the 
wide scope of this approach. In recent years several authors have, for instance, shown that 
the causal modeling approach can also be applied to mechanistic explanations in biology 
and medicine (Casini et al. 2011; Gebharter and Kaiser 2014; Clarke, Leuridan, and 
Williamson forthcoming; Gebharter forthcoming). Also Woodward’s interventionist theory 
of causation and causal explanation (2003) that makes extensive use of causal graphs is 
supposed to be applicable to a very wide range of causal relationships, including those in 
the biological sciences (2010, 2011, 2013). 
In this paper I agree that causal modeling is a powerful approach to formally 
represent, explain, and discover causal relations. However, I also think that its scope 
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should not be overestimated and that it is important to recognize also the limits of the 
causal modeling approach. This paper explicates one of these limits: the explanation of 
spatially and structurally complex biological phenomena.1 According to my line of 
criticism, formal causal models fail to offer adequate causal explanations of biological 
phenomena that essentially involve complex spatial and chemical-structural relations. This 
failure is due to the fact that causal graphs only provide causal difference-making 
information of the sort: A change in the value of X would under suitable conditions change 
the value (or probability distribution) of Y. The explanations of some biological 
phenomena, however, seem to be richer than this: these explanations do not only represent 
causal relations but also and prominently spatial relations and biochemical structures (such 
as the conformation and chemical structure of macromolecules, the spatial orientation and 
fitting of macromolecules to each other, and the complementarity of chemical structures). 
Based on the analysis of a case study from molecular biology, DNA recognition and 
binding by gene regulatory proteins, I show that the formal tools of causal graph theory are 
too impoverished to model biological processes that involve complex spatial-structural 
relations. 
Interestingly, Woodward (2011) has basically conceded this point, but he does not 
see this as a limitation of his causal modeling or interventionist approach to scientific 
explanation. Taking a relaxed stance, he argues that complex spatiotemporal information 
                                                      
1 Other limitations may be that causal models fail to account for the complex dynamics that 
biological phenomena such as biological clock mechanisms involve (Weber manuscript) 
and that causal models provide a confusing and ontologically inadequate view of the 
entities and activities involved in biological mechanisms (Gebharter and Kaiser 2014). 
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can just be added back to the backbone of causal difference-making information and can be 
used to “organize” (2011, 423) or “fine-tune” (2013, 55) causal difference-making 
information. This paper shows that things are not that easy. Some biological processes 
involve complex spatial and chemical-structural relations that are central to explaining 
these processes but that cannot be represented in causal graph models without rendering 
the model un-explanatory, unmanageable, or contradictory. 
I proceed as follows. In Section 2 I briefly review the core notions and assumptions 
made in the causal modeling literature such as the notion of a causal graph, a probability 
distribution, and the Causal Markov Condition. In Section 3 I introduce the case study on 
which my analysis relies by explaining the three kinds of fit that are involved in DNA-
protein recognition and binding (Section 3.1) and by specifying what exactly the 
phenomenon is that biologists seek to explain and which constraints on the adequacy of 
modeling this phenomenon follows from this (Section 3.2). In Section 4 I construct a 
causal graph model of DNA-protein recognition and then point out the shortcomings it has 
(Section 5). To elaborate my argumentation I discuss two possible objections that a causal 
modeler could raise: first, one might argue that the proposed causal graph model it not 
good enough, but that it is possible to construct an alternative model that does include the 
relevant spatial-structural information and is adequate (Section 5.1), second, one might 
object that I am not making an interesting or novel point as the explanation of DNA-
protein recognition is non-causal and causal graph theory was not intended to model non-
causal explanations (Section 5.2). 
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2. Causal Modeling 
The most frequently used causal models can be grouped into two kinds: causal Bayesian 
networks and structural equation models (which are distinct but closely related, cf. Spirtes 
2010). In this paper I focus on causal Bayesian networks (which can also be called causal 
graph models) and leave structural equations aside. Causal graph models combine 
mathematics and philosophy: the mathematical elements are directed acyclic graphs 
(DAGs) and probability theory (with focus on conditional independence); the philosophical 
elements are assumptions about the relationship between causation and probability 
(Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000).  
A directed acyclic graph (DAG, also called G) is an ordered pair G = V, E, where 
V is a set of variables and E is a set of directed edges (that are graphically represented by 
arrows) that have the variables in V as their vertices. A variable can be binary, its values 
representing for instance the instantiation or non-instantiation of some property, or 
variables can have multiple values or even be continuous. Here is an example of a DAG: 
 
 
Fig. 1: An example of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) 
 
Besides the DAG, a causal model consists of a probability distribution P over the variable 
set V that assigns a value to every variable in V such that the sum of all assigned variables 
in V equals 1. The pair of DAG G and probability distribution P over V is referred to as a 
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Bayesian network if and only if G and P satisfy the Markov Condition.2 A DAG becomes a 
causal graph as soon as its edges are interpreted causally: an edge leading for instance 
from variable X2 to variable X5 (see Figure 1) is interpreted such that X2 is a direct cause of 
X5. When DAGs are interpreted causally the Markov condition (and d-separation) are 
assumed to be the correct connection between causal structure and probabilistic 
independence. This assumption is called the Causal Markov Condition and it can be 
formulated as follows: 
Causal Markov Condition (CMC) 
G and P satisfy the Causal Markov Condition if and only if for every variable X in V, 
INDEPPr(X, N-Des(X) | Pa(X)). 
 
In words, a directed acyclic graph G and a probability distribution P over variable set V 
satisfy the Causal Markov Condition iff every variable X in V is probabilistically 
independent of X’s non-descendants (N-Des(X)) given X’s parents (Pa(X)). For example, 
X2 is probabilistically independent from its non-descendants (i.e. X3, X4, and X6) given X1. 
CMC captures the intuition that conditioning on all common causes (e.g., X1) and on 
intermediate causes breaks down the probabilistic influence between two formerly 
correlated variables (e.g., X2 and X3). Since causal models satisfy CMC they allow, for 
instance, for probabilistic prediction and manipulation. 
                                                      
2 In DAGs the Markov Condition turns out to be equivalent to a more generally useful 
graphical relation: d-separation (Pearl 1988). 
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In the remaining sections of this paper I apply these formal tools of causal graph 
theory to a paradigmatic example of a biological explanation: the explanation of how gene 
regulatory proteins recognize and bind to a specific DNA region. My analysis will show 
that the causal modeling approach reaches its limits when it comes to representing and 
explaining spatially-structurally complex biological phenomena.3 
 
3. DNA-Recognition and -Binding by Proteins 
The regulation of the expression of genes is an important process in living beings. 
Differential gene expression is for instance the basis for cell differentiation during 
development. In eukaryotes, gene expression is regulated at different steps, for instance, a 
cell controls when and how often genes are transcribed (transcriptional control). The most 
important elements in regulating gene transcription are gene regulatory proteins (also 
called transcription factors). These proteins can recognize and bind to specific nucleotide 
sequences without having to open the double helix. This is due to the fact that the surface 
                                                      
3 One might object that even in biological fields where spatially and structurally complex 
phenomena are studied (e.g., in protein folding and interaction research) graphical models 
turn out to be useful (cf. Balakrishnan et al. 2010, Thomas et al. 2009). I don’t think, 
however, that cases like these are counterexamples to my thesis. First, the applied 
graphical models are undirected probabilistic graphical models, not direct causal graph 
models of the kind I discuss here. Second, in these studies graphical models are not used to 
directly represent or to explain phenomena such as protein folding or protein-protein 
interaction. Rather, they are used as techniques or tools, for instance, to guide the design of 
new protein sequences. Hence, graphical models might be useful in that domain, but not 
for the purposes I discuss in this paper. 
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of the DNA (in particular, its major grooves) presents a distinctive pattern of hydrogen 
bond donors and acceptors, and hydrophobic patches. A gene regulatory protein recognizes 
a specific DNA sequence because its surface is extensively complementary to the special 
surface features of the major groove of DNA. In other words, the protein fits well to a 
certain region of the DNA. 
 
3.1 Three Kinds of Fit 
This fitting of a gene regulatory protein to a specific DNA binding site can be interpreted 
as involving three interwoven aspects: a spatial aspect, a structural aspect, and a causal 
aspect. The spatial fit refers to the fact that the spatial conformation of the protein is such 
that it allows certain parts of the protein being placed in the major groove of the DNA 
double helix, at the DNA backbone, or in its minor groove. The structural fit means that 
the protein exhibits particular amino acid residues at certain places such that they are 
complementary to the functional groups that the nucleotide bases of the DNA exhibits at 
certain places. The spatial and the structural fit give rise to a causal fit. That is, the spatial 
orientation and the structural complementarity of the protein and the DNA enable that 
certain causal interactions between the function groups of the protein and those of the 
DNA take place and certain chemical bindings between them are established. These three 
kinds of fit can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Spatial fit: The spatial conformation of the gene regulatory protein matches the 
double helix conformation of the DNA. 
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(2) Structural fit: The chemical structure of the protein (i.e., the sequence and 
location of its amino acids) is complementary to the nucleotide sequence of the 
DNA binding site. 
(3) Causal fit: Certain amino acid residues causally interact with/make contact with 
certain nucleotide bases. 
Consider the example of DNA recognition and binding by a zinc finger (ZnF). Zinc 
finger proteins are specific gene regulatory proteins that use zinc finger motifs to bind to 
DNA. The three zinc fingers of the Zif268 protein in mice, for instance, are arranged in a 
semicircular, C-shaped structure so that the α-helix of each zinc finger fits directly into the 
major groove of the DNA double strand (Pavletich and Pabo 1991). Figure 2 illustrates this 
spatial fit.  
 
Fig. 2: Spatial fit between Zif268 and the DNA. (Pavletich/Pabo 1991, 811, Fig. 2.) 
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The cylinders and ribbons mark the α-helical and β-sheet regions of each finger. The shape 
of the Zif268 protein is such that it wraps round the DNA and the three α-helices (the 
cylinders) fit into the major groove. 
The second kind of fit, the structural fit, is due to the fact that the chemical structure 
of the three zinc fingers is complementary to the nucleotide sequence of the DNA binding 
site. This means that the zinc finger protein possesses the “right” amino acids at the “right” 
places. For instance, the twenty forth amino acid of Zif268 protein is arginine, which has a 
positively charged residue. If the protein collides with the DNA binding site (in the right 
orientation) arginine is close to the nucleotide guanine, with which is can form hydrogen 
bonds (see Figure 3.b). Hence, the spatial and structural match between the zinc finger 
protein and its DNA binding region enables that the two also causally match: given that 
Zif268 collides with the DNA in the right orientation its three zinc fingers form extensive, 
characteristic contacts with the nucleotide bases (primarily along the guanine-rich DNA 
strand). Each finger has a similar relation to the DNA and makes its primary contacts in a 
three-base pair subsite. A summary of the critical base contacts is depicted in Figure 3a.  
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b
                     
Fig. 3: Base contacts made by Zif268. (a: Summary of all critical base contacts; b: 
Arginine-guanine interaction that is present in finger 1 and 3; Pavletich and Pabo 1991, 
812, Fig. 3.) 
 
An example for such a contact between an amino acid residue of the zinc finger protein 
and a nucleotide base of the DNA is the Arginine-guanine contact (see Figure 3b). 
Arginine-guanine interactions seem to be responsible for much of the specificity in the zinc 
finger complex (Pavletich and Pabo 1991, 816). 
 
3.2 Constraints on an Adequate Model of DNA-Protein Recognition 
In this section I point out the implications that the biological literature has for the 
conditions under which an explanatory causal model of DNA-protein recognition is 
adequate. For this purpose I, at first, specify what exactly the phenomenon to be modeled 
a 
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and to be explained in this case study is. Then I identify the different sorts of information 
that biologist treat as relevant to explaining this phenomenon. The underlying 
methodological assumption is that how biologists actually study and reason about DNA-
protein recognition tells us which information is relevant to explaining this phenomenon 
and which information thus must be included in an adequate causal model. 
In the biochemical literature the phenomenon is generally characterized as “DNA 
recognition by proteins” (Pavletich and Pabo 1991; Somers and Phillips 1992; Klemm et 
al. 1994) or as “protein-DNA interaction” (Luisi 1991). The target of these biochemical 
studies is to reveal why and how a particular gene regulatory protein (such as the zinc 
finger protein ZiF268 in mice) recognizes and binds to a specific DNA region.4  
It seems to me that the phenomenon of DNA-protein recognition has (at least) two 
major characteristics, both of which must be captured by any adequate model of this 
phenomenon. First, a model of DNA-protein recognition must account for the regular 
changes from unbound proteins to DNA-bound proteins that take place under certain 
conditions. These regular changes include certain sub-processes, as the process of diffusion 
(of the protein and the DNA strand), the process of collision of the protein and the DNA, 
the process of recognition, and the process of binding of the protein to the DNA. Second, 
an adequate model of this phenomenon requires that one accounts for the specificity of the 
binding process. That is, a model must elucidate why a certain gene regulatory protein 
                                                      
4 In mechanistic terms one could say that they seek to uncover the mechanism for DNA-
protein recognition and binding. 
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recognizes and binds to a specific DNA region, rather than to a different region with a 
different nucleotide sequence.  
The biochemical literature reveals further constraints on how DNA-protein 
recognition is adequately modeled. In Section 3.1 I have argued that biochemists provide 
three kinds of information when they explain how a certain gene regulatory protein 
recognizes and binds to a specific DNA region: first, they disclose the three-dimensional 
structure of the gene regulatory protein (which α helices and which β sheets it has and how 
they are located to each other) and its spatial orientation on the double helix when it is 
bound to the DNA. This amounts to showing that there is a spatial fit between the protein 
and its DNA binding region. Second, they reveal the chemical structure of the involved 
macromolecules and show that the chemical structure of the protein surface is 
complementary to the chemical features of the DNA sequence, that is, that there is a 
structural fit between protein and DNA binding site. Finally, biochemists point out which 
functional groups of the amino acid residues causally interact with which functional groups 
of the nucleotide bases and what the chemical nature of these interactions is (whether they 
are hydrogen bonds, van der Waals interactions, salt bridges, etc.). Modeling DNA-protein 
recognition typically involves providing a complete list of the contacts that are made 
between protein and DNA (e.g., Luisi et al. 1991, 502f; Pavletich and Pabo 1991, 812-814; 
Klemm et al. 1994, 23-25). This contact list specifies the causal fit between gene 
regulatory protein and DNA binding site.  
All three kinds of information are necessary parts of an adequate causal model that 
provides an understanding and explanation of how a gene regulatory protein recognizes 
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and binds to a specific DNA region. Neglecting some of these relevant kinds of 
information renders the model inadequate. At least such a model would be incomplete in a 
way that is disastrous for its explanatory power. If one for instance ignores complex spatial 
and structural information and represents only the causal interactions between the 
functional groups of protein and DNA, the regular changes from unbound proteins to 
DNA-bound proteins and the specificity of the binding process will remain obscure.  
 
4. How to Model DNA-Protein Recognition by Causal Graphs 
How can we construct a formal causal model of the binding of a gene regulatory protein 
(e.g., Zif268) to a specific DNA binding site? The framework of causal graph theory 
(recall Section 2; for an introduction see, e.g., Spirtes et al. 2000) seems to be a promising 
tool. One possibility to model DNA-protein recognition by causal graphs (and probability 
distributions) is to conceive this phenomenon as a chain of causal events that leads to the 
binding of the gene regulatory protein Zif268 to the corresponding DNA binding site. The 
preceding causal events would then be the diffusion of Zif268 into the nucleus, which 
leads to (or allows for) the collision between Zif268 and the DNA at the corresponding 
binding site, which in turn causes the binding of Zif268 to the DNA. This chain of causal 
events can be represented by the following causal graph model (let us call it M1):  
 
Fig. 4: Causal graph model M1 for DNA-protein recognition. 
 
++ 
D  C  B 
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D, C, and B are binary variables. D stands for the diffusion of Zif268 into the nucleus, C 
for the collision between Zif268 and the DNA at a certain region, and B for the binding of 
Zif268 to a certain DNA region. Each of the three variables can take one of the two values 
“taking place” and “not taking place”. D is a direct cause of C, which is a direct cause of B 
(represented by the arrows). The “+” stands for a positive causal influence: raising the 
probability that C takes the value “taking place” raises the probability that B takes the 
value “taking place”. Hence, the causal graph model allows for making predictions and 
testing them by interventions. For instance, the causal dependency relation between C and 
B can be tested by lowering the probability of the collision of proteins and DNA strands by 
dilution. According to the causal model the consequence of this intervention should be that 
also the probability for the binding of the protein to the DNA decreases. 
A possible objection to M1 is that it does not account for the causal fit between the 
gene regulatory protein Zif268 and the DNA binding site (not to mention the spatial and 
the structural fit). In the model there is only a single variable B that stands for the binding 
of Zif268 to a certain DNA region. No further information about which causal interactions 
between which amino acid residues and nucleotide bases take place and bring about the 
binding is included in the model. But this information seems to be crucial for an 
understanding of the causal fit between Zif268 and the DNA binding site. This objection 
can be avoided by choosing a larger number of more fine-grained variables. Instead of 
representing the collision of the entire protein with the entire DNA binding site by a single 
variable (C) this event is broken down to into various sub-events (e.g., amino acid residue 
x1 collides with nucleotide base y1, amino acid residue x2 collides with nucleotide base y2, 
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etc.), each of which is then represented by a distinct variable (C1, C2, etc.). Likewise, not 
the binding of the protein to the binding site in general is represented (by a single variable 
B). Rather, different variables (B1, B2, etc.) represent the binding of different amino acid 
residues to different nucleotide bases.5 The resulting causal graph model M2 is the 
following: 
 
Fig. 5: Causal graph model M2 for DNA-protein recognition. 
 
C1, …, Cn and B1, …, Bn are binary variables. Each of them can take one of the two values 
“taking place” and “not taking place”. C1, …, Cn stand for the collision (or spatial 
proximity) of a certain amino acid residue of Zif268 with a certain nucleotide base, and B1, 
…, Bn for the formation of a certain set of bonds/interactions between residues and bases. 
                                                      
5 One might claim that these variables (C1, C2, C3, B1, B2, and B3) are not only more fine-
grained, but also lower-level variables (i.e., variables that represent entities that are located 
on a lower organizational level than the entities represented by the former variables C and 
B). An even more “fine-grained” model would distinguish also among the different 
contacts that are made between one amino acid and one nucleotide. 
+
+
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
D  C1 
C2 
C3 
B1 
B2 
B3 
Chicago, IL -353-
 
 
17 
 
The arrows between the variables represent that D is a direct cause of C1, C2, and C3, 
which are direct causes of B1, B2, and B3. Since the binding of a particular amino acid 
residue to a particular nucleotide base may raise the probability that another binding 
between the protein and the DNA is established the causal graph model also contains 
arrows between the B-variables (such as the arrow between B1 and B2).6 
 
5. Where the Limits of Causal Graph Models Lie 
In Section 3.2 I have argued that three kinds of information are crucial to adequately 
explaining why and how gene regulatory proteins, such as Zif268, specifically and 
regularly recognize and bind to certain DNA regions: information about the spatial fit, 
about the structural fit, and about the causal fit between protein and DNA. M2 is superior to 
M1 since it succeeds in representing the causal fit, that is, M2 includes information about 
which amino acid residues causally interact with and establish chemical bindings to which 
nucleotide bases. However, M2 fails to provide an understanding of the spatial fit as well as 
of the structural fit between Zif268 and DNA. It entails no information about the 
conformation of Zif268 and about how it matches the double helix shape of the DNA 
(spatial fit). It also does not represent the complementarity of the chemical structure of the 
protein (i.e., the sequence and location of its amino acids) to the nucleotide sequence of the 
DNA binding site (structural fit). M2 includes information about which amino acids 
causally interact with which nucleotides (contained in the variables B1,…Bn). But this is, as 
such, no direct or complete information about the structural fit between protein and DNA: 
                                                      
6 The same might be true regarding the C-variables. 
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The fact that protein and DNA causally fit allows only inferences about the 
complementarity of their chemical structures and it sheds light on only some parts of the 
chemical structure of DNA and protein. The causal graph model M2 is thus inadequate 
because it leaves out spatial and structural information that is crucial for explaining why 
and how the zinc finger protein specifically and regularly recognizes and binds to DNA.  
In the next two subsections I elaborate on my argument by addressing two possible 
objections that the causal modeler could raise. First, one might admit that M2 is inadequate, 
but argue that it is possible to construct an alternative causal graph model that accounts for 
the spatial and structural fit between Zif268 and DNA and thus is adequate (Section 5.1). 
Second, one might agree that causal graph theory is not the appropriate tool to model 
spatially and structurally complex phenomena, but object that this is neither an interesting 
nor innovative insight as the explanations in these cases are non-causal and causal graph 
theory was not intended to model non-causal explanations (Section 5.2). 
 
5.1 Shortcomings of Alternative Modeling Strategies 
The first objection says that even if the causal graph model M2 is inadequate it is possible 
to revise M2 in a way that renders it adequate. In other words, an opponent might argue 
that it is possible to construct an alternative causal graph model that includes all the 
complex spatial and structural information that is relevant to explaining DNA-protein 
recognition into M2. But how could that be done? I see two different ways one could go.  
One option is to include information about the spatial conformation of Zif268 into 
the characterization of the variables C1, …, Cn or B1, …, Bn. For instance, one could 
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characterize B2 not as the “formation of a certain set of contacts between amino acid 
residue x2 and nucleotide base y2” but as the “formation of a certain set of contacts 
between amino acid residue x2 and nucleotide base y2, where x2 is covalently bound to x1 
and x3, forms a salt bridge to x14, has a close distance also to bases y3 and y9, and so on”.  
But this strategy encounters several problems. First, storing complex spatial and 
structural information into the characterization of the variables renders M2 unmanageable 
because the measurement of the values of the variables becomes very complicated or even 
unfeasible.7 Second, this strategy results in a causal model in which the spatial and 
structural information is highly fragmented because information about the spatial 
conformation of Zif268 and of the DNA binding site, about their spatial orientation to each 
other, about the chemical structures of protein and DNA, and about the complementarity of 
these structures is distributed over the many variables C1, …, Cn and B1, …, Bn. This 
fragmentation is devastating for the explanatory power of the causal model since the 
resulting model fails to elucidate why and how Zif268 spatially and structurally fits to the 
DNA bind site (e.g. that the whole protein Zif268 has a C-shaped structure so that the α-
helix of each zinc finger fits directly into the major groove of the DNA double strand). 
Third, this strategy of storing complex spatial and structural information into M2 gives rise 
to a causal model in which a great deal of the explanatorily relevant information is 
contained in the characterization of the variables, not in the represented causal dependency 
relations. This suggests that the causal dependency relations are less informative and bear 
                                                      
7 One might even argue that spatial and structural information is so complex that adding 
them to the causal model is not feasible in practice, but merely possible in principle. 
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+
+ 
less explanatory weight than the characterization of the variables. But this seems to conflict 
with the typical way of how causal graph models are conceived and reinforces the 
impression that one tries to add something that does not really fit. 
A second option is to add one or more variables to the causal model that are 
supposed to represent the spatial and structural fit between protein and DNA. One could, 
for instance, add the variable S that stands for the protein Zif268 having a certain 
conformation and chemical structure, the DNA having a certain shape and chemical 
structure, Zif268 being oriented towards the DNA binding site in a certain way, and the 
structures of protein and DNA being complementary.8 In its simplest form S would be a 
binary variable, which can take one of the two values “being realized” and “not being 
realized”. The resulting causal model M3 would look as follows: 
 
Fig. 6: Causal graph model M3 for DNA-protein recognition. 
 
                                                      
8 This option implies that one accepts that the conformations of, spatial relations between, 
and chemical structures of protein and DNA are difference makers with respect to their 
binding and that – given an interventionist, counterfactual theory of causation – 
information about the spatial and structural fit also is causal information (see Section 5.2). 
+
+
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
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M3 accounts for the fact that whether or not a certain amino acid base makes contact to a 
certain nucleotide base depends not only on whether protein and DNA collide, but also on 
whether they spatially and structurally fit (i.e. on whether the amino acid base and the 
nucleotide base are complementary and whether they are proximate enough).  
The revised causal model M3, however, is still not satisfactory. First, it has the feel 
of putting the missing relevant spatial and structural information in “by hand”:9 something 
that does not smoothly, automatically fit must be added under additional, atypical efforts. 
What reinforces this feeling is that all different elements of the spatial and of the structural 
fit are represented by a single variable S. It would be more adequate to add different 
variables (S1, …, Sn) each for protein conformation, DNA shape, spatial orientation of 
protein towards DNA, amino acid sequence of Zif268, chemical structure of the DNA 
binding site, and for the complementarity of protein and DNA structure. These different 
variables could then also be quantitative variables (rather than binary ones), which might 
represent, for instance, relative distances among sets of  protein molecules and sets of 
DNA molecules and possible combinations of proteins with a certain sequence binding to 
DNA molecules with a certain sequence. But this strategy encounters the problem that the 
variables are no longer conceptually independent from each other (e.g., a specific protein 
conformation requires a specific amino acid sequence, or the complementarity of protein 
and DNA binding site means that certain kinds of causal interactions can take place), 
which violates a central requirement of causal graph theory. Finally, even if we could add 
different variables for each element of spatial and structural fit the characterization of the 
                                                      
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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variables would be very complex. For instance, the variable that stands for the 
complementarity of protein and DNA structure would have to be characterized in a way 
that shows not only that the protein structure is complementary to the structure of the DNA 
binding site, but that also illuminates why they are complementary and what this amounts 
to. This requires storing detailed information about which functional groups of which 
amino acid residues fit (for which reasons) to which functional groups of which nucleotide 
bases into the characterization of variables. The second option of including complex spatial 
and structural information into the causal graph model thus encounters the same objections 
as the first option: storing complex information into the characterization of the variables 
renders the causal model unmanageable and it contradicts the basic assumption of causal 
graph theory that causal dependency relations between variables are a central element of 
causal models (i.e. that they are not less informative and bear less explanatory weight than 
the variables themselves).  
To conclude, even if it might be in principle or technically possible to include 
information about complex spatial relations and chemical structures into a causal graph 
model, this can only be done at the expense of the adequacy of the causal model as it 
renders the causal model non-explanatory (because the information gets highly 
fragmented), unmanageable, and entails inconsistencies with basic assumptions of causal 
graph theory (e.g. that variables must be conceptually independent and that causal 
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dependency relations are central). Hence, the causal graph approach reaches its limits when 
it comes to explaining spatially and structurally complex biological phenomena.10 
 
5.2 Just a Matter of Non-causal Explanations? 
A second line of criticism agrees with me that biological phenomena that involve complex 
spatial relations and chemical structures cannot be adequately modeled by the tools of 
causal graph theory, but argues that this is neither an interesting nor novel insight. 
Everybody agrees, so the criticism goes, that there are non-causal explanations in science 
such as the explanation of DNA-protein recognition and that causal graph theory is not the 
appropriate tool for representing such non-causal explanations. So what is the big news?  
I agree that if the explanation of DNA-protein recognition were non-causal it would 
be weird to investigate why causal graph theory fails to adequately represent this non-
causal explanation. But I think the process of DNA-protein recognition clearly is a causal 
process, which involves causal interactions between the functional groups of the protein 
and of the DNA binding site, and that this process must be explained causally, too.11 What 
is interesting about this explanation is that, besides causal relations, it also and prominently 
                                                      
10 Jantzen and Danks (2008) have recently argued that topological properties of complex 
molecules can be represented by graphical models. One might suggest that this challenges 
the argument that I provide in this paper. Note, however, that the graph models I discuss 
are very different from the ones that Jantzen and Danks propose. They use undirected 
graphs to represent topological properties of molecules, whereas I use directed, causal 
graphs to represent processes of DNA-protein binding. 
11 I regard explanations as causal if they explicitly (but not necessarily only) represent 
causal relations. 
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represents relations that are non-causal (or at least not directly causal): the shape of the 
gene regulatory protein Zif268, how Zif268 is spatially oriented to the DNA double helix 
(i.e. their spatial fit), the chemical structures of Zif268 and DNA binding site (i.e. the 
sequence of amino acids and nucleotides), and the complementarity of their chemical 
structures. The question of whether these kinds of non-causal information can be 
adequately represented in causal graph model or whether they constitute a limit of the 
applicability of the causal modeling approach is neither uninteresting nor has it already 
been sufficiently addressed.12 
One might question whether information about the spatial and structural fit between 
DNA and protein is in fact non-causal as both kinds of fit make a difference to the binding 
of DNA and protein (in other words, the binding counterfactually depends on there being a 
spatial and structural fit). Assuming a counterfactual view of causation one could then 
argue that (besides the collision) the spatial and structural fit between DNA and protein 
cause their binding. It is important to note that my analysis of the limits of causal graph 
theory is compatible with such an interpretation. Characterizing complex spatial and 
structural information as causal makes it even more urgent and interesting to analyze 
whether these kinds of information can be included in causal models. 
The discussion about the allegedly non-causal character of the explanation of DNA-
protein recognition points to another important issue: in explanations of spatially and 
                                                      
12 This question has already been discussed with regard to constitutive or part-whole 
relations (e.g., Casini et al. 2013; Gebharter and Kaiser 2014). This paper extends the 
discussion to spatial and structural relations. 
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structurally complex biological phenomena causal and non-causal information often cannot 
be easily separated, but rather are interwoven and highly integrated. For example, in my 
case study the structural fit between a gene regulatory protein and the DNA binding site is 
specified by referring to non-causal information such as information about the sequence of 
amino acids and nucleotides and to information about the complementarity of protein and 
DNA structures, which seem to be implicitly causal or to be closely connected to causal 
information. The complementarity of protein and DNA can be spelled out either 
dispositionally or counterfactually: to say that protein and DNA are complementary means 
to say that protein and DNA have the disposition to causally interact/form certain kinds of 
bounds (if they collide or are proximate enough) or that if protein and DNA collided or 
were proximate enough they would form certain kinds of bounds. Both explications refer 
to causal information about the formation of bounds between protein and DNA (i.e. 
information about the causal fit). Furthermore, the causal part of the explanation of DNA-
protein recognition seems to rely on its non-causal part because to understand the causal fit 
between protein and DNA binding site requires understanding how they spatially fit 
together and that their structures match. Hence, even if it is possible to entangle three 
respects how a gene regulatory protein fits to a specific DNA binding site (recall Section 
3.1) in fact these three kinds of fit and the causal and non-causal information they invoke 
are interwoven.  
This entanglement of causal (difference-making) information with non-causal 
(spatial-structural) information poses a challenge to Woodward’s argument that spatial 
information can simply be added to the backbone of causal difference-making information 
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and can be used to fine-tune causal information (2011, 2013). His argument requires that 
causal difference-making information and spatial-structural information are easily 
separable. But biological practice shows that in some cases information about causal and 
non-causal relations is closely related and interwoven in such complex ways that it is not 
possible to clearly tell them apart.  
 
6. Conclusions 
I agree that causal modeling is central to scientific practice and that formal theories of 
causal modeling and explanation, such as causal graph theory, are powerful. However, I 
think that their significance is not universal and that it is important to notice also the limits 
of causal graph theory. In this paper I have used an example from molecular biology to 
reveal one of these limitations: spatially-structurally complex phenomena. I have shown 
that causal graph models fail to provide explanations of biological processes that involve 
complex spatial-structural relations (such as DNA-protein recognition). 
The goal of this paper has not been to argue that there exist kinds of explanation in 
the biological sciences that are non-causal. The process of how a gene regulatory protein 
regularly recognizes and binds to a specific DNA region clearly is a causal process. But 
these causal relations are not the only kind of relations that is relevant to understanding and 
explaining the phenomenon of DNA-protein recognition. Besides causal difference making 
information, any adequate causal model of this phenomenon must also and prominently 
include spatial and structural information (i.e. information about protein and DNA 
conformation and chemical structure, about how they spatially fit, about why their 
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structures are complementary). This non-causal (spatial and structural) information is often 
entangled with causal difference making information. But exactly this is, as I have argued, 
the point at which the limits of causal graph models become apparent. 
My central argument in this paper has been that the formal tools of causal graph 
theory are inappropriate to model and to explain spatially and structurally complex 
biological phenomena (e.g. DNA-protein recognition) because they result in causal models 
which either ignore the importance of spatial and structural relations all together (such as 
M1 and M2) or which try to include the relevant spatial and structural information but, in so 
doing, render the causal graph models non-explanatory, unmanageable, or inadequate 
because they conflict with basic assumptions of causal graph theory (such as M3). This 
argument does not erode the significance of formal approaches to causal modeling, but it 
demonstrates that their scope is limited. 
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Unification and the Quantum Hypothesis in
1900–1913
Abstract
In this paper, I consider some of the first appearances of a hypothesis of quantized
energy between the years 1900 and 1913 and provide an analysis of the nature of the
unificatory power of this hypothesis in a Bayesian framework. I argue that the best way
to understand the unification here is in terms of informational relevance: on the assump-
tion of the quantum hypothesis, phenomena that were previously thought to be unrelated
turned out to yield information about one another based on agreeing measurements of the
numerical value of Planck’s constant.
Word Count: 4,977
1 Introduction
The idea that unification is a virtue of a scientific theory has a long history in philosophy of
science, and has been presented in several guises. Accounts range over those focused on the
common causal origins of various phenomena to those emphasizing a common explanatory
basis. Of course, these are not mutually exclusive ideas and a combination of these elements
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is common. Examples include William Whewell on the Consilience of Inductions (1989),
Michel Janssen on Common Origin Inferences (2002), Philip Kitcher on explanatory
unification (1989) and William Wimsatt on robustness (1981). While the details of such
discussions differ, it is clear that some version of this notion has played a role in several
important episodes of scientific theorizing. One period in the history of science that has
perhaps been neglected in this context is the case of the years leading up to the development
of the old quantum theory. While the history is well-documented (e.g. Klein (1961, 1965,
1966), ter Haar (1967), Hund (1974), Kuhn (1978), Mehra & Rechenberg (1982)) and there
have been excellent discussions of the justification of particular aspects of the theory (Norton
(1987, 1993)), an explicit discussion in terms of unification has not yet been provided.
First, consider what I refer to as the quantum hypothesis, QH: this is the idea that radiation
energy cannot always be treated in a continuous manner as in classical physics, but that
instead, radiation of frequency ν is emitted and absorbed in packets of size hν, where h refers
to the universal physical constant referred to as Planck’s constant. I will consider some of the
central applications of QH between 1900 and 1913 and explain its unificatory role. I will
argue that the best way to understand the unification present in this period is in terms of
informational relevance: on the assumption of QH, observations performed on various diverse
physical phenomena can be thought of as measuring or constraining the numerical value of h,
and these agreeing measurements of h render the physical phenomena relevant to one another
by providing information about the value one is likely to obtain in the various cases.
Such a feature is particularly important in early stages of scientific theory development before
alternative methods of justification are available. Despite the absence of a coherent theory that
incorporated QH, and despite its inconsistency with well-established physics, it was taken by
several scientists to be a promising starting point for the development of a more adequate
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theory. In this paper I will argue that they had reasonable grounds for doing so, because of
empirical support for QH in the form of its unificatory power.
I will first give an outline of unification in terms of informational relevance and comment
briefly on how I take this concept to differ from a common cause argument. I will then give an
overview of several scientific episodes invoking Planck’s constant and in doing so, I will
argue for my claim that the type of unification displayed here is best understood in terms of
experiments on phenomena providing information about one another by yielding agreeing
measurements of the parameter h.
2 Unification
As mentioned previously, there are several different ways to conceive of unification as well as
differences in what is being attributed unificatory power. I defend the idea that the unification
should be understood in terms of informational relevance. My claim is not that this
necessarily captures scientists’ actual motivations, but that we can retrospectively identify the
fact that the quantum hypothesis had unificatory power in the way to be explained. Here, I
have adopted the explication of unification given by Myrvold (2003).
Myrvold provides a Bayesian account of the feature of unification. He shows that on a
particular understanding of what it means for a hypothesis to unify phenomena, its ability to
do so contributes directly to its support by the evidence it unifies. Thus, if one accepts a
Bayesian confirmational framework, the unifying hypothesis obtains support from the
unifying phenomena.
More specifically, he takes a common definition of the informational relevance of a
proposition p1 to another proposition p2, conditional on background b,
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I(p2, p1|b) = Log2
Pr(p2|p1&b)
Pr(p2|b)
. (1)
He then defines the quantity U as a measure of the extent to which h unifies p1 and p2,
U(p1, p2;h|b) = I(p1, p2|h&b)− I(p1, p2|b). (2)
This generalizes straightforwardly to a set of hypotheses p1 . . . pn (2003, 411). He then shows
that on two common candidates for the degree to which evidence supports a hypothesis, the
quantity U contributes directly to the support of h by the evidence. I use the “degree of
confirmation” in my discussion, but a similar result holds if one takes Good’s measure of the
“weight of evidence.” Notice that the degree of confirmation, measured by log Pr(h|e&b)
Pr(h|b)
, is
identical to the definition of the informational relevance of e to h, so we can consider the
informational relevance as a measure of evidential support. We thus obtain for the
informational relevance of evidence e1 and e2 to hypothesis h,
I(h, e1&e2|b) = I(h, e1|b) + I(h, e2|b) + U(e1, e2;h|b). (3)
Myrvold explains the significance as follows:
[T]he degree of support provided to h by e1 and e2 taken together is the sum of
three terms: the degree of support of h by e1 alone, the degree of support h by e2
alone, and an additional term which is simply the degree of unification of the set
{e1, e2} by h. An analogous result holds for larger bodies of evidence. (2003,
412)
Thus, the ability of a hypothesis to unify previously unrelated phenomena contributes directly
Chicago, IL -371-
to the likelihood of that hypothesis given the evidence. In what follows, I will provide details
of how the case under consideration provides an example of this feature. Briefly, the physical
phenomena to be discussed were not clearly relevant to one another before the postulation of
QH. However, on the assumption of such a hypothesis, numerical values of quantities
obtained from observations of those phenomena could be used to calculate the numerical
value of h, all of which agreed to within an order of magnitude. The measured value of h via
one type of phenomenon thus provided information about the measured value of h via a
different phenomenon when assuming QH.
The explication of unification in terms of informational relevance certainly does not preclude
the existence of a common cause argument, such as the one given by Wesley Salmon in his
reconstruction of Jean Perrin’s determination of Avogadro’s constant (1984). However, I
would argue that characterizing the unificatory power of QH as being due to a common cause
would be to overstate the strength of the information available, since at the time in question, it
was not at all clear how quantization might be occurring, and no account of the underlying
mechanisms was forthcoming. Despite this, it was clear that QH did possess unificatory
power in the informational relevance sense, and this minimal sense is all that is required to
provide the hypothesis with some confirmational force.
3 Uses of the Quantum Hypothesis
3.1 Blackbody Radiation
Planck’s constant, h, was first introduced by Planck in his work on blackbody radiation
(1900). He began by interpolating an expression for the equilibrium entropy based on existing
laws which were only partially empirically adequate; with this formula, he was able to
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determine a radiation formula that correctly described the entire emission spectrum of
blackbody radiation, E =
c1λ
−5
ec2/λT − 1
. The interpretation of this formula led him to posit the
quantum hypothesis, that energy of frequency ν is absorbed and emitted in packets of size hν.
The formula for energy distribution could then be written as
E =
8pich
λ5
1
ech/kλT − 1
. (4)
Planck was then able to use this empirically confirmed radiation formula to estimate the size
of h. He used his formula to calculate the amount of radiation in air, and compared this with
values obtained by Ferdinand Kurlbaum in experimental work (1898). He then drew on
observations made by Otto Lummer and Ernst Pringsheim, who were able to determine the
wavelength of the maximum energy in air of blackbody radiation. The result was a numerical
value for the parameter h, h = 6.55 · 10−27erg · sec.
Near the beginning of his work on blackbody radiation, Planck was focused on providing
observationally motivated descriptions of phenomena using a general idea of ‘resonators’
while hoping that electron theory would later be able to fill in the gaps, so to speak, on how
absorption and emission of discrete energy amounts was taking place. As Gearhart has
pointed out, Planck repeatedly stressed the need for a physical interpretation of the constants
he introduced (2002, 200). In fact, there has been much debate on how Planck actually
understood the various derivations he gives of the quantum hypothesis. For instance, Kuhn
(1978) among others has argued that Planck was not literally considering quantized energy
elements in his 1900; 1901 papers, but was thinking in terms of continuous energy amounts
and using the mathematical apparatus of quantized energy as a calculational convenience.
This is in opposition to historians such as Klein (1961), who have argued for a more robust
understanding of Planck’s “energy quanta.” Gearhart has provided an overview of the history
Chicago, IL -373-
and the various interpretive positions, and argues that it is difficult to maintain the view that
Planck himself had in mind the quantization of something like phase space as early as 1900
and 1901 (2002). It is worth noting that Planck’s own understanding of what exactly is being
quantized is not crucial to the point being made here. Regardless of how and why absorption
and emission may occur, we can still see how QH had unificatory power by examining its
application in various phenomena.
3.2 Light Quanta
Although Einstein was aware of Planck’s work on blackbody radiation, his own work in
radiation theory stemmed from a slightly different motivation and he was in fact reluctant to
fully accept Planck’s conclusions, as Einstein believed they diverged further from classical
theory than Planck himself was aware. His work led him to conclude that “monochromatic
radiation of low density . . . behaves, in a thermodynamic sense, as it if consisted of mutually
independent radiation quanta of magnitude Rhν/kN0” ((Einstein, 1905, 143), translation
from (ter Haar, 1967, 102)), where I have here replaced Einstein’s constant β with the
equivalent h/k for ease of reference.
This paper is perhaps best known for Einstein’s treatment of the photoelectric effect in
producing “cathode rays,” or beams of electrons. One instance was the emission of such rays
from a metallic surface after the absorption of incident ultraviolet light. This was first
observed in 1887 and studied further in subsequent years, particularly by Philipp Lenard.
Einstein hypothesized that light quanta penetrating the surface layer of bodies has energy that
is transformed into electron kinetic energy within the substance; electrons then escape the
surface with a certain kinetic energy having produced some quantity of work. We can
consider the equation Einstein describes in terms of our discussion of informational relevance.
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The experiments done on the photoelectric effect yield information about the size of h. One
can derive a relation between the energy of electrons and the size of h based on the kinetic
energy of the electrons being emitted. Einstein reasoned that ΠE = Rhν/k − P ′, where the
body under investigation is charged to positive potential Π, E is the charge of a gram
equivalent of an ion, and P ′ is the potential of negative electricity. Experiments on the
photoelectric effect provided observed values for the unknowns in the relation
ΠE = Rhν/k − P ′. Known quantities could then be inserted into this formula: R is a known
constant, E = 9.6 · 103, P ′ = 0, ν = 1.03 · 1015. (ν corresponds to frequencies of ultraviolet
light, and the other values are given for an experimental setup.) The order of magnitude of Π
according to Lenard’s results = 107. Einstein calculated the theoretical value of ΠE according
to his theoretical assumptions, and found that his theoretical value of Π was in good accord
with the experimental results of Lenard. This provided a constraint for the value of h even
though at the time it could only have been given within an order of magnitude. Because
Einstein’s β was equivalent to h/k and the order of magnitude of β had 10−11, the measured
value of a body’s resistance in cases of the photoelectric effect constrained h to be of order of
magnitude 10−27.
Let us now explain how this fits into the Bayesian framework by determining how the various
experiments provide information about h. First, note that by beginning with QH, one can
calculate the average energy of the resonators Planck was considering in order to obtain the
radiation formula Equation 4. However, this equation refers only to the form of a family of
equations, where the value of h is not yet determined. Thus, let e1 be the proposition
expressing the results of Lummer and Pringsheim’s work determining the maximum
wavelength of blackbody radiation in air at a given temperature, “λmT = 0.294cm ·K.” Let
e2 be the proposition that an experiment on the photoelectric effect would yield a result such
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that Π is of the order of magnitude 107. From e1, in conjunction with QH as applied in
deriving Equation 4, one obtains that the value of h = 6.55 · 10−27erg · sec. Similarly, the
results of e2 in conjunction with QH yield the result that h is of the order of magnitude 10
−27.
Before the suggestion of QH, there was no way to use e1 to yield information about e2. Thus,
the informational relevance of e1 to e2 on background b, given by Equation 1, was very low.
After all, there was no way that Lummer & Pringsheim’s experiments on blackbody radiation
would constrain the behaviour of cathode rays, so Pr(e2|e1&b) should be the same as
Pr(e2|b), thus assigning I(e2, e1|b) the value 0. Compare this with the informational
relevance value on the assumption of QH along with background b. This is given by the
expression I(e2, e1|QH&b) = Log2
Pr(e2|e1&QH&b)
Pr(p2|QH&b)
. The value of Pr(p2|QH&b) is the
probability that Lenard’s results would obtain, which does not have a particularly high value if
considered against a general background. However, once we consider e1 as well, we can
calculate a value for h from the blackbody spectrum, thus constraining the value we would
obtain from experiments on the photoelectric effect. This yields a very high value for
Pr(e2|e1&QH&b), arguably a value very close to one, thus making the value of the
information relevance of e1 to e2 quite high.
Now recall that the unificatory power of QH is given by Equation 2, which measures the
difference between the relevance of e1 to e2 when including QH in the background
knowledge, and excluding it. This nonzero value contributes directly to the degree of
confirmation of QH by e1 and e2 as measured by Equation 3. Thus, by positing behaviour of
radiation in terms of quanta of size hν, the form of the blackbody radiation spectrum
constrained possible values of measurements conducted on the phenomenon of the
photoelectric effect by providing information about the size of h.
An interesting point here is that Einstein had different ideas in mind for the understanding of
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quantization than Planck; Einstein talked in terms of quantization of light, whereas Planck is
somewhat noncommittal. For instance, nine years after his introduction of h, he writes,
[P]revious electron theories suffer from an essential incompleteness which
demands a modification, but how deeply this modification should go into the
structure of the theory is a question upon which views are still widely divergent.
. . . [Some physicists, including Einstein] even believe that the propogation of
electromagnetic waves in a pure vacuum does not occur precisely in accordance
with the Maxwellian field equations, but in definite energy quanta hν. I am of the
opinion, on the other hand, that at present it is not necessary to proceed in so
revolutionary a manner, and that one may come successfully through by seeking
the significance of the energy quantum hν solely in the mutual actions with which
the resonators influence one another. (1915[1909], 68)
For this reason, a ‘common cause’ account of the spectrum of blackbody radiation and the
various light phenomena mentioned here would be difficult to provide. QH itself does not
posit any mechanisms that can be understood as causes; quantization might stem from the
actions of resonators, or the constitution of light, among other possibilities. Nevertheless, we
can see that the phenomena discussed above became relevant to one another on the
assumption of even something as general as QH, and different interpretations of its ‘cause’ do
not affect its unificatory power.
3.3 Spectral Phenomena
The quantum hypothesis and the quantity h were crucial in early characterizations of the
structure of the atom, as well as the behaviour of line spectra, specifically when heated gases
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produce lines of different colours. It was observed that the radiation emitted from these heated
gases were not of a continuous spectrum as classical mechanics would lead one to expect.
Rather, the emitted radiation was of a number of specific frequencies, as manifested in a
number of discrete lines on the spectrum. Balmer found a formula describing the emission
spectrum of hydrogen gas:
λ = B
(
m2
m2 − n2
)
(5)
where n = 2,m is an integer ≥ 2, B is a constant. Written in terms of frequency and explicit
values for the constant, and generalized to allow for different integers for n andm, this
becomes
ν =
2pi2me4
h3
(
1
τ 22
−
1
τ 21
)
. (6)
However, this formula had no known connection with the other phenomena discussed above.
Niels Bohr was able to develop a model of the atom that was able to account for the observed
line spectra of different elements, which no other theory had been able to do. On his model,
there were set orbits for electrons each associated with set amounts of energy. An electron
making the jump from one energy level to another would emit a discrete amount of energy,
hν. Thus, the spectral lines produced by a particular gas when heated corresponded to the
differences between discrete energy levels of the electrons moving from one level to another.
This explained the observed discrete spectrum. There were problems with this model since it
postulated the existence of stationary states, which went against certain laws of classical
electrodynamics, but importantly, the preliminary model was able to account for the observed
spectrum by incorporating the quantum hypothesis.
Bohr calculated relations between several observable quantities based on Planck’s radiation
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theory utilizing h; these calculations, with observed quantities, fit with the order of magnitude
of h. We can reinterpret this as a way to turn the observed line spectra into information about
the size of h: we already knew that Balmer’s formula could be used to describe emission
spectra. According to Bohr’s calculations,
2pi2me4
h3
= 3.1 · 1015 (7)
The observed value was 3.290 · 1015.
We can reverse the calculation in order to see how such an experiment would have constrained
the value of h. We use the same experimental values that Bohr used for the charge of the
electron e = 4.7 · 10−10 and the ratio of the charge to mass e/m = 5.31 · 1017, as well as the
observed value of 3.290 · 1015 and solve for h in the expression above. The result is
h = 6.38 · 10−27, which we see is remarkably close to Bohr’s previously calculated value. In
this way, we see how Balmer’s formula carried information about the size of h, which was
also given by the blackbody spectrum.
In order to make the informational relevance explicit, let us take e1, as above, to be the
statement of Lummer & Pringsheim’s results on the maximum wavelength of blackbody
radiation in air, λmT = 0.294cm ·K. Let e2 here be that the constant in Equation 7, in front
of the brackets, takes on a value around 3.290 · 1015. As before, a value of this constant
without the assumption of QH could a priori have taken on an infinite range of values, and the
result of measurements on blackbody radiation would not be expected to be informative about
this. Thus, the informational relevance of e1 to e2 was low, if not zero. However, by assuming
QH, the blackbody spectrum provides information about the size of h, thus constraining the
possible values that the constant could take. This makes it much more likely that the value of
the constant should be the one found (on the reasonable assumption that values close to the
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one calculated using Planck’s radiation theory would be more likely than those that do not
provide numerical agreement). This makes the informational relevance of e1 to e2 quite high
on the assumption of QH, in contrast to its value without the assumption of QH. This yields a
nonzero value for the unificatory power of QH with respect to e1 and e2, again contributing
directly to the degree of confirmation of QH by those phenomena.
After Bohr’s success with the hydrogen spectrum, other phenomena related to atomic spectra
were used as explicit tests for the value of h. James Franck and Gustav Ludwig Hertz
performed experiments on the energy of electrons colliding with molecules of an inert gas or
metal vapour (1914[1967]). In particular, their experiments with mercury vapour were able to
help determine value of h. Here, electrons of a certain kinetic energy were introduced into
mercury vapour. It was known that at relatively high energies, the mercury gas became
ionised. However, below this level but at certain energy thresholds, the electrons lost their
kinetic energy; this was attributed to inelastic collisions between the free electrons and those
bound to mercury atoms. The fact that these only occurred at discrete levels of energy of the
introduced electrons was evidence for the idea that the mercury gas atoms could only absorb
energy in those discrete quantities. These energy levels corresponded to the observed
spectrum lines emitted by mercury gas.
Since the experiment involved only quantities that were pre-determined or measurable such as
the energy of the introduced electrons, the voltage drop corresponding to the loss of the
electrons’ kinetic energy, and the frequency of emitted energy in the spectrum, these results
were used to calculate a value for Planck’s constant. Franck and Hertz calculated that h had
the value 6.59 · 10−27. An analysis of the informational relevance of this experiment is
analogous to the one given above.
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3.4 Summary of Informational Relevance
I have presented several phenomena that were unified by the quantum hypothesis, namely, the
frequency spectrum of blackbody radiation, light phenomena, atomic spectral phenomena,
and the specific heat of diamond. One important feature that I have emphasized is the ability
of several of these phenomena to help constrain and measure the numerical value of Planck’s
constant which was an integral feature of the quantum hypothesis. Below is a table
summarizing the values obtained from each of the phenomena discussed above.
Phenomenon Value of h
Blackbody radiation 6.55 · 10−27
Light quanta Order of 10−27
Hydrogen emission spectrum 6.38 · 10−27
Mercury gas resonance radiation 6.59 · 10−27
These measurements are significant because they demonstrate the idea that various
observations, understood in terms of constraining information about a parameter, were able to
render previously unrelated phenomena relevant to one another by yielding information
implicitly contained in those observations. By increasing the informational relevance of each
phenomenon to the other, the unificatory power of QH is raised. My previous discussion
considered only pairwise informational relevance relations, but the generalization to several
phenomena yields the following, taking each of the e’s below to represent the results of
experiments from the four phenomena listed in the table.
U(e1, e2, e3, e4;QH|b) = I(e1, e2, e3, e4|QH&b)− I(e1, e2, e3, e4|b) (8)
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Thus, the Bayesian notion of unificatory power of the quantum hypothesis is nonzero, and the
degree of confirmation of QH receives support not only from the individual phenomena, but
from the fact that QH makes those phenomena relevant to one another.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that the type of unification displayed by the old quantum theory
can be understood in terms of informational relevance, which yields the result that in a
Bayesian confirmational framework, this unificatory power contributed to the confirmation of
a quantum hypothesis over and above the evidence taken individually. I have argued that in
many of these cases, an account of the mechanisms that would explain the observed behaviour
were not available, which makes a causal story for the unification more difficult to provide.
While not denying that causal explanations have their place in theoretical justification, I hope
to have shown that there is at least one case where even when such unification is not available
to us, there is an alternative sense that has epistemic force. Thus, despite the lack of a fully
acceptable quantum theory, it was epistemically justified for scientists of the time to pursue
the quantum hypothesis.
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Science and Informed, Counterfactual, Democratic Consent 
Arnon Keren 
 
Abstract 
On many science-related policy questions, the public is unable to make informed decisions, because 
of its inability to make use of knowledge and information obtained by scientists. Philip Kitcher and 
James Fishkin have both suggested therefore that on certain science-related issues, public policy 
should not be decided upon by actual democratic vote, but should instead conform to the public's 
Counterfactual Informed Democratic Decision (CIDD). Indeed, this suggestion underlies Kitcher's 
specification of an ideal of a well-ordered science. The paper argues that this suggestion 
misconstrues the normative significance of CIDDs. At most, CIDDs might have epistemic 
significance, but no authority or legitimizing force.   
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1. Introduction 
According to a widely held view, democratic deliberations should arrive at results representing 
collective, informed decisions (Fishkin 2009). According to this view, science must play an 
important role within democratic decision-making, as the provider of relevant knowledge and 
information. But the idea that science can play this role faces serious challenges. One type of 
challenge emerges from the apparent inability of the public to make use of knowledge obtained by 
scientists. Research has demonstrated the extent of public ignorance on scientific matters, its lack of 
motivation to engage in serious study and deliberation on such matters, its vulnerability to 
manipulation, and the extent of systematic attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Thus, what we can 
reasonably expect to find, is an "underinformed and nondeliberative public” (Fishkin 2009, 7). 
Accordingly, even if scientists had all the relevant information needed to make a collective informed 
decision, the public's decision would often not be informed. Call this the problem of responsiveness 
to science.  
A different kind of challenge emerges from the fact that scientific activity may not be 
properly responsive to the values, needs, and interests of different segments of society. The clearest 
example of this concerns the way in which the scientific agenda is set. Scientists often do not pay 
enough attention to questions the answer to which would serve the interests of much of the public. 0F1 
Accordingly, even if the public were responsive to knowledge held by scientific experts, available 
scientific knowledge would often not allow the public to make informed decisions, because the 
knowledge scientists seek is not that which is relevant to the public and its needs. Call this the 
problem of the responsiveness of science.  
While these are distinct problems, a single idea, developed independently by prominent 
philosophers of science, such as Philip Kitcher (2001) and political theorists, such as James Fishkin 
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 A notable example is the relative lack of attention to diseases which afflict the poor within 
biomedical research (Flory and Kitcher 2004). 
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(2009) may seem to suggest a way of addressing them both. The suggestion can be presented via an 
analogy with the treatment of consent in contemporary medical ethics. In medical contexts, where 
actual informed consent cannot be obtained because of a patient's lack of decision-making capacity, 
it is widely held that treatment decisions should be based on what the patient would have decided 
upon, if he were to make an informed, considered decision. Analogously, when it comes to certain 
decisions that require scientific input, contemporary democracies may seem to lack the capacity to 
reach an informed democratic decision. On such questions, it might be suggested, policy should 
conform not to actual democratic decisions, but to what the public would have decided upon, if it 
were to reach a decision through an informed, democratic decision-making process. In other words, 
the problem of responsiveness to science can be addressed, if public policy on science-related issues 
is not based on an actual democratic decision, but instead conforms to a Counterfactual Informed 
Democratic Decision (henceforth: CIDD).  
This suggestion can also be relied upon to address the problem of the responsiveness of 
science. Indeed this is the core idea underlying Kitcher's suggested specification of an ideal of a well 
ordered science (2001; 2011). Thus, Kitcher suggests that in asking what the scientific agenda 
should be like, or in evaluating contemporary scientific institutions, the standard to which we should 
appeal is to be specified by ideal, hypothetical democratic deliberations. That is, the actual scientific 
agenda should conform to the agenda that would be decided upon, if it were decided upon through 
ideal, counterfactual, informed democratic deliberations.  
While I believe that CIDDs can play an important role in our attempt to address the problems 
of scientific responsiveness, I think that it is a mistake to think that we should make public policy 
decisions requiring scientific input in accordance with CIDDS, or that CIDDS determine the 
standards against which actual institutions should be judged. CIDDs, I shall argue, do not have the 
same normative import, and do not carry the same kind of authority, as either actual democratic 
decisions or counterfactual decision of incapacitated patients. The latter have legitimizing force, 
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while the significance of CIDDs is merely epistemic. The idea that public policy should ultimately 
accord with CIDDS therefore misconstrues their significance. 
2. Democratic Decision-Making for Incapacitated Societies 
In the medical context, the standard contemporary view is that if a patient lacks decision-
making capacity, then, provided certain conditions are met, whoever acts as surrogate decision-
maker should "attempt to decide as the patient would have decided in the circumstances that now 
obtain, if the patient were competent" (Brock 1994, S9). This is often referred to as The Substituted 
Judgment Standard (SJS). Now it might be suggested that when it comes to certain decision, for 
which scientific input is required, contemporary societies lack decision-making capacity. They are 
incapacitated, in the sense that they are unable to arrive at collective informed decision, not because 
relevant knowledge and information is unavailable, but because, like incapacitated patients, they lack 
the ability to make decisions based on sound deliberation on available information. It is for this 
reason that the analogy with the treatment of incapacitated patients may suggest itself.   
Here is how Fishkin employs the analogy:  
Just as when individuals offer informed consent to a medical…procedure, we think they 
should know what they are agreeing to…we can apply generally similar considerations to the 
outlines of an acceptable collective process of achieving something analogous—the consent 
of "we the people." (2009, 34) 
Now because our community is in a sense "incapacitated", "[The] choice…is between debilitated but 
actual opinion, on the one hand, and deliberative and counterfactual opinion, on the other." Fishkin, 
in advocating the use of deliberative polling, obviously thinks we should go for the latter.   
Deliberative Polling attempts to employ social science to uncover what deliberative public 
opinion would be on an issue …The resulting deliberative public opinion is both informed 
and representative. As a result, it is also, almost inevitably, counterfactual. (Fishkin 2009, 26) 
It should be noted that Fishkin, while claiming that knowledge of CIDDs of "we the people" 
has normative import, is not always clear on what its import should be. But the analogy with 
informed consent in the medical context suggests that under certain conditions, such decision should 
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be authoritative. 1F2 And Kitcher, as already noted, defends such a view explicitly with respect to the 
scientific agenda. Thus, in describing democratic deliberative procedure that should determine the 
proper scientific agenda, he is explicit that given the ignorance of the public "there's no thought that 
well-ordered science must actually institute" the procedures envisaged. Instead, "[T]he thought is 
that, however inquiry proceeds, we want it to match the outcomes those complex procedures would 
achieve…" (Kitcher 2001, 123). 
In the medical context, for SJS to be applicable, a number of conditions must hold. First, the 
decision to be made is one on which the patient's informed decision, if one were actually made, 
would have been authoritative, but on which the patient has not made a decision; second, the patient 
must lack decision-making capacity; and third, the surrogate decision-maker must nonetheless be 
able to know how the patient would have decided, if he were able to make an informed decision. 
Under these conditions, decision on the patient's behalf should conform to his counterfactual 
informed decision.  
If we take the analogy with the treatment of incapacitated patients seriously, the following 
might therefore suggest itself. That on questions on which a democratic decision would have been 
authoritative, but on which no democratic decision has been made; and on which, moreover, our 
society is unable to actually make an informed democratic decision, we should, as in the medical 
context, appeal to SJS. On such questions—call them difficult science-related questions—we should 
attempt to decide as the public would have decided, if it were able to make an informed democratic 
decision.  
Of course, one question about the applicability of SJS to democratic decisions is the question 
whether we can know what decision the public would have made, if it were to make an informed 
                                               
2
 For a more explicit endorsement of this idea, see, e.g., Fishkin (2002, 234). But often Fishkin does 
not commit himself to a particular conception of the significance of CIDDs. So my discussion should 
be understood as adjudicating between different lines of thought found in Fishkin's writings.  
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democratic decision. However, if we can have counterfactual knowledge about the kind of decisions 
an individual would have made if he were informed, then there are no principled reasons to think that 
we cannot have counterfactual knowledge about the democratic decision a community would have 
made, if it were properly informed. Indeed, social scientists are developing tools whose purpose is 
precisely to allow us to have such counterfactual knowledge. This is the purpose of Deliberative 
Polling, in which a random, representative sample of the population is invited and incentivized to 
participate in a deliberative process, culminating in a democratic vote on a policy question that is 
supposed to represent the decision the entire population would have made, if it could make an 
informed democratic decision. In recent years such deliberative polls have been put to use to decide 
on a range of questions—to determine the identity of party candidates in Greece, to guide the energy 
policy of the state of Texas, to prioritize ways of investment in infrastructure in Wenling city in 
China, and more (Fishkin 2009).  
We can now see how the analogy with informed individual consent might motivate Kitcher's 
suggestion that the agenda of science should also be set in accordance with a CIDD. Three features 
of contemporary science seem to support this suggestion. On the one hand, public funding of science 
and science's significant effect on the public may suggest that an actual democratic decision would 
have authority in determining the scientific agenda. On the other hand, public ignorance about 
science may suggest that the scientific agenda should not be determined by actual non-informed 
democratic decision, but in accordance with a CIDD (Kitcher 2001; 2007).  
3. Counterfactual Decisions, Individual and Collective  
However, there are reasons for doubt about the suggestion that decisions on the scientific 
agenda, or on science-related questions more generally, should conform to CIDDs. Indeed, there is a 
fundamental difference between the normative import of counterfactual decisions of individuals and 
that of CIDDs that should make us wary of the suggestion.  
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According to SJS, when we have reliable knowledge about an incapacitated patient's 
informed counterfactual decision, we should act accordingly, even if we also know that his 
counterfactual decision would not best serve his interests. We should make decisions based on the 
best-interest standard only when we have no decisive evidence about how the patient would have 
decided in this case (Brock 1994). For this reason, if we are certain that a Jehovah Witness, if he 
were capacitated, would have refused a course of treatment requiring a blood transfusion, we should 
not provide him with such treatment now that he is incapacitated, even if we are quite certain that 
such treatment would best serves his interests.  
What justifies acting on patients' counterfactual decision even when their decisions are not 
best? If this is justified, this is because doing so allows us to respect patients' autonomy and right of 
self-determination by deciding in accordance with their values and conception of the good (Brock 
1994). But it is doubtful if a similar justification can be given to the idea that we should make 
decisions in accordance with CIDDs, even when these decisions do not best serve the community's 
interest and do not achieve the most just distribution of benefits. There are at least two reasons 
underlying this doubt.  
First, in the case of an incapacitated patient, adhering to SJS when her informed 
counterfactual decision is not best involves sacrificing the patient's interests in order to respect her 
own values and conception of the good. In contrast, in the case of a community, acting in accordance 
with CIDDs when the counterfactual decision is not best—when it does not best serve the interests of 
community members, or the most just distribution—involves sacrificing the interest of some, in 
order to respect the values and conception of the good of others. In this sense the analogy studied 
here, to paraphrase on Rawls, extends to society a principle of choice for one person, thereby failing 
to take seriously "the distinction between persons" (1971, 27). But this distinction is of prime 
significance precisely when it comes to the right of self-determination. This right of yours requires 
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that I respect your values and decisions about how you conduct your own life; but it does not require 
that I respect your decisions and values when it comes to other persons' lives.  
A second objection to the analogy emerges from the observation that unlike the case of an 
individual, in the case of a community, acting in accordance with the counterfactual informed 
decision of the majority, and deciding in accordance with the majority's values, principles, and 
conception of the good may amount to very different things. This is an implication of what has been 
called the discursive dilemma (Pettit 2001). Consider the following case, of a community composed 
of three individuals, a, b, and c, each of which has a perfectly consistent set of judgments regarding 
the truth-value of three propositions (p; if p then q; q), as described in table 1:   
 p If p then q q 
a t t t 
b t f f 
c f t f 
majority  
judgment 
t t f 
Table 1 
Here, even though all members of the community have rational sets of judgments, so that all sets 
include whatever conclusions follow from accepted premises, the same is not true of the resulting 
collective set of judgments, generated by aggregating individuals' judgments through majority vote. 
As is well known, this is a general feature of majority vote. Certain principles and facts, from which 
certain conclusions logically follow, may be accepted by a majority of the population, and yet the 
conclusions might be rejected by the majority. 2F3 One implication of this is that while majority vote is 
a way of making collective decisions that are responsive to individuals' judgments, majority vote 
cannot be equally responsive to all judgments of all individuals. To be maximally responsive to some 
judgments it must be unresponsive to others. So the second reasons the analogy with the 
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 This feature of majority voting is not unique to it, and is shared by all aggregation functions that 
satisfy certain minimal conditions. 
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incapacitated patient fails is that in the case of a community, deciding on a question in accordance 
with the counterfactual informed decision of the majority may not amount to deciding on it in 
accordance with the values and principles of most members of the community.  
4. Democratic Decision-Making, Actual and Counterfactual 
CIDDs therefore do not have the same normative import as counterfactual informed decisions 
of incapacitated individuals. The latter are authoritative in the sense that we should abide by them, 
even if we are quite certain that the decision made is not best. CIDDs do not have this kind of 
legitimizing force. They can at best serve as an indication of what the best decision is. And they are 
neither the only relevant kind of indicator, nor the best possible one. Indeed, sometimes the 
consensus of scientists, or possibly, of philosophers, might provide a much better indication of that.  
A supporter of CIDDs-based standards might try to undermine my objections to their 
authoritativeness by claiming that if my objections were sound, they would not only show that 
CIDDs should not be authoritative, but that the same is also true of actual democratic decisions. And 
this is surely implausible. However, this counterargument from actual democracy is based on a 
mistake. The objection to CIDDs-based standards would undermine the authoritativeness of actual 
democratic decisions only if it equally applied to actual and counterfactual democratic decisions, and 
only if whatever could be said for the legitimacy of actual democratic decision-making would also 
apply to CIDDs. But neither of these conditions holds.  
Consider the objection from self-determination to the applicability of SJS to the case of the 
community. One might attempt to undermine the objection by claiming that communities, not only 
individuals, have a rights to self-government, in virtue of which a community's democratic decision 
is authoritative, even when the decision is not best, and even if as a result, some individuals' interests 
are sacrificed. This is something I do not want to contest. However, we need not deny that 
communities have such rights in order to deny the authoritativeness of CIDDs. For it is a 
community's actual democratic decisions, not its counterfactual democratic decisions, that are 
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authoritative. Even if knowledge of hypothetical decisions of agents has normative import, the 
reason why such knowledge has normative import is not the same as the reason why actual decisions 
have normative import. As Dworkin noted with respect to Rawls' hypothetical-contract argument for 
his theory of justice, "A hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of an actual contract; it is no 
contract at all" (1975). Actual consent to a contract can generate for me a reason to do what I would 
otherwise have no reason to do. In contrast, the fact that under certain conditions I would have 
consented to a contract does not create for me a reason for action. Instead, the force of a 
hypothetical-contract argument is merely epistemic: it can serve to show what reasons apply to us 
anyway. Accordingly, if the option that would be accepted by a CIDD is not best, its counterfactual 
acceptability does not generate for us a reason to accept it.  
But then why is that in the case of the individual incapacitated patient, we ought to decide as 
the patient would have decided, even when we know that his decision is not best? This is presumably 
so because we have reasons to respect his values, principles and conception of the good, and because 
his counterfactual decision would follow from these and thus represent them. But it is doubtful 
whether a community's CIDDs similarly represent its values and principles. In the case of an 
individual, we normally ascribe counterfactual decision to her on the basis of values, beliefs and 
principles we know she actually accepts, and we can thus take her counterfactual decision as 
representing her actual values and principles. But where our grounds for attributing to an individual 
or collective subject a counterfactual decision is not knowledge of her actual deep commitments, but 
rather a deliberative poll, or some other such experimental test indicating how she would have 
decided under counterfactual conditions, it would be a mistake to think that this counterfactual 
decision represents the subject's actual commitments. Accordingly, even if we can attribute mental 
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states to collective subjects, these cannot be attributed to them in virtue of merely counterfactual 
decisions. 3F4  
The central virtue Fishkin (2009) attributes to deliberative polls is that they arrive at a 
decision that is both representative and informed. But while deliberative polls may represent the 
counterfactual informed decision of the public, this counterfactual decision, unlike individual 
counterfactual decision appealed to in the medical contexts, cannot be assumed to represent the 
subject's actual values and principles. Therefore, it is not clear why what deliberative polls represent 
merits special respect. Matters are quite different with actual democratic decisions. Here, by virtue of 
the actual decision made, we have grounds to attribute commitments to a collective subject. 
Therefore, my objections to the acceptance of CIDD-based standards do not equally apply to actual 
and counterfactual democratic decisions.  
Consider the second condition that must hold for the counterargument from actual democracy 
to succeed. Is it the case that whatever can plausibly be said for the legitimacy of actual democratic 
decision-making similarly supports the adoption of CIDDs-based standards on science-related policy 
questions? There are reasons to think not. Indeed, there are reasons to think that, quite generally, 
                                               
4
 If we were to attribute mental states to communities merely on the basis of CIDDS, these would be 
very bizarre mental states. They would not satisfy minimal conditions of self-knowledge and 
rationality that any account of mental-state attribution should arguably insist on. Thus, beliefs 
attributed on the basis of CIDDs would be such that subjects supposedly holding them would 
normally have no way of knowing that they hold them without performing complicated social-
science experiments; nor would such beliefs have any tendency to be expressed in subjects' actual 
behavior and assertions. And as the discursive dilemma suggests, bodies of beliefs thus attributed to 
collective subjects would not satisfy condition of rationality, and subjects supposedly holding them 
would have no way of monitoring their body of belief to ensure that they display properties 
characteristic rational agency.  
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plausible arguments for democracy do not support adopting CIDDs-based standards. A detailed 
argument for this would demand much more space than available here, for arguments for democracy 
are many and varied. 4F5 But what has been said above suggests some reasons for thinking so, for it 
shows that some arguments for democracy, such as arguments from autonomy and self-
determination (Christian 2008) do not support adopting CIDDs-based standards. Moreover, 
instrumental arguments for democracy provide us with further prima-facie reasons for thinking that 
the objection from actual democracy fails. Such arguments appeal to the good consequences of 
implementing actual democratic decision-making procedures. For instance, one historically 
important instrumental argument for democracy is based on claims about the positive effects of 
participation in democratic decision-making on the character of citizens (Mill 1861/1991). Obviously 
conforming public policy to CIDDs would not have similar effects on citizens' character. And the 
same is arguably true of other familiar instrumental arguments for democracy. 5F6 For according to 
such arguments, we should insist on the state being governed by actual democratic decision-making 
procedures, because the good consequences associated with such democratic procedures cannot be 
obtained otherwise. Hence, if sound, such arguments suggest that these good consequences cannot be 
obtained by merely conforming public policy to CIDDs. Indeed, if we could obtain the same good 
consequences in this way, we could get all the good consequences of actual democratic voting and 
deliberation, while avoiding some of the familiar shortcomings and costs associated with modern 
democracies. This would constitute a powerful instrumental argument against the claim that we 
should hold actual, authoritative democratic voting procedures, even when actual democratic 
decisions can be informed.  
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5. The Epistemic Role of CIDDs  
We thus see that neither the analogy with medical informed consent nor our commitment to 
democracy should lead us to accept the authoritativeness of CIDDs on science-related questions. 
Reasons for insisting on the state being governed democratically do not similarly support the claim 
that public policy should conform to counterfactual democratic decisions. And reasons for giving 
authority to informed counterfactual decisions of individuals do not support giving authority to 
informed counterfactual democratic decisions of communities. The analogy with the informed 
consent of medical patients thus misrepresents the normative significance of CIDDs: The question, 
which option most people, if informed, would regard as best, is not the question we ultimately need 
to answer when faced with science-related policy issues.  
Nonetheless, the answer to this question is significant, and once the misguided idea that 
public policy should conform to CIDDs is rejected, we can better appreciate its true significance. For 
the problem with this idea is not only that it attributes to CIDDs a kind of significance that they do 
not have, but also that it suggests that CIDDs do not have the kind of significance that they should 
have. If it is the public's counterfactual informed democratic decisions with which public policy 
should conform, then for the well functioning of our democracies, it does not really matter how 
uninformed the public actually is. As long as we are able to know how the public would have 
decided under ideal counterfactual conditions, it does not matter whether the public learns about 
science from Fox News or from Scientific American, or whether our education system provides 
future citizens with a sound training in science, or in creation science. All that we need to make the 
right decision on behalf of the public is to know how it would decide, if it were properly informed. 
But this is a mistake. Systematic manipulation of evidence made available to the public, and 
resulting erroneous beliefs held by much of the public, represent a most serious threat to the well-
functioning and legitimacy of contemporary democracies. And if consideration of CIDDs does not 
allow us to avoid this problem, then there is arguably no way of addressing it that does not involve 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -398-
14 
 
combating this kind of public ignorance. It is in this context that deliberative polling can have an 
important epistemic role.  
Quite generally, knowledge of the opinion of other informed persons is an important 
epistemic resource. This can be an important epistemic resource even when the informed person is 
my peer (Christensen 2007). More so, when she is better informed than I am. This is why it is often 
important for us to know what scientists think on an issue. For this reason, knowing what the public 
would have judged, if it were informed, offers us with an important epistemic resource. Indeed, as a 
resource not only for coping with our fallibility and ignorance, but for learning about our fallibility 
and ignorance, it may have a unique role to play, a role which knowledge of what scientists think 
cannot play alone. 6F7  
A developed system of cognitive division of labor would not have created such problems for 
a democratic decision-making system based on the idea of equal-say to all, if the lay public knew 
that experts do not differ from the public in their interests, but simply had superior knowledge, and 
trusted them accordingly. But trust is lacking partially because the public systematically differs from 
scientists not only in terms of knowledge, but also in terms of interests. So while the encounter with 
others is an opportunity to learn, both scientists and the public often fail to learn because it is not 
clear what underlies the difference in opinions between them: different levels of knowledge or 
different kinds of interests.  
It is for this reason that CIDDs may provide both scientists and the public with a helpful 
mirror. For CIDDs represents the (possible) collective opinion of a group of individuals similar to the 
public in terms of their interests, but more similar to scientist in terms of their knowledge. A 
difference between the decision made through a CIDD and actual public opinion may suggest to the 
public that the difference between actual public opinion and scientific opinion is likely to be the 
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 Moreover, the fact that the collective opinion represented by CIDDs is merely possible, and not 
actual, makes no difference to its epistemic significance (Kelly 2005). 
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result of the public's own ignorance. In contrast, if the CIDD is similar to actual public opinion, and 
different from the opinion of the scientific community, this may suggest to scientists that the 
differences between their own opinion and that of the public may be explained not by public 
ignorance, but by something else: perhaps lack of trust, perhaps differences in interests.  
Because the division of cognitive labor creates systematic differences between scientists and 
the lay public both in terms of knowledge and in terms of interests, members of the scientific 
community can learn from knowledge of the general public opinion, and members of the public can 
learn from the scientific community's opinion. But members of both communities can learn more 
from these, if they also have knowledge of CIDDs. Devices like deliberative polling might therefore 
serve an important educational function that neither standard public-opinion polls, nor statements 
representing the scientific consensus can serve. But to see that this is indeed an important function, 
we must reject the idea that public policy on science-related questions ought to conform to CIDDs. 
We must admit that the well functioning of our democracies does not ultimately depend on our 
knowledge of how the public would decide, if it were properly informed, but rather on how 
misinformed the public actually is.  
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1 Introduction 
The focus in the literature on scientific explanation has shifted in recent years towards model-
based approaches. The idea that there are simple and true laws of nature has met with objections 
from philosophers such as Nancy Cartwright (1983) and Paul Teller (2001), and this has made a 
strictly Hempelian D-N style explanation largely irrelevant to the explanatory practices of 
science (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). Much of science does not involve subsuming particular 
events under laws of nature. It is increasingly recognized that science across the disciplines is to 
some degree a patchwork of scientific models, with different methods, strategies, and with 
varying degrees of successful prediction and explanation. And so accounts of scientific 
explanation have reflected this change of perspective and model-based approaches have 
flourished in the explanation literature (Batterman, 2002b; Bokulich, 2008; Craver, 2006; 
Woodward, 2003).  
Of course, not all scientific models are explanatory. Some models are merely 
calculational tools, whose use in the practice of science is entirely predictive or heuristic, while 
others are thought to actually explain the phenomena or system they are modelling. The history 
of scientific explanation in philosophy has focused on articulating independent criteria for what 
counts as an explanation. In recent work, Alisa Bokulich has argued that idealization has a 
central role to play in explanation (Bokulich, 2008, 2011, 2012). Bokulich hopes to find a place 
for certain highly-idealized models to be considered explanatory, even though they are not 
considered explanatory by causal, mechanistic, or covering law accounts of explanation. She 
calls these kinds of explanations structural model explanations and argues that the structural 
similarity between the model and the system can debar non-explanatory models (Bokulich, 2008, 
p. 145). She formulates her account as structural in part to capture models that are not 
explanatory on Woodward’s manipulationist account. She aims to expand the store of 
explanatory models to include as explanatory those that do not accurately represent, those that 
model a physical system by means of fictitious entities or processes, what she calls explanatory 
fictions.  
The second section of this paper examines Bokulich’s account as given in (Bokulich, 
2008, 2011, 2012) and articulate her three criteria for explanation. This section will also give an 
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analysis of Bokulich’s argument as it pertains to a case study examined in her book, viz. the 
phenomenon of quantum wave function scarring. She argues that this very interesting quantum 
phenomenon is best explained by appropriating concepts and formulae from classical closed 
orbit theory, rather than by employing quantum mechanical models. This prompts the third 
section of the paper in which her account is confronted with challenges, in part stemming from a 
review by Gordon Belot and Lina Jannson, in which they voice concerns over this account’s 
ability to debar non-explanatory models such as Ptolemaic astronomy (Belot & Jannson, 2010). I 
argue that the structural aspect of her account can in fact debar the Ptolemaic explanation when 
viewed comparatively, but at the same time it fails to find semiclassical models explanatory. Her 
own solution to this problem is to use a different aspect of the account to debar Ptolemaic 
epicycles and allow semiclassical models. However, in section four I argue that this points to a 
larger worry for structural accounts because the structural criterion is not the deciding factor for 
which models are explanatory and which are merely phenomenological. Thus on Bokulich’s 
account the measure of structural similarity a model bears to its target system is largely irrelevant 
to its being explanatory. I conclude with some remarks about what can be learned from 
Bokulich’s work and suggest some ways to move the discussion on explanation forward. 
2 Structural Model Explanations 
 
This section examines Bokulich’s structural model account of explanation as laid out in 
(Bokulich, 2008) and incorporates the amendments and clarifications made in (Bokulich, 2011, 
2012). Bokulich’s account of explanation relies on much of the work done by James Woodward 
(2003), so the relevant aspects of his account will be briefly recapped first. I then show how this 
account aims to capture semiclassical models by looking at the phenomenon of quantum 
wavefunction scarring and demonstrating how it satisfies her account’s criteria. 
On Woodward’s account, causality is framed in terms of counterfactuals rather than in 
terms of causal mechanisms or physical interaction. Of course not all counterfactuals are going 
to describe causal relations. He distinguishes between interventionist and non-interventionist 
counterfactuals. Basically, an explanatory counterfactual tells us what would happen to the 
systems if certain interventions were to take place. The relations that are invariant under certain 
changes are doing the work of distinguishing the accidental generalizations from genuine causes. 
Causal relationships, he claims, are out there in the world, but they are given in the reliable 
variable dependencies of models. Explanation is the activity of gaining information about these 
causal relations by discovering through intervention which dependency relations are largely 
invariant. The counterfactual dependency of these relations gives us important information that 
provides explanatory depth. This is information that answers what-if-things-had-been-different 
questions, or w-questions. Thus, the range of questions that counterfactual dependence answers 
is related to the explanatory power of that causal relation (Woodward, 2003; Woodward & 
Hitchcock, 2003).  
 Alisa Bokulich adopts aspects of Woodward’s account, in particular the idea that giving 
counterfactual information is central to explanatory power, but she rejects the causal 
manipulationism. In fact, she aims to give an account that can capture the explanatory power of 
the structural, non-causal, models that are not captured by Woodward’s account. She has in mind 
the models of semiclassical mechanics. She claims that these models cannot be explanatory on a 
causal account because the entities involved (electron trajectories) are fictional and have no real 
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causal power. As it will be shown, the morphologies of the quantum systems of interest depend 
on the particular periodic orbits of semiclassical mechanics, but the orbits cannot be said to cause 
the wavefunction distributions, even though there is a reliable dependency relation. Bokulich 
argues that none of the three main types of accounts of explanation (causal, covering law, and 
mechanistic) can capture the way semiclassical models explain quantum phenomena, and offers 
her own structural model explanation as a supplement. This account highlights the structural 
similarities between the real world system and the idealized or fictional model. Bokulich argues 
that structural model explanations are ones in which there is a pattern of counterfactual 
dependence among the variables of the model, which can be measured in terms of w-questions, 
and that this dependence is a consequence of the structural features of the target system 
(Bokulich, 2008, p. 145). 
 In developing her account, Bokulich draws on a suggestion made by Margaret Morrison 
that explanation has to do with structural dependencies (Morrison, 1999). Similar ideas have 
been developed by John Worrall, James Ladyman, and others (Esfeld & Lam, 2008; French & 
Ladyman, 2003; Ladyman, 1998; Worrall, 1989). Bokulich offers three general requirements for 
a structural model explanation, which I have enumerated as follows. The first criterion is E1, 
which states that the explanation makes reference to a scientific model, M. E1 specifies that the 
explanation is a model explanation and not a covering law or mechanistic explanation. The 
structural aspect of the structural model explanation comes from the second criterion E2, which 
says that M must be explanatory by showing how there is a pattern of counterfactual dependence 
of the relevant features of the target system on the structures represented in M. E2 is intended to 
determine which models are genuinely explanatory by ensuring that an explanatory model bears 
a close structural similarity to the counterfactual structure of the phenomenon. This structural 
‘isomorphism’, as she calls it, is given an objective measure in terms of w-questions (Bokulich, 
2008, p. 145). The final criterion is E3, which states that there must be a justification that 
specifies the domain of the application of M. E3 is what she refers to as the justificatory step, 
intended to specify “where and to what extent the model can be treated as an adequate 
representation of the world” (Bokulich, 2008, p. 146). 
She applies her criteria for explanation to some cases of semiclassical mechanics as part 
of a larger project of reconceiving the intertheoretic division between the quantum and the 
classical. She argues that semiclassical mechanics can be genuinely explanatory of certain 
quantum systems. Semiclassical mechanics is of particular interest to her because they seem to 
fall outside of the range of other accounts of explanation. The reason seems to be that the models 
of semiclassical mechanics are non-Galilean, or highly-idealized. The distinction between 
Galilean and non-Galilean idealizations is one that was made popular by McMullin and it can 
help clarify the special nature of these models (McMullin, 1985). Very simply, if one can add 
detail to an idealized model and continually get closer to the real system, then this is what is 
known as a Galilean idealization. For instance, Galileo, in determining the rate of falling bodies, 
made use of balls rolling down incline planes that were assumed to be frictionless. This kind of 
idealization is harmless, and the same mathematical relation at which Galileo arrived can be 
modified to include friction to increase its accuracy. Models featuring these idealizations can be 
explanatory for McMullin. They represent the target system in a straightforward fashion and 
their use in explaining the system is justified in part by the fact that they approximately 
represent.  Robert Batterman has described these models as having “controllable” idealizations, 
in that the idealizations of the system are justified theoretically (Batterman, 2005, p. 235). 
Idealizations that are non-Galilean on the other hand, have singular limits and cannot be 
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modified to approach the target system. They are what I refer to as highly-idealized models. 
These models lack the representation that justifies their use in explanation. However, Batterman, 
Bokulich, and others argue that this does not preclude explanation.  
Semiclassical models are prime examples of highly-idealized models because it is not 
possible to recover the quantum models by adding realistic detail into the semiclassical models. 
If the semiclassical models have explanatory power, it cannot be due to an underlying causal 
mechanism of which they are a Galilean idealization. Bokulich thinks that semiclassical models 
of quantum wavefunction scarring are precisely the kinds of structural explanations that 
Woodward’s 2003 account does not consider explanatory. This is why she allows that the 
justification of the application of the model to quantum phenomena (E3) can be top-down from 
theory, rather than bottom-up where it would be smoothly recovered in Galilean idealization. For 
semiclassical mechanics there is no smooth approximation, but there is Gutzwiller’s periodic 
orbit theory. This theory specifies how the classical trajectories can be used to model certain 
quantum features.  
Robert Batterman was the first to argue that semiclassical appeals to classical structures 
in quantum phenomena at the asymptotic limit between the two is explanatorily important 
(Batterman, 1992, 2002b). Bokulich claims that structural explanations are actually quite popular 
in mechanics where appeals to structural restrictions can account for certain aspects of systems. 
She argues that semiclassical mechanics can be an important interpretive and explanatory tool 
for certain quantum phenomena, specifically in the subfield of quantum chaos. Classical chaos is 
found in a great number of systems in which there is an extreme sensitivity to initial conditions, 
such that immeasurably small differences in initial conditions may result in an exponential 
divergence. Of course, sensitivity to initial conditions has no part in quantum theory, but 
quantum models that also describe these systems must exhibit something like chaos themselves. 
Both Bokulich and Batterman explain that one expects to find a correlate of classical chaos in 
quantum systems because of the Correspondence Principle, originally formulated by Bohr as the 
agreement between classical and quantum mechanics as    . The reason is that because 
classical mechanics is the classical limit of quantum mechanics, there ought to be quantum 
systems that underlie classically chaotic systems as well (Batterman, 1992, pp. 51-52; Bokulich, 
2008). One of Bokulich’s strongest examples is that of quantum wavefunction scarring in 
systems known as quantum billiard models (described below). Studies of these quantum billiard 
systems have revealed that there is an unexpected accumulation of the wave functions along the 
trajectories that would be periodic orbits in a classical chaotic system.  
In the classical billiard systems, a stadium shaped enclosed space is inhabited by a free-
moving particle whose trajectory is mapped. The shape of the enclosure generally creates a 
chaotic trajectory that displays an irregular pattern (Fig. 1).This irregular pattern eventually leads 
to a uniform distribution of trajectories throughout the space. However, there are a few initial 
conditions that lead to periodic orbits in which the motion of the particle constantly repeats itself. 
There are certain starting positions and velocities that will not result in a uniformly distributed 
stadium. This occurs in different shapes including a rectangle, a vee, and a bow tie, among others 
0. 
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(Fig. 1)              
Figure 1. A typical example of a classical chaotic trajectory of a particle in a stadium shaped enclosure 
(Stöckmann, 2010).  
In the quantum analog, since no sensitivity to initial conditions plays any part, one would expect 
to be unable to distinguish the chaotic and periodic orbits. Without orbit theory, there is no 
reason to expect that anything other than a random superposition of plane waves exhibiting a 
regular and diffuse pattern. But what one actually finds is that the probability density of the wave 
functions is significantly higher in certain areas 0. Not all the wavefunctions are evenly 
distributed. The interesting fact is that they actually converge on the classically stable periodic 
orbits.  
(Fig. 2)  
Figure 2. Three eigenstates of quantum billiard stadiums appear to give wavefunction distributions along 
trajectories predicted by the classical closed orbit theory. 
What this suggests is that the shapes of the classically stable orbits in the stadium overlap 
and make its probability more intense. Gutzwiller’s periodic orbit theory is a method of 
approximating the density of quantum states from classical periodic trajectories by means of the 
Gutzwiller trace formula (Eq. 1), a semiclassical approximation of Green’s function, 
(Eq. 1)         ∑      ቀ        ቁ   
where S labels the action of the periodic orbits p, A is a measure of the orbits' stability and m is 
the number of times the neighbouring orbits intersect the periodic orbit in one period. 
Gutzwiller’s theory specifies how the behaviour of a Gaussian wavepacket can serve as accurate 
solutions to the time-dependent Schrödinger equation, and thus how the allowed classical 
periodic orbits corresponds to the accumulation of wavefunction density observed as the scarring 
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phenomenon. Bokulich’s contention is that the scarring phenomenon is explained better by 
appealing to the periodic orbit theory than it is by solving the Schrödinger equation.  
She argues that classical trajectories, though fictions – false of the quantum system – are 
explanatorily relevant to the phenomenon of quantum wave function scarring. By falsely 
assuming that the particle travels along a classical trajectory, one correctly expects to find certain 
scarring patterns in quantum billiard systems, which one would not expect on a simple quantum 
picture. She argues that this example is a case of bona fide structural model explanation. This 
example is not an outlier case, but one of many Bokulich examines, including the conductance 
peaks of quantum dots, the orbits of Bohr’s model of the atom, and the resonance peaks of the 
Rydberg electrons.  
For Bokulich, these examples suggest that there is a “dynamical structural continuity” 
between the classical and quantum theories, though not as straightforward as relation proposed 
by Bohr. Because of this she argues that semiclassical fictions, in this case the classical periodic 
orbit theory applied to a particle, can serve to give counterfactual information about the quantum 
system. The closed orbits are not real, in the sense that the particle is not actually travelling in a 
classically defined orbit with position and velocity. Bokulich does not want to argue that the 
trajectories are real, but rather that they are a special kind of fiction that is also explanatory: 
“These closed and periodic classical orbits can be said to explain features of the spectral 
resonances and scarring insofar as they provide a semiclassical model of these phenomena” 
(Bokulich, 2008, p. 140).  
Bokulich admits that it is possible to derive these conductance properties and scarring 
patterns from a fully quantum picture, by numerically solving the Schrödinger equation, but the 
dependence of the conductance properties on the classical orbits allows her to say that the 
semiclassical model is playing an explanatory role here. This dependence conveys physical 
insight, or structural information, on the quantum dynamics. Of course, in order for Bokulich to 
claim that there is a genuine explanation here, the semiclassical model must satisfy her three 
criteria E1-3. And it can be easily shown that they do. The explanation makes reference to a 
scientific model, viz. Gutzwiller’s periodic orbit theory, and so it satisfies E1. The semiclassical 
mechanics models exhibit the counterfactual dependence of the conductance peaks of the 
stadiums on the particular classical orbits.  It satisfies E2, the structural criterion, because one is 
able to say how the wavefunction distribution inside the stadium would change if the periodic 
orbit had been different, or if the shape of the stadium is changed. This putative explanation is 
also justified in being applied to this domain (E3) because Gutzwiller’s periodic orbit theory 
specifies how to model features of quantum dynamics with classical trajectories.  
So for Bokulich, these semiclassical models qualify as explanatory. But Bokulich argues for 
an even stronger case, viz. that the semiclassical models actually provide better explanations 
than the fully quantum ones. She does not claim that quantum mechanics alone cannot predict 
these phenomena, but rather that its explanations are deficient because they do not provide as 
much counterfactual information about the system, which gives us physical insight into the 
system and grants understanding. In order to get a measure of the information a model gives 
about the system, she makes use of w-questions and Woodward and Hitchcock’s notion of 
explanatory depth. The more w-questions a model answers, the more information it gives, the 
deeper the explanation it provides (Bokulich, 2008, p. 152).  
For Woodward, the range of w-questions that a model can answer about a phenomenon is 
directly related to its ability to explain that phenomenon, where models that are more general or 
more fundamental provide deeper explanations. However, Bokulich claims that the semiclassical 
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model of wavefunction scarring gives counterfactual information about the quantum system, and 
further that “there can be situations in which less fundamental theories can provide deeper 
explanations than more fundamental theories” (Bokulich, 2008, p. 153). Given that there are full 
quantum derivations of these scarring phenomena, if Bokulich wants to argue that the 
semiclassical model is explanatory and the quantum derivation of the same phenomenon is less 
so, then she has to show that the semiclassical model can answer a wider range of w-questions. 
There would be more room for this argument is it could be argued that the semiclassical 
models offer answers to a different class of w-question, viz. questions about what the quantum 
wavefunction scarring would look like if the semiclassical orbit were different, or questions 
about why these particular morphologies are favoured. Information about why particular scarring 
patterns, as seen in 0, occur is given by the semiclassical model, so the argument would go, 
because it is easily capable of accounting for the chaotic and the particular periodic trajectories, 
and can show how the quantum scarring would change if things (the periodic orbits) had been 
different.  
3 Worries about a Structural Criterion for Explanation 
I have shown how Bokulich’s account aims to capture the explanatory power of highly-idealized 
models like those of semiclassical mechanics, and I now turn to examine some worries about 
these structural model explanations. In the aforementioned review of (Bokulich, 2008), Belot and 
Jannson are concerned that once the account of structural model explanations allows for such 
fictions as classical trajectories in quantum systems, it will be unable to reject models that are 
widely considered non-explanatory, such as those of Ptolemaic astronomy (Belot & Jannson, 
2010). The worry is that once she opens the door up to explanatory fictions her criteria are not 
strong enough to debar non-explanatory fictions, such as planetary epicycles. I shall show that on 
one reading of Bokulich’s account Ptolemaic models can be shown to be non-explanatory. 
However, the concerns of Belot and Jannson are not misplaced as I shall show that this same 
reading fails to conclude that semiclassical mechanics are explanatory.  
As is well known, the Ptolemaic model of the solar system makes use of epicycles in 
accounting for the apparent retrograde motion of the planets across the night sky as seen from 
Earth. Bokulich is explicit in wanting to allow for the idealizations in quantum dots and quantum 
billiard systems (fictitious electron trajectories), but not those of Ptolemaic astronomy (fictitious 
epicycles). Belot and Jannson are right to worry that epicycles and electron trajectories are of the 
same ilk, but Bokulich might have room for admitting one and not the other. At first glance, it 
seems that the Ptolemaic explanation for planetary motion satisfies her three criteria for a good 
explanation.  
The Ptolemaic explanation satisfies E1, insofar as it references the geocentric model of 
the solar system. The model is also counterfactually reliable under certain conditions. The 
Ptolemaic system has trigonometric tables of chords used for calculations, and these give us 
counterfactual information about the visible solar system. And so it also seems to satisfy E2. It is 
only on the third criterion E3 that the Ptolemaic models will be debarred according to Bokulich. 
The geocentric model and its epicycles are not adequate representations of the real structure of 
solar system, and so not deemed relevant to the explanation of planetary motion by the 
contemporary state of science (Bokulich, 2012, p. 735). This is indeed true, however, I will 
return to the third criterion in the following section, but for now I will focus on her assessment of 
Ptolemaic models and the structural criterion E2.  
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It is important to remember that E2 is the criterion intended to pick out which models are 
genuinely explanatory. This is the structural part of structural explanation. The structural 
isomorphism is meant to replace manipulationist causation in Woodward’s picture as the main 
deciding factor for an explanation. In order to most accurately assess the satisfaction of E2, one 
needs to actually measure the number of w-answers. 
Unfortunately, obtaining a measure of the number w-questions a certain model can 
answer is not straightforward, and Bokulich gives no real method for obtaining such a measure. 
The first problem one encounters is in attempting to count individual w-questions. The Ptolemaic 
system has methods of calculating the positions of the bodies of the solar system for any given 
day, for any place on Earth, including not just positions in the night sky, but eclipses, solstices, 
equinoxes, and so on. Importantly, these bodies have cycles and epicycles that are continuous, 
and so one could get an infinite number of w-question answers, along each of the points on the 
lines of the spherical trigonometry. And so the number of w-questions the model can answer 
cannot be meaningfully counted. 
Bokulich does not explicitly frame w-questions in a comparative way, but I suggest that 
Ptolemaic epicycles do answer fewer w-questions (provide fewer w-answers) than the 
Copernican model, and it can be debarred in that fashion. As we have seen, a quantitative 
method for counting is not possible, so a simple quantitative comparison cannot be made. 
However, there is a sense in which an intuitive comparison of the classes of w-questions is 
possible. Because there is a lot of overlap of the information one gets from the Ptolemaic model 
and the Copernican model, an argument could be made that the Ptolemaic model has a narrower 
scope, which is to say that the Copernican model can give all or nearly all the w-answers that the 
Ptolemaic model provides, but also a lot of additional w-answers as well, such as accounting for 
the phases of Venus and giving counterfactual information about the positions of the planets 
when not seen from Earth. 
The Copernican model answers more w-questions on this kind of comparison, so perhaps 
epicycles are not explanatory. With this kind of comparison there seems to be a way after all in 
which Bokulich can have her structural criterion E2 decide between explanatory and non-
explanatory models. 
If this comparative framework works for Ptolemaic astronomy, does the same hold in the 
case of semiclassical mechanics? Well, when one returns to the semiclassical models and 
attempts to compare the w-information with that provided by quantum mechanics, the 
comparison does not seem to lead to the conclusion that semiclassical mechanics is explanatory. 
The semiclassical model can give counterfactual information about the distribution of probability 
densities in the enclosure in straightforward way. There is a certain range of questions that can 
be answered about the dependence of the scarring on the classical orbits. It seems that “rather 
than obscuring the genuine mechanisms at work, this idealization actually brings them into 
focus” (Batterman, 1992, p. 64). So it seems that there could be a class of w-questions that are 
better, or more intuitively, answered by the highly idealized model. The highly-idealized model 
is indifferent to the details and particulars of the dynamics and allows certain features like 
scarring phenomena to be highlighted.  
However, the Schrödinger equation can derive the results that are obtained in the 
semiclassical models, as Bokulich freely admits. But in addition to this, the quantum model can 
also provide w-answers about many other quantum systems, ones in which the semiclassical 
model fails to hold. This seems to give the same comparative relation between Ptolemaic and 
Copernican models of the solar system. The quantum system can be seen to give more w-
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answers because it includes the semiclassical and much else. It can be seen that the comparison 
fails to side in favour of semiclassical mechanics. If there were a domain of phenomena in which 
the more fundamental theory could not derive the desired results (and I am certain there are 
many), then the best explanation would be given by the less fundamental theory. In this case 
however, Bokulich admits that the quantum models can account for the scarring phenomena 
described by the semiclassical models. And so it turns out that even though the classical 
trajectories can answer interesting w-questions about the particular morphologies of the 
wavefunction scarring, models from the more fundamental theory will always win out in terms 
of w-questions when they can account for the same phenomena. 
And this is what I believe Woodward and Hitchcock had in mind when they introduced 
the notion of w-questions. For Woodward and Hitchcock, the models of the more fundamental 
theory is able to provide more information, to give answers to more w-questions (Woodward & 
Hitchcock, 2003). For them, this implies that the deeper explanation is given by the more 
fundamental theory; e.g., General Relativity has more explanatory depth than Newtonian 
mechanics because it answers a wider range of w-questions. If a theory is more fundamental, 
then its models can answer a wider range of w-questions. Woodward might accept that these 
highly-idealized models are explanatory, but less explanatory than fundamental models that offer 
much deeper explanations, as long as they satisfy his criteria for explanation by exhibiting a 
degree of invariance under a range of interventions. However, this will not work for Bokulich, 
because it will not favour the models of semiclassical mechanics over those of quantum 
mechanics because they have overlapping domains. It is important for Bokulich, not only that 
semiclassical models be explanatory, but that they actually be better explanations of some 
quantum phenomena than the fully quantum explanations: “Without knowledge of the classical 
orbits, our understanding of the quantum spectra and wavefunction morphologies is incomplete” 
(Bokulich, 2008, p. 154). 
A further concern is that this kind of comparison seems only to work in cases where there 
is overlap in the domain of the phenomena. Where there is no overlap, an intuitive sense of 
which model answers more w-questions, does not seem to have any bearing on the explanatory 
power of one theory or the other. If one compares semiclassical mechanics with Ptolemaic 
astronomy, regardless of how the w-information balance tips, E2 still has no real bearing on 
whether the models of semiclassical mechanics are themselves explanatory. When there is no 
overlap in the domain of the models, the comparison is not helpful.  
Even if there were a quantitative way to measure the structural similarity using something 
other than w-questions, this problem persists for Bokulich. Imagine it was possible to give a 
compressed scalar rating of all the complex representations of structural similarity given by a 
complicated process of calculations and perhaps insights from measure theory. Now suppose that 
Ptolemaic epicycles were given a rating of 4, Copernican orbits a 9, and semiclassical 
mechanical models a generous 12. Even though it received a higher ranking than something like 
Ptolemaic explanations, it is still reasonable to ask “are the models of semiclassical mechanics 
explanatory?” And so it does not seem that there can be any way that such a comparative 
framework can provide a general criterion for explanation. It is only when the domain of the 
phenomena overlap that this will work. However, because a comparison that ranks semiclassical 
mechanics as less explanatory than quantum mechanics is inconsistent with her view, this 
measure will not be helpful for Bokulich.  
The main worry for a structural criterion for explanation is that a measure of structural 
similarity can be given to almost any model, no matter how inaccurately it represents. And so if 
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one wishes to debar the worst of these then a comparison must be made. However, this 
comparison, when possible, will always side in the favour of the models of the more fundamental 
theory and not the highly-idealized model of high-level theory. This does not serve Bokulich’s 
end, but it is not in itself problematic. The general problem is that this comparison is only helpful 
for models with overlapping domains, and leaves unanswered the question of whether a 
particular model explains its target phenomenon. Philip Kitcher offers a comparative account of 
explanation, but it is intended to function irrespective of domains (Kitcher, 1981, 1989). It is also 
comparative in a winner-take-all fashion, where only the most unifying theory was explanatory. 
The winner-take-all aspect would be problematic for Bokulich because it would not favour 
quantum mechanics, but this is not in itself a problem, nor a problem for Kitcher, though his 
purely syntactic approach to explanation theory choice has its other downsides, which willnot be 
covered here.   
4  Worries about the Justificatory Step 
Bokulich’s own solution is to debar Ptolemaic epicycles, not with the structural criterion E2, but 
with the justificatory criterion E3. And so in this section I will analyze this aspect of Bokulich’s 
account and raise some concerns about it playing the major role in distinguishing explanatory 
from non-explanatory fictions.  
This justificatory step has three aspects, which Bokulich has expanded upon in (Bokulich, 
2012, p. 736), and which I have labelled here as J1-3. The first, J1, is that an explanatory model 
involves a contextual relevance relation set by the contemporary state of science, which ensures 
that scenarios like falling barometers causing storms are simply not even candidate explanations. 
The justification also involves an articulation of the domain of applicability J2, wherein it is an 
adequate representation of the system. To satisfy this there must be either a top-down or bottom-
up justification of the model’s use, as I described above (Sec. 2). Lastly, and closely related is J3, 
a translation key of sorts that allows information about the model to be translated into 
conclusions about the real system. There must be some reason why information gained in the 
model is applicable to conclusions about the world. For example, Gutzwiller’s periodic orbit 
theory specifies how the trace formula (Eq. 1) is related to the actual observed morphologies in 
the quantum stadium billiard. E3 taken together is something like the explanatory standards of 
contemporary science. It ensures that the model makes reference to the right kinds of accepted 
entities, states, and processes, and that the relation between the model and the real system is not 
merely accidental.  
Bokulich does not appeal to E2 in order to debar Ptolemaic explanation, rather she argues 
that the models fail to be explanatory because they do not qualify as adequate representations of 
the solar system in contemporary science. Explanatory fictions “represent real entities, processes, 
or structures in the world, while [non-explanatory ones] represent nothing at all” (Bokulich, 
2012, p. 734). She wants to allow for fictions to be explanatory, but only fictions that count as 
adequate representation – something that can only be decided by the relevant scientific 
community. 
In the context of these two examples, the Ptolemaic model is non-explanatory because the 
orbits are not adequately representative of the real structure of planetary motion: “given the 
relevance relation set by the state of contemporary science, epicycles are irrelevant to the 
explanation of retrograde motion. This is not simply because they are fictional but, rather, 
because they fail to be an adequate fictional representation of the real structure of our solar 
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system,” whereas “the classical periodic orbits are able to capture, in their fictional 
representation, real features of the quantum dynamics in the dot” (Bokulich, 2012, p. 735). So 
the adequacy of the fictional representation as determined by the criteria of E3 can debar 
Ptolemaic epicycles.  
In her response to the worry of Belot and Jannson cited above (Sec. 3),  she says: 
“although the range of w-questions that a phenomenological model can answer will typically be 
more limited, scope alone cannot distinguish between explanatory and phenomenological 
models.” (Bokulich, 2012, p. 733) She offers instead the idea that the current state of scientific 
knowledge precludes the possibility of Ptolemaic epicycles being counted as explanatory, in the 
same way that it ought to preclude falling barometers causing storms – neither satisfy J3. It was 
shown in the previous section that E2 also debars both Ptolemaic epicycles and semiclassical 
models. Semiclassical models are not so obviously inadequate as to be excluded from the 
explanatory store, like shadows explaining flagpole heights, and so they satisfy J1. However, for 
J2 and J3, the semiclassical models of interest employ Gutzwiller’s periodic orbit theory to 
justify their application and provide a means of getting real-world information from the fictional 
model. And so the semiclassical models seem to satisfy E3 as a whole and are justified in being 
used in these systems exhibiting quantum chaos, even though it was shown that they did not 
satisfy E2. Bokulich has provided a reason for thinking that her account can debar this kind of 
standard counterexample. The Ptolemaic model is simply not a candidate explanation to begin 
with, because the fictions it employs are too empirically inadequate for them to be considered 
representations of the structure of the system. 
In the remainder of this section I will raise three worries about E3 and about this kind of 
criterion as the main deciding factor for explanation. The first worry is that even though she 
insists that electron trajectories in semiclassical models capture real features of the systems 
dynamics and Ptolemaic epicycles do not, it is not clear that in distinction from epicycles, 
classical electron trajectories are representative of the true electron dynamics, of the real 
structure of the quantum systems, as she claims (Bokulich, 2012). Part of the requirements of E3 
is that entities and processes of the model are considered by scientists to be potentially relevant 
to the explanation (J1). Earlier, I conceded that the semiclassical models should not be dismissed 
from potential explanations outright, but this does not imply the positive claim that they do 
capture real quantum structures. Consider the fact that the predictive success of semiclassical 
models is rather unexpected. This is so precisely because they are not true descriptions of the 
systems. It may be that there is a certain range of counterfactual information about the systems’ 
morphologies that can be gathered, but it is not readily understood why it is that the dependency 
relation holds. Given only the full semiclassical explanation, it is still a bit mysterious why the 
quantum effect would be dependent on the classical trajectory. However, if one were able to 
derive this phenomena and render it expectable on a fully quantum picture, that mystery would 
disappear. This seems to suggest that the real structure of the system is only given in a fully 
quantum picture, in the same way that the numerical coincidences of Ptolemaic calculations are 
revealed by more fundamental theories. 
The second worry is that because this is supposedly a structural explanation, a lot should 
depend on the satisfaction or degree of satisfaction of E2, but this does not seem to be the case. 
E2 is not capable of doing the work of distinguishing explanatory from non-explanatory fictions 
in the way that Bokulich wants, since it debarred both Ptolemaic models and those semiclassical 
mechanics in favour of models with broader scopes from more fundamental theories. Due to this, 
E3 has to do most of the heavy lifting. However, if E3 is largely responsible for maintaining a 
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threshold for explanation, then there is not much of a sense in which these 3 criteria taken 
together are independent criteria for explanation. The deciding factor is what satisfies E3, i.e. 
what is consistent with that currently considered to be explanatory in science, and not with the 
structurally analogous models. The structural criterion that was intended to pick out which 
models were genuinely explanatory by showing whether the models exhibited the relevant 
structural properties of the system failed to do so. In order to make a strong case that 
semiclassical mechanics can provide structural model explanations, the structure that allegedly 
links the models to the real-world system should determine that.  
The last related concern is not only that E2 should distinguish explanatory from non-
explanatory in a structural explanation, but that E3 is too context sensitive to do this. It seems as 
though E3 could be determined, or estimated, with structural information. If one wanted to assess 
the adequacy of a model’s depiction of reality, to determine whether its relation was 
numerological or correlational and know if the model’s information is applicable to the real 
world system, then its ability to give a wide range of reliable counterfactual information about 
that system seems a reasonable measure. This information is something that the model can 
provide on Woodward’s account, because it is explicitly manipulationist. But because Bokulich 
does away with the causal interventions and only imports the notion of explanatory depth, this 
must be added on as a separate criterion and loses objectivity. On Bokulich’s account, there can 
be no interventions to separate the correlational from the causal, instead it falls on the scientific 
community to decide if it is adequate. E3 is not meant to employ the measure of w-questions – it 
is not a measure of structural similarity, but a criterion for ensuring that the model is not known 
to be phenomenological. The criterion is context sensitive and particular to the details of the 
model and the current views in science regarding what explains and what accurately represents. 
What counts as an adequate fictional representation (J1) is a moving target, and may or may not 
be unanimously agreed on across a discipline.  
Even if what represents and what explains were widely agreed upon, there is something 
missing in this kind of justification – a degree of normativity. When Bokulich argues for the 
explanatory power of semiclassical mechanics she concludes from the work of Wintgen, Richter, 
and Tanner (1992), as well as others, that it is more than a tool or a method for generating more 
simply reliable predictions. Bokulich cites physicists as saying that semiclassical descriptions are 
desirable because the full quantum-mechanical calculations are cumbersome and elaborate and 
that the “simple interpretation of classical and semiclassical methods assists in illuminating the 
structure of solutions” (Wintgen et al., 1992, p. 19). It is in getting the structure of solutions that 
the semiclassical methods are most useful, i.e. they have much heuristic value. Batterman has 
argued along similar lines citing the work of W.H. Miller: “Semiclassical theory plays an 
interpretive role; that is, it provides an understanding of the nature of quantum effects in 
chemical phenomena, such as interference effects in product state distributions and tunnelling 
corrections to rate constants for chemical reactions” (Miller, 1986). While these quotations are 
clearly in favour of the value, and explanatory value, of semiclassical mechanics, it is important 
to remember that the scientists are unlikely to have in mind a rigorous and philosophically robust 
notion explanation, complete with independent criteria. And that even if some scientists, or even 
a majority, do find these models to be explanatory, there is more to a philosophical account of 
explanation than merely capturing that. An account of explanation should not be merely 
descriptive, but provide independent criteria capable of assessing putative explanations.  
Traditionally accounts of explanation have tried to provide a bar above which certain 
models are counted as explanatory. (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). Woodward also seemed 
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sensitive to this, particularly when he provided motivation for his manipulability account 
(Woodward, 2003, p. 93). It is not enough to describe the accepted use of causation (or in this 
case explanation) without providing sufficient motivation for why that particular conception 
should adopted.  
5 Conclusions and Suggestions for Moving Forward 
Semiclassical mechanics is still a very fruitful research avenue, and it is intuitively powerful. It 
allows us to picture and grasp systems that we should not be able to picture, and frame them in 
familiar terms. And quite astonishingly, it can give us simple and reliable counterfactual 
information about certain quantum systems. Semiclassical mechanics is certainly more relevant 
to the current state of science than Ptolemaic epicycles, because its models are heuristically 
valuable in providing frameworks for investigating and calculating quantum systems. Bokulich’s 
work on explanation and highly-idealized models is largely connected with her larger project of 
reconceiving the quantum to classical transition. She has, in explicit detail, gone over cases that 
cast doubt on a simple reductive picture. The concerns remaining for a structural account should 
not diminish the contributions she makes to our understanding of Bohr’s Correspondence 
Principle and the intricacies of the quantum to classical transition.  
Bokulich has taken bold steps forward in offering an objective measure for determining 
structural similarity in terms of w-questions. However, this measure proves difficult to 
determine. I have argued that because an independent, objective measure of structural similarity 
cannot be made, that an objective comparison can also not be made. I further argued that an 
intuitive comparison is no help for Bokulich. It can be made, but it always sides in favour of the 
more fundamental explanation and not the highly-idealized model, thus ruling out semiclassical 
mechanics, and other minimal models. I was able to show that the epicycles of Ptolemaic 
astronomy need not be considered explanatory, but the worry then becomes that semiclassical 
models, because they give less w-information than quantum models, are also not explanatory. 
Further, this distinction is of no use when the domains of the models are completely distinct. The 
remaining problem for structural accounts is that even if an objective measure were possible, it 
would still give no information about whether a model is explanatory across domains or 
independently. Therefore, I argue that structural similarity cannot distinguish between 
explanatory and non-explanatory fictions. 
Because of this, the other criteria in Bokulich’s account had to do the heavy lifting with 
regards to drawing a line between explanatory and non-explanatory models. But these criteria 
alone seem only to reflect what is currently thought about whether a model is considered 
explanatory, and do not give independent reasons to conclude that a model is explanatory. The 
strong role her third criterion plays is also worrying, not only because the structural aspect of the 
structural explanation is downplayed, but because it takes away the normative aspect that an 
account of explanation ought to have, and has traditionally aimed for.  
There are many lessons we can take away from the new direction this account has taken 
and the problems that remain. Highly idealized models are common in science and as other have 
argued (Batterman, 2002a; Batterman & Rice, 2014; Wayne, 2011), there is reason to consider 
them explanatory. Stepping out of the shadow of Woodward and expanding the scope of 
explanation is a next major step in the philosophy of science. Bokulich tries to do so by 
providing a quantitative measure for structural similarity but it ends up not working in her 
favour. The purely structural criterion is not helpful in distinguishing explanatory from non-
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explanatory idealizations, but more than that, an account of explanation should continue the 
tradition of offering independent normative criteria for explanation, and be descriptive of, and 
critical of, the explanatory practices of science.  
If Bokulich is correct about the limits of causal accounts and the explanatory virtue of 
highly-idealized models, and there are good reasons to think that she is, then developing an 
extended account of explanation and idealization is a worthy aim, and she has contributed a great 
deal to that end. 
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Against Lawton’s contingency thesis, or, why the reported demise of community ecology is 
greatly exaggerated.  
 
Stefan Linquist1 
 
Abstract 
Lawton’s contingency thesis (CT) states that there are no useful generalizations (“laws”) at the 
level of ecological communities because these systems are especially prone to contingent 
historical events. I argue that this influential thesis has been grounded on the wrong kind of 
evidence. CT is best understood in Woodward’s (2010) terms as a claim about the instability of 
certain causal dependencies across different background conditions. A recent distinction between 
evolution and ecology reveals what an adequate test of Lawton’s thesis would look like. To date, 
CT remains untested. But developments in genome and molecular ecology point in a promising 
direction.  
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1. Introduction  
Ecologist J.H. Lawton has developed one of the most influential recent critiques of community 
ecology (Lawton 1999). His discussion is framed around the question of whether community 
ecology admits of “general laws.” This branch of ecology studies multi-species assemblages. It 
thus focuses on a level of biological organization above (single species) populations but below 
entire ecosystems. Lawton argued that there are no “useful generalizations,” or laws, at the 
community level as such. His reason is that communities are subject to a wide range of 
contingencies that make it impossible to generalize from one instance to the next. For example, 
particular communities are shaped by different geological events. They each receive a different 
pool of migrants in a particular order. They experience different patterns of fire, flood, storm, 
and so on. These one-off events can dramatically impact the composition of a community. 
Hence, Lawton proposes that the rules governing community composition are transitory and 
idiosyncratic. However, he thinks that there is hope for generality at other levels of ecological 
investigation. Law-like regularities obtain at the (lower) population level and at the (more 
inclusive) macroecological level. They are found at the population level, according to Lawton, 
because these systems are simpler and behave in a more uniform fashion. By contrast, at the 
macroecological level regional contingences become less influential.  At this level, one looks at 
ecosystems on a broad geographic and temporal scale, “whereby a kind of statistical order 
emerges from the scrum” (1999, 183). These considerations inspired Lawton to pronounce the 
end of community ecology as a viable discipline: 
In sum, community ecology may have the worst of all worlds. It is more complicated 
than population dynamics, so contingent theory does not work, or rather, the contingency 
is itself too complicated to be useful. But paradoxically, community ecology is not big 
and bold enough to break out of the overwhelming complexity within which it appears to 
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be enmeshed. All this begs the question of why ecologists continue to devote so much 
time and effort to traditional studies in community ecology. In my view, the time has 
come to move on. (ibid)  
Many ecologists have heeded this suggestion. Lawton’s paper has received an average of 37 
citations per year since its publication, mostly endorsing his contingency thesis. Others who view 
their research as significant beyond the local field or stream find Lawton’s conclusion 
unbearably pessimistic (Chave 2013). These community ecologists soldier on in the search for 
generality despite Lawton’s warnings. Here I argue that they are correct to do so.  
 Lawton’s argument assumes that if a community has been influenced by unique historical 
events, then it cannot be explained in terms of law-like processes. I argue that this assumption is 
confused about the explanatory roles of ecology and history. Specifically, it views these two 
types of explanation as mutually exclusive. An alternative picture has recently been developed in 
the field of genome ecology (Linquist et al. 2013), which can be applied to the community level. 
On this picture, ecological and evolutionary (or historical) explanations make different 
idealizations about the same underlying process. In its pure form, ecological explanation treats 
focal entities (genes, populations, communities, etc.) as static types while focusing on how their 
intrinsic properties interact with features of the environment. Evolutionary explanation, in its 
pure form, accounts for changes in focal entities over time while ignoring relations to the 
environment.  More will be said, momentarily, about these two modes of explanation and how 
they are sometimes used conjointly –such as in explanations of evolution by natural selection. 
The important thing to note is how this picture refutes Lawton’s argument.  A useful analogy can 
be drawn to the field of developmental biology. In this field, a purely genetic explanation 
attempts to idealize over environmental differences, while a purely environmental explanation 
ignores genetic differences. The field of genetics has moved beyond the simple-minded idea that 
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evidence of an environmental influence negates the possibility of a genetic explanation. Rather, 
geneticists have developed statistical techniques for determining, given a certain pattern of 
variation in some trait, how much of it is explained by genetic and environmental factors, 
respectively. The same approach applies to historical and ecological factors and their influence 
on community composition. When we adopt this approach, it becomes apparent that Lawton’s 
contingency thesis is based on the wrong kind of data. He argues from evidence of contingency 
in particular communities to the conclusion that patterns of variation among communities cannot 
be explained by ecological laws. This would be like inferring from evidence of a genetic 
influence on some trait, in a particular individual, that variation among individuals cannot be 
explained by environmental factors. In both cases the reasoning is fallacious. Thus, it remains an 
open question whether ecological communities can be explained in terms of law-like relations to 
the environment.  
   This essay will proceed as follows. Section 2 offers a more precise statement of 
Lawton’s contingency thesis by drawing on Woodward’s (2010) concepts of stability and 
contingency. Section 3 reviews Lawton’s evidence for the contingency thesis. Section 4 
introduces the operative distinction between ecology and evolution (or history). Section 5 applies 
this distinction to the community level and explains why Lawton’s evidence falls short of 
supporting his conclusion.  
2. Interpreting Lawton. 
Philosophers and ecologists disagree about the conditions for natural laws (Colyvan 2003; Lange 
2005). My current aim is not to wade into these disputes.  Instead, I offer an interpretation of 
what Lawton means by “contingent” and how to best define the field of community ecology. 
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Clarifying these terms is a necessary first step in understanding his argument that there are no 
stable (or law-like) generalizations in this field.  
 Lawton distinguishes laws from patterns on the grounds that, “Patterns are regularities in 
what we observe in nature; that is, they are ‘widely observable tendencies;’” whereas laws are 
the “general principles that underpin and create the patterns” (1999, 178).  This statement 
suggests that Lawton views laws as causal generalizations, while patterns are mere correlations.  
Lawton notes that patterns can vary in their generality: “Indeed they raise the vexing problem of 
how many exceptions to general patterns might exist before we would no longer regard them as 
patterns” (ibid).  A similar problem arises for laws regarding their generality.  Although some 
interpretations of Lawton take him to view laws as universal or exceptionless (Roughgarden 
2009), this would render Lawton’s position rather uninteresting. Exceptions are found even in 
the laws of chemistry and physics (Cartwright 1983). Hence it would be no surprise to find 
exceptions in ecological laws also.   
 Lawton’s position is better stated using philosopher James Woodward’s concepts of 
causal stability and contingency (Woodward, 2010). For Woodward, causal relations are 
represented as counterfactual dependencies among variables. Thus, some variable Y is 
counterfactually dependent on another variable X just in case, for some set of background 
conditions B, an intervention that changes only the value of X will result in a corresponding 
change to Y. The stability (or contingency) of a dependency is defined by the range of 
background conditions (B) across which it obtains.  Thus, a highly stable (for current purposes, 
law-like) relationship between X and Y is one that holds across a wide range of background 
conditions. Contingency is the opposite of stability, where a dependency is restricted to a limited 
range of background conditions.  
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 These ideas are easily transferred to community ecology. Typical dependent variables (Y) 
in this field include species richness, average abundance, or trophic structure of a community. 
These are ensemble properties of multi-species assemblages. Typical independent variables (X) 
include the abundance of a general predator, degree of niche overlap, or other factors thought to 
impact a community.  Background conditions (B) come in at least two dimensions: taxonomic 
distance (e.g. different phyla or families) and habitat type (e.g. aquatic, marine, and terrestrial 
habitats). Thus, in some communities it has been observed that increasing the abundance of the 
top predator increases the diversity of shared prey. This causal relation is stable, in Woodward’s 
sense, to the extent that it holds true for different taxa or across different habitats.  A contingent 
ecological dependency is one that holds for few taxa or habitat types.    
 Lawton defines community ecology as the study of sets of coexisting species interacting 
at local scales. This discipline is distinct from population ecology, he claims, insofar as 
community ecologists study assemblages greater than just two or three species. Although some 
community ecologists might object to this restriction on their discipline, it is not an issue that I 
consider here. However, I do take exception to Lawton’s requirement that community ecology 
studies only local interactions. The question of how to circumscribe communities as objects of 
study remains a challenging issue (Sterelny 2006). Lawton suggests that community ecology 
restricts its focus only to local interactions, so that processes like immigration, emigration, or 
other meta-community dynamics fall under the purview of macroecology. This will strike many 
as an artificial way to distinguish these disciplines. Community ecologists should be allowed to 
circumscribe the boundaries of their subject matter as they see fit and as nature dictates.   
 Instead of drawing the community/macroecology distinction in terms of local/non-local 
interactions, a more useful distinction is drawn between the kinds of processes that these 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -422-
6 
 
disciplines investigate. Community ecologists have traditionally set aside questions about long 
term evolutionary processes, focusing instead on the relatively short term processes governing 
the abundance and distribution of species. Strategically, this simplification makes sense if it 
indeed turns out that evolutionary processes have only a marginal influence on community 
composition and abundance. Community ecologists also tend to ignore changes in community 
composition considered over geological time scales. Over such extended periods, community 
composition and dynamics are expected to vary considerably (Kricher 1998).  By contrast, the 
macroecological perspective, which Lawton favours, takes both evolutionary and historical 
processes into account. As Lawton explains, “macroecology is a blend of ecology, biogeography, 
and evolution and seeks to get above the mind-boggling details of local community assembly to 
find a bigger picture” (1999, 183).  My suggestion is simply that the distinction between 
community ecology and macroecology is best drawn by focussing on the kinds of process that 
these disciplines investigate. Community ecology ignores, as a simplifying assumption, 
evolutionary and historical changes in the focal entities that it investigates; while macroecology 
attempts to incorporate those changes as well as the events and processes that generate them. 
This way of drawing the distinction avoids thorny issues about how to draw the boundaries 
around a community or what constitutes a “local” scale.  
 To summarize my interpretation of Lawton’s position: the counterfactual dependency 
relations identified for species assemblages greater than 2-3 members are unstable (contingent) 
across different background conditions such as distinct taxa and habitats. But contingency is 
reduced either by dropping down to the population level, or, by taking into account broad 
evolutionary or geological times scales. I refer to this as the contingency thesis.  
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3. Evidence for the Contingency Thesis.  
Lawton’s central piece of evidence in support of the contingency thesis is based on his 20 years 
researching a particular bracken fern community located in Skipwith, England. He explains that 
the relative abundances of these 17 insect species were highly predictable over short (multi-year) 
time periods – rare species stay rare and more common ones stay common.  He adds that the 
composition of the community is strongly constrained by a species of predatory ant. From 
Woodward’s perspective we can think of this as an invariance relation in which abundance of the 
predator (X) influences composition and relative abundances of the other members of the insect 
community (Y). However, Lawton suggests that this relationship is not stable across different 
background conditions (B).  
I observed an average of about 17 herbivorous insects feeding on bracken at Skipwith 
each year. Why 17? In crude order of magnitude terms, why not 2? Or 170? This most 
basic aspect of community structure may have surprisingly little to do with the local 
processes that dominate so much of traditional thinking in community ecology. (1999, 
184)  
Lawton goes on to identify two different types of “filter” that, he thinks, determine community 
composition to a greater degree than those considered by community ecologists. The first is a 
historical or evolutionary filter: “understanding the origins of the pool requires a knowledge of 
the evolutionary history of the biota, of geology, of plate tectonics, and so on” (ibid).  He 
suggests, for example, that if members of this community had arrived in a different order it 
would have altered the relationship between predator and prey abundances. Lawton’s suggestion 
is that any number of one-off events could have significantly impacted community dynamics. 
Since historical events presumably differ from one community to the next, he reasons, different 
communities will not obey the same causal dependencies.   
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 The second sort of filter that Lawton identifies is spatial. He proposes that local 
community dynamics are often influenced by such factors as their distance from a source of 
migration or overall meta-community structure. Lawton seems to be relying here on the 
aforementioned stipulation that communities are essentially local. In the previous section I 
argued that community ecologists are not required to restrict their focus to local species 
assemblages (whatever that might turn out to mean). Rather, they are free to expand or contract 
their field of investigation as the situation demands. Thus, if Lawton thought that the 
composition of his bracken fern community was largely influenced by immigration from another 
community down the road, he might just have considered them together as a single unit.  Lawton 
distinguishes community from macroecology in such a way that the former is limited both 
temporally and spatially in its purview. I argue that the field does in fact take on a different 
character when historical and evolutionary considerations are taken into account. But it is less 
committed to a particular spatial scale. Hence, we can restrict our focus to the first of Lawton’s 
two filters and ask whether a science of ecological communities can find generality while 
ignoring historical and evolutionary considerations.   
4. Distinguishing Evolution from Ecology. 
What then is the relationship between ecology and history? For that matter, what makes a 
generalization ecological in the first place? A candidate solution to these questions has recently 
emerged within the field of genome ecology (Linquist et al. 2013). This burgeoning sub-
discipline applies ecological thinking at the level of the genome, viewing families of mobile 
genetic elements as akin to species and stable features of the genome as the environment 
(Brookfield, 2005).  As is often the case, applying a familiar theory to a novel domain requires 
Chicago, IL -425-
9 
 
close attention to its core commitments. This has led to the following operational definitions of 
“evolution” and “ecology.”  
1) A strictly evolutionary approach investigates change (or the lack thereof) in some focal 
entity over successive generations without taking into account its relationships to 
particular features of the environment.  
2) A strictly ecological approach assumes (for simplicity) no change in the focal entities 
themselves, but focuses instead on the relationships between those entities and features of 
their environment. 
In the following section I apply these definitions to the community level and explain how a 
strictly evolutionary approach is equivalent to what Lawton would classify as an historical 
approach. The remainder of this section explicates this distinction and shows how it can be used 
to determine the extent to which some patterns calls for an ecological or evolutionary 
explanation.  
 It is important to note that each mode of investigation is being defined here in its “strict” 
or pure form.  This is just to say that, considered on its own, each approach makes different sorts 
of idealizing assumptions.  For example, the work of Michael Lynch (2007) exemplifies of a 
purely evolutionary approach.  His “mutation hazard” model proposes that large amounts of 
genome evolution can be explained just in terms of mutation rate (M) and effective population 
size (Ne). The focal entity in this case is a population or gene pool. M and Ne are variables that 
apply to intrinsic features of a gene pool, they ignore its relations to features of the environment. 
In particular, natural selection is not taken into account by this model. It is assumed that when 
Ne is low the influence of selection on genome evolution is negligible.  This is just to say that the 
environment is ignored by this model under certain conditions. Suppose, then, that the dependent 
variable of interest is the degree of genetic divergence among a range of related species. Lynch 
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might explain this pattern of variation by appealing to mutation rate, the length of time over 
which the populations have been isolated, and the respective population sizes. This would 
qualify as a strictly evolutionary explanation according to definition 1, since the pattern is being 
explained in terms of changes in the focal entity while idealizing away relations to particular 
features of the environment.  
 Strictly ecological explanations are perhaps even more familiar. Ecologists routinely 
conduct studies of populations that focus exclusively on their relation to the environment while 
ignoring changes in the focal entities themselves. For example, the introduction of the Canadian 
beaver to Argentina in the 1940s led to a population explosion. Here the focal entity is a 
particular population and the relevant dependent variable is its growth rate. Ecologists attempt to 
determine which of several possible ecological variables (e.g. lack or predators, suitability of 
habitat) best explain the much higher rate of population growth in Argentina compared to North 
America. These studies attempt to account for differences in this dependent variable in terms of 
various relations to the environment (Anderson et al.  2006). However, they do so without 
considering whether northern and southern populations differ genetically. That is, they tend not 
to consider whether there has been change in the focal entities that might accounts for their 
differential growth rates.  Presumably there are good reasons for thinking, in this case, that 
genetic differences are negligible. The relevant point is that this mode of explanation is purely 
ecological in that it assumes of focal entities that they are a static type (beavers are beavers, 
regardless of the population) while focusing on their relation to the environment.    
 Of course, many patterns in nature cannot be explained either in strictly evolutionary or 
strictly ecological terms.  Often the two types of factor interact. In these cases, it is often 
necessary to consider how relations between the focal entity and its environment influence 
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subsequent changes in the entities. This would qualify as a combined or “hybrid” explanation – 
one that incorporates both evolutionary and ecological factors.  Explanations of evolution by 
natural section are a familiar example (Endler 1986).  
 Hybrid explanations are undeniably more epistemically demanding than either form of 
strict explanation. For this reason it is often preferable to establish whether a purely evolutionary 
or purely ecological model will account for most of the variation in some variable of interest. It 
is prudent to address this question before attempting to consider both evolutionary and ecological 
factors in conjunction. There is no need to adopt a more complicated hybrid model if a simpler 
model will do. Within genome ecology a straightforward strategy has been developed to 
determine the extent to which a given pattern can be explained by ecological or evolutionary 
factors (Linquist et al. 2013). One begins with a dependent variable of interest.  A population of 
entities is then selected in which there is variation in the dependent variable. Variation in the 
dependent variable is required in order to determine the relative contributions of ecological and 
evolutionary factors. The next step is to identify independent ecological and evolutionary factors 
that are likely to influence the dependent variable.  It is here that definitions 1 & 2 come into 
play. Evolutionary variables are ones that identify changes in the focal entities over time. For 
example, in the case of genome ecology, phylogenetic distance is used as a proxy for their 
evolutionary or historical divergence (ibid). Ecological variables are features of the environment 
thought to stand in a casual relation to the dependent variable. Admittedly, it is conceptually and 
empirically challenging to identify independent (ecological and evolutionary) variables that are 
suitable for this kind of an analysis. Those variables must themselves vary among entities in the 
sample. Only then can one determine how much of the variation in the dependent variable 
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correlates with ecological and evolutionary factors, respectively. But once the relevant variables 
are identified, conducting this type of analysis is a fairly simple matter of statistical regression.  
5. Identifying Generality at the Community Level.  
Recall that Lawton was worried about the disproportionate influence of historical “filters” on 
communities. He proposed that various one-off events would dramatically alter their composition 
and dynamics. We can think of these events as equivalent to the evolutionary factors identified in 
definition 1. Imagine a community that experiences some unpredictable disruption such as a fire 
or flood.  On the one hand, this might seem to be an “ecological” influence since it is externally 
imposed on the community. However, by hypothesis these are one-off events. Hence they cannot 
be treated as variables that take on various values across a range of communities. To treat these 
events in such a fashion would just be to regard them as ordinary ecological factors. To be sure, 
in some instances fire or flood might be viewed as a quantitative ecological variable. But we are 
interested here in what it means for these rare events to serve as a historical filter that potentially 
mitigates an ecological explanation. To view these events as historical contingencies, I suggest, 
involves viewing them just in terms of their effects on community structure and not, as it were, 
as types of causes.  In other words, when considering the impact of one–off events the relevant 
question concerns their impact on a community, and not whether the event was a fire, flood, or 
some other factor per se. Insofar as these events have the same type of effect there is no point in 
distinguishing them. By analogy, Lynch’s model is interested in how changes in Ne impact the 
fixation of alleles. It doesn’t matter about which particular events lead up to a change in Ne.  For 
explanatory purposes these “environmental” factors are treated as a generic kind of cause. Hence 
the explanation abstracts away from particular relationships to the environment. Much the same 
applies to the one-off events that Lawton was concerned about.   
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 Let us then consider how definitions 1 and 2 are applied to an ecological community. 
Suppose that the focal entities are insect communities such as the one Lawton observed.  In order 
to conduct a regression analysis we require a population of these communities that vary in some 
(quantitative) dependent variable. Following Lawton, let’s choose rank abundance as the 
relevant dependent variable. This standard measure in community ecology plots the relative 
abundance of community members against their rank in abundance, thus generating a curve with 
a particular shape and slope for each community. The advantage of this as a dependent variable 
is that it provides a common measure for comparing taxonomically distinct communities.   
 Lawton’s example of predator density is a suitable independent ecological variable, 
provided that it also varies across the set of communities in the sample. Of course, numerous 
other ecological variables might be selected. It bears mentioning that there is a considerable 
danger of false negatives when applying this framework to test for ecological influences on some 
dependent variable. Unless one selects the correct independent variable, an ecological influence 
could easily be overlooked.   
  A greater challenge concerns the selection of historical variables. In the case of genome 
ecology, phylogenetic relatedness served as a proxy for historical or evolutionary distance. Thus, 
it was possible to determine how much of the variation among genomes in a sample correlates 
with phylogenetic distance. The problem is that prototypical communities are less cohesive than 
genomes. Their members move independently from one community to another. Hence one 
cannot easily reconstruct a phylogenetic tree for a sample of communities. How then might one 
identify a quantitative variable to stand in for historical distance? 
 These limitations are indeed challenging when it comes to most prototypical 
communities.  It might simply turn out that assemblages of macro flora and fauna are poor 
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choices for testing the contingency thesis. However, recent years have seen increased interest in 
molecular and genome ecology.  Diverse communities containing thousands of microorgansims 
can be contained in a single test tube (Swenson et al. 200), or, in the case of gene families, 
uploaded to a database. These communities are easily isolated as cohesive units with divergent 
histories. Thus the molecular and genetic levels offer ample opportunity to test for the influence 
of chance historical events on community level variables. With this qualification in mind we 
can imagine how one might test for the stability of an ecological relationship.  This would 
involve comparing the influence of ecological and evolutionary variables across a range of 
different taxa and habitat types.  There are a wide range of molecular and genetic systems in 
which these experiments could be conducted. Similarly, the dependency between predator 
abundance and rank abundance could be tested across a range different habitat types. Lawton’s 
contingency thesis would predict little stability in ecological relationships among these different 
types of community and distinct habitats. To date, no adequate test of this hypothesis has been 
conducted.        
 Thinking back to Lawton’s argument it becomes clear that he was in no position to 
pronounce the demise of community ecology. It is a straightforward fallacy to assume that the 
presence of a historical explanation for some particular community undermines the explanatory 
power of ecological laws. Nor would it make quantitative sense to ask, “How much of the 
Skipwith bracken fern community was determined by its historical and ecological factors, 
respectively?”  Any given community will be influenced by both.  To partition the relative 
contributions of ecology and history one must compare a population of communities in which 
there is variation in the dependent variable of interest. One also requires a way to quantify 
ecological and historical influences on that dependent variable. Only then, by looking for 
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ecological correlations that obtain across a range of background conditions, can one determine 
the stability or contingency of an ecological dependency.  
6. Conclusion 
Perhaps the take-home message from this discussion is that demonstrating contingency in 
community ecology is no simple affair. Only certain communities will lend themselves to the 
kind of quantitative analysis that I have outlined.  There are significant challenges associated 
with identifying and measuring the relevant variables.  Even if one finds an apparent influence of 
history on the dependent variable, there will be looming questions about whether some 
unidentified ecological variable is perhaps being overlooked. To make matters more complex, an 
assessment of stability or contingency must proceed across a diverse range of taxa and habitats. 
In fairness to Lawton, neither the conceptual framework nor the requisite data were available at 
the time he was writing. However, I have suggested that recent advances in molecular and 
genome ecology make it easier to test the contingency thesis. As it stands, Lawton’s thesis has 
been supported by the wrong kind of data. It therefore remains an open question whether there 
are stable ecological generalizations at the community level.  
  
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -432-
16 
 
References 
Anderson, C. B., et al. (2006), “The effects of invasive North American beavers on riparian plant 
communities in Cape Horn, Chile. Do exotic beavers engineer differently in subantarctic 
ecosystems?” Biological Conservation 128, 467–474. 
Brookfield, John F. (2005), “The ecology of the genome - mobile DNA elements and their 
hosts”, Nature Reviews Genetics 6: 128–136. 
Cartwright, Nancy (1983), How the Laws of Physics Lie. New York: Oxford Press.  
Chave, Jerome (2013), “The problem of pattern and scale in ecology: what have we learned in 20 
years?” Ecology Letters 16(S1): 4-16.  
Colyvan, Mark, and  Ginzburgh, Lev (2003,) “Laws of nature and laws of ecology”, Oikos 101: 
649-653.  
Endler, John (1986), Natural Selection in the Wild. New York: Princeton University Press.   
Kricher, John (1998), “Nothing endures except change: Ecology’s newly emerging paradigm”, 
Northeastern Naturalist 5: 165-174.  
Lange, Mark (2005), “Ecological laws: What would they be and why would they matter?” Oikos 
110: 394-403.   
Lawton, John H. (1999), “Are there general laws in ecology?” Oikos 84: 177-192.  
Linquist, S. et al. (2013), “Distinguishing ecological from evolutionary approaches to 
transposable elements,” Biological Reviews 88: 573-584. 
Lynch, Michael (2011), “Statistical inference on the mechanisms of genome evolution”, PLOS 
Genetics 7: 1-4.  
Roughgarden, Joan (2009), “Is there a general theory of community ecology?” Biology & 
Philosophy 24: 521-529.  
Sober, Elliott (2000), “Appendix one: the meaning of genetic causation.” In From Chance to 
Choice – Genetics and Justice (eds. A. Buchanan, D. Brock, N. Daniels and D. Wikler). New 
York:  Cambridge Press,  349–373. 
Sterelny, Kim (2006), “Local ecological communities”, Philosophy of Science 73: 215-231.  
Swenson, W. et al. (2000), “Artificial ecosystem selection”, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 97: 9110-9114. 
Woodward, James (2010), “Causation in biology: stability, specificity, and the choice of levels 
of explanation”, Biology & Philosophy 25: 287-318. 
Chicago, IL -433-
What the 19th century knew about taxonomy
and the 20th forgot
P.D. Magnus
July 6, 2014
For presentation at the Philosophy of Science Association
biennial meeting in Chicago, Illinois (November 2014).
This is a draft. Comments are welcome.
e-mail: pmagnus(at)fecundity.com
web: http://www.fecundity.com/job
Abstract
The accepted narrative treats John Stuart Mill’s Kinds as the historical
prototype for our natural kinds, but Mill actually employs two separate
notions: Kinds and natural groups. Considering these, along with the
accounts of Mill’s 19th-century interlocutors, forces us to recognize two
distinct questions. First, what marks a natural kind as worthy of inclusion
in taxonomy? Second, what exists in the world that makes a category
meet that criterion? Mill’s two notions offer separate answers to the two
questions: natural groups for taxonomy, and Kinds for ontology. This
distinction is ignored in many contemporary debates about natural kinds
and is obscured by the standard narrative which treats our natural kinds
just as a development of Mill’s Kinds.
This paper concerns debates about classification in the 19th century between
Willaim Whewell (§2), John Stuart Mill (§3), and some lesser known critics (§4).
I aim to show that Mill provides separate answers to two important questions
in the neighborhood of what we would now call natural kinds: The taxonomy
question, about what distinguishes categories which are natural kinds from cate-
gories which are not; and the ontology question, about what there is in the world
which sustains that difference. Mill distinguishes natural groups as an answer
to the taxonomy question and Kinds as an answer to the ontology question for
some — but importantly not all — natural groups. This overturns the usual
story, according to which Mill’s Kinds map neatly on to our natural kinds, and
it also reveals a distinction we would do well to remember.
1 The standard story
The standard narrative, promulgated by Ian Hacking [4], is that the philosophi-
cal conception of natural kinds descends from John Stuart Mill’s notion of Kinds
1
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(with a capital ‘K’). According to Hacking, this was a central piece of a promis-
ing research program in the mid-19th century which has since degenerated. He
argues that the concept is no longer fruitful and so natural kinds should be
abandoned. In Hacking’s metaphor, Mill’s contribution was the “rosy dawn”
for natural kinds, present debates are a “scholastic twilight”, and the day for
thinking in terms of natural kinds has come to an end [5].
Hacking’s narrative is widely accepted. For example, John Dupre´ gestures
to the history of natural kinds by writing, “Ian Hacking reminded us that the
contemporary tradition of natural kinds arose. . . in the nineteenth century. . . ”
[2, p. vii]. The story has become sufficiently commonplace that some writers
even attribute the phrase ‘natural kind’ to Mill; e.g. Alexander Bird and Emma
Tobin write, “J. S. Mill. . . was one of the first to use the phrase ‘natural kind’ ”
[1]. Mill never used the phrase, however, even though his critics use the phrase
consistently later in the 19th century.1
So the narrative involves two claims of continuity: first, that recent debates
are continuations of ones that began with Mill; second, that the term of Mill’s
system which maps onto our ‘natural kind’ is his ‘Kind’.
Both these claims are mistaken, but my focus here is on the second.2 Mill’s
terms do not map one-to-one onto ours. In addition to Kinds, Mill has an
account of natural groups. Mill’s natural groups and Kinds answer two different
questions about what we call natural kinds.3
The first question is about what, as a matter of taxonomy, distinguishes
natural kinds from arbitrary categories: What criteria must a category satisfy
to count as a natural kind? This is not particularly an epistemic matter, because
we might not and perhaps could never be in a position to apply the criteria.
However, it is metaphysically somewhat thin. An answer to it specifies what a
category must do in order to fulfill the natural kind roˆle, but it need not specify
the fundamental ontology of such categories.
The second question concerns ontology: What kind of being has a natural
kind got? Answers might appeal to causal structure, universals, or primitive
similarity.
Call these the taxonomy and ontology question, respectively.4
The two questions are conflated in many recent discussions of natural kinds.
If we answer the taxonomy question by saying that natural kinds are those
which carve nature at its joints, then we answer the ontology question in terms
1It is unclear exactly when Mill’s Kinds came to be called ‘natural kinds’ as a matter of
jargon. Hacking [4] attributes the phrase ‘natural kinds’ to John Venn, and the attribution is
part of the standard narrative; for example, it is repeated uncritically by Laura Snyder [15,
p. 157, fn. 2]. Although Venn uses the words ‘natural’ and ‘kind’ together, it is unclear that
Venn was responsible for ‘natural kind’ as a fixed phrase; cf. Magnus [9, pp. 2–3].
2Magnus [9] debunks the first claim of continuity, arguing that the recent vogue for natural
kinds is not a continuation of 19th-century debates using the same phrase.
3Hawley and Bird [6] call these the ‘naturalness’ and ‘kindhood’ questions, respectively,
and point out that the distinction is not typically made. I have argued for the importance of
the distinction in the context of Homeostatic Property Cluster accounts [8].
4Even though the labels are mine, rather than Mill’s, it is clear that natural groups and
Kinds play two different roˆles in his system. So (I argue) it is not anachronistic to see them
as answers to different questions.
2
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of nature’s joints. We discharge both questions at once, and so it would be gra-
tuitous to distinguish them. The same elision occurs in more sophisticated ac-
counts. For David Lewis and followers, natural properties are “an e´lite minority
of special properties” [7, p. 346] and that eliteness is a matter of fundamental
metaphysics. A category is a natural kind if and only if it corresponds to a
natural property, providing taxonomy and ontology altogether. Similar elision
follows for any essentialist account in which natural kinds stand in a one-to-one
relationship with essences.
My central claim here is that Mill gives the two questions importantly differ-
ent answers — as a matter of history, Mill’s categories cannot be neatly mapped
onto contemporary terms. At the end, I briefly suggest how we might profit by
minding the distinction that Mill made in the 19th century but which was lost
in the 20th.
2 Whewell
This section briefly considers some features of William Whewell’s account of
classification. As we will see, Mill explicitly engages Whewell, and the contrast
between their views highlights Mill’s innovation.5
Whewell claims that the aim of taxonomy is to provide a natural classifica-
tion, to divide things into kinds or — as he more often writes — natural classes.
These are the categories that will support systematic induction. He writes that
“since the truths we are to attend to are scientific truths, governed by precise
and homogeneous relations, we must not found our scientific Classification on
casual, indefinite, and unconnected considerations” [18, p. 115].
Importantly, for Whewell, natural classes will support scientific inference
because they reflect the underlying construction of the world. So taxonomy
aims not merely to organize things for science but also to discover the world’s
construction. Discussing mineralogy, Whewell writes, “the science which we
require is a complete and consistent classified system of all inorganic bodies. For
chemistry proceeds upon the principle that the constitution of a body invariably
determines its properties; and consequently, its kind. . . ” [17, p. 189]. Discussing
botany, he writes similarly,
No person, however, who wishes to know botany as a science, that is,
as a body of general truths, can be content with making names his
ultimate object. Such a person will be constantly and irresistibly led
on to attempt to catch sight of the natural arrangement of plants,
5Mill explicitly acknowledges Whewell as providing him the crucial clue to Kinds. He had
stopped working on the Logic for five years, because he was unable to make sense of induction.
But Whewells’ 1837 History of the Inductive Sciences provided him with the comprehensive
survey of physical science which he needed to move ahead. [11] Although Mill found much to
disagree with in Whewell’s philosophy, there are considerable similarities in their accounts of
natural classification. Mill quotes Whewell approvingly on the topic [12, p. 488] and, where
he disagrees, still quotes Whewell at some length [12, p. 501–2]. For more on the relation
between Whewell and Mill on classification, see McOuat [10] and Snyder [15].
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even before he discovers, as he will discover by pursuing such a
course of study, that the knowledge of the natural arrangement is
the knowledge of the essential construction and vital mechanism of
plants. [17, pp. 319–320]
So what makes kinds natural for Whewell is ultimately the “constitution” and
“construction” of things. The taxonomy and ontology questions are answered
together.
3 Mill
Initially in Book I of the Logic, Mill distinguishes Kinds (with a capital-K)
from arbitrary classes. A class can be indicated by any property or list of
properties. For example, the class of white things corresponds to the property
of being white, and the class of red round things corresponds to the properties
of being red and of being round. Because there is a class corresponding to any
property or list of properties, no such class is more natural than any other.
White things have nothing in common beyond their whiteness and its necessary
consequences (e.g., that all white things are non-transparent). In contrast,
Kinds are classes of things which share indefinitely many properties. There are
some diagnostic criteria which we associate with a chemical kind or biological
species, but the members share many properties besides those which we use to
mark the Kind. On Mill’s view, a Kind “is distinguished from all other classes
by an indeterminate multitude of properties not derivable from one another”
[12, p. 99].
For Mill, Kinds are crucial for inductive generalization. Suppose we subject
a sample of phosphorus to an experimental condition in the lab and we infer
that other samples of phosphorus will react similarly. This relies on the other
phosphorus, the stuff outside the lab, sharing enough properties with our sam-
ple that the condition happening to them counts as an instance of the same
cause. We identify other samples of phosphorus merely by diagnostic criteria,
so how can we rely on distinct bits of phosphorus sharing further properties
beyond those used to diagnose them as phosphorus? We can do so, Mill would
say, because phosphorus is a Kind. The diagnostic criteria identify samples as
members of the Kind, assuring that they share indefinitely many other features.
In this example, the fact that all lumps of phosphorus are the same Kind is
crucial to a causal inference about what things like this will do. Yet, because
of Mill’s conception of causation, Kinds cannot themselves be held together by
causes. Mill thinks of causal inference as guided by the law of causation which
states that every event is preceded by some circumstances which necessitate it:
When those circumstances occur, the effect invariably follows [12, p. 410]. This
means that causes are regularities that obtain between prior and subsequent
events.
Kinds are also regularities, but they obtain between different things at the
same time (e.g. all the samples of phosphorus) rather than between events at
different times (e.g. heatings of phosphorus and a subsequent ignitions). For
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a Kind, Mill writes, the the shared properties are an “invariable co-existent, in
the same manner as an event must have an invariable antecedent” [12, bk. III,
ch. XXII]. Kinds are structures of non-causal regularities.
Laura Snyder describes Mill as “denying that kinds are natural” and writes
that Mill’s Kinds “are not real kinds” [15, p. 164]. What she means by this
is that, for Mill, there is no underlying mechanism “causally responsible for
the production of. . . shared superficial qualities” [15, p. 164]. She is correct
that Mill’s Kinds do not have a real essence in Locke’s sense, that there is no
deeper and more fundamental process which causally produces the regularity
observed in members of the Kind. Unlike Whewell, Mill refuses to talk about
the constitution or essential construction of things. However, Mill’s Kinds are
not enquiry dependent or merely nominal.6 Each corresponds to a law of nature,
a law of coexistence which has the same reality as diachronic causal laws. They
are defined in terms of the course of events, rather than in terms of actual or
possible science.
In Book IV, Mill takes up “operations subsidiary to induction” such as ob-
servation, abstraction, naming, and classification. In discussing naming, Mill
explicitly invokes the conception of Kinds which he developed in Book I.7 In dis-
cussing classification, Mill makes a different distinction between natural groups
and merely technical or artificial ones. He says some natural groups will be
Kinds but that not all of them will be. Natural groups — in contrast to Kinds
— are characterized by their function in scientific enquiry.
Properly scientific classification, in order to be as general as possible, should
reflect the causal structure of things. It is best “when the objects are formed
into groups respecting which a greater number of general propositions can be
made. . . . The properties, therefore, according to which objects are classified
should, if possible, be those which are causes of many other properties. . . ” [12,
p. 499]. He distinguishes properly natural classification from artificial classifi-
cation; continuing, “A classification thus formed is properly scientific or philo-
sophical, and is commonly called a Natural, in contradistinction to Technical or
Artificial, classification or arrangement” [12, p. 499]. The categories that figure
in a natural classification he calls natural groups. Mill uses the adjective ‘natu-
ral’ here to discuss natural classification and natural groups, but he never uses
it to modify Kinds. The phrase ‘natural kind’ was not part of his vocabulary.
6Mill writes that “there are in nature distinctions of Kind; distinctions not consisting in
a given number of definite properties plus the effects which follow from those properties, but
running through the whole nature. . . of the things so distinguished” [12, p. 502].
7Mill calls a system of names for Kinds ‘nomenclature’, in contrast to mere ‘terminology’.
Lavoisier’s new chemistry and Linnæus’ system of biology, he writes, provided nomenclature.
The taxonomic innovations allowed enquiry to move beyond parochial concerns, to chart Kinds
rather than mere categories of interest. Having a nomenclature is the mark scientific progress,
Mill thinks, and in other fields a lack of nomenclature “is now the principle cause which retards
the progress of the science” [12, p. 492]. Mill defines ‘nomenclature’ explicitly by reference
to Kinds, as “the collection of names of all the Kinds with which any branch of knowledge
is conversant”[12, p. 492]. He takes this distinction from Whewell. Mill writes, “The words
Nomenclature and Terminology are employed by most authors almost indiscriminately; Dr.
Whewell being, as far as I am aware, the first writer who has regularly assigned to the two
words different meanings” [12, p. 492].
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Mill insists that science will need names for more than just Kinds. He does
think that Kinds will should appear in a proper scientific classification, and so
Kinds qualify as natural groups — but he insists that a complete classification
will require more categories than there are Kinds. He writes, “The distinctions
between Kinds are not numerous enough to make up the whole of classification”
[12, p. 503].
The natural groups which are not Kinds distinguish the important qualities
of things. This is subject to the worry that importance depends on human
concerns. Mill recognizes this worry, acknowledging that farmers divide plants
differently than botanists and that geologists divide fossils differently than zo-
ologists [12, p. 500]. If this were the end of it, then natural groups (besides
those which correspond to Kinds) would not be real features of the world. They
would be determined by our sense of what is important, shaped by our projects
and interest. Different concerns could make for different taxa.
Mill avoids this result by saying that the natural groups are the ones which
would figure in the science of a disinterested enquirer. He writes that
when we are studying objects not for any special practical end, but
for the sake of extending our knowledge of the whole of their proper-
ties and relations, we must consider as the most important attributes
those which. . . would most impress the attention of a spectator who
knew all their properties by was not especially interested in any.
Classes formed on this principle may be called, in a more emphatic
manner than any others, natural groups. [12, pp. 500–1]
Natural groups would be identified by an ideal, neutral observer. So they are
objective in the sense of not being dependent on any particular subjective stand-
point.
Mill’s characterization of natural groups as the categories of an intersub-
jectively warranted taxonomy diverges from his characterization of Kinds as
determined by objective laws of coexistence. The two characterizations do not
pick out the same categories, and their rationale is importantly different. Nat-
ural groups are defined in terms of possible or ideal enquiry, whereas Kinds are
defined just in terms of how the world is.
By contrast, although Whewell provides characterizations of Natural Classes
both as objects of possible enquiry and as features of the world, for him the
difference is just one of exposition. As we saw, Whewell thought that ideal
scientific enquiry should divide things by their essential constitutions.
To put the difference in our terms, we might approach natural kinds by way
of taxonomy or by way of ontology. For Whewell, this makes no difference, and
any legitimate scientific categories can be approached from either direction. For
Mill, the two do not perfectly coincide. Beginning with taxonomy, we get a
wealth of natural groups. Beginning with ontology, we get just the Kinds.
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4 Mill’s critics
In an 1887 attack on Mill’s “doctrine of natural kinds”, M.H. Towry enumerates
four objections to Mill’s account.8 For our purposes, we can treat them as raising
two broader worries.9
One worry is epistemic and semantic. According to Mill, we frame an ar-
bitrary class by stipulating properties which hold of its members. The class
of white things is specified just by the property white. Towry accepts this and
argues that the same is true for all classes and kinds. She writes:
Nature has in reality neither the class White Things nor the class
Horse. We made both. . . . There are a quantity of things in the
universe, alike in point of being white; there are a quantity of things
alike in points a b c, &c. = Horses. The properties are not found by
the Kind, but the Kinds are formed by the properties. [16, p. 436]
So, Towry writes, “one class is no whit less a merely intellectual creation than
the other” [16, p. 436].
Another worry is metaphysical. Mill posits a difference in kind between
Kinds and mere classes, but Towry objects that there is at most a differ-
ence in degree. There are anomalies and intermediate cases. Towry invokes
Whewell, writing that “Whewell’s type-theory seems to me nearer the truth
than Mill’s impassable barriers, because it recognizes infinite gradations and
interminglings” [16, p. 438]. But Towry dissents from both Whewell and Mill
by insisting that Kinds are just nominal classes. She writes, “When we advance
beyond Singulars to many individuals or substances forming a ‘natural Kind,’
we have made an arbitrary and conventional combination” [16, p. 438]. That is
to say, the Kind does not correspond to anything in nature.
I think that Mill can fairly be seen to anticipate the first worry. He recognizes
that the semantics for Kinds must be different than the semantics for stipulated
groups, and so he holds that the term for a Kind has a different connotation than
the term for an arbitrary class. The term for an arbitrary class consists merely
of some stipulated attributes. The term for a Kind consists of some attributes
which distinguish the class along with the commitment to that class’s being a
Kind.10
8Although Franklin and Franklin (whom I discuss below) address their reply to “Mr.
Towry”, it seems likely that the author was Mary Helen Towry White. She published on
a range of topics — from the history of Scottish clans to stories of famous children — and
was credited under different variations of her name. My inability to decisively confirm that
this is the same Towry is an example of how women who contributed to philosophical debates
are made to disappear from our retelling of them.
9Towry begins with a fair and concise summary of Mill’s view: “Mill says that a Kind
is one of those classes which are distinguished from all others, not by one or a few definite
properties, but by an unknown multitude of them; the combination of properties on which the
class is grounded being a mere index to an indefinite number of other distinctive attributes,
and instances Plant, Animal, Sulphur, Horse, &c., as Kinds” [16, p. 435].
10Regarding terms for Kinds, Mill writes, “besides connoting certain attributes, they also
connote that those attributes are distinctive of a Kind” [12, p. 493]. This is an explicit point
of contrast with Whewell. On Whewell’s account, we identify an exemplary individual as the
7
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I think that Mill also has a ready response to Towry’s second worry, because
he only introduces Kinds as a way to understand how inductive generalization is
possible. If Towry’s worry were legitimate, then there would be no difference in
the world between real groups (like phosphorus) and an arbitrarily concatenated
group (like the union of phosphorus and sandwiches) — but then there would be
no more ground to generalize from samples of phosphorus than from samples of
phosphorus-or-sandwiches. This point is especially clear in hindsight, because
we are familiar with Goodman’s new riddle of induction. Even though philoso-
phers may disagree about what distinguishes ‘emerald’ from ‘emerose’ (where
‘emerose’ picks out all the observed emeralds and all the unobserved roses) it
is clear that something does. To put the point in terms which were available
to Mill’s 19th-century critics: Making sense of science requires that there be
some distinction between arbitrary and non-arbitrary classes. Insofar as Mill is
aiming at that distinction, there is something right about his notion of Kinds.11
There are two published replies to Towry.12 In the second of these, Fabian
Franklin and Christine Ladd Franklin concede to Towry that there may be no
fundamental difference between the mental operations by which we come to
think of arbitrary classes and natural kinds but insist that there is nonetheless
an important difference between them in the world. They begin, “The doctrine
of Kinds, as laid down by Mill, does not seem to be tenable. . . yet there is,
we think, a real difference between such classes and mere arbitrary classes; and
the nature of that difference may be stated very nearly as Mill stated it” [3,
p. 83]. Although they accept that any category is “an intellectual creation”
they maintain that it could not be “a merely intellectual creation” [3, p. 84].
Mill’s mistake, the Franklins suggest, was to suppose that what holds a
Kind together is a fundamental non-causal regularity which cannot be explained.
Rather, they suggest that the connection can be explained by either a causal
regularity or a historical connection between different members of the Kind.
They write:
When a certain set of qualities entails the presence of others, and the
supposition cannot be entertained that there is a causal connexion of
a general nature between them, the conclusion is inevitable. . . that
type, and the Kind is the class of things which are sufficiently similar to the type specimen.
On Mill’s account, we identify a list of properties which are diagnostic of the Kind, and the
Kind is the class of things which share the diagnostic properties and indefinitely many more.
As Whewell would have it, we read the diagnostic properties off of a designated type specimen.
Mill allows that we can imagine a type specimen, but he thinks that we do so by imagining a
thing with all of the diagnostic properties. [12, pp. 501–5] Schwartz [14] provides an extended
discussion of Mill’s semantics for Kind terms.
11One might worry that my reading of Mill describes Kinds as independent of enquiry, but
the reply to Towry defends Kinds by appealing to the possibility of enquiry. Such a worry is
easily defused: Although making sense of enquiry provides Mill’s reason for positing Kinds,
Kinds are not defined in terms of enquiry.
12In the first of these, W.H.S. Monck [13] insists that taxonomy is not a subject which
should be addressed by a logician at all, since it concerns knowledge of what the world is
actually like. This objection is oddly hidebound. It is obvious in the sections on Kinds and
categories that Mill, like Whewell before him, is doing philosophy of science.
8
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there is a certain community of origin among the objects possessing
that set of qualities. [3, p. 84]
By ‘community of origin’ they mean some common cause; that is, that members
of a natural kind have a shared history which explains their shared features.
Common cause provides a way to explain regularity, without it being the
unconditional result of causal or non-causal laws. Because of their common
history, the members of such a Kind will share features beyond those which we
initially notice or by which we diagnose membership in the Kind; when “we
regard the invariable concomitance of certain qualities with certain other marks
as proof of a common origin in the objects possessing those marks, there is no
reason for setting any limit to the number of ways in which that common origin
will be betrayed” [3, p. 85].
A consequence of this proposal is that Mill’s exemplary Kinds turn out to
be a disparate lot. Biological species are groups of common descent, and so
they can be explained by community of origin. Yet chemical kinds do not seem
to be. Rather, it seems more likely that chemical regularities are a matter of
causal law. Considering the example of sodium, the Franklins write, “there is
not. . . any external evidence that all the sodium. . . in the universe was derived
from a common stock; but it seems highly probably that either this is the case
or else that all the properties of sodium are deducible by general laws from a
few of them. . . [that] the properties of sodium are deductions from its molecular
constitution” [3, p. 85]. The only general thing to say about Kinds is that their
unity can be explained either by general laws or by common causes — i.e.,
“either the qualities or the objects have a real connexion with each other” [3,
p. 85].
This furthers the division between taxonomy and ontology that we saw al-
ready in Mill’s account. For Mill, some but not all natural groups correspond
to Kinds in the world. So the characterization of the criteria for what makes a
category natural is separate from the metaphysical description of what it is in
the world which satisfies those criteria. Franklin and Franklin drive the wedge
further, by suggesting that different categories might be realized in the world in
fundamentally different ways. Some natural groups, like chemical elements, are
unified because members of the kind have a similar composition and so behave
similarly according to general, causal laws. Others, like biological species, are
unified by sharing a historical source and so behave similarly because of their
common cause.
5 Conclusion
If we treat the 19th-century discussions as an anticipation of debates about
natural kinds in the last 50 years, Mill has two separate notions which might
be mapped onto our present term ‘natural kind’: Kinds and natural groups. As
is usual in the history of philosophy, it would be a gross over-simplification to
treat this simply as a matter of translation. The fact that there is not one clear
9
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counterpart to our term ‘natural kind’ suggests that, in some sense, Mill was
not thinking about natural kinds the way that we do.
We should not pretend that Mill had two entangled notions where we now
simply have one. Quite the contrary, we can distinguish the taxonomy and
ontology questions about what we call natural kinds. First, what criteria dis-
tinguish natural kinds from arbitrary categories? Second, what features of the
world make some categories but not others satisfy these criteria?
Failure to mind this distinction can be seen to lead to confusion in recent
debates. Establishing this is beyond the scope of this paper, but I will point to
one suggestive illustration: The idea that natural kinds are homeostatic property
clusters (HPCs) is most plausible if we treat it as an answer to the ontology
question for many but not all natural kinds. Yet many authors respond to HPC
accounts just by providing examples of natural kinds which are not HPCs or of
HPCs which are not natural kinds. Those counterexamples are only relevant if
we take HPCs as an answer to the both questions, to define both what it is to
be a natural kind and what a natural kind is in the world.13
We should reject the usual historical account, according to which Mill’s
Kinds matured into our natural kinds. We understand Mill better if we recognize
that he was struggling with separate issues, and that he introduced several
notions to resolve them. To revisit Hacking’s metaphor: The scholastic darkness
which shadows present discussions of natural kinds may be dissolved not by
abandoning natural kinds altogether but by recognizing complexities too often
overlooked. We would do well to let a Millian flower bloom.
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ABSTRACT 
 
Comparative cognition is the interdisciplinary study of nonhuman animal cognition. It has been 
criticized for systematically underattributing sophisticated cognition to nonhuman animals, a 
problem that I refer to as the underattribution bias. In this paper, I show that philosophical 
treatments of this bias at the experimental level have emphasized one feature of the 
experimental-statistical methodology (the preferential guarding against false positives over false 
negatives) at the expense of neglecting another feature (the default, or null, hypothesis). In order 
to eliminate this bias, I propose a reformulation of the standard statistical framework in 
comparative cognition. My proposal identifies and removes a problematic reliance on the value 
of parsimony in the calibration of the null hypothesis, replacing it with relevant empirical and 
theoretical information. In so doing, I illustrate how epistemic and non-epistemic values can 
covertly enter scientific methodology through features of statistical models, potentially biasing 
the products of scientific research. Broadly construed, this paper calls for increased 
philosophical attention to the experimental methodology and statistical choices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Comparative cognition is the interdisciplinary study of the evolution, development, and 
function of cognitive processes and mechanisms in nonhuman animals. A central controversy 
within the field concerns ways of guarding against bias in the course of interpreting nonhuman 
animal (henceforth, animal) behavior. As many philosophers and scientists have written, the 
worry is disproportionally aimed at guarding against overattribution of sophisticated cognition to 
animals (Sober 2005, Andrews 2011, de Waal 1998). For the purposes of this paper, I take it as a 
given that comparative cognition researchers as a group prefer explanations with the most 
austere cognitive ontologies, and that this practice results in an underattribution bias, or the 
systematic underascription of putatively complex cognition to animals (Andrews 2011, 
Fitzpatrick 2008, Meketa 2014). This preference is typically cashed out in terms of taking 
putatively simple mechanisms, processes, or abilities as the default experimental hypothesis. 
In this essay, I locate the mechanism that drives the underattribution bias within the choice 
of the statistical null hypothesis (H0). I argue that the manner in which the null hypothesis is 
currently chosen embeds a parsimony-based preference for simple cognitive ontologies. Having 
identified the mechanism driving the underattribution bias, I recommend removing that 
mechanism from the statistical methodology in which it is embedded, and replacing it with a 
procedure that is sensitive to empirical information. In so doing, I offer a case study of how 
values, such as parsimony, may come to play a central, though implicit, role in scientific 
methodology. 
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1. LOCATING THE SOURCE OF THE UNDERATTRIBUTION BIAS: THE NEYMAN-PEARSON 
METHOD OF HYPOTHESIS-TESTING 
 
 
 
In the case of comparative cognition, the dominant statistical analysis method is what is known 
as the Neyman-Pearson Method (NPM) of hypothesis testing. Although the NPM is not the only 
statistical system available to science – there are also Bayesian and likelihoodist methods – it is 
the orthodoxy in comparative psychology, and, by extension, in comparative cognition.1 The 
NPM includes what Peter Godfrey-Smith (1994) calls the error-rate asymmetry, which calls for 
preferring one type of hypothesis over another. Because the hypothesis typically preferred in 
comparative cognition is the one positing the simplest cognitive ontology, the error-rate 
asymmetry results in the underattribution bias. The remainder of this section explores the results 
of the error-rate asymmetry and sets the stage for my proposed solution for eliminating the 
underattribution bias. My solution works within the dominant paradigm of the NPM, retaining 
its desirable features, but offering a means of eliminating the parsimony-based underattribution 
bias. Put another way, my solution should be viewed as a reformation rather than as a revolution. 
What exactly is the NPM? Put simply, the NPM is a method for controlling the error- 
rates (long-run relative frequencies) of two types of errors, which are labeled Type I errors and 
Type II errors. Type I errors, in general, are defined as those that are most serious. In the 
Neyman-Pearson tradition, the assumption is that the most serious type of error is the one that 
rejects the null hypothesis (H0) when the H0 is true. Within this paradigm, accepting the H0 when 
 
 
1 For challenges to the orthodoxy of the NPM, see Kruschke (2010), who advocates replacing it 
with Bayesian analysis, and Anderson et al. (2000), who favor a version of likelihoodist methods 
to the allegedly “unscientific” null hypothesis testing methods. For philosophical defenses of the 
NPM, see Mayo (1981) and Mayo (1992). For a “severity-analysis” reformulation of the NPM 
see Mayo (2004) and Mayo and Spanos (2009, 2011). 
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it is false is a Type II error, and it is treated as less serious. Type I error rates are denoted as ơ and 
Type II error rates as Ƣ. To modify slightly Dienes’s (2008) formalization of the relationship 
between error types and their relative frequencies, we may say that 
ơ =def P(rejecting H0H0) 
Ƣ =def P(accepting H0¬H0). 
 
 
Although the NPM provides a means for controlling error rates in a way that minimizes the risk 
of making both types of errors, researchers have traditionally set the risk of a Type I errors lower 
than Type II errors. Typical values for ơ are .05, .01, and sometimes .001. Treating Type I errors 
as more serious translates into controlling for Type I errors by making ơ very small, while 
keeping Ƣ either large or not controlled at all. This preference for making Type II errors over 
Type I errors is the error-rate asymmetry. 
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NULL HYPOTHESIS 
 
With this background complete, it is now possible to see how earlier assessments of the 
underattribution bias in comparative cognition have correctly located the source of the bias at 
the statistical level, but preferentially emphasized the error-rate asymmetry over what I will now 
argue is the real mechanism: the null hypothesis. 
Earlier Solutions: Locating the Underattribution Bias in the Error-Rate Asymmetry 
Elliott Sober (2001, 2005) argues that there is no reason to prefer making Type II errors over 
Type I errors in comparative cognition and that this preference is furthermore a misapplication 
of MC, understood as a parsimony principle. According to Sober, not only is MC not a 
parsimony principle, but both types of errors are equally undesirable, since both errors are
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equally wrong. Sober advocates ridding the field entirely of the error-rate asymmetry, arguing 
that, “the only prophylactic [against risk of error] is empiricism” (Sober 2005, 97). 
Building on Sober’s work, Andrews (2011) identifies the preference for Type I error with 
an exaggerated and damaging worry over the alleged systematic overattribution of sophisticated 
cognition to animals.2 She agrees with Sober that the matter is an empirical one, but departs 
from his conclusion regarding the seriousness of each type of error. She argues that Type I 
errors are in fact more damaging than Type II errors because they foreclose on the possibility of 
future research (Andrews 2011). On her view, preferring to make Type I errors means preferring 
to wrongly conclude that, e.g., the New Caledonian crows do not use planning to solve puzzles. 
Once such a judgment has been made, it no longer makes sense to ask further questions about 
the features of e.g., the crows’ future-planning abilities, such as whether they are domain-specific 
or general, available only with appropriate environmental scaffolding, and so on. As a result, a 
potentially fruitful research program never gets a chance to get off the ground. Type II errors,  
on the other hand, promote a further refinement of experimental questions. These questions 
may produce results that conflict with the original (mistaken) judgment, but, argues Andrews, 
science must be willing to take such risks. 
Moving to the Null Hypothesis 
 
Despite discussing the biasing effects of the error-rate asymmetry, neither Sober (2001, 2005) 
nor Andrews (2011) question the fact that the H0 is treated as the absence of the mental feature 
 
 
2 Andrews refers to this overattribution fear as the fear of so-called anthropomorphism, or the 
attribution of allegedly uniquely human cognitive complexity to nonhuman animals. For in- 
depth analyses of the alleged mistake of anthropomorphism, or the mistaken attribution of 
human properties to nonhuman entities, in comparative psychology, see Fisher (1990; 1991). See 
also Keeley (2004) for an update to Fisher’s arguments. 
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0 under investigation.
3 However, as I will now show, the choice of the H is just as likely to be a 
 
source of bias as the error-rate asymmetry. Once the H0 is understood to be a source of bias, a 
solution to the underattribution problem will become clear. 
 
Consider Andrews’s claim that the error-rate asymmetry results in what she calls a 
behavioristic bias. She is right as long as the H0 is defined as the absence of a cognitive feature. 
However, if the H0 were defined as the presence of rich cognitive abilities, the result would be the 
opposite of a bias toward underattribution: comparative cognition would be biased toward 
overattribution. Such a dramatic difference in the outcome of the application of our procedural 
rules points to the significance of the construction of the H0, i.e., the choice of how it is to be 
defined. If the construction of the H0 is so important to the final outcome of a given hypothesis- 
testing procedure, then we must pay more careful attention to how we come to identify 
something as the H0. 
To illustrate the importance of attending to the construction of the H0 more concretely, 
consider a case where replacing the H0 while retaining the error-rate asymmetry results in a bias 
toward sophisticated cognitive explanations. Let us take a closer look at an experiment by 
Allison Foote and Jonathom Crystal (2007), which used a duration-discrimination task to test for 
metacognition – awareness of one’s own mental states – among rats. In this case, the mental 
state in question was that of uncertainty. Meketa (2014) describes the experiment as follows: 
“[Rats] were presented with audio tones of different durations and trained to classify the 
tones into the categories of ‘‘short’’ or ‘‘long.’’ The rats were then presented with a range 
of tones, some clearly short and others ambiguous. Correct responses were rewarded 
with food, and incorrect responses were not rewarded at all. Next, the rats were given 
 
 
 
3 Since the present essay was written, Andrews and Brian Huss have written, but, to my 
knowledge, not yet published a manuscript that includes an explicit discussion of the role of the 
null hypothesis (Andrews & Huss unpublished manuscript). 
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the same test, but were given a third option: to decline a test. Declined tests allowed the 
subjects to move on to more tests with the prospect of getting more food. When given 
the choice to decline tests, the rats consistently opted to decline the ambiguous 
(‘‘harder’’) tests but not the unambiguous tests, even though declining a test resulted in a 
smaller food reward than answering correctly. Moreover, the overall accuracy improved 
when rats were allowed to opt out of difﬁcult tests. Foote and Crystal (2007) concluded 
that the rats were aware of their own uncertainty.” (Meketa 2014) 
In other words, Crystal and Foote concluded that this behavior showed that the rats were 
metacognitive. 
Let us now abstract away from the details of the experimental setup and just consider the 
hypothesis being tested. We see that their H0 was that the rats do not possess metacognition. The 
alternative hypothesis – the one they wished to demonstrate – was that the rats are capable of 
metacognition.  Given the error-rate asymmetry, the burden of proof falls on the metacognitive 
hypothesis. In fact, in a follow-up paper on metacognition, Crystal and Foote (2009) clearly state 
that the default hypothesis – the H0 – is and should be that rats lack metacognitive capacities. The 
reason, they argue, is that the behaviors they observed in the 2007 trials could be explained by 
 
allegedly simpler mechanisms, such as associative learning, which is presumed to be 
incompatible with metacognition.4 This means that the metacognitive explanations bear the 
burden of proof. 
But now consider what would happen if the H0 in Foote and Crystal’s experiments were 
a rich cognitive explanation of the rats’ behavior (e.g., H0 = “rats are capable of metacognition”). 
 
 
4 The standard view that associative mechanisms are different from and simpler than cognitive 
processes has been coming under scrutiny in recent years. For example, Cameron Buckner 
(2012) argues against the view that cognitive and associative systems are incompatible. Taking 
issue with the assumption that association is simple, Gallistel (2008) argues that associative 
mechanisms are more demanding than cognitive systems insofar as they would require far 
greater energy expenditures than alternative mechanisms. He uses the honeybee navigation 
system to argue that the honeybee brain does not have enough computing power to process 
information through associations alone, and must require a representational system of mental 
maps (Gallistel 2008). 
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Then the burden of proof would be on the hypotheses positing less sophisticated cognition (e.g., 
H1 = “rats are relying on stimulus-response learning”). In this case, a preference for Type I 
errors over Type II errors would mean a preference for accepting (or failing to reject) the 
hypothesis that rats possess metacognitive abilities when, in fact, the rats do not. As a result, the 
underattribution bias would be inverted. 
The metacognition example suggests that the way that the H0 is constructed is at least as 
important as the error-rate asymmetry when it comes to assessing an experimental methodology 
for built-in theoretical commitments. What attending to the construction of the H0 reveals is 
that, while the asymmetry introduces a bias, the nature of this bias is specified by the content of 
the H0. In one sense, the role of the H0 may be more important than the error-rate asymmetry: 
while the asymmetry can only be made more or less pronounced, the content of the H0 can 
 
embed any number of problematic assumptions. 
 
This conclusion prompts the question: Why, if the content of H0 is so important, have 
scientists and philosophers of science assumed that the H0 is naturally defined as “non-presence” 
or “no effect”? It is curious that a feature that carries such powerful implications for inference 
from experiment should be casually assumed to be globally fixed at the non-presence of the 
target cognitive property. In order to explain why the content of the H0 has been systematically 
overlooked, I turn to Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (1994) analysis of the NPM and the possible 
justifications for its use. Placing the NPM into its historical context will, furthermore, motivate 
my suggestion that the NPM can be modified as I suggest in §5. 
 
3. THE NPM: A CHANGING JUSTIFICATION AND THE INTRODUCTION OF PARSIMONY 
According to Godfrey-Smith (1994), the original justification for the NPM was pragmatic, but 
that justification was rejected shortly after its introduction while the method of preferentially 
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controlling for Type I errors was retained. Contrary to Andrews’s claim, the original NPM 
included an accept/reject procedure. However, the original, pragmatic, justification of the 
‘accept/reject’ decision-procedure was intended as a behavioral strategy, where “accepting” an 
hypothesis meant acting as if the hypothesis were true (Godfrey-Smith 1994, 280-82). This 
pragmatic justification meant that the NPM could not be used to support belief in the truth of an 
hypothesis or even in the probability of the hypothesis being true. This pragmatic justification did 
not sit well with subsequent scientists and statisticians (e.g., R.A. Fisher), who wanted a statistical 
system to provide evidence for the truth or falsity of an hypothesis – something that the original 
NPM explicitly avoided (Dienes 2008, Anderson et al., 2000, Gigerenzer 2004). The result, 
according to Godfrey-Smith, was a proliferation of alternative justifications that have in turn 
altered the method in unexpected ways. 
One alternative justification – which Godfrey-Smith labels the ‘semantic’ justification5 – 
includes the concept of what he calls a ‘natural null,’ or Hn, which is typically defined as the 
hypothesis of no effect or no difference. On the semantic justification, the Type I error is a 
wrong rejection of the hypothesis of no effect, or no difference. Since Type I errors are 
considered more serious, the semantic justification advises erring on the side of concluding that 
no effect or difference was detected. Moreover, the accept/reject procedure is interpreted both 
behaviorally and epistemically (Godfrey-Smith 1994, 287). I wish to focus on what Godfrey- 
Smith calls the ‘semantic’ justification for the NPM, because this is the most popular justification 
in psychology and, hence, also in comparative psychology and comparative cognition. It is worth 
noting that the other two justifications that Godfrey-Smith discusses, the ‘pragmatic’ and the 
‘doxastic,’ do not specify a value for the H0, holding that “H0 is ‘true’ if the world is in a state 
5 Godfrey-Smith labels justification as “semantic” because it specifies the semantic content of 
the null. 
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such that the action associated with H0 is better than the alternative action” (Godfrey-Smith 
1994, 281).6 
Crucially, Godfrey-Smith identifies a curious metaphysical principle embedded in the 
semantic NPM: When combined with the error-rate asymmetry, the Hn results in a preference 
for nothing over something, that is an Occamist commitment to maximally simple ontologies and 
theories that favor such ontologies. Since the semantic justification is, according to Godfrey- 
 
Smith’s analysis, the most common interpretation in science – sometimes combined with the 
doxastic justification – it follows that the sciences that use it encode a commitment to Occamist 
metaphysics. Godfrey-Smith argues that psychology uses the semantic justification almost 
exclusively, though this is sometimes combined with a doxastic justification. Since comparative 
cognition is to a large extent constituted by comparative psychology, it is no surprise that 
Occamism is present in comparative cognition’s statistical methodology as well. 
Finally, if indeed the content of the H0 is at least as significant as the error-rate 
asymmetry for identifying bias in comparative cognition, then Sober and Andrews have been 
focusing on a feature that only becomes a problem under conditions in which the null 
hypothesis is biased. It is possible to retain the asymmetry found in the NPM without accepting 
the question-begging conservatism about animal minds. My analysis recommends that the 
justifications for the NPM be carefully re-examined to avoid smuggling in a priori theoretical 
commitments. 
 
 
 
 
6 By contrast with this behavioral “pragmatic” interpretation, the doxastic justification for the 
NPM is epistemic. It replaces the pragmatic component with the rule that “when an observation 
in the critical region [the set of values that would cause us to reject the hypothesis] occurs the 
researcher rejects H0. But when an observation falls outside the critical region the researcher 
merely suspends judgment” (Godfrey-Smith 1994, 282; emphasis added). 
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It is evident that statistical methods are often considered value-neutral and, in that 
respect, objective. However, I have shown that values may be embedded in these statistical 
methods. In the case of comparative cognition, this value is Occamist parsimony, and it is 
located in the choice of the null hypothesis within the NPM. Moreover, as a statistical 
methodology comes to be used as a standard in a given field, the values embedded in the method 
fade from scientific consciousness. The result is that, while researchers and philosophers 
appreciate the potential for a gerrymandering of data by cherry-picking statistical analyses, values, 
such as parsimony, continue to operate in the background methodology itself, without         
being subject to direct scrutiny. Analyses such as the one I offer here, are, therefore, crucial for 
uncovering and assessing the effects of values even in such inconspicuous places as tools for 
statistical analysis of experimental data. So much for a partial account of the invisibility of the 
null in the philosophy and science of comparative cognition. The next question is how the 
underattribution bias may be corrected. Given that comparative cognition researchers are 
unlikely to abandon the NPM in the near future, I propose a reformation of the semantic NPM. 
4. THE NPM REFORMED: REPLACING THE NATURAL NULL WITH A CONTEXTUAL NULL 
 
I have argued that the underattribution bias is driven by a parsimony-based preference for 
purportedly simple cognitive ontologies, and that this practice is regimented in the preference  
for a Hn. I will now show how to alter the “semantic” NPM in a manner that eliminates this bias. 
My strategy involves modifying the semantic NPM to replace the natural null with what I call a 
 
“contextual null” (Hc), which reflects a broader epistemic context for the animals under 
investigation. 
 
To begin, note that the semantic view does not require that the H0 must always be that 
the feature under investigation is absent. It is, however, this particular definition that lends the 
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semantic view its bias toward Occamist parsimony. It follows that removing the Occamism from 
the semantic NPM requires removing the natural null. This is precisely what I now suggest: the 
natural null should be replaced with a contextual null. In contrast to the Hn, the Hc is defined 
against a suite of background information about the research subjects, such as ontogenetic and 
 
phylogenetic information against the background of developmental and evolutionary theories, 
information about species-typical and individual behavioral profiles, neuroanatomical 
homologies7 and homoplasies,8 ecological context, and information from earlier studies and 
observational data.9 I call such a null “contextual” for two reasons: (1) it respects the differences 
among experimental settings and the organisms being studied, and (2) it does not presuppose 
either cognitive complexity or cognitive simplicity. It is sensitive to the changing conditions 
between experiments, both in terms of the kinds of questions that are asked and with respect to 
how much is known about the target system. 
The evolutionary considerations that I propose to be taken into account in constructing 
the Hc include the species’ phylogenetic proximity to species about whom more is known in 
order to gauge the likelihood of homologous cognitive structures and abilities. These 
considerations already enter into decisions about which species to study when searching for a 
given ability, but not into the decision to cast a given hypothesis as the presumptive null. For 
example, chimpanzees’ close phylogenetic proximity to humans is a frequently cited reason to 
test them for the presence of human-like abilities, such as tool use and metacognition. 
 
 
7 A homology is “a similarity inherited from a common ancestor” (Sober 2005, 94). 
8 A homoplasy is “a similarity that is the result of two or more independent derivations of the 
trait” (ibid). 
9 Fitzpatrick (2008) draws a very similar conclusion about the need for background information 
in hypothesis testing. However, he does not frame his case in statistical terms. His account is 
intended to displace the parsimony-based reading of Morgan’s canon, understood as a heuristic, 
with a principle he calls “Evidentialism.” 
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The developmental considerations relevant to constructing the Hc include, inter alia, 
hypotheses regarding developmental constraints on the evolution of the relevant cognitive and 
behavioral traits and the effects of the environment on gene expression. Ecological context 
would include information about the test subjects’ behavior in its natural habitat, such as 
whether it is a social or solitary animal, whether it hunts or stores its food, whether it uses tools, 
and so on. Once again, these considerations already drive the research projects, suggesting that 
researchers consider such information to be probability-conferring. Consider the following 
example of research that has been guided by both ecological and developmental considerations. 
Furlong et al. (2008) tested chimpanzees for their ability to use tools based on the knowledge 
that chimpanzees use tools under natural conditions (e.g., dipping sticks into ant mounds to 
catch ants; using leaves to scoop up water). Based on the negative results obtained by a previous 
study by Daniel Povinelli (2000), which concluded that chimpanzees lack the competency for 
flexible use of implements, Furlong et al. hypothesized that Povinelli’s chimps were 
developmentally stunted as a result of being brought up under socially impoverished conditions. 
Furlong et al. tested chimpanzees with different socialization backgrounds, and found that the 
ability to manipulate tools in a flexible manner (i.e., one suggestive of causal understanding) was 
positively correlated with social histories. This example shows the value of social ecology and its 
effects on chimpanzee intellectual development. Building such considerations into the null 
hypothesis would ensure that crucial information is not left out of the experimental design. 
Finally, the Hc should include information from previous studies and observational data. 
 
However, given the arguments of the foregoing sections, including the work of earlier 
experimental studies would require re-evaluating them for the presence of bias. This can be 
achieved by analyzing the choice of null hypothesis to ensure that unwarranted metaphysical 
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preferences have not been smuggled in and that relevant empirical and theoretical information 
was included. 
The upshot is that my proposed Hc ensures that Type I errors will always be more 
epistemically serious because probability-conferring evidence is built into the H0. Sometimes this 
method will produce a H0 positing a simple cognitive ontology, but this will no longer be based 
on a blanket Occamist preference for simple ontologies, but on an empirically-informed 
expectation. This suggestion respects the intuition that default hypotheses ought to be those that 
we have the best reason to adopt. In the end, my account preserves the risk-controlling structure 
of the semantic account of the NPM while eliminating the questionable metaphysics and 
replacing it with empirical information. 
CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that earlier assessments of bias in comparative cognition at the level of statistical 
data evaluation have ignored an important feature of the orthodox NPM –namely the null 
hypothesis. I have suggested that this lacuna may be attributed to a specific interpretation of the 
NPM – the semantic justification – which assumes that the null hypothesis must be universally 
set to a natural null of “no difference” or “no effect.” I have suggested that if the semantic 
version of the NPM commits the researcher to a position supported only by a problematic 
Occamist metaphysics, then the semantic version needs to be modified. My proposed 
modification to the NMP maintains the error-rate asymmetry, but replaces the Hn with the Hc. 
This change respects the intuition that the burden of proof should be on the hypothesis that has 
 
the least empirical and theoretical evidence on its side. 
At a more general level, the foregoing discussion provides a case study of how 
metaphysical assumptions, such as a preference for simple ontologies, can enter science at the 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -458-
15 | P a g e  
level of statistical model choice. The fact that such metaphysical assumptions can be grafted 
onto the standard statistical models of an entire field suggests the need for a more careful 
scrutiny of statistical models, as philosophers of statistics, such as Deborah Mayo have been 
arguing for years. I showed that the data processing instruments used to generate inferences may 
not be value-free. Whether a value-free statistical instrument is desirable is an open question, but 
recognizing its value-laden dimensions is a necessary step in evaluating the conclusions drawn 
from scientific experiments. 
Chicago, IL -459-
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Abstract:   
Reference models of the earth’s interior play an important role in the acquisition of 
knowledge about the earth’s interior and the earth as a whole.  Such models are used 
as a sort of standard reference against which data are compared.  I argue that the use 
of reference models merits more attention than it has gotten so far in the literature on 
models, for it is an example of a method of doing science that has a long and 
significant history, and a study of reference models could increase our understanding 
of this methodology. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 Reference models of the earth’s interior play an important role in the 
acquisition of knowledge about the earth’s interior and the earth as a whole.  Such 
models are used as a sort of standard reference against which data are compared.  
Deviations between the observations one would expect if the reference model were an 
accurate representation of the earth, and actual observations, are used to make 
inferences about the earth’s interior.  Perhaps the most widely used such model in 
geophysics, the Preliminary Reference Earth Model or PREM
2
 (Dziewonski and 
Anderson 1981), was completed in 1981, and it has been utilized for the construction 
of many other models through the end of the century (Ritzwoller and Lavely 1995).   
There is a recent, growing literature focusing on the use of models in science 
(e.g. Morgan and Morrison 1999, Wimsatt 2007, Weisberg 2013).  The use of models 
in a manner similar to the way in which reference models are used in geophysics is 
described by Wimsatt (2007), but he mentions these uses merely in passing in his 
                                                        
1
 The research for this paper was funded by Nanyang Technological University SUG 
No. M4080821.  I would like to thank the NTU Philosophy Division, especially Lina 
Jansson, as well as George Smith and Michael Friedman.    
2
 See Smith 2007 for an account of the history of seismology leading up to the 
construction of PREM.    
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discussion of neutral models in biology.  Weisberg (2013) has a much more 
comprehensive and systematic account of models and their uses in science, but he 
does not specifically mention a use of models in the manner I will describe in this 
paper.  I will argue that the use of reference models merits more attention than it has 
gotten so far in the literature on models, for it is an example of a method of doing 
science that has a long and significant history, one which has recently been described 
by Smith (2002) and Harper (2011) as “turning theory into evidence”, and a study of 
reference models could increase our understanding of this methodology.   
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature on models by first 
locating reference models relative to the general taxonomy of models described by 
Weisberg, and comparing them to the use of neutral models in biology as described 
by Wimsatt.  I will then examine some possible desiderata for the construction of 
reference models, and then end the paper with some considerations about the 
connection between reference models and “turning theory into evidence”.   
 
2.  Models and Idealization 
I will start with Weisberg’s picture of models because it is the most ambitious 
recent attempt to give a comprehensive account of models and their use in science, 
and it appears likely itself to become a standard reference on models for philosophers 
of science.  From the standpoint of Weisberg’s picture, Earth reference models would 
best be construed as target-directed models that utilize Galilean idealization 
(Weisberg 2013, 74-112).  Target-directed models are models for which the modeler 
has a specific target in mind.  For earth reference models, the target is clearly the 
interior of the earth.  In Weisberg’s picture of models, there are three different ways 
in which models can be idealized: Galilean idealization, minimalist idealization, and 
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multiple-models idealization.  Galilean idealization involves the simplification of 
models with the aim of making them more mathematically tractable.  Minimalist 
idealization involves the construction of models that include only difference-making 
factors that are necessary for a phenomenon, with the aim of constructing an 
explanation of a given phenomenon.  Multiple-models idealization involves building 
multiple incompatible models of a single phenomenon, usually in the study of highly 
complex phenomena.    
As we shall see, earth reference models involve Galilean idealization, so I 
want to examine this notion in more depth.  Weisberg’s discussion of Galilean 
idealization (2013, 99) depends heavily on the description given in McMullin (1985).  
Typically, there is some phenomenon of interest, but it is too complicated to model 
faithfully, so an initial simplified model is created.  Then, this simplified model is 
used to improve our understanding of the phenomenon, and the simplified model is 
gradually made more realistic in a process that McMullin calls “de-idealization”.  
Weisberg takes the whole purpose of Galilean idealization to be to deal with 
intractability, and thus “advances in computational power and mathematical 
techniques should lead the Galilean idealizer to de-idealize” (99).   
Weisberg does not give very detailed examples of this process of de-
idealization, but McMullin does.
3
  The most detailed example he gives is the Bohr 
model of the hydrogen atom (McMullin 1985, 260-261).  The Bohr model, in which 
the electron is in a circular orbit around the proton, could be used to predict the 
energy levels of the electron, which could then be compared to spectroscopic 
                                                        
3
 McMullin makes distinctions of his own regarding idealization, such as that between 
formal and material idealization.  The Bohr model of the atom is given as an example 
of formal idealization.  McMullin’s distinctions might well cross-cut Weisberg’s 
distinctions, and I do not want to complicate the picture here, so I will refrain from 
any discussion of McMullin’s distinctions.   
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observations of hydrogen.  More specifically, a theoretical value for the Rydberg 
constant could be calculated, which could then be compared to empirical 
measurements of this constant.  McMullin says that at least three idealizations were 
being made here: the neutron is at rest, the orbit of the electron is circular, and 
relativistic effects are left out.  Later on, successive corrections were made to the 
model which, McMullin claims, resulted in a closer fit between the model and reality.  
McMullin describes this process as one where the model “serves as the basis for a 
continuing research program”, one in which the model starts off as a tractable model 
that has significant departures from reality, and this model is gradually filled in with 
more and more details.   
Here, I want to ask exactly how the initial model serves as a basis for this 
research program.  There are two significantly different ways in which it could do 
that.  The first way is for the model simply to provide a sort of skeleton upon which 
further and further new details are added.  These details might come about through 
new observations, or through the development of new mathematical or computational 
techniques that overcome the intractability problems that led to the development of 
the initial simplified model, allowing such details to be filled in, where previously 
they could not.  The second way is for the model itself to be used directly to produce 
the new observations from which the further details can be added.  I will call the first 
kind of process passive de-idealization, while I will call the second kind active de-
idealization.  We will see that earth reference models are used for active de-
idealization.   
Exactly how does active de-idealization work?  Although Wimsatt (2007) 
does not use my terminology, he describes an example of active de-idealization.  One 
of the major points that Wimsatt makes is that false models can be used in many 
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different ways to learn true facts about complicated systems.  He gives a list of twelve 
ways in which false models can be used to search for better models.  I want to focus 
here on the first five such functions he gives for false models:   
 
1. An oversimplified model may act as a starting point in a series of models 
of increasing complexity and realism.   
2. A known incorrect but otherwise suggestive model may undercut the too 
ready acceptance of a preferred hypothesis by suggesting new alternative 
lines for the explanation of the phenomena.   
3. An incorrect model may suggest new predictive tests or new refinements 
of an established model, or highlight specific features of it as particularly 
important.   
4. An incomplete model may be used as a template, which captures larger or 
otherwise more obvious effects that can then be “factored out” to detect 
phenomena that would otherwise be masked or be too small to be seen.   
5. A model that is incomplete may be used as a template for estimating the 
magnitudes of parameters that are not included in the model.   
(Wimsatt 2007, 104) 
 
The first function is, of course, mentioned by both Weisberg and McMullin.  It is a 
statement of the idea of Galilean idealization and the process of gradual de-
idealization.  In functions 2 and 3, a false model is used as a heuristic—it suggests 
“new alternative lines for the explanation of phenomena”, or “new predictive tests or 
new refinements”.  I want to focus particularly on functions 4 and 5.  When used for 
these functions, Wimsatt says that the false model is used as a “template” that is used 
to either factor out larger effects in order to capture effects that are too small to be 
seen, or for estimating parameters that are not themselves included in the model.   
The discussion in Wimsatt (2007) involves a detailed study of the linear 
linkage model developed by Thomas Hunt Morgan in the early twentieth century.  
Wimsatt gives several examples of cases where deviations from the predictions of the 
linear linkage model were used to postulate causal factors that were not being taken 
into account in the model.  This use of the model would fall under function 4 
(Wimsatt 2007, 106-111).  He also discusses a case where deviations from the 
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predictions of another model, the Haldane mapping function, is used to estimate the 
value of a parameter that is not contained in the model itself (Wimsatt 2007, 120).   
 I want to emphasize again that functions 4 and 5 for models as described by 
Wimsatt is active, not passive, de-idealization.  The false model is used directly to 
produce evidence that can then be used to extract information about the system or 
phenomenon of interest.  It is not being used merely as a heuristic—rather, the model 
itself is used to produce the observations.  Wimsatt provides a very good example of 
these uses of false models, but one might get the impression that the way in which 
models are used here is relatively rare in science.  This impression, however, is 
mistaken—there are at least some sciences where this is the primary way in which 
progress is made.  Most of our knowledge of the interior of the earth, for example, is 
the result of the application of this method.   
 Perhaps one of the reasons that this method has not gotten the attention it 
deserves is that it raises some rather difficult issues with regard to justification.  There 
is, first of all, a circularity worry.  Suppose I create an initial model, and then I study 
the deviations from this model.  These deviations are then taken to be evidence for, 
say, causal factors that must be taken account in the model.  I then add these further 
causal factors, and improve the model.  Perhaps I then investigate further deviations 
from the predictions of this new model, and try to make further improvements to the 
model.  If, however, the wrong initial model was used, then the deviations might not 
reflect any real causal factors after all—they might turn out to have been illusory, in 
which case the research program would have been going down a “garden path”.
4
  So 
one thing you would want to be careful about is that if a false model is being used to 
create new observations, the model ought to be false in the right way—the deviations 
                                                        
4
 This is George Smith’s term.  See Smith 2002.   
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from the model ought to be ones which actually will tell us true things about the 
system, or at least point us in the right direction.  You would then expect that there 
might be some norms for models if they are being used in this way.  I will discuss 
such possible norms below.  I will now turn to a discussion of earth reference 
models—models that I believe are used in the way I have described.  
 
3.  Earth Reference Models 
The earth reference models that I have mentioned in this paper are idealized 
models of the mechanical properties of the earth’s interior.  If the interior of the earth 
is taken to be elastically isotropic, then the mechanical properties of each point in the 
earth’s interior can be characterized by three variables: density, and two parameters 
that express the elastic properties of the medium, usually incompressibility and 
rigidity.   If the earth is taken to be spherically symmetric, that is, mechanical 
properties of the earth are taken to depend only on the distance from the center of the 
earth, then the mechanical properties of the entire earth can be represented completely 
in terms of three functions of radius.  For such an idealized earth, expected travel 
times for various types of seismic waves can be calculated.  In the 1930’s, spherically 
symmetric models of the mechanical properties of the earth’s interior were 
determined by constructing idealized earth models and comparing expected travel 
times for such models with actual travel times of seismic waves.  There was a 
remarkable agreement between the earth models produced by the two main groups 
working on earth models at the time, one involving Harold Jeffreys and Keith Bullen, 
and the other involving Beno Gutenberg and Charles Richter (Bullen 1975).  The 
methods used here were hypothetico-deductive—that is, the models were postulated 
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as hypotheses about the earth’s internal structure, and they were compared directly 
against observations of travel times.   
In the 1960’s, the fortuitous confluence of digital computing technology with 
a couple of the largest earthquakes ever recorded made possible the recording of 
normal modes of oscillation of the earth.  Normal mode frequencies can be calculated 
for an idealized, spherically symmetric earth, and models that incorporate normal 
mode frequency observations were built starting in the 1960’s.  Further, advances in 
computing allowed geophysicists to develop Monte Carlo methods in which earth 
models were generated randomly by computer and tested against observations (e.g., 
Press 1968).  Some of the models that agreed with observation were significantly 
different from the other models that had been postulated at the time, and these studies 
led to worries about the possibility of radically different models being consistent with 
observations.  Work by the geophysicists George Backus and Freeman Gilbert 
(Backus and Gilbert 1967, 1968, 1970), which tried to address this non-uniqueness 
problem, showed that limits could be put on the degree of non-uniqueness of earth 
models, but only under the assumption that the functions relating earth structure to 
observations of normal mode frequencies were linear, an assumption that was known 
to be false.     
According to the geophysicist Keith Bullen (1974), a committee was set up in 
1971 for the construction of a “Standard Earth Model”.  The reason given for the 
construction of this new model is that a large amount of new data had been collected 
since the Jeffreys-Bullen and Gutenberg-Richter models had been constructed, and 
individual geophysicists had been incorporating this new data in different ways.  This 
had led to a “great untidiness in the presentation of numerical seismological results”.  
In the mid-1970’s, several teams of geophysicists began to develop earth models with 
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the goal of coming up with a standard reference model.  In 1981, this process 
culminated with the development of the Preliminary Reference Earth Model, which is 
still being used to this day, although there are now several other alternative models 
that are used as reference models as well.   
Earth reference models, such as PREM, are used in many ways, but what is 
most distinct about their use from an epistemological point of view is that they are 
best thought of in terms of functions 4 and 5 in the taxonomy of functions of idealized 
models described by Wimsatt.  They are used, that is, for detecting phenomena that 
would otherwise be masked or be too small to be seen, or for estimating magnitudes 
of parameters that are not included in the model.   
These two uses can be seen quite clearly in the way in which PREM has been 
used for the construction of three-dimensional models of the interior of the earth, that 
is, models that are no longer simply spherically symmetric, but express the 
mechanical properties of the earth’s interior in terms of three spatial variables.  Most 
of these models are based on observations of travel times of seismic waves.  They are 
not, however, constructed by simply constructing a model and comparing it with 
actual travel times of seismic waves.  The observations used are usually travel time 
residuals—that is, the deviations from the travel times predicted by a reference model 
such as PREM.  The three-dimensional model constructed is then a linear perturbation 
of a one-dimensional reference model, such as PREM (Ritzwoller and Lavely 1995).  
Thus, the deviations between the observations predicted by PREM and actual 
observations are being used to identify three-dimensional features of the earth which 
are not in PREM itself, and to measure parameters that represent mechanical 
properties of such additional features.   
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4.  Possible Norms for Reference Models 
 I now want to think about possible norms that might govern the use of 
reference models, keeping in mind Wimsatt’s functions 4 and 5: detecting phenomena 
that would otherwise be masked or be too small to be seen, or for estimating 
magnitudes of parameters that are not included in the model.  Reference models are 
being used to produce new observations through an analysis of the deviations of 
actual observations and predicted observations of the model.  These observations are 
then used to eventually arrive at a better picture of the earth’s interior.  In order to be 
useful in this process, the models are idealized—that is, they are false, but they must 
be false in the right way.  What is “false in the right way”, though?  There are, I think, 
two primary norms.  First, they must be simple in such a way that they can be utilized 
easily in this process of producing further observations.  Second, they must somehow 
reflect the physical situation, in such a way that deviations between what they predict 
and actual observations actually have some kind of physical significance.   
 Here is an example of how the first norm played into the development of 
PREM.  In the mid-1970’s, there were several teams of geophysicists working on 
different earth models towards the development of the standard reference model.  One 
such model was a “parametrically simple earth model” (Dziewonski, Hales and 
Lapwood 1975).  This spherically symmetric model represented the mechanical 
properties of the interior of the earth in terms of a piecewise continuous function, 
where most of the pieces were low-order polynomials.  There is, of course, no reason 
to think that the mechanical properties of the earth are truly distributed in accordance 
with low-order polynomial functions.  There are, however, advantages to this kind of 
representation.  For example, the “travel times of body waves and their derivatives 
would always vary smoothly as a function of distance on a particular branch of a 
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travel time curve.”  (Dziewonski, Lapwood, and Hales 1975, 12)  As I mentioned 
above, one-dimensional reference models are often used for the construction of three-
dimensional earth models using travel time residuals as observations.  A model in 
which the predicted travel times varied smoothly as a function of distance would be 
easier to compute residuals for.  This would not only be useful for the construction of 
three-dimensional models, but also for other investigations that require the use of 
travel time residuals, such as the location of seismic sources.  Ultimately, the 
representation of large sections of the interior of the earth in terms of low-order 
polynomials was adopted into PREM (Dziewonski and Anderson 1981) as well.   
 The other norm is, I think, more complicated.  Reference models must be 
false, but they must be false in a physically meaningful way.  Often, what this means 
is that reference models will not be the best fit model empirically.  One of the 
geophysicists involved in the construction of PREM, Adam Dziewonski, discusses 
this consideration in a later paper which considers the possibility of constructing a 
new reference model:   
 
A reference model, in a modern sense, is one which satisfies more than just 
one class of seismological or geophysical observations—like, for instance, 
travel times of body waves.  It should constitute a common basis of reference 
for all the different studies concerning the earth.  […]  This strategy seeks a 
model which has to be physically meaningful—as opposed to an empirical 
one, which could achieve good results at reproducing a narrow range of 
observations rather than explaining them.  (Morelli and Dziewonski 1993, 
179) 
 
What is meant here by “physically meaningful” is that deviations from what the 
model predicts and what actual observations show give us useful information about 
the interior of the earth.   
Exactly what “physically meaningful” means could depend on the specific 
ways in which the reference model is being used.  For example, if the reference model 
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is used in the construction of three-dimensional models of the earth, it would ideally 
correspond to the lowest order term in a spherical harmonic expansion of the normal 
modes of the earth.  Deviations from such a model would contain information about 
higher-order modes that would be indicative of finer three-dimensional structure.  
However, if a reference model is going to be used for many different purposes, a more 
general notion of “physically meaningful” might have to be used.  This is a 
complicated matter, on which further work needs to be done.  Here, however, I would 
like to point out the connections between the use of reference models and some recent 
work on scientific methodology.   
 
5.  Turning Data into Evidence 
 In this final section, I want to discuss connections between the way in which 
reference models are used in geophysics with some recent work on scientific 
inference by George Smith (2002)
5
 and William Harper (2011).  Both Smith and 
Harper have done extensive work on Newton, and they both emphasize the role of 
Newton’s Fourth Rule for Philosophizing in Newton’s methodology:   
 
In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by 
induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true 
notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make 
such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions.   
(Newton 1999, 796) 
 
The Fourth Rule of Reasoning says two things: that we should rule out hypotheses in 
favor of propositions that are gathered from phenomena, and that we should 
provisionally take such propositions to be either exactly or very nearly true. Smith 
                                                        
5
 George Smith has, himself, written on earth models (Smith 2007), including PREM, 
although his focus is on the period in geophysics before the construction of PREM, 
and not on the uses of PREM and other reference models.   
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(2002) argues that Newton’s methodology involves taking such propositions gathered 
from phenomena to be provisionally true so that deviations between what you would 
expect the phenomena to be like, given that the propositions are true, and what the 
phenomena are actually observed to be like, can be found.  These deviations are then 
taken to be new phenomena that require explanation.  Both Smith and Harper refer to 
this process as “turning data into evidence”.  They both reject a simple hypothetico-
deductive picture where there is a hypothesis, and this hypothesis is supported (or 
rejected) by data.  Instead, certain propositions are needed in order to extract 
phenomena from raw data—to “turn data into evidence”.
6
 
 The parallel with the use of reference models is obvious.  Reference models 
play the role of propositions gathered from phenomena.  Expected observations for 
these reference models are calculated as if the reference models were true, and then 
deviations between these expected observations and actual observations are either 
taken to be indicative of further causal factors, or these deviations are used to try to 
measure further parameters that are not captured in these models.  Reference models 
are being used, in other words, to turn data into evidence.  “Turning data into 
evidence” is another term for what I have been calling active de-idealization.   
  If this is, indeed, an accurate picture of a significant way in which science is 
done, then it might be useful to think about the norms that govern this methodology.  
If one of the aims of building models—or, more generally, theorizing—is to enable 
active de-idealization, then we might expect the norms that are required here to be 
different from those that would govern a more standard picture where models or 
theories are constructed without active de-idealization in mind.  For example, there 
might be a norm for simplicity that is driven less by notions about the connection 
                                                        
6
 See Miyake 2013 for a more detailed discussion.   
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between simplicity and truth, or by simple tractability considerations, and more by the 
fact that models that are simpler in certain ways can more easily be put to use in 
producing further observations.  There might also be a fairly complicated norm for 
“physical meaningfulness”—one that requires a model to yield deviations that would 
tell us something about a system or phenomenon of interest.   
 Now, one notable difference between Newton and earth modelers is that earth 
modelers already have fairly good ideas about what “physical meaningfulness” 
amounts to when building earth models, although they might not, by any means, have 
a complete picture.  On the other hand, the whole difficulty for Newton was coming 
up with a background theory that would allow him to differentiate between what is 
“physically meaningful” and what is not.  Thus, one might think that what I have to 
say here about reference models does not easily apply to the case of Newton.  On the 
contrary, however, I believe a detailed examination of the use of reference models 
could, itself, be a useful reference against which to compare the difficulties faced by 
Newton and others in various important episodes in the history of science.   
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Abstract
Philosophers argue that scientific discovery is far from be-
ing a rule-following procedure with a general logic: More
likely it incorporates creativity and autonomy of the scientist,
and probably luck. Others think that discovery can be au-
tomatized by some computational process. Based on a con-
crete example of Schmidt and Lipson Schmidt and Lipson
(2009), I argue that the bottom-up discovery is computable
and that both aspects of creativity and autonomy can be in-
corporated. The bio-inspired evolutionary computation (ge-
netic algorithms) are the most promising tool in this respect.
The paper tackles the epistemology of applying a evolution-
ary computational and genetic algorithms, to the process of
discovering laws of nature, invariants or symmetries from
collections of data. Here i focus on more general aspects of
the epistemology of evolutionary computation when applied
to knowledge discovery. These two topics: computational
techniques applied in science and scientific discovery taken
separately are both controversial enough to raise suspicions
in philosophy of science. The majority of philosophers of sci-
ence would look with a jaundiced eye to both and ask whether
there is anything new to say about discovery and computers
in science. This paper is a first stab to the philosophical rich-
ness of computational techniques applied to the context of
discovery. I discuss the prospect of using this type of com-
putation to discover laws of nature, invariants or symmetries
and appraise their role in future scientific discoveries.
Is scientific discovery an algorithmic
process?
I argue in this paper for a deeper connection between bio-
inspired computation and the process of scientific discovery.
Based on new concrete results of Schmidt and Lipson 2009, I
infer here some epistemological consequences for using evo-
lutionary computation in scientific discovery.
Knowledge is central to virtually all advanced forms of life;
discovery and learning characterize us as a species as well as
other higher order animals. We discover in order to survive
and adapt. Science is just another specific form of knowl-
edge in which data and experiments play a fundamental role
in conjecturing hypotheses about the world. If discovery is
probably intrinsically linked to our evolution as a whole, sci-
entific discovery played a central role only in the evolution
of humanity in the last four centuries or so (a good turning
point is the work of Francis Bacon and its influence during
the “Scientific Revolution”).
How do we infer laws and generalizations from data? How do
we discover new models and theories? Are creativity and au-
tonomy of scientists major cognitive faculties that define and
shape science, or, on the contrary, is scientific discovery just
a process of following rules, methods and algorithms? The
nature of scientific discovery, together with, arguably, artis-
tic creativity, moral decision making and religious experience
are among those faculties that define us as humans better than
anything else.
These fundamental questions about the nature of scientific
discovery are germane to the discussion of artificial scien-
tific discovery. As I link the process of discovery to human
life as a species, it is germane to investigate philosophically
the paths to an artificial process of scientific discovery. Can
we create machines that would perform activities deemed by
many as “human-only”?
The broader scope of this paper is to investigate the possi-
bility of a cooperation between the human scientist and the
artificial discoverer. I based my argument on a specific
Two approaches to scientific discovery
For the purpose of this paper, the scientific endeavor can be
divided between the context of discovery and the context of
justification. The distinction can be traced to H. Reichen-
bach’s early works but it is very clearly expressed in Reichen-
bach (1949). After introducing the infamous distinction, Re-
ichenbach discussed the reliability of a logic and epistemol-
ogy of discovery. Epistemology is a rational reconstruction
of a thought process. In a common interpretation, there is
no epistemology of discovery, which is basically a subjec-
tive and irrational process: P. Duhem, E. Mach, K. Popper,
R. Carnap, C. Hempel, or R. Brainwaite for different reasons
deemed discovery as irrelevant when compared to the context
of justification. The iconoclastic view of scientific discovery
as a “happy guess” or “mystic presentiment” is discussed in
Koestler (1959). In a different key, M. Curd and Th. Nickles
interpreted Reichenbach’s discovery-justification distinction
as not excluding an epistemology of discovery. There is an
epistemology of discovery, with or without a logic of discov-
ery. So epistemology is much a broader area than logic in this
specific framework.
For both these contexts it is relevant to ask this question: is
science based on deductive logic, induction or on heuristics?
A similar question can be asked about the nature of discovery:
is scientific discovery algorithmic, nearly algorithmic or, on
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the contrary, is it non-discursive, not re-constructible, non-
reproducible, singular, a “Eureka”-like mental episode? Is
discovery merely a psychological process with no epistemo-
logical significance (when compared to the process of justifi-
cation, for example)?
There are perhaps two main programs in the philosophy of
scientific discovery. First, there is a strong program aiming
to formulate a general logic for scientific discovery, to en-
compass all scientific discoveries under one formalism Simon
(1973); Hanson (1958). The connection proposed by Lan-
gley, Simon, Bradshaw and Zytkow (Langley et al., 1987)
between discovery and the heuristic search procedure falls
under this strong program. But this strong program felt in
disgrace for several reasons and was replaced with a weaker
program that gives up the idea of a formal and general logic
of scientific discovery and tackles the epistemological as-
pects of particular discoveries Nickles (1980b,a); Meheus and
Nickles (2009).1 Here epistemology can be both descriptive
and normative and more attention is paid to non-formal and
non-logical epistemological aspects of discovery: heuristics,
search, risky generalizations, etc. This weak program is more
sensitive to the specific conditions of the discovery and of the
specific nature of the discoverer. One can ask two questions:
(1) How do individual scientists, with
their limited cognitive faculty, discover
new scientific theories? By following a
set of rules or by sheer creativity?
(2) How new theories can be discovered
by scientists aided by computers, by Arti-
ficial Intelligence systems, or any system
other than individual scientists?
The descriptive epistemology of scientific discovery can an-
swer (1) by a careful analysis carried within history of sci-
ence. Here the discoverer is an individual—the lone genius
of Kant, or any scientist experiencing the “Eureka” moment
of discovery. We face here a “dilemma of explanation” if we
have a theory about scientific discovery as algorithmic Nick-
les (1980b); Wartofsky (1980):
(3) DILEMMA OF ALGORITHMIC EX-
PLANATION: The dilemma is then: ei-
ther the theory succeeds, and the concept
of discovery is explained away, or re-
ductively eliminated—or the theory fails,
and discovery remains unexplained.
I emphasize here the novelty of question (2). First, it does
not have a complete answer in the history of science, because
the computer-aided scientific discovery or discoveries made
by large teams of scientists have a shorter history–when com-
pared to scientific discoveries made by individuals. When the
discoverer is a collaborative team, a whole scientific commu-
nities, a team working with computers, or a set of computa-
tional processes, or all these working together, rationality and
creativity may well have radically opposite meanings. The
answer to (1) does not entail an answer to (2), and vice-versa.
Communities, computers or other entities may discover sci-
entific laws, patterns, or theories by an altogether different
mechanism than human scientists do, with or without explain-
ing away creativity.
This paper aims to answer (2) and show in what sense there is
“a third way” in Wartofsky’s dilemma (3). The way in which
1For reasons why the strong program failed, see Curd (1980);
Laudan (1980).
computers and artificial intelligence are used in science may
elucidate the normative part of this epistemological approach,
but we do not need to equate computational techniques with
rational agents, machines, number crunching devices, etc. I
do not identify rationality with logic, irrationality with cre-
ativity, or machines with logic and creativity with humans
only. When used in the scientific discovery, the computa-
tional technique comprehends several elements such as: cre-
ativity, rule-following procedures, logic etc. I think there is
something interesting for philosophers to study about discov-
ery and about computation, taken separately or when compu-
tation is directly applied to scientific discovery.
The skeptic against computers used in areas in which human
knowledge reigns may raise important questions: Are cur-
rent computational techniques versatile enough to reproduce,
and eventually enhance, the process of scientific discovery?
If so, which type of computation is the most promising? And
moreover, is this process going to slowly replace humans with
machines, even in the process of discover? I reckon that all
these questions are attractive from a philosophy of science
point of view. It is even more contentious whether a computa-
tional process can discover solutions to problems that humans
(alone) cannot discover.
In focusing on the epistemology of scientific discovery and
the possibility of its algorithmic reconstruction, the current
approach is more local and partial: I focus on a specific
bottom-up approach to discovery: inferring invariants and
laws of nature from large sets of data, and on a specific type
of computation: the evolutionary computation implemented
by genetic algorithms.
The philosophy of computation in science follows the debates
on the relation between data, phenomena, models and theo-
ries. For the purpose of my analysis, two contexts of compu-
tational science are relevant, both inspired by recent discus-
sions on applying science/applied science Morrison (2006);
Bod (2006); Boon (2006). (a) The computational technique
starts from a scientific theory and move towards the data: here
computation is the application of a theory or a “top-down”
approach. Or (b), computation is a heuristic tool that starts
from data and builds a theory in a “bottom-up” approach.
Each of these two approaches may have their own specific
computational turns: computational techniques used in one
may or may not be as revolutionary as they seem in the other.
Differentiating these two contexts may help the philosopher
argue for the novelty of the epistemological aspects of (b)
when compared to (a).
Evolutionary Computation and the
Bottom-up Approach to Theory-building
On different occasions, philosophers and scientists alike
pointed out to a major difference among two types of sci-
entific reasoning (Th. Kuhn, L. Laudan, among others). On
one hand, one has the rule-based reasoning in which new the-
ories or models are inferred from a set of rules. The system
of abstract rules is used to solve problems. The rules in gen-
eral are content-neutral and in the ideal situation they can be
applied to virtually any new set of data. On the other hand,
one witnesses case-based reasoning in science. Th. Kuhn
and K. Popper asked incessantly: is science applied by fol-
lowing rules? Exemplars are solutions to previous problems
that scientist learn during their scientific education and solve
future puzzles based on an “acquired similarity”Kuhn (1962).
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -478-
Scientists try to make a new phenomenon fit to one or more
previous phenomena.
A relevant step forward is to show that neither science, nor
computation can be reduced to a succession of rule-following
procedures. If we restrict computers to rule-following, then
there is little chance, if any, that computational techniques
can be useful in scientific discovery. Some philosophers
of science have analyzed computation as heuristics device
in the discovery of new theories. Here concrete results are
less notable than in (a). Computer scientists try to use al-
gorithms to discover laws of nature, invariants or patterns in
data at least since the 1970s: the most known are the pack-
ages DENTRAL, EURISKO, GLAUBER, STAHL and BACON
Simon et al. (1981); Mitchell (1997); Waltz and Buchanan
(2009). They are designed for a theory-building procedure,
when the scientists have little or no idea about how the theory
is supposed to look like Keller (2003); Galison (1996); Lang-
ley (1979); Barberousse et al. (2007); Pennock (2000, 2007).
There is a similarity between the Case-Based reasoning sug-
gested by Kuhn and similar AI techniques used in problem-
solving Bod (2006). A case-based procedure always retrieves
cases whose problem is similar to the problem being solved.
The procedure discussed is data-oriented as opposed to rule-
based processing. Computers mimic frequently the process
of learning, which is not completely based on rules. Accord-
ing to Bod, data-oriented procedures in computers are similar
to the way scientists explain new phenomena “by maximiz-
ing derivational similarity between the new phenomenon and
previously derived phenomena” Bod (2006).
Therefore, neither scientists nor computers follow strict rules,
but reuse previous results in order to solve new problems. For
Bod, previous patterns of derivations are learned and accu-
mulated, not phenomena in themselves. Rules are always
present, but they are complemented with corrections, nor-
malizations, exemplars derivations, adjustments, all stored
and reused from previous cases. In context (b), in the data-
oriented discovery process, something else is needed than
rule-following procesures. This takes us a step towards an-
swering (1) and solving dilemma (3). As P. Langley et al.,
P. Thagard (1998) and L. Darden (1998) have argued, bring-
ing in computation into the discussion on scientific discovery
should majorly boost philosopher’s interest in discovery. But,
as my argument goes, the nature of computation plays a cen-
tral role in dismissing (3) as a false dilemma and answering
(2). I show that once we move to a new type of computation,
(3) is based on some false assumptions if we give up the very
restrictive concept of algorithm and adopt a general concept
of computation.
Based on the concrete case study (Schmidt and Lipson, 2009),
I show in what sense creativity and rationality can in fact
go hand in hand in the case of genetic algorithms applied
to scientific discovery. The answer lies in the artificial life
metaphor used by Schmidt and Lipson. Computational re-
sults in this context are still rare, but as my argument goes,
this case cuts deeper into the computational epistemology.
More concretely, in the following two sections I address these
questions:
(4) What are the epistemological conse-
quences of using evolutionary computa-
tion in scientific discovery?
(5) Is evolutionary computation the ap-
propriate type of computation for the
process of discovery?
Evolutionary Computation
Roughly speaking, computer algorithms were born based on
three distinct analogies: algorithms as “formal proofs”, algo-
rithms as “learning processes” and algorithms as “searching
procedures for optimality”. The latter inspired the area of
evolutionary computation, as the paradigm for optimality is
an organism optimally adapted to its environment.
How is “search” related to “life”? In the 1930s, S. Wright
(1932) interpreted a biological species as a system that
evolves in time by exploring a multi-peaked landscape heuris-
tic of optimal solutions to a “fitness problem” . The operation
of optimization of search which is typically performed by an
algorithm can mimic a living organism that over a long pe-
riod of evolution fits the environment. On the other hand the
process of adaptation and evolution is not smooth.
Organisms are subjected to random mutations, too. Taken
the biomimetic strategy on step forward: Is it a good idea
to add randomness to algorithms? There are several types
of stochastic algorithms each of them being more or less
biomimetic in their nature. Biomimetic strategies are widely
used in robotics and artificial intelligence, but they are almost
ignored by philosophers.2 Are they useful when applied to
scientific discovery?
After a serendipitous proposal by A. Turing in the early
1950s, Evolutionary Computation (EC) was rediscovered and
reinvented at least ten times before the 1980s (Fogel, 1998).
The milestone is J. Holland’s work (1975). Following Tur-
ing and von Neumann, Holland was able to see the potential
of using the knowledge on natural adaptation process to im-
proving search techniques and applied the principles of nat-
ural selection directly to problem-solving algorithms. One
fundamental difference, not available in Turing’s time, is that
selection occurs better at the level of population, not at the
level of individuals.
The elements of a genetic algorithm
Genetic algorithms are iterative procedures of searching for
the optimal solution to a problem P. They are based on the
metaphor of biological processes in which organisms: (a)
non-consciously adapt to the “environment” P and (b) are
selected by a supraindividual mechanism such as selection.3
The question is whether we can generate algorithms in the
same way organisms are created through evolution.
Genetic algorithms start from a given number of initial indi-
viduals randomly distributed in a given space, called the ini-
tial population. The genetic algorithm transforms individuals,
each with an associated value of fitness, into a new generation
by using the principles of survival-of-the-fittest, reproduction
of the fittest and sexual recombination and mutation. Sim-
ilar to Wright’s landscape, the genetic algorithm finds “the
most suitable” or the “best so far” solution to the problem by
breeding individuals over a number of generations.
The procedure can be stopped by a termination condition:
when the sought-for level of optimality is reached or when all
2On the concept of biomimetics, see Srensen (2004); Muntean
and Wright (2007).
3I take here algorithms as abstract, mathematical objects,
whereas programs as their concrete instantiation on a machine.
A sensitive difference is between genetic algorithms, genetic pro-
gramming and genetic strategies. See Jong (2006).
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the solutions converge to one candidate. The fitness function
estimates the fitness to breeding of individuals in accordance
with the principle of survival and reproduction of the fittest:
• Better individuals are more likely to be selected than infe-
rior individuals.
• Reselection is allowed.
• Selection is stochastic.
The genetic algorithm ends with a termination condition that
can be the satisfying of a success predicate or completing a
maximum number of steps. The success predicate depends on
the user’s choice and can be deemed as a pragmatic criterion.
The winner is designated at the “best-so-far” individual as the
result of the run.
Here is an abstract implementation of a genetic algorithm:
[1] produce an initial population of
individuals
[2] WHILE `termination’ not met do
[3] evaluate the fitness of all
individuals
[4] select fitter individuals for
reproduction
[5] produce new individuals
[6] generate a new population by
inserting some new
good individuals and
by discarding some
‘bad’ individuals
[7] mutate some individuals
[8] ENDWHILE
[9] Call the individual(s) which satisfy
the ‘termination’ condition
the ‘‘best-fit-so-far’’
Case study: (Schmidt and Lipson, 2009):
Distilling laws and invariants
To show that “algorithmic explanation” and “creativity” are
not mutually exclusive in (3), I use as an example of compu-
tation applied directly to science the result reported in Nature
(Schmidt and Lipson, 2009). M. Schmidt and H. Lipson have
showed how symbolic regression based on evolutionary pro-
gramming can be used in discovering natural, non-trivial and
meaningful invariants in physics.4 Their algorithm searches
over the infinite possible ways of modeling data to find the
best and most useful expression available given (i) a set of
data; (ii) a termination condition and (iii) a set of evolutionary
path. It starts with a set of individuals which can be equations,
models and scientific heuristic methods of search—not nec-
essary mathematical objects. Each individual is tested against
a bank of experimental data. Many individuals do not make
4The package is EUREQA, a software based on evolutionary
algorithms Lab (2009).
Figure 1: The Pareto front with two “cliffs”.(Schmidt and
Lipson, 2009, supplementary online materials)
sense mathematically or do not meet some consistency crite-
ria, so they are discharged. Some may fit the data better than
others. The software saves these individuals for “breeding”,
cross-combining a ‘father’ with a ‘mother’. It is claimed that
over hundreds of thousands of generations, some extremely
fit individuals emerge.
Schmidt and Lipson approached scientific discovery as be-
ing data-driven. They started from a set of measured, un-
interpreted set of data representing the position, velocity and
acceleration of a lab experiment or a virtual system (gener-
ated by another algorithm). The method used, the “symbolic
regression”, is not new at all, but here the program searches
for both the form and the parameters of an equation that
model a given set of experimental data. They have discovered
not only analytic functions from empirical data, but structures
which are highly relevant to physical sciences: Hamiltonians,
Lagrangians, laws of conservation, symmetries, and other in-
variants.
Schmidt and Lipson adopted the balance between two objec-
tives: the predictive power and the complexity/parsimony of
each candidate. By calculating the “Pareto front” of the de-
pendence predictive ability versus parsimony, Schmidt& Lip-
son found that there are two cliffs where predictive ability
jumps rapidly at some relatively small increase in complex-
ity.
The Epistemology of Discovery with
Evolutionary Algorithms: Risks and
Advantages
One knee-jerk reaction to applying computation to science
is: what is so philosophical about (yet) another tool used by
scientists? Although we are nowhere near an “end of com-
putation”, the philosopher would not directly infer from its
success, its epistemological relevance. Many scientific tools
are successful in science, but philosophically inept, and vice
versa. Although not yet successful, I claim that this case
study is worth of a philosophical scrutiny as it sheds some
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light on some concepts such as: creativity, rule-following,
knowledge production, etc. The procedure addresses some
very general epistemological issues of scientific discovery.
The knowledge-production in this case study uncovers inter-
esting aspects of the scientific discovery. I frame the follow-
ing epistemic “aspects” both as problems and as novel fea-
tures of the scientific discovery based on evolutionary algo-
rithms. The direct application of evolutionary computation
to scientific discovery shows how productive bio-inspired al-
gorithms can be. The most attractive feature of evolutionary
computation is its ability to “explore” the logical space of so-
lutions, even those which remains unconceived to the mind
of the scientist. But the whole process is not totally automa-
tized and the algorithm is not fully autonomous. The human
scientist imposes her own meta-rules on the algorithm. On
the other hand, because every solution is a model better or
worse adapted to data, the bio-mimetic aspect of this exam-
ple is clear: scientific models adapt to the data and create
populations of solutions such that each individual contributes
to the adaptation function of the population. After running
the algorithm as suggested by Schmidt and Lipson, the sci-
entist is able to explore the “tip of the iceberg”, i.e. the best
adapted in so far individual from a multitude of previous gen-
erations of solutions. The unconceived alternative models, al-
though not direcly present in the final solution did influence it
if they were part of the intermediate generations of solutions.
I relay the epistemological aspects of the genetic algorithms
used in scientific discovery to the various aspects of artifi-
cial life. A stronger connection, not endorsed here, would
connect knowledge in general to evolution, the are being the
evolutionary epistemology. The main part of my argument
is that the face of scientific discovery “as we know it” may
change radically once evolutionary computation is involved
in the process of discovery. I list here several aspects of this
“upward epistemology” that is still nascent but very enticing
philosophically.
Stochasticity versus scrutability of solutions
Genetic algorithms can be stochastic or not, depending on
the mutation operator occurring in step (7) or by selecting
the individuals for reproduction in step (5) (in Table 1). An
algorithm becomes deterministic if exactly one parent is iden-
tically reproduced or if two parents are combined without
adding or losing information based solely on their fitness.
Genetic algorithms are stochastic in two major respects: both
the operation of selection and reproduction are random. That
means the results (offspring) are not direct results of the input
data (the parents).
The crossover operator takes two individuals, the parents,
and produces two new individuals, the offspring, by swap-
ping substrings of the parents. Randomly choosing two par-
ents to mate or randomly deleting or adding information from
the parents will make the algorithm stochastic. Mutation is
a background redistribution of strings to prevent premature
convergence to local optima.
Weak individuals may survive “by luck” and fit individuals
may not be drawn to reproduce. The advantage of a random
mutation is that at least some populations, ideally a few only,
could escape the traps which deterministic methods may be
captured by, and end up with an unexpected and novel result.
For very complex problems, this biomimetic procedure can
output results which are definitely not accessible to determin-
istic algorithms if a delicate balance between the mechanism
of selection that decrease variation and those that increase
variation (mutation) has been achieved.
Because the scientist can control this mutation operator and
its frequency, the output of such a discovery algorithm is not
traceable by humans. At the limit, the solution of such an
algorithm may be inscrutable to humans. It is also the case
that for any run, because of the stochastic element, the best
individuals are not guaranteed to be selected, and the worst
are not eliminated. One can say that the algorithm favors the
best and marginalizes the unfit. The selection is not entirely
“greedy” in the search space. We do not need to associate cre-
ativity to such a random process. As I show before, human
element is not totally eliminated in this case. The creativity
is blind in this case, similar to mutation in biological popula-
tions.
Rules, laws and metarules
The evolutionary algorithms do not follow a set of rules in
respect of the discovery of new laws or invariants. As the case
study suggests, the process of discovery is here ruled by the
metarules of evolution as well as the method used to decide
about the fitness function and the termination condition.
For simple laws and invariants, genetic algorithms are easily
outrun but Turing machines. But given the complexity of cur-
rent science, deterministic algorithms may well be worn out
as aiding tools to optimality. Although this may sound specu-
lative, let us assume that science evolved toward increasingly
complex representations. Maybe the good-old-days of sim-
ple, beautiful laws of nature are gone. What if were not going
to encounter beautiful laws such as:
F = ma; F = k
m1m2
r2
; E = mc
2
; Rij−
1
2
gijR = 8piGTij
anywhere down the road? For the time being, weve been
lucky enough that our best laws of nature could have been fit
on a “T-shirt”, as it were. How do we discover more and more
complex laws of nature? We are limited by conceivability
and our limited resources to recognize patterns and regular-
ities may become overtaken by the increasingly complex set
of data. Time in which we could deduct laws from phenom-
ena without any epistemic extenders may be over. More and
more complex data are collected. Cosmologists, neuroscien-
tists, sociologists, political scientists do not have the luxury
to infer their laws from laws as simple as Newton’s or Ein-
stein’s. What if, from now on, the would-be laws of nature
wont fit even a football banner? We need to brace up for
more and more complex scientific representations...
Social science, biology, suggest that we may want to drop
completely the ideal of laws of nature in their simplest and
purest form. In some historical cases, pre-existing theories
and the accompanying mathematics were not “already there”
when a major discovery in science occurred: contrast this
with the received view on the “unreasonable effectiveness of
mathematics”. We may even need to reconsider the concept
of universal laws of nature, existing independent of the way
we collect and simulate data.
Now, here is a brighter perspective. Even if the good old
days are bygone, there are new ways of coping with increas-
ing complexity in the form of invariants, regularities, laws
of nature and alike. Distributive knowledge in science is
a tempting idea. Science made by communities of scien-
tists, labs, research programs may steadily replace science
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made by individuals. The other possible path suggested by
Humphreys is a collaborative work between computers and
humans. Maybe we have to face the fact that science is get-
ting closer to the limits of our knowledge, we as limited in-
dividual brains. Philosophically put, science is getting closer
to the conceivability limit of possibilities.
Triviality versus meaningless
In Schmidt and Lipson’s approach, there is a problem of triv-
iality and meaninglessness of solutions. For almost any set of
empirical data there are uncountable invariants or conserved
quantities, some of them being trivial, some being meaning-
less. The main task in this case is to find a non-trivial in-
variant of the system that also can be interpreted as having
a meaning. Schmidt and Lipson proposed a criterion based
on decomposability: the candidate equations should predict
connections between dynamics of the subcomponents of the
system. This is done by pairing the variables and looking
for natural behaviors of parts of the system. More precisely,
the conservation equations should be able to predict connec-
tions among derivatives of groups of variables over time, re-
lations that we can also readily calculate from new experi-
mental data. Ultimately, their procedure was able to infer the
optimal form of the double pendulum Hamiltonian by avoid-
ing trivial and meaningless solutions. Schmidt and Lipson in-
cluded a human decision maker in their algorithm who stops
the search process at certain time and imposes the constraints
of the symbolic regression such as: “naturalness”, “interest-
ingness” or “meaningfulness”.
Interpretation versus understanding
Bootstrapping can also be used to infer laws for more com-
plex systems. Results about simpler systems can be used to
infer equations for more complex systems. From a statisti-
cal analysis, Schmidt and Lipson inferred that terms that are
frequently used and are more complex have also meaning.
For example, trigonometric terms represent potential energy,
squared velocities are associated to kinetic energy. The main
claim of Schmidt and Lipson is that these terms are ready for
a human interpretation:
These terms may make up an ‘emergent alphabet’
for describing a range of systems, which could accel-
erate their modeling and simplify their conceptual un-
derstanding. [. . . ] The concise analytical expressions
that we found are amenable to human interpretation and
help to reveal the physics underlying the observed phe-
nomenon. Many applications exist for this approach,
in fields ranging from systems biology to cosmology,
where theoretical gaps exist despite abundance in data.
Might this process diminish the role of future sci-
entists? Quite the contrary: Scientists may use pro-
cesses such as this to help focus on interesting phenom-
ena more rapidly and to interpret their meaning Schmidt
and Lipson (2009).
The outcome of such an algorithm can help in the future with
understanding scientific results which are not strictly speak-
ing discovered by humans. The operation of distilling laws
from data does more than generating symbols, be them com-
plex expressions of conserved quantities or equations. Sim-
ilar to numerical simulations, “the results are not automati-
cally reliable” and more effort and human expertise is needed
to decide what results are reliable and which are not (Wins-
berg, 2009). But in this case the computation is more than a
tool or a technique because it makes the results intelligible to
the human scientist and the question whether the method can
be truly creative is up for grabs.
Path dependency versus global solutions
Genetic algorithms compensate some of their drawbacks by
their effectiveness in global search. Remember that they
maintain a population of solutions which are constantly up-
dated with fitter new individuals and hence avoid local op-
tima. For a certain complexity of the search space, a ge-
netic algorithm has a better chance to find the global opti-
mum. This changes radically the epistemological aspects of
genetic algorithms. They are very efficient in solving “hard
problems” where little or nothing is known about the sought-
for structure and when discovering new structures trumps the
process of evaluating existing knowledge.
The case study underscores well this problem of any evo-
lutionary computation: its path dependence. Even the non-
trivial and meaningful solutions are not unique! The proce-
dure does not produce a single set of solutions, but a set of
candidates for the analytical solutions. It is known that any
complex problem has a number of local maxima in the land-
scape of solutions with different fitness values. At different
runs of the simulations, different populations can converge to
different maxima. The human discoverer will always reach
only one solution, whereas a set of genetic algorithms run-
ning on the same initial population will end up with differ-
ent optimal solutions. This is a direct consequence of the
fact that similar to biological evolution, the process is non-
deterministic. As it was recently argued, this leads to a non-
modular functionality of the algorithms and hence to a lim-
ited understanding of the operations (Kuorikoski and Pyhnen,
2013). The only aspect which is etymologically accessible to
the scientist is comparing results and deciding the best fit. But
the way we achieved that results is inscrutable to the scientist.
Previous generations and the evolution itself is in many cases
too complicated to follow or alternatively, too stochastic to
constitute a justification per se. As we cannot trace the proof
of the algorithm and replicate it, this is in direct analogy with
the way we can run the tape of life and every time a different
rational agent will emerge as the “better-to-fit”. The princi-
ples of recombination, selection, and mutation are basically
“operators” in the algorithm to generate new individuals.
Turing versus non-Turing; abstraction versus implementation
This aspect is more speculative and reflects a general attitude
towards computation in general. Why is evolutionary compu-
tation so special? Some theoretical results suggest that evolu-
tionary Turing machines may are more expressive than Tur-
ing machines—at an abstract level.5 The so-called “Turing
Evolutionary machine” is more expressible than an ordinary
Turing machine, and its output can converge to the output
of an universal Turing Machine. More importantly, the evo-
lutionary Turing machine can solve the TM-unsolvable halt-
ing problem using non-algorithmic means (Eberbach, 2005).
Generalizing computation to a non-Turing aradigm would
5I will follow here mainly Eberbach (2005). See also Pudlk
(2001).
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provide novel and unexpected epistemological results. Un-
like Turing machines, the theory of Evolutionary Turing Ma-
chines is relatively unknown to the philosophical community.
Eberbach has showed that evolutionary computation can be
non-algorithmic, can evolve non-recursive functions and that
an evolutionary Turing machine can solve the TM unsolv-
able halting problem of a UTM. “They are specific metaalgo-
rithms (i.e., algorithms operating on other algorithms) with
no restriction on their domain and some (rather historical)
restriction on evolutionary algorithms that they have to be
probabilistic, population-based, and using fitness function.”
Eberbach (2005). Practical implementations of evolutionary
computation are approximations of Turing machines and they
are heavily restricted to time and resources of concrete imple-
mentations.
Conclusion
With its “upward epistemology”, evolutionary computation
applied to discovery is a promising new tool for future sci-
entific projects. Evolutionary computation and genetic algo-
rithms in particular, anticipate the way scientific methodology
and knowledge may look in a couple of decades. And the
philosopher of science cannot wait for the foreseeable mo-
ment of the informational singularity when artificial intelli-
gence will compete with humans. My humble philosophical
prediction is that evolutionary computation, or some more
“evolved” offspring of it, will be there at the “singularity”
party - if there shall be any.
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Structural Chaos
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Abstract
Philosophers often distinguish between parameter error and model
error. Frigg et al. [2014] argue that the distinction is important because
although there are methods for making predictions given parameter
error and chaos, there are no methods for dealing with model error
and “structural chaos.” However, Frigg et al. [2014] neither define
“structural chaos” nor explain the relationship between it and chaos
(simpliciter). I propose a definition of “structural chaos”, and I explain
two new theorems that show that if a set of models contains a chaotic
function, then the set is structurally chaotic. Finally, I discuss the
relationship between my results and structural stability.
Climate scientists need at least two types of information to generate
forecasts: (1) data about the earth’s current climate and (2) a model that
describes how the climate changes over time. Thus, there are at least two
causes of inaccuracy in climate predictions. First, predictions might may be
inaccurate because current climatic conditions are mismeasured or misesti-
mated. Call this initial conditions error (ice). Alternatively, error may
arise from an inaccurate model of how the climate changes over time. Call
this structural model error (sme).1
The same remarks apply to predictions about any dynamical system.
If one is interested in predicting the evolution of an ecosystem over time
(e.g., how population levels of various organisms change), or the behavior
of markets (e.g. how prices of various commodities change), or how an
epidemic will spread through a city, etc., one needs to identify both the
initial conditions of the system and how the system changes over time. So
there are likewise at least two sources of error in all these problems.2
1This distinction is similar to Parker [2010]’s distinction between parameter and model
uncertainty.
2For a discussion of other sources of error in modeling, see Bradley [2012].
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In a recent paper, Frigg et al. [2014] argue that the distinction between
sme and ice is crucial for both scientific practice and policy-making. They
claim that, although there are methods that can generate accurate predic-
tions in the presence of both (i) ice and (ii) chaos, there are no known
methods for doing the same with respect to (i’) sme and (ii’) an analo-
gous notion of “structural chaos”, which they call the “hawk-moth” effect.3
For this reason, Frigg et al. [2014] argue that structural chaos and sme are
neglected, but important topics within philosophy of science.
Although they provide an illustrative example and ample computer sim-
ulations to suggest structural chaos might be widespread, Frigg et al. [2014]
do not define “structural chaos” or investigate its relationship to chaos (sim-
pliciter).4 This is important because there are many definitions of “chaos”,
and so there might be many analogous notions of “structural chaos.”5
Frigg et al. [2014]’s arguments, therefore, raises at least three important
questions for philosophers of science, applied mathematicians, and working
scientists. First, for each definition of “chaos”, what is the analogous concept
of structural chaos? Second, what are the relationships among the various
notions of chaos (simpliciter) and the analogous notions of structural chaos?
Finally, what are the implications of structural chaos for prediction, control,
and explanation?
This paper takes a preliminary step with respect to the first two ques-
tions. Section one describes some conditions that are used to define “chaos.”
I focus on topologically mixing systems, which are an important class of
chaotic ones.6 In section two, I define an analogous notion of “structural
mixing” that might be used to characterize structural chaos. I then prove
that, when a sufficiently rich collection of models contains a topologically
mixing function, then the collection is structurally mixing in my sense.
Section three explores the relationship between my results and other
3Similar arguments appear in [Parker, 2011].
4Frigg et al. [2014] do formally define what they call “closeness to goodness fit.” This
definition is analogous the the definition of sensitivity to initial conditions, which is gen-
erally considered to be a necessary but insufficient condition for chaos. See section one
below. At points, they implicitly suggest that structural instability might be the structural
analog to chaos. This suggestion is criticized in the section three.
5For discussions of definitions of chaos, see [Batterman, 1993] and [Werndl, 2009].
6According to Devaney et al. [1989]’s widely-cited definition, a system is chaotic if
it satisfies three conditions: (i) it is sensitive to initial conditions; (ii) it is topologically
transitive, and (iii) its periodic points are dense in state space. Topological mixing systems
are topologically transitive, and under very general conditions, they are also sensitive to
initial conditions. Thus, they satisfy two of the three properties that are widely used to
define “chaos.”
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potential characterizations of structural chaos. In particular, I argue that
definitions of “structural instability”, which are often informally motivated
in ways analogous to definitions of chaos, are not clearly analogous to notions
of chaos simpliciter. The final section discusses the philosophical importance
of my results and answers to the above three questions.
1 Chaos
Popular writings often describe chaos via an appeal to Lorenz’s metaphor
of the “butterfly effect”. Lorenz famously asked whether the flapping of a
butterfly’s wings in Brazil could cause a thunderstorm in Texas. In general,
a chaotic system is often described as one in which small changes (e.g. a
butterfly flapping its wing) in the initial conditions of a system can create
large changes in its behavior (e.g., storm patterns).
This informal gloss captures only one aspect of standard definitions of
“chaos”, however. To give more precise characterizations, it is necessary
to introduce some definitions. A discrete-time dynamical system is a
triple 〈X, d, ϕ〉 where (i) 〈X, d〉 is a metric space called the state space,
and (ii) ϕ : X → X is a time-evolution function.7 For the remainder
of the paper, I use the phrases “model”, “dynamical function” and “time-
evolution function” interchangeably, though of course I recognize not all
models in science are time-evolution functions.
For example, a dynamical system might describe the motion of a parti-
cle in space. In this case, X is be three-dimensional space; d represents a
function specifying the distance between points in three-dimensional space,
and ϕ is a function describing how a particle moves over time. Or X might
be the set of vectors specifying the temperature, pressure, and wind veloc-
ities at different places in the atmosphere; d would represent how similar
two descriptions of the earth’s climate are, and ϕ would represent how the
climate changes over time.
How can one use the definition of a dynamical system to capture the
notion of sensitivity to initial conditions? Let ∆ be a number representing
a large distance between states. What counts as “large” can depend upon
the state space and one’s interests. Say a dynamical system’s behavior is
sensitive to initial conditions to degree ∆ if for every state x ∈ X and
every arbitrarily small distance ǫ > 0, there exists a state y within distance ǫ
of x and a natural number N such that d(ϕN (x), ϕN (y)) > ∆. Here, ϕN (x)
7Note that, for simplicity, I assume that the time evolution function ϕ is constant over
time. Not all discrete dynamical systems have this property.
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represents the state of the system after N stages if its initial conditions were
x. Informally, a system exhibits sensitivity to initial conditions if no matter
the true initial state x, there is an arbitrarily close state y such that, if y
had been the initial state, the future would have been radically different.
This mathematical definition is the natural way of capturing the above
informal description of chaos above, but there are many time-evolution func-
tions that are sensitive to initial conditions in the above sense and yet are
hardly “chaotic” in any sense of the word. Consider, for example, the func-
tion f(x) = 2x on the state space consisting of all real numbers. Then f is
sensitive to initial conditions because if two numbers x and y differ by even
the smallest amount, then the result of multiplying them by two repeatedly
will cause them to drift apart. That is, |fn(x)− fn(y)| = 2n|x− y| becomes
arbitrarily large as n grows. So f is sensitive to initial conditions, but f
does not exhibit “chaotic” behavior in the least.
What other conditions might one add in order to characterize “chaos”? It
turns out there is no wide agreement, and that several different definitions of
chaos are common.8 Because my aim is to show how three types of questions
might be answered (see above), I will not defend a particular analysis of
chaos. Rather, I will simply show how to answer the three questions with
respect to the concept of “topologically mixing”, which plays an important
in characterizing chaos (see footnote 5).
A time-evolution function ϕ is called topologically mixing if for any
pair of non-empty open sets U and V , there exists a number N > 1 such
that
ϕn(U) ∩ V 6= ∅.
for all n ≥ N . In order to reduce the amount of technical jargon, I will say
ϕ is chaotic if it is topologically mixing.
For the reader unfamiliar with topology, ignore the phrase “open set”
for now. Just think of U and V as representing sections of state space. If
the system begins in some state in U , then the expression ϕn(U) represents
all possible future states after n many steps of time. For example, suppose
the dynamical system describes the movement of a gas molecule in a room.
Further, assume that U represents the upper-left quarter of the room and
that V represents the lower-right hand corner. Then ϕn(U) represents the
8For what it’s worth, I agree with Werndl [2009] that the vast majority of systems that
are agreed to be chaotic are strongly mixing in the sense of ergodic theory. Moreover, I
agree with [Berkovitz et al., 2006] that, because strong mixing is one among several logi-
cally related concepts of probabilistic independence in the ergodic hierarchy, it is probably
most productive to think of chaos as coming in degrees, where different degrees may have
different implications for prediction, explanation, and control.
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possible positions of the gas molecule after n many units of time if the gas
particle started in the upper-left quarter of the room. The above equation
says that there is some time in the future such that, from that point onward,
there is always a position in the upper-left corner of the room (U) such that,
if the gas particle had started in that position, then it would end up in the
lower-right quarter of the room (V ). A time-evolution function is chaotic if
this holds for any regions of state space, which is to say that (in the example)
a gas particle that starts in one section of the room can end up in any other
section of the room after a sufficiently large period of time.
If topological mixing is taken to be a characteristic of chaotic systems,
would would it mean to say that smes can lead to “structural chaos”? This
is the topic of the next section.
2 Structural Chaos
A dynamical system is chaotic if, when the time-evolution function is held
fixed, similar initial conditions can have any future. Analogously, a set of
dynamics should be called “structural chaotic” if, when the initial conditions
are held fixed, similar time-evolution functions can produce any future. See
figure below. To rigorously define “structural chaos”, therefore, one needs a
metric to quantify how “close” two time-evolution functions are.
Let XX represent all time-evolution functions for a system with state
space X. Depending upon one’s interests, there are different appropriate
metric quantifying the distance between models (i.e. time-evolution func-
tions). However, clearly there is some relationship between (1) the distance
between two models and (2) the distances between their predicted future
states after one unit of time. If two models entail that a system, starting
in the same initial position, will be in radically different places in a short
amount of time, then the models are substantially different.
One demanding notion of closeness requires that two models are close
precisely if their values are always close. In other words, the distance be-
tween two time-evolution functions is the maximum/supremum distance be-
tween the models after one unit of time, where the maximum is taken over
all possible starting states. In symbols, define:
D(ϕ, ψ) = sup
x∈X
d(ϕ(x), ψ(x)).
Henceforth, I assume that D quantifies the distance between two time-
evolution functions, but the results below hold for a variety of metrics.
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“Structural mixing” should capture the idea that similar models can
produce different trajectories through the state space given the same initial
conditions. To make this idea rigorous, I introduce some notation. For any
ǫ > 0, let Bǫ(ϕ) denote all models within distance ǫ of ϕ. Next, for any
natural number n ∈ N and any point x ∈ X, define a map fx,n : P(X
X)→
P(X) as follows:
fx,n(Φ) = {ϕ
n(x) : ϕ ∈ Φ}
where P(X) is the power set of X, i.e., the set of all subsets of X. In other
words, fx,n maps a set of time-evolution functions to the set of points they
reach after n stages if they are initialized to start at x.
Given a set of time-evolution functions Φ ⊆ XX and a particular model
ϕ ∈ Φ, say that Φ is structurally mixing at ϕ if for all x ∈ X, all ǫ > 0
and all non-empty open sets V ⊆ X, there is some N ∈ N such that
fx,n(Bǫ(ϕ) ∩ Φ) ∩ V 6= ∅
for all n ≥ N . In other words, small differences between the estimated
model and the true one can lead to divergent predictions even if one correctly
identifies the initial condition. To reduce jargon, I sometimes say a set of
models is structurally chaotic at ϕ if it is structurally mixing.
Topological Mixing Structural Mixing
The concept of structural mixing is the obvious analog of the definition
of topological mixing in the previous section. Clearly, different definitions of
chaos will generalize to different definitions of structural chaos. Nonetheless,
this example suggests a new research program, which consists of three ques-
tions. First, for each definition of “chaotic system”, what is the analogous
6
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concept of structural chaos? Second, what is the relationship between the
various notions of chaos (simpliciter) and the analogous notions of structural
chaos? Finally, what are the implications of structural chaos for prediction,
control, and explanation?
Given my definition of structural chaos, the second question can be given
a precise answer:9
Theorem 1 Suppose ϕ is continuous and topologically mixing. If X has no
isolated points, then XX is structurally mixing at ϕ.
That is, the set of possible time-evolution functions is structurally chaotic
if it contains a chaotic model. One might object that this theorem is very
weak. According to the theorem, one should worry about structurally chaos
if every time-evolution function were a plausible description of the dynamics
of the system. However, in practice, the set of plausible models is much
narrower given existing data, domain knowledge, physical constraints, and
so on. For example, if it were 40◦C in Demascus today, then it would be
bizarre if it snowed tomorrow. However, one possible time-evolution function
for Demascus’ weather will entail that a 40◦C day will be followed by a
snowy day. Thus, one might object that if the class of models is restricted
to realistic time-evolution functions, then structural chaos will be rarer.
However, the proof of the above theorem actually shows something much
stronger. It shows that, if the true time-evolution function is chaotic and
the set of possible time-evolution functions contains all models that are
empirically indistinguishable from the true one, then structural chaos will
arise. To explain why, I introduce some definitions.
Data sets are always finite. So let F = {x0, . . . , xn} by a finite set of
states, which represents the observed history of the system so far. Let ǫ > 0
be a small number representing the precision of one’s measurement devices.
Say two models are ǫF -indistinguishable if (1) the values of time-evolution
functions are equal for all but finitely many states outside F and (2) the
two models are no more than ǫ apart according to D.
Two models are ǫF -indistinguishable if they are, in a very strong sense,
indistinguishable given all available empirical data. Why? The first clause
entails that the two models are equal on all observed data points, and so
there is no way that past data alone can distinguish between them. If two
models differ anywhere, however, then there are logically possible exper-
iments that can distinguish between them. Namely, if controlled experi-
ments are financially, pragmatically and ethically feasible (which they often
9See appendix for a proof.
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are not), one can initialize the system to one of the states at which the two
models differ and observe the results.
This is where the second clause kicks in. Suppose scientists’ measuring
instruments and statistical techniques cannot guarantee estimates of the
observed states with accuracy better than ǫ > 0. If two models are ǫF -
indistiguishable, then second clause guarantees that no information about
the current or next state of the system is sufficient to distinguish the models.
One might object that small measurement errors are detectable in the long
run, especially if the model is chaotic. However, if the true dynamics are
continuous and ǫ is sufficiently small, then the second clause entails that no
experiment of a feasible length (i.e. time) will distinguish between it and an
ǫF -indistinguishable model.
The previous discussion motivates the following definition. Let F denote
the finite set of observed states. Say a set Φ of time-evolution functions is
closed under empirical-indistinguishability if there exists some ǫ > 0
such that if ϕ ∈ Φ and ψ is ǫF -indistinguishable from ϕ, then ψ ∈ Φ. The
above argument is intended to show that, if scientists are strict empiricists,
then the set of models that they consider possible ought to be closed under
empirical indistinguishability. Theorem 1 is a special case of the following
stronger result.
Theorem 2 Suppose ϕ is continuous and chaotic. Let Φ be a set of time-
evolution functions containing ϕ. If X has no isolated points and Φ is closed
under empirical indistinguishability, then Φ is structurally chaotic at ϕ.
3 Structural Stability: Conclusions and Future Re-
search
Readers familiar with chaos theory may find the previous theorem surprising.
On one hand, my definition of “structural chaos” seems to formalize the
idea that small errors in identifying the model can lead to divergent future
behavior. On the other hand, many of the time-evolution functions that lead
to “structural chaos” (according to my definition) are structurally stable in
one or more senses.10 This is counter-intuitive because structural stability
10Suppose f : A → A and g : B → B are functions on topological spaces. Then f and
g are said to be topologically conjugate if there is a homeomorphism h : A→ B such that
g ◦ h = h ◦ f . A function f : A → A is Cr structurally stable if there is some ǫ > 0 such
that every function within distance ǫ of f in the Cr metric is topologically conjugate to f .
Cr structural stability is perhaps the most common definition, but other definitions have
a similar logical form, which is discussed in the body of the paper.
8
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -492-
is intended to formalize the idea that small changes to the model do not
result in large differences in the model’s trajectory.
It is best to begin with an example to understand the tension. A paradig-
matic chaotic function is the logistic map Fr(x) = rx(1 − x), where r is
greater than about 3.57. It is known that the logistic map is C2-structurally
stable when r > 4, and it is structurally stable on an open dense set of values
of r between 0 and 4. For this reason, some chaos theorists might claim that
small changes to the logistic map will not result in divergent future behavior.
However, the logistic map (for r = 4) is precisely the example that Frigg
et al. [2014] use to demonstrate the impacts of structural chaos. Moreover,
if Φ is a set of models that contains the logistic map and is closed under
empirical-indistinguishability, then Theorem 2 entails that Φ is structurally
chaotic at the logistic map, as the logistic map is topologically mixing. So
Frigg et al. [2014]’s and my results seem to be in tension with facts about
structural stability.
One possible reason for the tension is that definitions of structural sta-
bility almost always assume that the set of models under investigation are
well-behaved, in the sense that models are differentiable (perhaps several
times) and hence, continuous. In contrast, in order to demonstrate the exis-
tence of “structural chaos” in computer simulations, Frigg et al. [2014] sim-
ulate discretized functions that are, by necessity, discontinuous. Moreover,
if a set of models is closed under empirical indistinguishability in my sense,
it will contain discontinuous functions and other “poorly behaved” models.
Some may see this as a deficiency in Frigg’s and my arguments. Continuity
and differentiability are mathematically convenient assumptions, and Ock-
ham’s razor or other metaphysical arguments might lead one to accept that
the dynamics of real physical systems are continuous. Nonetheless, conve-
nience and simplicity are extra-empirical considerations; a finite sequence
of observed states may be consistent with assuming the continuity of the
system’s time-evolution function, but it does not require doing so. Further-
more, many metaphysical arguments for continuity do not obviously extend
to showing that a function is twice differentiable.
However, I will not defend the thesis that physical laws might be discon-
tinuous or non-differentiable. Rather, I discuss the relation between struc-
tural chaos (in my sense) and various notions of structural stability in order
to illustrate a broader point. Mathematicians, scientists, and philosophers
have yet to investigate whether plausible structural analogs of “chaos” are
actually in tension with definitions of structural stability. My results show
that there may, in fact, be no direct logical inconsistency, and that inconsis-
tency may only arise when additional, substantive assumptions (e.g. conti-
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nuity or differentiability) about the dynamics of the system are introduced.
There are two further reasons to question whether standard definitions
of “structural instability” are really the appropriate dynamical analogs of
chaos. To understand the two reasons, it is not necessary to review all
existing definitions of structural stability. Rather, it suffices to describe
their common logical form [Pugh and Peixoto, 2008]. Namely, given some
equivalence relation R (e.g., topological conjugacy) over functions, one says
a function f is structurally stable if all “close” functions (under some metric)
are R-equivalent to f . Why are definitions of this form not analogous to
characterizations of chaos (simpliciter)?
First, the concepts employed to define structural stability are disjoint
from those used to define chaos. For example, definitions of structural
stability typically use the notions of homeomorphism and diffeomorphism,
whereas definitions of chaos employ notions like sensitivity to initial con-
ditions, topological transitivity, density, etc. Of course, some difference in
definitions is unavoidable, as structural stability is about small changes in
time-evolution functions, whereas chaos is about small changes in states.
Nonetheless, if Werndl [2009] and Berkovitz et al. [2006] are correct, then
probability is a key concept in characterizing degrees of chaos. In contrast,
none of the definitions of structural stability employ probability at all. This
is surprising, given that probability (and in particular, probabilistic inde-
pendence) is perhaps the most widely-employed tool used to characterize
uncertainty, noise, and (expected) error. The fact that probability is not
used in definitions of structural stability, therefore, raises serious questions
about the importance of such definitions for discussions of prediction, con-
trol, and explanation.11
Second, time plays different roles in definitions of chaos and structural
stability respectively. Definitions of chaos typically contain a clause – like
the definition of topological mixing – that places constraints on the distant
future of the system. For example, in many chaotic systems, nearby initial
conditions may have similar trajectories for a long period of time, but their
trajectories may diverge suddenly and radically in the distant future. The
potential for such sudden divergence is what renders long-term predictions
problematic. In contrast, to my knowledge, all but one of the equivalence
relations used to define structural stability constrain only one time step in
the evolution of a dynamical system, and the one exception is typically only
11The reader will note that my definition of structural mixing likewise does not employ
the use of probability. It turns out that the standard notion of topological mixing is closely
related the ergodic (and hence, probabilistic) concept of strong mixing. I conjecture an
analogous relationship will hold in the structural case, but this remains to be shown.
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applied to dynamical systems that are described by differential equations.
These two reasons do not provide conclusive evidence that the math-
ematically rich research on structural stability is, at the end of the day,
unimportant for empirical science. Rather, they suggest two more questions
to add to the list at the outset of the paper: what are the relationships
among various definitions of chaos and structural stability? And what is
the importance of the various notions of structural stability for prediction,
control, and explanation?
4 Conclusions and Philosophical Upshots
Section one outlined a broad research program, which consisted of three
questions. Section two provided a brief example of how one might go about
answering two of three questions. In particular, I defined a notion of “struc-
tural mixing” that is analogous to the standard notion of “topological mix-
ing”, and I proved a theorem relating the two concepts. I now conclude by
discussing philosophical significance of this research program.
To see why this seemingly technical series of questions has broad philo-
sophical importance, replace every occurrence of the phrase “time-evolution
function” with the word “regularity” in the above discussion of structural
chaos and in the two theorems. Doing so reveals that the main result roughly
asserts that there are many “similar” regularities that (i) produce widely
different future behavior and (ii) are compatible with the observed past.
That’s just an instance of the problem of induction. So investigating struc-
tural chaos amounts to investigating (in a mathematically precise setting) a
(the?) central problem of epistemology and philosophy of science.
With this in mind, it is now easy to see why answers to each of the
three questions are philosophically important. Question one asks, “For each
definition of “chaotic system”, what is the analogous concept of structural
chaos?” Because there are different “degrees” of chaos [Berkovitz et al.,
2006], an answer to question one would characterize differing “degrees” of
problem of induction.12 That is, an answer to the first question would allow
one to characterize inductive problems in terms of their difficulty.
Question two asks, “what are the relationships among the various notions
of chaos (simpliciter) and the analogous notions of structural chaos?” To see
12Kelly [1996] contains a sophisticated description of a hierarchy of “problems” of in-
duction. I am skeptical there is any relationship between Kelly’s hierarchy and that which
would arise from pursuing the first question here. So this project would provide an inde-
pendent, orthogonal way of characterizing inductive difficulty.
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why this question is important, it is useful to consider one reason why chaotic
systems are so interesting. The classic problem of induction shows that past
observations are insufficient to identify a dynamical system’s time-evolution
function, and hence, there are many regularities that (a) are compatible with
past observations and (b) predict radically different futures. The existence of
chaos entails that predicting or manipulating a dynamical system’s behavior
might be difficult even if the exact dynamics of the system are known. Hence,
an answer to question two provides a bridge between research on the classical
problem of induction and new research in chaos theory, which respectively
identify different sources of difficulty for prediction and manipulation.
Finally, question three asks, “what are the implications of structural
chaos for prediction, control, and explanation?” The importance of this
question is self-explanatory: prediction, control, and explanation are three
central goals of science, and so an answer to question three amounts to an
answer to the question, “Why is structural chaos important?”
A Proofs
Lemma 1 Let X be any metric space, U ⊆ X an open set and F ⊆ X
be finite. Then U \ F is open. If X be has no isolated points, U \ F is
non-empty.
Theorem 2 Suppose ϕ is continuous and topologically mixing. Suppose
that ϕ ∈ Φ and that Φ is closed under F -indistinguishability for some finite
F ⊆ X. If X has no isolated points, then Φ is structurally mixing at ϕ.
Proof: Let x0 ∈ X. It must be shown that for all ǫ > 0 and all non-empty
open sets V ⊆ X, there is some N ∈ N such that
fx0,n(Bǫ(ϕ) ∩ Φ) ∩ V 6= ∅ for all n ≥ N
Call this condition †(ǫ, V,N). Let ǫ > 0 and V ⊆ X be an open set.
Define xj = ϕ
j(x0) for all natural numbers j, and let M = |F | + 1.
Because Φ is closed under F -indistiguishability, there is β > 0 such that if
(a) ϕ and ψ agree everywhere on all but finitely many elements of X \ F
and (b) D(ϕ, ψ) < β, then ψ ∈ Φ. As ϕ is continuous and F is finite, it
follows that for all k ≤M there is δk > 0 such that
Bδk(xk) ∩ F =
{
{xk} if xk ∈ F
∅ otherwise.
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and
y ∈ Bδk(xk)⇒ d(ϕ(y), ϕ(xk)) < {ǫ, β}
Note here I am using Bγ(z) to refer to the γ-ball around z ∈ X with respect
to the metric d, in the same way that I have used Bγ(ϕ) to refer to the
γ-ball around ϕ with respect to D.
Let δ = min{δk : k ≤ M}. Because ϕ is topologically mixing, for each
k ≤M there is Nk ∈ N such that for all n ≥ Nk:
ϕn(Bδ(xk)) ∩ V 6= ∅
Let N∗ =M +max{Nk : k ≤M}. I claim that †(ǫ, V,N∗). Let n ≥ N∗.
It is necessary to find a function ψ ∈ Bǫ(ϕ) ∩ Φ such that ψ
n(x0) ∈ V . If
ϕn(x0) ∈ V , then we’re done. So assume ϕ
n(x0) 6∈ V .
Because M > |F |, there is k ≤M such that xk 6∈ F . Notice
n− k ≥ N∗ −M ≥ max{Nj : j ≤M} ≥ Nk.
Hence, by choices of δ and N∗, there is y ∈ Bδ(xk) such that ϕ
n−k(y) ∈ V .
Note y 6= xk because ϕ
n−k(xk) = ϕ
n(x0) 6∈ V . I claim that y may be chosen
so that ϕj(y) 6= xk for all j ≤ n− k.
Why? Suppose for the sake of contradiction that for all y ∈ Bδ(xk),
there is some j ≤ (n − k) such that ϕj(y) = xk. In particular, there is
j0 ≤ (n − k) such that ϕ
j0(xk) = xk. Thus, for all m ≥ (n − k) and all
y ∈ Bδ(xk):
ϕm(y) ∈ {xk, ϕ(xk), . . . , ϕ
j0−1(xk)}.
Let T = X \ {xk, ϕ(xk), . . . , ϕ
j0−1(xk)}. Then T is non-empty and open by
the lemma. However, by the above reasoning, ϕm(Bδ(xk)) ∩ T = ∅ for all
m ≥ (n− k). So ϕ is not topologically mixing, contradicting assumption.
It has been shown that y ∈ Bδ(xk) may be chosen so that ϕ
j(y) 6= xk
for all j ≤ (n− k). Define ψ : X → X as follows:
ψ(z) =
{
ϕ(y) if z = xk
ϕ(z) otherwise.
NoteD(ϕ, ψ) = d(ϕ(xk), ϕ(y)). By continuity of ϕ, it follows that d(ϕ(xk), ϕ(y)) ≤
min{β, ǫ}. Hence, ψ ∈ Bǫ(ϕ). Because ψ is equal to ϕ everywhere except
xk 6∈ F , it follows that ψ is βF -indistinguishable from ϕ. As Φ is closed
under βF -indistinguishability, ψ ∈ Φ.
Finally, ψn(x) = ϕn−k(y) ∈ V because ϕj(y) 6= xk for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n− k.

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Contrastive explanations, crystal balls and the inadmissibility of
historical information   
                                                                         Abstract
I  argue  for  the  falsity  of  what  I  call  the  "Admissibility  of  Historical
Information  Thesis"  (AHIT).  According  to  the  AHIT  propositions  that
describe past events are always admissible with respect to propositions
that describe future events. I irst demonstrate that this demand has some
counter-intuitive  implications  and  then  argue  that  the  source  of  the
counter-intuitiveness is a wrong understanding of the concept of chance. I
also discuss the relation between the failure of the AHIT and the existence
of contrastive explanations for chancy events (which David Lewis denied).
Introduction
Suppose you know the chance of some event, E, and suppose this chance
is very low. Then E occurs. Intuitively, this calls for an explanation. What
intuitively calls for an explanation is not that E occurred. Rather it is that E
occurred  rather  than  “not  E”  (as  “not  E”  had  a  greater  chance  of
occurring).  David  Lewis  famously  argued  that  there  can  be  no  such
explanation.  There  might  be  an  explanation  for  E,  but  there  is  no
contrastive explanation for “E rather than ‘not E’”. There is – argued Lewis
– no reason for the outcome of a chancy event to turn out one way rather
than another “for is it not the very essence of chance that one thing may
happens rather  than  another  for  no reason  whatsoever?”  (Lewis  1986,
p.175)1
At the macro-level, however, we often do give contrastive explanations for
events that we also plausibly take to be chancy. For example, that I won
the backgammon game I played yesterday rather than my opponent is
explained by the fact that I am a much more experienced player (or by the
fact that he was not paying full attention to the game, or by the fact that I
was very determined to win so I spent a lot of time thinking before each
move etc.). This is true, even though there was (up to the last turn of the
game) a non-trivial chance that I will lose. 
1 See Percival 2000 for a good discussion of Lewis’ position.
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There were several (quite successful) attempts in the literature to give an
account  for  such  contrastive  explanations  that  will  be  compatible  with
Lewis’ claim regarding “the essence of chance”. Here, however, I want to
argue against Lewis’ claim that it is the essence of chance that “one thing
may happen rather than another for no reason whatsoever”. 
Notice that Lewis referred to “reasons” rather than to “causes”. This is no
accident. Reasons (unlike causes) justify beliefs. To say that there is no
reason that A occurred rather than not A is to say that there is nothing
that can justify a belief that A will occur rather than not A, over and above
the fact that there was some chance that A rather than not A will occur.
Moving from full beliefs to partial beliefs, to say that there is no reason
that A occurred rather than not A is to say that there is no propositions, E,
such that one’s degree of belief in A conditional on the proposition that
says that the chance of A is x and E should be higher than one’s degree of
belief in A conditional on the proposition that says that the chance of A is
x.  If there is such a proposition then this proposition is a reason that A
rather than not A will occur over and above the fact that there is some
positive chance that A rather than not A will occur.
Although in his discussion of explanations of chancy events, Lewis does
not explicitly commit himself to such a formulation, his choice of words
clearly hints that this is what he had in mind, as the condition mentioned
in the previous paragraph is a condition Lewis does explicitly discuss and
endorse elsewhere (in Lewis 1980).
As it is, the condition is false and Lewis was well aware of that. A itself, for
example,  is  a  reason for  the occurrence  of  A rather  than not  A.  Lewis
called  propositions  that  describe  such  reasons,  propositions  that  give
information  about  the  outcomes  of  chancy events  over  and above  the
information one gets by learning the chance of these events, inadmissible
propositions.   
Lewis  was  well  aware  that  there  are  inadmissible  propositions,  but  he
believed many propositions are admissible. I take it that what Lewis really
wanted to say in his discussion of contrastive explanations is the following:
there is no propositions, E which is only about events prior to some time, t,
before  the  occurrence  of  A,  such  that  one’s  degree  of  belief  in  A
2
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conditional on the proposition that says that the chance of A, at t, is x and
E should be higher than one’s degree of  belief  in A conditional on the
proposition that says that the chance of A at t is x. In other words, Lewis
wanted to say that there is no historical reason that A will occur rather
than not A.  
Lewis was explicitly committed to this latter claim. However, I will argue
here,  he  was  wrong.  Past  events  can  give  us  information  about  the
occurrence of chancy future events, over and above the information we
get by learning the chance of these future events. In the literature such
propositions  are  sometimes called “crystal  balls”  (see for  example Hall
1994). Although the term is catchy and successfully captures one aspect
of the role they play – if they exist – in our systems of beliefs, it misses
another important role. Balls made of crystal that show future events are
very good in predicting these events, but they do not supply us (or the
magicians that use them) explanations for the events they show.
Inadmissible propositions that describe past events, on the contrary, often
do give us information  about  the future through the explanations  they
provide to future events (in case they will occur), or so I will argue. If this
is so, then contrastive explanations are possible: a proposition E can serve
as a contrastive explanation for another proposition, A, if E is inadmissible
to A and is about events prior to the event described by A. 
The rest of the paper will be organized in the following way. In sections 1 I
will  discuss  Lewis’  Principal  Principle  (PP)  and  the  role  the  concept  of
admissibility plays in it. The discussion, I believe, will touch upon several
issues that have not been properly dealt with in the literature. In section 2
I will discuss the claim that historical information is always admissible (call
this claim the “Admissibility of Historical Information Thesis” or the AHIT).
The main point of this section will be that the motivation for accepting the
AHIT is that it enables the PP to perform the role it is supposed to play, i.e.
to characterize the conceptual role of chance. 
In section 3 I will argue that there are cases in which the AHIT does not
intuitively play this role as it is inconsistent with another intuitive principle.
In  section  4  I  will  argue  that  Lewis’  own  theory  of  chance  (which  is
designed to  explain  the  PP)  does  not  only  allow  but  also  predicts  the
3
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failure of the AHIT. In section 5 I will use the conclusions of the irst four
sections in order to defend Callender and Cohen (2010) and Hoefer (2007)
from a recent criticism by Christopher Meacham (forthcoming).        
The Principal Principle and the concept of admissibility
David Lewis was not the irst to introduce the idea that a rational agent’s
degree of belief in a proposition, A, should be constrained by his beliefs
regarding the chance of A. Long before Lewis published his 1980 paper in
which  he  presented  his  version  of  the  principle,  the  idea  was  well
discussed in the literature under diferent titles (“The Principle of Direct
Probability”,  “The  Principle  of  Direct  Inference”,  “Miller’s  Principle”,
“Probability Coordination”. See Strevens [1999] for an overview).   
Lewis’  formulation  of  the  idea  has,  however,  several  signiicant
advantages over the formulations preceding it. One of these advantages is
of special importance for the current discussion. In order to appreciate it, it
will  be  instructive  to  irst  present  what  seems  to  be  the  most
straightforward way to express the idea. Let us call it “the Naive Principle”:
NP (naive principle): “A rational agent’s credence in A, conditional on the
proposition “the chance of A is x”, equals x”.
One problem with the NP is as follows. The principle is supposed to be a
principle of rationality. It restricts the range of credence functions that a
rational agent is permitted to adopt. However, if an agent starts with a
rational credence function and then updates his beliefs after gaining new
information in a rational way, he should end up holding another rational
credence function. This is just part of what makes an updating method
rational – that it preserves the rationality of credence distributions. The
naive  principle,  however,  is  not  necessarily  preserved  under  any
reasonable updating method, as after learning A the credence a rational
agent assigns to A conditional on any other proposition must be 1, not the
chance that A is true. Thus, it must be the case that credence distributions
that do not obey the NP can be rational, which, in turn, means that the NP
is not a principle of rationality.
Partly in order to handle this problem, Lewis introduced a variation of the
naive principle that is not vulnerable to the problem just described. Lewis’
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irst formulation of the principle, which he called “the Principal Principle
(PP), is as follows:
Let C be any reasonable initial credence function. Let t be any time.
Let  x  be  any  real  number  in  the  unit  interval.  Let  X  be  the
proposition that the chance, at time t, of A's holding equals x. Let E
be any proposition compatible with X that is admissible, at time t.
Then C(A|XE) = x. (Lewis 1980, p.266). 
It is easy to see that the PP, unlike the naive principle, is preserved under
Bayesian  updating  on  A:  it  holds  also  after  learning  A  because  any
reasonable initial credence function gives credence of 1 to A conditional
on any proposition of the form “A and the chance of A is x”. In other words,
a proposition is always inadmissible to itself. Is the PP always preserved
under Bayesian conditionalization? To see that it is, consider the following
inference:
Let c(.)  be the agent’s initial probability distribution and let c’(.)  be his
probability  distribution  after  learning  some  admissible  proposition,  E.
Assume c(.) obeys  the PP. Then:
c’(A|XE) = c’(A│X) = c’(AX)/c’(X) = c(AX│E)/ c(X│E) = c(A|XE)=  x = c(A|X)
Notice,  that  in order for the inference to be true no explication of  the
concept of admissibility is required. In order for Lewis’ attempt to avoid
the problem that the NP sufers from to work, it only has to be the case
that 
*For every admissible proposition, E, c(A| XE)= c(A│X). 
The plausibility  of  the PP depends,  then,  entirely  on our  willingness to
accept - given an explication for “admissibility” - that * keeps on holding
after Bayesian conditionalization on an admissible proposition. 
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Although * must hold in order for  the PP to avoid  the problem the NP
sufers from, * cannot serve as a deinition for admissibility (i.e. it cannot
be  the  case  that  E  is  admissible  to  A  if  *  holds),  as  by  deining
admissibility in such a way it becomes impossible to violate the PP2. Thus,
in order for the PP to have a bite, in order for it to restrict the range of
credence functions that a rational agent is permitted to adopt, the concept
of admissibility must be deined independently of the PP. 
It is important to understand what exactly * demands, however. Let c’’(.)
be the agent’s credence function after learning X. Then:
c’’(A|XE) = c’’(A|E) = c’’(AE)/c’’(E) = c(AE|X)/c(E|X) = c(A|XE) = c(A|X) =
c’’(A) 
so
c’’(A|E)  = c’’(A)
In other words, if E is admissible to A, then after learning the chance of A,
E and A become probabilistically independent (even if prior to learning the
chance of A, E and A were probabilistically dependent). 
Indeed, Lewis understood admissibility exactly in this spirit: 
Admissible propositions are the sort of information whose impact on
credence about outcomes comes entirely by way of credence about
the chances of those outcomes. Once the chances are given outright,
conditionally or unconditionally, evidence bearing on them no longer
matters. (Lewis, 1980, p.272).
2 Lewis was well aware of this point. He wrote: “The power of the Principal 
Principle depends entirely on how much is admissible. If nothing is admissible it is 
vacuous.  If everything is admissible it is inconsistent” (Lewis, 1980, p. 272).
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The above discussion makes it clear that admissibility is a triadic relation:
it is a relation of one proposition, A, to another proposition, B, with respect
to a given credence distribution, c(.). A proposition can be admissible to
one  proposition  and  inadmissible  to  another  (every  proposition,  for
example, is inadmissible to itself and admissible to any other proposition
which  is  probabilistically  independent  of  it),  and  a  proposition  can  be
admissible  to  another  proposition  with  respect  to  one  credence
distribution, but inadmissible to it with respect to another (for example, if I
believe to degree 1 that every time I lip a coin using my left hand, it falls
“Heads” , then “I lipped the coin using my left hand” is inadmissible to
“the coin falls Heads”, but if I believe this conditional to degree 0, then the
admissibility relation between the two propositions does hold).
Which propositions are admissible?
We saw in the previous section that both the power and the plausibility of
the PP depend on how much is admissible. Lewis’ informal characterization
of admissible propositions (that was quoted above) captures the role the
concept  plays  in  rational  reasoning.  However,  it  does  not  help  one
determine whether a given proposition is admissible.
Lewis did, however, characterized two families of propositions that must
be admissible. The irst family is that of propositions about the past: At
any given point in time, ti, every proposition which is only about events
prior  to  ti,  is  admissible  to  any  proposition,  E,  which  is  about  future
(relative to ti) events.
The second family is  that  of  conditionals  in which the antecedent  is  a
complete description of the world up to some point in time, t i,  and the
consequent is a proposition that assigns a certain chance to some event,
E,  at  ti (Lewis  added  one  qualiication  for  this  characterization,  but  it
should  not  concern  us  here).  All  such  propositions,  argued  Lewis  are
admissible to E (at all times).
Using these two claims Lewis introduced a second version of the PP and
showed that it follows (using his two assumptions) from the irst version.
Here it is:
7
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Let Ht be a complete description of  the world up to time t;  let T be a
conjunction of conditionals of the sort just described (i.e. conditionals from
full histories of the world up to a time, t, to chances of events at t) that
assigns a chance to every event at t; let Pt(.) be the chance distribution
over a set of events according to T at time t; let c(.) be any reasonable
initial credence function and let A be any proposition to which T assigns a
chance at t, then:
 
c(A|THt) = pt(A)
While the second version of the PP follows from the original version, it is
not clear (without a full characterization of admissibly) whether the two
versions are equivalent3.    
Christopher Meacham (2010) argued that Lewis intended the two versions
to be equivalent and suggested to take their equivalence as a criterion for
admissibility: He introduced a formal deinition for admissibility and proved
that this deinition is necessary and suicient for the two versions to be
equivalent. 
There is no need for us to discuss Meacham’s condition. Given Meacham’s
criterion for admissibility – namely that it must make the two versions of
the PP equivalent – his condition is the right one to adopt. The problem is
that  Meacham  adopted  the  wrong  criterion.  It  is  the  wrong  criterion
because it makes the two versions of the PP equivalent. The two versions
cannot be equivalent, I will argue in the next section, because while the
irst version is a principle of rationality, the second is not. 
The  problem  with  the  second  version  to  which  I  will  point  is  its
commitment  to  the  claim that  past  events  must  be  admissible  to  any
future  event.  Let  us  call  this  commitment  the  Admissibly  of  Historical
Information  Thesis  (AHIT).  Before  arguing  against  the  AHIT,  it  will  be
instructive to explain the initial motivation for accepting it. 
3 In this paper I do not discuss Lewis’ “new principal principle” or any of the other 
attempts to solve “the big bad bug” as none of these attempts is relevant to my 
argument. 
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Lewis  does  not  explicitly  discuss  his  reasons  for  adopting  the  AHIT.
Moreover, he does explicitly claim (see Lewis 1980 p. 274) that the AHIT is
only true “as a rule” and might have rare exceptions. He also claims that it
being true “as a rule” is a contingent matter that might be absent in other
possible worlds. His reasons for these qualiications of the AHIT are the
following. Lewis pointed to the possibility of what was later described by
Ned Hall (1994) and others as “crystal balls”, i.e. past events that carry
information about the future outcomes of chancy events: 
“if the past contains seers with foreknowledge of what chance will
bring, or time travelers who have witnessed the outcome of coin
tosses to come, then patches of the past are enough tainted with
futurity so that historical  information about them may well  seem
inadmissible” (Lewis 1980 p. 274). 
Meacham (2010) presented an argument against the possibility of crystal
balls. I will critically discuss his argument in section 5 and argue that there
are in fact many crystal balls in our world. We all know them: they are
described by the “special sciences”. 
In any case, it seems that in the absence of crystal balls, Lewis would be
willing to accept the AHIT as always true (and as noted, Hall, Meacham
and others explicitly do so). Why did he ind the AHIT so attractive? 
The  reason,  I  believe,  does  not  steam  from  Lewis’  commitment  to  a
speciic theory of chance. Rather it lays in the conceptual role Lewis took
the PP  to  play.  Lewis  took  the  PP to  express  all  “that  we know about
chance” (Lewis, 1980. P. 266). Whatever chance is, Lewis believed, it must
make the PP a principle of rationality. Our concept of chance, according to
Lewis, is a concept of a feature of reality that plays the role the PP assigns
to chance. Indeed, for Lewis, a restriction on any theory of chance is that it
must explain why the PP is a principle of rationality (see his discussion in
Lewis 1994). 
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Lewis’ acceptance of the AHIT should, I believe, be understood in a similar
way.  It  is  clear  that  without  an  operational  characterization  of  a  large
family of propositions which are admissible, there is no conceptual role
that can be ascribed to chance via the PP. To say that the PP does capture
the conceptual  role chance plays is to commit oneself  to some such a
characterization  (and,  as  was  explained  in  the  previous  section,  some
propositions must be taken to be inadmissible in order for the PP to be
consistent). Lewis thought that in our world this characterization is partly
captured by the AHIT. 
This is, I believe, why Lewis argued (in the quote above) that the existence
of  crystal  balls  might  make  propositions  about  the  past  “seem
inadmissible”.  It  is  clear  from his  discussion  that  he did  not  only  take
historical  information in worlds in which there are crystal  balls to  seem
inadmissible but that he also took them to actually be inadmissible: they
are inadmissible because, in such worlds, they seem inadmissible. 
In such worlds, the PP captures the conceptual role chance plays using a
diferent set of propositions which are always admissible, not using the set
of all propositions that carry only historical information.  
However, in our world – Lewis’  thought was – the PP does capture the
conceptual role chance play using the AHIT. Lewis (implicitly) supported
this claim using an example of a coin which you are certain is fair (i.e. you
are certain that its chance to fall Heads is 0.5). Lewis wrote:
“...you have plenty of seemingly relevant evidence tending to lead
you to expect that the coin will  fall  heads. This coin is known to
have  a  displaced  center  of  mass,  it  has  been tossed  100  times
before with 86 heads, and many duplicates of it have been tossed
thousands of  times with about  90% heads.  Yet you remain quite
sure, despite all this evidence, that the chance of heads this time is
50%. To what degree should you believe the proposition that the
coin falls heads this time?”  
Answer. Still 50%. Such evidence is relevant to the outcome by way
of its relevance to the proposition that the chance of heads is 50%,
not in any other way. If the evidence somehow fails to diminish your
certainty that the coin is fair, then it should have no efect on the
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distribution  of  credence  about  outcomes  that  accords  with  that
certainty  about  chance.  To  the  extent  that  uncertainty  about
outcomes is based on certainty about their chances, it is a stable,
resilient sort of uncertainty-new evidence won't get rid of it.” (Lewis
1980, pp. 265-6).
Notice  that  Lewis  does  not  present  in  this  quote  an  argument  for  the
application of the AHIT he describes. He just states it. This is so; it should
be  clear  by  now,  since  Lewis  took  this  example  to  be  a  paradigmatic
example of our everyday use of the concept of chance. To the extent that
some  feature  of  reality  plays  the  role  of  chance  in  this  example,  the
application  of  the  AHIT  Lewis  employs  must  be  valid  on  conceptual
grounds. 
I do not disagree with Lewis about his use of the AHIT in this example. I do,
however,  believe that  not  all  applications  of  the AHIT  are  equally  self-
evident. 
In order to convincingly argue against Lewis that in our world the AHIT is
sometimes false (i.e. that there are crystal balls in our world) I must, then,
demonstrate that in our world there are instances of historical information
which is intuitively inadmissible. I will do this now.
Inadmissible historical information
Let  E  be  a  proposition  that  describes  some future  event.  Let  E*  be  a
proposition  of  the  form “the  chance  of  E  at  time t  is  x”.  Let  M be  a
proposition that describes some past event (i.e. an event prior to t) that
intuitively explains E. Let c(.) be the credence function of a rational agent
at time t.
Epistemic relevancy of explanations (ERE): there are some cases in
which 
                                                                   
                                                               c(M|E*) < c(M|E*E)
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ERE  demands  that  in  some  cases  learning  that  some  event,  E,  has
occurred makes a rational agent raises the credence he attaches to some
past event, M, occurring (i.e. to an explanation of E), even if the agent
already learned what the chance of E was just before its occurrence (i.e. at
a time later than the time in which M has occurred). 
Example 1: the conditional credence I attach to “Bob intended – a second
ago - to open the window” given that Bob will actually open the window is
higher than the unconditional credence I attach to this proposition and
this is so even if I already learned the chance of Bob opening the window
(now). In other words, Bob actually opening the window is more indicative
of Bob’s intention to open the window than the proposition that there is
some positive – but possibly very low – chance of Bob opening the window
(the chance of Bob opening the window can be low, for example, either
because Bob did not intend to open the window and there is a low chance
that Bob will  do it involuntarily, or because Bob did intend to open the
window but there is a high chance that Bill the Bully will not let him open
the  window.  Learning  that  Bob  actually  opened  the  window  clearly
indicates that there was an intention on Bob’s behalf). 
The example demonstrates that there are cases in which giving up on the
ERE  (i.e.  denying  the  claim  that  the  epistemic  state  described  in  the
example is rational) is extremely unintuitive. However, it is straightforward
to see that the ERE is inconsistent with the AHIT.   
Proof:  c(M|E*E) =  =  =  
However, if the AHIT holds and c(E|E*) = c(E|E*M)
12
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  = c(M|E*).
Thus,
c(M|E*E) = c(M|E*) contrary to the ERE. 
In words: if learning that Bob opened the window is more indicative to his
intention to open the window than that there is a certain (high or low)
chance that he will open the window, then Bob’s intending to open the
window is inadmissible to Bob actually opening the window. 
It is clear, then, that either the ERE or the AHIT must go. Now, here is what
I would like to argue: since the original motivation for adopting the AHIT is
the  intuitive  appeal  of  its  role  in  a  characterization  of  the  conceptual
status  of  the  concept  of  chance  and  since  in  the  example  the  AHIT
intuitively does not play this role, the conclusion must be that it is the
AHIT that has to go4. 
I do argue that but arguing only that is not enough. The situation is a bit
trickier here. When I look at the ERE applied to our example my intuition
strongly supports accepting it. However, I must admit that when I look at
the AHIT applied to our example my intuition also support accepting it. 
My degree of belief that Bob intended to open the window given that there
was a chance of 0.01 that he will does intuitively seem to me to be much
lower than my degree of  belief  that Bob intended to open the window
given that there was a chance of 0.01 that he will and that he will actually
open the window.  But,  at  the same time, I  ind the demand to ix my
degree of belief that Bob will open the window given that there is a chance
4 It is important to emphasise that the example only aims at showing that in some cases the AHIT is
unintuitive,  not  that  it  is  false.  However,  as  explained,  the  only  justiication  for  the  AHIT  is  its
intuitiveness  as  a restriction on the PP that  helps  it  perform its  role as  a characterization  of  the
conceptual role of chance.     
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of 0.01 that he will and that he intended a second ago to open the window
on 0.01 highly intuitive.
My intuitions conlicts. Now, I have argued that since the ERE must be true
(based on the example), the AHIT cannot be true. However, one can make
the opposite inference. One can argue that since the AHIT must be true,
the  ERE  cannot  be  true5.  Both  alternatives  –  rejecting  the  AHIT  and
endorsing the ERE and vice versa - are consistent. 
In order to convincingly argue for rejecting the AHIT while endorsing the
ERE it is not enough for me to point to how unintuitive rejecting the ERE is.
I must also explain why the intuition that supports accepting the AHIT is
misleading.  Part  of  my  explanation  will  be  presented  only  in  the  next
section, but the general strategy can be presented now.
My  explanation  begins  with  a  diagnosis  for  why  we  ind  the  AHIT  so
intuitive.  Here  it  is:  we  tend  to  think  about  chance  as  something  like
“degrees of belief of a perfectly rational and maximally informed agent”.
Since  such an agent  will  not  ignore relevant  information such  as “Bob
intended a  second ago  to  open the  window” when forming his  beliefs
about the prospects of Bob opening the window, we let the chance “screen
of” the efect of learning that Bob intended a second ago to open the
window.
This way of thinking about chance is actually explicitly adopted by Ned
Hall (1994 and 2004) and others (see footnote 7 in Hall 1994 for example).
Hall  writes:  "Why should chance guide credence? Because-as far as its
epistemic role  is  concerned-chance is like an expert  in  whose opinions
about the world we have complete conidence. Let us imagine that chance
just  is  the  credence  of  such  an  expert,  called  "the  Oracle".  Since  the
Oracle's credence is ideal, we should like our own to match hers "(Hall
1994, p. 551). 
I tend to agree that  if Hall is right and chance is like an expert in whose
opinions about the world we have complete conidence, the AHIT should
hold. I do not, however, agree with Hall that chance is always like such an
expert. In the next section I will argue that although chance must be like
5 I thank Matthew Cotzen for this formulation of the dilemma. 
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such  an  expert  when  it  comes  to  some  types  of  propositions,  chance
cannot be like such an expert regarding all types of propositions. 
Thus, although the AHIT does seem intuitive, in some cases this intuition is
misleading  and  the  reason  for  that  is  that  it  is  based  on  a  wrong
understanding of the concept of chance.
Before  presenting  my  argument  for  this  last  claim,  Notice  that  the
inadmissible proposition in the example (that Bob intended to open the
window) can serve as an explanation for the proposition it is inadmissible
for  (that  Bob  will  actually  open the  window).  In  fact,  prior  to  learning
whether Bob will open the window (but possibly after learning the chance
that  Bob  will  open  the  window)  the  agent  can  be  certain that  Bob’s
intention to open the window will serve as an explanation for Bob opening
the window, in case Bob will open the window. The agent is just uncertain
whether there will be anything to explain (i.e. whether Bob will open the
window).
More importantly, if (as I argued) Bob’s intention to open the window is
inadmissible to “Bob will open the window” then Bob’s intention can serve
as a contrastive explanation for why Bob opened the window rather than
not. Suppose I learned that the chance of Bob opening the window is very
low.  Then Bob opens the window. This,  of  course,  is a surprise so it  is
natural to ask: why did Bob open the window  even though there was a
very low chance that he will? “because he intended to” seems like a good
answer to this question. 
This  is  so,  however,  only  under the assumption that  Bob’s  intention is
inadmissible to Bob’s act. If Bob’s intention is admissible to Bob’s act then
it cannot teach me anything about Bob’s act above what it teaches me
about  the  chance  of  Bob  acting  in  a  certain  way.  Thus,  the  answer
“because he intended to” does not seem appropriate: Bob’s intention does
not  explain why Bob opened the window rather  than not  even though
there was a low chance that  he will,  because Bob’s  intention contains
information about Bob’s act only through the information it contains about
the chance of Bob’s act.
However, inadmissible information does teach a rational agent something
about a proposition not through what it teaches him about the chance of
15
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this proposition. Thus, if Bob’s intention is inadmissible to Bob’s act, it can
explain why Bob opened the window even though there was a low chance
that  he  will.  Since  intuitively  it  does  explain  that,  intuitively  it  is
inadmissible to “Bob will open the window”.   
Now, notice that Bob’s intention – if it is, as argued, inadmissible to Bob's
action - is a kind of a crystal ball: it is an event that contains information
about the future outcome of a chancy event. However, this information
seems intuitively to be exactly the kind of information needed in order to
explain the outcome of the chancy event, in case it will occur. 
To  better  demonstrate  this,  consider  the  two  following  examples
(structurally identical to example 1):
Example 2:
My conditional degree of belief, at 9:01, in "there was a cloud in the 
sky a minute ago", given "it will rain at 9:10 and the chance – now – 
that it will rain at 9:10 is x" is higher than my conditional degree of 
belief in "there was a cloud in the sky a minute ago" given only "the
chance that it will rain at 9:10 is x". This is intuitively so since under 
the assumption that it will actually rain at 9:10, it is very likely that 
there was a cloud in the sky a minute ago (even if that was a cloud 
with low chances of dropping rain). However, only under the 
assumption that there is a low chance for rain, it is unlikely that 
there was a cloud in the sky. 
Example 3:
My conditional degree of belief in "Bob is a much more experiences 
Backgammon player than Ann" given "Bob will win the game and 
the chance – now – that Bob will win is x" equals my conditional 
degree of belief in "Bob is a much more experiences Backgammon 
player than Ann" given only "the chance that Bob will win the game 
is x". 
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While in example 3 the two conditional probabilities seem intuitively to be
equal, in – the structurally equivalent – example 2 they seem intuitively to
be diferent of each other. What is the diference between the examples? 
Well, while in example 2 the proposition "there was a cloud in the sky a
minute ago" intuitively explains the proposition "it will rain at 9:10" even
under the assumption that at 9:01 there was a chance of x for it to rain at
9:10,  in  example  3  the  proposition  "Bob  is  a  much  more  experienced
player" does not explain "Bob will  win" under the assumption that just
before the game ended Bob had a chance of x to win the game. 
Thus, it seems that a proposition's inadmissibility with respect to another
proposition and its explanatory power with respect to that proposition are
closely related.       
In  this  section  I  argued  for  the  un-intuitiveness  of  a  mathematical
implication of the AHIT. In the previous section I explained that such un-
intuitiveness is problematic since the supposed justiications of the AHIT
exactly  is  that  it  intuitively  enables  the  PP  to  perform  its  role.  Thus,
together  the  conclusions  of  the  two  sections  constitute  an  argument
against the AHIT. However, I did not supply an explanation for what makes
historical information inadmissible, in cases it is. As explained, supplying
such  an  explanation  will  make  my  argument  against  the  AHIT  even
stronger. In order to explain why historical information can be inadmissible
we must turn to speciic explications of “chance”. In the next section I will
argue that adopting “best system” explications of chance (such as Lewis’
1994  own  theory  or  Carl  Hoefer’s  2007  version)  can  explain  the
inadmissibility of historical information.
The best system explication of chance and inadmissible historical
information
According to both Lewis and Hoefer the chance of an event is the chance
the best chance system of the world attaches to this event. Although there
are  several  important  diferences  between  Hoefer’s  version  and Lewis’
original one, they should not concern us at this point. 
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Instead  of  committing  myself  to  a  speciic  “best  system”  account  and
describing it  in  length,  it  might  be better  to demonstrate  the way my
explanation for the failure of the AHIT works using a simple example to
which both accounts will give approximately the same treatment. 
Consider  a  (very  simple)  world  in  which,  at  every  point  in  time,  the
universe can be in one of two possible states, 1 or 0. Suppose in this world
there are only 20 discrete points in time. Finally suppose this world can be
described using the following inite sequence of zeros and ones. 
00110000001110101100
In this world, at the irst point in time event of type 0 occurs, at the second
point in time event of type 0 occurs again, at the third point in time event
of type 1 occurs and so on. Let us call events which are the state of the
universe at each point in time, basic events.
The sequence above is, we stipulated, a full  description of the world. A
chance system of this world is a set of claims (that can be, of course,
encoded as another sequence of 0s and 1s) of the following form: “at t i the
chance of event E is x” that obeys the Kolmogorov axioms6. A full chance
system of the world is a chance system of the world such that for every t i
and for every event, E (not only basic events but also events which are
unions and intersections of basic events), there is a x such that the claim
“at ti the chance of event E is x” follows from the system.       
A  full  chance  system of  the  world  is  trivial  if  all  the  chance  values  it
assigns to events are either 0 or 1 and is nontrivial if the chance value it
attaches to at least one event is strictly higher than 0 and lower than 1.
Lewis only deals with nontrivial systems that assign at each point in time a
trivial chance value to any event prior to that point in time and I will follow
him in that (the last assumption - that the chance of any past event is
trivial - is explicitly rejected by Hoefer 2007 but I do not need to relax this
assumption in order to make my point).   
6 It is straightforward to see that this characterization of chance systems is 
identical to the one Lewis’ used and that was mentioned in section 2: a 
conjunction of conditionals from complete histories up to a time to a chance value
for an event after that time. 
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The  best system of this world is, according to both Lewis and Hoefer, a
system  of  this  world  that  has  the  best  balance  between  strength,
simplicity  and  it.  Obviously,  a  lot  hangs  on  the  questions  of  what
constitutes the right measures of strength, it and simplicity and on what
constitutes  the  right  “balance”  between  the  three.  Neither  Lewis  nor
Hoefer presented accurate answers to these questions7. However, I think
in the context of our simple example it will be fair to say that both of them
will  take  the  “strength”  of  any  system  of  the  simple  world  we  are
considering to go roughly with “how close” the system is to the ideal of
being  a  full  system  (i.e.  of  assigning  a  chance  value  to  all  events);
“simplicity”  goes roughly with  the length of  the system and “it”  goes
roughly  with  “how  close”  the  chance  values  the  system  assigns  to
diferent events are to the actual relative frequencies of these events.
In order to demonstrate how historical information can be inadmissible it
will be convenient to restrict our attention only to full systems. This will
allow  us  to  examine  more  freely  the  trade-of  between  itness  and
simplicity.
Obviously, the ittest full system of our world is the system that assigns, at
each point in time, a chance of 1 to any event if it occurs and a chance 0 if
it does not. This system is, however, not very simple. A simpler full system
of our world will assign to some future events non-trivial chance values.  
Consider irst T0, a very simple system of our world. T0 assigns, at each
point in time, a probability for a future basic event to be of type i (when i is
either  0  or  1)  which is  equal  to  the actual  relative frequency of  basic
events of type i in the sequence. 
Let us use the notation Etji for “the basic event that occurs at t j is of type i”
(when i is either 0 or 1). Let Pti(.) be the chance function according to T0 at
7 Maybe except with regards to “itness” in which more precision can be found.
Lewis  understood  itness  in  the  following  way:  “the  chance  of  that  course  of
history will be higher according to some systems than according to others” (Lewis
1994, p.480). Elga (2004) argues that this is not a satisfactory way to understand
itness and suggested an alternative explication that Hoefer (2007) adopts.  My
treatment of itness is consistent with both approaches, as I will only apply the
concept to our very simple world in which the disagreements between the two
explications of “itness” are mute.
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ti (of course, the chance values T0, or any  other system, assigns to every
event may change at diferent points in time). 
At each point in time:
For any y ≥ 1:
Pti(Eti+y1) = 2/5
Pti(Eti+y0) =  3/5
And for every i,j ε {0,1}
Pti(Eti+y+1i| Eti+yj) =  Pti(Eti+y+1i) 
Here is the full description of our world again: 
00110000001110101100
I leave it to the reader to verify that I have constructed T0 correctly. 
Although T0 is a very simple system, it is not very it. It might be the case
that the best system of our simple world is a little less simple though a
little itter. Consider, for example, T1 which is the system that we get by
equating the probability of the next basic event to be of type i, at each
point in time in which the basic event is of type j, to the actual relative
frequency of “i”s after “j”s which are not the last event in the sequence.
(The addition in Italics in the previous sentence is necessary, since after
the last event in the sequence comes no other event. Thus, we can look
instead, on the relative frequency of “i”s after “j”s which are not the last
event in the sequence). 
In our case, this is what we get:
Let Q(.) be the chance function according to T1.
For any y ≥ 1:
              At each point in time in which the basic event is of type 1:
Qti(Eti+10)= 0.5 = Pti(Eti+y+10| Eti+y1)
Qti(Eti+11)= 0.5 = Pti(Eti+y+11| Eti+y1)
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At each point in time in which the basic event is of type 0:
Qti(Eti+10) = 7/11 = Pti(Eti+y+10| Eti+y0)
               Qti(Eti+11) = 4/11 =  Pti(Eti+y+11| Eti+y0)
Here is the full description of our world again:
00110000001110101100
At any point in time in which the basic event is of type 1, Q ti(Eti+10) = 0.5 is
true, for example, because in our sequence there are eight 1s (and none
of them is the last event in the sequence) and after four of them there is
another 1. 
At any point in time in which the basic event is 0, Qti(Eti+10) = 7/11 is true
because in our sequence there are eleven 0s which are not the last event
in the sequence (there are 12 0s overall, but one of them is the last event
in the sequence) and after seven of them there is another 0. 
The best system of our world might be itter but less simple than T1 (this
depends  on  the  exact  way  in  which  the  balance  between  itness  and
simplicity is constituted), but for our demonstration we can assume that T1
is the best theory of our world, as the point I am trying to push can be
made using any non-trivial system.
The point is, actually, very simple. Even in the very simple world we are
considering there are many regularities not captured by T1 (or any other
non-trivial system). For example, after any sequence of the form 001, the
next  basic  event  is  1.  Thus,  although  at  the  third  point  in  time,  for
example, Qt3(Et41)= 0.5, an agent that assigns, at t3, a credence of 1 to the
event Et41 will – others things being equal -  get his credence values “closer
to the truth” (regarding the basic event at t4) than an agent who assigns at
t3 a credence of 0.5 to this event. Such an agent must take, at each point
in time, ti, events of the form Eti-20∩ Eti-10∩ Eti1 to be inadmissible to events
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of the form Eti+11, i.e. he must violate the AHIT8. What can be a plausible
ground for arguing that such an agent is irrational? 
The agent is not irrational in the sense of violating either the Kolmogorov
axioms or  the  PP  (i.e.  the  original  version  of  the  PP that  includes  the
admissibility clause) and he does adopt a credence distribution which is
“closer” to the actual relative frequencies in the world. It is, of course, true
that the agent does not know that this is the case. Thus, one might argue,
there seems to be no good reason for him to take events of the form Eti-20∩
Eti-10∩ Eti1 to be inadmissible to events of the form Eti+11. This might be true
but the important point is that the agent does not have any good reason
not  to take such events to be inadmissible to events of the form Eti+11.
Thus,  it  seems  that  rationality  allows  (but  certainly  does  not  dictate)
treating events of the form Eti-20∩ Eti-10∩ Eti1 to be inadmissible to events of
the form Eti+11. 
Furthermore,  an agent might gain –  through inductive inference -  good
reasons to take certain kind of (historical)  events to be inadmissible to
(future) events of another kind. To the extent that inductive inferences can
give an agent good reasons to adopt a certain degree of belief in a given
(either  full  of  partial)  chance  system,  it  can  also  give  the  agent  good
reasons to treat a certain class of propositions as inadmissible to some
other class of propositions (more on this point in the next section)9.   
It  will  be  useful  to  explicitly  state  a  possible  lawed  objection  to  my
treatment of  the example in this  section.  One might argue that  it  was
wrong of me to assume that T1 is the best system of the world since it
must  be  the  case  that  the  best  system  of  the  world  assigns  at  t3 a
probability of 1 to Et41. In other words, the objection is that given that there
is at least one proposition, A, which should (or could rationally) be taken to
be inadmissible to another proposition, B, relative to some chance system,
8 Explicating the term “closer to the truth” here might prove to be a tricky 
business, but it seems to me obvious that any plausible explication of the term 
must take a credence distribution (at t3) that obeys the PP with respect to T1 but 
takes events of the form Eti-20∩ Eti-10∩ Eti1  to be inadmissible to events of the form 
Eti+11, to be closer to the truth than a credence distribution that obeys the PP with 
respect to T1 but does not take these events to be inadmissible. 
9 See Smart (2013) for a good discussion of Humean vs. anti-Humean treatments 
of induction.
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Ti, there is another system, Tj which is better that Ti. This system is, so the
objection goes, the system that agrees with the credence distribution of
an agent who takes Ti to be the best system of the world and treats A as
inadmissible to B.  
In order to see what is wrong with this objection, let us go back to our
example and let us assume (with the objection) that the best system of
the world, let us call it T2, assigns to any event a chance value which is
equal to the credence value a rational agent that takes T1 to be the best
chance system of the world but also takes events of the form Eti-20∩ Eti-10∩
Eti1 to be inadmissible to events of the form Eti+11 would assign to it. 
T2 is, no doubt, itter than T1, but it is also less simple as it adds some
qualiications to T1. Now, it surely might be the case that the best system
of the world is less simple (but itter) than T1, but the point is that the best
system of the world is not the ittest system (i.e. the system that assigns
at each point in time a chance of 1 to any event that occurs and a chance
0  to  any  event  that  does  not).  Thus,  whatever  the  best  system  is,  a
rational agent can “do better” (in terms of ittness) than the best system
by taking some historical events to be inadmissible to some future events.
To demonstrate, note that T2 still misses some regularities in our simple
world. Here is the description of our world again: 
00110000001110101100
For example, at each point in time, t i, in which it is true that Eti-20∩ Eti-10∩
Eti1 it is also true that Eti+30. Thus, a rational agent can still “gain” in terms
of itness by setting, at t5 and at t13, 
c(Eti+10|T2∩ Eti-21∩ Eti-30∩ Eti-40) = 1 
i.e. by taking events of the form Eti-21∩ Eti-30∩ Eti-40  to be inadmissible to
events of the form Eti+10, relative to T2. 
Notice that, unlike the case of events of the form Eti-20∩ Eti-10∩ Eti1 which can
be rationally taken to be inadmissible to events of the form Eti+11 relative to
T1, events of the form 
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Eti-21∩Eti-30∩Eti-40  can be rationally taken to be inadmissible to events of the
form Eti+10 relative to T2, even though the type of events T2 was designed
to be the ittest with regards to which do not supervene on them (in the
following sense: while events of the form Eti-2i∩ Eti-1j∩ Etik determine events
of the form Etik, events of the form Eti-2i∩ Eti-3j∩ Eti-4s do not determine events
of the form Etik). Thus, my explanation for the failure of the AHIT does not
hold only in cases in which the type of events the best system of the world
is designed to deal with supervene on the type of inadmissible historical
events which are responsible for the failure of the AHIT. 
The explanation ofered here for the failure of the AHIT is very simple: as
long as the best system of the world in non-trivial, for any given level of
simplicity, there are some regularities in the world that the best system
does not capture and these regularities can justify taking some historical
events to be inadmissible. 
Although the explanation is very simple it sheds new light on the role the
admissibility clause plays in the PP. Since a chance system must obey the
laws of  probability,  holding the levels of  simplicity  and strength of  the
system constant, a chance system cannot be “the ittest” with respect to
all types of events. It must “choose” the type of events regarding which it
seeks to be the ittest10. Whatever this type of events is, there is another
type of events regarding which there is another system which is itter than
the best system of the world. 
The  admissibility  clause  enables  rational  agents  to  overcome  this
limitation of  chance systems.  While the level  of  simplicity  of  a  chance
system has a constitutive role in what makes or does not make it the best
system of the world, it plays no such role in what makes a given credence
distribution a rational (or irrational) one. While the “goodness” of chance
systems is sensitive to how simple they are, the rationality of credence
functions is  not.  Simplicity  is  a  theoretical  virtue,  it  is  not  a virtue for
rational agents. A rational agent should never give up on the accuracy of
his degrees of belief in order to make his credence function simpler. He
should, that is, use all the information available to him, even if this means
10 Lewis believed, for example, that this type of events (the type of events with 
respect to which the itness of the best theory is measured) is micro-physical 
events.
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taking more events in the algebra over  which his credence function is
deined to be probabilistically dependent. 
The admissibility clause enables rational agents to do just this. It allows
them to use information that the best system of the world ignores for the
sake  of  simplicity.  This  explains  how  historical  information  can  be
inadmissible, i.e. it explains how past events can teach a rational agent
something about future events not through what they teach him about the
chances  of  these future events.  They can do that  by giving the agent
information about the future which is ignored by the best system and thus
is not relected in the chances of future events.
This  also  explains  why  it  is  wrong  to  understand  chance  (or  chance's
epistemic role) in the way Hall suggested (i.e. as an expert). An expert's
credence function should always be based on all the information available.
Thus, when it comes to (a maximally informed about the past) expert it
makes  sense  to  let  the  expert's  opinions  "screen-of"  the  evidential
support of past propositions. However, unlike experts, chance values are
constituted in a way which always ignores  some information.  When an
agent  has  good  reasons  to  suspect  that  he  has  stumbled  upon  such
information, he is rationally permitted (and plausibly required) to use it.  
This concludes my positive argument for the possibility of violations of the
AHIT. In the next section I will argue against a possible objection to my
account, presented by Meacham (forthcoming). 
Meacham’s argument against autonomous chances
The explanation suggested in the previous section for the failure of the
AHIT,  is  closely related to a claim made my Hoefer in his 2007 paper.
Hoefer argues in his paper that diferent physical set-ups may give rise to
diferent chance values. Very roughly the idea is that as long as a given
physical set up produces a sequence of events in which a stable regularity
that is best characterize using a chance system is observed, it is justiied
to  assign  the chances  –  according  to  this  characterization  –  the name
“chance”. 
At the end of his paper Hoefer discusses a situation in which a rational
agent  knows  the  chance  of  some  macro-level  event  (such  as  a  train
25
Chicago, IL -523-
arriving at the station at some time) according to both the best system of
chance (which is  constructed – this is  Hoefer’s  assumption – to be the
ittest system regarding micro-level events) and some high-order system
that assigns a chance value to the macro-level event according to some
regularity in the macro-level set-up (such that the set-up that consists of
all the arrivals of the train to the station):
 Suppose God whispers in one ear the macro-level chance, based on
the  entire  history  of  9:37  trains  in  my  town,  while  a  Laplacean
demon who calculates the micro-derived chance whispers it in your
other ear. Which should you use? Common
wisdom among philosophers of science suggests that it must be the
micro-derived chance... But on the contrary, I want to suggest that
it could be the macro-derived chance that better deserves to guide
credence. How could this be?  (Hoefer 2007, p.592).
Hoefer’s answer to the question he poses is the following:
The  micro-level  chances  are  what  they  are  because  they  best
systematize the patterns of outcomes of micro-level chance setups,
such as quantum state transitions...  But that entails nothing about
what will happen for train arrivals. The micro-theory of chances in
the Best System gets the frequencies right for micro-level
events  (and  reasonable-sized  conjunctions  and  disjunctions  of
them), to a good approximation, over the entire mosaic. This simply
does not entail that the micro-theory must get the frequencies right
for sets of distinct one-of setups, each being a horribly complex
conjunction of micro events... (Hoefer 2007, p. 593).
Hoefer goes on to generalize this conclusion:
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              There are chance-making patterns at various ontological levels.
Nothing makes the  
              patterns in one level automatically dominate over those at
another; at whatever 
              level, the chances that can best play the PP role are those that
count as the ‘real’ 
              objective probabilities. (Hoefer 2007, ibid)    
It is easy to spot the similarities between Hoefer’s argument and the one
presented in the previous section. As the best system of the world, Tbest, is
designed to be the ittest regarding a given type of events, and as it must
keep its level of simplicity relatively high, there will always be some other
type of  events regarding which the best system is inferior,  in  terms of
itness,  to  another  chance  system,  Talternative.  A  rational  agent,  it  seems
natural to argue, should use the chance system that best it the type of
events  he  is  considering  to  guide  his  credence,  not  the  best  system
overall.  
It seems clear to me, however, that if this is right, then the conclusion of
the  previous  section  must  hold:  a  rational  agent  must  sometimes (i.e.
when  he  assigns  a  relatively  high  credence  to  Talternative)  equate  his
conditional credence in some proposition, P, given that the chance of P
(according  to  Tbest)  is  x  and  some  other  proposition,  E,  (which  is  a
proposition of the type regarding which Talternative is the ittest system) to
the chance of P given E according to Talternative, not to x. Thus, if all of this is
correct, the PP can be taken to be a principle of rationality only if in such a
case, E is taken to be inadmissible to P. 
Hoefer does not explicitly adopt this conclusion in his paper. In a puzzling
footnote he writes: “It may be that our two posited chances are such that
admissibility considerations rule out the use of one, if the other is known,
as we saw in the breast cancer case.  But it is not clear to me that this
must happen in general” (Hoefer 2007, footnote 35, my italics). I do not
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see, though, how it is possible to reject my conclusion, while accepting
Hoefer’s conclusion and taking the PP as a principle of rationality.
In  a  recent  paper,  Meacham seems  to  agree  with  this  last  claim.  He,
however, takes it as an argument against the claim that sometimes it is
Talternative that  should  guide a  rational  agent’s  credence.  More  generally,
Meacham argues  against  the  possibility  of  what  he  calls  “autonomous
chances”, i.e. chance values which are objective but nevertheless diferent
from the chance values the best system of the world assigns to events.
Meacham’s  mentioned  two  diferent  accounts  of  autonomous  chances,
which steam from diferent motivations.
The  irst  account  is  that  of  Callender  and  Cohen  (2010)  that  want  to
establish the independence of the special sciences from physics and so
suggest an account of laws and chances for the special sciences which can
be autonomous from those of physics. The second account is Hoefer’s one
(which has a more general motivation).
Meacham’s attack on both these accounts is based on what he calls “the
conlict problem”: 
Chances are generally taken to place constraints on rational belief.
All else being equal, if you know the chance of some event is 1/2,
then your  credence in  that  event  should be 1/2.  But  if  we have
multiple autonomous chance theories, it seems like these diferent
chance  theories  could  impose  conlicting  constraints  on  rational
belief. Call this the Conlicts Problem. (Meacham forthcoming, p. 2)
It  is easy to see that “the conlict problem” just is Hoefer’s conclusion.
Meacham agrees with me that one potential way of “solving” the conlict
problem is to take advantage of  the admissibility clause in the PP,  but
rules this possibility out as unsatisfactory. Meacham writes:
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it’s worth mentioning why one tempting way of modifying the 
chance-credence principle in order to avoid problematic 
prescriptions – adding an admissibility  clause... doesn’t look 
promising.  This kind of proposal faces all three of the challenges 
sketched above – precisely charactarizing the resulting principle     
(and the notion of admissibility it employs), showing that the 
resulting principle avoids conlicts, and addressing motivational 
questions regarding the principle and the chances it employs. 
(Meacham forthcoming, p.16).       
In the paper he only discusses, however, the third challenge. His argument
is  the  following.  Adding  an  admissibility  clause  to  the  PP  must  be
motivated  in  the  following  sense:  it  must  be  shown  that  adding  the
admissibility clause to the PP is required in order for the PP to perform its
role as the principle that captures the conceptual role “chance” plays. As
should be clear from the discussion in section 2, I am sympathetic to this
demand.
As mentioned, Meacham thinks that the admissibility clause is motivated
in this sense when it comes to Lewis’ irst formulation of the PP. According
to Meacham, the role of the admissibility clause in Lewis’ irst formulation
is  to  make the  second  formulation  of  the  PP  (which  neatly  captures  –
according to Meacham - the conceptual  role of  “chance” and does not
contain an admissibility clause) identical to the irst formulation. 
However,  Meacham  argues,  an  inclusion  of  an  admissibility  clause  in
Lewis’  second  formulation  of  the  PP  is  unmotivated  since  the  second
formulation neatly captures the conceptual role chance plays. To support
this claim Meacham considers several potential worries one might have
concerning  Lewis’  second  formulation  of  the  PP  that  might  motivate
adding  an  admissibility  cause  to  it  and  rules  them out.  One  of  these
potential worries is the following one: 
         The other potential worry one might have is that the Principal
Principle is too strong   without an admissibility clause... In  particular,
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one might think that in ‘crystal balls’ cases, where (say) an agent get
evidence about the outcomes of future events, her credence should
not line up with the chances... (Meacham forthcoming, p.17)
Meacham’s answer to this worry has a few steps, but for our discussion it
is  enough  to  concentrate  on  one  of  them (which  is  the  one  I  reject).
Suppose there are “infallible” crystal  balls, argues Meacham, and let us
imagine a rational agent that knows the best system of the world and also
knows that a given crystal ball says that some future event, E, to which
the best system of the world assigns some non-trivial chance, x, will occur.
Still  the agent needs, argues Meacham, evidence that the given crystal
ball is indeed infallible. Now, since the best system of the world tells the
agent that the chance of E is x, the agent clearly has no evidence that the
crystal ball is infallible and so he should ignore its predictions and set his
credence in E to be equal to x. 
Here is Meacham’s again:
            Suppose the crystal ball infallibly indicates that A will occur... Then
either the agent’s  total  evidence TK entails  A,  or  it  doesn’t.  If  TK
doesn’t  entail  A,  then  the  agent  shouldn’t  heed  the  crystal  ball’s
predictions  are  correct,  since  her  total  evidence  doesn’t  give  her
reason  to  think  the  crystal  ball’s  predictions  are  correct.  So  she
should line up her credences with the chances, just as the Principal
Principle says.  
There is, however, a gap in the argument: How does it follow from “TK
doesn’t entail A” that the agent’s total evidence “doesn’t give her reason
to think the crystal ball’s predictions are correct”? Suppose, for example, a
given crystal ball has given only accurate predictions in the past, including
in cases in  which it  predicted an occurrence  of  an event to which the
(known) best system of the world assigned a very low chance. In such a
case  the  agent’s  total  evidence  does  not  entail  the  infallibility  of  the
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crystal ball, but the agent does seem to have a good reason to think the
crystal ball’s predictions are correct. 
Meacham’s thought, I take it, was that to the extant the agent does have
such good reasons they must be relected in the chances the best system
of the world assigns to the events predicted by the crystal balls. However,
as we saw in the previous section, this is not necessarily true as the best
system of the world cannot be the ittest system regarding all types of
events.  There  will  always  be  some  type  of  events  that  exhibit  some
regularity,  which  is  not  relected  in  the chances  according  to  the best
system. It might be the case that our agent will notice this regularity and if
he does, it will be irrational of him to ignore it when setting his degrees of
beliefs. The examples in section 3 shows that such cases are in fact not
very rare in our world. 
Thus, contrary to Meacham’s position, there seem to be a clear motivation
for including an admissibility clause in Lewis’ second formulation of the PP:
without such a clause, the second formulation is false. The sense in which
it is false is that it does not accurately characterize the conceptual role
“chance” plays. It is just not true that our concept of chance demands that
after learning that the chance (now) of Bob opening the window is 0.001,
learning that Bob will actually open the window is not evidence that Bob
intended to open the window (a few seconds ago).
The discussion in the previous section shed further light on the motivation
for  including  an  admissibility  clause  in  the  PP.  As  was  argued,  the
admissibility  clause  is  needed  in  order  to  enable  a  rational  agent
overcome  the  limitations  the  simplicity  consideration  put  on  the  best
system of the world. While the best system of the world must give up on
some of its itness in order to gain in terms of simplicity, a rational agent’s
credence  function  is  not  bound  under  this  demand.  The  admissibility
clause is what allows a rational agent to overcome this limitation of the
best  system of  the  world.  Now,  this  motivation  for  an  inclusion  of  an
admissibility  clause  holds  under  both  formulations  of  the  PP,  not  only
under the irst one.
Notice also that while Meacham took the second formulation of the PP to
be the more fundamental one and argued that the role of the admissibility
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clause is only to make the irst formulation equivalent to the second, in his
original paper, Lewis presented the conceptual relation between the two
formulations the other way round. Lewis took the irst formulation to truly
capture  “all  that  we  know  about  chance”  (Lewis  1980,  p.  266)  and
introduced the second formulation (while being explicitly open to the idea
that the two formulations are not equivalent due to the possible failure of
the  AHIT) only as a principle which is “easier to use” (Lewis 1980, p.277).
Lewis  also  took  the  second  formulation  to  enjoy  “less  direct  intuitive
support than the original formulation” (Lewis ibid).
I agree with Lewis that it is the irst formulation that best captures the way
we use the concept of chance both in our everyday uses and in scientiic
discourses. The second formulation is much less intuitive and the reason
for  that  is  that  it  is  false:  it  assumes  the  AHIT  which  rules  out  some
intuitive  judgements  we  have  regarding  chancy  events.  The  irst
formulation,  however,  needs  an  admissibility  clause  in  order  to  be
consistent. As explained in section 1, since this is so we must ind a way to
at least partly characterize the set of admissible propositions (to a given
proposition). I have argued that the AHIT is not the right characterization
to use, but I did not ofer an alternative characterization (thus I have not
provided answers to Meacham’s irst and second challenges). I intend to
do that elsewhere. 
Now, although chances are against me (judging by the current acceptance
rate  in  philosophy  journals),  in  case  I  will  succeed  in  doing  that,  my
intention will  serve as a contrastive explanation for my ofering such a
characterization rather than not.  Since this is so, my intention is (now)
inadmissible to my actually doing so sometime in the future. Thus, my
degree of belief that I will is pretty high. There is nothing irrational in that.
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Opinion polling and election predictions
Abstract
Election prediction by means of opinion polling is a rare empirical success story for 
social science, but one not previously considered by philosophers. I examine the details 
of a prominent case, namely the 2012 US presidential election, and draw two lessons of 
more general interest:
1) Methodology over metaphysics. Traditional metaphysical criteria were not a useful 
guide to whether successful prediction would be possible; instead, the crucial thing was 
selecting an effective methodology.
2) Which methodology? Success required sophisticated use of case-specific evidence 
from opinion polling. The pursuit of explanations via general theory or causal 
mechanisms, by contrast, turned out to be precisely the wrong path – contrary to much 
recent philosophy of social science.
1. Introduction: metaphysics and methodology
Is systematic predictive success in social science possible? Many have given reasons why
it is not, such as the fact that social systems are open systems, or that they exhibit 
reflexivity, or simply that there are too many variables needing to be modeled (Taylor 
1971, Giddens 1976, Hacking 1995, Lawson 1997). In this paper I examine a notable 
case of predictive success so far relatively neglected by philosophers – namely election 
prediction by means of opinion polling – that seems to contradict these reasons.
Next, if successful prediction is possible, what makes that so? The lesson from the 
opinion polling case is that the most fruitful answer to this question is not metaphysical 
but rather is methodological. In particular, success or the lack of it was not predictable 
from the metaphysics of elections, which indeed in many respects remain unknown.1 
Rather, what was crucial was a certain methodological approach.
One popular methodological view, borne in part from pessimism about the possibility of 
prediction, has argued that the main aim of social science should instead be explanation. 
1 Strevens (2005), for instance, gives metaphysical conditions for when explanation and 
prediction are possible in some complex systems. But it is unclear whether these 
conditions are satisfied in the elections case.
1
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This latter can be achieved via the discovery of causal mechanisms, as urged by ‘new 
mechanists’ (Lawson 1997, Brante 2001), or else via the development of underlying 
theory (Elster 1989, Little 1991). Moreover, much of mainstream practice in economics –
and other social science – is implicitly committed to this latter view: while all accept that 
rational choice models, for instance, might not be predictively successful, nevertheless 
they are held to provide ‘understanding’ or ‘underlying explanation’.
A contrary view rejects this methodological emphasis on mechanisms or underlying 
theory (Cartwright 2007, Reiss 2008). One strand, motivated in part by detailed case 
studies of other empirical successes, has emphasized instead context-specific and extra-
theoretical work. Theories and mechanisms play at most a heuristic role; empirical 
success requires going beyond them (Alexandrova 2008, Alexandrova and Northcott 
2009). 
The details of the opinion polling case turn out to endorse this second view. The reason is
that, roughly speaking, while the extra-theoretical approach achieved prediction but not 
explanation, the theory-centred approach achieved neither. That is, a search for 
explanation not only yielded no predictive success, it also yielded no explanations. So the
first view gives exactly the wrong advice.
I focus on the 2012 US presidential election, in which Barack Obama defeated Mitt 
Romney. I begin by describing the predictive success achieved by aggregators of opinion 
polls (section 2), before examining how this success was achieved (sections 3 and 4). In 
contrast, theoretical approaches to election prediction fared much worse (section 5). I 
then discuss their failure also at furnishing explanations (sections 6 and 7).
2. Predictive success and metaphysical criteria
The 2012 presidential campaign featured literally thousands of opinion polls. The most 
successful of all election predictors were some aggregators of these poll results. 
Famously, several successfully forecast the winner of all 50 states in the 2012 election, as
well as also getting Obama and Romney’s national vote shares correct to within a few 
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tenths of a percent.2 This was a stunning success, arguably with few equals in social 
science. Nor was it easy – no one else replicated it, although many tried.3 On the morning
of the election the bookmakers had Romney’s odds at 9/2, i.e. about 18%. Political 
futures markets such as InTrade had Romney’s chances at about 28%. These market 
prices imply that common opinion was surprised by the outcome.4
Moreover, it is not reasonable to declare this success a mere fluke. First, the same poll 
aggregators have been successful in other elections too. And within any one election there
have been many separate successful predictions, such as of individual Senate races or of 
margins of victory, which are at least partially independent of each other. Second, the 
aggregators’ methods are independently plausible. It therefore behooves philosophers of 
social science to understand them.
Meanwhile, do elections satisfy the metaphysical criteria allegedly necessary for 
predictive success? It seems not. Presidential elections are clearly open systems in that 
they are not shut off from causal influences unmodelled by political science. They 
undoubtedly feature many variables. And they are clearly subject to reflexivity concerns: 
sometimes the mere publication of a poll itself influences an eventual election result; 
indeed there were several examples of this in the 2012 campaign. Yet despite such 
troubles, highly successful prediction proved possible nevertheless.
2 Four of the most successful aggregators were: http://votamatic.org, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/pollster/, http://election.princeton.edu/, and 
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/. The forecasting models for the first two of these
were designed mainly by political science academics, the third by a neuroscience 
academic, and the last by a non-academic. Three of the four got every state right.
3 See http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2012/11/war-on-nate-silver-final-after-action-report-
the-flag-of-science-flies-uncontested-over-silvergrad-weblogging.html for a list of 47 
examples of failure, with an emphasis on their suspicion of polling-based prediction.
4 There is an issue here about exactly what we are predicting and, thus, how we measure predictive 
success. After all, these market prices still had Obama as favorite, so why should we term them ‘surprised’ 
by his victory? In reply, first, besides the simple fact of the overall winner, there were also relevant 
additional facts: who won each state; and by how much did they win them? Odds-makers were not 
impressive with respect to these more detailed targets. Indeed, barring unlikely background assumptions, 
the details of the state-level results are hard to reconcile with a 28% chance of overall Romney victory. 
Second, the best poll aggregators’ predictions were probabilistic, which makes it quite an intricate matter 
assessing who actually did best. (For analysis, see http://rationality.org/2012/11/09/was-nate-silver-the-
most-accurate-2012-election-pundit/.) But there is no serious dispute that the odds-makers and many other 
predictors were not accurate.
3
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3. The science of opinion polling5
In any opinion poll, the voting intentions of a sample serve as a proxy for those of a 
population. How might things go wrong, such that the sample will not be representative? 
The most well-known way, a staple of newscasts and introductory statistics courses alike,
is sampling error: small samples can lead to misleading flukes. But sampling error is not 
the only source of inaccurate predictions and indeed is far from the most important one. 
Awareness of this crucial point lies at the heart of any serious election prediction.
To begin, a major issue for pollsters is to ensure that their samples are appropriately 
balanced with respect to various demographic factors. Suppose, for example, that two-
thirds of interviewees were women. Since there was good reason to think that women 
were disproportionately likely to vote for Obama, it follows that such a woman-heavy 
sample would give misleadingly pro-Obama predictions. Polling companies would 
therefore rebalance such a sample, in effect putting greater weight on men’s responses. 
Notice several things about such a rebalancing procedure. 
First, it is quite different from sampling error.6 In particular, if our sampling procedure 
over-selects women, then the error will not be reduced just by making the sample larger.
Second, sample rebalancing is clearly unavoidable if we wish to predict accurately. For 
this reason, every polling company performs some version of it.
Third, a poll’s headline figures are therefore heavily constructed. They are certainly not 
the raw survey results. Exactly what and how much rebalancing is required depends on 
assumptions about the actual turnout on election day. For instance, in recent American 
5 Although election prediction is the focus of this paper, opinion polls of course have 
many other uses too.
6 Lying in the background here are reference class issues. If we partition the population 
fine-grainedly enough, presumably even instances of sampling error will not be 
‘random’. But given the unavoidable cognitive and epistemic constraints facing polling 
scientists, choice of reference class is not arbitrary. And in practice the distinction 
between sampling and systematic error is of enormous importance to election prediction.
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presidential elections typically there have been slightly more women than men voters, so 
it would be a mistake to rebalance the sample to exactly 50-50. The correct figure may 
not be obvious, it needing to be inferred from imperfect polling data about past elections, 
and moreover with some assessment about how patterns of turnout in the upcoming 
election may be different from those in previous ones. Accordingly, different polling 
companies may quite reasonably choose slightly different rebalancing procedures. The 
result is the phenomenon of ‘house effects’, when any particular company’s polls may 
systematically favor one or other candidate compared to the industry average. When 
assessing the significance of a poll for election prediction, it is vital to be aware of this.
Fourth, the rebalancing issue is pressing because it applies to many other factors besides 
gender, such as: age; income; race; likeliness to vote; education; ownership of cellphones 
but not landlines; and home access to internet. Not only is the precise rebalancing 
procedure for each of these factors arguable, it is also arguable exactly which factors 
should be rebalanced for in the first place (see below).
In addition to random sampling error and systematic sampling bias, there are several 
other potential sources of error as well. There is space only to mention a couple here. One
is the phenomenon of herding: at the end of a campaign pollsters – it is widely suspected 
– ‘herd’, i.e. report headline figures closer to the industry mean, presumably to avoid the 
risk of standing out as having missed the final result by an unusually large margin. Some 
sensitivity to this turns out to be optimal for accurate election prediction.7 A second worry
is simply that voters may change their minds between a poll and election day. This is the 
main reason why polls taken, say, six months before an election have a much poorer 
predictive record than do those taken closer to the time. Election predictions must 
therefore take into account a poll’s date too.
4. Poll aggregation
7 For evidence of herding’s significance, and references, see: 
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/oct-10-is-romney-leading-right-
now/, http://votamatic.org/pollsters-may-be-herding/, and 
http://themonkeycage.org/2012/09/26/robo-polls-a-thumb-on-the-scales/ 
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Turn now to the aggregation of polls, which represents a second layer of method, quite 
distinct from that required for a single poll. Historically, poll aggregation has had a better 
predictive record than using individual polls alone. One obvious reason is that 
aggregation increases effective sample size and therefore reduces sampling error. A 
typical individual poll may have 95% confidence intervals of 3 or 4%; the confidence 
intervals for an aggregation of eight or ten polls, by contrast, are typically 0.75 or 1%.8 
But it is a different story for the other possible sources of error. Mere aggregation is no 
cure for those, because it might be that they bias all polls – and hence the aggregate of 
polls – in a similar way.9
What, then, does account for aggregation’s superior predictive success? In part, it is 
indeed simply the reduction of sampling error. But it is not just that; it is also that 
sophisticated aggregation can mitigate the other sources of error too. This explains why 
the best aggregators beat simple averaging of the polls. It is instructive to consider a 
couple of methodological issues in more detail.
4.1) State versus national polls
One feature of the 2012 US presidential campaign was a divergence between state and 
national polls. By combining opinion polls for individual states, making due allowance 
for population and likely turnout, it is possible to calculate an implicit figure for the vote 
share across the country as a whole. When this was done, there was a surprising 
inconsistency: the state polls implied that Obama was ahead at the national level, but the 
national-level polls showed him behind. The divergence was at least three percentage 
points. What to do? Simple averaging was no answer, because the inconsistency was true 
of the polls’ averages too.
One possible cause of the divergence was that it was just sampling error – confidence 
intervals are sufficiently wide that there is a non-negligible chance of this. However, a 
similar discrepancy had persisted for much of the campaign, rendering this explanation 
8 There were rarely more than eight or ten polls of a single area in a single time period.
9 Although house effects will, by definition, tend to cancel out, still it might be that the 
best sample rebalancing procedure is an outlier relative to the industry average.
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implausible. Another possibility was that Obama’s votes were disproportionately 
concentrated in heavily-polled swing states. But this explanation turned out to be 
implausible too: first, it required disproportionately good Romney polling in non-swing 
states, but this had not occurred. Second, it seemed unlikely anyway given that, 
demographically speaking, swing voters in Ohio or Virginia are much the same as those 
in Texas or California, so why should their voting intentions be systematically different? 
– after all, both campaigns were spending similar amounts in the swing states. Third, such
a pattern is uncommon historically.
There therefore seemed little prospect of reconciliation; instead, it boiled down to 
preferring one of the state or national polls to the other. In favor of the latter: national 
polls tend to have larger sample sizes and to be run by more reputable firms. But on 
balance, there were better reasons to prefer the state polls instead. First, there are many 
more of them, suggesting that sampling error is less likely. Second, some of the other 
sources of error are arguably less likely too. In particular, herding effects will likely occur
relatively independently in different states. As a result, that source of error for state polls 
will likely cancel out at the level of national polling numbers. Third, historical evidence 
again: when the two have conflicted in previous elections, typically the state polls have 
proven better predictors than have national ones.
The take-away is to emphasize the value added by sophisticated poll aggregation. Simply 
averaging the polls was not enough. Neither was it optimal just to split the difference 
between state and national polls symmetrically. Instead, more sophisticated analysis was 
required.
4.2) Could all the polls have been wrong?
By the end of the 2012 campaign, it was clear that if the polls were right then Obama 
would win. Romney’s only hope by then was that the polls were systematically skewed 
against him. Thus, all turned on whether the polls could indeed be so skewed. Once 
again, simple averaging is no help here, since the issue at hand is not what the polls said 
but rather whether we should believe what they said.
7
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The historical record suggested it was unlikely the polls were skewed enough to save 
Romney.10 Confidence in this conservative verdict was strengthened by the absence in 
2012 of factors that have marked systematic polling errors in the past, such as a high 
number of voters declaring themselves ‘undecided’, or a significant third-party candidate.
Given that it was the end of the campaign, there was also little reason to expect a large 
change of voters’ minds before election day – especially given also the record levels of 
early voting. Finally, the number of polls involved and the size of Obama’s lead made 
sampling error too an implausible savior for Romney.
The only remaining source of error was therefore sample rebalancing. In particular, was 
there some procedural skew, common across many or all polls, which had been 
mistakenly depressing Romney’s figures? There was little evidence of a significant 
‘Bradley effect’, i.e. where polls overrated Obama because respondents were reluctant to 
state their opposition to him for fear of seeming racist.11 But a different possibility was 
much discussed. It concerned whether polling companies should rebalance samples 
according to party affiliation. American voters self-identify as one of Democrat, 
Republican or Independent. If a polling sample were, say, disproportionately composed 
of Democrats, that would yield a skewed pro-Obama result. In 2012, that was exactly the 
accusation: polls showed that Romney had a big lead among Independents, and critics 
charged that Obama came out ahead overall only because the polls were ‘over-sampling’ 
Democrats. That is, the proportion of Democrats in samples was charged to be 
disproportionately high in light of exit polls from previous elections and other 
considerations.12
The key methodological issue is whether party affiliation is a stable population variable 
that should be adjusted for in the same manner as age or gender, or whether instead it is 
an unstable variable that is merely an attitude and often just an effect of voting 
10 http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/nov-3-romneys-reason-to-play-
for-pennsylvania/ 
11 http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2008/08/persistent-myth-of-bradley-effect.html
12 http://www.redstate.com/2012/10/26/why-i-think-obama-is-toast/
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preferences. If the latter, then the party of whomever is the more popular candidate may 
be ‘over-sampled’ simply because a voter’s party self-identification is influenced by their 
voting intention in a way that their age or gender cannot be. If so, then it is distorting to 
rebalance for stated party affiliation; but if not so, then it is distorting not to. Standard 
industry practice had been the former, i.e. not to rebalance for stated party affiliation. 
Predicting correctly who would win the presidency turned critically on whether this 
practice was correct. Was it?
Again, simply averaging the polls was no help. One piece of evidence gives a flavor of 
the more detailed kind of analysis required. Across different polls of a particular state, 
with similar headline figures, there was typically a strong positive correlation between 
Romney’s lead among Independents and the proportion of voters self-identifying as 
Democrats.13 The inference from this is that party self-identification is an unstable 
variable. For various reasons, a given Obama voter might self-identify as Independent in 
one poll but as Democrat in a second. As a result, in the first poll there are fewer 
Democrats and Romney’s lead among Independents is lower, whereas in the second both 
are higher – hence the positive correlation between the two. The important thing from a 
prediction point of view is whether Obama is leading overall in both polls – as, in swing 
states, he indeed was.
5. Failure of the theory-centred approach
The details of poll aggregation show clearly the case-specific nature of its methods. The 
alternative is to focus instead on ‘fundamentals’, i.e. on variables that might shed light on
election results generally not just case-specifically, such as economic conditions, the 
perceived extremism of candidates, incumbency, and so forth. There is a literature in 
political science on election prediction that aims to furnish just such generalizable 
models.14 How does it fare?
13 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nick-gourevitch/romney-lead-with-
independents_b_2058290.html
14 Influential contributions include Fair (1978), Campbell and Wink (1990), Hibbs 
(2000), Abramowitz (2008), and Lewis-Beck and Tien (2008). Montgomery et al (2012) 
averages these and other models to achieve the best forecasting success of all.
9
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Conveniently, it too has focused on US presidential elections. The sample size is 
relatively small, as fewer than 20 elections have good enough data. This creates a danger 
of overfitting. In response, models typically feature only a small number of variables, 
most commonly economic ones such as growth in GDP, jobs or real incomes.15 Sensibly, 
they are estimated on the basis of one part of the sample and then tested by tracking their 
predictive performance with respect to the rest of the sample.16 Even then, there remains a
risk of overfitting – if a model predicted the first few out-of-sample elections quite well, 
will its success continue in future elections? Moreover, even if a model does successfully 
predict past elections, there is no guarantee the political environment is so stable that the 
model will remain valid in future too.
These caveats noted, it is true that the models do have a little success. On one estimate, 
the best ones’ average error when predicting the incumbent party’s share of the vote is 
between 2 and 3%.17 But this is not quite as impressive as it might initially sound: first, 
for our purposes it is something of a cheat, in that one of the variables in by far the 
highest weighted model – Abramowitz 2008 – is a polling result, namely presidential 
approval rating. So the success is not achieved purely by fundamentals. Second, a 2-3% 
average error corresponds to an average error when estimating the gap between the 
leading two candidates of about 5%. And third, vote shares rarely deviate all that much 
from 50% anyway, so they are quite an easy target – indeed, another estimate is that 
economic variables account for only about 30-40% of the variance in incumbent party 
vote share.18 Overall, the models do not predict individual election results very reliably. 
15 Literally thousands of economic variables could plausibly be deemed relevant, not to 
mention many non-economic ones too.
16 Of course, there is a long history of debate within philosophy of science about the 
relative epistemic merits of novel prediction versus retrospective accommodation of the 
facts. Defenses of the latter typically emphasize how theory may have been developed or 
tested independently of the particular accommodation, how background knowledge may 
leave the main epistemic task mere calibration of an agreed functional form, or how a 
lack of any plausible alternative explanations tells in favor of the one that we do find. But
none of these defenses apply well to the election prediction case, justifying the literature’s
concentration here on prediction.
17 See http://www.brendan-nyhan.com/blog/2011/11/a-comparison-of-presidential-
forecasting-models.html for discussion and references.
18 http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/a-radical-centrist-view-on-
election-forecasting/
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On many occasions, they even get wrong the crude fact of which candidate won. For 
accurate prediction, it is necessary to incorporate the results of opinion polls.
6. Explanation
Why did Obama win? Answering this requires identification of an event’s causes.19 That 
in turn requires a verified theory or causal model. The problem is that nobody – from 
either approach – has managed to produce one.
On the polling side, in a trivial sense Obama’s victory is ‘explained’ by the fact that, as 
revealed by aggregators, on the eve of the election a majority of the electorate were 
minded to vote for him. But, of course, for most investigative purposes a deeper 
explanation is required, in particular one that might apply to other elections too. Poll 
aggregation provides none.20
On the fundamentals side, if their models had fared better they would have provided 
exactly the explanations that polling aggregation does not. After all, that is precisely the 
motivation for theory-centred methodology. Thus, say, we might have been able to 
explain that Obama won because of positive GDP and jobs statistics in the preceding two 
quarters. Unfortunately, though, the fundamentals models are not predictively accurate.
Can they nevertheless provide us with explanations anyway? The argument would be that
they have truly identified relevant causes. It might be postulated, for instance, that GDP 
or stock market growth does causally impact on voter preferences and thus on election 
outcomes. True, other causes impact too and so the models do not explain the outcomes 
fully nor predict them accurately, but that still leaves room for the claim that they explain 
them ‘partially’ by correctly identifying some of the causes present.21
19 Following the literatures under consideration here, I focus on causal explanation. I do 
not mean to rule out the possibility of other forms of explanation.
20 It is true that some proximate explanations of the election outcome can be tested by 
careful observation of movements in the polls. For instance, the impact of Obama’s weak 
performance in the first presidential debate, or of Hurricane Sandy in the campaign’s final
week, can be assessed in this way. But testing an explanation is not the same as providing
one.
21 See Northcott (2013) for more on the relevant sense of partial explanation.
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But, alas, even this claim is dubious. First, the different models cite different variables. 
Abramowitz’s, for instance, cites GDP growth, presidential approval rating, and a 
complex treatment of incumbency; Hibbs’s though cites growth in real disposable income
and the number of military fatalities abroad. Even among economic variables alone, some
models cite GDP, some household incomes, some jobs data, some stock market 
performance, and so on. There are many different ways to achieve roughly the same 
limited predictive success, which shakes our faith that any one way has isolated the true 
causal drivers of election results. Perhaps the small sample size relative to the number of 
plausible variables makes this problem insoluble.
The second reason for pessimism is that, elsewhere in science, a standard response to 
predictive failure is to test putative causes in isolation. As it were, at least we achieve 
predictive success in the isolated test. But unfortunately such experiments are impossible 
in the case of election predictions. So as well as predictive failure at the level of elections 
as a whole, the causal factors picked out by the models have not earned their empirical 
keep by other means either.
The upshot is that we have no warrant for asserting that we have found even some of the 
causes of election outcomes, and therefore no warrant for claiming even partial 
explanations. Thus the basic conclusion stands: we have not achieved any explanation of 
election outcomes, and so the original motivation for turning to fundamentals models is 
frustrated.
7. Transportability
Are the predictive successes of one election transferrable to another? That is, will a 
similar polling aggregation strategy work elsewhere? For US presidential elections, it 
seems that the answer is ‘yes’ – witness the success of many of the same polling 
aggregators in 2008. However, it is a different story for other elections, such as US 
congressional elections or elections in other countries.22
22 The http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/ predictions of these two in 2010, for 
instance, were notably less successful.
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The reason is precisely the case-specific nature of polling aggregation – for the best 
aggregation does not rely only on polls. It must also factor in features such as whether an 
election is a single national vote or split into many smaller constituencies, whether there 
are two or many major political parties, whether the voting system is first-past-the-post or
proportional representation, one-shot or multi-round, and so on. The implications of a 
poll for election prediction depend on just such factors. It has also proved profitable to 
moderate polling results by considering what result should be ‘expected’, given various 
local demographic and historical factors. The details of just how to do this are important 
– and inevitably highly case-specific.
Perhaps even more significantly, the earlier nuances, namely adjudicating state versus 
national polls and whether polls might be systematically skewed, could also only be 
resolved by case-specific knowledge. There are many similar examples, such as the 
extent of regression to the mean to be expected if one candidate is ‘surprisingly’ far ahead
at an early stage of the campaign, or after party conventions or presidential debates. Such 
knowledge is crucial, but typically it is transferrable to new elections only imperfectly if 
at all.
So a serious polling aggregator must build a new election prediction model each time. 
This lack of transportability is really just the flipside of two facts familiar from above: 
first, that no one has achieved satisfactory causal explanations – not even the poll 
aggregators. And second, that predictive success requires case-specific knowledge rather 
than a search for generalizable causal mechanisms or theoretical underpinnings.
8. Conclusion
How can we make progress, i.e. predict election results even better? It is clear that 
improving the models of fundamentals is an unpromising route. Rather, progress will be 
made in the same way as it has been made in the last few years – by doing polling 
aggregation better. This might involve getting better polling data, analyzing that data 
better, or understanding better how the implications of that data depend on local 
13
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peculiarities – in other words, by developing the case-specific, extra-theoretical 
components of prediction for each application anew. Although transportable explanations 
are elusive, predictive success need not be; what is clear, though, is that misplaced 
context-free theory offers neither. It seems there are no short-cuts in social science.
14
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Curie’s principle asserts that every symmetry of a cause manifests as a symmetry 
of the effect. It can be formulated as a tautology that is vacuous until it is 
instantiated. However instantiation requires us to know the correct way to map 
causal terminology onto the terms of a science. Causal metaphysics has failed to 
provide a unique, correct way to carry out the mapping. Thus successful or 
unsuccessful instantiation merely reflects our freedom of choice in the mapping. 
 
1. Introduction 
 When Pierre Curie (1896) introduced the principle that now carries his name, his concern 
was a quite specific problem in crystallography. The properties of a crystalline substance 
supervene on the atomic structure of its crystalline lattice. Hence those properties must respect 
the symmetries of the lattice. If, in addition, the lattice is subject to external influences such as an 
electric or magnetic field, the symmetries to be respected reduce to those common to the lattice 
and external influence. This last remark is the substance of Curie’s observation. 
 Curie expressed it as one of a number of “propositions” in the general language of cause 
and effect.2 
                                                
1 I thank my co-symposiasts, Elena Castellani, Jenann Ismael and Bryan Roberts for stimulating 
discussion. 
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When certain causes produce certain effects, the symmetry elements of 
the causes must be found in the their effects. 
This proposition continues as a basic supposition of crystallography. The generality of its form, 
however, has led it to appear in other sciences, such as structural geology. (See Nakamura and 
Nagahama, 2000). It has also entered the philosophy of science literature. 
 If one seeks an ever-elusive principle of substantial content in the metaphysics of 
causation, one might be tempted to identify this principle. As Brading and Castellani (2013) 
point out, it does appear to be a straightforward application of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient 
reason. A symmetry expresses an indifference in a cause. We should expect that same 
indifference in the effect, since we lack a sufficient reason for it to be otherwise.  
 Appealing as this vindication of causal metaphysics may seem, the principle’s status in 
the literature is fraught. A straightforward macroscopic account of spontaneous symmetry 
breaking is a prima facie counterexample. An isotropic ferromagnet, on cooling past its Curie (!) 
point, acquires a magnetization in some random direction. (The example is much disputed. See 
Ismael, 2007, §7; Castellani, 2003; and Earman, 2004.) Chalmers (1970, p. 134) allows that 
Curie’s principle may be irrefutable, since we might overturn any counterexample by seeking 
some as yet undiscovered asymmetry. He also reports (p.133) Freundenthal’s suspicion that the 
generality of the principle depends on its being “necessarily vague.” The supposition that 
asymmetry can only come from asymmetry is falsified, van Fraassen (1989, p. 240) asserts, by 
indeterministic processes. Ismael (§§ 2, 3 and 6) responds that the principle is a demonstrable 
truth for both deterministic and indeterministic systems. Belot (2003, pp. 404-405) and, more 
forcefully, Roberts (2013) have described counterexamples to Curie’s principle. In short, there is 
no consensus on the status of Curie’s principle. It is all of an irrefutable, metaphysical necessity 
with counterexamples; a demonstrable truth; an empirical falsehood; and an overreaching 
vagueness.  
 My purpose in this paper is to identify precisely why Curie’s principle engenders such a 
proliferation of opinions. I will argue that Curie’s principle is a demonstrable truth, but merely as 
an easy tautology.  Its success or failure in science depends entirely on whether it is instantiated 
in some system. Whether it is instantiated depends in turn on how we interpret elusive terms like 
                                                
2 Curie (1894, p. 127); translation Brading and Castellani (2003. p. 312). 
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“cause” and “effect.” There is sufficient pliability in our interpretation of causal language to 
make the principle a truism, when it does turn out to be true. That is, it is a self-evident truth, but 
one whose truth is attained cheaply through a pliability in the meaning of causal terminology.  
 The pliability in our interpretation of causal language arises from the failure of causal 
metaphysics to deliver unequivocal meanings. Elsewhere (Norton, 2003, 2007, 2009), I have 
argued that the metaphysics of causation supports no independent, empirical principles of 
universal scope. Rather successful causal talk in science is merely the opportune attachment of 
causal labels to terms in the propositions of a science, without in any way restricting their 
content. These same concerns apply here. Depending on how we construe the notions of cause 
and effect, we can render Curie’s principle a truth of a selected application in science or not.  
 Each of the proliferating opinions of Curie’s principle arises by emphasizing one or other 
aspect of these success and failures of instantiation. A sense of the pervasive truth of the 
principle comes from the fact that familiar construals of cause and effect enable successful 
instantiation. In some cases, other construals are so contrived as that we see no alternative. This 
is a purely fortuitous alignment of our causal prejudices with the case at hand. We mistake that 
accident as a manifestation of a deep truth of universal scope.  
 A sense that the principle is banal and its truth cheaply won, I will suggest, derives from 
an implicit recognition that these construals are not necessities. No higher principle precludes us 
using different ones that may lead the principle to fail. Finally, a sense that the principle is a 
falsehood stems from a recognition of the natural construals of cause and effect that preclude its 
instantiation.  
 In Section 2, I will give a more precise statement of the principle as tautology, a 
demonstrable truth. In Section 3, success or failure of the principle will be characterized as 
success or failure to instantiate the tautology. The remaining Sections 4 and 5 will provide 
illustrations of the failure of the principle to be instantiated in a context in which it is generally 
assumed to succeed (deterministic theories); and illustrations of the success of the principle in 
contexts in which it is normally supposed to fail (indeterministic theories).  
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2. Curie’s Principle Formulated as a Lemma 
 Informally stated, Curie’s principle requires that any symmetry of a cause manifests as a 
symmetry of the effect. To convert this into a demonstrable proposition, we need to make the 
notions invoked a little more precise.  
Causes and their symmetries. The set of possible causes {C1, C2, C3, …} admits a 
group GC of symmetry transformations {S
C
1, S
C
2, S
C
3, …} such that any 
symmetry SCi acting on any cause Ck satisfies Ck = S
C
i 
. Ck.  
Effects and their symmetries. The set of possible effects {E1, E2, E3, …} admits a 
group GE of symmetry transformations {S
E
1, S
E
2, S
E
3, …} such that any 
symmetry SEi acting on any effect Ek satisfies Ek = S
E
i 
. Ek.  
This characterization is sparse. More would be needed if any of the details of the 
symmetry transformations are to be displayed.3 However it is not required here since 
these details will prove irrelevant to what follows. 
 The causes C and effects E carry these names since they are related by functional 
determination. For Curie, the cause was a supervenience base of the crystal lattice and imposed 
fields; the effect was a property fixed by it synchronically. In the philosophy of science 
literature, the cause is most commonly an initial state and the effect is the state to which it 
evolves under some rule of time evolution. The general relation is:  
Causes determine effects. There is a functional relation of dependence of effects 
on causes. That is, there is a function f, such that for each cause Ci there is a 
unique effect Ei = f(Ci). 
The dependence function must obey one restriction if it is to figure in a statement of Curie’s 
principle: it must preserve any symmetry present in the cause when it maps causes to effects. 
This will be formulated more precisely as (CP2) below.  
                                                
3 For example, a cause might be the distribution of certain properties over a base space. The 
symmetry would map points in the base space to other points and carry the properties along in 
such a way that the final distribution is the same as the initial. 
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 Curie’s principle can now be formulated as a simple lemma, that is, a simple 
“if…then…” proposition:  
 
Curie’s Lemma4 
IF (CP1) Symmetry 
of cause. 
Causes Ci admit symmetries GC. 
 (CP2) 
Determination 
respects 
symmetries. 
If causes Ci admit symmetries GC and 
are mapped to effects Ei = f(Ci) then 
there exists a symmetry group GE that 
is isomorphic5 to GC. 
THEN (CP3) Symmetry 
of effect. 
The effects Ei = f(Ci) admit symmetries 
GE isomorphic to GC. 
 
 
 
                                                
4 This formulation fails to capture the informal intuition that the symmetry of the effect should 
be produced by the symmetry of the cause. It does not preclude the case of a cause that admits a 
symmetry SO3 in space, while the effect admits no such symmetry in space but, coincidentally, 
an SO3 symmetry in an internal space, not present in the cause. The formulation here of the 
tautology is good enough for the analysis that follows since that same analysis would apply to 
any augmented tautology. 
5 That is, there is a bijection between GC and GE that preserves group operations. 
Demonstrations of Curie’s principle may assume that the same symmetry transformation S can 
act on both causes and effects without specifying the sense of sameness (e.g. Ismael, 1997, p. 
169) The formulation of (CP2) here is more complicated to avoid this difficulty. 
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3. The Meaning of Success and Failure 
 It is clearly heavy-handed to lay out the principle in the form of the last section. For there 
is little substance to it. It is a tautology implementing as an easy modus ponens “A; if A then B; 
therefore B.” That simplicity does make precise the sense that the principle somehow has to be 
true. For whenever a cause admits a symmetry and the rule of causal determination respects that 
symmetry in the precise senses of (CP1) and (CP2), then the symmetry must reappear in the 
effect as a matter of elementary logic.  
 Once we have formulated Curie’s principle as a tautology, then its truth is automatic. 
How can there be any question of it succeeding or failing? That success or failure depends on 
whether the tautology is instantiated by some system of interest; that is, whether that system of 
interest provides a model of the tautology in the usual semantic sense in logic. Successes or 
failures of Curie’s principle then depend entirely on how we map the terms appearing in its 
statement to system of interest.  
 Successes of Curie’s principle arise when we perform the mapping so that (CP1), and 
(CP2) are verified. Failures of Curie’s principle arise when we perform the mapping so that they 
are not verified. These facts powerfully restrict our analytic options. Any success of the principle 
must be traced back to this mapping verifying (CP1) and (CP2). Any failure of Curie’s principle 
must be traced back to this mapping failing to do so.  
 We now see why the principle is a truism, when the instantiation succeeds. That just 
means that it is a pliable truth whose successful application to some system comes cheaply. It 
arises directly from the pliability of our mapping of the terms cause, effect and causal 
determination into the terms of the specific case at hand.  
 There will be many ways to carry out the mapping. When Curie’s principle is applied to 
cases of deterministic time development, the natural mappings typically yield success. When 
indeterministic time developments are considered, however, the natural mappings do not. In 
particular, indeterministic time evolutions give rules of dependence that tend to violate 
symmetries. Hence successes of Curie’s principle are normally associated with deterministic 
time development and failures with indeterministic time development.  
 The main claim of this paper, however, is that this association is happenstance. There is 
no higher principle that dictates which mapping is correct. What decides the mapping used is 
familiarity, comfort and, ultimately, our whim. The sections that follow will illustrate different 
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mappings that bring an unexpected failure of Curie’s principle for a deterministic system and 
unexpected successes of Curie’s principle for indeterministic systems.  
3. Failure in a Deterministic Theory 
 Determinism alone cannot be sufficient to ensure Curie’s principle. Some extra condition 
like (CP2) is required. This is shown by a toy example: highly symmetric causes C1, C2, … are 
mapped one-one to effects E1, E2, …, each of which has no symmetry whatever. Curie’s 
principle fails, since (CP2) is not verified. Below is a more realistic failure and a contrasting 
success.  
3.1 Galileo’s Law of Fall (failure) 
 A body with initial horizontal (x direction) velocity v(0) falls vertically (-z direction) 
with constant acceleration g. It is mapped as follows:  
 
 cause The body at the instant t=0 moving with horizontal 
velocity v(0). 
 
 effect The parabolic trajectory in the x-z plane; a compounded 
horizontal and vertical motion. 
 
 rule of dependency Galileo’s law of fall, expressed as dv(t)/dt = -gk, where k 
is a unit vector in the z direction. 
 
 
Curie’s principle fails for Galileo’s law of fall, when the causal notions are mapped as indicated. 
The symmetries of the cause are all spatial rotations and mirror reflections that preserve v(0). 
However, as shown in Figure 1, the effect does not manifest these symmetries. Spatial rotations 
about v(0) are not symmetries of the parabolic trajectory of the effect.  
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v(0)
v(t)
x
z
x
v(0)
 
Figure 1. Symmetries of Galileo’s Law of Fall 
 
 The reason for the failure is that condition (CP2) of the lemma is not verified. Galileo’s 
law of fall does not preserve the full symmetries of the initial state. It introduces a vertical 
motion that violates the rotational and most mirror symmetries of the initial state about the axis 
of v(0).  
3.2 Fall in a Gravitational Field (success) 
 There is an easy way to restore Curie’s principle to the law of fall. We say that Galileo’s 
law of fall, as expressed in Section 3.1, does not fully represent all the relevant causal processes. 
It introduces a preferred direction of space, the z direction, which is distinguished as vertical. We 
should, the restoration says, give the physical reason for this distinction. We now know that it is 
the presence of a gravitational field: ϕ = gz. Galileo’s law of fall should be replaced by the 
Newtonian field version:  
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dv(t)/dt = - ∇ϕ = -gk, 
We now map the augmented example as:  
 
 cause The body at the instant t=0 moving with horizontal 
velocity v(0); and the gravitational field ϕ = gz. 
 
 effect The parabolic trajectory in the x-z plane; a compounded 
horizontal and vertical motion. 
 
 rule of dependency Galileo’s law of fall, expressed as dv(t)/dt =  - ∇ϕ = -gk, 
where k is a unit vector in the z direction. 
 
 
With the augmentation of the gravitational field and these new mappings, Curie’s principle 
succeeds. The symmetries of the cause are now greatly reduced. They are merely the symmetries 
common to the initial velocity v(0) and the gravitational field ϕ = gz. That is just the single 
mirror reflection that preserves the x-z plane in which the initial velocity v(0) is found. This 
reduced symmetry is respected by Galileo’s law of fall. The same symmetry now manifests in 
the effect, for the parabolic trajectory of fall is fully contained within this x-z plane.  
3.3 Which is the Real Cause? 
 One might be tempted to dismiss the failure of Curie’s principle in the first case as arising 
from an imperfect identification of the causes. Correctly identify the real cause as including the 
asymmetric field of the second case and then Curie’s principle succeeds.  
 The temptation should be resisted. It rests on the presumption that asymmetries have to 
be included in causes and cannot be included in the rule of dependency.6 That presumption 
conflates a familiarity with a necessity. Asymmetries in rules of dependencies do often later 
prove to result from other processes still; and that discovery may enable the asymmetry to be 
moved from the rule to the cause; and it may be done in a way that conforms with (CP1) and 
(CP2). However there is no necessity that it must always be so. A deterministic rule of 
dependency that breaks symmetries is unusual among physical laws, not impossible. A law of 
fall that includes a preferred direction in space contains no incoherence. Indeed a more elevated 
                                                
6 Ismael (1997, p. 171) seems to defend this view. 
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example has been a fixture in the standard model of particle physics for half a century. The weak 
interaction violates spatial parity conservation. To formulate the physical laws governing the 
weak interaction, we must introduce a preferred handedness into space, much as formulation of 
Galileo’s law of fall requires identification of a preferred direction in space.  
4. Success in Indeterministic Theories 
 The most mentioned failures of Curie’s principle involve indeterministic time evolutions. 
Two examples are presented here. Depending on the mappings used, we can render them as 
successes or failures of Curie’s principle.  
4.1 A Probabilistically Stochastic Theory: Radioactive Decay 
  Consider the radioactive decay of an atom. To be specific, take the alpha decay of a 
heavy atom. The decay product, the alpha particle, will be projected isotropically in space; or at 
least it will be if we follow a Gamow-style model of alpha decay as the quantum tunneling of a 
particle from a spherically symmetric potential well. It will be governed by the law of radioactive 
decay, which asserts that the probability of decay in some small time interval dt is λdt, where λ 
is the decay constant. It follows that the probability density of the alpha particle being projected 
in angular direction θ, φ at time t is given by7 
ρ(θ, φ, t) = (4π sinφ /λ) exp(-λt) 
This density distributes the probability of projection isotropically, that is, uniformly over the 
angular directions θ, φ. The symmetry is then broken by realization of one direction of 
projection. 
 Here are two mappings of the causal notions. One leads to failure of Curie’s principle; 
one leads to success of Curie’s principle.  
 
                                                
7 θ, the longitude and φ, the co-latitude, are the standard angular coordinates of a spherical 
coordinate system. 
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  Curie’s principle fails Curie’s principle succeeds  
 cause Radioactive atom at t=0. Radioactive atom at t=0.  
 effect Specific radioactive decay 
event in which an alpha 
particle is ejected at time t in 
direction θ, φ. 
Probability distribution 
ρ(θ, φ, t) that an alpha particle 
is ejected at time t in direction 
θ, φ. 
 
 rule of 
dependency 
Spatially isotropic law of 
radioactive decay; symmetry 
breaking projection. 
Spatially isotropic law of 
radioactive decay. 
 
 
 The “fails” column has the normal mapping. The cause, the radioactive atom, is 
spherically symmetric in space. The effect, the emission of an alpha particle in a particular 
spatial direction, violates this symmetry. Curie’s principle fails to be instantiated. The failure 
derives from the failure of the mappings to verify (CP2). For the effect, the particular time and 
direction of the decay, is not functionally dependent on the cause, the state of the atom at t=0; 
and the rule of dependency allows the decaying alpha particle to move in a particular direction, 
contrary to the symmetry of the atom.  
 The “succeeds” column indicates another mapping. The effect is not the individual decay 
event, but the probability distribution to which it conforms. With this mapping, we can quickly 
verify that Curie’s principle succeeds. The spherical symmetry of the cause, the radioactive 
atom, is respected by the spatially isotropic law of radioactive decay. The new effect, the 
probability distribution ρ(θ, φ, t), manifests the spherical symmetry of the cause. Replacing the 
individual decay event by the probability distribution averages away the spatial anisotropy of 
particular effects, allowing (CP2) to be verified.  
4.2 A Non‐Probabilistic Indeterministic Theory: The Dome 
 The sort of indeterminism manifested in radioactive decay is limited in the sense that the 
undetermined futures must conform to a probability distribution. There are many examples of a 
more extreme failure of determinism. The physics is indeterministic and, crucially, it provides no 
probability distributions to which the many admissible futures must conform. Yet we shall see 
that this more severe form of indeterminism is just as hospitable to Curie’s principle.  
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 To make the analysis concrete, consider the simplest example of this sort of 
indeterminism: the “dome” within ordinary Newtonian physics. A radially symmetry dome has 
radial coordinate r along the surface of the dome and angular coordinate θ. It sits in a uniform 
gravitational field and is shaped so that a point at r is depressed vertically below the apex by a 
distance h = (2/3g)r3/2, where g is the acceleration due to gravity. At time t=0, a point mass that 
can slide frictionlessly over the dome surface is motionless at the apex, r=0. It is easy to show 
(Norton, 2003, §3) that Newton’s laws do not determine the future motion of the mass. It may 
remain forever at the apex, or, at any time t = T≥0, it may spontaneously move in any direction 
Θ with the motion:  
rT(t) = (1/144) (t-T)
4        t≥T 
= 0                             t≤T 
θΘ(t) = Θ 
for Θ some constant angle. Each value of T and Θ yields a distinct motion compatible with the 
initial condition. The key property of the example is that Newtonian physics provides no 
probabilities for the different directions in which the spontaneous motion may proceed or for its 
timing. I have argued in Norton (2010), that it cannot provide such probabilities for the timing 
unless we artificially add further physical structure, such as a time constant.  
 As before, there are mappings under which Curie’s principle fails and mappings under 
which it succeeds:  
 
  Curie’s principle fails Curie’s principle succeeds  
 cause Mass-dome system at t=0. Mass-dome system at t=0.  
 effect A particular spontaneous 
motion, (rT(t), θΘ(t)), for some 
specific T and Θ. 
The set of all possible motions 
M = {(rT(t), θΘ(t)): all Θ, T≥0} 
 
 rule of 
dependency 
Newton’s laws of motion. Newton’s laws of motion.  
 
 For the “fails” case, the cause, the mass-dome system at t=0, is symmetric under rotations 
of the dome around the apex. The effect, however, does not manifest this symmetry, since the 
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motion is always in some particular direction Θ.8 This arises since Newton’s laws turn out not to 
respect the rotational symmetry of this particular system (which is an unexpected outcome for 
those of us whose expectations are set by ordinary textbook treatments of Newtonian systems).  
 The change in the mapping that enables Curie’s principle to succeed is to alter what is 
mapped as the effect. A particular spontaneous motion is replaced by the set of all possible 
motions M, as indicated. This is quite analogous to the shift of the effect from a particular 
radioactive decay event to the probability distribution to which it conforms. This set M does 
manifest the rotational symmetry of the cause. That is, if Rα is a rotation over the dome by angle 
α about the apex of the dome, then an individual spontaneous motion is mapped to a new one:  
Rα(rT(t), θΘ(t)) = (rT(t), θΘ+α(t)) 
If (rT(t), θΘ(t)) is in the set M, then so is (rT(t), θΘ+α(t)). Hence it follows that
9 
RαM = M 
for all angles α. Thus Curie’s principle succeeds. That Newton’s laws do not respect rotational 
symmetry for individual spontaneous motions is no longer a problem. Newton’s laws do respect 
this symmetry when applied to the set of all possible spontaneous motions, compatible with the 
cause.  
4.3 Success and Failure for Type versus Token Causation 
 Once again it is tempting to protect the standard view that Curie’s principle fails for 
indeterministic systems by favoring one mapping of cause and effect over another. We might 
argue that mapping the effect to the set of all motions yields success selectively by excising just 
that part of the effect that would lead to failure.  
 The temptation should be resisted. There is no unique, correct mapping of cause and 
effect into the examples. Both described here are admissible. They merely correspond to 
different senses of cause and effect. The distinction is so familiar that the senses have different 
                                                
8 The exception is the case in which the mass remains forever at the apex. We might imagine that 
case included in the formulae above as T=∞. 
9 That is, RαM = {Rα(rT(t), θΘ(t)): all Θ, T≥0} = { (rT(t), θΘ+α (t)): all Θ, T≥0} 
= { (rT(t), θΘ’(t)): all Θ’, T≥0} = M, where Θ’= Θ+α. 
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names. One is “type causation”: treatment with penicillin cures bacterial infections. The other is 
“token causation”: treatment of this particular patient on such and such days cured this particular 
patient’s bacterial infection. The two senses can separate. At the type level, smoking causes lung 
cancer. But it is harder to maintain that causal relation at the token level when a majority of 
smokers do not contract lung cancer.  
 In the last two examples of radioactive decay and Newtonian indeterminism, Curie’s 
principle succeeds for type causation and fails for token causation. The sense we select will 
match our purposes and perhaps whims. A smoker’s concern is his or her own specific well-
being. Such a smoker may concentrate on a failure of token causation, at least in the sense that 
this smoker’s smoking will neither assuredly or even probably lead to the smoker contracting 
lung cancer. Public health officials will focus on type causation: in general, smoking causes lung 
cancer in the sense that it raises the average cancer rate in the population. They seek to advance 
the overall health of the population and, for them, the averages matter.  
 Correspondingly, might we argue that the initial state of the radioactive atom or the dome 
is not properly the cause of the specific decay or spontaneous motion, but rather only of the 
tendencies and possibilities encoded in the probability distribution ρ(θ, φ, t) or set M. That view 
favors type causation and the success of Curie’s principle. Both Chalmers (1970, p. 146) and 
Ismael (1997, §6) protect Curie’s principle from failure in the case of radioactive decay in just 
this way.  
5. Conclusion 
 Causal metaphysics is a troubled field. It is had no content beyond an elaborate exercise 
in naming, that is, the attaching of causal labels to pre-existing science. While evocative labeling 
can be conceptually helpful in so far as it aids us in forming apt mental pictures, mere labeling 
falls short of what causal metaphysics sometimes purports to offer: factual restrictions on all 
possible sciences in virtue of their causal characters.  
 Elsewhere (Norton, 2003, 2007, 2009), I have argued for the failure of efforts to locate 
such a factual principle of causality that usefully restricts our science. Curie’s principle is 
another such failure.  Symmetries of a crystal lattice and imposed fields must reappear as 
symmetries of the crystal’s properties. Symmetries of an initial state, propagated by a symmetry 
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preserving rule of time evolution, must reappear as symmetries in the propagated state. However 
these are not instances of a more general, factual causal principle to which all science must 
conform. Whether the principle succeeds or fails, I have argued, is a matter of how we choose to 
attach causal labels to our science. This pliability of choice is what makes Curie’s principle a 
pliable truth, that is, a truism; or at least it is in cases in which we deem it to succeed.  
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How Explanatory Reasoning Justifies Pursuit: A Peircean View of IBE
Rune Nyrup, Durham University, rune.nyrup@dur.ac.uk 
Abstract: This paper defends an account of explanatory reasoning generally, and inference 
to the best explanation in particular, according to which it first and foremost justifies 
pursuing hypotheses rather than accepting them as true. This side-steps the problem of why 
better explanations should be more likely to be true. I argue that this account faces no 
analogous problems. I propose an account of justification for pursuit and show how this 
provides a simple and straightforward connection between explanatoriness and justification 
for pursuit.
1. Introduction
Most proponents of inference to the best explanation (IBE) take it to be a distinctive mode 
of non-deductive inference where explanatory reasoning, i.e. considerations concerning 
what would be a good or the best explanation of one or more phenomena, is used as a 
guide to theory choice. This form of reasoning, they hold, is in general a reliable, if fallible,
guide to the truth of hypotheses.
The idea of an explanatory inference goes back to Charles Peirce who promoted an 
inference, which he called abduction, proceeding from the premise that a given hypothesis,
if it were true, would make an otherwise surprising fact “a matter of course” (CP 5.189).1 
Recent scholarship has however emphasised that Peirce's mature account of abduction 
differs significantly from the contemporary notion of IBE.2 Contemporary discussions 
usually assume that explanatory reasoning, at least in the form of IBE, can justify 
accepting hypotheses as (approximately, partially, etc.) true. They thus regard it as a 
species of inductive or ampliative inference. This view is often called Explanationism.
1 All references to Peirce (1932-58) are abbreviated: CP [volume].[paragraph number].
2 The following interpretation is defended especially clearly by McKaughan (2008). Cf. also Hintikka 
(1998), Minnameier (2004), Paavola (2006), Campos (2011).
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While Peirce agreed that abductions should guide our choices of hypotheses, he 
only understood this in the sense of choosing which hypotheses to investigate further. 
Peirce held that only empirical investigations can justify accepting a hypothesis, insisting 
that abduction gives us no reason to regard a hypothesis as true, except insofar as it leads to
subsequent empirical testing which the hypothesis passes. He did regard abduction as a 
form of inference which involves giving reasons (whether good or bad) and not, for 
instance, a mere heuristic for “discovery”. However, these are reasons for courses of 
action, viz. subjecting hypotheses to empirical testing, rather than reasons for belief or 
acceptance (McKaughan 2008, 450 & 454).
In this paper I defend a view of the justificatory role in science of explanatory 
reasoning in general, and IBE in particular, along the lines of these Peircean insights.3 
Specifically, drawing on the distinction between acceptance and pursuit (Laudan 1977; 
Franklin 1993a), I propose to see explanatory reasoning as first and foremost providing 
justification for pursuing a hypothesis, as opposed to justification for accepting it.
The Peircean view defended here avoids what Peter Lipton (2004) calls Voltaire's 
Objection to explanationism: why should we regard a hypothesis as any more likely to be 
actually true just because it would be a better explanation if it were true? The Peircean 
view side-steps this problem since it requires no general connection between 
explanatoriness and truth. Furthermore, the Peircean view faces no analogous problem 
either. As I shall show, there is a simple and straightforward connection between good 
explanations and justification for pursuit, based on the kinds of “economical” 
considerations Peirce stressed as fundamental to abduction. I introduce Voltaire's Objection
in Section 2 and explain why it poses a problem to explanationism. In Section 3, I present a
3 I do not claim this view to be the most plausible interpretation of Peirce's considered views on abduction,
much less to capture everything Peirce ever wrote about it. I merely use it as a name for the view, 
inspired by Peirce, which I defend in the context of the contemporary debate.
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general account of pursuit and then, in Section 4, show how explanatory reasoning can 
justify pursuit.
2. Voltaire's Objection
The slogan that one should infer “the best” explanation conceals an important distinction. 
For there are at least two senses in which an explanation can be better than its competitors, 
and these should be kept separate when evaluating explanatory inferences (Lipton 2004, 
ch. 4). In the first case, a hypothesis may be the likeliest explanation relative to the other 
competing hypotheses considered. The likeliness of an explanation has to do with truth – it 
is the explanation which we regard as most probably true, or closest to the truth, etc. For 
instance, we may be able to rule out, or make highly improbable, all plausible alternative 
explanations in light of the available evidence and accepted background theories. Here, the 
remaining explanatory hypothesis would be the likeliest available explanation, and in this 
sense the best. As Lipton is careful to point out, IBE is only interesting as an inductive 
inference to the extent that it goes beyond merely being an inference to the likeliest 
explanation. Since scientists generally aim to discover good explanations, if a hypothesis 
H is the likeliest available explanation of some otherwise surprising phenomenon, they 
would be justified in accepting H. For my purposes here, this is a perfectly cogent 
inference and nothing I say in this paper aims to challenge it.
The sense of “best explanation” that is of interest to explanationists concerns how 
good an explanation we would deem a hypothesis H to be, if it were true. Let us say that 
the explanatoriness of H is the amount and quality of the explanations H would provide, if 
it were true. Or, since the “goodness” of explanations is usually taken to concern how 
much understanding they give us, the explanatoriness of H can also be understood as the 
amount of understanding H could potentially afford us.4 Assessing this requires subjunctive
4 Explanatoriness is my preferred term for what Lipton calls “loveliness”.
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reasoning, i.e. reasoning about what would be the case – viz. how much understanding it 
would provide – if H were true. We can call this kind of reasoning explanatory reasoning. 
What explanationists claim, then, is that explanatory reasoning can give us additional or 
independent reason to accept a hypothesis as true (or approximately true). In other words, 
they regard the explanatoriness of a hypothesis as a guide to its likeliness.
This claim is also what makes the explanationist account of IBE controversial. One 
question concerns what “good explanations” means. There are many different accounts of 
explanation (causal, unification, etc.), and these variably emphasise certain virtues (being 
simple, unifying, coherent, elegant, quantitatively precise, specifying a mechanism, etc.) as
characteristic of good explanations. Since my argument in this paper does not depend on 
any particular view of explanation or of how they give us understanding (however we 
conceive of this), I stay neutral on these matters.
Explanationism however faces a more pressing problem – what Lipton (2004, ch. 9)
calls Voltaire's Objection. As critics have pointed out, the fact that a hypothesis would be a 
good explanation of something, if it were true, does not, prima facie, seem to have any 
implications for whether it is actually true. Indeed, this seems worryingly close to a form 
of wishful thinking. So why should this give us any additional reason to accept the 
hypothesis?5 Of course, like all inductive inferences, IBE would be fallible, and so 
explanationists should not be expected to guarantee its success. Nonetheless, they ought to
provide some reason to think that explanatoriness is generally a reliable guide to likeliness 
or that it generally tends to take us closer to the truth.
My focus in this paper is however not on the arguments explanationists give for the 
reliability of IBE.6 Rather, I restrict myself to showing that the Peircean view avoids 
Voltaire's Objection altogether and, furthermore, faces no analogous problems.
5 See Barnes (1995) for a sustained criticism along these lines directed specifically at Lipton.
6 See Douven (2011, sec. 3.2) for a brief overview.
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3. Pursuing Hypotheses and Justifying It
In his exegetical study of Peirce's views on abduction, Daniel McKaughan (2008) 
distinguishes three general interpretations: the Generative Interpretation, the Justificatory 
Interpretation, and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation. The Justificatory Interpretation 
corresponds to explanationism, where abduction is taken to provide justification for 
accepting hypotheses as true or approximately true. This view is typically contrasted with 
the Generative Interpretation, associated with Hanson (1958) (e.g. Paavola 2006). Hanson 
argued that it is a significant philosophical task to analyse the processes through which 
scientific theories are formulated, generated or discovered, promoting Peirce's abduction as
such an analysis. Popper (1934/1959) and the positivists, he argued, were mistaken in 
restricting philosophy to questions of how evidence justifies the acceptance of theories, 
relegating all other issues to empirical sociology, psychology or history.
McKaughan argues that these two interpretations overlook an important step in the 
process of inquiry between the initial formulation of a hypothesis and its subsequent 
acceptance (or rejection) as part of established scientific knowledge. Apart from 
formulating and developing hypotheses to investigate, scientists, in order to prioritise their 
time, resources, and efforts, furthermore need to make decisions regarding which of these 
to investigate or develop further. In other words, scientists need to make decisions 
regarding which hypotheses are most worthy of further pursuit.7 As McKaughan shows, 
this was a dominant theme especially in Peirce's later discussions of abduction – thus, the 
Pursuitworthiness Interpretation. It is this aspect of Peirce's views on which I draw in the 
following.
7 Pursuing a hypothesis is generally taken to involve at least two aspects: (i) subjecting it to empirical 
testing and (ii) developing it theoretically, e.g. clarifying it, resolving conceptual problems, or removing 
apparent tensions with other accepted theories (Laudan 1977; Whitt 1990). I focus on (i) in this paper.
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The distinction between accepting and pursuing a hypothesis was first coined (in 
those terms) by Larry Laudan (1977, 108-14; 1980, 174). Laudan noticed that, historically, 
scientists have often chosen to work on scientific theories despite these having have major 
empirical and conceptual problems relative to the dominant views, citing, amongst others, 
Copernicanism, the atomic theory, and quantum mechanics in their early stages. By 
distinguishing between pursuing and accepting, Laudan argued, we can say that it was 
rational for scientists to pursue these theories even though there where strong reasons to 
accept competing theories. More recently, Allan Franklin (1993a, 1993b) argues that 
certain episodes in particle physics are best understood as cases where physicists chose to 
pursue hypotheses before they had reasons to accept them.
Franklin's case studies are especially suggestive for present purposes, since these 
concern hypotheses that were pursued exactly because of their potential for explaining 
otherwise puzzling phenomena. For example, Franklin (1986, ch. 1) discusses the rejection
by particle physicists of the so-called principle of parity conversation. The puzzling 
phenomenon physicists faced was this: for a specific set of decay patterns, the principle 
that each particle has a unique mass indicated that these decays stemmed from a single 
particle, while the principle of parity conversation ruled this out. When the physicists T.D. 
Lee and C.N. Yang in 1956 proposed that parity conversation may be violated in weak 
interactions, and suggested experiments to test this hypothesis, it sparked an intense 
experimental interest. It should be noted, first, that the same hypothesis had earlier been 
suggested as a logical possibility, but without being proposed as a solution to the above 
puzzle and without arousing much interest (Franklin 1986, 29f). Second, many of the 
physicists involved were quite convinced that the experiments would falsify the 
hypothesis.8
8 Franklin reports (1986, 24) that Richard Feynman bet Norman Ramsey $50 to $1 that the experiments 
would fail to show parity violation – and ended up paying!
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Apart from the descriptive point that scientist often actually do make and argue for 
decisions about which hypotheses to pursue, there are also normative reasons why 
scientists ought to justify such choices.9 The reason is pragmatic: the resources available to 
scientists are scarce but human imagination is abundant. In Peirce's words: 
Proposals for hypotheses inundate us in an overwhelming flood, while the 
process of verification to which each one must be subjected before it can 
count as at all an item, even of likely knowledge, is so very costly in time, 
energy, and money—and consequently in ideas which might have been had 
for that time, energy, and money, that Economy would override every other 
consideration even if there were any other serious considerations. In fact 
there are no others. For abduction commits us to nothing. It merely causes a 
hypothesis to be set down upon the docket of cases to be tried (CP 5.602)10
In other words, scientists need to justify which hypotheses are worth investigating in order 
to prioritise their resources. Justifying pursuit is, essentially, a decision-theoretic problem 
of how to optimise the epistemic output of science.
Although justification for pursuit is motivated by practical or pragmatic issues, it is 
not wholly detached from epistemic matters. On the contrary, it is still concerned with how 
to best or most effectively achieve our epistemic goals. This also makes it slightly 
misleading to characterise the distinction as one between justification and pursuit. 
Although the two are sometimes conflated, the distinction between (justification for) 
accepting and pursuing hypotheses cuts across the much discussed distinction between 
9 Further case studies of pursuit are discussed by Whitt (1990) and McKaughan (2008).
10 Peirce frequently connects “economical” considerations to his account of abduction. See McKaughan 
(2008, 452ff) for further references.
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context of discovery/context of justification.11 Choices regarding which hypotheses to 
accept as well as which to pursue can and ought to be justified. The difference is that 
acceptance concerns which hypotheses are more likely to be to true, given our background 
knowledge and evidence, whereas justification for pursuing hypotheses involves practical 
reasoning about which courses of action to follow, given our resources, overall goals, and 
available information.12
How do we decide which hypotheses we are justified in pursuing, then? To answer 
this we must first, as Šešelja, Kosolosky & Straßer (2012) point out, make clear what kinds
of goals we are justifying pursuit relative to. If we are interested in a broader set of moral, 
political and epistemic goals (as e.g. Kitcher (2011)) we need to take things like ethical 
implications and technological progress into account. In this paper I am however focusing 
only on epistemic or intellectual goals such as learning the truth or getting better 
explanations or understanding. This focus also seems to be assumed by explanationists – 
ethical implications or potential technological applications are usually taken to be 
irrelevant to the explanatoriness of a hypothesis.
Given this focus, we are justified in pursuing that course of action we judge will 
bring us the closest to achieving our epistemic goals. Doing will typically involve, as 
McKaughan (2008) points out, somehow weighing and ranking the salient competing 
hypotheses in terms of factors we take to be relevant to determining this. What these 
factors are exactly will presumably vary somewhat from case to case, but some general 
suggestions can be made. Thus, Peirce highlights the “cost, the value of the thing proposed,
in itself; and its effect upon other projects” (CP 7.220). Elaborating on Peirce, McKaughan 
11 Laudan (1980, 174) characterises context of pursuit as a “nether region” between discovery/generation 
and (ultimate) justification. In my view, the “context” terminology is still misleading: these are not neatly
separated phases or contexts of scientific inquiry. The distinction concerns different kinds of choices, 
which may overlap, and the kinds of justification relevant to them.
12 McKaughan (2008, 454); cf. Kapitan (1992).
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mentions “our time, resources, and value of the estimated payoff in comparison to other 
courses of action … If we estimate that testing the hypothesis will be easy, of potential 
interest, and informative, then we should give it a high priority” (2008, 457). Indepen-
dently, Franklin (1993a, 122) observes from his case studies that “[t]he decision to pursue 
an investigation seems to depend on a weighting of at least three factors; the interest of the 
hypothesis, its plausibility, and its ease of test”. He also mentions (1993b) more pragmatic 
concerns such as “recycling expertise” or being able to continue already ongoing research 
programmes.
This of course raises the question of how these factors should be weighed against 
each other. In practice, this will probably be a matter of informed judgement. But in order 
to clarify the underlying logic, it can be useful to think of it terms of decision-theoretic 
models of simplified or idealised situations. To illustrate this, I will in the following 
develop a model that is particularly useful for thinking about explanatory reasoning.
This model focuses on just three types of outcomes of pursuing a hypothesis H:
i. We get strong enough evidence in favour of H to accept it.
ii. We get strong enough evidence against H to reject it.
iii. We get inconclusive evidence, and so stay agnostic.
We can abbreviate each of these outcomes as a(H), r(H) and ~a(H)&~r(H), respectively. 
So we are ignoring how to figure in the costs of pursuing H, whether pursuing H might 
reveal other interesting things about the world, as well the possible “effects upon other 
projects” or Franklin's pragmatic factors.
Let EV(a(H)), EV(r(H)) and EV(~a(H) & ~r(H)) represent the epistemic value 
associated with each of the three outcomes obtaining. We can think of this as the degree to 
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which each of these outcomes would take us towards or away from reaching our epistemic 
goals. It corresponds roughly to what Peirce, McKaughan and Franklin call the “value” or 
“interest” of the hypothesis. Since pursuing H has a causal influence on which of outcome 
obtains, we should weigh each of these in terms of how probable they are to obtain given 
that we pursue it. Let p(H) be the decision to pursue H and let EEV(H) be the expected 
epistemic value of pursuing H, we thus have:13
(1) EEV(p(H)) = EV(a(H)) * Pr(a(H) | p(H))
+ EV(r(H)) * Pr(r(H) | p(H))
+ EV(~a(H) & ~r(H)) * Pr(~a(H) & ~r(H) | p(H))
Since we are ignoring the costs and other effects of pursuing H, it is natural to stipulate for 
simplicity that the value of staying agnostic is nil, and so drop the last line. 
Now, how epistemically valuable it would be to accept H, and how likely we are to 
get evidence for or against it, presumably depends on whether H is actually true. To make 
this explicit in the model, we can conditionalise on the truth and the falsity in each line, 
giving us:
(2) EEV(p(H)) = EV(a(H) & H) * Pr(a(H) | H & p(H)) * Pr(H)
+ EV(a(H) & ~H) * Pr(a(H) | ~H & p(H)) * Pr(~H)
+ EV(r(H) & H) * Pr(r(H) | H & p(H)) * Pr(H)
+ EV(r(H) & ~H) * Pr(r(H) | ~H & p(H)) * Pr(~H)
13 The probabilities can be interpreted either as objective chances or credences, depending on whether one 
is interested in externalist or internalist justification for pursuit. In the latter case, the conditional 
probabilities should be interpreted as the credence that pursuing H will bring about the outcome.
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In this model, then, we would be justified in pursuing that hypothesis H which maximises 
EEV(p(H)).14 
One attractive feature of this model is that it explicitly represents a number of the 
factors mentioned earlier, and furthermore calls attention to some factors left out. I have 
already mentioned that EV(a(H) & H) and EV(r(H) & ~H) represents how valuable or 
interesting it would be to know whether H is true. Correspondingly, EV(a(H) & ~H) and 
EV(r(H) & H) is how problematic it would be to mistakenly accept a falsehood or reject a 
truth. The unconditional probabilities represent how likely or plausible H (and ~H) is prior 
to testing; and the conditional probabilities represent how likely we are to get reliable and 
misleading evidence, respectively.
Models of this kind are of course both idealised and abstract. I do not suppose that 
it is generally possible to make anything but rough estimates or comparisons of these 
factors. Furthermore, the estimates of individual scientists, as well as what they take the 
most important epistemic outcomes of science to be, probably varies significantly. I do not 
have any comprehensive account of these matters. Finally, scientists obviously do not 
always conform to or even approximate this model in their deliberations about which 
hypotheses to pursue even when their goals are purely epistemic; nor do I claim that it 
would be better if they did. Nonetheless, I find that this kind of models provides a useful 
normative framework for expressing and clarifying issues regarding justification for 
pursuit. In the following I apply it to the case of explanatory reasoning.
4. How Explanatory Reasoning Justifies Pursuit
I claim that the Peircean view avoids Voltaire's Objection. In a nutshell, I claim that 
explanatory reasoning justifies pursuing a hypothesis H by showing that it would be more 
14 The model becomes more complicated if we take into account possible synergy effects of pursuing more 
than one hypothesis simultaneously.
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epistemically valuable to learn that H is true than its salient competitors. 
To spell out this argument in more detail, notice first that the epistemic goals of 
science include more than simply knowing as many truths as possible. As Philip Kitcher 
(1993, 94) puts the point:
Tacking truths together is something any hack can do. … The trouble is that 
most of the truths that can be acquired in these ways are boring. Nobody is 
interested in the minutiae of the shapes and colors of the objects in your 
vicinity, the temperature fluctuations in your microenvironment, the infinite 
number of disjunctions you can generate with your favorite true statement as
one disjunct, or the probabilities of the events in the many chance setups 
you can contrive with objects in your vicinity. What we want is significant 
truth.
There are plenty of trivial truths out there that could be discovered and at much lower cost 
than the questions actually pursued by scientists. The value of scientific knowledge 
depends on other factors beyond merely the amount of truths known, no matter how 
certain.
Now, what these additional factors are – what other “epistemic goods”, as we might
call them, are important in science – is not something we need to give a general account of 
here. However, most philosophers of science, and explanationists in particular, seem to 
agree that having good explanations is among them.15 So one way a hypothesis can be 
more epistemically valuable than merely being true is by being a good explanation, i.e. by 
increasing our understanding of the phenomena scientists investigate. Philosophers may 
15 For instance, Kitcher (1993, 105ff) discusses “Explanatory Progress” as one of the goals pursued by 
science beyond mere truth.
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disagree about why explanation and understanding are epistemically valuable – maybe they
are intrinsically valuable, or maybe they are only valuable as a means to achieving other 
important epistemic goals. However, all I need for the present argument is that 
explanation/understanding is in fact epistemically valuable.
Now, consider the premise of an IBE: that the hypothesis H would provide the most
understanding out of a set of rival explanations, if it were true. Thus, if we were to learn 
that H is actually true, this would be an epistemically valuable outcome. Indeed, learning 
that the most explanatory hypothesis is true would be the optimal epistemic outcome as far 
as explanation and understanding are concerned. Suppose, then, that everything else is held
equal between a set of rival hypotheses: the costs of pursuing them are the same, we regard
it as equally likely that pursuing them would give us reliable evidence for or against them, 
all other expected epistemic outcomes of pursuing them are equal, and so on. In this case,  
given the account of justification for pursuit outlined above, scientists would be justified in
pursuing the most explanatory hypothesis (given that we focus on epistemic goals).
To express this in terms of the decision-theoretic model developed earlier, we can 
express the assumption that explanatoriness is one important epistemic goal as the claim 
that if H1 is more explanatory than H2, then, all else being equal, EV(a(H1) & H1) > 
EV(a(H2) & H2).16 Notice furthermore, from equation (2), if EV(a(H1) & H1) > EV(a(H2) & 
H2) then, all else being equal, EEV(p(H1) > EEV(p(H2). So it follows that if H1 is more 
explanatory than H2, we are, all else being equal, justified in pursuing H1 rather than H2.
The argument can be illustrated by an analogy: Suppose a team of treasure hunters 
know of two caves, C1 and C2, where a large treasure might be stashed. As far as they know
the treasure is equally likely to be in either cave, but they only have the resources to send 
an expedition to one of them. However, they do know that C1 could hold up to twice the 
16 This is “all else being equal” since H2 might be more valuable with regards to other epistemic goals 
besides explanatoriness.
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amount of treasure that C2 could. Assume that this does not give them any further 
information about its location or how difficult or expensive it would be to recover. 
Nonetheless, it is still more rational (for obvious decision theoretic reasons) for them to 
send the expedition to explore C1 rather than C2.
This argument shows that IBE can justify pursuit, all else being equal. In other 
words, explanatoriness can serve as a tie-breaker to justify pursuing one hypothesis rather 
than certain others. More generally, it should also be clear that if a hypothesis has a high 
degree of explanatoriness this adds to the expected epistemic value of pursuing it and thus 
gives some additional reason to pursue it, although not always a decisive reason.
Notice that I am assuming that we are deciding which hypothesis to pursue after we
have fixed our estimates of all factors relevant to pursuit. If we, for instance, discover that 
a hypothesis is more unifying than we previously thought, or change it to become more 
unifying, this can influence our estimates of the other factors. So if revising the hypothesis 
makes it less plausible, this might cancel out any gains in explanatoriness. Similarly, we 
had to assume in the treasure hunter analogy that knowing the size of the cave does not 
provide additional information about the location of the treasure, or that they have already 
taken this into account.
Since nothing in this argument assumes a connection between explanatoriness and 
likeliness, this shows why the Peircean View avoids Voltaire's Objection. Let me close by 
considering a possible objection: Justifying the pursuit of a hypothesis still involves 
showing it to be minimally plausible or probable. Indeed, Peirce sometimes says that 
abductions give us “reason to suspect that [the hypothesis] is true” (CP 5.189) or reasons 
“regarded as lending the hypothesis some plausibility” (CP 2.511, footnote) and that 
“[c]ertain premises will render an hypothesis probable, so that there is such a thing as 
legitimate hypothetic inference [i.e. abduction]” (loc. cit.). However, if this is the case, the 
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Peircean view would also require some connection between explanatoriness and likeliness 
(or plausibility), even if a weaker one than explanationists tend to require. But this is 
sufficient for a version of Voltaire's Objection to apply to the Peircean view as well.
The premise of this objection is mistaken. Justification for pursuit need not stem 
from showing the hypothesis any more probable or plausible than before. Even if a 
necessary condition for a hypothesis being pursuitworthy is some minimal degree of 
plausibility, it is not sufficient. One way of justifying pursuit might be to show that the 
hypothesis is more plausible than previously thought. However, this is not the only way. 
For one thing, one could equally argue that a hypothesis is only worth investigating if it is 
not completely trivial or obvious.17 Thus, could also justify pursuing a hypothesis by 
showing that there is more reason to doubt it than previously thought. And, as argued 
above, justification for pursuing a hypothesis can also stem from how interesting or 
valuable it would be to know whether it is true, independently of its plausibility.
Furthermore, it is not generally the case that having higher plausibility gives us 
more reason to pursue a hypothesis. Consider equation (2) again. If Pr(H1) > Pr(H2) it does
not follow that, all else being equal, EEV(H1) > EEV(H2). First, raising Pr(H1) gives more 
weight to both the first and the third term in equation (1). So if, say, EV(a(H1), H1) * 
Pr(a(H1) | H & p(H1)) < EV(r(H1) & H1) * Pr(r(H1) | H1, p(H1)) – which by assumption is 
the same for H1 and H2 – this make EEV(H1) lower than EEV(H2). Second, raising Pr(H1) at
the same time lowers Pr(~H1), thus lowering the second and the third term. Again, 
depending on our estimates of the other factors, this could lower EEV(H1).
In sum, although being very likely or plausible can sometimes be a good reason to 
pursue a hypothesis, we can equally be justified in pursuing a hypothesis exactly because 
17 In fact, neither of these conditions are necessary. As Franklin (1993a, ch. 3) points out, physicists 
sometimes pursue experimental work on a hypothesis after they regard it as conclusively falsified. 
Pursuing H can serve other epistemic goals beyond merely generating evidence for or against H.
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we think it very likely false and it would be easy to show this. And this was in fact 
something Peirce often stressed:
the best hypothesis … is the one which can be the most readily refuted if it 
is false. This far outweighs the trifling merit of being likely (CP 1.120)
This is also a plausible interpretation of why the physicists in Franklin's (1986) story chose
to pursue the parity violation hypothesis, despite thinking it very likely to be false. 
5. Conclusion
The argument given in this paper is quite general. It only rests on the premise that it, all 
else being equal, is more epistemically valuable to know whether more explanatory 
hypotheses are true than less explanatory ones. In particular, I have not presupposed any 
specific account of explanation or of why explanations are valuable. Combined with the 
account of justification for pursuit outlined in section 2, I have shown how this gives us a 
simple and straightforward connection between explanatoriness and justification for 
pursuit. The Peircean view avoids Voltaire's Objection and faces no analogous problems.
- 16 -
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❙✐♠♣❧❡ ❈♦♥t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✱ ❙❈✿ ❲❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s s✐♠♣❧❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡✲
❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✱
✭❙✶✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ q(X) = p(X|E)✳
❍❡r❡ p ❛♥❞ q ❛r❡ t❤❡ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ♦❧❞ ❛♥❞ ♥❡✇ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ❢✉♥❝t✐♦♥✱ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡❧②✳ ❍❡r ♦❧❞ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡
❢✉♥❝t✐♦♥ ✐s ♦♥❡ t❤❛t s❤❡ ❤❛❞ ❜❡❢♦r❡ ✉♥❞❡r❣♦✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡✱ ❛♥❞ ❤❡r ♥❡✇ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ❢✉♥❝t✐♦♥
✐s ♦♥❡ t❤❛t s❤❡ ✇✐❧❧ ❤❛✈❡ ❛❢t❡r ✉♥❞❡r❣♦✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡✳ ✭❍❡r❡ ❛♥❞ ❜❡❧♦✇✱ p ❛♥❞ q ❛❧✇❛②s
r❡❢❡r t♦ t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t ❛❣❡♥t✬s ♦❧❞ ❛♥❞ ♥❡✇ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ❢✉♥❝t✐♦♥s✱ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡❧②✳✮
✶■♥ t❤❡ ❝❛s❡s ✇❤❡r❡ t❤❡r❡ ✐s ♥♦ ❝♦♥❢✉s✐♦♥✱ ■ ✇✐❧❧ ♦♠✐t t❤❡ ♣r♦✈✐s♦ t❤❛t ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ❛r❡ ✇❡❧❧✲
❞❡✜♥❡❞✳ ▼② ❞✐s❝✉ss✐♦♥ t❤❛t ❢♦❧❧♦✇s ❞♦❡s ♥♦t ❞❡♣❡♥❞ ♦♥ t❤✐s ❛ss✉♠♣t✐♦♥✳
✷
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❚❤❡ s❡❝♦♥❞ t②♣❡ ♦❢ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ❞✐r❡❝t❧② ❝❤❛♥❣❡s ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ❞✐str✐❜✉t✐♦♥ ♦✈❡r
❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r ♣❛rt✐t✐♦♥ ❛♥❞ ♥♦t❤✐♥❣ ❡❧s❡✱ ❛♥❞ s♦ tr✐❣❣❡rs ❜❡❧✐❡❢ ✉♣❞❛t✐♥❣ ❜② ✇❤❛t ✐s ♦❢t❡♥
❝❛❧❧❡❞ ❵❏❡✛r❡② ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✬✳ ❚❤✉s✱ ■ ✇✐❧❧ ❝❛❧❧ t❤❡ s❡❝♦♥❞ t②♣❡ ♦❢ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ❵❏❡✛r❡②
❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡✬✳ ❲❤❡♥ ❛ ❝♦✉rs❡ ♦❢ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ❞✐r❡❝t❧② ❝❤❛♥❣❡s ❛ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ❞✐str✐❜✉t✐♦♥ ♦✈❡r E
❛♥❞ ♥♦t❤✐♥❣ ❡❧s❡✱ ■ ✇✐❧❧ ❝❛❧❧ t❤✐s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ❵❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✬✳ ✭❍❡r❡ ❛♥❞
❜❡❧♦✇✱ E ❛❧✇❛②s r❡❢❡rs t♦ ❛ ♣❛rt✐t✐♦♥ {E1, · · ·En} ✇❤♦s❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ❛r❡ ♠✉t✉❛❧❧② ❡①❝❧✉s✐✈❡
❛♥❞ ❝♦❧❧❡❝t✐✈❡❧② ❡①❤❛✉st✐✈❡✳✮ ❚❤❡♥✱ ❏❡✛r❡② ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥ ✐s ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t❡❞ ❛s ❢♦❧❧♦✇s✿
❏❡✛r❡② ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✱ ❏❈✿ ❲❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡✲
❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✱
✭❏✶✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ q(X) = Σiq(Ei)p(X|Ei)✳
❚❤❡ t❤✐r❞ t②♣❡ ♦❢ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ✇✐❧❧ ❜❡ ❝❛❧❧❡❞ ❵❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ✭r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✮✬✳ ❚❤✐s
❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ❞✐r❡❝t❧② ❝❤❛♥❣❡s ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ❞✐str✐❜✉t✐♦♥ ♦✈❡r E✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ❛♥❞
♥♦t❤✐♥❣ ❡❧s❡✳ ❍❡r❡ ❵❝❤❛♥❣✐♥❣ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ❞✐str✐❜✉t✐♦♥ ♦✈❡r E✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✬
♠❡❛♥s t❤❛t ❢♦r s♦♠❡ Ei ∈ E✱ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ Ei ❣✐✈❡♥ F ✐s ❝❤❛♥❣❡❞✳
▲✐❦❡ ❙✐♠♣❧❡ ❛♥❞ ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡✱ t❤✐s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ tr✐❣❣❡rs ❜❡❧✐❡❢ ✉♣❞❛t✐♥❣ ❜② ❛ ✈❡rs✐♦♥ ♦❢
❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✱ ✇❤✐❝❤ ✐s ❞✉❜❜❡❞ ❵❆❞❛♠s ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✬✳ ❚❤✐s ✈❡rs✐♦♥ ✐s ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t❡❞
❛s ❢♦❧❧♦✇s✿
❆❞❛♠s ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✱ ❆❈✿ ❲❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡✲
❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✱
✭❆✶✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ q(X) = Σiq(Ei|F )p(X|EiF )p(F ) + p(XF¯ )
❯♥❧✐❦❡ ❙❈ ❛♥❞ ❏❈✱ ❆❈ ✇❛s ♦♥❧② r❡❝❡♥t❧② ♣r♦♣♦s❡❞ ❜② ❇r❛❞❧❡② ✭✷✵✵✺✮✳✷
◆♦✇✱ ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r t❤❡ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❛♠♦♥❣ ❡❛❝❤ ✈❡rs✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✳ ❙✐♠♣❧❡ ❡①✲
♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ✐s ❛ s♣❡❝✐❛❧ ❝❛s❡ ♦❢ ❏❡✛r❡②✴❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡✳ ❈♦♥s✐❞❡r ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✇❤♦ ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s
❙✐♠♣❧❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✳ ❲❡ ❝❛♥ s❛② ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t❧② t❤❛t t❤❡ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❏❡✛r❡②
✷❙♦♠❡ ❛✉t❤♦rs ❝❛❧❧ ❙❈ ❵❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✬ ❛♥❞ ❏❈ ❵Pr♦❜❛❜✐❧✐t② ❑✐♥❡♠❛t✐❝s✬✳ ■♥❞❡❡❞✱ t❤❡r❡ ❛r❡ ✈❛r✐♦✉s
♥❛♠❡s t❤❛t r❡❢❡r t♦ t❤❡ ✜rst ✈❡rs✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✖❡✳❣✳ ❇❛②❡s✐❛♥ ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✱ ❙tr✐❝t ❈♦♥❞✐✲
t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✱ ❈❧❛ss✐❝❛❧ ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥ ❛♥❞ s♦ ❢♦rt❤✳ ■t ✇❛s ❇r❛❞❧❡② ✭✷✵✵✺✮ ✇❤♦ ♥❛♠❡❞ t❤❡ t❤✐r❞ ✈❡rs✐♦♥
♦❢ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥ ❵❆❞❛♠s ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✬✳ ❆ s✐♠✐❧❛r ❞✐s❝✉ss✐♦♥ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❢♦✉♥❞ ✐♥ ❲❛❣♥❡r ✭✷✵✵✸✮✳
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❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯} s♦ t❤❛t ❤❡r ♥❡✇ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ E ✐s ✶✳ ❆♥❞ ✭❏✶✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t❧②
tr❛♥s❢♦r♠❡❞ ✐♥t♦ ✭❙✶✮ ✇❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❙✐♠♣❧❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✳✸ ▲✐❦❡✲
✇✐s❡✱ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ ❛❧s♦ s❛② ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t❧② t❤❛t t❤❡ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣
{E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲T s♦ t❤❛t t❤❡ ♥❡✇ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ E ❣✐✈❡♥ T ✐s ✶✳ ✭❍❡r❡ ❛♥❞ ❜❡❧♦✇✱ T r❡❢❡rs
t♦ ❛ t❛✉t♦❧♦❣②✳✮ ❆♥❞ ✭❆✶✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t❧② tr❛♥s❢♦r♠❡❞ ✐♥t♦ ✭❙✶✮ ✇❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s
❙✐♠♣❧❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✳✳✹ ❚❤✉s✱ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ s❛② t❤❛t✿
Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ ✶✿ ❲❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❙✐♠♣❧❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✱ ✭❏✶✮ ❛♥❞
✭❆✶✮ ❡❛❝❤ ❛r❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭❙✶✮✳
■♥ ♦t❤❡r ✇♦r❞s✱ ❙❈ ✐s ❛ s♣❡❝✐❛❧ ❝❛s❡ ♦❢ ❏❈ ❛♥❞ ❆❈✳ ❆ s✐♠✐❧❛r ❝♦♥❝❧✉s✐♦♥ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❞r❛✇♥ ✇✐t❤
r❡❣❛r❞ t♦ t❤❡ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥ ❏❈ ❛♥❞ ❆❈✳ ❲❡ ❝❛♥ s❤♦✇ ✇✐t❤ ♥♦ ❞✐✣❝✉❧t② t❤❛t✿✺
Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ ✷✿ ❲❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✱ ✭❆✶✮ ✐s
❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭❏✶✮✳
❚❤❛t ✐s✱ ❏❈ ✐s ❛ s♣❡❝✐❛❧ ❝❛s❡ ♦❢ ❆❈✳
❋♦r t❤❡ ❞✐s❝✉ss✐♦♥ t❤❛t ❢♦❧❧♦✇s✱ ✇❡ ❛❧s♦ ♥❡❡❞ t♦ ♥♦t❡ s♦♠❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢
❙❈✱ ❏❈ ❛♥❞ ❆❈✳ ❈♦♥s✐❞❡r t❤❡ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s✿
✭❙✷✮ q(E) = 1✱ ❛♥❞ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ p(X|E) = q(X|E)✳
✭❏✷✮ ❋♦r ❛❧❧ X ❛♥❞ Ei(∈ E)✱ p(X|Ei) = q(X|Ei)✳
✭❆✷✮ p(F ) = q(F )✱ ❛♥❞ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X ❛♥❞ Ei(∈ E)✱ p(X|F¯ ) = q(X|F¯ ) ❛♥❞ p(X|EiF ) =
q(X|EiF )✳
✸❙✉♣♣♦s❡ t❤❛t ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯} s♦ t❤❛t t❤❡ ♥❡✇ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ E
✐s ✶✳ ❆❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ ❏❈✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ q(X) = q(E)p(X|E) + q(E¯)p(X|E¯)✳ ◆♦t❡ t❤❛t t❤❡ ♥❡✇
❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ E ✐s ✶✱ t❤❛t ✐s q(E) = 1. ❚❤✉s✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ q(X) = p(X|E)✳
✹❙✉♣♣♦s❡ t❤❛t ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲T s♦ t❤❛t t❤❡ ♥❡✇ ❝r❡✲
❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ E ❣✐✈❡♥ T ✐s ✶✳ ❆❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ ❆❈✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ q(X) = q(E|T)p(X|ET)p(T) +
q(E¯|T)p(X|E¯T)p(T) + p(XT¯)✳ ◆♦t❡ t❤❛t t❤❡ ♥❡✇ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ E✲❣✐✈❡♥✲T ✐s ✶✱ t❤❛t ✐s
q(E|T) = 1. ❚❤✉s✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ q(X) = p(X|E)✳
✺❈♦♥s✐❞❡r ❛ ❝♦✉rs❡ ♦❢ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ t❤❛t ❞✐r❡❝t❧② ❝❤❛♥❣❡s ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ❞✐str✐❜✉t✐♦♥ ♦✈❡r E ❛♥❞
♥♦t❤✐♥❣ ❡❧s❡✳ ❲❡ ❝❛♥ s❛② ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t❧② t❤❛t t❤❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ q✉❡st✐♦♥ ❞✐r❡❝t❧② ❝❤❛♥❣❡s ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡
❞✐str✐❜✉t✐♦♥ ♦✈❡r E✲❣✐✈❡♥✲T ❛♥❞ ♥♦t❤✐♥❣ ❡❧s❡✳ ❆❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ ❆❈✱ t❤❡♥✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ q(X) =
Σiq(Ei|T)p(X|EiT)p(T) + p(XT¯) = Σiq(Ei)p(X|Ei)✳
✹
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■t ✐s ✇❡❧❧ ❦♥♦✇♥ t❤❛t ✭❙✶✮✱ ✭❏✶✮ ❛♥❞ ✭❆✶✮ ❛r❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭❙✷✮✱ ✭❏✷✮ ❛♥❞ ✭❆✷✮✱ r❡s♣❡❝✲
t✐✈❡❧②✳✻ ❍❡r❡ ✇❡ ♥❡❡❞ t♦ ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r ✭❏✷✮✱ ✇❤✐❝❤ ✐s ♦❢t❡♥ ❝❛❧❧❡❞ ❘✐❣✐❞✐t② ♦r ❙✉✣❝✐❡♥❝②✳ ❲✐t❤
t❤❡ ❤❡❧♣ ♦❢ ✭❏✷✮✱ ✇❡ ❡❛s✐❧② ❛s❝❡rt❛✐♥ t❤❛t ❏❈ r❡q✉✐r❡s t❤❛t ✇❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❏❡✛r❡②
❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✱ ❤❡r ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ❣✐✈❡♥ ❡❛❝❤ ♠❡♠❜❡r ♦❢ E s❤♦✉❧❞ r❡♠❛✐♥
t❤❡ s❛♠❡✳ ◆♦t❡ t❤❛t ✭❙✷✮ ❛♥❞ ✭❆✷✮ ❛❧s♦ ✐♥✈♦❧✈❡ t❤✐s ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ r✐❣✐❞✐t②✳ ❙♦♠❡ ❛✉t❤♦rs ❧✐❦❡
❈❤r✐st❡♥s❡♥ ✭✶✾✾✹✱ ♣✳✼✵✮ t❤✐♥❦✱ t❤✉s✱ t❤❛t ❘✐❣✐❞✐t② ✐ts❡❧❢ s❤♦✇s ❛ ❝♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐✈❡ s♣✐r✐t ♦❢ ❈♦♥✲
❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✳ ❍♦✇❡✈❡r✱ ✐t ✐s ♥♦t ❝❧❡❛r ❤♦✇ ❘✐❣✐❞✐t② ✐ts❡❧❢ ✐s r❡❧❛t❡❞ t♦ t❤❡ ❛❢♦r❡♠❡♥t✐♦♥❡❞
❝r❡❞❛❧ ❝♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ❘✐❣✐❞✐t② ♣♦s❡s s♦♠❡✇❤❛t ❞✐✣❝✉❧t q✉❡st✐♦♥s s✉❝❤ ❛s✿ ❲❤②
s❤♦✉❧❞ r❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ❛❣❡♥ts ❤♦❧❞ ✜①❡❞ t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s r❛t❤❡r t❤❛♥ ♦t❤❡r ❝r❡✲
❞❡♥❝❡s❄✼ ❚❤✐s ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ q✉❡st✐♦♥ ✐s r❛✐s❡❞ s✐♥❝❡ ✐t ✐s ✉♥❝❧❡❛r ❤♦✇ ❘✐❣✐❞✐t② ✐s r❡❧❛t❡❞ t♦ ♦✉r
❡♣✐st❡♠♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ♥♦r♠s ❧✐❦❡ ❝♦♥s✐st❡♥❝②✱ tr✉t❤✲❝♦♥❞✉❝✐✈❡♥❡ss✱ s✐♠♣❧✐❝✐t②✱ ❛♥❞ s♦ ❢♦rt❤✳ ❚❤✉s✱
✐❢ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ ❡①♣♦s❡ ❝❧❡❛r❧② ❤♦✇ ❘✐❣✐❞✐t② ✐s r❡❧❛t❡❞ t♦ ❈r❡❞❛❧ ❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠ t❤❛t s❡❡♠s t♦ ❜❡
♦♥❡ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❡♣✐st❡♠♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ♥♦r♠s✱ t❤❡♥ ✇❡ ♠❛② ✜♥❞ ❛ ❝❧✉❡ ❢♦r ❛♥s✇❡r✐♥❣ t❤❛t q✉❡st✐♦♥✳ ❋♦r
t❤✐s ♣✉r♣♦s❡✱ ✇❡ s❤♦✉❧❞ ✜rst ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t❡ ❡①♣❧✐❝✐t❧② ❈r❡❞❛❧ ❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠✳
✸ ❋♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ ❈r❡❞❛❧ ❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠
❈r❡❞❛❧ ❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠ s❛②s t❤❛t ✇❤❡♥ ✇❡ ✉♥❞❡r❣♦ ❛ ❝♦✉rs❡ ♦❢ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡✱ ♦✉r ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s
✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ t❤❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ s❤♦✉❧❞ r❡♠❛✐♥ t❤❡ s❛♠❡✳ ❚❤✐s ❝♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠ s❤♦✉❧❞ ✐♥❝❧✉❞❡ ❝♦♥✲
❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ❛s ✇❡❧❧ ❛s ✉♥❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ♦♥❡s✳ ❙♦✱ t❤❡ ❝♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ r❡✲❞❡s❝r✐❜❡❞
❛s ❢♦❧❧♦✇s✿
❈❈✿ ❲❤❡♥ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ❞✐r❡❝t❧② ❝❤❛♥❣❡s ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ❛♥❞ ♥♦t❤✐♥❣
❡❧s❡✱ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X ❛♥❞ Y ✱ p(X|Y ) = q(X|Y ) ✐❢ t❤❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ✐s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❤❡r ❝♦♥❞✐✲
t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y ✳
❆❞♠✐tt❡❞❧②✱ ❈❈ ✐s ❢❛r ❢r♦♠ ❝❧❡❛r✳ ■♥ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r✱ ✐♥ ♦r❞❡r t♦ ❡①❛♠✐♥❡ t❤❡ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥
❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥ ❛♥❞ ❈❈✱ ✇❡ s❤♦✉❧❞ ✜rst ❞❡✜♥❡ t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s t♦
✻❚❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t ♣r♦♦❢s ❛r❡ ❢♦✉♥❞ ✐♥ ✈❛r✐♦✉s ♣❛♣❡rs ♦r t❡①t❜♦♦❦s✳ ❋♦r ❡①❛♠♣❧❡✱ s❡❡ ❇r❛❞❧❡② ✭✷✵✵✺✮✱ ❏❡✛r❡②
✭✶✾✾✷✱ ✷✵✵✹✮✱ ❛♥❞ ❍♦✇s♦♥ ❛♥❞ ❯r❜❛❝❤ ✭✶✾✾✸✮✳
✼❚❤✐s q✉❡st✐♦♥ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❢♦✉♥❞ ✐♥ s♦♠❡ ✐♥tr♦❞✉❝t♦r② ✇♦r❦s ♦♥ ❇❛②❡s✐❛♥ ❡♣✐st❡♠♦❧♦❣②✖❢♦r ❡①❛♠♣❧❡✱ s❡❡
❚❛❧❜♦tt ✭✷✵✵✽✮✳ ❆♥❞ t❤❡r❡ ❛r❡ ❞✐s❝✉ss✐♦♥s ❛❜♦✉t ✇❤② r❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ❛❣❡♥ts s❤♦✉❧❞ ❤♦❧❞ ✜①❡❞ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧
❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ q✉❡st✐♦♥ r❛t❤❡r t❤❛♥ ♦t❤❡rs ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s✖❢♦r ❡①❛♠♣❧❡✱ s❡❡ ❍❛r♣❡r ❛♥❞ ❑②❜✉r❣ ✭✶✾✻✽✮ ❛♥❞ ▲❡✈✐
✭✶✾✻✾✮✳
✺
Chicago, IL -585-
❙✐♠♣❧❡✴❏❡✛r❡②✴❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡✳ ■♥ ✇❤❛t ❢♦❧❧♦✇s✱ ■ ✇✐❧❧ ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r s❡✈❡r❛❧ ❝❛s❡s ✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ ❛♥
❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s s✉❝❤ ❦✐♥❞s ♦❢ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ❛♥❞ t❤❡♥ ❞❡✜♥❡ ♣r♦❜❛❜✐❧✐st✐❝❛❧❧② t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡
✐♥ q✉❡st✐♦♥✳
❋✐rst✱ ❧❡t✬s ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r ❙✐♠♣❧❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ t❤❛t ♠❛❦❡s ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♣❞❛t❡ ❤❡r ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ❜② ❙❈
♦♥ E✳ ❍♦✇ ❝❛♥ ✇❡ ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t❡ ♣r♦❜❛❜✐❧✐st✐❝❛❧❧② t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❛ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥
X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y t♦ t❤✐s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡❄ ▼❛♥② ❇❛②❡s✐❛♥s ♠❛② ❞❡✜♥❡ t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ ❜② ♠❡❛♥s ♦❢ t❤❡
♣r♦❜❛❜✐❧✐st✐❝ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ✐♥❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥❝❡ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥ X ❛♥❞ E ❣✐✈❡♥ Y ✳ ❚❤❛t ✐s✱
❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✶✿ ❙✐♠♣❧❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E ✐s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧
❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y ✐❢ ❛♥❞ ♦♥❧② ✐❢ p(XE|Y ) = p(X|Y )p(E|Y )✳
❲❤❡♥ p(E|Y )❃✵✱ t❤❡ ♣r♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ t❤❛t p(XE|Y ) = p(X|Y )p(E|Y ) ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ t❤❡
♣r♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ t❤❛t✿
✭✸✳✶✮ p(X|Y E) = p(X|Y )✳
❚❤✐s s❛②s t❤❛t t❤❡ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y r❡♠❛✐♥s t❤❡ s❛♠❡ ♥♦ ♠❛tt❡r
✇❤❡t❤❡r ♦r ♥♦t E ✐s ❛❞❞❡❞ t♦ ❤❡r ❜❛❝❦❣r♦✉♥❞ ❦♥♦✇❧❡❞❣❡✳
❚❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❛ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s t♦ ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ❝♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ ❞❡✜♥❡❞ ✐♥ ❛
s✐♠✐❧❛r ✇❛②✳ ❙✉♣♣♦s❡ t❤❛t ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✳ ▲❡t ✉s t❤✐♥❦
❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✿
✭✸✳✷✮ p(X|Y E1) = · · · = p(X|Y En) = p(X|Y )✳
❚❤❡s❡ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s ❤❛✈❡ t❤❡ s❛♠❡ s♣✐r✐t ❛s ✭✸✳✶✮✳ ❚❤❛t ✐s✱ ✭✸✳✷✮ s❛②s t❤❛t t❤❡ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ❝♦♥❞✐✲
t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y r❡♠❛✐♥s t❤❡ s❛♠❡ ♥♦ ♠❛tt❡r ✇❤✐❝❤ ♠❡♠❜❡r ♦❢ E ✐s ❛❞❞❡❞ t♦
❤❡r ❜❛❝❦❣r♦✉♥❞ ❦♥♦✇❧❡❞❣❡✳ ❚❤❡♥✱ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ ❞❡✜♥❡ t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧
❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ t♦ ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ❛s ❢♦❧❧♦✇s✿✽
❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✷✿ ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E ✐s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧
❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y ✐❢ ❛♥❞ ♦♥❧② ✐❢ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(XEi|Y ) = p(X|Y )p(Ei|Y )✳
◆♦t❡ t❤❛t ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥s ✶ ❛♥❞ ✷ ❤❡❛✈✐❧② ❞❡♣❡♥❞ ♦♥ t❤❡ ♣r♦❜❛❜✐❧✐st✐❝ ✐♥❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥❝❡ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s✳
❉✐❛❝♦♥✐s ❛♥❞ ❩❛❜❡❧❧ ✭✶✾✽✷✮ s✉❣❣❡sts ❛ s✐♠✐❧❛r ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥ ❛s ❛ ❞❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ♦❢ t❤❡ ♣r♦❜❛❜✐❧✐s✲
✽■t ✐s str❛✐❣❤t❢♦r✇❛r❞ t❤❛t ✇❤❡♥ p(Ei|Y ) > 0 ❢♦r ❛♥② Ei ∈ E✱ ✭✸✳✷✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦
✭✯✮ p(XEi|Y ) = p(X|Y )p(Ei|Y ) ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✳
◆♦t❡ t❤❛t ✭✯✮ ✐s ♠♦r❡ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ t❤❛♥ ✭✸✳✷✮✳ ■♥ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r✱ ✇❤❡♥ p(Ei|Y ) = 0 ❢♦r s♦♠❡ Ei ∈ E✱ ✭✸✳✷✮ ♠✉st ❤❛✈❡
s♦♠❡ ✉♥❞❡✜♥❡❞ t❡r♠s ❜✉t ✭✯✮ ❞♦❡s ♥♦t✳
✻
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t✐❝ ✐♥❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥❝❡ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥ ❛ ♣❛rt✐t✐♦♥ E ❛♥❞ ❛ ♣r♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ X✳ ■t ✐s ❛❧s♦ ♥♦t❡✇♦rt❤② t❤❛t
❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✷ ✐s ❛ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ ✈❡rs✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✶✳
❋✐♥❛❧❧②✱ ✇❡ s❤♦✉❧❞ ♣r♦✈✐❞❡ ❛ ❞❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ t❤❛t ❝❛♥ ❤❛♥❞❧❡ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡✳ ■♥ ♦t❤❡r
✇♦r❞s✱ ✇❡ s❤♦✉❧❞ ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r ❛ ❝♦✉rs❡ ♦❢ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ t❤❛t ❞✐r❡❝t❧② ❝❤❛♥❣❡s s♦♠❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧
❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ❛♥❞ ♥♦t❤✐♥❣ ❡❧s❡✳ ❋♦r s✐♠♣❧✐❝✐t②✱ ❧❡t✬s s✉♣♣♦s❡ t❤❛t ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❆❞❛♠s
❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✳ ❍❡r❡ ✐t s❤♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ ❡♠♣❤❛s✐③❡❞ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝❤❛♥❣❡ ♦❢ t❤❡
❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ E ❣✐✈❡♥ F ❛♥❞ ✐♥ E¯ ❣✐✈❡♥ F ❛♠♦✉♥ts t♦ t❤❡ ❝❤❛♥❣❡ ♦❢ t❤❡ r❛t✐♦
❜❡t✇❡❡♥ t❤❡ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ EF ❛♥❞ ✐♥ F ✳ ❚♦ ♣✉t ✐t ✐♥ ❛♥♦t❤❡r ✇❛②✱ t❤❡ r❛t✐♦ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥ p(EF )
❛♥❞ p(F ) ❞❡t❡r♠✐♥❡s p(E|F ) ❛♥❞ p(E¯|F )✱ ❛♥❞ ✈✐❝❡ ✈❡rs❛✳ ❚❤❡♥✱ ♦♥❡ ♠❛② ❛tt❡♠♣t t♦ ❞❡✜♥❡
t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ ❝♦♥❝❡r♥✐♥❣ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ❜② ♠❡❛♥s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✿
✭✸✳✸✮ p(X|Y EF ) = p(X|Y F ) = p(X|Y )✳
❆t ✜rst s✐❣❤t✱ ✭✸✳✶✮✱ ✭✸✳✷✮ ❛♥❞ ✭✸✳✸✮ s❡❡♠ t♦ s❤❛r❡ ❛ ❝♦♠♠♦♥ ❡♣✐st❡♠✐❝ ❢❡❛t✉r❡✳ ❚❤❛t ✐s✱
✭✸✳✸✮ s❛②s✱ ❧✐❦❡ ✭✸✳✶✮ ❛♥❞ ✭✸✳✷✮✱ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y r❡♠❛✐♥s
t❤❡ s❛♠❡ ♥♦ ♠❛tt❡r ✇❤✐❝❤ ♦❢ EF ❛♥❞ F ✐s ❛❞❞❡❞ t♦ ❤❡r ❜❛❝❦❣r♦✉♥❞ ❦♥♦✇❧❡❞❣❡✳ ■♥❞❡❡❞✱
✭✸✳✸✮ ✐s str♦♥❣ ❡♥♦✉❣❤ t♦ ❜❡ ❛ s✉✣❝✐❡♥t ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥ ❢♦r t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y
t♦ ❜❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✳ ❚❤❡ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ EF ❛♥❞
✐♥ F ❥♦✐♥t❧② ❞❡t❡r♠✐♥❡ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ E ❣✐✈❡♥ F ✭❛♥❞ ✐♥ E¯ ❣✐✈❡♥ F ✮✳ ❚❤✉s✱
✐t s♦✉♥❞s ♥❛t✉r❛❧ t♦ st❛t❡ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ t❤❡ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ EF ❛♥❞ ✐♥ F
✐s ❛❧s♦ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ E ❣✐✈❡♥ F ❛♥❞ ✐♥ E¯ ❣✐✈❡♥ F ✳
❍♦✇❡✈❡r✱ ✭✸✳✸✮ ✐s t♦♦ str♦♥❣ t♦ ❜❡ ❛ ♥❡❝❡ss❛r② ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥ ❢♦r t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ ✐♥ q✉❡st✐♦♥✳
◆♦t❡ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ E ❣✐✈❡♥ F ❞♦❡s ♥♦t ❞❡t❡r♠✐♥❡ t❤❡ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ EF
❛♥❞ ✐♥ F ✳ ❚❤❛t ✐s✱ p(E|F ) ❝❛♥ ❞❡t❡r♠✐♥❡ ♦♥❧② t❤❡ r❛t✐♦ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥ t❤❡ r❛t✐♦ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥ p(EF )
❛♥❞ p(F )✱ ❜✉t ♥♦t t❤❡ ✈❛❧✉❡s ♦❢ p(EF ) ❛♥❞ p(F ) t❤❡♠s❡❧✈❡s✳ ❙♦✱ ✐t ✐s ✐♠♣❧❛✉s✐❜❧❡ t❤❛t t❤❡
❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ E ❣✐✈❡♥ F ✭❛♥❞ ✐♥ E¯ ❣✐✈❡♥ F ✮ ✐s ❛❧s♦
✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ EF ❛♥❞ ✐♥ F ✳
❚♦ s❡❡ t❤✐s ♠♦r❡ ❝❧❡❛r❧②✱ ❧❡t ✉s ❝♦♠♣❛r❡ t✇♦ ❦✐♥❞s ♦❢ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡✿ ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡
r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {EF, E¯F, F¯} ❛♥❞ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✳ ◆♦t❡ t❤❛t ✭✸✳✸✮
✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦
✭✸✳✹✮ p(XEF |Y ) = p(X|Y )p(EF |Y )✱ p(XE¯F |Y ) = p(X|Y )p(E¯F |Y )✱ ❛♥❞
✼
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p(XF¯ |Y ) = p(X|Y )p(F¯ |Y )✳✾
❆❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✷✱ t❤❡♥✱ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y s❛t✐s❢②✐♥❣ ✭✸✳✸✮ ✐s
✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {EF, E¯F, F¯}✳ ❙♦✱ ✐❢ t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ ❝♦♥❝❡r♥✐♥❣
❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✐s ❞❡✜♥❡❞ ✉s✐♥❣ ♦♥❧② ✭✸✳✸✮✱ t❤❡♥ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧
❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F s❤♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ r❡❣❛r❞❡❞ ❛s
❜❡✐♥❣ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {EF, E¯F, F¯}✳ ❍♦✇❡✈❡r✱ t❤❡r❡ ❛r❡ s♦♠❡
✭❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✮ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s t❤❛t ❛r❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ t❤❡ ❢♦r♠❡r ❜✉t ♥♦t t❤❡ ❧❛tt❡r✳ ❚♦ s❡❡ t❤✐s✱
❧❡t✬s t❛❦❡ ✐♥t♦ ❛❝❝♦✉♥t t❤❡ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥ t❤❡ ✭❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✮ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ F ✭❣✐✈❡♥ T✮
❛♥❞ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✳ ❍❡r❡ ✐t s❤♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ ❡♠♣❤❛s✐③❡❞ t❤❛t t❤❡
❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ E ❣✐✈❡♥ F ❝❛rr✐❡s ♥♦ ✐♥❢♦r♠❛t✐♦♥ ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ F ✳ ■♥ ♦t❤❡r
✇♦r❞s✱ ❢♦r ❛♥② r❡❛❧ ♥✉♠❜❡rs a ∈ [0, 1] ❛♥❞ b ∈ (0, 1]✱ t❤❡ ♣r♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧
❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ E ❣✐✈❡♥ F ❡q✉❛❧s a ✐s ❝♦♠♣❛t✐❜❧❡ ✇✐t❤ t❤❡ ♣r♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥
F ❡q✉❛❧s b✳✶✵ ❚❤✉s✱ ✐t s♦✉♥❞s ✐♥t✉✐t✐✈❡ t♦ s❛② t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ F ✐s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦
❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✳ ❚❤❡♥✱ ❤♦✇ ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥
t❤❡ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ F ❛♥❞ ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {EF, E¯F, F¯}❄ ■t ✐s ✐♥t✉✐t✐✈❡❧② ✈❡r② ❝❧❡❛r
t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ F ✐s ✐♥t✐♠❛t❡❧② r❡❧❛t❡❞ ✇✐t❤ ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ t❤❛t ❞✐r❡❝t❧② ❝❤❛♥❣❡s
t❤❡ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ F¯ ✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✷ ❛❧s♦ s❛②s t❤❛t t❤❡② ❛r❡ ♥♦t ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❡❛❝❤
♦t❤❡r✳✶✶ ❆s ❛ r❡s✉❧t✱ t❤❡ ✭❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✮ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ F ✭❣✐✈❡♥ T✮ ✐s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❆❞❛♠s
❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✱ ❜✉t ♥♦t ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {EF, E¯F, F¯}✳
■♥ ❝♦♥❝❧✉s✐♦♥✱ ✭✸✳✸✮ ✐s ❛ s✉✣❝✐❡♥t ❜✉t ♥♦t ♥❡❝❡ss❛r② ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥ ❢♦r t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡
✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y t♦ ❜❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✳
❚❤❡♥✱ ❤♦✇ ❝❛♥ ✇❡ ❞❡✜♥❡ t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ ❛t ✐ss✉❡❄ ❚❤✐♥❦ ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✿
✭✸✳✺✮ p(E|XY F ) = p(E|Y F ) = p(E|F )✳
✾❍❡r❡ ✐t ✐s ❛ss✉♠❡❞ t❤❛t p(EF |Y ) > 0✱ p(E¯F |Y ) > 0 ❛♥❞ p(F¯ |Y ) > 0✳ ◆♦t❡ t❤❛t ✭✸✳✸✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦
✭✸✳✸✯✮ p(X|Y EF ) = p(X|Y E¯F ) = p(X|Y F¯ ) = p(X|Y )✳
❚❤❡♥✱ ✐t ❢♦❧❧♦✇s ❢r♦♠ t❤❡ ❞❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s t❤❛t ✭✸✳✸✯✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭✸✳✹✮✳
✶✵❆❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t❤❡ st❛♥❞❛r❞ ♣r♦❜❛❜✐❧✐t② t❤❡♦r②✱ ✇❤❡♥ t❤❡ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ F ❡q✉❛❧s ③❡r♦✱ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡
✐♥ E ❣✐✈❡♥ F ✐s ♥♦t ✇❡❧❧✲❞❡✜♥❡❞✳ ❚❤✉s✱ t❤❡ st❛♥❞❛r❞ t❤❡♦r② s❛②s t❤❛t t❤❡ ♣r♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥
F ❡q✉❛❧s ③❡r♦ ✐s ♥♦t ❝♦♠♣❛t✐❜❧❡ ✇✐t❤ t❤❡ ♣r♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ E ❣✐✈❡♥ F ❡q✉❛❧s ❛
♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r r❡❛❧ ♥✉♠❜❡r✳ ■♥ ♦r❞❡r t♦ r✉❧❡ ♦✉t t❤✐s ♣♦ss✐❜✐❧✐t②✱ t❤❡ ❞♦♠❛✐♥ ♦❢ t❤❡ ✈❛❧✉❛❜❧❡ b s❤♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ (0, 1]✱
♥♦t [0, 1]✳
✶✶❙❡tt✐♥❣ X ❛♥❞ Y ✐♥ ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✷ t♦ ❜❡ F ❛♥❞ T r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡❧②✱ ✐t ❤♦❧❞s t❤❛t p(FEF |T) 6= p(F |T)p(EF |T)✱
p(FE¯F |T) 6= p(F |T)p(E¯F |T) ❛♥❞ p(FF¯ |T) 6= p(F |T)p(F¯ |T)✱ ✇❤❡♥ p(F ) 6= 1✳
✽
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❋✐rst✱ ✐t s❤♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ ♥♦t❡❞ t❤❛t ✭✸✳✸✮ ✐s ♥♦t ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭✸✳✺✮✳✶✷ ❇✉t ■ t❤✐♥❦ t❤❛t ✭✸✳✺✮
✐s ❛♥♦t❤❡r s✉✣❝✐❡♥t ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥ ❢♦r t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ ❛t ✐ss✉❡✳ ❙✉♣♣♦s❡ t❤❛t ❢♦r ❛♥② X, Y ✱
E ❛♥❞ F ✱ ✭✸✳✸✮ ✐s ❛ s✉✣❝✐❡♥t ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥ ❢♦r t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y t♦ ❜❡
✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✳ ❚❤❡♥✱ ✐t ❢♦❧❧♦✇s ❢r♦♠ ✭✸✳✺✮ t❤❛t
t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ E ❣✐✈❡♥ F ✐s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {X, X¯}✲
❣✐✈❡♥✲Y ✳ ■ ❛ss✉♠❡ ❤❡r❡ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ E ❣✐✈❡♥ F ✐s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❆❞❛♠s
❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {X, X¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲Y ✐❢ ❛♥❞ ♦♥❧② ✐❢ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥
Y ✐s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✳ ❑❡❡♣✐♥❣ ✐t ✐♥ ♠✐♥❞ t❤❛t
✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s ❛r❡ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧❧② r❡❣❛r❞❡❞ ❛s s②♠♠❡tr✐❝✱ ✇❡ ❝♦✉❧❞ ✜♥❞ t❤✐s ❛ss✉♠♣t✐♦♥
♣❧❛✉s✐❜❧❡✳ ❚❤❡♥✱ ✭✸✳✺✮ ✐♠♣❧✐❡s t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y ✐s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦
❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✳ ❚♦ s✉♠ ✉♣✱ ✐❢ ✭✸✳✸✮ ✐s ❛ s✉✣❝✐❡♥t ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥
❢♦r t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y t♦ ❜❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣
{E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✱ t❤❡♥ s♦ s❤♦✉❧❞ ✭✸✳✺✮✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ s❡tt✐♥❣ X ❛♥❞ Y ✐♥ ✭✸✳✺✮ t♦ ❜❡ F ❛♥❞
T r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡❧②✱ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ ✐♠♠❡❞✐❛t❡❧② ❛s❝❡rt❛✐♥ t❤❛t ✭✸✳✺✮ ❤♦❧❞s✳ ❚❤✉s✱ ✐❢ ✭✸✳✺✮ ✐s ❛♥♦t❤❡r
s✉✣❝✐❡♥t ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥ ❢♦r ❛ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y t♦ ❜❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❆❞❛♠s
❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✱ t❤❡♥ t❤❡ ✭❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✮ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ F ❣✐✈❡♥ T ❝❛♥ ❜❡
❝❧❛ss✐✜❡❞ ❛s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ t❤❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ q✉❡st✐♦♥✱ ✇❤✐❝❤ ✐s ✐♥ ❦❡❡♣✐♥❣ ✇✐t❤ ♦✉r ✐♥t✉✐t✐♦♥✳
❚❤✐s r❡s✉❧t ❝❛♥♥♦t ❜❡ ♦❜t❛✐♥❡❞ ✐❢ t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ✐s ❞❡✜♥❡❞
✉s✐♥❣ ♦♥❧② ✭✸✳✸✮✳
■♥ ❧✐❣❤t ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r❛t✐♦♥✱ ■ ♣r♦♣♦s❡ t♦ ❞❡✜♥❡ t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ ✐♥ q✉❡st✐♦♥ ❛s ❢♦❧❧♦✇s✿
❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✸✿ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ {E, E¯}✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✐s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❤❡r ❝♦♥✲
❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y ✐❢ ❛♥❞ ♦♥❧② ✐❢
✭✸❛✮ p(XF |Y ) = p(X|Y )p(F |Y ) ❛♥❞ p(XEF |Y ) = p(X|Y )p(EF |Y )❀ ♦r
✭✸❜✮ p(EY |F ) = p(E|F )p(Y |F ) ❛♥❞ p(EXY |F ) = p(E|F )p(XY |F )✳
❲❤❡♥ p(EF |Y ) 6= 0✱ ✭✸❛✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭✸✳✸✮✳ ❆♥❞ ✇❤❡♥ p(EF |Y ) = 0✱ ✭✸✳✸✮ ❤❛s s♦♠❡
✉♥❞❡✜♥❡❞ t❡r♠s ❜✉t ✭✸❛✮ ❞♦❡s ♥♦t✳ ❯♥❧✐❦❡ ✭✸✳✸✮✱ t❤✉s✱ ✭✸❛✮ ❤❡❧♣s ✉s t♦ ❤❛♥❞❧❡ s♦♠❡ ❝❛s❡s
✶✷❙✉♣♣♦s❡ t❤❛t p(XY EF ) = p(XY E¯F ) = p(X¯Y EF ) = p(X¯Y EF¯ ) = p(X¯Y E¯F ) = p(X¯Y E¯F¯ ) = 0.1
❛♥❞ p(XY F¯ ) = p(Y¯ EF ) = p(Y¯ EF¯ ) = p(Y¯ E¯F ) = p(Y¯ E¯F¯ ) = 0.08✳ ❚❤❡♥✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t p(E|XY F ) =
p(E|Y F ) = p(E|F ) = 0.5 ✇❤✐❧❡ p(X|EFY ) = p(X|FY ) = 0.5 6= (7/17) = p(X|Y )✳
✾
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✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ p(EF |Y ) = 0✳ ❋♦r t❤✐s r❡❛s♦♥✱ ■ ♣r❡❢❡r ✭✸❛✮ t♦ ✭✸✳✸✮✳ ❆ s✐♠✐❧❛r ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r❛t✐♦♥ ❣♦❡s
✇✐t❤ ✭✸✳✺✮ ❛♥❞ ✭✸❜✮✳ ◆♦✇ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧✐③❡ ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✸ ❛s ❢♦❧❧♦✇s✿
❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✹✿ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✐s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❤❡r ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧
❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y ✐❢ ❛♥❞ ♦♥❧② ✐❢
✭✹❛✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(XF |Y ) = p(X|Y )p(F |Y ) ❛♥❞ p(XEiF |Y ) = p(X|Y )p(EiF |Y )❀ ♦r
✭✹❜✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(EiY |F ) = p(Ei|F )p(Y |F ) ❛♥❞ p(EiXY |F ) = p(Ei|F )p(XY |F )✳
❚❤✐s ❞❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✐s ❛ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ ✈❡rs✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✷✳ ■♥ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r✱ s❡tt✐♥❣ F ✐♥ ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✹
t♦ ❜❡ T✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❡ s❛♠❡ ❞❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ❛s ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✷✳✶✸
❲✐t❤ t❤❡ ❤❡❧♣ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❛❜♦✈❡ ❞❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥s✱ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ r❡✲❢♦r♠✉❧❛t❡ ♠♦r❡ ❡①♣❧✐❝✐t❧② ❈r❡❞❛❧
❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠ ❛s ❢♦❧❧♦✇s✿
CCS✿ ❲❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s s✐♠♣❧❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✱
✭❙✸✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X ❛♥❞ Y ✱ p(X|Y ) = q(X|Y ) ✐❢ p(XE|Y ) = p(X|Y )p(E|Y )✳
CCJ✿ ❲❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✱
✭❏✸✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X ❛♥❞ Y ✱ p(X|Y ) = q(X|Y ) ✐❢ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(XEi|Y ) = p(X|Y )p(Ei|Y )✳
CCA✿ ❲❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✱
✭❆✸✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X ❛♥❞ Y ✱ p(X|Y ) = q(X|Y ) ✐❢
✭❛✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(XF |Y ) = p(X|Y )p(F |Y ) ❛♥❞ p(XEiF |Y ) = p(X|Y )p(EiF |Y )❀ ♦r
✭❜✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(EiY |F ) = p(Ei|F )p(Y |F ) ❛♥❞ p(EiXY |F ) = p(Ei|F )p(XY |F )✳
✶✸❚♦ s❡❡ t❤✐s✱ ❧❡t✬s s❡t F ✐♥ ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✹ t♦ ❜❡ T✳ ❚❤❡♥✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t✿
❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✹✯✿ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✲❣✐✈❡♥✲T ✐s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❤❡r ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥
X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y ✐❢ ❛♥❞ ♦♥❧② ✐❢
✭✹❛✯✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(XEi|Y ) = p(X|Y )p(Ei|Y )❀ ♦r
✭✹❜✯✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(EiY ) = p(Ei)p(Y ) ❛♥❞ p(EiXY ) = p(Ei)p(XY )✳
■t ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❡❛s✐❧② s❤♦✇♥ t❤❛t ✭✹❜✯✮ ✐♠♣❧✐❡s ✭✹❛✯✮✳ ❚❤✉s✱ t❤❡ ❞✐s❥✉♥❝t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ✭✹❛✯✮ ❛♥❞ ✭✹❜✯✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦
✭✹❛✯✮✳ ❙♦✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t✿
❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✹✯✯✿ ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✲❣✐✈❡♥✲T ✐s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t t♦ ❤❡r ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥
X ❣✐✈❡♥ Y ✐❢ ❛♥❞ ♦♥❧② ✐❢ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(XEi|Y ) = p(X|Y )p(Ei|Y )✳
❚❤✐s ✐s t❤❡ s❛♠❡ ❛s ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✷✳
✶✵
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CCS✱ CCJ ❛♥❞ CCA ❝♦rr❡s♣♦♥❞ t♦ ❝♦✉rs❡s ♦❢ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ t❤❛t tr✐❣❣❡r ❙❈✱ ❏❈ ❛♥❞ ❆❈ ❜❡❧✐❡❢
✉♣❞❛t✐♥❣✱ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡❧②✳ ❆♥❞ ✭❙✸✮✱ ✭❏✸✮ ❛♥❞ ✭❆✸✮ r❡♣r❡s❡♥t ❡①♣❧✐❝✐t❧② t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❛
❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ t♦ t❤❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡✳ ◆♦t❡ t❤❛t t❤❡s❡ ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ❛r❡ ♣r♦♣♦s❡❞ ✇✐t❤ t❤❡
❤❡❧♣ ♦❢ ♣r♦❜❛❜✐❧✐st✐❝ ✐♥❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥❝❡ ✭❛♥❞ ✐ts ✈❛r✐❛♥t✮ t❤❛t ✐s ♠❛t❤❡♠❛t✐❝❛❧❧② ✇❡❧❧✲❢♦✉♥❞❡❞✳
❇❡❢♦r❡ ✜♥✐s❤✐♥❣ t❤✐s s❡❝t✐♦♥✱ ■ ✇♦✉❧❞ ❧✐❦❡ t♦ ❡♠♣❤❛s✐③❡ t❤❡ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ t✇♦ Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥s✿✶✹
Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ ✸✿ ❲❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❙✐♠♣❧❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✱ ✭❏✸✮ ❛♥❞
✭❆✸✮ ❡❛❝❤ ❛r❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭❙✸✮✳
Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ ✹✿ ❲❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❏❡✛r❡② ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✱ ✭❆✸✮ ✐s
❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭❏✸✮✳
❲✐t❤ t❤❡ ❤❡❧♣ ♦❢ t❤❡s❡ Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥s✱ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ s❛② t❤❛t CCS ✐s ❛ s♣❡❝✐❛❧ ❝❛s❡ ♦❢ CCJ ❛♥❞ CCA✱
❛♥❞ t❤❛t CCJ ✐s ❛ s♣❡❝✐❛❧ ❝❛s❡ ♦❢ CCA✳
✹ ❚❤❡ ❊q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥ ✇✐t❤ ❈r❡❞❛❧ ❈♦♥s❡r✲
✈❛t✐s♠
❙♦ ❢❛r✱ ■ ❤❛✈❡ ❞❡✜♥❡❞✱ ✐♥ ❛ ♣r♦❜❛❜✐❧✐st✐❝ ✇❛②✱ t❤❡ ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s t♦
❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡✳ ❆♥❞ t❤❡s❡ ❞❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥s ❤❛✈❡ ❤❡❧♣❡❞ ✉s ❣✐✈❡ ✢❡s❤ t♦ ❈❈✱ ✐✳❡✳ ❈r❡❞❛❧ ❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠✳
◆♦✇✱ ✇❡ ❛r❡ r❡❛❞② t♦ ❞❡r✐✈❡ ♦✉r ♠❛✐♥ r❡s✉❧t✿ ❈❈ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✳
❊①❛❝t❧② s♣❡❛❦✐♥❣✱ ✐t ✇✐❧❧ ❜❡ ♣r♦✈❡❞ ✐♥ t❤✐s s❡❝t✐♦♥ t❤❛t CCS✱ CCJ ❛♥❞ CCA ❛r❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t
t♦ ❙❈✱ ❏❈ ❛♥❞ ❆❈✱ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡❧②✳ ❋♦r t❤✐s ♣✉r♣♦s❡✱ ✇❡ ✇✐❧❧ ♣r♦✈❡ ✜rst t❤❛t✿
Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ ✺✿ ❆❈ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ❈❈❆✳
❆s ✇❛s ❛❧r❡❛❞② ♠❡♥t✐♦♥❡❞✱ ❆❈ ✐s ❛ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧✐③❡❞ ✈❡rs✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❙❈ ❛♥❞ ❏❈✱ ❛♥❞ ❈❈❆ ✐s ❛ ❣❡♥❡r✲
❛❧✐③❡❞ ✈❡rs✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❈❈❙ ❛♥❞ ❈❈❏✳ ❚❤✉s✱ t❤❡ ♣r♦♦❢ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❆❈ ✇✐t❤ ❈❈❆ ✇♦✉❧❞
❜❡ ♦❢ ❤❡❧♣ ✐♥ ♣r♦✈✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❙❈ ✇✐t❤ ❈❈❙✱ ❛♥❞ ♦❢ ❏❈ ✇✐t❤ ❈❈❏✳
❚♦ ♣r♦✈❡ Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ ✺✱ ✐t ✐s s✉✣❝✐❡♥t t♦ s❤♦✇ t❤❛t✿
✶✹❘❡❝❛❧❧ t❤❛t ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✹ ✐s ❛ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ ✈❡rs✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✷✱ ❛♥❞ t❤❛t ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✷ ✐s ❛ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ ✈❡rs✐♦♥
♦❢ ❉❡✜♥✐t✐♦♥ ✶✳ ❚❤❡♥✱ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ ❛s❝❡rt❛✐♥ Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥s ✸ ❛♥❞ ✹ ✇✐t❤ ♥♦ ❞✐✣❝✉❧t②✳
✶✶
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Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ ✻ ❲❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✱
✭❆✶✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭❆✸✮✳
❆ss✉♠❡ t❤❛t ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❆❞❛♠s ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✲❣✐✈❡♥✲F ✳ ❋✐rst✱ ❧❡t✬s ♣r♦✈❡
t❤❛t ✭❆✸✮ ✐♠♣❧✐❡s ✭❆✶✮✳ ❆s ♠❡♥t✐♦♥❡❞ ✐♥ ❙❡❝t✐♦♥ ✷✱ ✐t ✐s ✇❡❧❧✲❦♥♦✇♥ t❤❛t ✭❆✶✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t
t♦ ✭❆✷✮✳ ❋♦r t❤❡ ♣r❡s❡♥t ♣✉r♣♦s❡✱ t❤✉s✱ ■ ✇✐❧❧ s❤♦✇ t❤❛t ✭❆✸✮ ✐♠♣❧✐❡s ✭❆✷✮✳ ❙❡tt✐♥❣ X
❛♥❞ Y ✐♥ ✭❆✸✮ t♦ ❜❡ F ❛♥❞ ❛ t❛✉t♦❧♦❣② T r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡❧②✱ ✭❆✸✮ ✐♠♠❡❞✐❛t❡❧② ✐♠♣❧✐❡s t❤❛t
p(F ) = q(F )✳ ❙✐♠✐❧❛r❧②✱ s❡tt✐♥❣ Y ✐♥ ✭❆✸✮ t♦ ❜❡ F¯ ✱ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ ❞❡r✐✈❡ ❢r♦♠ ✭❆✸✮ t❤❛t ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱
p(X|F¯ ) = q(X|F¯ )✳ ▲❛st❧②✱ ❧❡t✬s s❡t Y ✐♥ ✭❆✸✮ t♦ ❜❡ EjF ✳ ✭❍❡r❡✱ Ej ✐s ❛♥ ❛r❜✐tr❛r② ♠❡♠❜❡r
♦❢ E✳✮ ❚❤❡♥ ✭❆✸✮ ✐♠♣❧✐❡s t❤❛t ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ p(X|EjF ) = q(X|EjF )✳ ✭❙❡❡ ❆♣♣❡♥❞✐① ✶✳✮ ❚♦
s✉♠ ✉♣✱ ✭❆✸✮ ✐♠♣❧✐❡s t❤❛t p(F ) = q(F )❀ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ p(X|F¯ ) = q(X|F¯ )❀ ❛♥❞ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X ❛♥❞
Ei(∈ E)✱ p(X|EiF ) = q(X|EiF )✳ ❚❤❛t ✐s✱ ✭❆✸✮ ✐♠♣❧✐❡s ✭❆✷✮ t❤❛t ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭❆✶✮✳
◆♦✇✱ ❧❡t✬s s❤♦✇ t❤❛t ✭❆✶✮ ✐♠♣❧✐❡s ✭❆✸✮✳ ❆❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ ✭❆✶✮✱ ✐t ❤♦❧❞s ❢♦r t✇♦ ❛r❜✐tr❛r②
♣r♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥s X ❛♥❞ Y t❤❛t✿
✭✹✳✶✮ q(X|Y ) = q(XY )
q(Y ) =
Σiq(Ei|F )p(XY |EiF )p(F )+p(XY F¯ )
Σiq(Ei|F )p(Y |EiF )p(F )+p(Y F¯ )
✳✶✺
❆ss✉♠❡ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❛♥t❡❝❡❞❡♥t ♦❢ ✭❆✸✮ ❤♦❧❞s ❢♦r t❤❡ X ❛♥❞ Y ✐♥ ✭✹✳✶✮✳ ❚❤❛t ✐s✱ ❛ss✉♠❡ t❤❛t✿
✭✹✳✷✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(XF¯ |Y ) = p(X|Y )p(F¯ |Y ) ❛♥❞ p(XEiF |Y ) = p(X|Y )p(EiF |Y )✱ ♦r
✭✹✳✸✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(EiY |F ) = p(Ei|F )p(Y |F ) ❛♥❞ p(EiXY |F ) = p(Ei|F )p(XY |F )✳
❍❡r❡ ■ s❤♦✉❧❞ ♣♦✐♥t ♦✉t t❤❛t ✇❤❡♥ ✭✹✳✶✮ ❤♦❧❞s✱ ✭✹✳✷✮ ❛♥❞ ✭✹✳✸✮ ❡❛❝❤ ✐♠♣❧② t❤❛t p(X|Y ) =
q(X|Y )✳ ✭❚❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t ♣r♦♦❢s ❛r❡ ❣✐✈❡♥ ✐♥ ❆♣♣❡♥❞✐① ✷ ✳✮ ◆♦t❡ t❤❛t p(X|Y ) = q(X|Y ) ✐s
t❤❡ ❝♦♥s❡q✉❡♥t ♦❢ ✭❆✸✮✳ ❚❤✉s✱ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ s❛② t❤❛t ✭❆✶✮ ✐♠♣❧✐❡s ✭❆✸✮✳ ❆s ❛ r❡s✉❧t✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡
t❤❛t ✭❆✶✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭❆✸✮✱ ❛♥❞ t❤✉s t❤❛t ❆❈ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ❈❈❆✳ ◗✳❊✳❉✳
◆♦t❡ t❤❛t t❤✐s r❡s✉❧t ✐♠♠❡❞✐❛t❡❧② ✐♠♣❧✐❡s t❤❡ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ♣r♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥✿✶✻
Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ ✼✿ ❙❈ ❛♥❞ ❏❈ ❛r❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ CCS ❛♥❞ CCJ✱ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡❧②✳
✶✺■t ✐s ❛ss✉♠❡❞ ❤❡r❡ t❤❛t 0 < p(Y ) < 1 ❛♥❞ 0 < p(EiF ) < 1 ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei ∈ E✳ ❚❤❡s❡ ❛ss✉♠♣t✐♦♥s ❛♥❞ ❆❈
❥♦✐♥t❧② ✐♠♣❧② t❤❛t 0 < q(Y ) < 1✱ ❛♥❞ s♦ t❤❛t q(X|Y ) ✐s ✇❡❧❧✲❞❡✜♥❡❞✳
✶✻❙✉♣♣♦s❡ t❤❛t ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❙✐♠♣❧❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✳ ❚❤❡♥✱ Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥s ✶ ❛♥❞ ✸ ✐♠♣❧②
t❤❛t ✭❆✶✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭❙✶✮✱ ❛♥❞ t❤❛t ✭❆✸✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭❙✸✮✳ ❖♥ t❤❡ ♦t❤❡r ❤❛♥❞✱ ❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦
Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ ✻✱ ✭❆✶✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭❆✸✮✳ ❍❡♥❝❡✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t ✇❤❡♥ ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s ❙✐♠♣❧❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡
r❡❣❛r❞✐♥❣ E✱ ✭❙✶✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ✭❙✸✮✳ ■♥ ♦t❤❡r ✇♦r❞s✱ ✇❡ ♦❜t❛✐♥ t❤❛t ❙❈ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ❈❈❙✳ ■♥ ❛ s✐♠✐❧❛r
✇❛②✱ ✐t ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ♣r♦✈❡❞ t❤❛t ❏❈ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦ ❈❈❏✳
✶✷
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❚❤✐s r❡s✉❧t ✐s ✐♥t❡r❡st✐♥❣✳ ❈♦♥s✐❞❡r ❏❈✱ ❢♦r ❡①❛♠♣❧❡✳ ❆❧❧ ❏❈ r❡q✉✐r❡s ✐s t❤❛t t❤❡ ♥❡✇
❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✐♥ X s❤♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ ♦❜t❛✐♥❡❞ ❢r♦♠ t❤❡ ♦❧❞ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ X ❣✐✈❡♥ Ei ❜②
t❛❦✐♥❣ ❛ ✇❡✐❣❤t❡❞ ❛✈❡r❛❣❡✱ ✇✐t❤ t❤❡ ✇❡✐❣❤ts ❜❡✐♥❣ t❤❡ ♥❡✇ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ Ei✳ ❍♦✇❡✈❡r✱ t❤✐s
r❡q✉✐r❡♠❡♥t ✐ts❡❧❢ ✐s ♥♦t ❤❡❧♣❢✉❧ ❢♦r ✉s t♦ ✉♥❞❡rst❛♥❞ ❝❧❡❛r❧② t❤❡ ❡♣✐st❡♠♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ tr❛✐ts ♦❢
❏❈✳ ❚❤✉s✱ s♦♠❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ ❙❈ ❛♥❞ ❏❈ ❤❛✈❡ ❤✐t❤❡rt♦ ❜❡❡♥ s✉❣❣❡st❡❞✳ ✭❙❡❡
❏❡✛r❡② ✭✶✾✾✷✱ ♣♣✳✶✶✽✲✶✷✻❀ ✷✵✵✹✱ ♣♣✳✺✶✲✺✺✮✳✮ ❋♦r ❡①❛♠♣❧❡✱ ✭❏✶✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦✿
❋♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ Y ❛♥❞ Ei✱ P (X)/P (Y ) = Q(X)/Q(Y ) ✐❢ ❡❛❝❤ ♦❢ X ❛♥❞ Y ✐♠♣❧✐❡s Ei✳
❋♦r ❛❧❧ X ❛♥❞ Ei✱ Q(Ei)/P (Ei) = Q(X)/P (X) ✐❢ X ✐♠♣❧✐❡s Ei✳
❙✐♠✐❧❛r t♦ ✭❏✷✮✱ ✇❤✐❝❤ ✐s ♦❢t❡♥ ❝❛❧❧❡❞ ❘✐❣✐❞✐t②✱ t❤❡s❡ ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s t❡❧❧ ✇❤❛t s❤♦✉❧❞ r❡♠❛✐♥
t❤❡ s❛♠❡ ✇❤❡♥ ♦✉r ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ❛r❡ ✉♣❞❛t❡❞ ✐♥ ❛❝❝♦r❞❛♥❝❡ ✇✐t❤ ❏❈✳ ❍♦✇❡✈❡r✱ t❤❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t
❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ❢❛✐❧ t♦ s❤♦✇ ❝❧❡❛r❧② t❤❡ ❡♣✐st❡♠♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ♣❧❛✉s✐❜✐❧✐t② ♦❢ ❏❈✳ ❊✈❡♥ ❏❡✛r❡② ✭✶✾✾✷✱
♣✳✶✶✽✮✱ ✐t s❡❡♠s✱ t❤♦✉❣❤t t❤❛t ❘✐❣✐❞✐t② ❛♥❞ t❤❡ ❛❜♦✈❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ❛r❡ s♦♠❡✲
✇❤❛t ✉♥❝❧❡❛r✳ ❲❤② s❤♦✉❧❞ t❤❡ r❛t✐♦s ✐♥ q✉❡st✐♦♥ r❡♠❛✐♥ t❤❡ s❛♠❡ ❛❢t❡r ✇❡ ✉♥❞❡r❣♦ s♦♠❡
r❡❧❡✈❛♥t ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡❄ ■t ✐s ♥♦t ❡❛s② t♦ ❣✐✈❡ ❛ s❛t✐s❢❛❝t♦r② r❡s♣♦♥s❡ t♦ t❤✐s q✉❡st✐♦♥✳ ❯♥❧✐❦❡
t❤❡s❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s✱ ❤♦✇❡✈❡r✱ ❈❈❏ ❞✐s♣❧❛②s ❝❧❡❛r❧② ❛♥ ❡♣✐st❡♠✐❝ ♥♦r♠✖♥❛♠❡❧②✱
❡♣✐st❡♠✐❝ ❝♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠✳ ■t ✐s ❤❛r❞ t♦ ❞❡♥②✱ t❤✉s✱ t❤❛t ❈❈❏ s❤♦✇s ♠♦r❡ tr❛♥s♣❛r❡♥t❧② s♦♠❡
❡♣✐st❡♠♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ tr❛✐ts ♦❢ ❏❈ t❤❛♥ t❤♦s❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s✳ ❚❤❡ ❧✐❦❡ ♠❛② ❜❡ tr✉❡ ♦❢ ❙❈
❛♥❞ ❆❈✳ ■♥t❡r❡st✐♥❣❧②✱ ✈❡r② ❧✐tt❧❡ ❛tt❡♥t✐♦♥ ❤❛s ❜❡❡♥ ♣❛✐❞ t♦ t❤❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥❝❡ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥ ❈❈
❛♥❞ ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥ ❛s ❢❛r ❛s ■ ❦♥♦✇✳ ❚❤✉s✱ Pr♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥s ✺ ❛♥❞ ✼ ❝♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ r❡❣❛r❞❡❞ ❛s
❛ s✉❜st❛♥t✐❛❧ ❝♦♥tr✐❜✉t✐♦♥ t♦ ❇❛②❡s✐❛♥ ❡♣✐st❡♠♦❧♦❣②✳✶✼
✶✼❍❡r❡ ■ s❤♦✉❧❞ ♠❡♥t✐♦♥ t❤❛t ❉✐❡tr✐❝❤✱ ▲✐st ❛♥❞ ❇r❛❞❧❡② ✭✉♥♣✉❜❧✐s❤❡❞✮ r❡❝❡♥t❧② ♣r♦✈✐❞❡ s♦♠❡ ❛r❣✉♠❡♥ts
t❤❛t ❤❛✈❡ s♦♠❡ s✐♠✐❧❛r ❢❡❛t✉r❡s t♦ ♠✐♥❡✳ ❚❤❛t ✐s✱ t❤❡② ❞❡✜♥❡ ❵❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐✈❡♥❡ss✬ ✐♥ ❛ ❢♦r♠❛❧ ✇❛②✱ ❛♥❞
❡①❛♠✐♥❡ ❤♦✇ ✐t ✐s r❡❧❛t❡❞ ✇✐t❤ ❇❛②❡s✐❛♥ ✉♣❞❛t✐♥❣ r✉❧❡s✳ ❍♦✇❡✈❡r✱ t❤❡r❡ ❛r❡ s♦♠❡ s✉❜st❛♥t✐❛❧ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s
❜❡t✇❡❡♥ t❤❡✐r ✇♦r❦ ❛♥❞ ♠✐♥❡✳ ❋✐rst✱ ♠② ❈r❡❞❛❧ ❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠ ✐s ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t❡❞ ❜② ♠❡❛♥s ♦❢ ♦♥❡ ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡ ✭♦r
♣r♦❜❛❜✐❧✐t②✮ ❢✉♥❝t✐♦♥ t❤❛t ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t ❤❛❞ ❜❡❢♦r❡ ✉♥❞❡r❣♦✐♥❣ s♦♠❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ ✇❤✐❧❡ t❤❡✐r ❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐✈❡♥❡ss
✐s ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t❡❞ ❜② ♠❡❛♥s ♦❢ s♦♠❡ s❡ts ♦❢ ♣r♦❜❛❜✐❧✐t② ❢✉♥❝t✐♦♥s t❤❛t r❡♣r❡s❡♥t ❛♥ ❛❣❡♥t✬s ❜❡❧✐❡❢ st❛t❡s ❛♥❞
s♦♠❡ ❡①♣❡r✐❡♥❝❡ t❤❛t s❤❡ ✉♥❞❡r❣♦❡s✳ ❙❡❝♦♥❞✱ ♠② ♠❛✐♥ r❡s✉❧t ✐s t❤❛t ❈r❡❞❛❧ ❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦
❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥ ✇❤✐❧❡ ❉✐❡tr✐❝❤✱ ▲✐st ❛♥❞ ❇r❛❞❧❡② s❤♦✇ ❥✉st t❤❛t ✭✇❤❡♥ t❤❡✐r ❵❘❡s♣♦♥s✐✈❡♥❡ss✬ ✐s ❛ss✉♠❡❞✱✮
❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐✈❡♥❡ss ✐♠♣❧✐❡s ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✳
✶✸
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✺ ❈♦♥❝❧✉❞✐♥❣ ❘❡♠❛r❦s
❘♦✉❣❤❧②✱ ■ ❤❛✈❡ s❤♦✇♥ ✐♥ t❤✐s ♣❛♣❡r t❤❛t ♦✉r ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ❛r❡ ✉♣❞❛t❡❞ ✐♥ ❛❝❝♦r❞❛♥❝❡ ✇✐t❤
❈r❡❞❛❧ ❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠ ✐❢ ❛♥❞ ♦♥❧② ✐❢ ♦✉r ❝r❡❞❡♥❝❡s ❛r❡ ✉♣❞❛t❡❞ ✉s✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❇❛②❡s✐❛♥ ✉♣❞❛t✐♥❣
r✉❧❡✖✐✳❡✳ ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✳ ■❢ ❈r❡❞❛❧ ❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠ ✐s ❛ ♣❧❛✉s✐❜❧❡ ❡♣✐st❡♠✐❝ ♥♦r♠✱ t❤❡♥
t❤✐s r❡s✉❧t ✇♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ r❡❣❛r❞❡❞ ❛s ❛ ❥✉st✐✜❝❛t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❙❈✱ ❏❈ ❛♥❞ ❆❈✳ ■ ❞♦♥✬t r✉❧❡ ♦✉t t❤❡
♣♦ss✐❜✐❧✐t②✱ ❤♦✇❡✈❡r✱ t❤❛t ♦♥❡ ♣r♦✈✐❞❡s ♣♦✇❡r❢✉❧ ❛r❣✉♠❡♥ts ❛❣❛✐♥st ❈r❡❞❛❧ ❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠✳
◆♦♥❡t❤❡❧❡ss✱ ✐t ❝❛♥♥♦t ❜❡ ❞❡♥✐❡❞ t❤❛t✱ ✉♥❧✐❦❡ ❡①✐st✐♥❣ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ ❈♦♥❞✐✲
t✐♦♥❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✱ ❈r❡❞❛❧ ❈♦♥s❡r✈❛t✐s♠ s❤♦✇s ❝❧❡❛r❧② ❛♥ ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥t ❡♣✐st❡♠♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ tr❛✐t ♦❢ t❤❡
❇❛②❡s✐❛♥ ✉♣❞❛t✐♥❣ r✉❧❡✳
❆♣♣❡♥❞✐① ✶
❋✐rst✱ ❧❡t✬s s❡t X ❛♥❞ Y ✐♥ ✭❆✸✮ t♦ ❜❡ F ❛♥❞ ❛ t❛✉t♦❧♦❣② T r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡❧②✳ ❚❤❡♥✱ ✭❆✸✮
✐♠♠❡❞✐❛t❡❧② ✐♠♣❧✐❡s t❤❛t✿
✭■✮ p(F ) = q(F ) ✐❢
✭■✳✶✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(F |T) = p(F |T)p(F |T) ❛♥❞ p(FEiF |T) = p(F |T)p(EiF |T)❀
♦r
✭■✳✷✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧Ei✱ p(EiT|F ) = p(Ei|F )p(T|F ) ❛♥❞ p(EiFT|F ) = p(Ei|F )p(FT|F )✳
◆♦t❡ t❤❛t ✭■✳✷✮ ♠✉st ❜❡ tr✉❡✳ ❍❡♥❝❡✱ t❤❡ ❛♥t❡❝❡❞❡♥t ♦❢ ✭■✮ ❤♦❧❞s✱ ❛♥❞ s♦ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t
p(F ) = q(F )✳ ❙❡❝♦♥❞✱ ❧❡t✬s s❡t Y ✐♥ ✭❆✸✮ t♦ ❜❡ F¯ ✳ ❚❤❡♥✱ ✐t ❢♦❧❧♦✇s ❢r♦♠ ✭❆✸✮ t❤❛t✿
✭■■✮ ❋♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ p(X|F¯ ) = q(X|F¯ ) ✐❢
✭■■✳✶✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧Ei✱ p(XF |F¯ ) = p(X|F¯ )p(F |F¯ ) ❛♥❞ p(XEiF |F¯ ) = p(X|F¯ )p(EiF |F¯ )❀
♦r
✭■■✳✷✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧Ei✱ p(EiF¯ |F ) = p(Ei|F )p(F¯ |F ) ❛♥❞ p(EiXF¯ |F ) = p(Ei|F )p(XF¯ |F )✳
■t ✐s ♦❜✈✐♦✉s t❤❛t ❜♦t❤ ✭■■✳✶✮ ❛♥❞ ✭■■✳✷✮ ♠✉st ❜❡ tr✉❡✳ ❚❤✐s ✐s ❜❡❝❛✉s❡ ❢♦r ❛♥② Z✱ p(ZF |F¯ ) =
p(ZF¯ |F ) = 0✳ ❍❡♥❝❡✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ p(X|F¯ ) = q(X|F¯ )✳ ▲❛st❧②✱ ❧❡t✬s s❡t Y ✐♥ ✭❆✸✮
t♦ ❜❡ EjF ✳ ✭❍❡r❡✱ Ej ✐s ❛r❜✐tr❛r② ♠❡♠❜❡r ♦❢ E✳✮ ❚❤❡♥ ✭❆✸✮ ✐♠♣❧✐❡s t❤❛t✿
✶✹
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✭■■■✮ ❋♦r ❛❧❧ X, p(X|EjF ) = q(X|EjF ) ✐❢
✭■■■✳✶✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(XF |EjF ) = p(X|EjF )p(F |EjF ) ❛♥❞ p(XEiF |EjF ) =
p(X|EjF )p(EiF |EjF )❀ ♦r
✭■■■✳✷✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(EiEjF |F ) = p(Ei|F )p(EjF |F ) ❛♥❞ p(EiXEjF |F ) =
p(Ei|F )p(XEjF |F )✳
❈❧❡❛r❧②✱ ✭■■■✳✶✮ ♠✉st ❤♦❧❞s ❢♦r ❛❧❧X✳ ❆❜♦✈❡ ❛❧❧✱ ♥♦t❡ t❤❛t ✐t ♠✉st ❜❡ tr✉❡ t❤❛t p(XF |EjF ) =
p(X|EjF )p(F |EjF )✳ ❚❤✐s ✐s ❜❡❝❛✉s❡ p(XF |EjF ) = p(X|EjF ) ❛♥❞ p(F |EjF ) = 1✳ ❍♦✇
❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ♣r♦♣♦s✐t✐♦♥ t❤❛t ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(XEiF |EjF ) = p(X|EjF )p(EiF |EjF )❄ ❋✐rst✱ ❝♦♥✲
s✐❞❡r t❤❡ ❝❛s❡s ✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ i 6= j✳ ❚❤❡♥✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t p(XEiF |EjF ) = 0 = p(X|EjF )p(EiF |EjF )✳
❚❤✐s ✐s ❜❡❝❛✉s❡ t❤❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ E ❛r❡ ♠✉t✉❛❧❧② ❡①❝❧✉s✐✈❡ ❛♥❞ s♦ p(XEiF |EjF ) = p(EiF |EjF ) =
0 ✇❤❡♥ i 6= j✳ ❙❡❝♦♥❞✱ ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r t❤❡ ❝❛s❡s ✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ i = j✳ ■♥ t❤❡s❡ ❝❛s❡s✱ ✐t ❤♦❧❞s t❤❛t✿
p(XEjF |EiF ) = p(XEiF |EiF ) = p(X|EiF ) ❛♥❞
p(X|EjF )p(EiF |EjF ) = p(X|EiF )p(EiF |EiF ) = p(X|EiF )✳
❚❤✉s✱ p(XEiF |EjF ) = p(X|EiF )p(EiF |EjF ) ✇❤❡♥ i = j✳ ❆s ❛ r❡s✉❧t✱ ✇❡ ♦❜t❛✐♥ t❤❛t ❢♦r
❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(XEiF |EjF ) = p(X|EjF )p(EiF |EjF )✳ ❚❤✉s✱ t❤❡ s❡❝♦♥❞ ❝♦♥❥✉♥❝t ♦❢ ✭■■■✳✶✮ ✐s ❛❧s♦
tr✉❡✳ ❚❤✉s✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t ✭■■■✳✶✮ ❤♦❧❞s ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱ ❛♥❞ s♦ ✐t ❢♦❧❧♦✇s ❢r♦♠ ✭■■■✮ t❤❛t ❢♦r ❛❧❧ X✱
p(X|EjF ) = q(X|EjF )✳
❆♣♣❡♥❞✐① ✷
▲❡t✬s ♣r♦✈❡ t❤❛t ✇❤❡♥ ✭✹✳✶✮ ❤♦❧❞s✱ ✭✹✳✷✮ ❛♥❞ ✭✹✳✸✮ ❡❛❝❤ ✐♠♣❧② t❤❛t p(X|Y ) = q(X|Y )✳ ❚❤❛t
✐s✱ ■ ✇✐❧❧ s❤♦✇ t❤❛t✿
■✳ ✭✹✳✶✮ ❛♥❞ ✭✹✳✷✮ ❥♦✐♥t❧② ✐♠♣❧② t❤❛t p(X|Y ) = q(X|Y )✱ ❛♥❞
■■✳ ✭✹✳✶✮ ❛♥❞ ✭✹✳✸✮ ❥♦✐♥t❧② ✐♠♣❧② t❤❛t p(X|Y ) = q(X|Y )✳
❋✐rst✱ ❧❡t ♠❡ s❤♦✇ t❤❛t ✭✹✳✶✮ ❛♥❞ ✭✹✳✷✮ ❥♦✐♥t❧② ✐♠♣❧② t❤❛t p(X|Y ) = q(X|Y )✳ ❙✉♣♣♦s❡ t❤❛t
✭✹✳✷✮ ❤♦❧❞s✳ ❚❤❛t ✐s✱ ❧❡t✬s ❛ss✉♠❡ t❤❛t✿
✭✹✳✷✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(XF¯ |Y ) = p(X|Y )p(F¯ |Y ) ❛♥❞ p(XEiF |Y ) = p(X|Y )p(EiF |Y )✳
✶✺
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❚❤❡♥✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t✿
✭✹✳✷❛✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(XY F¯ ) = p(X|Y )p(Y F¯ ) ❛♥❞ P (XY |EiF ) = p(X|Y )p(Y |EiF )✳
❲✐t❤ t❤❡ ❤❡❧♣ ♦❢ t❤❡ ♣r♦❜❛❜✐❧✐t② ❝❛❧❝✉❧✉s ❛♥❞ t❤❡ ✜rst ❝♦♥❥✉♥❝t ♦❢ ✭✹✳✷✮✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ t❤❛t✿
p(XY F¯ ) = p(X|Y )p(F¯ |Y )p(Y ) = p(X|Y )p(Y F¯ )✳
❚❤❛t ✐s✱ ✇❡ ♦❜t❛✐♥ t❤❛t p(XY F¯ ) = p(X|Y )p(Y F¯ )✳ ◆♦✇✱ ❧❡t✬s ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r ❛♥ ❛r❜✐tr❛r② Ei✳
❚❤❡ ♣r♦❜❛❜✐❧✐t② ❝❛❧❝✉❧✉s ✐♠♣❧✐❡s t❤❛t✿
p(XY |EiF ) =
p(XEiF |Y )p(Y )
p(EiF )
✳
❚❤❡♥✱ ❇❛②❡s t❤❡♦r❡♠ ❛♥❞ t❤❡ s❡❝♦♥❞ ❝♦♥❥✉♥❝t ♦❢ ✭✹✳✷✮ ✐♠♣❧② t❤❛t✿
p(XY |EiF ) =
p(XEiF |Y )p(Y )
p(EiF )
= p(X|Y )p(EiF |Y )p(Y )
p(EiF )
= p(X|Y )p(Y |EiF )✳
❚❤❛t ✐s✱ ✇❡ ♦❜t❛✐♥ t❤❛t ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ P (XY |EiF ) = P (Y |EiF )P (X|Y )✳ ❆s ❛ r❡s✉❧t✱ ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡
✭✹✳✷❛✮ ✇✐t❤ t❤❡ ❤❡❧♣ ♦❢ ✭✹✳✷✮ ❛♥❞ t❤❡ ♣r♦❜❛❜✐❧✐t② ❝❛❧❝✉❧✉s✳ ▲❛st❧②✱ ✇❡ s❤♦✉❧❞ ♥♦t❡ t❤❛t ✭✹✳✶✮
❛♥❞ ✭✹✳✷❛✮ ✐♠♣❧② t❤❛t✿
q(X|Y ) =
Σiq(Ei|F )p(XY |EiF )p(F ) + p(XY F¯ )
Σiq(Ei|F )p(Y |EiF )p(F ) + p(Y F¯ )
=
Σiq(Ei|F )p(X|Y )p(Y |EiF )p(F ) + p(X|Y )p(Y F¯ )
Σiq(Ei|F )p(Y |EiF )p(F ) + p(Y F¯ )
= p(X|Y ).
❚❤❡r❡❢♦r❡✱ ✐t ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❝♦♥❝❧✉❞❡❞ t❤❛t ✭✹✳✶✮ ❛♥❞ ✭✹✳✷✮ ❥♦✐♥t❧② ✐♠♣❧② t❤❛t p(X|Y ) = q(X|Y )✳
❙❡❝♦♥❞✱ ❧❡t✬s ♣r♦✈❡ t❤❛t ✭✹✳✶✮ ❛♥❞ ✭✹✳✸✮ ❥♦✐♥t❧② ✐♠♣❧② t❤❛t p(X|Y ) = q(X|Y )✳ ❙✉♣♣♦s❡ t❤❛t
✭✹✳✸✮ ❤♦❧❞s✳ ❚❤❛t ✐s✱ ❧❡t✬s ❛ss✉♠❡ t❤❛t✿
✭✹✳✸✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(EiY |F ) = p(Ei|F )p(Y |F ) ❛♥❞ p(EiXY |F ) = p(Ei|F )p(XY |F )✳
◆♦t❡ t❤❛t ✭✹✳✸✮ ✐s ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t t♦
✭✹✳✸❛✮ ❢♦r ❛❧❧ Ei✱ p(Y |EiF ) = p(Y |F ) ❛♥❞ p(XY |EiF ) = p(XY |F )✳
◆♦t❡ ❛❧s♦ t❤❛t Σiq(Ei|F ) = 1✳ ❚❤❡♥✱ ✇❡ ♦❜t❛✐♥ ❢r♦♠ ✭✹✳✶✮ ❛♥❞ ✭✹✳✸❛✮ t❤❛t✿
q(X|Y ) =
Σiq(Ei|F )p(XY |EiF )p(F ) + p(XY F¯ )
Σiq(Ei|F )p(Y |EiF )p(F ) + p(Y F¯ )
=
p(XY |F )p(F )Σiq(Ei|F ) + p(XY F¯ )
p(Y |F )p(F )Σiq(Ei|F ) + p(Y F¯ )
=
p(XY )
p(Y )
= p(X|Y ).
✶✻
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Quantum Mechanics for Event Ontologists
Thomas Pashby∗
What is quantum mechanics about? That is, what is the intended domain of an interpretation of
the theory? In the long history of attempts to interpret quantum theory a wide variety of answers
have been given to this question, including: observations, experiments, wavefunctions, the
universe, point particles, information. In this paper I explore a particular view of quantum
mechanics which maintains that it is a theory of events. On this event ontology view, the
probabilities supplied by the quantum state are probabilities for the occurrence of events, and the
observables of the theory are to be interpreted accordingly. In contrast, the standard (Dirac-von
Neumann) view maintains that observables correspond to physical quantities which, when
measured, come to have definite values—values that represent possessed properties of the system.
In this vein, Wightman (1962) interprets position experiments in terms of localization: on
measurement, a particle comes to be localized within a particular region of space; it has the
property of existing here rather then somewhere else.
The event view has had some recent interest from notable theoretical physicists such as Carlo
Rovelli and Rudolf Haag, who express in different ways the core idea of this view. Rovelli (2005)
contrasts the “‘wave function ontology,” which takes the state “as the ‘real’ entity which fully
represents the actual state of affairs of the world,” with his proposal for an “ontology of quantum
events.”
∗Any questions or comments may be addressed to: tom.pashby@gmail.com.
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A better alternative is to take the observed values . . . as the actual elements of reality,
and view [the state] as a mere bookkeeping device, determined by the actual values
. . . that happened in [the] past. From this perspective, the real events of the world are
the ‘realizations’ (the ‘coming to reality’, the ‘actualization’) of the values . . . in the
course of the interaction between physical systems. These quantum events have an
intrinsically discrete (quantized) granular structure. (p. 115)
The key idea is that the changing quantum state given by the dynamics of the theory does not
describe the changing properties of some physical object.1 Rather, the quantum state describes the
probabilities for events to occur; events that often arise as the result of interactions between
systems.
In turn, here is Haag’s (2013) recent critique of the conventional view:
What do we detect? The presence of a particle? Or the occurrence of a microscopic
event? We must decide for the latter.. . . [T]he standard use of the term “observable”
does not really correspond to the needs of collision theory in particle physics. We do
not measure a “property of a microscopic system”, characterized by a spectral
projector of a self-adjoint operator. Rather we are interested in the detection of a
microscopic event. The first task is to characterize the mutually exclusive alternatives
for such an event. (p. 1310)
So in practice, i.e. in the context of a particle detection experiment, the theory concerns—is
about—microscopic events, such as the ionization of a molecule by a cosmic ray. The detector is
1In approvingly citing Rovelli’s commitment to an ontology of events I do not mean to
endorse his accompanying interpretation of quantum theory, Relational Quantum Mechanics,
about which there is much to criticize. I shall not do so here, however.
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expressly designed to amplify these micro-events such that they reliably lead to a macroscopic
record of detection, by which we mean detection at a place, at a time.
My main concern in this paper is the task of re-interpreting the spectral projectors of position
in terms of events, and constructing an appropriate probability space for these events. That is, my
focus will be on the re-interpretation of Wightman localization in terms of the occurrence of
localized events within extended spatio-temporal regions. I claim that, interpreted in terms of
events, there is a crucial further question concerning localization to which quantum mechanics
must supply an answer: When does an event occur? Providing a satisfactory answer to this
question, I contend, gives an informative account of Haag’s ‘Principle of Random Realization’
and thus avoid Rovelli’s paradox that “the statement that a certain specific outcome ‘has
happened’ can be true and not-true at the same time” (p. 115).
The paper is laid out as follows. In Section 1, I provide an account of Wightman localization.
In Section 2, I present a result that makes trouble for the conventional account of localization in
terms of the possession of a property. In Section 3, I explore the idea that a localization
experiment can be interpreted as a conditional probability for an event to occur in some region of
space, given that it occurs at some time. I give an expression for these conditional probabilities in
terms of Lu¨ders Rule by forming a temporally extended space of histories of a system. In
conclusion, I propose a philosophical interpretation of these probabilities as Lewisian objective
chances, conditioned on the future occurrence of an event in the possible worlds to which the
chances apply, but maintain that there is no need to adopt a corresponding Everettian ‘no
collapse’ interpretation of quantum mechanics to accommodate them.
1. Localization as a Property The position of a quantum particle is given by the position
observable, Q. But, considered as an operator, Q returns the expectation value of position. That
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is, a system in state ψ (a unit vector inH, a Hilbert space) has an expectation value for position
〈ψ|Qψ〉. This does not refer to the position of a particular system, or a particular run of a position
experiment, but rather a certain characteristic of the likely distribution for an ensemble of such
systems. In the conventional interpretation, probabilistic statements about individual systems take
the form: ‘The value of position lies in the interval [a, b].’ This statement is associated with a
spectral projector of Q, P
Q
[a,b], through the Spectral Theorem, and the probability that, on
measurement, the statement is found to be true is 〈ψ|P[a,b]ψ〉. If such a statement is true, i.e. if
〈ψ|P[a,b]ψ〉 = 1, then this has been interpreted as saying that the system is located within the
spatial region corresponding to [a, b].
Wightman (1962) showed that directly associating a projector P∆ with a spatial region ∆, and
demanding of these projectors that they be appropriately related under symmetry transformations
of the underlying space-time, suffices to determine uniquely the position operator Q. In his
“notion of localizability in a region” ∆, these projectors are “supposed to describe a property of
the system, the property of being localized in ∆” (p. 847, original emphasis). A localization
experiment corresponds to a series of experimental questions2 which ask “is the particle located in
∆?” One of the crucial features of such questions is that they must be asked at a particular instant
of time so that quantum mechanics may provide answers via the Born Rule.
That is, a projector P∆ associates with a state of the system ψ a vector P∆ψ ∈ H. According
to the Born Rule, the probability of finding a system in state ψ to be located in the region ∆ is
given by the inner product 〈ψ|P∆ψ〉. Thus if the probability is one, it must be the case that
P∆ψ = ψ. This is the eigenstate-eigenvalue link: if the system is located in ∆ then the state ψ is
an eigenstate of the projection P∆, and if the state is such an eigenstate of P∆ then it is located in
2This term is due to Mackey who provided the more general notion of a System of
Imprimitivity, of which Wightman’s system of localization is an example.
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∆ with probability one. Introducing time through the Schro¨dinger picture, we associate a time
indexed state ψt ∈ H with a time t through the unitary group Ut = e
iHt by setting ψt = Utψ,
where H is the Hamiltonian operator and ψ is the state at t = 0.
Operating on these time-indexed states, the projector returns a vector P∆ψt ∈ H, which
(properly normalized) is a state located in∆ at the time t. The probability of localization in∆ at a
time t is, therefore, 〈ψt|P∆ψt〉. However, in general a state such as this will fail to be localized in
∆ at any other time. In fact, we can say something quite definitive about the character of the times
at which a state can be localized in this way. To do so requires the Heisenberg picture, which is
reached by considering the time evolution of the observables rather than the state. That is, the
Heisenberg projector corresponding to localization in ∆ at time t is P∆(t) = U−tP∆Ut, and the
Heisenberg state of the same system is ψ = ψ0, for all t.
Thus the probabilities supplied by the Heisenberg picture are numerically identical to those of
the Schro¨dinger picture since 〈ψ|P∆(t)ψ〉 = 〈ψ|U−tP∆Utψ〉 = 〈ψt|P∆ψt〉. Conceptually,
however, it is now more straightforward to associate properties of the system possessed at distinct
times with the state of the system described by a single vector ψ ∈ H. A system localized in
region ∆1 at t1 and ∆2 at t2 must be associated with a state ψ such that
P∆1(t1)ψ = P∆2(t2)ψ = ψ.
3
2. A Problematic Result I will now show that the times at which a system is localized in this
way are severely limited, so long as the Hamiltonian of the system obeys a common requirement
known as the Spectrum Condition, which requires the system to have lowest value of energy
below which it cannot drop. If this condition holds, as it does for all physically reasonable
3This amounts to the assumption that P∆1(t1)P∆2(t2)ψ = P∆2(t2)P∆1(t1)ψ, which won’t be
true in general (Malament 1996). This difficulty is closely related to the problem I display below.
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quantum systems, then there can be no time interval such that a system is localized in some region
at every time in that interval, unless it is localized within that region at all times. This follows
from the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let P be a projection operator associated with a property of the system, let
ψ ∈ H be a vector of unit norm in a separable Hilbert space, and let Ut = e
iHt be the
one-parameter unitary group uniquely generated by H , a self-adjoint operator with
semi-bounded spectrum. Let P ({tk}) be the projection operator that corresponds to the
possession of the property P at every time t ∈ {tk}. That is, ψ is in the range of P ({tk}) if
P (t)ψ = ψ for all t ∈ {tk}. Let ψ be in the range of P ({tk}) then either:
1. {tk} is a set with zero Lebesgue measure, or
2. ψ is in the range of P (R), i.e. P ({tk}) = P (R).
Therefore, there is no projection P (I) that corresponds to the possession of a property at an open
interval of instants I ⊂ R and at no other time.
Let us consider the implications of this result in the context of localization. Applied to the
projector P∆, the result says that the states which possess the property of being localized in ∆ at
more than one time are severely limited. One way of interpreting the result would be to say that if
a system is confined to a region of space for a time interval (i.e. a continuous set of instants) then
it is confined to that region for all time. This resembles the Quantum Zeno (or Watchdog) Effect
where continuous measurement of a projector confines the evolution of the system to a subspace
of its state space (Misra & Sudarshan 1977).
If, on the other hand, we have reason to believe that the system is not localized in some region
for all time, then the times at which the system is localized anywhere within that region are
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severely limited. This is because the result applies to subregions as well. That is, if Σ ⊃ ∆ is a
larger region that includes ∆ then PΣ(t)ψ 6= ψ implies that P∆(t)ψ 6= ψ.
4 So the conclusion of
the result restricts localization within a subregion of the region just as much as it does for the
region itself, and the region under consideration could be as large as one likes: the Earth, the
Solar System, or so on. Moreover, the condition that a state must satisfy to be localized within a
region for a time interval is so severe that a non-zero probability that the system is localized
anywhere outside of the region at any time t entails that the set of times at which it is localized
within the region has measure zero.
The upshot of all this is that if we are to admit the mere possibility that the particle could be
detected outside of the lab next week, then it cannot be localized within the lab today at more than
a set of times with zero measure. Therefore, on the Wightman interpretation, the properties of
systems (or at least the properties that we can hope to have empirical access to) are temporally
sparse, in this sense. But what sort of persisting physical object fails to have spatial properties (in
the regions we care about) at the vast majority of times? This is, I claim, a further indication that
this interpretation of the state, as describing the changing properties of a physical thing, is a
mistake. In its place, I propose an account of localization in terms of the occurrence of
spatio-temporally located events rather than possessed properties.
3. Localization as Occurrence of an Event Picture a typical diffraction experiment which
involves a source emitting a beam of particles, a diffraction grating through which the beam
passes, and a luminescent screen. The source of quanta (electrons or photons, say) emits a single
quantum particle at a time, at a frequency such that only a single particle is ever in the apparatus.
4Let P∆(t)ψ = ψ then, since PΣ(t)P∆(t) = P∆(t), we have
PΣ(t)ψ = PΣ(t)P∆(t)ψ = P∆(t)ψ = ψ, in contradiction with the assumption made above.
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Some time after a particle is emitted, a dot appears on the screen, and, repeating the experiment
many times, the relative intensity of these discrete events comes to form a characteristic spatial
interference pattern. Some things to note: first, the outcome of the experiment is an event, i.e. a
definite occurrence situated in space and time; second, the time interval after which the dot
appears will vary; finally, the screen is sensitive over the entire course of the experiment, and an
individual experiment ends only when the particle is detected. Taken together, these observations
suffice to show that the usual interpretation of localization as a property arising from an
instantaneous measurement of position cannot be right.
Following Haag’s suggestion (above), our first task is to characterize the mutually exclusive
alternatives for our detection event. Clearly, a single event occurs in just one comparatively small
region of the screen at one time. So our outcome space must allow for variation in space and time.
Furthermore, since every run of the experiment ends with a detection, the elementary event (to
which probability one is assigned) must correspond to a dot appearing somewhere on the screen
at some time after emission. None of these characteristics mesh well with the idea that spatial
localization is a property resulting from an instantaneous measurement of the corresponding
projector. In particular, the elementary event for a localization experiment is always localization
at a time.
As a first step, I propose that we interpret P∆(t) not as an experimental question asked at time
t, but rather as a proposition about an event: the proposition that an event occurs in spatial region
∆ at time t. David Lewis (1986) gave an account of an event as a property (or class) of
spatio-temporal regions as follows, which is easily adapted to the present case.
To any event there corresponds a property of regions: the property that belongs to all
and only those spatio-temporal regions, of this or any other possible world, in which
that event occurs. Such a property belongs to exactly one region of any world where
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the event occurs . . . (p. 243)
Note first that Lewis distinguishes ‘occurring in’ a region from ‘occurring within’ a region. If an
event occurs within a region ∆ then, according to Lewis, it occurs within every super-region
Σ ⊃ ∆. This closely resembles the account of Wightman localization given in the previous
sections since if P∆ψ = ψ then PΣψ = ψ for all Σ ⊃ ∆. However, according to Lewis, an event
occurring in a region ∆ does not occur in any super-region, nor any subregion. The region in
which an event occurs is, therefore, ‘just the right size.’ This can be achieved here by means of
the following definition: Given a state ψ, a localization event occurs in a region ∆ if and only if
P∆ψ = ψ and there is no subregion Ω ⊂ ∆ such that PΩψ = ψ. This ensures that a localization
event cannot occur in ∆ and its super-region Σ, since if it occurs in ∆ (and thus obeys the first
condition) then the latter condition (required for occurrence in Σ) is not satisfied.
We can think of a certain class of states as giving the relevant space of possible worlds. We
are interested in worlds in which a system prepared in (Heisenberg) state ψ results in a detection
event, i.e. an event occurring within the screen some time after emission from the source. Let the
detector be sensitive in region ∆ over all times.5 Then the possible outcomes of the experiment
correspond to worlds where P∆(t)ψ = ψ, i.e. worlds in which a detection event occurs at time t.
The elementary event, to which we must assign probability one, is the occurrence of an event
within ∆ at some time t ∈ R. This event (corresponding to a class of possible worlds) is
associated with the state ψ∆ for which P∆(t)ψ∆ = ψ∆ at every t ∈ R.
Quantum mechanics gives conditional probabilities through Lu¨ders’ Rule, according to which
5Effectively, we assume here that emission occurs some time in the distant past, i.e. at t = −∞.
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the probability of outcome A given outcome B is6
Pr(A|B) =
〈PBψ|PAPBψ〉
〈ψ|PBψ〉
,
where PA and PB are projectors representing outcomes A and B, respectively, such that
PA ≤ PB. But what instantaneous projector could correspond to our elementary event?
It is here that the limitations of the Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger pictures start to bite, since
each considers only instantaneous projectors. But the relevant projectors here concern a
continuous interval of time, e.g. the projector onto all states ψ∆ such that P∆(t)ψ∆ = ψ∆ at every
t ∈ R.7 The difficulty we face is that every vector ψ ∈ H uniquely corresponds to a history
ψt = Utψ, but the histories we are interested in (corresponding to the occurrence of an event
within some time interval) must be defined more generally.
To free ourselves from this restriction, let us consider instead vector valued functions of t,
Ψ(t) = ψ(t), with ψ(t) ∈ H. Such a function represents an entire history of a system, i.e a
possible world. We may thus define a history Ψ∆(t) corresponding to the desired elementary
event by the function Ψ∆(t) = P∆Utψ. But these functions of t cannot lie in the instantaneous
Hilbert spaceH = L2[R3] of functions of (configuration) space. Instead, we must consider the
temporally extended Hilbert spaceH+ = L
2[R3]× L2[R] of functions of space and time.8 We can
now define a projector P+∆ onH+ that operates on every instantaneous state, P
+
∆Ψ(t) = P∆ψ(t).
6Lu¨ders’ Rule is usually given in terms of the trace, but for simplicity’s sake we will only
consider pure states here.
7In one-dimension ∆ is an interval [a, b]. The relevant subspace is the square integrable
functions on the interval [a, b], i.e. ψ∆ ∈ L
2[a, b], states for which P∆(t)ψ∆ = ψ∆ (implying that
the (sub-)domain of the Hamiltonian is closed in L2[a, b]).
8See the Appendix for a rigorous definition ofH+ as a continuous direct sum.
Chicago, IL -607-
Moreover, we can define a projection operator P T ([t1, t2]) which has the effect of truncating an
arbitrary history Ψ(t) as follows:
P T ([t1, t2])Ψ(t) =


ψ(t) if t1 ≤ t ≤ t2
0 otherwise.
Armed with these projectors onto times, we may now associate the outcome space of our
diffraction experiment with conditional probabilities through Lu¨ders’ Rule. Let ψ ∈ H be the
Heisenberg state of the system in question and let Ψ(t) = Utψ. Then, making use of the inner
product onH+ (see Appendix), Lu¨ders’ Rule returns probability one for the elementary event
corresponding to detection within ∆ at some t, as required,
Pr(∆|∆) =
〈P+∆Ψ|P
+
∆P
+
∆Ψ〉+
〈Ψ|P+∆Ψ〉+
=
limτ→∞
∫ τ
−τ
〈ψ(t)|P∆ψ(t)〉dt
limτ→∞
∫ τ
−τ
〈ψ(t)|P∆ψ(t)〉dt
= 1.
But we may also obtain the conditional probability for detection during I = [t1, t2] by means of
the projector P T ([t1, t2]) defined above,
Pr(I|∆) =
〈P+∆Ψ|P
T (I)P+∆Ψ〉+
〈Ψ|P+∆Ψ〉+
=
∫ t2
t1
〈ψ(t)|P∆ψ(t)〉dt
limτ→∞
∫ τ
−τ
〈ψ(t)|P∆ψ(t)〉dt
< 1.
Thus we obtain the means to associate probabilities with the occurrence of events localized in
time and space. From this perspective, the Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger pictures are rather
limiting since a unit vector ψ(t) ∈ H can only be associated with an instantaneous elementary
event, in which case having unit norm says that, with certainty, an event will occur at t. On the
contrary, in defining the conditional probability Pr(I|∆) by an integral, we treat 〈ψ(t)|P∆ψ(t)〉 as
a probability density rather than a probability and so the probability of occurrence during any
particular instant t is zero. This latter result seems to correctly reflect the probability that a
detector sensitive for a mere instant would fire at that instant—real detectors are sensitive over
time intervals, not collections of instants (with measure zero).
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Before concluding it should be acknowledged that there are close links of my proposal to that
of Brunetti & Fredenhagen (2002) for event time Positive Operator Valued Measures (POVMs),
taken up by (e.g.) Hegerfeldt & Muga (2010). The crucial distinction, however, is that their
interpretation of these POVMs does not serve to define a valid conditional probability (which
assigns probability one to the occurrence of the elementary event described by the condition). The
relation is as follows. If I 7→ F (I) is the POVM inH that they associate with an event occurring
in ∆ during I then my conditional probability (above) can be written as:
Pr(I|∆) =
〈P+∆Ψ|P
T (I)P+∆Ψ〉+
〈Ψ|P+∆Ψ〉+
=
〈ψ|B(R)1/2F (I)B(R)1/2ψ〉
〈ψ|B(R)ψ〉
where B(R) is the positive operator B([−∞,∞]) =
∫
∞
−∞
P∆(t)dt, and
F (I) = B(R)−1/2B(I)B(R)−1/2 with B(I) =
∫ t2
t1
P∆(t)dt.
4. Conclusion The conditional probabilities obtained for these spatio-temporally localized
events can be usefully thought of a Lewisian chances (Lewis 1981): the condition serves to pick
out those possible worlds in which the event in question occurs at some t, and the chances of
detection within a time interval I at each of these worlds are given by the means described above.
Although each possible world to which the chances apply is a world in which the event occurs at a
definite time, those times are inadmissible before the experiment begins (which is when these
probabilities are assigned). The usefulness of ‘possible worlds talk’ here may suggest that these
events could be characterized within an Everettian ‘no collapse’ interpretation of quantum
mechanics, perhaps using the Lewis-friendly possible world semantics of Wilson (2012). This
would be consistent with Rovelli’s seemingly paradoxical claim that “the statement that a certain
specific outcome ‘has happened’ can be true and not-true at the same time” (2005, p. 115).
However, the modern Everettian regards the (world-bound) occurrence of an event as the result of
a process of decoherence, no mention of which has been made here. Instead, the occurrence of
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these events may be regarded as an indeterministic stochastic process confined to a single world,
which is presumably how Haag intends his Principle of Random Realization to be interpreted.
Appendix The proof of Proposition 1 makes use of the following lemma, due to Hegerfeldt (1998).
Lemma 1. (Hegerfeldt) For any positive operator P , any vector ψ ∈ H, and any unitary group
Ut = e
iHt generated by a self-adjoint Hamiltonian H whose spectrum is semi-bounded either:
1. 〈ψ|U−tPUtψ〉 = 0 for all t, or
2. 〈ψ|U−tPUtψ〉 6= 0 for (almost) all t.
Proof. (Of Proposition 1). Let Pc be the projector onto the orthogonal complement of P . At each
time t ∈ {tk} we have 〈ψ|U−tPcUtψ〉 = 0. The premises of Hegerfeldt’s Lemma are satisfied by
ψ, Ut and Pc. Therefore, 〈ψ|U−tPcUtψ〉 = 0 for all t, unless {tk} is a set of zero Lebesgue
measure. Assuming that {tk} has non-zero Lebesgue measure, it follows that 〈ψ|U−tPUtψ〉 = 1
for all t. Thus PUtψ = Utψ for all t ∈ R. Therefore, if ψ is in the range of P ({tk}) then ψ is in
the range of P (R), i.e. P (R) ≥ P ({tk}). But, by definition, if ψ is in the range P (R) then ψ is in
the range of P ({tk}), i.e. P ({tk}) ≥ P (R). Thus P ({tk}) = P (R).
Inspired by Naimark & Fomin (1957), we define the extended Hilbert spaceH+ as a
continuous direct sum of instantaneous Hilbert spacesHt, each with inner product
〈Φ|Ψ〉t =
∑
k
〈φ(t)|ek〉〈ek|ψ(t)〉,
where {ek} is a fixed orthonormal basis forH. A function Ψ(t) is measurable if f(t) = 〈φ|ψ(t)〉
is measurable (with respect to the usual Borel measure on R) for all φ ∈ H. If two such functions
Ψ(t),Φ(t) are measurable, then so is the numerical function of t defined by their instantaneous
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inner product F (t) = 〈Ψ|Φ〉t. The set of all such measurable functions is a Hilbert space,
9 which
corresponds to the continuous direct sum of the spacesHt, that is, an integral with respect to
Lebesgue measure:
H+ :=
∫
R
⊕Ht dσ(R).
The inner product onH+ may now be defined as
〈Φ|Ψ〉+ =
∫
R
〈Φ|Ψ〉t dσ(R). (1)
It may be verified thatH+ is thus a Hilbert space, and the condition for inclusion of a function Ψ
inH+ is 〈Ψ|Ψ〉+ <∞. This means that Ψ(t) = Utψ with t ∈ R is not included in this space, but
partial dynamical evolutions of the system are, i.e. if Ψ(t) = Utψ for t ∈ [t1, t2], 0 otherwise,
then Ψ ∈ H+.
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Is Organismic Fitness at the Basis of Evolutionary Theory?
Charles H. Pence1 and Grant Ramsey2
Fitness is a central theoretical concept in evolutionary theory. Despite its importance, much debate has 
occurred over how to conceptualize and formalize fitness. One point of debate concerns the roles of 
organismic and trait fitness. In a recent addition to this debate, Elliott Sober argues that trait fitness is 
the central fitness concept, and that organismic fitness is of little value. In this paper, by contrast, we 
argue that it is organismic fitness that lies at the bases of both the conceptual role of fitness, as well as 
its role as a measure of evolutionary dynamics.
1. Introduction. In a recent paper, Elliott Sober (2013) argues that the fitness of individual organisms 
in the sense usually described by propensity theorists is urtseless to the actual practice of evolutionary 
biology. Rather, the crucial sense of fitness for the study of evolution is the fitness of traits, and it is 
“population-level variation in [trait] fitness” – rather than the absolute value of trait fitness – “that is a 
causal propensity” (p. 337). Indeed, Sober argues that only for variations in trait fitness can a tenable 
propensity interpretation be constructed; there exists no consistent propensity account of trait fitnesses 
themselves.
Sober’s argument has much to recommend it. First and foremost, his clarity regarding the 
distinction between individual fitness3 and the fitness of traits, as well as the relationship between the 
1 Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Louisiana State University
2 Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame
3 While the debate over biological individuality and the levels of selection is undeniably relevant to 
work on the concept of fitness (Bouchard and Huneman 2013), the term ‘individual’ should be 
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two, has been sadly lacking in recent literature on fitness.4 But we will argue here that his central thesis 
– that individual fitness is broadly irrelevant – is mistaken, and that this mistake arises as a result of 
confusion over the variety of roles that the notion of fitness plays in evolutionary theory. While trait 
fitness is the salient concept for some of the roles of fitness, for other uses – and uses in which 
philosophers are particularly interested – it is individual fitness that is the relevant fitness concept. 
Sober’s conclusion is thus too hasty; individual fitness remains vital to the practice of evolutionary 
biology, and for the interpretation of evolutionary theory.
Many of the most important uses of fitness fall under two categories. First is what we will call a
metrological role of fitness – that is, fitness’s role as a quantitative measure in evolutionary studies. 
Biologists can measure the realized fitness of organisms by tallying such things as their lifetime 
reproductive success, and they can measure trait fitness by recording trait changes over time.
Second is what we will call the conceptual role of fitness – that is, fitness as an element of the 
causal or explanatory structure of evolutionary theory. It is this sense of fitness to which Abrams 
appeals when he says that “the kind of fitness relevant to natural selection is fitness of types, that is, 
properties of organisms, since it is types that are heritable and selected for” (2009, pp. 751-752), and to 
which Pence and Ramsey appeal when they argue that “organismic fitness plays important roles in 
taken to be equivalent to ‘organism’ in the following.
4 In his paper, Sober refers to organismic fitness as “token” fitness, while trait fitness is referred to as 
“type” fitness. We avoid these locutions for several reasons. First, one could construct “type-
organism” concepts of fitness. Second, while traits are something like “types” in the sense familiar 
from metaphysics, they are restricted to particular populations and environments (that is, we are not
interested in the fitness of the type “organism with brown fur,” but in the fitness of the trait “brown 
fur” within a population, in an environment, at a given time). To avoid these (and other) 
complications, we will refer exclusively to trait and organismic (or individual) fitness in the 
following.
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parts of ecology and evolutionary biology, and is the concept of fitness underlying the [propensity 
interpretation of fitness]” (2013, pp. 871-872). Here we are considering a deeper, interpretive question 
about natural selection – fitness either plays some sort of causal or explanatory role in the theory of 
evolution by natural selection or it does not – and if it does play a role, then the specifics of that role 
need to be clarified. It is this role of fitness that we refer to as its conceptual usage.
Keeping this distinction in mind, then, our argument proceeds as follows. In section 2, we argue
that there exist three common conceptions of trait fitness – and each of these, in turn, is parasitic on 
individual fitness, making individual fitness the fundamental notion of fitness in the conceptual role. In 
section 3, we argue that in the metrological role, the situation is less clear – there are certainly studies 
in which trait fitness is the more important concept. But it is, we claim, far from true that, as Sober 
argues, “evolutionary biology has little use for [individual] fitness” (2013, p. 336). In a wide variety of 
examples, we argue, it is indeed the fitness of individual organisms that biologists look to measure, 
even when they make inferences about the fitness of traits from those measurements. Individual fitness 
is therefore fundamental in the conceptual role, and useful in the metrological role, and should thus, 
contra Sober, by no means be rejected outright.
2. The conceptual role of organismic fitness. In order to understand the conceptual role of organismic
fitness in evolutionary theory, we must know what trait fitness is and how it is related to organismic 
fitness. We will therefore begin by reviewing the uses of trait fitness in its conceptual role in the 
philosophical literature.  We will then show how these concepts are related to one another and to 
organismic fitness, finally arguing that organismic fitness lies at the conceptual basis of each of the trait
fitness concepts, and is therefore at the conceptual basis of the theory of evolution by natural selection. 
2.1. Three concepts of trait fitness. We will introduce three definitions intended to capture the 
core conceptual usage of trait fitness. Nothing in this section should, notably, strike philosophers of 
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biology as particularly surprising or controversial, since these three definitions of trait fitness appear 
throughout philosophical work on fitness and natural selection.5  Further, and importantly, as we will 
note at the end of this section, these three definitions are often interchanged with one another. Despite 
the fact that these definitions are often treated as terminological variants, we suggest that they are in 
fact in profound tension, and their being used interchangeably is deeply problematic. 
The first concept of trait fitness holds that the fitness of a trait is the average of the fitness 
values of the individuals that carry the trait.
(TF1) The fitness of a trait t is equal to the average individual (organismic) fitness 
values of individuals bearing t.
Commitment to (TF1) is widespread and quite explicit. To take one example, Sober notes in his (2001) 
a tendency for equivocation between individual and trait fitness.  He then asserts, however, that the 
choice of trait or individual fitness is merely semantic, because the two are related by (TF1).  That is, 
“the fitness value of a trait is the average of the fitness values of the individuals that have the trait” 
(2001, p. 26).  Many other authors also explicitly adopt this definition, including Mills and Beatty 
(1979, p. 276), Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew (2002, p. 462), Abrams (2009, p. 752), and Godfrey-Smith 
(2009, p. 21).
Second, spurred by the usage of fitness within population genetics, trait fitness is often 
definitionally linked to trait dynamics:
(TF2) The fitness value of a trait is a quantity that is, given some model of population 
dynamics, predictive of the future dynamics of that trait in a population.
5 Notably, they also appear throughout – and are used on both sides – of the debate between “causal” 
and “statistical” interpretations of evolutionary theory.  We do not intend anything here to privilege 
or argue for one of these two positions over the other; these definitions could describe either 
causally potent or causally impotent concepts.
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This finally lets us cash out some of the value of trait fitness. We want trait fitness to enable us to 
predict that, in a given population, the fitter traits will, all other things equal, tend to drive out the less 
fit.
In biological terms, (TF2) is nebulous, since “future trait dynamics” is a multivalent concept. 
There are countless models connecting fitness to future outcomes, and there are countless future 
outcomes we might want to observe, from the simple fraction of a trait in a population to times to 
extinction or fixation. For our purposes, we intend (TF2) not to pick out any one of these as privileged, 
but as a highly general definition of trait fitness: whatever we might think that trait fitness is, it must 
give us some (reasonably accurate) handle on future trait dynamics.  Consider, for example, the way in 
which trait fitness is defined in the population genetics literature.  In the simplest models of population 
genetics – haploid organisms reproducing asexually in discrete time without overlapping generations – 
the “Darwinian fitness,” w, may directly provide us with the future proportion at some time t, of two 
competing alleles in a population, pt / qt, given their initial proportion (Hartl and Clark 1997, p. 215):
pt / qt = w
t · p0 / q0 (1)
In this and many other models of population genetics, the Darwinian fitness is effectively definitionally
connected to the changes in allele frequencies over generational time.  (TF2), when used by 
philosophers, seems to capture their concern for preserving this usage of fitness in population genetics.
If (TF2) does not hold, it is often argued, there is no reason to bother with trait fitness in the 
first place. A good example here is the work of Ariew and Ernst, who argue that we “employ the 
concept of fitness when we want to explain why a trait spreads through a population when it does,” and
that it is a condition of the adequacy of a fitness concept that it “enable us to compare the degree to 
which natural selection will favor the spread of one trait over another, alternative trait” (2009, p. 290).6
The third concept of trait fitness invokes fitness’s colloquial usage as a description of the 
6 Explicit mentions of (TF2) also appear in Abrams (2009, p. 752) and Krimbas (2004, p. 188).
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“advantage” or “benefit” that an individual organism receives in virtue of possessing a trait:
(TF3) Trait fitness is the reproductive advantage to the individual conferred by 
possessing the trait.
This definition echoes the original usage of ‘fitness’ in evolutionary theory – the fact that organisms 
bearing some traits are “better fitted” to their environment than those with other traits (Darwin 1859).
2.2. The relationship between (TF1), (TF2), and (TF3). Before we consider the relationship 
between organismic fitness and (TF1)-(TF3), we will briefly consider the relationship between these 
trait fitness concepts. These definitions are often conflated in the literature, and our analysis here shows
that such conflations are deeply problematic.
Consider the pictures of trait fitness invoked by (TF1) and (TF2).  If (TF1) is the operative 
definition of trait fitness, then trait fitnesses, taken to be averages of individual fitness values, are just 
one of the causal influences responsible for determining future trait frequencies.  But now turn to the 
case of (TF2).  If a model like Equation (1) defines trait fitness, then trait fitness includes the effect of 
(at least) heritability – future trait frequencies are determined only by current trait frequencies and 
current trait fitnesses.  Trait fitness in the sense of (TF1) does not include the impact of heritability, but 
trait fitness as (TF2) does.  In many populations, therefore, (TF1) and (TF2) will result in different 
values for the fitnesses of traits.
The same argument applies to the relationship between (TF2) and (TF3).  If a trait has a 
significant benefit to individual organisms, yet is not (or not efficiently) transmitted from parents to 
offspring, then the (TF3)-fitness of that trait may be high while its (TF2)-fitness remains low.
Finally, the relationship between (TF1) and (TF3) is similarly complex.  Consider a trait which 
constitutes a fairly minor benefit to organisms, and the (TF3)-fitness of which is hence relatively small.
If this trait were to occur only in organisms possessing an otherwise extremely fit genetic background, 
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then the (TF1)-fitness of the trait might nonetheless be quite high.  As another example, a novel trait 
could be instantiated in a sterile individual.  In such a case, this trait would have a (TF2)-fitness of zero,
as the only individual organism bearing it will have no offspring whatsoever, and hence has an 
individual fitness value of zero. And this would be true regardless of the trait’s (TF3)-fitness value. The
average fitness of the individuals bearing a trait can be large (or small), that is, without the effect on 
individuals being positive and large (or negative and deleterious) in all cases.7
It is also noteworthy that the ranges of possible values for these different notions of trait fitness 
differ.8 Individual fitness values can only be positive numbers (an individual cannot have negative 
fitness), so the (TF1)-fitness of a trait can only be positive. The (TF2)-fitness or (TF3)-fitness of a trait,
on the other hand, can clearly be negative – if a trait is declining in frequency within a population, or if 
it is deleterious to the individual which holds it, then its (TF2)- or (TF3)-fitness values, respectively, 
will be less than zero.
2.3. The relationship between trait and individual fitness. It is clear, due both to the extensive 
use of trait fitness in the literature and the wide variety of ways in which it is defined, that Sober is 
quite right to argue that trait fitness is an important component of the conceptual foundations of 
evolutionary theory.  But, as noted in the introduction, we take issue with his claim that trait fitness is 
the conceptually fundamental notion of fitness in evolutionary theory.  We will now demonstrate that, 
for each of the three definitions we offered of trait fitness above, organismic fitness is the conceptually 
fundamental concept.  While trait fitness concepts are valuable, individual fitness serves as the 
7 Further instances of this sort can be constructed by appealing to the effects of variance on fitness, as
described by Gillespie (1974), or by considering cases of pleiotropy – a pleiotropic trait can have 
only one (TF1)-fitness (the average of its varying effects on organisms with different genetic 
backgrounds), but its (TF3)-fitness might vary radically across those different organisms.
8 Normalizing these values could, of course, solve this, but this approach is not taken in the literature.
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conceptual foundation for all our uses of fitness in evolutionary theory.
Consider first (TF3).  In order to properly apply (TF3) to a particular trait, we need to have a 
grasp on the appropriate notion of “benefit to the individual.”9 How are we to understand such a 
concept? As mentioned above, many possible “benefits” can be conceived. They all share one 
important characteristic in common, however – all will involve references to the fitness of individual 
organisms. Precisely the challenge of developing a model of individual fitness is to determine the way 
in which various putatively beneficial influences should be factored into the overall picture offered by 
fitness. Importantly, though, it is precisely this work that needs to be performed in order to clarify the 
notion of “benefit to the individual” that is invoked by (TF3). To put the point differently, the work of 
fully specifying (TF3) to the extent that it can actually be used to describe any particular trait will 
require the construction of a measure of benefit to the individual. This, in turn, just is the construction 
of a model of individual fitness. However (TF3)’s invocation of benefit might be cashed out, then, it 
will ultimately depend on some concept of individual fitness.10
The conceptual dependence of (TF1) on individual fitness is nearly trivial – if trait fitness 
simply is the average of individual fitness values, then individual fitness is assuredly the conceptually 
fundamental notion for (TF1).  On (TF1), trait fitnesses can be defined in terms of individual fitnesses, 
but the converse is impossible. Similarly, information about individual fitness can derive (TF2) values, 
but (TF2) values cannot derive individual fitness values.
9 One could, conceivably, have a “type”-based notion of (TF3), where the discussion of “benefit” was
of “benefit to the type” (thanks to Elliott Sober for pointing out this possibility). It is not clear to us,
though, that this would resolve the issues raised here: it does not seem plausible that one could 
somehow discover what the benefit to a type of individual is without clarifying the benefit to token 
individuals.
10 For a discussion of some of the problems that models of individual fitness need to overcome, see 
Sober (2001), Abrams (2009), and Pence and Ramsey (2013).
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The most difficult case is (TF2).  As Sober noted, (TF2)-fitness is in fact a fairly heterogeneous 
property, including such effects as heritability and individual fitness.  The question at hand is whether, 
like for (TF1) and (TF3), individual fitness also lies at the conceptual basis of (TF2). We contend that 
this is indeed the case. Our argument for this conclusion is that when (TF2) is analyzed, individual 
fitness is one of its core components, but not vice versa. To see this, consider that (TF2) is a rate of 
change in a population. If we ask what underlies this rate of change, the answer will involve several 
components. If there is immigration, than the immigrants can change trait frequencies. Similarly, 
emigration can change frequencies, especially if there is a difference in the propensity of different types
in the population to emigrate. Mutations and transmission biases, though often small effects, can also 
change population trait frequencies. All of these factors can change the way in which natural selection 
operates – but none of them is natural selection, and one of the main causes of trait frequency change 
(or stability) remains the individual fitness values of the organisms in the population. Although there 
can be (TF2) values in the absence of individual fitness differences, such (TF2) values would not 
indicate an adaptive response. Instead, they are merely due to migration, mutation, drift, and so forth. It
is thus true that when we analyze (TF2), organismic fitness is not just an important factor, but the 
central factor for understanding the adaptive import of (TF2) values.
Now consider individual fitness. Is (TF2) at its basis? The answer is no: Individuals have fitness
values that help lead to (TF2) values, but because (TF2) takes into account population factors like drift 
and migration, and because such factors are extrinsic to the propensities of individuals to survive and 
reproduce, there is no sense in which (TF2) lies at the conceptual foundation of organismic fitness. 
While it is true that organisms are built out of traits, and it is these traits that crucially determine 
organismic fitness values, it is not true that trait fitness determines organismic fitness values. (TF2) and
organismic fitness clearly bear an asymmetric relation to one another, and it is organismic fitness that is
conceptually primary.
We should pause here to deal with one objection. A response to this discussion of (TF2) might 
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run as follows: Of course (TF2) is not a complete account of the fitness of traits – we need to include 
explicit accounts of other properties, such as heritability, population/trait dynamics, and so forth. Once 
enough of these factors have been considered, only then can we say that we’ve arrived at a true account
of trait fitness.11 Our reply to this objection is that it seems to invoke something like a limiting process, 
where we begin with the limited information offered to us by (TF2) and add to it until we have arrived 
at a “complete” picture. But in what would this complete picture consist? It seems, we claim, that some
notion like the concept of “benefit to the individual” invoked by (TF3) must be the “target” of the limit,
and this would therefore collapse a (TF2)-notion of trait fitness into one based on (TF3). In this case, 
all the arguments that we deploy with (TF3) would then apply.
It is thus clear that, however we choose to define trait fitness, we are left with a notion of trait 
fitness that fundamentally depends on the concept of individual fitness.  As far as the conceptual role of
trait fitness is concerned, then, it is the case that individual fitness always stands conceptually prior to 
trait fitness.
Of course, as mentioned above, the conceptual role is not the only one in which trait fitness 
features.  When Sober argues that “biologists don’t bother with the fitness of Charlie the Tuna, though 
they may want to discuss the fitness of tuna dorsal fins” (2013, p. 337, emphasis added), he presumably
means that individual fitnesses are of little-to-no use in the empirical arena, or for what we called the 
metrological role of trait fitness.  It is to this role that we now turn.
3. The metrological role of organismic fitness. At first blush, it would seem that Sober’s argument 
against the usefulness of organismic fitness rests on entirely plausible premises. The fitness of 
organisms is typically inaccessible. This is because “organisms taste of life but once” (Sober 2013, 
337). Sober’s argument seems to say that even though organisms have fitness values, unless the values 
are zero (through infertility, say), we cannot measure them. We saw in the first section that this 
11 Thanks to Elliott Sober for offering this response.
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measurement-focused (metrological) role of individual fitness can be distinguished from its conceptual 
role. Because of this, individual fitness can clearly be the conceptual foundation of evolutionary theory 
even if it is not readily measurable. In this section, however, we would like to address the metrological 
question. Is it really true that biologists never care about or measure the fitness of Charlie the Tuna?
One excellent resource for gauging the degree to which individual fitness plays a role in 
evolutionary studies comes from Endler’s (1986) classic monograph on the study of natural selection in
the wild. In Chapter 3, Endler identifies ten distinct methods for studying natural selection in the wild. 
These methods vary from method I, which seeks correlations between environmental factors and traits, 
to method X, which compares optimization models with actual trait distributions. It is clear that for 
some of the methods, it is traits that are central, not individual organisms and their fitness values. But 
for at least some of the methods, the fitness of individual organisms plays a central role. Consider 
method VII, cohort analysis. In Endler’s words, “By gathering detailed data on individuals, data can be 
obtained on survivorship, fertility, fecundity, mating ability, and so on. Data on parents and offspring 
can also provide information on genetics (condition c for natural selection, inheritance). Data are best 
gathered from individually marked individuals, though some information can be gained by giving all 
members of the same cohort the same mark” (1986, 81). This method clearly focuses on individual 
fitness. But in order for method VII to serve as a counterexample to Sober, we will need some sense of 
how often this method is used in studies of natural selection in the wild. 
Method VII is not one that is easy to perform, especially for some taxa. As Endler notes, it “can 
be the most laborious method” (81). Does the fact that it is this laborious, however, mean that it is so 
useless, that, as Sober argues, biologists need not (or cannot) bother with attempting to measure 
individual fitness values? Fortunately for us, Endler took the trouble to conduct a through survey of 
studies directly demonstrating natural selection in the wild. His Table 5.1 lists 139 species along with 
the methods used in the study of each species as well as the publications that have described these 
studies. If Sober is right that individual fitness is worthless, we should find that few or none of the 
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studies listed in the table employ method VII. It turns out, however, that a majority of the species 
(~57%) listed in the table have had natural selection demonstrated in populations via method VII, that 
is, 79 species mention VII as a method in their studies. Method VIII, which also sometimes focuses on 
individual fitness (though combined together into “age classes” of individuals), is mentioned for 57 
species. If we subtract the 18 species whose study has involved both VII and VIII, we have a total of 118
species that have been subject to methods VII or VIII, 85% of the total. Thus if we assume that Endler’s 
list is representative of the kind of studies conducted today, we can’t avoid the conclusion that 
individual fitness dominates the metrological role of fitness. 
On the face of it, then, it seems that biologists wishing to demonstrate natural selection in the 
wild do care about the fitness of individuals. Charlie the Tuna’s fitness is worth measuring, after all. In 
the previous section, we showed that individual fitness is at the conceptual foundation of evolutionary 
theory, and in this section we have shown that individual fitness plays important metrological roles in 
many (or even most) evolutionary studies. The claim that individual fitness is useless, then, is difficult 
to maintain. Is the case closed on individual fitness being the metrological and conceptual foundation 
of evolutionary biology? Before we can draw this conclusion, we should consider a case study, 
focusing on just what sort of role individual fitness actually plays in evolutionary studies of the type 
that Endler catalogued. 
Consider a typical method VII study, that of Booth (1995). Booth tattooed damselfish in a reef 
ecosystem and then tracked their fates. By following the outcomes of individual life histories, the study
was centered on individual fitness. The determination of individual fitness was not, however, the aim of
the study. Rather, Booth was trying to determine the impact of grouping behavior on individual fitness. 
Is it a fitness advantage to be prone to join groups? And are larger or smaller groups the best ones to 
join? In terms of our (TF1)-(TF3) framework, we can understand the study as proceeding this way: 
Individuals are identified and their fitness values are recorded along with traits of interest (in this case 
the characters of the groups they belong to). The data from similar individuals can then be averaged, 
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resulting in the (TF1)-fitness of the traits measured. This average was then used to parameterize models
that offered predictions about future evolutionary dynamics (TF2), and also to estimate the impact that 
various group sizes have on the individual (TF3).
Thus, just as biologists will be more interested in how dorsal fins affect tuna fitness than the 
fitness of an individual tuna, they will also be more interested in the fitness effect of particular traits 
(like tending to join large groups), than in the fitness of particular damselfish. In such cases, individual 
fitness is frequently used as a means of exploring questions about the evolution of traits. But even if 
this is true, it still does not mean that individual fitness does not play an important role. In fact, we 
hope to have shown that the fitness of individuals serves as the basis for the demonstration of natural 
selection in a large percentage of these kinds of empirical studies. This is perhaps to be expected if, as 
we argued in section 2, individual fitness lies at the conceptual basis of evolutionary theory. 
4. Conclusion. We have argued against Sober’s contention that individual fitness is useless to the 
practice of evolutionary biology. While we agree that trait fitness is sometimes the biologist’s sole 
focus, two facts make Sober’s claim incorrect. First, conceptually, each of the three common 
definitions of trait fitness in fact conceptually relies upon the fitness of individual organisms. 
Organismic fitness thus lies at the conceptual basis of trait fitness. And second, even when biologists 
are attempting to measure the fitness of traits, they often do so in ways that rely, either tacitly or 
explicitly, on organismic fitness, making it fundamental as well for the metrological role of trait fitness.
Organismic fitness, therefore, is crucial to both the theory and practice of evolutionary biology.
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Chapter 1
Intensive and Extensive Quantities
(Rough draft as of October 29, 2014. Please do not cite.)
Z. R. Perry
1 Introduction: Physical Quantities
1.1 The Problem of Quantity
Physical quantities—like mass, charge, volume, and length—are commonly rep-
resented in science and in everyday practice by mathematical entities, like numbers
and vectors. For instance, we use real number and a unit to represent the deter-
minate magnitudes of mass (like 2kg, 7.5kg, pig, etc.). These representations are
appropriate because they faithfully represent the physical world as being a certain
way, as exhibiting certain structural features. Specifically they represent what we
might describe as these physical quantities being structured in a certain way.
There has been a long standing problem in explaining exactly what this phys-
ical structure consists in. The difficulty lies in giving an account of quantitative
structure without either (1) making ineliminable appeal to abstract Platonic math-
ematical entities themselves (which seem ill suited to explain their own adequacy as
representational tools) or (2) positing primitive, irreducible metric structure at the
fundamental level (for instance, a distinct and primitive ‘n times as long as’ relation
for every real n).1 Call this the problem of quantity.
1I won’t motivate these added constraints here. I take it that the motivations for the latter
constraint are transparent. An uncountable infinity of distinct primitive posits is the sort of thing
that should be avoided wherever possible. Field (1984) makes the best case for the former constraint.
I’ll just point out that even the most red-blooded Platonist ought to be suspicious of the idea that
the numbers 6 and 10 are somehow involved in the ultimate explanation of, e.g., why this 6kg ball
ricocheted at this particular speed and angle when it collided with this 10kg one.
1
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I examine the ways physical quantities constrain the structure of their worldly
instances, specifically the mereology of the physical entities which instantiate them.
In this paper, I identify a phenomena which I call “proper extensiveness”. Of the
physical quantities which do put constraints on mereology, including those one might
classify as “additive”, only a proper sub-class qualify as properly extensive.
In what follows, I will provide motivations for positing such a phenomena, and
argue that proper extensiveness cannot be dependent on dynamics. In the second half
of the paper, I make the case for taking proper extensiveness to be metaphysically
fundamental (at least relative to most of our other physical ontology), by showing
that doing so allows us to construct an elegant and attractive solution to the problem
of quantity (though only as it applies to quantities which are properly extensive).
Here’s the plan for the paper: The rest of this section contains a primer on
quantitative structure and establishes some terminology. The argument that we
need to posit proper extensiveness is made in sections 2 and 3. Section 2 introduces
a puzzle about explaining the reliable success of paradigm physical measurements.
The worry is that no explanation that essentially appeals to dynamics can account for
the success of synchronic length measurements, like those involving pairs of aligned
rods. The best explanation for this success, I argue, requires a pre-dynamical but
modally robust connection between quantitative structure and mereology.
Section 3 outlines two candidate connections, one commonly known as “addi-
tivity” and the other a previously unrecognized phenomena which I dub “proper
extensiveness”. I show that only proper extensiveness is sufficient to underwrite the
explanation of the length measurement presented in section 2. Also, taking length to
be properly extensive better accords with our modal intuitions involving the quantity.
The final section offers a sketch of an application of the distinction to the prob-
lem of quantity. I describe a solution to the problem of quantity only available to
properly extensive quantities, as I understand them. I discuss the implications such
a result would have on our understanding of the nature and significance of proper
extensiveness.
2
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1.2 Quantitative Structure
Every physical quantity is associated with a class of determinate magnitudes or
values, each member of which is a (non-quantitative) property or relation itself. So
when a particle possesses mass, charge, or length, it always instantiates one particular
magnitude of that quantity – like 2.5kg, 7C or 2pim.2 These magnitudes exhibit, or
the objects which instantiate them, exhibit “quantitative structure” just in case they
are related to one another by certain “structural relations”.
We can represent these relations as between magnitudes and between the in-
stances of magnitudes. Some of them are metrical—we say “this pumpkin is over 8.7
times as massive as that gourd” when talking about objects and “1.5m is ten times
as much as 15cm” when talking about magnitudes. Other structure is sub-metrical.
Let me introduce two relations which handily express the sub-metrical structure we
intuitively apply to one-dimensional unsigned scalar quantities,3 i.e. things like mass,
length, and volume (and unlike charge, velocity, and spin).
We say “this pumpkin is less massive than that table” and “22m3 is less than
22.1m3”, when talking about the ordering on (in these cases) massive objects and
determinate magnitudes of volume, respectively.
Let ‘≺’ denote a two-place relation symbolizing the intuitive “less than” relation
over the magnitudes, Qi, of some quantity, Q. Intuitively Qa ≺ Qb when Qa is “lesser
than” Qb. When an object, x, instantiates a mass magnitude that bears ≺ to the
magnitude instantiated by another object y, we say that x is less massive than y.
We say “this stick is as long as that pencil and this highlighter put together” and
“12kg is the sum of 7kg and 5kg”, when talking about the summation or concate-
nation structure on (in these cases) lengthy objects and determinate magnitudes of
2It is sometimes said that quantities are determinables and their magnitudes their determinates,
but this is not universally accepted. Certainly the magnitudes of mass, say, are all and only the
determinates of the determinable property denoted by the predicate ‘has mass’ or ‘has a mass’, but
it’s not obvious that we should identify the quantity mass with this determinable property.
3By “one-dimensional scalar” quantity, I mean one which is intuitively gradated along only one
axis and which don’t involve any notion of direction. By an “unsigned” quantity I mean just those
which are not most faithfully divided into categories like “positive” and “negative”, where two
magnitudes might have the same “degree” but differ in “sign”. In what follows, I will drop these
descriptors, but my focus, for simplicity’s sake, will always be on quantities of this type.
3
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mass, respectively.
Let ‘⊕’ denote a three-place relation over the Qi’s which serves to map two
magnitudes to a third magnitude which is their “sum”. So when ⊕(Qa, Qb, Qc) we
say Qc is the “sum” of Qa and Qb, and we write Qa ⊕ Qb = Qc. When ⊕ obtains
between three length magnitudes instantiated by objects x, y, and z respectively, we
say that z is as long as x and y taken together.
I will say a bit more about metrical structure, since it is our target. We’ll say
the ratio of Qa to Qb is intuitively 4.767 to 1 when 4.767 : 1(Qa, Qb). Since we are
construing these only as relations between magnitudes and not between magnitudes
and numbers, every distinct ratio must correspond to a distinct 2-place relation.4
2 Quantities and the World
The primary way that we gain epistemic access to facts about quantities is by
performing measurements. However, measurements are interesting physical pro-
cesses/procedures5 in their own right, even putting aside their crucial epistemic role.
For our purposes, a “Q measurement” is a physical procedure performed on cer-
tain objects, a and b, (though there needn’t be just two) which instantiate magnitudes
of a particular quantity, Q. Measurements have a ready state, a specification of the
state of the measurement apparatus and of a and b relative to that apparatus, as
well as a set of possible (mutually incompatible) outcomes. Outcomes can include
things like different possible positions of a pointer, the relative positions of plates on
a balance scale, or a distribution of illuminated pixels on a readout screen.
A measurement’s ready state and the different possible outcomes should be dis-
tinguishable without appeal to quantitative features of or relations between a and b
4This is why doing away with mathematical entities but still positing irreducible metrical struc-
ture is an unacceptable solution to the problem of quantity. It requires making an unweildy (indeed,
infinite) number of distinct, primitive posits.
5I prefer the term ‘procedure’ to ‘process’, and will use the former in what follows. This is for
two reasons. First, the same procedure can have different outcomes. Second, processes take time,
while some measurement procedures are instantaneous (Section 2.2 gives an example). We could
think of procedures as event-types which can be tokened in a few importantly different ways, where
these differences amount to the different “possible outcomes” discussed below.
4
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(or their respective parts).6 That is, the ready state of a mass measurement should
not include the condition that a be more massive than b, and two possible distinct
outcomes of a length measurement cannot be distinguished only by whether or not
a and b bear the “same length as” relation to each other.
Let’s call a particular token measurement procedure, performed on a and b, suc-
cessful if the occurrence or non-occurrence of each possible outcome is reliably corre-
lated with the obtaining or non-obtaining of different quantitative relations between a
and b (or between the magnitudes of Q they instantiate). A successful such measure-
ment procedure produces a counterfactually robust correlation between its outcomes
and the quantitative facts—i.e. it renders true conditionals of the form “If a had
stood in RQ to b (at the time of our measurement), then outcome Oi would have
occurred”.
Such robust correlations, when they obtain, cry out for explanation. A great
many such explanations appeal to the role of Q in the dynamics evolving the ready
state into one or another possible outcome (I give an example of a mass measure-
ment with such an explanation in Case 1 below). However, certain paradigmatic
length measurements do not admit of explanation by such means, yet they still can
be robustly successful. Case 2 describes one such successful length measurement,
and offers an intuitive, non-dynamical explanation for its success. The rub is, this
explanation depends on a substantive connection – which isn’t mediated by dynam-
ics! – between length’s quantitative structure and the mereology of lengthy physical
entities.
2.1 Case 1: Weights on a scale
In the first case, we want to measure the ordering structure (i.e. to determine
which, if either, is more massive than the other) of a pair of massive objects, a and b.
6Indeed, I require that the outcomes of a given measurement procedure must be distinguished
wholly non-quantitatively (i.e. not by the obtaining or non-obtaining of any quantitative fact,
magnitude, or relation). If I was only concerned with the epistemic role of measurement, this last
requirement would be needlessly strong. This requirement screens off measurements whose success
is really only revelatory of their relationships with and impact on other quantities, and not the
non-quantitative world directly.
5
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To do this, we set up a balance scale, with two plates suspended from opposite ends
of a bar. The bar is balanced at its center on a rigid, vertical stand. The ready state
for the scale is with the bar parallel to the ground and weights a and b positioned on
opposing plates. We perform the measurement by releasing the plates and waiting
a moment or two. The possible outcomes are: a’s plate is lower than b’s plate, b’s
plate is lower than a’s plate, or the bar is parallel to the ground.7
Suppose we run this measurement and get the first outcome—a’s plate is lower.
Suppose further that a is more massive than b, and that if a had been less massive
than (just as massive as) b, the second (third) outcome would have obtained. That
is, we have performed a successful length measurement on a and b. In this particular
case, what explains our measurement’s success?
Here the explanation should be clear. Mass’s quantitative structure plays a cer-
tain role in the dynamical laws of motion and gravitation. Specifically, objects which
are more massive experience a greater force pulling them towards the earth. After
we set the scale up in its ready state,8 the weights on the scale are impressed by
gravitational forces, as dictated by the physical laws. The downward forces on the
plates will unbalance a properly calibrated balance scale just in case the objects dif-
fer in mass, with the more massive object being pulled more forcefully. Thus the
dynamical laws come together with the quantitative facts and the physical makeup
of the scale to bring about one of the three outcomes in a way which is reliably
correlated with the “less massive than” relation.
Call a measurement procedure of this sort a dynamical measurement. Dynamical
measurements are successful in virtue of the dynamics governing the evolution from
the ready state to the resulting outcome. While there are other ways the dynamics
7One might worry that “lower” is a quantitative notion. However, it is not a matter of any
quantitative relations between a and b and, in particular, is not a fact about a and b’s masses. Even
so, this quantitativeness is easy to get rid of, if we complicate our measuring device a bit. Many
balance scales have a needle, perpendicular to the horizontal bar, attached at its center. The point
of this needle is exactly above the vertical stand when the bar is parallel to the ground, and can
either end up still upright or leaning to the left or the right of the vertical stand after.
8It turns out that there’s some freedom in which ready state you pick. Even if the scale doesn’t
start with the bar perfectly parallel to the ground, the dynamics on the system will bring it to the
right outcome as long as we wait a sufficiently long time.
6
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -632-
can be involved in our general measurement practices—e.g. in us perceiving which
outcome obtains, or in me building a balance scale—a measurement only counts as
dynamical when the dynamics play an essential role in the measurement’s success.9
2.2 Case 2: Aligning Rods
We want to measure the ordering structure for a pair of lengthy objects, in this
case straight rigid rods. To do this, we arrange the rods so that they are parallel
and lay them side-by-side. We then align them at one endpoint—i.e. while keeping
them parallel, positioning one endpoint of rod a such that it is immediately adjacent
to the endpoint on the same side of rod b. This is the ready state. There are three
possible outcomes, as before: rod a extends past rod b, rod b extends past rod a,
or neither rod extends past the other (Where “extending past”, for these rods, just
means one rod having a part which isn’t adjacent10 to any part of the other rod).
We observe which of the rods, if either, extends past the other, and conclude that
that rod is longer.
Suppose we perform this measurement and get the second outcome—rod b extends
past rod a. Let’s also suppose that this measurement is successful. I.e. that b is, in
fact, longer than a, and that if b hadn’t been longer than a, then b would not have
extended past a (etc.). What explains the success of this measurement procedure?
In this case, we cannot appeal to length’s role in the dynamics to explain the suc-
cess of our length measurement. There are, of course, dynamical laws that involve
spatial quantities like length, but this measurement has no temporal component. The
procedure’s ready state – a and b laid flush against each other and aligned at one
endpoint – is simultaneous with the procedure’s outcome – b’s extending past a. Of
9Classical mass, it turns out, only admits of dynamical measurement. While there are many
mass measurement procedures, including various kinds of scales, as well as “collision tests” where
massive objects are knocked against each other to see which resists displacement to a greater degree,
they all involve an appeal to the dynamics of the measuring system as it evolves from the ready
state to one of the resulting outcomes.
10We can make the notion of extending past even clearer by doing away with adjacency. For a
and b arranged as described in the text, a extends past b just in case there exists a plane orthogonal
to a and b which intersects a part of a and no part of b.
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course, the dynamics will play a role in our observing the outcome after the mea-
surement, and it will play a role in our positioning the rods before the measurement,
but the dynamics plays no role in evolving the system from the ready state to the
particular outcome. This means that the success of this measurement, and the re-
liable correlation between its non-quantitative outcome and the quantitative facts,
does not depend on the dynamics of length or any other quantity.
Indeed, this length measurement could occur and be successful at a world gov-
erned by no dynamical laws, which exists only for one moment, as long as, at that
moment, the rods a and b are situated in the right way.11
If not the dynamics, what can explains the success of a length measurement of
this sort? This measurement procedure is so transparently legitimate that it’s un-
clear what mechanism could be underlying the correlation. The notion of extending
beyond is so close to our conception of being longer (or instantiating a length mag-
nitude bearing ≺ to the other) that it’s hard to see the gap at all, let alone identify
what’s bridging it. It’s not especially difficult to come up with an intuitively satis-
fying explanation of this case. The trouble is giving an account of what length must
be like such that this explanation applies.
11There’s a bit of nuance here that we should address. The issue isn’t merely that the ready
state and result state are simultaneous, though this is important. The issue is that the connection
between them isn’t dynamical. For instance, we could construct a mass measurement which could
be performed instantaneously, but it would still depend on the dynamics. In 2.1, I pointed out that,
in the case of a balance scale, we have some freedom in where we set the angle of the balance bar
suspending the two plates, as long as we wait long enough for the system to enter equilibrium.
What makes the outcome of such a measurement important is that it represents an equilibrium
state of the system. The state evolves to equilibrium and then stays in that state. Since there’s
some freedom as to the angle of the bar, we could start with our bar in exactly the right position
such that the system is already in an equilibrium state when we let it go! In this case, there is a
certain sense in which the ready state and the outcome are simultaneous.
However, the fact that the two states are simultaneous doesn’t mean the success of the measure-
ment isn’t dependent on mass’s role in the dynamics. What gave that outcome its status was that
it’s an equilibrium state, but being at equilibrium is a dynamical feature. It’s a matter of what the
dynamics governing that system would do to such a system if it were left alone and given a chance
to evolve. So even if there were a world that existed only for an instant and contained a balance
scale in exactly the right position, it would only count as a successful mass measurement if there
were dynamics “governing” (or that would govern) that short-lived system, and the system was in
equilibrium according to those dynamics. A short-lived world without any dynamical laws at all
could not support such a measurement.
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Here’s what I think is going on in this case:
b extends past a. So while there’s a part of b that is perfectly aligned with a, but
there’s also a remainder—i.e. another part of b that has no part that’s adjacent
to any part of a. Call the first part x and the second part, the remainder, y. The
existence of such parts doesn’t yet establish that b is longer than a. For that we need
two bridge principles connecting the mereology and the quantitative facts.
(1) If two rods are laid side by side such that neither extends past either endpoint
of the other, then they are as long as each other.
(2) A rod must be longer than any of its proper “rod segments”.12
(1) establishes that a is as long as x. (2) establishes that b is longer than x. Together
they establish that, in situations like our length measurement, above, b is longer than
a. While premise (1) is of central importance to the practice of measuring length by
laying rods side-by-side, I will not be discussing it much here.13
12Premise (2) is expressed in terms of rules of thumb for measuring rigid rods, and makes use
of the notion of a “rod segment”. This is not ideal, but it’s important to recognize that the
more natural sounding principle: “a rod must be longer than any of its proper parts” has some
unfortunate exceptions. In particular, a three meter rod could be cut “lengthwise”, so to speak,
and thus divide into two three meter parts. Alternatively, it also has proper parts that, intuitively,
have no length at all, but are just a few spatially disconnected pieces of rod. The notion of “rod
segment” is meant to rule out cases like these.
If the reader is still worried that a rod could be as long as one of its “rod segments”, perhaps
because the rod segment is just the segment of the rod minus some lengthless slice at one endpoint,
we can add premise (3):
(3) If a rod can be partitioned into two “rod segments”, it is longer than each of them.
What premise (3) relies on is the idea that an infinitely thin slice off the endpoint of a rod is not a
“rod segment” (even if its complement is). Once we move beyond this example and do away with
talk of rods in favor of talk of spatiotemporal paths, we can avoid all the ambiguity involved in the
notion of a rod segment.
13Premise (1) is likely an approximation of a principle that has its source in Euclid,
with his Common Notion 4: “Things which coincide with one another are equal to one
another.”[Euclid (trans. Heath, 1908)]. Since material bodies can’t interpenetrate, the closest to
coinciding we can come, practically, is alignment without remainder, i.e. being laid side by side
with neither extending beyond the other. There’s much more to be said about the spatial structure
of the world such that this approximation works, to the extent it does, but that’s outside the scope
of this paper.
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2.3 The puzzle of non-dynamical measurement
This is a patently non-dynamical explanation. The outcome (b extending past a)
and the quantitative facts (b being longer than a) are correlated, according to this
explanation, not because of length’s role in the dynamics but because of certain con-
straints on the mereology of lengthy objects (i.e. on the possible lengths of objects
given their mereological structure and relations, and the possible mereological struc-
ture of objects given their lengths and length relations.). This connection between
quantitative structure and mereology shows up at two points in the explanation:
The first is obvious. Premise (2) establishes that a rod bears a certain quantitative
relation (longer than) to every member of a certain special sub-class of its parts.
The second involves premise (1), though in a more nuanced way: The explanation
of the success of a length measurement of a given pair of rods, a and b, such that b
extends past a, was presented as fully general. That is, for any rod shorter than b,
which is measured against it in this way, b must have a proper part that’s perfectly
aligned with that rod. By (1) this implies that b has a proper part that’s as long as
that rod, for any such rod shorter than b! Here this explanation (& specifically its
generality) puts substantial constraints on the parts of b and the lengths those parts
can have.
Before we go any further, we will have to replace this talk of rods with something
more rigorous. (1) and (2) are approximately true, as is this assumption about the
generality of the explanation. However, though the success of the measurement of
the rods a and b can be roughly explained by appeal to these principles, we don’t
need to tether our explanation to the nature of something as derivative and clunky as
the notion of a concrete, straight, macroscopic material rod, and the “rod segments”
which make it up. Indeed, if we want to give a truly rigorous and completely general
explanation, we will need to give it in terms of the fundamental entities and properties
in the vicinity.
Let’s say that length is, fundamentally, a property of one-dimensional, open (i.e.
non-looped) paths through spacetime. To the extent that a concrete material rod
can be said to have length, it has its length derivatively, in virtue of occupying
10
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a region containing certain (properly oriented) spatiotemporal paths of such-and-
such a length. We should be able to recapture an explanation in terms of rods by
appealing to the properties of the regions they occupy. For the remainder of this
paper, however, I’ll be concerned only with the more general and rigorous principles
concerning spatiotemporal paths.
We can capture the significance of premise (2) and of the generality assumption in
one principle (By “object of length Ln” I’m only referring to things like substantival
paths, and not to anything which has its length derivatively):
(2′) For all objects x of length Ln, and for all lengths Lm ̸= Ln, x has a proper part
of length Lm iff Lm ≺ Ln.
(2′) puts very strong constraints on the sorts of parts lengthy objects can have,
and on the possible lengths those parts can have. Analogously to (2), (2′) implies
that a given path is as long or longer than all of its lengthy parts. Analogously to
the assumption about generality, (2′) implies that a given path of length Ln must
have a lengthy proper part corresponding to every length property bearing ≺ to Ln.
The only explanation for the reliable success of synchronic length measurement
on offer requires a principle like (2′). But neither the physical details of the measure-
ment procedure, nor the dynamical laws governing the system, are responsible for
conditions like (2′). If this explanation is a good one, then, our theory of quantities
like length should be able to account for the truth of (2′) in the relevant situations.
To do this, we will have to consider how certain quantities constrain the mereology
of their instances. In the next section, I argue that the way quantities are stan-
dardly assumed to put constraints on that mereology is insufficient to underwrite
this explanation, and I propose an alternative.
3 Constraining the World
In this section, I consider two ways a quantity might put constraints on the
mereological structure of its instances. The first is commonly called “additivity”,
while the second is a hitherto undiscussed phenomena, which I have dubbed “proper
11
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extensiveness” (though I will argue that it better captures some of our modal intu-
itions concerning certain physical quantities). I will show that additivity, properly
understood, cannot explain the success of instantaneous length measurements, while
proper extensiveness can.
3.1 Additivity
An additive quantity, roughly, is one for which composite objects “inherit” their
Q-value (what magnitude of Q they instantiate) from the Q-values of their parts (if
they have any). For instance, mass and length are both additive quantities. 2kg and
3kg stand in ‘⊕’ relation to 5kg (2kg⊕3kg = 5kg). Since mass is additive, composites
of massive objects “inherit” their masses from their parts; so the mereological sum
of a non-overlapping14 pair of objects weighing 2kg and 3kg must weigh 5kg.15 The
inheritance analogy is a powerful one, as it indicates both the strength and – we
shall see – the limitations of this connection.
Put more formally, an additive quantity necessarily satisfies the following con-
ditionals. They hold for any magnitudes, Qi (of the same additive quantity), that
satisfy the antecedent. The mereological relations used are these: ‘O(x, y)’ for over-
lap, ‘(x, y)C(z)’ for a three-place composition relation, with the third relatum being
the fusion of the first two, and ‘P (x, y)’ for parthood.
Additive ≺: (Qm ≺ Qn)→ ∀x∀y((Qn(x) ∧Qm(y))→ ¬P (x, y))
Additive ⊕: (Qm ⊕ Qn = Qr) → ∀x∀y∀z((Qm(x) ∧ ¬O(x, y) ∧ (x, y)C(z)) →
(Qr(z)↔ Qn(y)))
14If we’re being really strict about it, the parts may either have no overlap or have only “negligible
overlap”. What counts as negligible overlap depends on the structure and mereology of the quantity
in question. For instance, often negligible overlap might just be overlap which instantiates the “zero
magnitude”, like 0m or 0kg or 0cm3. However, if one’s metaphysics of the relevant quantity does
not include a zero magnitude ([Balashov, 1999] takes issue with the very idea of a zero magnitude,
albeit for reasons I’m not especially sympathetic to) the notion of negligible overlap must be got
at in a different way.
15For ease of presentation, I assume mereological universalism. Certain complications would arise
if we were to drop this assumption. However, none of the substantive points of the paper depends
on it. I also assume that none of the massive objects discussed are spinning.
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In the case of mass,Additive ≺ says that no massive object can have a part which
is more massive than it. Additive ⊕ says that the fusion of any two non-overlapping
objects has the “sum” of their respective mass magnitudes as its mass, providing
they instantiate mass magnitudes at all. These conditionals (on the assumption that
⊕ is commutative) fully specify the mereological significance of additivity. These
conditionals are modally16 robust: Suppose pumpkin is a 5kg object composed out
of non-overlapping parts body and stem. If we consider a counterfactual scenario in
which the only difference is that stem is 2kgs heavier (than it actually is), we readily
(often automatically) infer that at this world pumpkin is 2kgs heavier as well. Indeed,
its difficult to conceive of a world where only stem, but neither body nor pumpkin,
changes its mass.
3.2 Additivity and Measurement
The reason additivity cannot explain the success of synchronic length measure-
ment is well illustrated by the “inheritance” analogy. Additivity says that an object’s
mass is determined by the masses of its parts. However, Additive ⊕ and Additive
≺ are entirely silent on whether a given massive object has parts (massive or oth-
erwise). This means that length’s additivity cannot itself account for the truth of
(2′).
Since Additive ≺ and Additive ⊕ never imply that a given object must have
parts of some kind, they’re consistent with a pair of objects, a and b, instantiating
magnitudes, Qa and Qb, (of some additive quantity) where Qa ≺ Qb yet both a
and b are mereological simples. There’s nothing obviously wrong with admitting of
such a possibility for mass. On the ordinary understanding of most particle theo-
ries, elementary particles are assumed to be mereologically simple, and there is no
prohibition on different elementary particles ever possessing different masses! How-
16The nature of this modal robustness, i.e. the degree of necessity possessed by the conditionals
Additive ⊕ and Additive ≺, is not entirely clear, and may differ from quantity to quantity. For
instance, on some understandings of classical mass, on which it is identical to inertia, the truth of
Additive ⊕ and Additive ≺ for mass might be grounded in the nature of mass’s dynamical role.
If so, then these conditionals may well be merely nomologically necessary, when it comes to mass,
rather than metaphysically necessary.
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ever, the analogous possibility for lengthy entities is flatly inconsistent with (2′).17
Moreover, such a possibility also seems to get the modality of fundamentally lengthy
entities (like spacetime paths or trajectories) intuitively wrong (I go more in depth
into this issue in particular in the next section).
Mere additivity cannot explain the reliable and general success of synchronic
length measurement.
3.3 Proper Extensiveness
I’m going to introduce a phenomena called “proper extensiveness”. My contention
is that certain physical quantities are properly extensive—length, volume, and tem-
poral duration among them—and that properly extensive quantities, by their nature,
put stronger constraints on the mereological structure of the world than merely ad-
ditive quantities do. Specifically, these constraints are sufficient to entail (2′) for
length and thereby support the intuitive explanation offered in the previous section
for the success of synchronic length measurement.
Physical quantities can be grouped into the additive and the non-additive (some-
times called “intensive”) quantities, and the class of additive quantities can be further
divided into the merely additive quantities and the properly extensive quantities. As
such, properly extensive quantities satisfy Additive ≺ and Additive ⊕:
Additive ≺: (Qm ≺ Qn)→ ∀x∀y((Qn(x) ∧Qm(y))→ ¬P (x, y))
Additive ⊕: (Qm ⊕ Qn = Qr) → ∀x∀y∀z((Qm(x) ∧ ¬O(x, y) ∧ (x, y)C(z)) →
(Qr(z)↔ Qn(y)))
2m and 3m stand in ⊕ to 5m (i.e. 2m ⊕ 3m = 5m). Length is additive, so the
fusion of two non-overlapping objects of length 2m and 3m laid end-to-end (in the
right way) will be 5m long. If length were merely additive, that would be the end of
the story. Because length (we are supposing) is also properly extensive, we can say
17To see this, realize that it’s also consistent with the dictates of additivity that there be two
lengthy objects, a and b, of lengths, 2m and 5m respectively, where b has no proper part as long as
a (that is, 2m long) because b is a mereological simple.
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more—e.g., since 2m⊕ 3m = 5m, any 5m path must admit of a partition into a 2m
part and a 3m part. We’ll understand a partition of o as a class of non-overlapping
objects whose fusion is o. That is, properly extensive quantities also necessarily
satisfy:18
Extensive ≺: (Qm ≺ Qn)⇒ ∀x(Qn(x)→ ∃y(y ̸= x ∧Qm(y) ∧ P (y, x)))
Extensive ⊕: (Qm ⊕ Qn = Qr) ⇒ ∀x(Qr(x) ↔ ∃y∃z(Qm(y) ∧ Qn(z) ∧ ¬O(y, z) ∧
(y, z)C(x)))
In the case of length,19 what Extensive ≺ says is that every spatial path of a
given length Ln, such that Lm ≺ Ln, has an interval (which is to say, a part which
is itself a path) of length Lm. Extensive ⊕ says a path can instantiate a length
magnitude La such that Lb⊕Lc = La, if and only if it has two non-overlapping parts
which respectively instantiate those magnitudes. This is a very powerful condition,
because it says that, given the quantitative facts, just instantiating a given length
magnitude, La, necessarily requires you to have parts with certian length properties
standing in certain mereological relations to one another.
Recall that, in order for our explanation of synchronic length measurement in
terms of the existence of a remainder to apply, our theory of length must entail that
the quantity satisfies:
18Additivity and proper extensiveness both involve principles which concern the quantitative
features of objects “put together in the right way”. For most quantities, like mass or volume, the
formula ‘¬O(x, y) ∧ (x, y)C(z)’ will accurately describe this condition. However, since only certain
kinds of objects can have length (namely, unbroken non-looping paths), the conditions for putting
two paths together “in the right way” are more stringent. It isn’t enough for path a and path b to
not overlap and to together compose object c. If a is the spatial path from my nose to my upper
lip, and b is the shortest path from the surface of the earth to the moon, then their fusion, c, isn’t
an unbroken path, and so doesn’t have length! The conditions for length would be something like
this: a and b are both intervals of path c, which is their mereological fusion, and a and b either
don’t overlap or have a lengthless overlap (either one with 0m length or without length, depending
on what we want to say about the lengths of unextended points). Since I am more concerned here
with the relationship between the second-order ≺ and parthood, I will set this issue aside
19Technically these conditionals, as stated, only directly apply to properly extensive quantities
like volume or surface area. They would need slight tweaking to accurately characterize a quantity
like length. How we sort out this wrinkle won’t, however, make a difference for our argument
concerning measurement.
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(2′) For all objects x of length Ln, and for all lengths Lm ̸= Ln, x has a proper part
of length Lm iff Lm ≺ Ln.
An account of length on which length is properly extensive does entail (2′). By
Extensive ≺, we get that if Lm ≺ Ln then x has a part of length Lm, and by
Additive ≺, we get that if x has a proper part of length Lm, then Lm must be
either = Ln or ≺ Ln (which, given the assumption that Lm ̸= Ln, implies that
Lm ≺ Ln.
3.4 The significance of Proper Extensiveness
The fact that proper extensiveness is necessary to explain the reliable success of a
paradigm measurement procedure is important because it indicates that (1) there is
good reason to take length to be properly extensive and (2) that the necessary con-
ditionals characterizing proper extensiveness must be independent of the operation
of the dynamical laws. Solving the puzzle of synchronic length measurement is less
an end in itself and more a means to introduce and motivate proper extensiveness.
In this section I will further examine this phenomena, and in the next outline a very
significant application.
Some of our central intuitions regarding physical quantities like length, volume,
and temporal duration—specifically those concerning how the mereological structure
of the world reflects the quantitative structure of the properties instantiated at it—
already suggest a tacit commitment to something like proper extensiveness for these
quantities.
One striking consequence of taking length to be properly extensive illustrates this
quite well. Suppose we discover a path through space that had a non-zero length,
Lu, but no proper sub-paths (i.e. no proper parts which are paths). According to
Extensive ≺, this implies that there are no length magnitudes ≺ Lu (except the
zero-magnitude, 0m, if there is such a thing)—meaning that the quantity, length, is
discrete (best represented by the natural numbers plus zero) and that Lu is its unit
length.
This result very closely accords with our intuitive expectations about what the
16
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physical world can tell us about quantities like length. We do not hear metaphysicians
raise concerns when physicists run together the possibility that there is a smallest
non-zero length (alternatively, that the quantity length is discrete) with the possi-
bility that there are shortest possible paths (alternatively, that space is discrete).
Indeed, many discussions of length readily use “shorter than” and “as long as a
proper sub-interval of” interchangeably. Similar points can be made for area, vol-
ume, and temporal duration. The pervasiveness of this line of thought disguises how
significant of a metaphysical commitment it amounts to, once we take it seriously.
The notion of proper extensiveness is how we should characterize this commitment.
It is important to stress again how these commitments simply do not hold sway for
merely additive quantities. Though mass’s status as merely additive is not entirely
uncontroversial, treating it that way is in accordance with an extremely common un-
derstanding of the quantity.20 On this understanding, there could very well be two
simples (objects without proper parts) with differing, non-zero, masses. When enter-
taining the epistemic possibility that, e.g., the electron is a point-particle (without
spatial extension and, it is presumed, mereologically simple), we don’t at all expect
every other elementary particle to therefore be exactly as massive as the electron!
However, that is precisely the sort of conclusion we should reach in the analogous
scenario for quantities like length and volume!
I’ve suggested that there exists a distinction in our intuitions about the modal
mereology of additive physical quantities. If this is right, it stands as strong evidence
in favor of a distinction between the additive quantities into the merely additive and
the properly extensive, as I draw it. The lack of acknowledgment or discussion of
this phenomena in the philosophical and physical literature means that (as of yet)
20The fact that mass is closely associated with a certain dynamical role is good evidence that
it’s not properly extensive, since we standardly think that the same dynamical role in gravitation
or inertia could be played equally well by a mereological complex or a simple. However, for all we
know it may turn out that mass more closely aligns with earlier notions of physical mass as the
“measure of matter”. If that is right, to say that a is less massive than b is to say that a has less
matter making it up than b. One way to draw out this understanding would be to treat mass as
properly extensive, and to expect its instances to obey the associated mereological constraints (i.e.
if b has more matter making it up than a does, then b should have a part which has exactly as
much matter making it up as a does).
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there are no suggestions on the table as to why some quantities are extensive, or
how this constraining of the mereology is supposed to work. For our purposes, it
suffices to say that some quantities are extensive and that they constrain mereology
in a modally robust way that is independent of the dynamical laws.
4 Conclusion: Applying Proper Extensiveness to
the Problem of Quantity
In the previous two sections I have argued in favor of positing a distinction
amongst the additive quantities into the merely additive and the properly extensive.
I have argued that this distintion better captures and explains the data, specifically
regarding simultaneous length measurement as well as our modal mereological intu-
itions about various physical quantities. I’d like to close by gesturing in the direction
of a significant potential application of this distinction. Specifically, I will give a
few reasons to believe that an elegant and principled solution to the problem of
quantity, as it applies to properly extensive quantities, is available if we take proper
extensiveness as fundamental
Many metaphysicians of quantity appeal to measurement theory in their answer
to the problem of quantity. Specifically, they attempt to reduce facts about metric
structure to facts about the world satisfying the right measurement-theoretic ax-
ioms.21 Measurement theory is a formal discipline which involves rationalizations,
formalizations and defenses of empirical measurement practices. The game of mea-
surement theory is to take a domain of material objects, which instantiate different
magnitudes of some quantity, Q, posit some axioms that these objects obey, and
then prove theorems which imply that Q can be faithfully represented, up to a point,
with a certain mathematical structure, e.g. the real numbers.22
Some of the axioms required to prove these theorems impose certain requirements
on the size and structure of the domain itself. They say that domains are well
21Field (1980) is the most famous account along these lines.
22Cf. [Krantz, et. al. 1971]
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populated (existence axiom), and that there’s ample variation in which magnitudes
of Q are instantiated therein (richness axiom). The satisfaction of such axioms is a
contingent matter. If there aren’t enough objects, or if they don’t instantiate enough
different magnitudes, these axioms fail to be satisfied.
But our account of the ground of metric structure ought not to be contingent on
the world being well-populated! This contingency problem has been acknowledged in
the literature, and various theorists have proposed ad hoc solutions to eliminate this
contingency. [Mundy, 1987] gives up on the domain of massive objects and instead
attempts to apply measurement theory to the domain of mass magnitudes, while
Arntzenius and Dorr in their (2013) avoid the contingency problem by positing well-
populated substantival physical spaces, and identifying the geometry of this space
with the relevant quantitative structure.
The unique advantage of properly extensive quantities is that any world where
such a quantity is instantiated must, by the conditions it places on the mereology of
its instances, be well populated and variegated, to a certain degree. Suppose that
Lx is a length magnitude, instantiated by a path, p. Extensive ≺ implies that p
will have at least as many proper parts as there are length magnitudes which bear ≺
to Lx. Similarly, Extensive ⊕ implies that p will admit of a partition into parts of
length Ly and Lz, for every such pair of length magnitudes such that L
y ⊕ Lz = Lx.
This suggests that a domain where a properly extensive quantity is instantiated,
and in which its instances satisfy the necessary constraints its proper extensiveness
puts on their mereology, may be of the right form to satisfy the relevant existence
and richness axioms. I think this can be shown, but there’s no room to do so here.
However, if it were true, it would allow for a uniquely elegant and principled solution
to the problem of quantity, as it applies to properly extensive quantities.
A result of this kind, if it can be done (and I think it can), is not just important
because it moves us closer to a satisfactory solution to the problem of quantity in
full generality. It also speaks to the metaphysical depth of the distinction between
properly extensive quantities and all other physical quantities, one which manifests
not just in the way these quantities relate to mereology, but also in the nature and
ground of their metric structure.
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Abstract 
Recent claims, mainly from computer scientists, concerning a largely automated and model-
free data-intensive science have been countered by critical reactions from a number of 
philosophers of science. The debate suffers from a lack of detail in two respects, regarding (i) 
the actual methods used in data-intensive science and (ii) the specific ways in which these 
methods presuppose theoretical assumptions. I examine two widely-used algorithms, 
classificatory trees and non-parametric regression, and argue that these are theory-laden in an 
external sense, regarding the framing of research questions, but not in an internal sense 
concerning the causal structure of the examined phenomenon. With respect to the novelty of 
data-intensive science, I draw an analogy to exploratory as opposed to theory-directed 
experimentation. 
1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, computer scientists have claimed that a new scientific methodology has 
become possible through advances in information technology (e.g. Gray 2007). This approach 
is supposed to be data-driven, strongly inductive, and relatively theory-independent. The 
epistemology of such data-intensive science has recently emerged as a novel topic in 
philosophy of science. Generally, the reactions have been rather critical, often referring to the 
more or less trivial observation that some kind of theory-ladenness always occurs in scientific 
research. But, as I will argue, this means throwing the baby out with the bathwater, since 
interesting shifts in the role of theory can indeed be observed when examining specific 
methods employed in data-intensive science. 
In Section 2, I will suggest a definition for data-intensive science reflecting those features that 
are interesting from an epistemological perspective. I will then, in Section 3, briefly introduce 
the debate on theory-ladenness in data-intensive science. To assess the various arguments, I 
will discuss two algorithms that are widely used, namely classificatory trees (Section 4) and 
non-parametric regression (Section 5). For both of these methods, I will point out the specific 
ways in which theory has to be presupposed to identify causal connections and thus yield 
reliable predictions. I will conclude in Section 6 that these algorithms require an external 
theory-ladenness concerning the framing of research questions, but little internal theory-
ladenness concerning the causal structure of the examined phenomena. I will also point out 
remarkable analogies to the analysis of theory-ladenness in exploratory experimentation. 
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2. Defining data-intensive science 
The problems usually addressed in data-intensive science bear close resemblance to standard 
problems in statistics. They concern classification or regression of an output variable y with 
respect to a large number of input parameters x, also called predictor variables or covariates, 
on the basis of large training sets. The main differences compared with conventional problems 
in statistics consist in the high-dimensionality of the input variable and the amount of data 
available about various configurations or states of the system. For example, an internet store 
wants to know how likely someone buys a certain product depending on surf history, various 
cookies and a user profile as well as based on data of other users who have either bought or 
failed to buy the product. A medical researcher examines which combinations of genetic and 
environmental factors are responsible for a certain disease. A political adviser is interested 
how likely a specific individual is going to vote for a certain candidate based on a profile 
combining for example voting history, political opinions, general demographics, or consumer 
data.  
In a classification problem, the output variable has a finite number of possible values. In a 
regression problem, the output variable is continuous. In order to establish an adequate and 
reliable model, extensive training and test data is needed. Each instance in the training and 
test sets gives a value for the output variable dependent on at least some of the input 
parameters. The training data is used to build the model, e.g. determine relevant parameters, 
the test data to validate and verify the model. Using part of the data to determine the accuracy 
of a model is commonly referred to as cross-validation.3 
In this essay, we cannot delve into all the technical details of the various algorithms employed 
in data-intensive science, such as support vector machines, forests or neural networks. Instead 
we will look at two simple but widely-used algorithms, namely classificatory trees and non-
parametric regression, to examine how much and what kind of theory must be presupposed in 
order for these algorithms to yield meaningful results. 
The term data-intensive science is notoriously blurry, as has been emphasized for example by 
Sabina Leonelli: ‘a general characterisation of data-driven methods is hard to achieve, given 
the wide range of activities and epistemic goals currently subsumed under this heading.’ 
(2012, 1) However, in order to say something substantial about the role of theory, we have to 
be more specific about the kinds of practices we want to include as data-intensive science 
even if an exact definition does not fully correspond to common usage of the term.  
In the computer science literature, various definitions have been proposed for the closely 
related concepts of a data deluge or of big data. Most of these refer to the pure amount of 
information or to the technical challenges that such ‘big data’ poses in terms of the so-called 
‘three Vs’—volume, velocity and variety of data (Laney 2001). However, from a philosophy 
of science perspective, these definitions do not provide much insight. After all, larger amounts 
of data do not automatically imply interesting methodological developments. 
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Leonelli, partly following Gray (2007, xix), identifies two characteristic features for data-
intensive methodology: ‘one is the intuition that induction from existing data is being 
vindicated as a crucial form of scientific inference, which can guide and inform experimental 
research; and the other is the central role of machines, and thus of automated reasoning, in 
extracting meaningful patterns from data.’ (2012, 1) She adds that these features are 
themselves quite controversial and criticizes that they are difficult to apply in research 
contexts. 
In defining data-intensive science, I largely follow Leonelli, while attempting to be more 
precise about the type of induction. I will argue that eliminative induction in the tradition of 
Mill’s methods4 plays the crucial role. The first part of my definition thus focusses on the 
premises that are necessary to carry out eliminative induction: data-intensive science requires 
(I) data representing all relevant configurations of the examined phenomenon with respect to 
a specific research question. For complex phenomena, this implies high-dimensional data, i.e. 
data sets involving many parameters, as well as a large number of observations or instances 
covering a wide range of combinations of these parameters. We will see later that this premise 
underwrites the characteristic data-driven and inductive nature of data-intensive science. 
(II) The second feature concerns the automation of the entire scientific process, from data 
capture to processing to modeling (cp. Gray 2007, xix). This allows sidestepping some of the 
limitations of the human cognitive apparatus but also leads to a loss in human understanding 
regarding the results of data-intensive science. Again, being more precise about the type of 
induction allows to determine under which circumstances automation is really possible. 
3. Theory-free science? 
Proponents of data-intensive science claim that important changes are happening with respect 
to the role of theory. An extreme, but highly influential version of such a statement is by the 
former editor-in-chief of Wired Chris Anderson, who notoriously proclaimed ‘the end of 
theory’ altogether (2008). More nuanced positions can be found for example in the writings of 
Google research director Peter Norvig (2009): ‘Having more data, and more ways to process 
it, means that we can develop different kinds of theories and models.’ Simpler models with a 
lot of data supposedly trump more elaborate models with less data (Halevy et al. 2009, 9).  
A number of philosophers have objected to claims of a theory-free science—generally by 
pointing out various kinds of theory-ladenness. For example, Werner Callebaut writes: ‘We 
know from Kuhn, Feyerabend, and […] Popper that observations (facts, data) are theory-
laden. Popper […] rejected the “bucket theory of knowledge” in favor of the “searchlight 
theory,” according to which observation “is a process in which we play an intensely active 
part.” Our perceptions are always preceded by interests, questions, or expectations—in short, 
by something “speculative”.’ (Callebaut 2012, 74) Leonelli concurs in her work on big data 
biology: ‘Using data for the purposes of discovery can happen in a variety of ways, and 
involves a complex ensemble of skills and methodological components. Inferential reasoning 
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from data is tightly interrelated with specific theoretical commitments about the nature of the 
biological phenomena under investigation, as well as with experimental practices through 
which data are produced, tested and modelled. For instance, extracting biologically 
meaningful inferences from high-throughput genomic data may involve reliance on theories 
about gene expression and regulation, models of the biological processes being regulated and 
familiarity with the instruments and organisms from which data were obtained. In this 
context, “inductive” clearly does not mean “hypothesis-free”; nor can automated reasoning be 
seen as a substitute to human judgment based on specific expertise and laboratory 
experience.’ (2012, 2)  
Certainly, the idea of an entirely theory- or model-free science is absurd. So, Callebaut and 
Leonelli rightly point out various kinds of theoretical assumptions that enter scientific 
analyses. But this kind of argument turns out too general and in the end fails to do justice to 
the remarkable shift towards a strongly inductive approach. Thus, the interesting question is in 
which ways data-intensive science is indeed theory-laden, and, more importantly, in which 
sense it can be theory-free. To provide an answer, we now take a detailed look at two 
algorithms that are widely employed, namely classificatory trees and non-parametric 
regression. We link these methods to eliminative induction and then determine the kind of 
theoretical knowledge that has to be presupposed.   
4. First case study: classificatory trees 
Classificatory trees (e.g. Russell & Norvig 2010, Ch. 18.3.3) are used to determine whether a 
certain instance belongs to a particular group A depending on a number of parameters C1, …, 
CN and thus perfectly match the scheme of data-intensive problems as described in Section 2. 
With help of training data, the tree is set up recursively. First, the parameter CX is determined 
that contains the largest amount of information with respect to the classification of the 
training data, as formally measured in terms of Shannon entropy. If CX classifies all instances 
correctly, the procedure is terminated. Otherwise, two subproblems remain, namely 
classifying when CX is present and when it is absent. This step is repeated until either all 
instances are classified correctly or no potential classifiers are left. If the algorithm is 
successful, the resulting tree structure gives a Boolean expression of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for A, which can be interpreted as a complex scientific law: e.g. if (C3C2 ˅ 
C4¬C2)C1 ˅ C6C5¬C1, then A. 
The framing of classificatory trees in particular and of problems in data-intensive science in 
general in terms of a mapping of boundary conditions to an outcome variable fits well with 
eliminative induction as exemplified in John Stuart Mill’s methods of elimination (1886, Bk. 
III, Ch. VIII) with a predecessor in Francis Bacon’s method of exclusion (1620/1994, Bk. 2). 
While until the end of the 19th century, Bacon’s approach was widely considered the 
methodological foundation for modern science, eliminative induction has not been very 
popular since. So, there exist comparably few modern accounts, including von Wright (1951), 
Mackie (1965, appendix), Skyrms (2000), Baumgartner & Grasshoff (2004), Pietsch (2014).5  
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In eliminative induction, a phenomenon A is examined under the systematic variation of 
potentially relevant boundary conditions C1, …, CN with the aim of establishing causal 
relevance or irrelevance of these conditions, relative to a certain context or background B 
consisting of further boundary conditions. The best known and arguably most effective 
method is the so-called method of difference that establishes causal relevance of a boundary 
condition CX by comparing two instances which differ only in CX and agree in all other 
circumstances C. If in one instance, both CX and A are present and in the other both CX and 
A are absent, then CX is causally relevant to A. There is a twin method to the method of 
difference that one might call the strict method of agreement, which establishes causal 
irrelevance, if the change in CX has no influence on A. Eliminative induction can deal with 
functional dependencies and an extension of the approach to statistical relationships is 
straightforward.6 
Thus, causal (ir-)relevance is a three-place relation: a boundary condition C is (ir-)relevant to 
a phenomenon A with respect to a certain background B of further conditions that remain 
constant if causally relevant or are allowed to vary if causally irrelevant. The restriction to a 
context B is necessary because there is no guarantee that in a different context B*, the causal 
relation between C and A will continue to hold. Causal laws established by eliminative 
induction thus have a distinctive contextual or ceteris-paribus character. Extensive 
information about all potentially relevant boundary conditions in as many different situations 
as possible is necessary to establish reliable causal knowledge by means of eliminative 
induction. Exactly this kind of information is provided in data-intensive science. 
Eliminative induction corresponds to a difference-making account of causality, which is 
closely related to the counterfactual approach. However, the truth-value of counterfactuals is 
now determined via the method of difference or the direct method of agreement, and thus by 
comparison with actual situations that differ from the counterfactual statement only in terms 
of irrelevant circumstances, and not by a possible-world semantics as in traditional 
counterfactual approaches like that of David Lewis. 
Obviously, classificatory trees rely on eliminative induction. Thus, to assess their quality, one 
has to look at the premises required for eliminative methods to yield the correct causes. Partial 
analyses of this problem are given for example in Keynes (1921, Ch. 22), von Wright (1951, 
Ch. V), Baumgartner & Grasshoff (2004, Sec. IX 2.4), Pietsch (2014, Sec. 3f). We will again 
follow the exposition in the last reference. There are at least three main assumptions: (i) 
determinism, i.e. that the phenomenon A is fully determined by boundary conditions C and 
background B; (ii) constancy of the background, i.e. that no relevant parameters in the 
background change when two instances are compared via the method of difference or the 
strict method of agreement; and finally (iii) an adequate vocabulary, that the parameters C 
reflect suitable causal categories for the given context B. Applied to classificatory trees, we 
can for example say: if there is a single sufficient condition CX among the C and there is 
sufficient data in terms of instances of the system in various configurations to avoid spurious 
correlations, then the classificatory tree algorithm will return CX as cause. Certainly, these 
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assumptions are quite strong. And there are supposedly weaker constraints for causal relations 
of statistical nature, but this issue goes beyond the scope of the present paper.  
We can now identify the elements of theory that have to be presupposed. In particular: (a) one 
has to know all parameters C that are potentially relevant for the phenomenon A in a given 
context determined by the background B; (b) one has to assume that for all collected instances 
and observations the relevant background conditions remain the same, i.e. a stable context B; 
(c) one has to have good reasons to expect that the parameters C are formulated in stable 
causal categories that are adequate for a specific research question; (d) there must be a 
sufficient number of instances to cover all potentially relevant configurations of the 
phenomenon. If such theoretical knowledge can be established, then there is enough data to 
avoid spurious correlations and to map the causal structure of the phenomenon without further 
internal theoretical assumptions about the phenomenon.  
This motivates and explains the definition of data-intensive science given in Section 2. In 
particular, premise (I) is the fundamental condition allowing for a strongly inductive approach 
based on parameter variation. This viewpoint is further corroborated by the fact that in many 
cases data-driven approaches become effective rather suddenly—a transition point that could 
be called a data threshold (Halevy et al. 2009). Halevy et al. give a plausible explanation for 
its existence: ‘For many tasks, once we have a billion or so examples, we essentially have a 
closed set that represents (or at least approximates) what we need, without generative rules.’ 
(2009, 9) At this threshold, the data represents a large fraction of the relevant configurations 
of the considered phenomenon. 
Of course, in scientific practice full theoretical knowledge a) to d) is rarely available. 
However, in general, including more potentially relevant parameters C will increase the 
probability that the actual cause of A might be among them, while admittedly also increasing 
the probability for spurious correlations, i.e. that boundary conditions accidentally produce 
the right classification. However, more data in terms of instances of different configurations 
can reduce the probability for such spurious correlations. Thus, more data in terms of 
parameters and instances will generally increase the chance that correct causal relations are 
identified by data-intensive algorithms. 
5. Second case study: non-parametric regression 
A recent paradigm shift in statistics closely mirrors the change from a hypothesis-directed to a 
more inductive, data-driven approach. It has been described as a transition from parametric to 
non-parametric modeling (e.g. Wassermann 2006; Russell & Norvig 2010, Ch. 18.8), from 
data to algorithmic models (Breiman 2001), or from model-based to model-free approaches. 
Since the shift concerns methodology and not theoretical or empirical content, it differs in 
important ways from scientific revolutions. Nevertheless, the statistics community has 
experienced over the past two decades some of the social ramifications and ‘culture clashes’ 
that are typical for scientific paradigm shifts as documented for example in Breiman (2001) or 
in Norvig’s dispute with Noam Chomsky on data-driven machine translation (Norvig 2011). 
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This paradigm shift has the following basic features: i) Parametric methods usually 
presuppose considerable modeling assumptions. In particular, they summarize the data in 
terms of a ‘small’ number of model parameters specifying for example a Gaussian distribution 
or linear dependence, hence the name. By contrast, non-parametric modeling presupposes few 
modeling assumptions, e.g. allows for a wide range of functional dependencies or of 
distribution functions. ii) In non-parametric modeling, predictions are calculated on the basis 
of ‘all’ data. There is no detour over a parametric model that summarizes the data in terms of 
a few parameters. iii) While this renders non-parametric modeling quite flexible with the 
ability to quickly react to unexpected data, it also becomes extremely data- and calculation-
intensive. This aspect accounts for the fact that non-parametric modeling is a relatively recent 
development in scientific method strongly dependent on advances in information technology. 
It has largely emerged in parallel with the rise of data-intensive science. 
Let me give a simple example as an illustration, the comparison between parametric and non-
parametric regression. In a parametric univariate linear regression problem, one has 
reasonable grounds to suspect that a number of given data points (xi;yi) can be summarized in 
terms of a linear dependency: y = ax + b. Thus, two parameters need to be determined, offset 
b and slope a, which are usually chosen such that the sum of the squared deviations ∑                   is minimized. 
In non-parametric regression, the data is not summarized in terms of a small number of 
parameters a and b, but rather all data is kept and used for predictions (e.g. Russell & Norvig 
2009, Ch. 18.8.4). A simple non-parametric procedure is connect-the-dots. Somewhat more 
sophisticated is locally weighted regression, in which a regression problem has to be solved 
for every query point xq. The yq-value is determined as yq = aqxq + bq with the two parameters 
fixed by minimizing ∑                               . Here, K denotes a so-called 
kernel function that specifies the weight of the different xi depending on the distance to the 
query point xq in terms of a distance function d(). Of course, an xi should be given more 
weight the closer it is to the query point.  
Let us briefly reflect how these regression methods illustrate the differences between 
parametric and non-parametric modeling i) to iii). While in parametric regression, linear 
dependency is presupposed as a modeling assumption, the non-parametric method can adapt 
to arbitrary dependencies. In parametric regression, the nature of the functional relationship 
has to be independently justified by the theoretical context, which prevents an automation of 
the modeling process. Certainly, non-parametric regression also makes modeling 
assumptions, e.g. a suitable kernel function must be chosen that avoids both over- and 
underfitting. However, within reasonable bounds the kernel function can be chosen by cross-
validation. Since often, predictions turn out relatively stable with respect to different choices 
of kernel functions, an automation of non-parametric modeling remains feasible. 
While non-parametric regression is more flexible than parametric regression, it is also much 
more data-intensive and requires more calculation power. Notably, in the parametric case, a 
regression problem must be solved only once. Then all predictions can be calculated from the 
resulting parametric model. In the non-parametric case, a regression problem must be solved 
for every query point. In principle, each prediction takes recourse to all the data. While the 
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parametric model consists in a relatively simple mathematical equation, the non-parametric 
model consists in all the data and an algorithmic procedure for making predictions. 
The main difference in terms of theoretical assumptions is that in parametric regression the 
type of functional dependency is presupposed in contrast to non-parametric regression. The 
latter again relies on eliminative induction. Essentially, it constitutes a case of Mill’s method 
of concomitant variations, which derives its inferential power from the method of difference 
as argued for example in Skyrms (2000, Sec. V.9) and Pietsch (2014, Sec. 3d). Thus, the 
conditions for identifying a causal relationship are largely the same as those discussed in the 
previous section—determinism, constancy of the background, and correct causal language—
resulting in the same premises in terms of theoretical assumptions a)-d). In particular, when 
mapping a functional dependency, all causally relevant conditions in the background must 
remain constant. And there must be sufficient data points such that the functional dependence 
can be traced in adequate detail. 
6. Conclusion: data-intensive science and exploratory experimentation 
We are finally in a position to evaluate the claims concerning a theory-free science. In both 
case studies, certain elements of theory had to be presupposed in order to yield reliable results 
in terms of causal structure that in turn can underwrite successful prediction and 
manipulation. In particular, among the considered parameters must be those that are causally 
relevant for a phenomenon in a considered context and not too many that are causally 
irrelevant to avoid spurious correlations. Also, the parameters should reflect adequate causal 
categories. Finally, the collected instances or observations should cover all configurations that 
are relevant in the given context. 
Because these aspects all concern the framing of the problem, one could speak of external 
theory-ladenness. By contrast, there is another kind of theory-ladenness that is largely absent 
from data-intensive science. For example, in classificatory trees no hypotheses are made 
about the causal connections that link the various parameters. Equally, in non-parametric 
regression, no assumptions are presupposed about the functional dependencies between 
different quantities. Thus, the essential difference in comparison with a hypothesis-driven 
approach is that not much is presupposed about the internal causal structure of the 
phenomenon. Rather, this structure is mapped from the data by parameter variation. 
How novel is this approach? On closer scrutiny, data-intensive science much resembles the 
practice of exploratory as distinguished from hypothesis-directed experimentation (Steinle 
1997, Burian 1997, Waters 2007; cp. also Vincenti 1993, 291). Exploratory experimentation 
essentially consists in the very same parameter variation of eliminative induction, where the 
experimenter tries to map the system of interest in all those states that she considers relevant. 
It is this common methodological core, which links exploratory experimentation and data-
intensive science and speaks against the claim, for example by Krohs (2012), that the latter 
constitutes a novel experimental approach focusing on data-gathering.  
Not surprisingly, the debate concerning theory-ladenness in exploratory experimentation 
parallels the discussion in the present article. For example, Steinle (2005) suggests a 
Chicago, IL -655-
distinction between different kinds of theory-ladenness. According to this view, exploratory 
experimentation presupposes theoretical knowledge in terms of classification systems or 
empirical rules, but not in terms of theories that postulate empirically inaccessible abstract 
entities (285). Steinle refers to Duhem, Hacking and Cartwright as having drawn similar 
distinctions between an experimental/phenomenological and a theoretical level in scientific 
theories. Indeed, the distinction between exploratory and hypothesis-driven experimentation 
fits well with Hacking’s (1983) claim that experiments have a life of their own and 
Cartwright’s (1983) position of entity realism, which postulates a causal level in science that 
is mostly phenomenological and largely independent of the theoretical level. 
Building on Burian and Steinle’s work, Kenneth Waters emphasizes a subtle difference 
between ‘theory-directed’ and ‘theory-informed’. While in exploratory experimentation, 
background theories are used ‘to set up experiments, generate data, and draw conclusions’, 
such experiments ‘are not “directed” by the aim to test, develop, or otherwise articulate an 
existing theory or hypothesis.’ (2007, 280) Laura Franklin makes a similar point that 
exploratory experiments are theory-laden in terms of background knowledge, but not in terms 
of local theories (2005, 891). 
These remarks closely parallel the previous discussion regarding external and internal theory-
ladenness. The distinction between a phenomenological and a theoretical level is also helpful 
for the analysis of data-intensive science, which supposedly concerns the phenomenological 
level regarding local, causal structure of phenomena, but does not rise to the theoretical level.  
An important difference between exploratory experimentation and data-intensive science is 
that in the former, data is usually of experimental nature, while the latter often deals with 
observational data. But this is largely irrelevant from the perspective of a difference-making 
account of causation according to which experimental intervention has only pragmatic 
advantages over observational data. Another difference concerns the complexity of the 
phenomena. While mapping the causal structure by parameter variation is as old as science 
itself, carrying it out in the computer can address phenomena that were previously largely 
inaccessible to causal analysis. This new handle, which data-intensive science provides, for 
mapping the causal structure of highly complex phenomena will make all the difference to 
scientific practice.  
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Abstract. Mechanistic explanations satisfy widely held norms of explanation: the ability to 
control and answer counterfactual questions about the explanandum. A currently debated 
issue is whether any non-mechanistic explanations can satisfy these explanatory norms. 
Weiskopf (2011) argues that the models of object recognition and categorization, JIM, 
SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE, are not mechanistic, yet satisfy these norms of explanation. In this 
paper I will argue that these models are sketches of mechanisms. My argument will make use 
of model-based fMRI, a novel neuroimaging approach whose significance for current debates 
on psychological models and mechanistic explanation has yet to be explored. 
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1. Introduction  
 According to the mechanistic account of explanation, a phenomenon is explained by 
describing the entities, activities, and organization of the mechanism that produces, underlies, 
or maintains the phenomenon (see, e.g., Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005). Mechanistic 
explanations satisfy what are widely considered normative constraints of explanation: the 
ability to answer a range of counterfactual questions regarding the explanandum 
phenomenon and the ability to manipulate and control the explanandum phenomenon (Craver 
2007). These norms capture what is distinctive about the scientific achievement of 
explanation rather than prediction, description, or categorization. A currently debated issue is 
whether any non-mechanistic forms of explanation can satisfy these explanatory norms.1 
Weiskopf (2011) argues that the models of object recognition and categorization, JIM, 
SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE, are not mechanistic, yet satisfy these norms of explanation.  
In this paper, in part using recent model-based fMRI research, I will argue that JIM, 
SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE are in fact mechanism-sketches, i.e. incomplete mechanistic 
explanations. Model-based approaches to neuroimaging allow cognitive neuroscientists to 
locate the distributed neural components of psychological models. These novel neuroimaging 
approaches have developed only recently and philosophers have yet to discuss their 
significance for current debates on psychological models and mechanistic explanation. The 
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opportunity to demonstrate this significance is one advantage of responding to Weiskopf 
(2011) in particular.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will motivate the mechanistic 
account of explanation and introduce two crucial concepts in the mechanistic account: the 
mechanism-sketch and the how-possibly model. In Section 3, I will introduce the models of 
object recognition and categorization (JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE) that Weiskopf 
presents as non-mechanistic, yet explanatory. In Section 4, I will present Weiskopf’s 
arguments for thinking these models are non-mechanistic, yet explanatory, and I will begin 
responding to these arguments. This section demonstrates that JIM is a mechanism-sketch. 
Demonstrating that SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are mechanism-sketches requires covering 
recent studies employing model-based fMRI, a novel neuroimaging method that will be 
explained in section 5.   
2. Mechanistic Explanation 
 Salmon (1984) developed the causal-mechanical account of explanation primarily in 
response to the covering-law or deductive-nomological model of explanation (Hempel and 
Oppenheim 1948). According to the deductive-nomological model, an explanation is an 
argument with descriptions of at least one law of nature and antecedent conditions as 
premises and a description of the explanandum phenomenon as the conclusion. On this view, 
explanation is showing that the explanandum phenomenon is predictable given at least one 
law of nature and certain specific antecedent and boundary conditions. However, tying 
explanation this closely to prediction generates some famous problems for the covering-law 
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model (see section 2.3 of Salmon [1989] for a review of these problems). On such a view, 
many mere correlations come out as explanatory. For example, a falling barometer reliably 
predicts the weather but the falling barometer does not explain the weather. In contrast, on 
the causal-mechanical view, explanation involves situating the explanandum phenomenon in 
the causal structure of the world. There are many ways of situating a phenomenon in the 
causal structure of the world and in this paper I am solely concerned with explanations that 
identify the mechanism that produces, underlies, or maintains the explanandum 
phenomenon.2 
 Another problem with tying explanation so closely to prediction is that we miss what 
is distinctive about the scientific achievement of explanation. Weiskopf (2011) and I agree on 
what makes explanation distinctive: explanations provide the ability to answer a range of 
counterfactual questions regarding the explanandum phenomenon and the ability to 
manipulate and control the explanandum phenomenon. These are the norms of explanation. 
Weiskopf and I disagree over what kinds of explanation can satisfy these norms. 
 Within the mechanistic framework there are two important distinctions: between 
complete mechanistic models and mechanism-sketches and between how-possibly and how-
actually models (Craver 2007). Mechanism-sketches are incomplete descriptions of 
                                                 
2 Other ways of causally situating a phenomenon include etiologically and contextually 
situating it. See Bechtel (2009) for a discussion of some of these different forms of causal 
explanation. What Bechtel calls “looking down” I am here calling “mechanistic explanation.” 
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mechanisms that may contain black boxes and filler terms (Ibid., 113). Mechanistic models 
rest on a continuum of more-or-less complete (114). As more details are incorporated into the 
model, the more complete it becomes – though no model is ever fully complete, just 
complete enough for practical purposes. A more complete model is not necessarily a better or 
more useful model. There can certainly be too many details for the purposes of the modeler 
and the details that are included should be relevant.3 Idealization can be readily 
accommodated within a mechanistic framework.  
 A how-possibly model describes a merely possible mechanism, whereas a how-
actually model describes the mechanism actually producing, maintaining, or underlying the 
explanandum phenomenon. As Weiskopf (315) rightly points out, this distinction is 
epistemic. Turning a how-possibly model into a how-actually model does not require 
modifying the model itself in any way; it requires testing the model. The greater the 
evidential support for the model, the more how-actually it is. In contrast, turning a 
mechanism-sketch into a complete(-enough) model requires modifying the model by filling 
in missing details. 
3. JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE 
 In this section I introduce the models of object recognition and categorization JIM, 
SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE. The next section presents Weiskopf’s arguments for thinking these 
models are non-mechanistic, yet explanatory. 
                                                 
3 See Craver (2007, section 4.8) for an account of constitutive (i.e. mechanistic) relevance. 
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 According to JIM (John and Irv’s Model), in perception objects are broken down into 
viewpoint-invariant primitives called “geons”. These geons are simple three-dimensional 
shapes such as cones, bricks, and cylinders. The properties of geons are intended to be non-
accidental properties (NAPs), largely unaffected by rotation in depth (Biederman 2000). The 
geon structure of perceived objects is extracted and stored in memory for later use in 
comparison and classification. 
 The importance of NAPs is shown by the fact that sequential matching tasks are 
extremely easy when stimuli only differ in NAPs. If you are shown a stimulus, then a series 
of other, rotated stimuli, each of which differs from the first only in NAPs, it is a simple 
matter to judge which stimuli are the same as or different than the first. Sequential matching 
tasks with objects that differ in properties that are affected by rotation are much harder. 
 In JIM, this object recognition process is modeled by a seven layer neural network 
(Biederman, Cooper, and Fiser 1993). Layer 1 extracts image edges from an input of a line 
drawing that represents the orientation and depth of an object (182). Layer 2 has three 
components which represent vertices, axes, and blobs. Layer 3 represents geon attributes 
such as size, orientation, and aspect ratio. Layers 4 and 5 both derive invariant relations from 
the extracted geon attributes. Layer 6 receives inputs from layers 3 and 5 and assembles geon 
features, e.g., “slightly elongated, vertical cone above, perpendicular to and smaller than 
something” (184). Layer 7 integrates successive outputs from layer 6 and produces an object 
judgment. 
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The Attention Learning Covering map (ALCOVE) is a 3-layer, feed-forward, neural 
network model of object categorization (Kruschke 1992). A perceived stimulus is represented 
as a point in a multi-dimensional psychological space with each input node representing a 
single, continuous psychological dimension. For example, a node may represent perceived 
size, in which case the greater the perceived size of a stimulus, the greater the activation of 
that node. Each node is modulated by an attentional gate whose strength reflects the 
relevance of that dimension for the categorization task. Each hidden node represents an 
exemplar and is activated in proportion to the psychological similarity of the input stimulus 
to the exemplar. Output nodes represent category responses and are activated by summing 
hidden nodes and multiplying by the corresponding weights. 
 The Supervised and Unsupervised Stratified Adaptive Incremental Network 
(SUSTAIN) is a network model of object categorization similar to ALCOVE (Love, Medin, 
and Gureckis 2004). Its input nodes also represent a multidimensional psychological space, 
but they can take continuous and discrete values, including category labels. Like ALCOVE, 
inputs are modulated by an attentional gate. Unlike ALCOVE, which stores all items 
individually in memory in exemplar nodes, the next layer of SUSTAIN consists of a set of 
clusters associated with a category. All of SUSTAIN’s clusters compete to respond, with 
inhibitory connections between each cluster, and the cluster closest to the stimulus in the 
multidimensional space is the winner. The cluster that wins activates the output unit 
predicting the category label. The output leads to a decision procedure that generates a 
category response.  
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4. Weiskopf’s Objections 
 Weiskopf argues that the previous models are able to satisfy the norms of explanation 
but are not mechanistic models. How do these models provide the ability to answer 
counterfactual questions about, and the ability to manipulate and control, the explanandum 
phenomenon? According to Weiskopf, they satisfy explanatory norms “because these models 
depict one aspect of the causal structure of the system” (334). This claim is in tension with 
one reason Weiskopf gives for thinking these models are not mechanistic. He argues, “there 
may be an underlying mechanistic neural system, but this mechanistic structure is not what 
cognitive models capture. They capture a level of functional abstraction that this mechanistic 
structure realizes” (333). But the claim that these models are not mechanistic because they 
depict a level of functional abstraction, not causal structure, conflicts with the claim that 
these models are explanatory because they depict causal structure. This conflict results from 
the general difficulty of specifying how a model can satisfy the norms of explanation without 
being mechanistic. 
One way of trying to reconcile the above claims is to argue that these models are 
explanatory because they depict causal structure, but they are not mechanistic, because the 
causal structure that is depicted is not a mechanism. This is the line Weiskopf takes. Why, 
according to Weiskopf, are these causal structures not mechanisms? He argues that 
If parts [of mechanisms] are allowed to be smeared-out processes or distributed 
system-level properties, the spatial organization of mechanisms becomes much more 
difficult to discern. … Weakening the spatial organization constraint by allowing 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -666-
 
 
distributed, nonlocalized parts incurs costs, in the form of greater difficulty in 
locating the boundaries of mechanisms and stating their individuation conditions. 
(334) 
The causal structures depicted by JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE should not be thought of as 
mechanisms, according to Weiskopf, because these structures are highly distributed. If 
mechanisms are allowed to contain distributed parts, this will make locating them difficult. 
The problem, then, is practical. Weiskopf does not give any reason to think the philosophical 
(rather than practical) problem of mechanism individuation is made more difficult by 
allowing distributed parts. 4 Yet numerous neuroimaging methods, especially model-based 
fMRI, allow cognitive neuroscientists to locate highly distributed neural mechanisms 
corresponding to the internal variables of computational models. Cognitive neuroscientists 
are interested in more than the behavioral accuracy of these models; they are also interested 
in their mechanistic accuracy. That cognitive neuroscientists conduct neuroimaging studies 
using these models shows that they are treated as mechanistic. Next I will present some of 
the neuroimaging studies conducted with JIM and argue that JIM is a mechanism-sketch. 
                                                 
4 Weiskopf (331) also cites the phenomenon of neural reuse as inconsistent with mechanism. 
This assumes that a part of one mechanism cannot be a part of another mechanism but 
Weiskopf has not provided any reason to think this nor to think that the possibility of reuse 
should give rise to any special philosophical (rather than practical) problems of mechanism 
individuation. 
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 JIM was built, not merely to produce the same behavior as human beings in object 
recognition tasks, but to model something that might really be happening in human brains. 
Biederman et al. write, “We have concentrated on modeling primal access: The initial 
activation in a human brain of a basic-level representation of an image from an object 
exemplar, even a novel one, in the absence of any context that might reduce the set of 
possible objects” (Biederman, Cooper, Hummel and Fiser 1993, 176). Accordingly, Irving 
Biederman, one of the co-creators of JIM, and others have conducted various neuroimaging 
studies to investigate the neural underpinnings of the model.  
If JIM is a mechanism-sketch, the systems and processes in the model required for the 
extraction, storage, and comparison of geon structures must to some extent correspond to 
(perhaps distributed) components in the actual object recognition mechanisms in the brain. 
For example, if JIM is a mechanism-sketch, there is an area or a configuration of areas in the 
brain where simple parts and non-accidental properties are represented. In one study 
(Hayworth and Biederman 2006), subjects were shown line drawings that were either local 
feature deleted (LFD), in which every other vertex and line was deleted from each part, 
removing half the contour, or part deleted (PD) in which half of the parts were removed. On 
each experimental run, subjects saw either LFD or PD stimuli presented as a sequential pair 
and had to respond whether or not the exemplars were the same or different. The second 
stimulus was always mirror-reversed with respect to the first. Each run was comprised of an 
equal number of three conditions: Identical, Complementary, and Different Exemplar. In the 
Identical condition, the second stimulus was the same as the first stimulus (mirror-reversed, 
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as all of the second stimuli were). In the Complementary condition, the second stimulus was 
the complement of the first, where an LFD-complement is composed of the deleted contour 
of the first and a PD-complement is composed of the deleted parts of the first. In the 
Different Exemplar condition, the second stimulus is a line-drawing of a different exemplar 
than the first. 
 An fMRI-adaptation design was used, which “relies on the assumption that neural 
adaptation reduces activity when two successive stimuli activate the same subpopulation but 
not when they stimulate different subpopulations” (Krekelberg, Boynton, van Wezel 2006, 
250; see also Kourtzi and Grill-Spector 2005). The results of the study showed adaptation 
between LFD complements and lack of adaptation between PD complements in lateral 
occipital complex, especially the posterior fusiform area, an area known to be involved in 
object recognition. These results imply that this area is “representing the parts of an object, 
rather than local features, templates, or object concepts” (Hayworth and Biederman 2006, 
4029). Biederman has conducted many other fMRI experiments, including some that 
“suggest that LO [lateral occipital cortex] is the locus of the neural correlate for the greater 
detectability for nonaccidental relations” (Kim and Biederman 1824). 
 While these results resolve Weiskopf’s worry about the difficulty of locating 
distributed parts, he has another argument for why JIM is not mechanistic. JIM has properties 
that do not and could not correspond to anything in the brain. Weiskopf (2011, 331) mentions 
JIM’s “Fast Enabling Links” (FELs), which allow the model to bind representations and 
which have infinite propagation speed. According to Weiskopf, FELs are an example of 
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fictionalization, “putting components into a model that are known not to correspond to any 
element of the modeled system, but which serve an essential role in getting the model to 
operate correctly” (Ibid.), and he argues that this undermines the claim that JIM is a 
mechanism-sketch. Weiskopf is right that FELs are an essential fictionalization, but playing 
an essential role in getting a model to operate is not the same as explaining; these parts of the 
model carry no explanatory information and render the model, or at least part of it, how-
possibly (where the possibility involved is not physical possibility, since FELs are physically 
impossible). Right now FELs play the black box role of whatever-it-is-that-accounts-for-
binding. In addition to playing a black box role, they serve practical and epistemic purposes 
like the ones discussed by Bogen (2005), such as suggesting, constraining, and sharpening 
questions about mechanisms. Let me explain how by comparing FELs to Bogen’s example of 
the GHK equations.  
The Goldman, Hodgkin, and Katz (GHK) voltage and current equations are used to 
determine the reversal potential across a cell’s membrane and the current across the 
membrane carried by an ion. These equations rely on the incorrect assumptions that each ion 
channel is homogeneous and that interactions among ions do not influence their rate (Bogen 
409). About the inadequacy of these equations Bogen writes, 
While some generalizations are useful because they deliver empirically acceptable 
quantitative approximations, others are useful because they do not… Investigators 
used these and other GHK equation failures as problems to be solved by finding out 
more about how ion channels work. Fine-grained descriptions of exceptions to the 
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GHK equations and the conditions under which they occur sharpened the problems 
and provided hints about how to approach them. (Bogen 410) 
The GHK equations provide a case of “using incorrect generalizations to articulate and 
develop mechanistic explanations” (Bogen 409). I argue that something similar can be said 
about FELs. Not only do FELs play an essential black box role, FELs suggest new questions 
about mechanisms, new problems to be solved. For example, Hummel and Biederman (1992) 
write, 
[T]he independence of FELs and standard excitatory-inhibitory connections in JIM 
has important computational consequences. Specifically, this independence allows 
JIM to treat the constraints on feature linking (by synchrony) separately from the 
constraints on property inference (by excitation and inhibition). That is, cells can 
phase lock without influencing one another’s level of activity and vice versa. 
Although it remains an open question whether a neuroanatomical analog of FELs will 
be found to exist, we suggest that the distinction between feature linking and property 
inference is likely to remain an important one. (510) 
Like the GHK equations, FELs suggest new lines of investigation, in this case regarding the 
relation between feature linking, property inference, and their neural mechanisms. 
Specifically, FELs suggest questions such as, “Can biological neurons phase lock without 
influencing one another’s activity?” and “Are there other ways biological neurons could 
implement feature linking and property inference independently?”. 
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 In the next section, I will explain model-based fMRI and demonstrate how recent 
model-based fMRI studies show that SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are mechanism-sketches. 
5. Model-Based fMRI 
 Model-based fMRI is a neuroimaging method that aims to discover the neural 
mechanisms that correspond to model variables. Model-based fMRI “can be used as a means 
of discriminating between competing computational models of cognitive and neural function. 
Thus, model-based fMRI provides insight into 'how' a particular cognitive function might be 
implemented in the brain, not only 'where' it is implemented” (O' Doherty, Hampton, and 
Kim 39). In this way, model-based fMRI provides a way of discriminating between 
competing, equally behaviorally confirmed cognitive models (Glascher and O’Doherty 502). 
 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a neuroimaging method that 
provides an indirect measure of neuronal activity. Neuronal activity requires glucose and 
oxygen for fuel, which the vascular system provides. The oxygen is bound to hemoglobin 
molecules and the magnetic properties of deoxygenated hemoglobin are detectable by fMRI. 
In this way, fMRI measures a physiological indicator of oxygen consumption – 
deoxyhemoglobin concentration – that correlates with changes in neuronal activity (Huettel, 
Song, and McCarthy 159-160). 
 To conduct a model-based fMRI analysis, one starts with a computational model that 
describes the function(s) by which stimuli are transformed to result in behavioral output. 
Stimulus input and behavioral output are observable, but the computational model postulates 
internal variables linking input and output. The neural correlates of these internal variables, at 
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each time point in the experiment, can then be located using regression analyses (O' Doherty, 
Hampton, and Kim 36).  
The variables that change from trial to trial are converted into a time series of the 
model-predicted BOLD (blood-oxygen-level dependent) response and then convolved with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function (Glascher and O’Doherty 505). This just means 
that the predicted variable values, taken over time, are mathematically combined with a 
stereotypical BOLD signal function. This is done to account for the usual lag in the 
hemodynamic response (O' Doherty, Hampton, and Kim 37). This yields a new function that, 
when put into a general linear model, can be regressed against fMRI data. General linear 
models have the following form:  
y = B0 + B1 x1 + B2 x2 + … + Bn xn + e 
where y is the observed data, the xi are regressors (the model-predicted time series), the Bi are 
variable weights (B0 represents the contribution of factors held constant throughout the 
experiment), and e is residual noise in the data (Huettel, Song, and McCarthy 343). This 
allows researchers to identify brain areas where the model-predicted time series significantly 
correlates with the observed BOLD signal changes over time. 
 I should make clear that model-based fMRI has limitations and does not obviate the 
need for other neuroimaging methods (e.g., PET, EEG, or MEG). Like fMRI in general, 
model-based fMRI can only establish correlations between neural activity and behavior. In 
order to establish causal claims about neural activity and behavior, the same methods need to 
be used that were used before the introduction of model-based fMRI, such as lesioning and 
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transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (O' Doherty, Hampton, and Kim 50). Like fMRI in 
general, model-based fMRI also has poor spatiotemporal resolution. This means that small 
computational signals such as those at the level of the single neuron will go undetected by 
model-based fMRI. For these reasons, a model-based approach to other neuroimaging 
methods is needed (Ibid.) 
Now that we have a basic understanding of how model-based fMRI works and what it 
can accomplish, let me return to SUSTAIN and ALCOVE and show how they are 
mechanism-sketches by drawing on recent model-based fMRI research.  
Both models were investigated in a model-based fMRI study in which participants 
completed a rule-plus-exception category learning task (Davis, Love, and Preston 2012). 
During the task, a schematic beetle was presented and subjects were asked to classify it as 
“Hole A” or “Hole B,” after which they received feedback. The beetles varied on four of the 
following five attributes, with the fifth held constant: eyes (green or red), tail (oval or 
triangular), legs (thin or thick), antennae (spindly or fuzzy), and fangs (pointy or round). Six 
of the eight beetles presented could be correctly categorized on the basis of a single attribute. 
For example, three out of four Hole A beetles might have thick legs and three out of four 
Hole B beetles could have thin legs. The other beetles were exceptions to the rule, having 
legs that appeared to match the other category.  
 Two predictions from SUSTAIN and ALCOVE were tested. First, during stimulus 
presentation SUSTAIN predicts a recognition advantage for exceptions but ALCOVE 
predicts no recognition advantage. This is called the recognition strength measure. This 
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difference in recognition strength measure predictions arises because in ALCOVE, but not in 
SUSTAIN, all items are stored individually in memory regardless of whether they are 
exceptions or rule-following items. Second, when subjects are given feedback, both 
SUSTAIN and ALCOVE predict that exceptions should lead to greater prediction error. This 
is called the error correction measure (Ibid., 263-4).  
 The results showed that the recognition strength measures and error correction 
measures predicted by SUSTAIN found correlations in MTL regions including bilateral 
hippocampus, parahippocampal cortex, and perirhinal cortex, and regions in bilateral 
hippocampus and perirhinal cortex, respectively. ALCOVE's predicted recognition strength 
measures did not find correlations in MTL, although its error correction predictions found 
correlations in MTL similar to SUSTAIN's (Ibid., 266-7). These results “suggest that, like 
SUSTAIN, the MTL contributes to category learning by forming specialized category 
representations appropriate for the learning context” (Davis, Love, and Preston 269). 
Furthermore, these correspondences to brain areas open a whole new range of opportunities 
for manipulation and provide answers to counterfactual questions that were not available 
before, thereby increasing the explanatory power of these models. 
  SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are mechanism-sketches. SUSTAIN is more how-actually 
than ALCOVE because both of SUSTAIN’s prediction measures (recognition strength and 
error correction) were significantly correlated to areas of brain activation, whereas only one 
of ALCOVE’s (error correction) was correlated. SUSTAIN, therefore, has more evidential 
support than ALCOVE. These results also show that cognitive neuroscientists are currently 
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advancing the ability to map the entities and activities in psychological models to distributed 
neural systems, such as MTL regions spanning bilateral hippocampus, parahippocampal 
cortex, and perirhinal cortex.  
Davis, Love, and Preston (2012) are at times quite explicit about the mechanistic 
nature of the models they are investigating, although they do not use the term “mechanistic.” 
For instance, they write, “We use a model-based functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) approach to test the proposed mapping between MTL function and SUSTAIN’s 
representational properties” (261) and “The theory we forward relating SUSTAIN to the 
MTL…goes beyond the model’s equations by tying model operations to brain regions” (270). 
Given their emphasis on mapping models to the brain, it is clear that they intend the models 
to be mechanistic. They are interested in more than the behavioral accuracy of these models. 
SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are already behaviorally well-confirmed, but model-based fMRI 
allowed Davis et al. to test their mechanistic accuracy. 
6. Conclusion 
 Weiskopf (2011) presented three models of object recognition and categorization, 
JIM, ALCOVE, and SUSTAIN, that he claimed were non-mechanistic, yet explanatory. He 
argued that they were not mechanistic because their parts could not be neatly localized and 
they contained some components, such as Fast Enabling Links (FELs), which could not 
correspond to anything in the brain but are nevertheless essential for the proper working of 
the model. I argued on the contrary that these models are mechanism-sketches. In addition to 
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playing a black box role, FELs possess non-explanatory virtues such as suggesting new lines 
of investigation about feature linking and property inference.  
My argument for the claim that SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are mechanism-sketches 
relied on model-based fMRI research. Model-based fMRI and other model-based 
neuroimaging approaches are beginning to allow cognitive neuroscientists to map 
psychological models onto the brain. Cognitive neuroscientists can then discriminate 
between equally behaviorally confirmed psychological models. The development of these 
model-based approaches has broader implications, beyond the narrow dispute over JIM, 
SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE, for the debate over the explanatory and mechanistic status of 
psychological models. As cognitive neuroscientists continue to test psychological models 
against neuroimaging data using model-based techniques, they will retain those models that 
find correspondences in the brain and reject those that do not, and in so doing reveal that 
explanatory progress in cognitive neuroscience consists in the development of increasingly 
mechanistic models. 
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Abstract: The effects of atrazine on amphibians has been the subject of much 
research, requiring the input of many disciplines. Theory reductive accounts of the 
relationships among scientific disciplines do not seem to characterize well the ways 
that diverse disciplines interact in the context of addressing such complex scientific problems.  ǲProblem agendaǳ accounts of localized scientific integrations seem to 
fare better.  However, problem agenda accounts have tended to focus rather 
narrowly on scientific explanation.  Attention to the details of atrazine research 
reveals that characterization deserves the sort of attention that problem agenda 
theorists have thus far reserved for explanation.  
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1. Background and introduction 
 
 Although a consensus has developed around skepticism about the prospects 
and motivation for Nagelian theory reduction in the biological sciences, several 
authors have pointed out that participants in this consensus have historically failed 
to offer much in the way of well-developed alternative philosophical accounts of 
how various sciences and disciplines might be epistemically related (Rosenberg 
1997, Robert 2004); in response to the apparent untenability of theory reduction, 
proposals of the epistemic relationships among the various biological and allied 
disciplines have typically been given in terms of explanatory reductionist, anti-
reductionist, and nonreductionist (often pluralist) strategies, but a need persists for 
detailed development of these strategies and application to particular case studies 
(Brigandt and Love 2012).     Contra more radically permissive pluralist accounts 
(e.g., Dupre 1993), advocates of the so-called ǲpluralist stanceǳ have contended that 
the nature of the specific scientific problem or question being addressed constrains the ǲvariety of acceptable classificatory or explanatory schemes.ǳ ȋKellert et al ʹͲͲ͸Ȍ  
Taking onboard this feature of the pluralist stance, Love (2008) and Brigandt (2010) 
have offered structured accounts of local integrations in evolutionary 
developmental biology (evo-devo) that are centered around solving particular 
problems and explaining particular explananda.  These local integrations need not, 
for the authors, necessarily be part of any broader unificatory theoretical reduction 
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of the sort envisioned by proponents of theory reduction (Nagel 1961; Schaffner  
1993) or unificatory explanatory ideal (Kitcher 2001).  Love and Brigandt’s views do, 
however, emphasis the important role of more problem-specific explanatory (as 
opposed to theoretical) reductions in biological explanation.  Where theory reduction approaches tend to contend that laws describing ǲlowerǳ mereological 
levels are always more fundamental in explanation, on the problem-centered view, explanatory fundamentality ǲvaries with the specific problem at hand.ǳ ȋBrigandt 
2010Ȍ Thus, Brigandt and Love’s problem-centered integrative frameworks are 
nonreductionist in that they do not necessarily ascribe explanatory fundamentality 
to lower level epistemic units (laws, theories, models, etc.).  However, these 
frameworks are not antireductionist because they reserve a place for reductive 
explanation when such explanation is called for by the nature of the specific 
scientific problem or problems under consideration.   
 Love and Brigandt both take research into explanations of evolutionary 
innovation and novelty as their focus.   Hence, Love’s and Brigandt’s accounts of 
local integration have centered on questions about multidisciplinary explanation 
(Love 2008; Brigandt 2010).   But while explanation is the central concern of many 
biological projects, explanation is not the only concern.  Waters (2007) points out 
that the findings of so-called ǲexploratoryǳ experiments can have significance for 
various scientific goals other than explanation and theory development, including 
knowledge about experimental manipulation and conceptual development to guide 
future research.  Minimally, explanation requires explananda, and those explananda 
often require scientific investigations to in order to be recognized as things wanting 
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explanation and to disclose the ways in which they might be experimentally 
manipulated or exploited in the future.  Thus, solving scientific problems often 
requires a certain sort of characterization, achieved through various scientific 
practices, that is conceptually distinct from explanation. Maps of concentrations of 
environmental pollutants, for instance, are an outcome of scientific experiments and 
modeling practices where the goal is experimentally-grounded pattern 
characterization rather than the provision of an explanatory account of a 
phenomenon, although the pattern so characterized may later be an object of 
explanation. 
Love (2008) and Brigandt (2010) do not explicitly treat the sort of empirical 
characterization that )’ve characterized above (although their projects appear 
amenable to the inclusion of such a treatment).  Love ʹͲͲͺ’s nonreductionist ǲproblem agendaǳ account of local (as opposed to more broadly theoretical or 
unificatory) integration in the biological sciences deploys the concept of ǲcriteria of 
explanatory adequacy.ǳ These criteria, associated with particular problems and sets 
of problems, act as unifying constraints by specifying what sorts scientific 
explanations are adequate for the problems that motivate them.  I here seek to 
augment nonreductionist problem-centered epistemologies of multidisciplinary 
integration with a treatment of the criteria by which various scientific disciplines 
might judge empirical characterizations  (as opposed to explanations) and the 
processes by which such characterizations are generated to be adequate in the 
context of solving particular problems and sets of problems. 
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 Research into the endocrine disrupting effects of the herbicide, atrazine, is a 
promising case study because, while concerned with explanation, this research 
agenda clearly also makes necessary use of empirical characterization (e.g., dose-
response curves for atrazine exposure and geographic maps of atrazine 
concentration).  Additionally, atrazine research is remarkably multidisciplinary.  
Critical evaluation of claims about inherent multidisciplinarity on the part of 
scientists participating in atrazine research provides an opportunity for describing 
how certain disciplines play a role in offering answers to the questions that atrazine 
researchers seek to answer.  Articulating the roles played by the contributions of 
each discipline also presents an opportunity to demonstrate how a nonreductionist 
epistemology can provide an account of disciplinary integration centered on solving 
particular problems and answering particular questions.  Such an account is 
desirable not only because it promises to fill the void left by the abandonment of 
traditional theory reduction approaches for describing epistemic relationships 
among disciplines, but also because it promises to yield novel insights into 
reasoning across scientific disciplines and novel interpretations of multidisciplinary 
disagreement.    
2. Atrazine research as a case study 
Atrazine is a top selling herbicide that is a persistent and widely distributed 
ground and surface water pollutant.   The effects of atrazine on amphibians and the 
contribution of these effects to global amphibian decline has been the subject of 
much research, requiring the input of many disciplines.   Work in molecular biology, 
biochemistry, developmental biology, endocrinology, physiology, and organismal 
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biology has revealed that atrazine acts as an endocrine (hormone) disruptor in 
vertebrate organisms; it induces a class of enzymes (aromatases) that convert 
androgens (e.g., testosterone) into estrogens (e.g. estradiol).  This conversion has 
diverse effects on different kinds of vertebrate organisms, from ǲfeminizationǳ 
leading to decreased reproductive success in frogs to increased cancer rates in 
humans.     Describing and predicting atrazine persistence, transport, and exposure 
has involved input from diverse disciplines including hydrology, agricultural science, 
geology, soil science, environmental chemistry, and meteorology (Hayes 2005, 
Hayes et al 2011).   Tyrone Hayes, a leading researcher on atrazine’s endocrine 
disrupting effects on frogs, claims that, 
 ǲTo truly assess the impact of atrazine on amphibians in the wild, diverse fields of 
study including endocrinology, developmental biology, molecular biology, cellular 
biology, ecology, and evolutionary biology need to be invoked.  To understand fully 
the long-term impacts on the environment, meteorology, geology, hydrology, 
chemistry, statistics, mathematics and other disciplines well outside of biology are 
required.ǳ  (2005, 321)  
 
Although understanding physiological developmental mechanisms seems 
key to understanding abnormal amphibian development resulting from exposure to 
endocrine disruptors like atrazine, and research on atrazine transport and 
persistence seems clearly necessary to infer exposure rates and magnitudes, it is not 
immediately clear what it is about this question that requires input from other 
disciplines, e.g. evolutionary biology.   What justifies (ayes’ claim that evolutionary 
biology is required? A framework for structuring multidisciplinary inputs within the 
atrazine research program can help us articulate the roles played by various 
disciplines in answering the question of the impact of atrazine’s endocrine 
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disrupting effects on amphibians in the wild and thereby allow us to critically 
evaluate claims (like Hayes’s) for the necessity of particular disciplines.    
Love (2008) develops an account of localized integration in the sciences 
based on what he calls ǲproblem agendas,ǳ or sets of problems (complex questions 
composed of simpler questions) related to a particular epistemic goal.     Here I cast 
the impact of atrazine’s endocrine disrupting effects on amphibians as a simpler 
question within the problem (complex question) of the impact of anthropogenic 
endocrine disruptors on the environment. I will characterize environmental 
endocrine disruption as a problem shared by the problem agendas of environmental 
toxicity and developmental endocrine function.  To aid in this characterization, I will 
describe Love’s notion of ǲexplanatory adequacy,ǳ the criteria by which explanatory 
answers to problems (complex questions) on a particular problem agenda are 
judged to be adequate or inadequate.   I will then introduce the complementary 
concept of criteria of characterizational adequacy (CCA), criteria by which 
empirically grounded characterizations and the practices by which they are 
generated are judged to be adequate or inadequate with respect to particular 
epistemic goals.   I will show how the criteria of characterizational and explanatory 
adequacy of the two problem agendas of environmental toxicity and developmental 
endocrine function structure disciplinary inputs with respect to the narrower 
question of the impact of atrazine’s endocrine disrupting effects on amphibians.  
Finally, I will show how a set of proposed criteria of explanatory and 
characterizational adequacy drawn from the two problem agendas can make clearer 
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the contributions of evolutionary biology to the question of the impacts of atrazine 
on amphibians in the wild.   
3. Love on local integration 
 Love (2008) characterizes problem agendas as sets of problems (complex 
questions) related to a particular complex epistemic goal.    Problem agendas are 
united in part by criteria of explanatory adequacy, criteria for judging the 
acceptability of candidate solutions to the problems composing the agenda (875). 
Against theorists who argue for (typically reductive) stable theoretical integration 
or unification of diverse fields of science (Nagel 1961; Schaffner 1993), Love argues 
that integration of multiple fields of study can profitably be localized to particular 
epistemic goals without necessarily requiring more global theoretical integration or 
unification.   Criteria of explanatory adequacy are central to Love’s account of localized integration.  Such criteria make possible ǲan explicit account of how different areas 
of research make their contribution without one being more fundamental than 
another.ǳ ȋʹͲͲͺ, ͺ͹ͷȌ   Because calls for multidisciplinary research typically arise 
out of the need to solve problems and answer questions rather than a need for 
theory-building or testing, what is needed is an account of what ought to count as 
adequate answers to the complex questions driving the research. 
Love uses the problem agenda of evolutionary innovation and novelty as an 
example to illustrate the concepts of problem agendas and criteria of explanatory 
adequacy.  Problems on the innovation and novelty agenda include, e.g., ǲ(ow did vertebrate jaws originate?ǳ and ǲ(ow did avian flight originate?ǳ    Although perhaps 
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superficially resembling more ordinary questions (e.g., How was the window 
broken?)  these problems are not standard interrogatives of the sort that can be 
answered with a single proposition.  These problems, due to their complexity and 
the diversity of simpler questions that they naturally engender, are thought to 
require multidisciplinary input from developmental, evolutionary, molecular, and 
systematic biology (2008, 879).   
Love claims that the inputs of these disciplines can be structured by the 
criteria of explanatory adequacy associated with the project.  For Love, adequate 
explanations of the origination of radical evolutionary changes in phenotype must 
meet three criteria grounded in the nature of the explananda.  First, the explanation 
must address both form and function; e.g., explanations of the origination of 
vertebrate jaws must include considerations related to how these sorts of jaws 
function given the particular forms that they take.  Second, accounts of origination 
must explain innovation and novelty at all biological levels of organization as well as 
relations among these levels, e.g., genetic, cellular, modular, organismal, and 
population levels (Love 2008, 880).  And finally, there is the third criterion of ǲdegree of generalization,ǳ which deals with how different problems within the 
agenda are related.  For the case of evolutionary novelty, this criterion can be 
broken into two further questions. 1- ǲCan investigations of particular novelties be generalized to other research on different innovations or novelties?ǳ and ʹ- ǲCan 
investigations of model systems be generalized to the phylogenetic juncture 
relevant to the innovation or novelty under scrutiny?ǳ ȋLove ʹͲͲͺ, ͺͺͳȌ  The 
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concern here is the appropriateness of generalizations from one problem or 
question within the agenda to others.   
 4. The problem of endocrine disruptors in the environment 
Environmental problems are exemplary of the sorts of problems that require 
multi-disciplinary input for generating adequate solutions (Love 2008, 875).  The 
question of atrazine’s effects on amphibians in the wild as a result of its endocrine 
disrupting properties can be viewed as a simpler question located within the 
environmental problem (complex question) of endocrine disruptors and their 
ecological impacts.  This problem is shared by the problem agendas of 
environmental toxicity and developmental endocrine function, each with its own 
criteria of explanatory and characterizational adequacy.  These criteria will be 
shown to constrain and unify attempts at answering questions clustered around the 
impact of atrazine on amphibians.  To illustrate this, I will begin by offering some 
plausible sample questions germane to the broader question of atrazine’s role as an 
environmental amphibian endocrine disruptor.  Notice that the levels of biological 
organization at which the questions are aimed increases sequentially.  The first 
question is aimed at the biochemical and genetic levels; the second is aimed at the 
morphological level; the third is aimed at the population level, and the fourth is 
aimed at global scale ecological phenomena and impacts on higher-level taxa.  The 
species named in the first through the third question are reflective of some of the 
organisms that are frequently used in such research (Hayes 2005; 2011). 
1. What effect does atrazine exposure at a given concentration and duration 
have on CYP19 (aromatase gene) expression in Xenopus laevis? 
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2. How do the morphological effects of given concentration and duration of 
atrazine exposure in Hyperolius argus differ depending on the developmental 
stage at which exposure occurs? 
3. What impacts do atrazine’s endocrine disrupting effect have on Rana pipiens 
populations in Midwestern corn growing regions?   
4. Does atrazine’s endocrine disrupting effect play a significant role in global 
amphibian decline? 
I want to suggest that answers to these and similar questions will be constrained 
by criteria of explanatory and characterizational adequacy drawn from the two 
problem agendas in which problem of environmental endocrine disruption and the question of atrazine’s impact on amphibians seem to reside.   
5. Environmental toxicity (and a distinction between explanation and 
empirical characterization) 
 Environmental toxicology has been described as ǲthe study of the impacts of pollutants on the structure and function of ecological systems.ǳ ȋLandis et al. 2010, 
1)  Its focus is the identification of toxic agents and the establishment of the causal 
bases of their toxicity (Landis et al. 2010, Chapter 3).  
These two epistemic goals highlight a distinction between empirical 
characterization and explanation.  In the case of identifying toxic agents, the goal is 
identifying and characterizing the effects of a chemical and classifying it according 
to its toxic properties, a task of description and evaluation (characterization).  In the 
case of identifying causal bases of toxicity, the goal is explanatory, concerned with 
providing a causal account of the processes by which a chemical gives rise to toxic 
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effects.  Such explanatory goals seem clearly amenable to constraint by criteria of 
explanatory adequacy as Love develops the concept.  E.g., an explanation of the 
mechanism by which atrazine is toxic to plants, starvation and harmful oxidative 
effects due to interruption of plastoquinone-binding in photosystem II (Appleby et 
al. 2001), is constrained by the criterion of explaining higher-level physiological 
effects by reference to lower-level biochemical processes. 
It seems strange, however, to say that the descriptive and evaluative goals of 
describing and classifying chemicals and their impacts according to toxicity are 
constrained by sensu stricto criteria of explanatory adequacy.  After all, the goal is 
description and classification rather than explanation (although as we will see, some 
descriptive and classificatory claims derive their inferential justification from 
explanatory accounts).   Rather, such attempts at scientific characterization are 
constrained by what we might call criteria of characterizational adequacy. Criteria of 
characterizational adequacy (CCA) are constraints on empirically grounded 
characterizations (e.g. claims about response, correlation, concentration, etc.) that 
specify what counts as adequate justification for those sorts of characterizations.  
To illustrate how the concept of CCA might apply, consider the case of dose-
response curves common to the problem agenda of environmental toxicology.  A dose response curve is ǲa graph describing the response of an enzyme, organism, 
population, or biological community to a range of concentrations of a xenobiotic.ǳ 
(Landis et al. 2010, 36)  The task here is characterizational rather than explanatory; 
such curves have no necessary reference to causal mechanisms explaining the 
phenomena represented by the graph.  However, the production of such a 
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characterization is constrained by certain criteria.  For example, the points on the 
graph must make reference to a concentration of the xenobiotic and must be 
compared to a control in which the xenobiotic is absent, i.e., the ǲnormalǳ behavior 
of the enzyme, organism, population, or biological community under consideration.  
These ǲconcentration relativeǳ and ǲcompared to controlǳ CCA allow us to see the 
contributions of exploratory research aimed at characterizing the properties of 
entities in a way that we could not if we considered only criteria of explanatory 
adequacy.  Much of the research activity in the environmental toxicity problem 
agenda is aimed at characterizing concentrations (in cells, organs, organisms, 
particular habitats, etc.)(Rohr and McCoy 2010, Hayes et al. 2011).  Properties of 
entities at characterized concentrations must then be compared to properties of 
entities free from the putative toxin, and the characterization of these toxin-free 
properties involves exploratory research. In the case of atrazine, the near ubiquity 
of the chemical in fresh water supplies, and its potential for effects at very low doses 
has necessitated the development of sophisticated filtering techniques and careful 
attention to laboratory hygiene in order to characterize the properties of biological 
entities in their atrazine-free conditions.  Additionally, due again to atrazine’s near 
ubiquity in the environment, the ǲcompared to controlǳ criterion has made essential 
early characterizations of frog morphology in the wild (e.g. Witschi 1929), 
characterizations made before the wide-spread application of atrazine began in the 
1950s (Hayes 2004; Rohr and McCoy 2010). 
6. Developmental endocrine function 
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 The purpose of the study of developmental endocrine function is to provide 
an account of the biochemical processes and pathways of hormone synthesis, 
storage, and physiological function during organismal development (Hayes 2005).  
Problems (complex questions) comprising a developmental endocrine function problem agenda include ǲhow do sex steroids control development?ǳ and ǲhow do 
thyroid hormones control development?ǳ Solutions to these sorts of problems 
would seem to be constrained by the need to address causality at multiple levels of 
biochemical and biological organization and the need to justify generalizations from 
insights about pathways and processes in model organisms to claims about other organisms ȋroughly, Love’s second and third criteria of explanatory adequacyȌ ȋLove 
2008, 880-881).   
 Research into sex steroid determination of sexual development provides 
examples of these criteria in action.  Comparative endocrinology research has 
discovered that androgens and estrogens control sexual development across the 
vertebrates, although the developmental effects of these hormones vary by taxa, 
imposing limits on generalizations made across taxa.  The effects of these hormones tend to be ǲorganizationalǳ and irreversible at earlier stages of development and ǲactivationalǳ and reversible in adults. Explanations of these effects (and their 
relative permanence) make reference to biochemical pathways, gene expression, 
cellular metabolism and differentiation, and organ development (Hayes 2005, Hayes 
et al 2011).   
7. Criteria of adequacy applicable the problem of endocrine disruptors in the 
environment and the narrower atrazine question 
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  Now I wish to show how some of the criteria of explanatory and 
characterizational adequacy that constrain solutions to problems on the 
environmental toxicology and developmental endocrinology problem agendas also 
constrain answering narrower questions germane to assessing atrazine impacts on 
amphibians.  First, because environmental toxicity problem solutions must make 
reference to controls free from the putative toxin, answers to the question of the 
impacts of atrazine must be predicated on atrazine exposure effects compared to 
atrazine-free controls or hypothetical populations.  Much of the important research in the ǲemergingǳ science of amphibian endocrine disruption has been made 
possible by basic research on, e.g., CYP19 gene expression, aromatase catalysation of 
estrogenesis, sex steroid control of sexual differentiation during amphibian 
development, amphibian reproductive anatomy and behavior, and population 
genetic modeling of amphibian evolution (2005, Hayes et al 2011) Such studies 
provide a baseline characterization against which the effects of atrazine at 
environmental concentrations inferred by sampling (as well as transport and 
persistence studies) can be compared.  This criterion also provides grounds for the 
rejection of some proposed answers to questions about atrazine’s effects on 
amphibians.   Some authors, for instance, have proposed that hermaphrodism is 
widespread in wild amphibian populations in the absence of atrazine exposure 
(Carr and Solomon 2003).  However, this conclusion was based on field and 
laboratory studies in which the controls are thought to have been exposed to 
environmental atrazine, possible at relatively high concentrations (Hayes 2004; 
2005, Rohr and McCoy 2008) 
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Second, adequate answers to questions about atrazine’s effects on amphibians 
must give an account of all the relevant levels of biological organization.  For 
instance, an answer to the third question in the list above would plausibly give a 
causal account of the effects of atrazine on Midwestern leopard frog populations by 
invoking atrazine’s role in inducing aromatase expression, enhanced rates of 
estrogenesis in developing male frogs, demasculization and feminization of affected 
individuals, decreased reproductive success, and, finally, population level outcomes, 
e.g. local extinction or adaptation. The absence of this sort of relatively complete 
mereological level-hierarchical causal chain would imply ǲblack boxesǳ that would 
potentially frustrate attempts to explain higher level phenomena in terms of 
atrazine exposure. 
Third, (similar to the third of Love’s criteria for explanations of innovation and 
novelty), adequate answers to questions about atrazine’s endocrine disrupting 
effects on amphibians in the wild must be constrained by considerations of 
generalization.   There seem to be two dimensions of generalization at play here.  
The first concerns inferring the presence of mechanisms of endocrine disruption 
(e.g., aromatase induction) in a given clade or clades from the presence of such 
mechanisms in another clade or clades. The second concerns generalizing from the 
(biochemical, cellular, organismal, or populational) effects of endocrine disruption 
in one clade to similar effects in another.  With respect to the first dimension, CYP19 
aromatase induction due to atrazine exposure seems to be a mechanism conserved 
across the vertebrate classes, so here generalizations from one amphibian clade to 
others seem appropriate.  Similarly, aromatase catalyzation of estrogenesis appears 
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to be highly conserved (Hayes 2005). With respect to the second dimension, can we 
infer from population level effects of atrazine in one amphibian clade to similar 
effects in another?  In this case, perhaps not, because sex-steroid mediated 
developmental endpoints may differ among clades (Hayes 2005), and so population 
level effects will also be likely to differ. 
8. Evolutionary biology 
 I will now use the above proposed criteria to take up a question that was 
posed at the outset: what role does evolutionary biology play in research on the 
ecological effects of atrazine as an amphibian endocrine disruptor?  First, 
evolutionary biology can provide population genetic models of amphibian 
populations, e.g. models of sex ratios in amphibian clades.  These hypothetical 
populations provide null hypotheses (or baseline characterizations) against which 
claims of atrazine impact can be tested.  This contribution of evolutionary biology is disclosed by consideration of the ǲcompared to controlǳ criterion of 
characterizational adequacy. 
 Second, evolutionary and (evolutionary developmental) biology provides 
models of relations among levels of biological organization.  Love says that such 
relations can be understood spatially and temporally both in ontogeny and 
evolution.  Temporal hierarchies in development articulate the relation of, e.g., gene 
expression to the formation of physiological pathways and morphological structures 
(2008, 880).  In the atrazine case, developmental endocrinology explains how sex 
steroids at the biochemical level determine the development of sex-specific traits in 
amphibians at the organismal level.  Evolutionary biology contributes here by 
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providing models linking such traits to population level phenomena; population 
genetic models can articulate relations between organismal traits and population 
level effects e.g., covariance between abnormal sex ratios as a result of atrazine-
induced feminization (aggregated from the sexual character states of individual 
organisms) and mean fitness in amphibian clades (Hayes 2010; Guiterres and Teem 
2006). 
Finally, evolutionary biology contributes phylogenies of relevant traits, e.g. 
phylogenies of the CYP19 gene, the sex steroids and their receptors, and 
phylogenies of certain developmental pathways that are mediated by these steroids.   
Together, these phylogenies are informative about the degree to which atrazine 
generalizes as an endocrine disruptor and what its likely effects are across diverse 
amphibian clades. These phylogenies play an important role in satisfying the ǲgeneralizationǳ criterion because such phylogenies can either justify or proscribe 
inferences from research on one clade to claims about another.  Importantly for 
human health, aromatase induction and its effects on sex steroids appear to be 
conserved across vertebrates (Hayes 2005).   
8. Conclusion (ere )’ve used Love ȋʹͲͲͺȌ’s problem agenda framework to characterize 
research on the impact of atrazine’s endocrine disrupting effects on amphibians as 
addressing a question located within the problem of assessing the impacts of 
endocrine disruptors in the environment.   
This problem is seen as shared by the problem agendas of environmental 
toxicity and developmental endocrine function.  To characterize the epistemic goal 
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of impact assessment central to the environmental problem of endocrine disruptors, 
I have developed and deployed the concept of criteria of characterizational 
adequacy, constraints of adequacy on empirically-grounded characterizations and 
the processes that generate them.  This concept, along with Love ȋʹͲͲͺȌ’s concept of 
criteria of explanatory adequacy, make clearer the ways in which various disciplines 
make their contributions to the problem of atrazine toxicity and the question of atrazine’s endocrine disrupting effects on amphibians.   )n particular, we’ve seen 
that evolutionary biology contributes by providing models of relevant evolutionary 
processes and phylogenies that inform the propriety of generalizing from findings 
about one clade to claims about others.  Evolutionary biology also contributes by 
providing models of population-level phenomena that may result from organismal-
level atrazine exposure effects. 
The forgoing treatment of atrazine research can be seen as a further  
development of Love ȋʹͲͲͺȌ’s and Brigandt ȋʹͲͳͲȌ’s response to the challenge 
issued by Rosenberg (1997) and others.  This challenge is for those who participate 
in the skeptical consensus about the prospects and motivation for Nagelian-type 
theory reduction to provide alternative accounts of the epistemic relations among 
scientific disciplines.  Love and Brigandt have provided nonreductionist accounts of 
disciplinary integration centered on solving particular problems and providing 
particular explanations in evo-devo.  (ere we’ve seen how Love’s problem agenda 
framework can be applied to another area of research by expanding this framework 
to include criteria of characterizational adequacy, criteria constraining what counts 
as an adequate empirically-grounded characterization given the problems that such 
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characterizations are meant to address.  In this way, the forgoing treatment of 
atrazine research is meant to provide a modest contribution the broader project of 
giving plausible nonreductionist problem-centered philosophical accounts of the 
epistemic relationships among scientific and especially biological disciplines.   
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Abstract 
 
There is a trade-off between specificity and accuracy in existing models of belief.  
Descriptions of agents in the tripartite model, which recognizes only three doxastic 
attitudes—belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment—are typically accurate, but not 
sufficiently specific.  The orthodox Bayesian model, which requires real-valued 
credences, is perfectly specific, but often inaccurate: we often lack precise credences.  I 
argue, first, that a popular attempt to fix the Bayesian model by using sets of functions is 
also inaccurate, since it requires us to have interval-valued credences with perfectly 
precise endpoints.  We can see this problem as analogous to the problem of higher order 
vagueness.  Ultimately, I argue, the only way to avoid these problems is to endorse 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability.  This principle has some surprising and radical 
consequences.  For example, it entails that the trade-off between accuracy and specificity 
is in-principle unavoidable: sometimes it is simply impossible to characterize an agent’s 
doxastic state in a way that is both fully accurate and maximally specific.  What we can 
do, however, is improve on both the tripartite and existing Bayesian models.  I construct a 
new model of belief—the minimal model—that allows us to characterize agents with 
much greater specificity than the tripartite model, and yet which remains, unlike existing 
Bayesian models, perfectly accurate. 
 
0. Introduction 
 
 Much traditional epistemology employs a tripartite model of belief, which 
recognizes three doxastic attitudes: belief, disbelief and suspension of judgment.  
However, this model is too coarse-grained.  Its descriptions of agents are typically 
accurate, but they are not sufficiently specific.  For example, one may believe both P1 
and P2, and yet be more confident of one than the other.  The tripartite model is blind to 
these differences in confidence, and yet they are crucially important (for example, in the 
explanation of action).   
 Observations like these are often taken to motivate the orthodox Bayesian model, 
which recognizes uncountably many different doxastic attitudes: one for each real 
number between 0 and 1.  However, this model suffers from the opposite problem.  It is 
too fine-grained.  Descriptions of agents in this model are perfectly specific—reflecting 
even the subtlest differences in confidence—but this comes at the cost of accuracy.  
Sometimes we lack precise, point-valued credences. 
 The tripartite model, then, has accuracy without specificity; the orthodox 
Bayesian model has specificity without accuracy.  One aim of this paper is to present 
powerful reasons for the claim that this trade-off between accuracy and specificity in the 
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representation of belief is in principle unavoidable: it is simply not possible to represent 
belief in a way that is both fully accurate and maximally specific. 
 What we can do, however, is improve on both the tripartite and orthodox 
Bayesian models.  Another aim of the paper is to construct and promote a new model of 
belief—the minimal model—which allows for much greater specificity than the tripartite 
model, and yet which remains, unlike the orthodox Bayesian model, perfectly accurate. 
I begin in section 1 by discussing a popular attempt to improve on the orthodox 
Bayesian model by using a set of functions to represent an agent, rather than a single 
function.  It will turn out that this set-of-functions model suffers from a slightly different 
version of the same sort of inaccuracy; specifically, it requires interval-valued credences 
with perfectly precise endpoints.  An analogy between credal imprecision and vagueness 
will reveal that the set-of-functions model is analogous to supervaluationism, and the 
problem of interval endpoint precision analogous to the problem of higher-order 
vagueness.  We’ll see that other approaches to vagueness inspire analogous models of 
belief, but many suffer from analogs of some version of the higher-order vagueness 
problem. 
 In section 2 I argue that the only way to avoid these problems is by endorsing a 
surprising and radical principle I call Insurmountable Unclassifiability.  I then ask what 
can be said about the representation of belief if this principle is true.  As a preliminary to 
answering, in section 3 I present a novel way of using sets of functions, and intervals, to 
characterize doxastic states.  This minimal model allows us to give multiple accurate 
characterizations of the same agent at different levels of specificity.   
 The minimal model has two primary virtues.  First, it constitutes an improvement 
over the tripartite model and both existing Bayesian models, in that it allows for much 
greater specificity than the tripartite model, and yet, unlike existing Bayesian models, 
remains fully accurate.  Second, it is neutral on the issues that divide defenders of 
different views on credal imprecision and higher order vagueness.  Thus, it provides a 
framework within which we can make progress on a wide range of questions in 
epistemology and decision theory without having to first take a stand on these difficult 
and controversial issues. 
In section 4 I make use of the minimal model in showing that if Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability is true, then the trade-off between accuracy and specificity in the 
representation of belief is in principle unavoidable: it is impossible to characterize an 
agent’s doxastic state in a way that is both fully accurate and maximally specific.   
 Insurmountable Unclassifiability is a radical and mysterious view, however, as 
becomes apparent in section 5, where I discuss the forced march scenario.  In section 6 I 
display some advantages of the view by showing how it can dissolve two challenging 
problems: puzzle cases for the Principle of Indifference, and diachronic decision 
problems for agents who lack precise credences.   
Ultimately I do not come down one way or the other on whether we should accept 
this fascinating view.  My aim is only to argue that there is a powerful reason in favor of 
it—namely, that it is necessary for avoiding the analogous problems of inaccuracy due to 
overprecision in the representation of belief, and higher order vagueness—and to begin 
exploring some of its consequences. 
 
1. The Vagueness Analogy 
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 In this section, I begin by spotlighting the problem faced by the orthodox 
Bayesian model.  Then I discuss a popular attempt to fix this problem by using a set of 
functions, rather than a single function.  I point out that this set-of-functions model faces 
a problem very similar to the one that undermined the single-function model.  Pursuing 
an analogy between credal imprecision and vagueness helps us gain deeper insight into 
the nature of these problems.  In particular, we can see the set-of-functions model as 
analogous to the supervaluationist approach to vagueness, and the problem facing this 
model as analogous to a well-known problem for supervaluationism, sometimes called 
the problem of higher-order vagueness.  I then briefly review two other approaches to 
vagueness: an infinite hierarchy of borderline cases, and many-valued logics.  In each 
case, we see that it would be possible to construct an analogous model of belief, but that 
the resulting model would suffer from a version of the higher-order vagueness problem. 
 The orthodox Bayesian model represents the doxastic state of an agent by a 
function which assigns to each proposition some real number between 0 and 1.  However, 
our confidence levels are not always that precise.  For example, consider LUCKY, the 
proposition that you will find a four-leaf clover tomorrow.  I could inquire about your 
level of confidence in LUCKY, and demand that you choose exactly one real number 
between 0 and 1, precise down to the millionth decimal place (and beyond)—but there 
would be an element of arbitrariness in any choice you might make.1, 2 
 One popular attempt to fix this problem involves using a set of functions to 
represent each agent, rather than a single function.  (Proponents include Jeffrey (1983), 
van Fraassen (1990), and Joyce (2005, 2010).)  This set generates interval-valued 
credences; one’s credence in P is the interval which contains all and only the real 
numbers r such that some function in one’s set has Pr(P) = r. 
 However, this model faces a problem much like the one that undermined the 
single-function model.  The problem of arbitrariness resurfaces, just in a slightly different 
form.  What, exactly, is the upper endpoint of your interval-valued credence for LUCKY?  
.0001?  .00009?  .000121?  Again, any particular number seems arbitrary.3 
 We can gain a deeper understanding of these problems of arbitrariness by 
pursuing an analogy between credal imprecision and vagueness.  To begin, I’ll define a 
predicate MC.  Roughly, MC applies to numbers that represent credences greater than 
your level of confidence in LUCKY.  For a more precise definition, first, let B[r] say that 
                                                 
1
 Some insist that despite appearances to the contrary, every agent does in fact have a precise credence in 
every proposition.  Arguing against this view is beyond the scope of this paper.  Those who are sympathetic 
to it may interpret the paper as aiming to defend the conditional claim that the conclusions pursued here 
will follow, if in fact we sometimes lack precise credences.  
2
 One might object to my presupposition that this inaccuracy in the orthodox Bayesian model is 
problematic.  After all, simplifying idealizations are commonly used with great success in models in 
science.  My reply is simple: whether an idealization is problematic depends entirely on the purpose to 
which the model is put.  For example, if the goal is prediction, an idealization might be unproblematic (and 
even beneficial).  In this paper, however, I evaluate models according to their ability to satisfy a simple 
curiosity about the actual facts—the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth—about the nature of 
our doxastic states.  Relative to this goal, any inaccuracy in the way a model represents our doxastic states 
is automatically a shortcoming. 
3
 The problem of interval endpoint arbitrariness is also raised (though not under that name) in Sturgeon 
(2008, 158) and Maher (2006), and discussed in Kaplan (2010). 
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a coin with bias r towards heads will land heads on the next toss.  For example, B[.7] 
says that a coin with bias .7 towards heads will land heads on the next toss.  Assume that, 
in accordance with rationality, for all r, your credence in B[r] is r.  Then we can define 
MC (for more confident) as the predicate that applies to a number r just in case you’re 
more confident of B[r] than LUCKY. 
 MC is analogous to paradigm vague predicates like TALL.  In each case there is a 
spectrum such that the predicate clearly applies at one end, and clearly fails to apply at 
the other, but there does not seem to be a sharp boundary.  Both seem to admit of 
borderline cases, and give rise to sorites-style paradoxes.   
Importantly, there is a close connection between our lack of a precise credence in 
LUCKY and the vagueness of MC.4  If we had some precise credence c in LUCKY, there 
would be a sharp boundary between MC and not-MC: all numbers greater than c would 
have MC, and all numbers equal to or less than c would have not-MC.  A natural thought, 
then, is that credal imprecision is of a piece with the vagueness of predicates like MC. 
 The set-of-functions model is an attempt to account for our lack of precise 
credences, and, thereby, an attempt to account for the vagueness of predicates like MC.  
We can interpret this model along supervaluationist lines: each function in your set is one 
admissible precisification of your doxastic state.  Functions excluded from your set are 
inadmissible precisifications.  A proposition about your doxastic state is determinately 
true if true according to all functions in your set.  It’s indeterminate if true according to 
some, but not all, functions in your set.   
For example, if all functions in your set have Pr(B[.9]) > Pr(LUCKY), it’s 
determinate that you’re more confident of B[.9] than LUCKY, i.e., it’s determinate that 
MC[.9] is true.  If some functions in your set have Pr(B[.0001]) > Pr(LUCKY) while 
others do not, it’s indeterminate whether you’re more confident of B[.0001]) than 
LUCKY, i.e., it’s indeterminate whether MC[.0001] is true.  So, on the supervaluationist 
interpretation, we can see the set-of-functions model as an attempt to account for the 
vagueness of MC by introducing a third category, indeterminately MC, just as the 
supervaluationist tries to account for the vagueness of TALL by introducing a third 
category, indeterminately TALL.5 
Supervaluationism faces a well-known problem: it requires a sharp boundary 
where, intuitively, there shouldn’t be one, namely, between the determinate and 
indeterminate.  This is the so-called problem of higher-order vagueness.  On the 
supervaluationist interpretation of the set-of-functions model, the problematic 
requirement of precise endpoints for interval-valued credences is just an instance of this 
more general problem.  A sharp upper endpoint for one’s interval-valued credence in 
LUCKY would constitute a sharp boundary between the numbers to which MC 
determinately applies and those to which it indeterminately applies.  But there is no sharp 
boundary here.6 
                                                 
4
 For simplicity I will speak as if MC is vague, but strictly speaking I rely only on the claim that MC is 
structurally analogous to paradigm vague predicates. 
5
 Supervaluationist approaches to vagueness are defended in Fine (1975) and Keefe (2000), among others. 
6
 Unfortunately, the question of how to interpret the set-of-functions model has received very little attention 
in the literature, so although some explicitly endorse the supervaluationist interpretation (including van 
Fraassen (1990, 2005, 2006) and Hajek (2003)), it is unclear how widespread this interpretation is, and 
what alternatives might look like.  One clearly incompatible interpretation appears in Schoenfield (2012) 
and Kaplan (2010): if some functions in your set have Pr(A) > Pr(B), while others have Pr(A) < Pr(B), and 
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As the literature has shown, it is extremely difficult to do justice to higher order 
vagueness.  Below I briefly review a couple of prominent attempts and why they are 
unsatisfactory.  Because of the analogy between credal imprecision and vagueness, in 
each case there is an analogous model of belief that would face analogous problems. 
First, some postulate an infinite hierarchy of borderline cases, borderline 
borderline cases, etc.  For example, indeterminately tall heights are first-order borderline 
cases, but there are also second-order borderline cases: heights that are borderlines of the 
distinction between determinately tall and indeterminately tall.  For every natural number 
n, there are nth-order borderline cases.  This strategy could be employed in an attempt to 
fix the problem of precise endpoints for interval-valued credences: we would account for 
the lack of a sharp line between determinately MC and indeterminately MC by 
postulating borderline cases of that distinction, and so on up the hierarchy. 
 However, there is a compelling objection to this approach.  Consider paradigm 
tall heights that aren’t borderline cases at any level.  Call these absolutely tall.  If every 
height must be classified as either absolutely tall, or absolutely not tall, or, for some 
natural number n, a borderline case of nth order, then there will be a sharp cut-off 
between those classified as absolutely tall and those classified some other way.  But there 
should not be a sharp cut-off here.7  Similarly, if every real number between 0 and 1 must 
be classified as either absolutely MC, or absolutely not MC, or, for some natural number 
n, a borderline case of nth order, then there will be a sharp cut-off between the numbers 
that are absolutely MC and those that are not.  But there is no sharp boundary here.   
A different class of views on vagueness involves multiple degrees of truth.8  Some 
postulate uncountably many: one for each number between 0 and 1, inclusive.  This view 
also faces the problem of higher order vagueness.  If we assign some precise degree of 
truth to every proposition of the form TALL(r), there will be a sharp cut-off between the 
numbers such that TALL(r) is true to degree 1, and the numbers such that TALL(r) is true 
to some degree less than 1.  But there should not be a sharp cut-off here. 
 The analogous model of belief, on which each proposition of the form MC(r) is 
assigned some precise degree of truth, suffers from the same problem: it requires a sharp 
cut-off between those numbers for which MC(r) is true to degree 1, and those for which 
MC(r) is true to some degree less than 1.  But again, there is no sharp boundary here. 
 
2. Insurmountable Unclassifiability 
 
 The orthodox Bayesian model of belief, as we have seen, is inaccurate.  The 
nature of the inaccuracy is that it requires point-valued credences, which, as we saw in 
the previous section, amounts to the requirement that there be sharp lines where, 
intuitively, there aren’t any—such as between MC and not-MC.  (MC(r) says, recall, that 
                                                                                                                                                 
still others Pr(A) = Pr(B), then it’s false that you’re more confident of A than B; false that you’re less 
confident of A than B; and false that you’re equally confident of A than B.  Your attitude towards A and B 
falls into a fourth category.  (This is analogous to a view in value theory defended, among others, by Ruth 
Chang (see, for example, Chang (2002)), on which it can be the case that A is neither more valuable than B, 
nor less valuable, nor equally valuable.)  This interpretation requires, implausibly, a sharp boundary 
between the numbers that have MC, and those that fall into the fourth category. 
 
7
 Similar problems are presented in Sainsbury (1991) and Wright (2009). 
8
 See, for example, Smith (2008) and Zadeh (1975). 
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you are more confident of B[r]—that a coin with bias r towards heads will land heads on 
the next toss—than LUCKY (that you will find a four-leaf clover tomorrow).) 
 So, we cannot use the two categories MC and not-MC to give an exhaustive 
classification of all numbers between 0 and 1.  In the previous section we surveyed a 
number of different attempts to reach a categorization that is genuinely exhaustive by 
refining this initial two-way distinction.  Specifically, each attempt involved adding more 
(in some cases, infinitely more) intermediate categories.  But all these attempts foundered 
on the same sort of problem: each ended up requiring sharp lines where, intuitively, there 
shouldn’t be any. 
 In fact, we can identify an even more substantive commonality among the sources 
of failure of these different attempts.  In each case, the proposed model failed because it 
ended up requiring a sharp line between those numbers for which MC(r) is as true as 
possible, and those for which it is not.  For example, consider the supervaluationist 
framework.  Here, to be determinately true is to be as true as possible, and to be 
indeterminately true is to fail to be as true as possible.  So the sharp line, required by this 
framework, between the determinate and the indeterminate amounts to a sharp line 
between what’s as true as possible and what’s not.  Postulating an infinite hierarchy of 
borderline cases doesn’t help; we still have a sharp line between what’s as true as possible 
(in this case, when MC(r) is absolutely true, not borderline at any level) and what’s not 
(when MC(r) is either a borderline case at some level, or absolutely false).  Many-valued 
logics require a sharp line between those numbers for which MC(r) is true to degree 1 (as 
true as possible), and those true to some degree less than 1 (not as true as possible). 
 The error that unifies these models, then, is their joint commitment to a sharp line 
between what’s true as possible and what’s not.  That there is no sharp line here imposes 
a severe restriction on our ability to classify the numbers between 0 and 1 according to 
their MC status.  This restriction can be stated more precisely, as follows: 
 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability:  For any set of categories C with properties (1) and 
(2) (definitions to follow), it is not the case that every number between 0 and 1 can be 
classified into some category in C.  (1) For some proper subset of C, any number r that 
falls into some category in that subset is, in virtue of being in that category, such that 
MC(r) is as true as possible.  (2) Any number r that falls into some category in C in the 
complement of that proper subset is, in virtue of being in that category, such that it’s not 
the case that MC(r) is as true as possible. 
 
 Insurmountable Unclassifiability is intended to capture the idea that, not only can 
we not classify all numbers along the two-way MC/not-MC distinction, but we also 
cannot classify all numbers according to any set of categories that is intended to 
supersede this two-way distinction, or refine it via the addition of (even infinitely many) 
more intermediate categories.9  What is wrong the initial two-way distinction is not that 
there are too few categories into which to sort numbers.  Rather, the fundamental problem 
is the exhaustiveness assumption.  The mistake is to think that every number can be 
                                                 
9
 Sainsbury (1991) sketches a view that has much in common with Insurmountable Unclassifiability. 
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assigned to some category that completely captures its status with respect to MC.  
Insurmountable Unclassifiability denies this.10 
 Now, it is clear that some numbers are classifiable in categories that are members 
of a set with properties (1) and (2).  What Insurmountable Unclassifiability denies is just 
that all numbers are so classifiable.  That some, but not all, numbers are so classifiable 
might lead one to think that we can draw a sharp line between those that are, and those 
that aren’t.  But, as we will see, this, too, is not possible.  That it’s not begins to illustrate 
the truly insurmountable nature of the unclassifiability. 
Suppose we were able to say, for each number, whether it was so classifiable or 
not.  If so, then, for each classifiable number r, we can say whether or not MC(r) is as 
true as possible.  (If we couldn’t, then r wouldn’t be in the classifiable category.)  So, 
there would be a sharp two-way distinction between, on the one hand, the numbers that 
are classifiable, and such that MC(r) is as true as possible; and, on the other, those that 
are either unclassifiable, or, classifiable, but not as such that MC(r) is as true as possible.  
But that would constitute a sharp two-way classification between the numbers for which 
MC(r) is as true as possible, and those for which it is not!  Each number in the first 
category—classifiable, and such that MC(r) is true as possible—is clearly such that 
MC(r) is true as possible.  Of the numbers in the second category, those that are 
classifiable, but not such that MC(r) is true as possible, are, obviously, not such that 
MC(r) is true as possible. And—crucially—those in the second category that are not 
classifiable are clearly such that it’s not the case that MC(r) is true as possible.  After all, 
if MC(r) were as true as possible, then that number would fall into the first category.  So 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability entails that, although some numbers are classifiable, and 
it’s not the case that all numbers are classifiable, we cannot categorize each number as 
either classifiable or not. 
As will become even more apparent later in the paper, Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability is quite a radical and mysterious view.  In this section I have argued, 
though, that accepting it is absolutely necessary if we are determined to avoid problems 
of the sort that plagued the orthodox Bayesian model and the myriad attempts, discussed 
in the previous section, to improve upon it.  That is, accepting Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability is absolutely necessary to avoid commitment to the existence of sharp 
lines where, intuitively, there shouldn’t be any.   
 
3. The Minimal Model 
 
 I began this paper by noting a trade-off between accuracy and specificity in two 
popular models of belief.  In the section following this one I will show that if 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability is true, then this trade-off is in principle unavoidable: it 
                                                 
10
 Those with supervaluationist inclinations might think the solution is to posit a third category, consisting 
of borderline cases of the distinction between what’s as true as possible and what’s not.  But there can be no 
borderlines of this distinction.  Suppose there were.  Then there would be a distinction between the 
determinately true as possible, and the borderline true as possible.  Consider an instance of the second 
category.  Since it is determinately in the second category, rather than the first, it determinedly fails to be as 
true as it possibly could be.  (It could be in the first category.)  So what we would have is not borderline as 
true as possible, but rather, determinately not as true as possible.  It is part of the nature of the distinction 
between what’s as true as possible, and what’s not, that there can be no borderlines of it.  (Compare the 
argument in Broome (1997) for his Collapsing Principle and an argument in Barnes (1982), p. 55.) 
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is impossible to characterize belief in a way that is both fully accurate and maximally 
specific.  In order to do this, I will first construct a new way of using interval notation and 
sets of functions to represent belief, which I call the minimal model.  That is the aim of 
this section.  As we will soon see, it turns out that this minimal model constitutes an 
improvement over both the tripartite model and existing Bayesian models: it allows for 
much greater specificity than the tripartite model, and yet remains, unlike existing 
Bayesian models, perfectly accurate. 
 First, notice that among informal characterizations of belief, some are more 
specific than others.  For example, suppose I say you’re more confident of P than not, and 
then elaborate that you’re nearly certain of P.  The second description is more specific 
than the first, but both are perfectly accurate.  The new minimal interpretation of sets and 
intervals presented here allows us to give, in a similar fashion, multiple accurate 
characterizations, at different levels of specificity, of a single agent’s doxastic state.   
I’ll start with intervals.  First I’ll give a definition that is helpful, but potentially 
misleading; then I’ll do it more carefully.  Helpful, but misleading: on the minimal 
interpretation, [c, d] accurately characterizes an agent’s doxastic state toward H just in 
case the agent’s level of confidence in H is contained within [c, d].  Note that on this 
interpretation there will always be multiple accurate intervals at varying levels of 
specificity.  On reason is that, if [c, d] is accurate, then any larger (more inclusive) 
interval is also accurate.  This is because, if one’s level of confidence is contained within 
[c, d], then it is contained within any interval of which [c, d] is a subset.  For example, 
since I am fairly confident that LUCKY is false, my doxastic attitude toward LUCKY is 
accurately characterized by [0, 1], [0, .8], [0, .5], and many others.  On the minimal 
interpretation, each of these is perfectly accurate; some are more specific than others. 
The definition given above is misleading insofar as it presupposes that the agent 
has a precise, point-valued level of confidence.  The fix is: on the minimal interpretation, 
an interval [c, d] accurately characterizes an agent’s doxastic state toward H just in case 
(1) the agent is more confident of H than any proposition in which her credence is less 
than c; and (2) the agent is less confident of H than any proposition in which her credence 
is greater than d.  One final clarification: the conditions on the right-hand side must be as 
true as possible for the interval to count as accurate. 
 One noteworthy feature of this new use of intervals is that it is entirely compatible 
with the substantive views held by proponents of different views on credal imprecision, 
including the supervaluationist interpretation, an infinite hierarchy of borderline cases, 
many-valued logics, Insurmountable Unclassifiability, even the single-function model, 
etc.  For example, if the supervaluationist has [c, d] as the agent’s unique interval-valued 
credence in H, then that interval (as well as any more inclusive interval) automatically 
counts as accurate on the minimal interpretation.  This is because the supervaluationist 
interpretation of the interval notation is logically stronger than the minimal interpretation 
of the same notation (hence the name minimal).  For another example, if one has a point-
valued credence c in H, then every interval of which c is a member will count as accurate 
on the minimal interpretation.  What this makes salient is that to characterize an agent’s 
doxastic attitude using the new, minimal interval notation is to remain neutral on the 
issues that divide defenders of all different views on credal (im)precision.  This is 
because, on the minimal interpretation, to characterize an agent’s attitude towards H with 
some interval is to remain completely neutral about the status of numbers inside that 
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interval.  For any such number r, it may be that one is more confident of H than B[r]; or 
less confident; or equally confident; it may be indeterminate whether r is one’s level of 
confidence in H; etc.  For any possible status r might have, we remain completely neutral 
about whether r has that status.  To describe one’s attitude with an interval is to be 
committal only about numbers outside that interval. 
 We can give a new, minimal re-interpretation of sets of functions in the same vein.  
First pass: a set counts as accurate just in case every proposition about the agent’s 
doxastic state that is true according to all functions in that set is true (as possible) of the 
agent.  This is only a first-pass definition, though, because some propositions true 
according to all functions in the set are not true of the agent.  For example, it is true 
according to every function in the set that you have a precise credence in LUCKY.  (The 
functions agree that you have a precise credence; they just disagree about what it is.)  But 
that you have a precise credence in LUCKY is precisely what we want to deny!  We can 
get to the root of this problem by noticing that, although the existential claim there is 
some real number r such that r is your precise credence in LUCKY is true according to 
every function, there is no instance of that existential claim that is true according to every 
function; that is, there is no r such that r is your precise credence in LUCKY is true 
according to every function in the set.  So, we can fix the problem by revising the 
definition as follows: First, let Z be the set of all propositions true according to all 
functions in the set.  Generate Z- by removing from Z any proposition that is, or is 
equivalent to, some existential claim such that no instance of that existential claim is true 
according to every function in the set.  Now the proper definition: on the minimal 
interpretation, a set counts as accurate just in case every proposition in Z- is true (as 
possible) of the agent.   
 To characterize an agent with a set, on this new, minimal interpretation, is to 
remain entirely neutral on the status of propositions about which different functions in the 
set disagree, just as the minimal interval notation remains neutral on the status of 
numbers inside the interval.  There will always be multiple accurate sets, just as there are 
always multiple accurate intervals.  In addition, as before, this interpretation is 
compatible with different views on credal imprecision.  For example, if S is the agent’s 
unique set of functions, interpreted in the supervaluationist way, then S (and any more 
inclusive set) counts as an accurate description of that agent on the minimal 
interpretation.  If an agent is best represented by a single credence function, any set 
containing that function is accurate.   
 This minimal model can easily accommodate traditional Bayesian approaches to a 
wide range of different issues, such as learning from experience, theory confirmation in 
science, decision theory, etc.  It will typically be the case that if, on the single-function 
model, some proposition B is true of an agent if that agent’s credence function has 
property Q, then, on the minimal model, B will be true of the agent if there is some set of 
functions, which accurately characterizes that agent, all of whose members have property 
Q.  For example, on the minimal model we can say that E confirms H if there is some 
accurate set of functions, all of whose members have Pr(H|E) > Pr(H).  The agent 
satisfies minimal synchronic requirements for rationality if there is some accurate set of 
functions, all of whose members conform to the axioms of probability.  The agent 
rationally updates on evidence E, received between t1 and t2, just any case any set of 
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functions S2 that is accurate at t2 can be obtained from some set S1 that was accurate at 
t1 via conditionalizing each function in S1 on E.  And so forth. 
What I want to emphasize here, though, is that when it comes to the 
representation of belief, the minimal model is an improvement over both the tripartite 
model and existing Bayesian models.  It allows for characterizations much more specific 
than those of the tripartite model.  For example, if [.95, .96] accurately characterizes my 
attitude toward A, and [.97, .98] my attitude toward B, the model represents that I am 
more confident of B than A, even if I believe both.  Yet it remains (unlike existing 
Bayesian models) perfectly accurate.  It does not fall prey to the problem of arbitrariness, 
since accurate intervals are not taken to be uniquely accurate.  It is perfectly accurate to 
characterize my attitude toward LUCKY with [0, .8], even though the endpoints are 
perfectly precise, because this characterization is not taken to be a unique best one.  Other 
intervals, such as [0, .7] or [0, .6], may be equally accurate. 
The only shortcoming of this model is that it typically provides only partial 
descriptions of the agent’s doxastic state.  To characterize one’s doxastic state with [0, .7], 
for example, is not maximally informative, since narrower intervals may be equally 
accurate.  Whether this shortcoming can be remedied is addressed in the next section. 
 
4. Insurmountable Unclassifiability Renders Impossible the Combination of  
Perfect Accuracy and Maximal Specificity in the Representation of Belief 
 
In the previous section I constructed the minimal model, which allows us to give 
multiple accurate descriptions of an agent’s doxastic state at different levels of specificity.  
It is fine to characterize one’s doxastic state by giving a few descriptions of this kind, but 
doing so raises a natural question.  What is the most specific accurate interval?  For 
example, above I listed the following as accurate characterizations of my attitude toward 
LUCKY: [0, 1], [0, .8], and [0, .5].  Having done this, it is natural to ask about other 
intervals.  What about [0, .3]?  (0, .27)?  [0, .2]?  In particular, it is natural to wonder 
which interval is the most specific interval that is still accurate.  After all, any information 
encoded in a less specific interval is also contained in a more specific interval—so why 
not just isolate the maximally specific accurate interval, identify it as such, and forget 
about the rest? 
 Interestingly, it turns out that if we are serious about avoiding counterintuitive 
sharp lines—i.e, if we accept Insurmountable Unclassifiability—then we must regard this 
very natural thought as deeply flawed.  Suppose there were a most specific interval that 
accurately characterized my attitude towards LUCKY—say, [c, d].  Then any narrower 
interval would fail to be accurate.  But then d would constitute a precise boundary where 
there shouldn’t be one.  For all numbers greater than d, MC(r) would be as true as 
possible; for all numbers equal to or less than d, MC(r) would fail to be as true as 
possible.  But, as we have seen, Insurmountable Unclassifiability entails that we can’t 
classify all numbers r according to this scheme.  The upshot: if we accept Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability—the only way to avoid problems of arbitrariness and higher-order 
vagueness—then sometimes there is no maximally specific, fully accurate 
characterization of one’s doxastic state. 
 This is a surprising and radical conclusion.  It means that it is impossible to give a 
complete description of an agent’s doxastic state; there is no such thing as a complete 
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description.  We can give partial descriptions of an agent’s doxastic state; some will be 
more specific than others.  But we can never identify a particular description as 
maximally specific, or complete.11 
 
5. Quietism and the Forced March 
 
 In order to draw out some further implications of Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability, consider a forced march scenario.  Consider the following finite series 
of intervals.  All intervals in the series share the same lower endpoint: 0.  The upper 
endpoint of the first element of the series is 1.  For each interval in the series, its upper 
endpoint is the result of subtracting some minuscule positive real number ε from the 
upper endpoint of its predecessor.  The last element of the series is the first interval whose 
upper endpoint is equal to or less than 0. 
 Imagine going through the elements of this series one by one, and asking 
someone, for each interval, whether it is accurate concerning their level of confidence in 
LUCKY.  At first, the obvious answer is yes.  But at some point, the response must be 
something else.  (Otherwise the person will answer yes to the last element of the series, 
which is clearly incorrect.)  But what can they say? 
 It follows from Insurmountable Unclassifiability that in order to avoid error, the 
speaker is at some point required to perform a speech act that is non-committal in the 
following sense: the content of the speech act is compatible with its being the case that 
yes would have been a correct answer; and also compatible with its being the case that 
yes would have been an incorrect answer.  Which speech act may have these features is 
an empirical question.  Silence is a natural candidate—but only if it’s understood not to 
implicate that the answer is not yes.  The person might say “I’m bored of this.  Let’s go 
swimming!” or “Was that a Pileated Woodpecker that just flew by?” 
 This suggestion—that, at some point, one must switch to a non-committal speech 
act—may strike some as unsatisfying.  Those who find it unsatisfying may try to stipulate 
that the subject will say yes if and only if yes would be a correct answer.  Then speech 
acts like “Let’s go swimming!” won’t allow them to wriggle out of the question. 
 However, a defender of Insurmountable Unclassifiability should deny that such a 
stipulation can be made.  On the assumption that, for each question, there is a fact of the 
matter about whether not the subject responded with yes, then the claim that they will say 
yes if and only if yes is a correct answer is equivalent to the claim that, for each interval, 
                                                 
11
 How might this affect other issues, such as updating, decision theory, etc.?  In a sense, not at all—these 
are still handled in the minimal model exactly as described in the previous section.  But Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability introduces a new wrinkle: there is now no guarantee that there will be a fact of the matter 
about whether the relevant conditions obtain (although there may always be a fact of the matter).  For 
example, on the minimal model we have that if there is some accurate set of functions, all of whose 
members have Pr(H|E) > Pr(H), then E confirms H.  And if there is no accurate set of functions, all of 
whose members have Pr(H|E) > Pr(H), then it’s not the case that E confirms H.  But since, according to 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability, it’s not the case that every set is classifiable as either accurate or not, the 
door is now open to the possibility that it will not be settled whether E confirms H.  It is important to 
emphasize, however, that Insurmountable Unclassifiability does not require that there sometimes fail to be 
a fact of the matter here.  It is compatible with Insurmountable Unclassifiability that there is always a fact 
of the matter about whether E confirms H.  The same goes for other issues, such as rational updating, 
minimal constraints on synchronic rationality, etc. 
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there’s a fact of the matter about whether it’s accurate or not.  And the denial of this is a 
core commitment of Insurmountable Unclassifiability. 
 What we are left with, then, is a form of Quietism.  For any subject of the forced 
march, it must be the case that there is some pair of adjacent intervals such that they 
answer yes to the question about one but give a different answer to the question about the 
other.  That answer must be non-committal in the sense described above. 
 This section has only begun to explore the implications of Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability; many further questions remain.  Already, though, we can see that it 
leads to some surprising, radical, and mysterious conclusions.  Those who are serious 
about avoiding the problems of arbitrariness, higher-order vagueness, and 
counterintuitive sharp lines are in for some exciting times! 
 
6.  Dissolving Problems with Insurmountable Unclassifiability 
 
 My goal in this section is to highlight some of the virtues of Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability by showing how it dissolves two challenging problems: (1) puzzle cases 
for the Principle of Indifference; (2) diachronic decision problems for agents who lack 
precise credences.   
 The much-discussed Principle of Indifference (POI) says that if one has no more 
reason to believe A than B, and no more reason to believe B than A, then one’s credence 
in A should equal one’s credence in B.12  In the orthodox Bayesian model, where 
credences are point-valued, this famously seems to lead to contradiction in some cases.  
For example, suppose a factory produces cubes of equal size.13  You know only that the 
length (L) of a side of a cube is 2 feet or less.  Plausibly, you have no more reason to 
believe 0 < L ≤ 1 than 1 < L ≤ 2, and vice versa; so, according to POI, you must have the 
same point-valued credence in each of these propositions, namely, ½.  But now notice 
that your initial information is equivalent to the information that the area (A) of a side is 
4 feet or less.  Now it seems you have no more reason to believe any one of these four 
possibilities than any of the others: 0 < A ≤ 1; 1 < A ≤ 2; 2 < A ≤ 3; 3 < A ≤ 4.  So, 
according to POI, you must have the same point-valued credence in each, namely, ¼.  But 
this contradicts the recommendation of the first application of the principle, since 0 < L ≤ 
1 is equivalent to 0 < A ≤ 1. 
 Some (including Joyce (2005) and Weatherson (2007)) have claimed that moving 
to the set-of-functions model—with the attendant move to interval-valued credences—
solves the problem: that we can respect both verdicts of the POI by giving the same 
(unique, maximally specific) interval-valued credence to each member of the two-celled 
partition, and the same (unique, maximally specific) interval-valued credence to each 
member of the four-valued partition.  However, as I have shown elsewhere [reference 
removed for blind review], this is coherent only if one’s interval-valued credence in all 
six is [0, 1].  And, as I have argued elsewhere, (maximally specific) interval-valued 
credences with such extreme endpoints are not rationally permissible [reference removed 
for blind review]. 
 This entire set of problems evaporates if Insurmountable Unclassifiability is 
adopted—specifically, if we give up the presupposition that we must have a maximally 
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 For some recent discussion, see, among others, White (2010) and Huemer (2009). 
13
 Example adapted from Van Fraassen (1989). 
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specific, fully accurate interval-valued or point-valued credence in each proposition.  
First, we can use the minimal model to re-state the POI in a way compatible with 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability, as follows: if one has no more reason to believe A than 
B, and no more reason to believe B than A, then, if one is rational, then if some interval R 
is an accurate characterization of one’s attitude toward A, then that same interval R is also 
an accurate characterization of one’s attitude toward B, and vice versa.  This principle 
does not lead to contradiction, even if we agree that you have no more reason to believe 0 
< L ≤ 1 than 1 < L ≤ 2, and no more reason to believe any of the following than any 
other: 0 < A ≤ 1; 1 < A ≤ 2; 2 < A ≤ 3; 3 < A ≤ 4.  For example, each of the following 
intervals can coherently accurately characterize your attitude toward each of these six 
propositions: [0, .75]; [.12, .8]; [.011, .673]; etc.  With Insurmountable Unclassifiability 
in place, there is no longer any requirement to find a maximally specific accurate interval 
for each proposition—and it is this requirement that we should give up in light of the 
contradiction, not the innocuous principle that when you have no more reason to believe 
one thing than another, you shouldn’t take different doxastic attitudes towards them. 
 Giving up this requirement also pulls the rug out from under an argument in Elga 
(2010) for the claim that rationality requires us to have a precise, point-valued credence 
in every proposition.  Elga draws this conclusion after considering a number of different 
possible decision rules one might use if one had a (unique, maximally specific) interval-
valued credence in some proposition.  In each case, he argues that the rule is 
unacceptable.  He infers that it is not rational to have a (unique, maximally specific) 
interval-valued credence in any proposition; and concludes from this that all rational 
credences are point-valued. 
 Once Insurmountable Unclassifiability is on the table, it’s clear that the final step 
in Elga’s argument is invalid.  Elga does not consider the possibility that rationality might 
allow one to lack a point-valued credence and also lack a unique, maximally specific 
interval-valued credence.14  I will argue that the decision theory that accompanies 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability gives the right results about the case on which, Elga 
claims, the view that we have a (maximally specific) interval-valued credence founders. 
 Elga supposes that the agent has a maximally specific credence in H of [.1, .8].  
He then supposes the agent is offered some bet A, immediately followed by another bet 
B.  If the agent accepts bet A, she will gain $15 if H is true but lose $10 if H is false.  If 
she accepts bet B, she will lose $10 if H is true, but gain $15 if H is false.  The thing to 
notice is that if the agent accepts both bets, she is guaranteed to gain $5.  Of course, 
rejecting both guarantees $0.  So it would be irrational to reject both bets.  (We assume 
the agent cares only about money, etc.)  But, Elga claims, no decision theory for 
(maximally specific) interval-valued credences can accommodate this.  For example, 
according to one popular rule that has been frequently endorsed in the literature, rejecting 
bet A is permissible, and rejecting bet B is permissible as well.   
 Now, suppose that, in accordance with Insurmountable Unclassifiability, the agent 
in this case lacks a maximally specific interval-valued credence, but that [.1, .8] is an 
accurate characterization (in the minimal model) of their doxastic attitude.  What 
decision-theoretic commitments would follow?  As we have seen, the minimal model 
remains completely silent on matters about which different functions in some accurate set 
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 It is understandable that he does not consider this view, as it has heretofore not been a salient position in  
the debate. 
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disagree.  In this case, since [.1, .8] is an accurate interval, there will be some accurate set 
which contains, for each value v in [.1, .8], some function with Pr(H) = v.  Some 
functions in that set have the expected value of rejecting bet A greater than accepting, but 
others have the expected value of accepting greater than rejecting.  There is no agreement 
among the members of this set about whether rejecting is permissible or not.  So the 
minimal model remains completely silent on that question.  The same is true for bet B.  
This is good news—the minimal model does not have the implausible consequence that 
rejecting each bet is permissible. 
 However, we might wonder whether we can also do justice to the intuition that 
rejecting both bets would be impermissible.  In fact, we can!  Although the minimal 
model does not prohibit the individual action of rejecting bet A; and does not prohibit 
rejecting bet B; it does prohibit the compound action of rejecting both bets.  This is 
because every function in that accurate set agrees that the expected value of rejecting 
both bets is $0, and that the expected value of accepting both bets is $5; and so all 
functions agree that rejecting both bets is rationally impermissible.  The minimal model 
yields exactly the result that Elga claimed no decision theory for non-precise credences 
could accommodate.15 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 I began by noting a trade-off between accuracy and specificity in two commonly-
employed models of belief.  The tripartite model, which recognizes only three doxastic 
attitudes, allows us to characterize belief in a way that is perfectly accurate, but not 
sufficiently specific.  The model is too coarse-grained.  The orthodox Bayesian model, on 
the other hand, is too fine-grained.  It represents agents in a way that is highly specific, 
but typically inaccurate.  It requires point-valued credences in every proposition, but 
usually our doxastic attitudes are not this precise (nor does rationality require them to be).  
A popular modification of the Bayesian model—the set-of-functions model—suffers 
from a similar sort of problem.  It requires a unique interval-valued credence, with 
perfectly precise endpoints, for each proposition.  But our doxastic attitudes are usually 
not this precise either (nor does rationality require them to be). 
I have shown that if Insurmountable Unclassifiability is true, then this trade-off 
between accuracy and specificity is in-principle unavoidable: it is simply not possible to 
characterize belief in a way that is both fully accurate and maximally specific.  I gave a 
powerful reason in favor of this principle: it is, I argued, non-negotiable for those serious 
about avoiding the problem of inaccuracy due to overprecision in the representation of 
belief, and the analogous problem of higher order vagueness.  Moreover, it can dissolve 
two challenging problems: puzzle cases for the Principle of Indifference, and diachronic 
decision problems for agents who lack point-valued credences. 
                                                 
15
 One thing this discussion reveals is that Elga’s argument against some other decision rules is too quick. 
For example, what he calls permissive rules have the same verdict as the minimal model—that the 
compound action of rejecting both bets is impermissible—for similar reasons.  However, this is 
complicated by the fact that according to these rules, rejecting bet A is permissible, as is rejecting bet B.  So 
they are committed to the implausible result that a certain compound action is impermissible even though 
each component action is permissible.  The combination of Insurmountable Unclassifiability and the 
minimal model has no such implausible commitment. 
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However, it has not been my aim in this paper to reach a final verdict on 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability.  It will doubtless be controversial; some of its 
consequences are surprising and radical.  For example, it entails that the subject in a 
forced march scenario is required, at some point, to respond in a way that is maximally 
non-committal on the question asked.   
 Regardless of whether or not we accept this fascinating and mysterious view, we 
can improve on both the tripartite model and the existing Bayesian models of belief.  One 
aim of the paper has been to describe and promote a new model of belief—the minimal 
model—that enables us to use intervals, and sets of functions, to characterize belief in a 
way that is much more specific than the tripartite model, and yet which does not fall prey 
to problems of overprecision and so is perfectly accurate.  A further virtue of the minimal 
model is that it remains neutral on the issues that divide defenders of different approaches 
to the problem of higher order vagueness.  Thus, it provides a framework within which 
we can make progress on a wide range of different issues in epistemology and decision 
theory without first having to take a stand on this challenging and controversial problem. 
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Curie’s hazard: From electromagnetism to symmetry violation
Bryan W. Roberts
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Abstract. We explore the facts and fiction regarding Curie’s own example of
Curie’s principle. Curie’s claim is vindicated in his suggested example of the elec-
trostatics of central fields, but fails in many others. Nevertheless, the failure of
Curie’s claim is still of special empirical interest, in that it can be seen to under-
pin the experimental discovery of parity violation and of CP violation in the 20th
century.
1. Introduction
Curie (1894) wrote that, “when certain causes produce certain effects, the elements
of symmetry of the causes must be found in the produced effects” (Curie 1894, pg.
394)1. This claim has received mixed reviews. Brading and Castellani (2013) have
suggested that a common interpretation of the principle is faulty, and Norton (2014)
has argued that it is an exercise in dubious causal metaphysics. Many have suggested
that the principle fails for the phenomenon of spontaneous symmetry breaking in
quantum field systems, although Castellani (2003) and Earman (2004) have each
argued that this is not the case.
In this paper I’d like to do two things. First, I would like to discuss Curie’s own
example of his principle in electromagnetism. It is a deceptively simple example. My
aim will be to draw out the particular physical facts that allow Curie’s statement to
succeed in this example, by formulating and proving a sense in which it succeeds,
while isolating a sense in which it can also fail. This is the core of what I would like
to say: the truth of Curie’s statement is contingent on special physical facts, which
obtain in some cases but not others.
Second, I would like to point out that one of the more useful applications of Curie’s
principle is the detection of its failure, which can provide evidence that the laws of
nature are symmetry-violating. Many commentators have focused on the connection
between Curie’s principle and a different concept, that of spontaneous symmetry
breaking2. Here I will instead point out how Curie’s principle played crucial role in
1“lorsque certaines causes produisent certains effets, les e´le´ments de syme´trie des causes doivent
se retrouver dans les effets produits”
2C.f. Castellani (2003) and Earman (2004).
1
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the famous experimental detections of parity violation and CP -violation in the 20th
century.
2. Curie’s example
Curie’s original statement is slightly different from the statement that philosophers
and physicists have come to refer to as Curie’s principle. I will discuss the latter in
more detail in the next section. For now, to keep track of the difference, I will refer
to Curie’s original statement as:
Curie’s Hazard. A symmetry of the causes must be a symmetry of the
effects.
Curie gave the following example of this hazardous conjecture. Consider two op-
positely charged plates, placed close together and centered on an axis as in Figure 1.
Think of the charges as a “cause” whose “effect” is to give rise to an electric field.
That effect, Curie says, must exhibit all the symmetries of the cause. So, since the
charges are rotationally symmetric, the electric field must be too.
+
+ ++
+
+
-
- -
-
-
-
Cu
Zn
Figure 1. Curie’s example: A symmetry of the charges is a symmetry
of the electric field.
In Curie’s own words:
To establish the symmetry of the electric field, suppose that this field
is produced by two circular plates of zinc and of copper placed one
facing the other, like the plates of an air condenser. Considering a
point on the common axis between the two plates, we see that this
axis is an axis of isotropy and that every plane containing this axis is
a plane of symmetry. The elements of symmetry of the causes must be
found in the produced effects; therefore the electric field is compatible
with the symmetry (Curie 1894, pg. 404, emphasis added)3.
3My translation. The original reads: “Pour e´tablir la syme´trie du champ e´lectrique, supposons
que ce champ soit produit par deux plateaux circulaires de zinc et de cuivre place´s en face l’un de
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Curie’s example is deceptively simple. In the case of two electric plates, it is true
that a symmetry of the charge distribution is also a symmetry of the electric field.
However, it is not true of Maxwell’s equations more generally: a number of implicit
assumptions are required in order for it to get off the ground. For example, if the
particles in the plates were in motion it would of course cause the field lines to
propagate asymmetrically, breaking the symmetry in the charge distribution.
Thus, an obvious implicit premise of Curie’s argument must be an absence of
motion. But even that is not enough. Suppose that there are no charges at all —
that is, consider the vacuum. Maxwell’s equations by themselves do not guarantee
that an electric field will share the symmetries of the vacuum. On the contrary, there
are plane wave solutions to the vacuum Maxwell equations in which the electric field
propagates in any direction that one likes (Figure 2).
Figure 2. The vacuum has no charge or current, but is compatible
with an electromagnetic plane wave propagating in any direction.
Getting Curie’s example to work thus takes a little bit of care. In the next section,
I’ll explain how this can be done. If taken truly literally, Curie’s hazard is simply
wrong: the symmetries of a charge distribution are not necessarily symmetries of the
electric field. However, if one presumes a certain amount of special physical facts
about particular electromagnetic fields, then there are versions of Curie’s hazard that
are actually true.
l’autre, comme les armatures d’un condensateur a` air. Conside´rons entre les deux plateaux un point
de l’axe commun, nous voyons que cet axe est un axe d’isotropie et que tout plan passant par cet
axe est un plan de syme´trie. Les e´le´ments de syme´trie des cause doivent se retrouver dans les effets
produits; donc le champ e´lectrique est compatible avec la syme´trie” (Curie 1894, pg. 404).
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3. A symmetry theorem
Curie’s hazard on electromagnetism can be made true given appropriate back-
ground assumptions. Let me begin with an informal discussion of the physics under-
lying Curie’s argument, before turning to the more precise formulation of a symmetry
principle for electromagnetism along these lines.
3.1. Physics of Curie’s example. Curie’s two-plate example can be characterized
by the following facts.
(1) Gauss’ Law. Electric fields are related to charge distributions by ∇ · E = ρ.
(2) Electrostatics. When there is no change in magnetic field, the electric field is
roughly curl-free: ∇× E = 0.
(3) Central field. The electric field “goes to zero” sufficiently quickly outside of
some region, in a sense to be made precise in the next subsection.
These three statements express a divergence and a curl for a vector field that is
subject to some appropriate boundary conditions. Given all this, it turns out that
Curie’s hazard about electric fields holds too. This result stems from two facts; I
discuss their proof in the next subsection.
First, it turns out that all of the above relations are preserved by rotations. In
particular we have (using E′ and ρ′ to represent the rotated field and charges),
(a) Rotations preserve Gauss’ law. ∇ · E′ = ρ′
(b) Rotations preserve electrostatics. ∇× E′ = 0
(c) Rotations preserve centrality. E′ = 0 on the boundary of and everywhere
outside some region.
This kind of reservation does not hold of arbitrary smooth transformation, but does of
rotations. We will see shortly that this stems from the fact that a rotation preserves
the metric.
Second, an elementary result of vector analysis4 shows that every central field v
is uniquely determined by its divergence (∇ · v) and its curl (∇ × v). That is, if
two such vector fields v and v′ subject to these boundary conditions have the same
divergence and curl, then v = v′.
These two facts allow one to say why Curie’s hazard works in the example of the
two plates. Suppose we have a charge distribution that is invariant under rotations:
ρ′ = ρ.
4This result is a corollary of what is often called the Helmholtz-Hodge decomposition theorem.
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Then by our first observation, the electric field E and its rotated counterpart E ′ have
the same divergence and curl:
∇ · E = ρ = ρ′ = ∇ · E ′
∇× E = 0 = ∇× E ′.
But the divergence and curl uniquely determine a vector field under these conditions,
so E ′ = E. In other words, when the conditions (1)-(3) are satisfied, then a charge
distribution ρ is invariant under rotations only if the electric field E is too, and Curie’s
hazard is correct.
3.2. As a general theorem. The argument above can be stated in more general
and rigorous terms as follows. Let M be a smooth manifold, and let gab be a metric,
assumed here to be a smooth symmetric invertible tensor field with inverse gab; I
use Penrose abstract index notation for raising and lowering indices. Let ∇ be the
derivative operator compatible with gab in the sense that∇agbc = 0. A diffeomorphism
ϕ :M → is called an isometry if ϕ∗gab = gab, and is the natural notion of a symmetry
in this context.
We begin by collecting two facts about the derivative operator ∇; the proofs are
included in an appendix. The first is that isometries “preserve” the derivative oper-
ator:
Proposition 1. If ϕ :M →M is an isometry and λbc
d
an arbitrary tensor field, then
ϕ∗(∇aλ
bc
d
) = ∇aϕ∗λ
bc
d
.
The second fact expresses the sense in which the divergence and the curl uniquely
determine a vector field. I will state a geometric version of the standard result, which
applies in many more geometries beyond the standard Euclidean metric on R3. To
state this fact, we’ll first need a general formulation of the divergence and curl of a
vector ξa on a 3-dimensional manifold (a 3-manifold) M with volume element5 ǫabc:
div(ξ) = ∇aξ
a
curl(ξ) = (∇× ξ)c = ǫabc∇aξb.
A few more definitions are needed. A metric gab on M is called positive definite if
ξaξa ≥ 0, in which case (M, gab) is called a Riemannian manifold. Finally, we define
what we mean for a vector field to be a “Central Field”:
(Central Field) Ea = 0 on the boundary and outside of a region R.
5A volume element for an n-dimensional Riemannian manifold (M, gab) is a smooth n-form that
satisfies ǫa1...anǫa1...an = n!. A manifold is oriented if it admits a volume element.
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This formulation is slightly stronger than is necessary. In particular, central fields
can be formulated for regions without boundary, such as R3, a version of our next
Proposition still holds so long as the fields go to zero quickly enough (see e.g. Arfken
1985, §1.15). But this minor generalisation is considerably more complicated to state
and prove, and the following result is sufficient for our purposes.
Proposition 2. Let (M, gab) be an oriented simply-connected 3-dimensional Rie-
mannian manifold, and let ξa and χb be two vector fields that each satisfy the Central
Field assumption with respect to some (possibly different) region. If div(ξ) = div(χ)
and curl(ξ) = curl(χ), then ξa = χa.
With these two facts in place, we can now finally state a theorem that captures some
general conditions under which Curie’s hazardous conjecture is true. The slightly
stronger-than-necessary “Central Field” assumption will be adopted here too, as it is
simpler and sufficient for our needs.
Theorem. Let ρ be a scalar field, Ea a vector field, and let ϕ :M →M be an isometry
on an oriented simply-connected 3-dimensional Riemannian manifold (M, gab). If,
(1) (Gauss’ law) ρ = ∇aE
a
(2) (Electrostatics) (∇× E)a = 0
(3) (Central Field) Ea = 0 on the boundary and outside of a region R
then ϕ∗ρ = ρ (symmetric cause) only if ϕ∗E
a = Ea (symmetric effect).
Proof. Let ϕ∗ρ = ρ. By Gauss’ law,
∇aE
a = ρ = ϕ∗ρ = ϕ∗(∇aE
a) = ∇aϕ∗E
a,
where the last equalty is an application of Proposition 1. Thus, Ea and ϕ∗E
a have
the same divergence. Moreover, by the assumption of electrostatics,
(∇× E)a = 0 = ϕ∗0 = ϕ∗(∇× E)
a.
Applying the definition of the curl to the right hand side now gives us,
(∇× E)a = ϕ∗ǫ
bca∇bEc = ±ǫ
bcaϕ∗∇bEc = ±ǫ
bca∇bϕ∗Ec
= ±(∇× ϕ∗E)
a.
where the second equality applies the fact that isometries preserve volume elements
up to a sign6. But (∇×E)a = 0, so this implies that Ea and ϕ∗E
a have the same curl.
Moreover, since Ea is a Central Field with respect to the regions Ri, so is ϕ∗E
a with
6Since isometries preserves the metric, (ϕ∗ǫ
bca)(ϕ∗ǫbca) = ǫ
bcaǫbca = ±n!. Thus, ϕ∗ǫ
bca is a
volume element too. But ǫbca and −ǫbca are the unique volume elements, so ϕ∗ǫ
bca = ±ǫbca.
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respect to the regions ϕ(Ri). Therefore, the premises of Proposition 2 are satisfied,
and it follows that Ea = ϕ∗E
a. 
What I would like to emphasize about this result is that even for Curie’s own
example, the truth of Curie’s hazard depends on a significant amount of background
structure. It is not an a priori fact about causes and effects. Indeed, the argument
does not go through in the more general context of pseudo-Riemannian manifolds, as
are adopted in general relativity, except when restricted to a spacelike hypersurface
where the metric gab becomes positive definite. In particular, the proof of Proposition
2 makes crucial use of the non-degenerate metric available in Riemannian manifolds.
I do not know if this theorem can be generalized to the pseudo-Riemannian case, but
if it can, then it would likely be established by a rather different argument.
3.3. General electromagnetic fields. Curie’s hazard fares worse when applied to
general electromagnetic fields in spacetime. The natural analogue of Curie’s statement
for electrostatics simply fails when translated into this language.
Electromagnetism is naturally formulated on a smooth manifold M with with a
metric gab that is symmetric and invertible, but not necessarily non-degenerate. Such
a pair (M, gab) is called a pseudo-Riemannian manifold. To do electromagnetism, we
assume the existence of a vector field Ja representing charge-current density, and an
anti-symmetric tensor field Fab representing the electromagnetic field, which satisfy
Maxwell’s equations7:
∇[aFbc] = 0
∇aF
ab = J b.
(1)
These general equations reduce in certain contexts to the usual Maxwell equations
(for an overview see Malament 2012, §2.6).
What is Curie’s hazard in this context? If we take the cause to be the charge-
current Ja (instead of just the charge ρ) and take the effect to be the electromagnetic
field Fab (instead of just the electric field E
a), then Curie’s statement would be that
a symmetry of the charge-current Ja is a symmetry of the electromagnetic field Fab.
That statement is false.
The problem is that the charge-current Ja does not uniquely determine an electro-
magnetic field Fab up to isometry without further specification. This makes it possible
to find explicit counter-examples to Curie’s hazard, such as the following.
7In fact, an even more general formulation is available in terms of the Hodge star operator (for
an overview see Baez and Muniain 1994, §1.5), although this will not concern us here.
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Counterexample. Let Fab, J
a be a solution to Maxwell’s equations, and let ϕ :
M →M be an isometry that does not preserve Fab,
ϕ∗Fab − Fab = Hab 6= 0,
but such that Hab is divergence-free, ∇aH
ab = 0. For example, this occurs when Fab
is the field for a plane wave (as in Figure 2) and ϕ is a rotation; then ∇aF
ab = 0 and
so ∇aH
ab = 0, but Hab 6= 0. Since diffeomorphisms preserve the zero vector, this
implies,
ϕ∗J
b = 0 = J b.
Thus, if J b is the “cause” and Fab the “effect,” then a symmetry of the cause fails to
be a symmetry of the effect. Without specifying some initial and boundary conditions
such as those considered in the previous subsection, a symmetry of J b need not be a
symmetry of Fab.
A persistent believer in Curie might still draw a more optimistic conclusion. It is
easy to see that the converse expression of Curie’s claim is true. Suppose we consider
Fab to be the “cause” and J
b the “effect”, and let ϕ∗Fab = Fab. Then applying
Proposition 1 we have,
ϕ∗J
b = ϕ∗(∇aF
ab) = ∇aϕ∗F
ab = ∇aF
abs = J b.
So, every symmetry of the electromagnetic field Fab is a symmetry of the charge-
current field Ja. One could conclude from this that Curie simply mistook cause for
effect: the appropriate cause in this example is the electromagnetic field Fab, and the
appropriate effect the charge-density current Ja. I do not know what would justify
this kind of conclusion; on the contrary, the argument of Norton (2014) suggests it
would be little more than dubious causal metaphysics.
Another possible route is to adopt initial and boundary conditions that guarantee
Ja will determine a unique electromagnetic field Fab. This is not so easy to do. Wald
(1984, Chapter 10, Problem 2) points out some (fairly restrictive) circumstances under
which Fab is unique, by demanding that J
a = 0, and also that the values of the electric
and magnetic fields be on a Cauchy surface. Under these circumstances, one has for
any isometry ϕ :M →M that ϕ∗J
a = Ja = 0, and so,
∇aϕ∗F
ab = ϕ∗∇aF
ab = ϕ∗J
b = 0 = J b = ∇aF
ab.
Thus, since Fab is the unique field satisfying Maxwell’s equations under these circum-
stances, it follows that ϕ∗Fab = Fab for all isometries. In other words, Curie’s hazard
is made true, in that a symmetry of Ja is a symmetry of Fab, in the restrictive circum-
stances of Ja = 0 when there is a complete absence of charge-current in spacetime.
Chicago, IL -727-
Curie’s hazard: From electromagnetism to symmetry violation 9
But this is only possible in the presence of this or some similar initial and boundary
conditions that render Fab unique.
The point I would like to make about all this is not that Curie’s hazard is totally
misguided, but rather that very specific structures must be in place for it to be true.
Without a number of particular background facts, Curie’s hazard can fail, even in his
own example of electromagnetism.
4. From electromagnetism to symmetry violation
In this section, I will identify a sense in which the failure of Curie’s hazard can
provide evidence of symmetry violation. In fact, its failure provides an indicator
of symmetry violation in some of the most famous historical examples of symmetry
violation: the parity violation detected by Chien-Shung Wu in 1956, and the CP-
violation detected by Val Cronin and James Fitch in 1964. I will also now turn to
the statement that philosophers and physicists have more commonly come to call
“Curie’s principle.”
4.1. Curie’s principle in skeletal form. The statement known as “Curie’s prin-
ciple” can be cast in an incredibly general form. Here is how to get there from the
example of electromagnetism. Under very particular circumstances, a symmetry of
the charge-current distribution is also a symmetry of the electromagnetic field. For
Curie’s two-plate capacitor, we have seen that sufficient circumstances are the elec-
trostatics of central fields: (1) Gauss’ law, (2) Electrostatics, and (3) Central Field.
Let me now summarise these properties as the statement that the relation between
cause and effect is “symmetry preserving,” formulated as follows.
Proposition 3 (Curie Principle). Let C and E be two sets, and let σc : C → C and
σe : E → E be two bijections. If D : C → E is a mapping such that,
(symmetry preservation) Dσ−1
c
x = σ−1
e
Dx for all x ∈ C,
then σcx = x (symmetric cause) only if σeDx = Dx (symmetric effect). If D is a
bijection, then σcx = x if and only if σeDx = Dx.
Proof. If σcx = x, then σeDx = σeD(σ
−1
c
x) = σe(σ
−1
e
D)x = Dx. If D is a bijection
then it has an inverse, so σeDx = Dx only if x = (D
−1σ−1
e
D)x = D−1(Dσ−1
c
)x = σ−1
c
x
and hence σcx = x. 
The ‘σ’s are to be interpreted as “the same” symmetry8, such as a fixed rotation
(or whatever), applied to each of the sets C and E. The ‘D’ mapping captures a sense
8One may wish to cash this out as Norton (2014) does in terms of an isomorphism that carries σc
to σe. Or (as is now fashionable) one may interpret this as meaning that C and E are two categories
related by a functor F with σc a morphism of C and σe a morphism of E satisfying F(σc) = σe. The
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in which “causes determine effects.” Note that this formulation explicitly excludes
“time reversing” symmetries like T and CPT , since they are typically expressed as
mappings between causes and effects9.
Proposition 3 is similar to some existing formulations of Curie’s principle10. One
sense in which it differs slightly is that it does not presume causes uniquely determine
effects. When they do not, then the converse statement need not be true, that a
symmetry of an effect is necessarily a symmetry of the cause. Elena Castellani11 has
emphasized out that Curie himself viewed his principle as asymmetric:
In practice, the converse... [of Curie’s hazards] are not true, i.e., the
effects can be more symmetric than their causes. Certain causes of
asymmetry might have no effect on certain phenomena (Curie 1894)12
Proposition 3 captures this asymmetry: if causes do not bijectively determine effects,
then the converse of Curie’s hazard is not guaranteed. However, if a cause does (bi-
jectively) determine a unique effect that satisfies symmetry preservation, then Curie’s
hazard is true in both directions.
The bare-bones construal of Curie’s principle of Proposition 3 can be applied in all
kinds of ways. Here are a few, limited only by the imagination.
Example 1 (Electromagnetism). We have already seen the example in which C
be is the set charge distributions, and E the set of electric fields on a Riemannian
manifold. Here is another way to look at it (which is essentially just the proof of the
theorem). Given conditions (1)-(3), Proposition 2 provides a mapping D : ρ 7→ Ea
that determines a unique Ea for each ρ. Proposition 1 then implies13 that Dϕ∗ = ϕ∗D
for any isometry ϕ. Therefore, given (1)-(3), a symmetry of the charge distribution
ϕ∗ρ = ρ is also a symmetry of the electric field ϕ∗E
a = Ea.
Example 2 (General Relativity). Let C and E both refer to the set of symmetric 2-
place tensor fields on a relativistic spacetime (M, gab), thinking of an element Tab ∈ C
as energy-momentum and an element Gab ∈ E is the Einstein tensor. Let D : Tab 7→
difficulty is that “spurious” identifications of symmetries may still occur, as identified by Norton
(2014, fn.4).
9This is required in order to get a true principle; for time-reversing symmetries, Curie’s principle
badly fails (Roberts 2013a).
10C.f. Ismael (1997), Belot (2003), Earman (2004, pg.175-176), Mittelstaedt and Weingartner
(2005, pg.231), Ashtekar (2014) and Norton (2014).
11Personal communication.
12Translation from Brading and Castellani (2003, pg.312).
13Namely, Proposition 1 implies that if ρ = ∇aE
a (and hence that Dρ = Ea), then ϕ∗ρ =
ϕ∗∇aE
a = ∇aϕ
∗Ea, and thus Dϕ∗ρ = ϕ∗Ea = ϕ∗Dρ.
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Gab =
8piG
c4
Tab be the map determined by Einstein’s equation. The symmetries of C
and E are determined by an underlying diffeomorphism ϕ :M →M , and identifying
σc = σe = ϕ∗ we trivially find that Dσc = σ
−1
e
D.
Example 3 (Particle Physics). Let C = Hin and E = Hout be identical copies of a
Hilbert space H representing the in-states and out-states of a scattering experiment.
LetD = S : ψin 7→ ψout be the scattering matrix. Then the condition that a symmetry
σ (a unitary operator) satisfy Dσin = σ
−1
outD just amounts to the condition that it
commute with the scattering matrix. When this condition obtains, there is a sense
in which Curie’s hazard is true, that a symmetry of causes (viewed as an “in” state)
gives rise to a symmetry of an effect (viewed as an “out” state).
It is this last example that is significant for the history of symmetry violation, to
which we will now turn.
4.2. Curie’s failure implies symmetry violation. When S is a scattering matrix,
Proposition 3 says that Curie’s hazard holds for a symmetry σ if and only if the
S-matrix is “invariant” under that symmetry. For a long time it was presumed
that the laws of nature must be invariant under symmetries like parity (P ) and
the combination of charge conjugation and parity (CP ). However, in the mid-20th
century this presumption was dramatically disproven, when first parity invariance
and then CP invariance were both found to be violated in weak interactions.
The significance of Curie’s principle for those discoveries can be seen by casting
Proposition 3 in the equivalent “contrapositive” form: if Curie’s hazard fails, in that
either σc(x) = x and σe(Dx) 6= Dx or else σe(Dx) = Dx and σc(x) 6= x, then we
have a case of symmetry violation: Dσ−1
c
6= σ−1
e
D. Applying this principle to particle
decays is a little subtle, but not much. That application is stated and proved in
Roberts (2013b, Fact 2) as follows.
Proposition 4 (Scattering Curie). Let S be a scattering matrix, and R : H → H
be a unitary bijection. If there exists a decay channel ψin → ψout, i.e. a non-zero
amplitude 〈ψout, Sψin〉, such that either,
(1) (in but not out) Rψin = ψin but Rψout = −ψout, or
(2) (out but not in) Rψout = ψout but Rψin = −ψin,
then,
(3) RS 6= SR.
This principle is precisely what was used in the very first revelations that the laws
of nature are symmetry violating. For example, parity — the “mirror” transformation
that reverses total orientation (or “handedness”) of a system — has been long known
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Figure 3. The P -violating interaction suggested by Lee and Yang.
to preserve the two-pion state π+π0, but reverse the phase of the three-pion state
π+π+π−:
Pπ+π0 = π+π0
Pπ+π+π− = −π+π+π−.
The originating particle state for the first was originally called τ and the second
θ. Both appeared in the interactions of charged strange mesons, and both were soon
found to have a very similar lifetime and rest mass. The famous question thus arose:
might these be the very same particle? This was known as the θ − τ puzzle. Here
is where Curie’s principle appears: if θ and τ are the same, then parity symmetry is
violated by Proposition 4. For whether or not parity preserves the originating particle
state, it would still sometimes decay into a state with different parity, as in Figure 3.
This led Lee and Yang to suggest:
One might even say that the present θ − τ puzzle may be taken as
indication that parity conservation is violated in weak interactions.
This argument is, however, not to be taken seriously because of the
paucity of our present knowledge concerning the nature of the strange
particles. (Lee and Yang 1956, pg.254).
Their hesitant suggestion was famously vindicated experimentally by Chien-Shiung
Wu and her collaborators that same year, in an elegant experiment that was quickly
repeated14.
Curie’s principle was even more directly applied in the discovery of CP -violation
a few years later. A number of simple theoretical models had arisen in which the
observed parity-violation was explained in a way that required CP -invariance. This
requirement thus was tested by James Cronin and Val Fitch at Brookhaven, by ob-
serving a beam of neutralK-mesons or kaons. They began with a “long-lived” neutral
kaon stateKL, which was known to have its phase reversed by the CP transformation;
14Confirming results were reported by Wu et al. (1957) and by Garwin et al. (1957).
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Figure 4. The CP -violating interaction discovered by Cronin and Fitch.
the two-pion state π+π−, on the other hand, was preserved by parity:
CPKL = −KL
CPπ+π− = π+π−.
In a small but unmistakable number of decays, Cronin and Fitch found15 the KL
state to decay into π+π−, as in Figure as in Figure 4. Again Curie’s principle appears
in the form of Proposition 4, which implies that, contrary to what the early models
suggested, CP symmetry is violated.
These were two of the most important experimental discoveries of 20th century
physics. Nobel prizes were awarded for each. And both were crucially underpinned
by Curie’s principle. In this sense, Curie was not mistaken when he suggested that
”there is interest in introducing into the study of physical phenomena the symmetry
arguments familiar to crystallographers” (Curie 1894)16.
4.3. Norton on Curie’s Truism. Norton (2014) has convincingly argued that the
only true formulation of Curie’s principle that does not invoke dubious causal meta-
physics is a near-tautology. Namely, suppose one presumes that,
Determination respects symmetries: Causes admitting symmetries are
mapped to effects that admit those same symmetries.
Then Curie’s claim that symmetries of the causes are symmetries of the effects is
obviously true. Norton refers to this as “Curie’s Lemma,” pointing out:
“there is little substance to it. It is a tautology implementing as an
easy modus ponens ‘A, if A then B; therefore B.’ That simplicity does
make precise the sense that the principle somehow has to be true.”
(Norton 2014, pg.6)
Let me add two comments about the little bit of substance that the truism retains,
in light of what we have discussed so far.
First, establishing the truth of the premise that “Determination respects symme-
tries” may by itself amount to a deep result. It is analogous to the “symmetry
15The discovery was reported in Christenson et al. (1964).
16Translation from Brading and Castellani (2003, pg.311).
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preservation” premise in my formulation of Curie’s principle in Proposition 3, which
says that given a mapping D : C → E between sets and a symmetry represented by,
(symmetry preservation) Dσ−1
c
x = σ−1
e
Dx for all x ∈ C.
This may be far from obvious for a given choice of causes C, effects E, and a determi-
nation relationD. The theorem formulated in section on electromagnetism establishes
it for central fields in electrostatics, which is established by premises (1)-(3). But al-
though the proof itself is straightforward, it does rely on some facts such as Stokes’
theorem and the uniqueness of a compatible derivative operator that are not exactly
trivial (details can be found in the Appendix).
Second, statements of the truism may have empirical significance that is non-trivial.
We have seen that the discoveries of parity violation and of CP violation both involved
the existence of decay modes in scattering experiments that have different symmetries
from the originating states. Curie’s principle establishes that such an observation is
enough to tell us something interest that the laws of nature, in that there exist
possible trajectories whose symmetry-transformed counterparts are not possible. In
particular, the unitary evolutions corresponding to the S matrix for a weak interaction
are symmetry-violating.
Curie’s principle is of course still a pretty insubstantial statement in this context,
in that it is still a simple fact about mappings between sets as in Proposition 3. How-
ever, this lack of substance is also a strength: the piddling amount of mathematical
structure in Curie’s principle assures that it is very robust. Thus, using Curie’s prin-
ciple to establish that the laws of nature are symmetry-violating provides evidence
that is extremely resilient to theory change, even as new mathematical structures
come and go17.
5. Conclusion
Curie managed to hazard a conjecture that is of interest both when it is true and
when it is false. The original hazard requires very special circumstances in order to be
true. We have verified mathematically that one such circumstance is that of Curie’s
example, when one restricts attention to the electrostatics of central fields. However,
its formulation as a general statement about electromagnetic currents and fields is
false.
When we draw out the special circumstances under which Curie’s hazard holds,
we find a skeletal but true proposition about sets. This proposition captures what
many philosophers of science have in mind when referring to “Curie’s principle.”
Although so bare as to be nearly a triviality, formulating Curie’s principle in this
17See Ashtekar (2014) for a more elaborate argument on this point.
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way allows one to identify it among the arguments for the great symmetry-violating
experiments of the mid-20th century. Viewed from this perspective, Curie’s principle
is indeed a simple and true statement, which managed to become one of the very
fruitful symmetry principles of modern physics.
Appendix
Definitions. Let M and M˜ be smooth manifolds, each with a metric gab and g˜ab, as-
sumed here to be smooth symmetric invertible tensor fields, which are non-degenerate
but not necessarily positive-definite. I adopt Penrose’s abstract index notation for
this discussion.
A derivative operator ∇ (or a ‘covariant derivative’ or a ‘connection’) maps an index
a and an arbitrary tensor like λbc
d
to another tensor, written ∇ : (a, λbc
d
) 7→ ∇aλ
bc
d
.
It is defined by the following properties, which we adopt following Malament (2012,
§1.7).
(1) ∇ commutes with addition, index substitution and contraction on tensor fields.
(2) ∇ satisfies the Leibniz rule with respect to tensor multiplication.
(3) If ξa is a vector field and α a scalar field, then ξa∇aα = ξ(α). That is, ξ
a∇aα
is the “directional derivative” that ξ assigns to α.
(4) ∇ is torsion-free, in that if α is a scalar field, then ∇a∇bα = ∇b∇aα.
Let ∇ be a derivative operator on M , and suppose that it is compatible with the
metric gab in that ∇agbc = 0. Let ∇˜ similarly be a derivative operator on M˜ satisfying
∇˜ag˜bc = 0. I will write ϕ : M → M˜ to indicate a diffeomorphism, with pushforward
ϕ∗ and pullback ϕ
∗.
Preserving derivatives. As a simple example, consider first the case of the deriva-
tive of a scalar field, ∇aα. Every diffeomorphism ϕ “preserves” covariant derivatives
of a scalar field, in that,
(2) ϕ∗(∇aα) = ∇˜aϕ∗α.
This statement can be quickly verified: if α is any scalar field at p ∈M and ξ˜a is any
vector at ϕ(p) ∈ M˜ , then,
ξ˜aϕ∗(∇aα) = (ϕ
∗ξ˜a)(∇aα) = (ϕ
∗ξ˜)(α) = ξ˜(α ◦ ϕ−1) = ξ˜a∇˜aϕ∗α.
Equation 2 does not always hold when α is replaced with an arbitrary tensor. How-
ever, it does when we further restrict ϕ to be an isometry — and in fact for a slightly
weaker condition. It is established by the following.
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Lemma 1. Let ϕ :M → M˜ be a diffeomorphism. Then the equality,
ϕ∗(∇aλ
bc
d
) = ∇˜aϕ∗λ
bc
d
holds for an arbitrary tensor field like λbc
d
if and only if ∇˜aϕ∗gab = 0, where gab is the
metric compatible with ∇. In particular the equality holds if ϕ is an isometry.
Proof. The ‘only if’ direction is trivial, since if the above equality holds for all tensors,
then in particular,
∇˜aϕ∗gbc = ϕ∗(∇agbc) = ϕ∗0 = 0,
where the penultimate equality applies compatibility, and the final equality the fact
that ϕ∗0 = ϕ∗(0+ 0) = ϕ∗0+ ϕ∗0.
For the ‘if’ direction, consider the mapping ∇ˆ defined by,
∇ˆ : (a, λbc
d
) 7→ ϕ∗(∇˜aϕ∗λ
bc
d
).
where a is an index. The first step is to show that this mapping is a derivative
operator. It obviously commutes with addition, index substitution and contraction
because all three maps do (ϕ∗, ϕ
∗ and ∇˜a). It is also easy to check that it satisfies
the Leibniz rule and the torsion-freeness condition. Moreover, for all vectors ξn and
all scalar fields α, ∇ˆ satisfies the condition that,
ξa∇ˆaα = ξ
aϕ∗(∇aϕ∗α) = ξ
a∇aϕ
∗ϕ∗α = ξ
a∇aα = ξ(α),
where the second equality is an application of Equation 2. Therefore ∇ˆ is a derivative
operator. Note that this argument required only that ϕ be a diffeomorphism.
The second step is to observe that ∇ˆ is compatible with the metric:
∇ˆagbc = ϕ
∗∇˜a(ϕ∗gbc) = ϕ
∗0 = 0,
where the second equality applies our assumption. Compatibility holds in particular
when ϕ is an isometry, since then ∇˜a(ϕ∗gbc) = ∇˜a(g˜bc) = 0.
Finally, we use the fact that there is a unique derivative operator compatible with
a given metric (Malament 2012, Prop. 1.9.2). So, ∇ˆ and ∇ are the same. Therefore,
∇aλ
bc
d
= ∇ˆaλ
bc
d
= ϕ∗(∇˜aϕ∗λ
bc
d
)
Pushing-forward the left and right sides with ϕ∗, we thus have that,
ϕ∗(∇aλ
bc
d
) = ∇˜aϕ∗λ
bc
d
.

As a special case of this lemma we have Proposition 1 from page 5.
Proposition 1. If ϕ :M →M is an isometry and λbc
d
an arbitrary tensor field, then
ϕ∗(∇aλ
bc
d
) = ∇aϕ∗λ
bc
d
.
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Non-isometries. An example of a non-isometry that preserves covariant derivatives
is any ‘constant’ conformal transformation, i.e. a conformal transformation ϕ∗gab =
Ω2g˜ab for which the conformal factor Ω is a constant scalar field, ∇aΩ = 0. Then,
∇˜aϕ∗gab = ∇˜a(Ω
2g˜ab) = Ω
2∇˜agab = 0.
Since the premises of the proposition are satisfied, this transformation ϕ preserves
covariant derivatives.
However, these are the only conformal transformations that preserve covariant
derivatives. If Ω is any conformal factor with non-zero covariant derivative, then
applying the chain rule we have,
∇˜aϕ∗gab = ∇˜aΩ
2gab = gab∇˜a(Ω
2) + Ω2 ∇˜g˜ab︸︷︷︸
=0
= 2Ωg˜ab∇˜aΩ 6= 0.
So, conformal transformations do not in general preserve covariant derivatives.
Proposition 2. Let (M, gab) be an oriented simply-connected 3-dimensional Rie-
mannian manifold, and let ξa and χb be two vector fields that each satisfy the Central
Field assumption with respect to some (possibly different) region. If div(ξ) = div(χ)
and curl(ξ) = curl(χ), then ξa = χa.
Proof. Let λa = ξa−χa. We will show that λa = 0. By the linearity of the divergence
and curl we have,
div(λ) = div(ξ)− div(χ) = 0,
curl(λ) = curl(ξ)− curl(χ) = 0.
A vanishing curl curl(λ) = ǫabc∇aλb is only possible if ∇[aλb] = 0, i.e. if λb is closed
18.
But a closed covector on a simply connected manifold is exact, meaning that it may
be expressed as a gradient,
λa = ∇aφ
for some scalar field φ (Malament 2012, Prop. 1.8.3).
Now, we have assumed that ξa vanishes on the boundary and outside of some region
R1, and χ
a similarly for some region R2. Both ξ
a and χa thus vanish on the boundary
and outside of the combined region R = R1 ∪R2, and therefore so does λ
a = ξa−χa.
That is, λa is a central field with respect to the region R. We thus have,
(3)
∫
R
λaλ
a =
∫
R
(∇aφ)(∇
aφ) =
∫
R
∇a(φ∇
aφ) =
∫
∂R
ηaφ∇
aφ =
∫
∂R
ηaφλ
a = 0,
18An antisymmetric tensor ξ[a∇bλc] can always be written in terms of the volume element as
ξ[a∇bλc] = kǫabcǫ
defξ[d∇eλf ] for some constant k (Malament 2012, §1.11). And a vanishing curl
implies kǫabcǫ
defξd∇eλf = 0 for any arbitrary vector ξ
d. But then the total antisymmetry of ǫabc
implies that 0 = kǫabcǫ
defξ[d∇eλf ] = ξ[d∇eλf ]. Since ξ
d was arbitrary, this requires ∇[eλf ] = 0.
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where second equality follows from the chain rule and the fact that ∇a∇
aφ = ∇aλ
a =
0; the third equality applies Stokes’ theorem (Wald 1984, Appendix B, B.2.26); and
the last equality applies the assumption that ∇aφ = λa = 0 on the boundary ∂R.
Finally, gab is assumed to be positive definite. Thus, λ
aλa is strictly non-negative,
so Equation 3 is only possible if λa = 0. 
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Is de Broglie-Bohm Theory Specially
Equipped to Recover Classical Behavior?
Joshua Rosaler
Abstract
Supporters of the de Broglie-Bohm (dBB) interpretation of quantum the-
ory argue that because the theory, like classical mechanics, concerns the mo-
tions of point particles in 3D space, it is specially suited to recover classical
behavior. I offer a novel account of classicality in dBB theory, if only to
show that such an account falls out almost trivially from results developed
in the context of decoherence theory. I then argue that this undermines any
special claim that dBB theory is purported to have on the unification of the
quantum and classical realms.
1 Introduction
Several advocates of the de Broglie-Bohm (dBB) interpretation of quantum
theory hold that because, like classical mechanics, it concerns the motions of
point particles in 3D space, it is specially suited to recover classical behavior.
1 2 They note that in dBB theory, we can ask simply: under what circum-
stances do the additional particle configurations posited by the theory follow
approximately Newtonian trajectories? Moreover, the equations of motion
for the additional “hidden” variables in dBB theory take the form of classical
equations of motion, but with an additional “quantum potential” or “quan-
tum force” term that produces deviations of the trajectories from classicality.
On this basis, a number of authors have suggested that dBB theory furnishes
special tools to recover classical behavior that other interpretations do not,
via the requirement that the quantum potential or force be negligibly small
(Allori et al., 2002), (Bohm and Hiley, 1995).
1By“classical,” I mean having sharply defined values for properties such as position
and momentum and conforming approximately to Newtonian equations of motion.
2For brevity, I refer to the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum theory as “dBB
theory.”
1
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Here, I provide an alternative to existing accounts of classicality in dBB
theory, if only to show that such an account falls out almost trivially from
results developed outside the context of dBB theory, in the literature on deco-
herence. Formal tools specific to dBB theory, such as the quantum potential
or quantum force, turn out to be neither necessary nor helpful to the anal-
ysis. Here, I regard decoherence theory as an interpretation-neutral body of
results that follow when both a system and its environment (including any
observers, measuring apparati, and residual microscopic degrees of freedom)
are modeled as a closed system that always obeys the unitary Schrodinger
evolution. On my account of classicality in dBB theory, the Bohmian con-
figuration evolves classically only because it succeeds in tracking one among
the many branches of the total quantum state defined by decoherence, and
the approximate classicality of such a branch in turn is a consequence of the
unitary Schrodinger evolution, on which dBB theory has no special claim.
Since the dBB account of classicality is entirely parasitic on the branch-
ing structure defined by decoherence, the claim that dBB theory is uniquely
suited to recover classical behavior must already presuppose what is at is-
sue in debates about the interpretation of quantum mechanics: namely, that
it provides the one true account of how one among the many potentiali-
ties/branches contained in a decohered quantum superposition gets selected
as “the outcome” (necessarily, in accordance with Born Rule). Insofar as
other interpretations furnish viable resolutions to this issue, they should be
able to make similar use of decoherence-based results to recover classical be-
havior on their own terms. For example, (Wallace, 2012), Ch. 3 provides a
decoherence-based account of macroscopic classical behavior on the Everett
Interpretation. At most, the fact that dBB theory can recover classical be-
havior on its own terms can be regarded as an internal test of the theory’s
adequacy; it should not be regarded as a point in favor of dBB theory over
other interpretations.
In Section 2, I review the major existing lines of approach to modelling
classical behavior in dBB theory and highlight a number of gaps in these
accounts. In Section 3, I explain the basic mechanism whereby environ-
mental decoherence helps to recover macroscopic classical behavior in dBB
theory. In Section 4, I summarize the analysis of macroscopic classical be-
havior furnished by decoherence theory on the bare formalism of quantum
mechanics (that is, Schrodinger evolution without collapse) . In Section 5,
I show how the dBB account of classical behavior follows straightforwardly
from the decoherence-based analysis of the previous section.
2
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2 Existing Accounts of Classicality in dBB
Theory
Bohm’s theory posits that the state of any closed system is given by a wave
function Ψ(X, t) that always evolves according to the Schrodinger equation
(with the same Hamiltonian as in conventional quantum mechanics), and a
configuration q that evolves according to the equation dq
dt
= ∇S(X,t)|q
m
, where S
is the phase of the wave function; it also posits that, at some initial time t0,
our knowledge of the particle configuration is characterized by the probability
distribution |Ψ(X, t0)|2 (Bohm, 1952a), (Bohm, 1952b). Efforts to model
classical behavior in Bohm’s theory fall into two broad categories: 1) what
I call “quantum potential” approaches, which rely on the vanishing of the
quantum potential and/or force, and in which the Bohmian configuration
occupies center stage; 2) what I call “narrow wave packet” approaches, which
take an analysis of the wave function as their starting point and treat the
Bohmian configuration as being in some sense simply “along for the ride.”
2.1 Quantum Potential Approaches
If one plugs the polar decomposition of the wave function, Ψ(X, t) = R(X, t)ei
S(X,t)
~ ,
into Schrodinger’s equation, one obtains the following relations as the real
and imaginary parts, respectively, of the resulting relation:
∂S
∂t
=
(∇S)2
2M
+ V − ~
2
2M
∇2R
R
(1)
∂R2
∂t
+∇ · (∇S
M
R2) = 0. (2)
The first equation takes the form of the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation,
except for the additional term Q ≡ − ~2
2M
∇2R
R
, known as the “quantum po-
tential.” The second equation takes the form of a continuity equation for the
probability distribution ρ ≡ R2. Together with the evolution equation for
the dBB configuration, dq
dt
= ∇S(X,t)|q
M
, the first of these equations implies that
this configuration obeys the relation,
M
d2q
dt2
= −∇V |q −∇Q|q, (3)
3
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which mathematically resembles Newton’s Second Law, but with an addi-
tional “quantum force” term −∇Q. When ∇Q ≈ 0, q follows an approxi-
mately Newtonian trajectory; some authors have also suggested Q ≈ 0 as a
requirement for classicality, though the sufficiency of this condition for clas-
sicality presupposes implicitly that ∇Q ≈ 0 is also satisfied Many supporters
of dBB theory feel that the quantum potential/force’s being approximately
equal to zero furnishes a simple, transparent condition for classicality, and
moreover, one that is unique to dBB theory. Bohm and Hiley, Holland, and
Allori, Durr, Goldstein and Zanghi are among the authors who offer analyses
of classicality rooted in this supposition (Bohm, 1952a), (Bohm and Hiley,
1995), (Holland, 1995), (Allori et al., 2002), (Durr and Teufel, 2009). Some of
these authors also suggest ways of generalizing this approach to incorporate
environmental decoherence, but do not explain in detail how the conditions
Q ≈ 0, ∇Q ≈ 0 are to be extended to the case where the system is open,
or why this would be useful given that the results (1) and (3) were derived
under the now-abandoned assumption that the system is closed and in a pure
state.
2.2 Narrow Wave Packet Approaches
A second approach that is sometimes adopted in the effort to model classical
behavior in dBB theory makes use of Ehrenfest’s Theorem,
M
d〈Pˆ 〉
dt
= −〈 ∂ˆV
∂X
〉, (4)
which applies generally to wave functions evolving under the Schrodinger
equation with a Hamiltonian of the form Hˆ = Pˆ
2
2M
+ V (Xˆ). The crucial
point in this approach is that for wave packets narrowly peaked in position
(narrowly, that is, relative to some characteristic length scale on which the
potential V changes ), one has approximately that
M
d〈Pˆ 〉
dt
≈ −∂V (〈Xˆ〉〉)
∂〈Xˆ〉 , (5)
which entails that the expectation value of position 〈Xˆ〉 evolves approxi-
mately along a Newtonian trajectory. In dBB theory, the property of equiv-
ariance, whereby the Born Rule probability distribution |Ψ(X, t)|2 is pre-
served by the flow of the configuration variables, ensures that the Bohmian
4
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trajectory will follow the wave packet and therefore traverse the same New-
tonian trajectory as the expectation value 〈Xˆ〉. The primary advocate of
the narrow wave packet approach in the literature has been Bowman, who
has also actively criticized approaches based on the quantum potential and
quantum force (Bowman, 2005). Bowman notes that the narrow wave packet
approach, as applied to isolated systems, does not explain why the state of
S should be a narrow wave packet to begin with; however, he argues, cor-
rectly on my view, that this can be corrected by incorporating environmental
decoherence into the analysis. However, Bowman’s account does not recog-
nize the need, not just for decoherence, but for a special type of decoherence
that ensures disjointness of the branches of the total quantum state in the
combined configuration space of the system and environment. Moreover,
Bowman confines his attention to the reduced dynamics of the open system
whose classicality we seek to model (say, the center of mass of the moon)
and does not consider the structure of the overall pure state of the system
and environment; for reasons that will become clear in the next section, this
restriction obscures the true mechanism whereby the Bohmian configuration
of the system comes to be guided by just one of the narrow wave packets
present in the overall superposition.
3 The Role of the Environment
To illustrate the role of the environment in recovering classicality from dBB
theory, and why it is not sufficient to model a macroscopic system like the
moon’s center of mass as an isolated system, it is instructive to consider a
simple example. Let S be the center of mass of some macroscopic body, and
assume to begin with that the system is always closed and in a pure state.
Let the pure state be a superposition of narrow wave packets with opposite
average momenta, initially separated across a macroscopically large distance
in space; in addition, let the time evolution of the state be such that the
trajectories of the packets - for simplicity, assume they are straight lines and
that the system is free - overlap at some point in S’s configuration space
and then pass through each other (so that the trajectories of the two packets
over time make the shape of an “X”). Then the quantum state at every time
takes the form,
5
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|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
[|q1, p〉+ |q2,−p〉], (6)
where |q, p〉 designates the quantum state of a wave packet simultaneously
peaked about postion q and momentum p (to within the restrictions of the
uncertainty principle) and q1 and q2 change with time in the manner specified.
Assuming the mass M to be macroscopically large, we can neglect spreading
of these wave packets. 3 Now consider an ensemble of initial Bohmian config-
urations associated with this pure state. Those trajectories associated with
initial conditions in the first packet initially will follow the classical straight-
line trajectory of that packet, and likewise for the second packet. However,
Bohmian trajectories of a closed pure-state system cannot cross, so when the
packets overlap in configuration space, trajectories initially associated with
one wave packet will exit the overlap region in the wave packet in which they
did not begin, rather than proceeding in a straight line with their original
wave packet. Thus, the trajectories will exhibit highly non-classical kink as
a consequence of the overlap. In dBB theory, such non-classicalities in the
Bohmian trajectory are a generic consequence of wave packets overlapping
in configuration space, even in cases where the mass M is macroscopically
large (M & 1kg.) and wave packet spreading can be neglected; also, they are
not restricted to the simple case of a free particle discussed here.
Let us now abandon the assumption that the system S is isolated and
allow it to interact with and become entangled with its environment E. Now
it is the combined system SE, rather than S, that is closed and in a pure
state, though it is still S’s classicality that we wish to recover. Let us assume
that at every time the wave function of the closed system SE consisting
of the center of mass and its environment (which may consist of photons,
neutrinos, or other particles of matter) takes the form
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
[|q1, p〉 ⊗ |φ1〉+ |q2,−p〉 ⊗ |φ2〉], (7)
for some states |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 in E’s Hilbert space HE, where |q1, p〉 and
|q2, p〉 follow the same trajectories through S’s configuration space as in the
3Using the formula σ(t) =
√
σ20 + (
~t
Mσ0
)2 for the time dependence of the width of
an initial Gaussian under free evolution, one can show that for a free particle of mass
M ∼ 1kg., the time it takes for a wave packet initially localized on the scale of an Angstrom
to spread to a centimeter is longer than the age of the universe.
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isolated case just considered. Moreover, assume that |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 have
disjoint supports in E’s configuration space QE - that is, that they are “su-
perorthogonal”: 4
〈φ1|y〉〈y|φ2〉 ≈ 0 for all y ∈ QE (8)
where |y〉 is a position (or more accurately, configuration) eigenstate of the
environment. Because of the disjointness of the supports of |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 in
QE, the packets |q1, p〉⊗|φ1〉 and |q2,−p〉⊗|φ2〉 will remain disjoint in the total
configuration space QSE, even when |q1, p〉 and |q2,−p〉 overlap in QS. The
non-overlap condition for Bohmian trajectories applies only to trajectories
in QSE since the state is pure only relative to SE, so the configuration
qSE = (QS, qE) of the whole system will forever remain in one wave packet
or the other - say, the first one. As a consequence, the configuration QS
associated with S always follows the classical trajectory of the wave packet
|q1, p〉 in QS. There is no “kink” as in the isolated case. If E contains on
the order of 1023 microscopic degrees of freedom, as it typically will, we can
expect the relation (8) to hold irreversibly, and for this reason can effectively
ignore the second wave packet since it will have no influence on the motion of
the total configuration. Moreover, the configuration qE of the environment
will be irreversibly correlated to the wave packet |q1, p〉, since it is bound lie
in the support of 〈y|φ1〉 (if qSE had started in the second packet, qE would
instead be in the disjoint region associated with the support of 〈y|φ2〉 and be
correlated with the wave packet |q2,−p〉).
4 Decoherence-Based Models of Classical Be-
havior
In this section, I describe the evolution of the pure state of a closed system
SE consisting of the center of mass S of some macroscopic body and its
environment E, on the assumption that this evolution is always governed
by the Schrodinger equation. This analysis draws most directly from (Joos
4By “support” of a configuration space function, I mean the region of configuration
space in which the function’s value is not negligibly small - so, greater than some arbitrarily
chosen small ǫ. Note that superorthogonality implies orthogonality but is not implied by it;
the term “superorthogonal” can be traced back to (Bohm and Hiley, 1995) and (Maroney,
2005) .
7
Chicago, IL -745-
et al., 2003), Ch.’s 3 and 5, (Hartle, 2011), and (Wallace, 2012), Ch.3. In
the next section, I show that an account of classicality at the level of the
Bohmian configuration follows straightforwardly from this analysis.
The quantum description of the closed system in question takes as its
Hilbert space H = HS ⊗ HE, the tensor product of the Hilbert space HS
associated with the center of mass of the body in question and the Hilbert
space HE associated with the residual microscopic degrees of freedom in the
environment (which includes degrees of freedom both internal and external
to the body in question). The dynamics with respect to this set of variables
are given by a Schrodinger equation of the form
i~
∂|Ψ〉
∂t
=
(
HˆS ⊗ IˆE + IˆS ⊗ HˆE + HˆI
)
|Ψ〉, (9)
where |Ψ〉 ∈ HS ⊗ HE, IˆE is the identity operator on HE, IˆS the identity
operator on HS, and HˆI is an interaction Hamiltonian acting on HS⊗HE. In
the models of interest here, HˆS =
Pˆ 2
2M
+ V (Xˆ), and HˆI is a function of only
of center-of-mass position Xˆ and the positions of environmental particles,
represented collectively by yˆ. At a more coarse-grained level, we can examine
the evolution of the reduced density matrix ρˆS ≡ TrE|Ψ〉〈Ψ| of S. For a
wide variety of models, in which environmental decoherence is significant
but dissipative effects can be ignored, the evolution of ρˆS is governed by the
equation,
i~
∂ρˆS
∂t
=
[
HˆS, ρˆS
]− iΛ[Xˆ, [Xˆ, ρˆS]], (10)
where the first term generates unitary evolution prescribed by HˆS and the
second represents the effect of decoherence from the environment; the sec-
ond term suppresses the off-diagonal elements of 〈X ′|ρˆS|X〉 throughout its
evolution, and Λ is a constant derived from the parameters in the closed
system Hamiltonian in (9) (This is an important special case of the well-
known Caldeira-Leggett equation; for further discussion and derivation of
this equation, see (Joos et al., 2003) and (Schlosshauer, 2008)). From (10),
one can show that M d〈Pˆ 〉
dt
= −〈 ∂ˆV
∂X
〉, where 〈Oˆ〉 ≡ Tr[ρˆSOˆ] for any Hermitian
operator Oˆ on HS; this constitutes a generalization of Ehrenfest’s Theorem
to open, decohering quantum systems (Joos et al., 2003). By analogy with
the case of closed systems, one can show that when the width of the dis-
tribution ρS(X) ≡ 〈X|ρˆS|X〉, known as the ensemble width of S, is narrow
8
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by comparison with the characteristic length scales on which V varies, we
have M d〈Pˆ 〉
dt
≈ −∂V (〈Xˆ〉〉)
∂〈Xˆ〉
, which entails that the expectation value of position
〈Xˆ〉 = TrS(ρˆSXˆ) follows an approximately Newtonian trajectory as long as
the width of the distribution ρS(X), also known as the ensemble width of ρˆS,
remains narrowly peaked relative to the characteristic length scales on which
V varies. The timescales on which the ensemble width of an initially narrow
ρS(X) remains narrowly peaked will depend both on the value of the mass
M and on the strength of chaotic effects in the Hamiltonian HˆS (for further
discussion of the role of chaos in wave packet spreading in open systems, see
(Zurek and Paz, 1995) ).
Let us now consider what constraints this analysis of ρˆS places on the
the evolution of the pure state |Ψ〉 of the total system SE, recalling that
ρˆS ≡ TrE|Ψ〉〈Ψ|. The decoherent or consistent histories formalism will prove
especially useful for this purpose. 5 Consider a partition {Σα} of the classical
phase space associated with the system S such that the cells Σα all have equal
phase space volume. Using this partition, we can define the positive operator-
valued measure (POVM) given by the operators Πˆα ≡
∫
Σα
dz |z〉〈z|, where
z ≡ (q, p) is a notational shorthand for a point in phase space, and |z〉 is
a minimum-uncertainty coherent state centered on the phase space point z.
6 7 If the cells Σα are significantly larger than the volume in phase space
over which coherent states have strong support (i.e., ~), then the operators
Πˆα constitute an approximate PVM since in this case ΠˆαΠˆβ ≈ δαβΠˆα. We
can extend this approximate PVM on HS to an approximate PVM {Pˆα}
on HS ⊗ HE by defining Pˆα = Πˆα ⊗ IˆE. Inserting factors of the identity
IˆSE =
∑
αi
Pˆαi at regular time intervals of the unitary evolution, we can
then write the state evolution at successive time intervals N∆t as follows:
5For an introduction to the decoherent histories formalism, see for example (Gell-Mann
and Hartle, 1993), (Griffiths, 1984), (Halliwell, 1995).
6For my purposes, it is sufficient for the reader to think of a coherent state state simply
as a Gaussian wave packet narrowly peaked both in position and momentum.
7A positive-operator-valued measure (POVM) on H is a set {Πˆα} of positive opera-
tors such that
∑
α Πˆα = Iˆ; recall that an operator Oˆ is positive if it is self-adjoint and
〈Ψ|Oˆ|Ψ〉 ≥ 0 for every |Ψ〉 ∈ H. A projection-valued measure (PVM) {Pˆα} on Hilbert
space H is a POVM such that PˆαPˆβ = δαβPˆα (no summation over repeated indices).
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|Ψ(N∆t)〉 = e− i~ HˆN∆t|Ψ0〉 (11)
= (
∑
αN
PˆαN )e
− i
~
Hˆ∆t(
∑
αN−1
PˆαN−1)...(
∑
α1
Pˆα1)e
− i
~
Hˆ∆t(
∑
α0
Pˆα0)|Ψ0〉 (12)
=
∑
α0,...,αN
Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉 (13)
where the components Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉 are defined by
Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉 ≡ PˆαN e−
i
~
Hˆ∆tPˆαN−1 ...Pˆα1e
− i
~
Hˆ∆tPˆα0 , |Ψ0〉. (14)
The reason for using this particular approximate PVM will be made clear
shortly. Each component Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉, corresponds to a particular “history”
or sequence (Σα0 , ...,ΣαN ) of regions through phase space. Let us examine in
more detail the structure of one of these components. Using the definition
of the operators Pˆαi we can write,
Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉 =
∫
Σi0
...
∫
ΣiN
dz0...dzN |zN〉 ⊗ |φ˜(z0, ..., zN)〉 (15)
=
∫
Σi0
...
∫
ΣiN
dz1...dzN w(z0, ..., zN) |zN〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, ..., zN)〉
(16)
with |φ˜(z0, ..., zN)〉 ≡
∑
i |ei〉〈zN , ei|Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉 ∈ HE for {|ei〉} any basis
of HE, w(z0, ..., zN) ≡
√
〈φ˜(z0, ..., zN)|φ˜(z0, ..., zN)〉, and |φ(z0, ..., zN)〉 ≡
|φ˜(z0,...,zN )〉
w(z0,...,zN )
. As Zurek has shown, the coherent states |z〉 for systems like S
are special in that under fairly generic conditions, they become entangled
with the environment only on much longer timescales than other states in
HS; he calls such states “pointer states” (Zurek et al., 1993). As Wallace
demonstrates in detail in (Wallace, 2012), Ch.3, continuous monitoring of
the center of mass position by the environment (usually via scattering of
photons, air molecules, etc. by the center of mass) enforces the relation:
〈φ(z′0, ..., z′N)|φ(z0, ..., zN)〉 ≈ 0 (17)
for zi and z
′
i differing by more than the width of a coherent wave packet, for
any 0 ≤ i ≤ N . From (15) and (17) it follows immediately that
10
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〈Ψ0|Cˆ†α′0,...,α′N Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉 ≈ 0 (18)
if αi 6= αi for any 0 ≤ i ≤ N . When this condition holds, each component
Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉 of the total superposition is said to constitute a “branch” of the
quantum state, or simply a branch state (note that, as written, they are not
normalized). Thus, we can see the reason for the choice of the approximate
coherent state PVM: the histories defined in terms of this PVM are mutually
decoherent, which follows as a consequence of the fact that the states |z〉
are generically pointer states for systems like S. In turn, satisfaction of (18)
for each N ensures that the only allowable transitions from branch states
Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉 at an earlier time to branch states Cˆβ0,...,βM |Ψ0〉 at a later time
(with N < M), are those for which (β0, ..., βN) = (α0, ..., αN) - that is, such
that the history associated with the earlier state is an initial segment of the
history associated with the later state. This is part of what is meant when
decoherence is said to generate a branching structure for the quantum state.
As a consequence of the open systems version of Ehrenfest’s Theorem, on
time scales where ensemble spreading can be ignored, Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉 ≈ 0 for
all histories (α0, ..., αN) that are not approximately classical. Thus, we can
restrict the sum (11) to the subset Hc of histories that are approximately
classical:
|Ψ(N∆t)〉 ≈
∑
(α0,...,αN )∈Hc
Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉 (19)
From this we can see that relative to a single branch Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉, the
mean values of S’s position and momentum at each time step i∆t (with
1 ≤ i ≤ N) lie along an approximately classical trajectory, and the en-
semble distributions in position and momentum relative to this branch re-
main tightly peaked around these values. 8 Moreover, it follows from (17)
that the reduced density matrix of E relative to branch α ≡ (α0, ..., αN),
ρˆαE ≡ 1|w(α)|2TrS[Cˆα|Ψ0〉〈Ψ0|Cˆ†α], exhibits a strong correlation to this trajec-
tory in that it is orthogonal to the reduced density matrix ρˆα
′
E associated with
any other trajectory/branch α′ - i.e., TrE(ρˆ
α
E ρˆ
α′
E ) ≈ δαα′ .
8Relative to the branch Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉, the expectaiton values of position and momen-
tum at times i earlier than N are given respectively by 1|w(α0,...,αi)|2 〈Ψ0|Cˆ†α0,...,αi(Xˆ ⊗
IˆE)Cˆα0,...,αi |Ψ0〉 and 1|w(α0,...,αi)|2 〈Ψ0|Cˆ†α0,...,αi(Pˆ ⊗ IˆE)Cˆα0,...,αi |Ψ0〉.
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5 The dBB Model of Macroscopic Newtonian
Systems
Since the wave function in dBB theory obeys the same Schrodinger dynam-
ics as was assumed in the analysis of the previous section, the quantum
state in the corresponding dBB model also takes the form (19). However,
we saw in Section (8) that classicality in Bohm’s theory requires not just
the orthogonality of environmental states associated with different branches,
represented in (17), but the stronger condition of superorthogonality, which
ensures disjointness of these states in QE:
〈φ(z′0, ..., z′N)|y〉〈y|φ(z0, ..., zN)〉 ≈ 0 ∀y ∈ QE, (20)
for zi and z
′
i sufficiently different for any 0 ≤ i ≤ N . Typically, the unitary
Schrodinger evolution will also enforce this stronger condition. It follows im-
mediately from (20) that the branch states associated with different histories
are disjoint in the full configuration space QSE:
〈Ψ0|Cˆ†α′0,...,α′N |X, y〉〈X, y|Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉 ≈ 0 ∀(X, y) ∈ QSE (21)
if αi 6= α′i for any 0 ≤ i ≤ N . As a consequence of this disjointness,
the Bohmian configuration qSE will lie in the support of just one branch
Cˆβ0,...,βN |Ψ0〉, and the influence of all other branches on its evolution, and all
future sub-branches of those other branches, can be neglected.
Let us now examine what this implies about the evolution of the system
configuration QS and the environmental configuration qE. Let SEβ0,...,βN
designate the support of Cˆβ0,...,βN |Ψ0〉 in QSE. This region will be contained
in the region Sβ0,...,βN × Eβ0,...,βN , the direct product of the regions in which
the marginal distributions over QS and QE have support, with Sβ0,...,βN ≡
supp
[ ∫
dy|〈X, y|Cˆβ0,...,βN |Ψ0〉|2
] ⊂ QS and Eβ0,...,βN ≡ supp[ ∫ dX|〈X, y|Cˆβ0,...,βN |Ψ0〉|2] ⊂
QE. Now the region Sβ0,...,βN should roughly coincide with the range of posi-
tions associated with the phase space region ΣβN ; thus, Sβ0,...,βN for each N
should lie close to the Newtonian configuration space trajectory Xcl(N∆t)
associated with the sequence (Σβ0 , ...,ΣβN ). Moreover, because of (20), the
regions Eα0,...,αN corresponding to the environmental support of each distinct
branch will be disjoint, so that
Eα′0,...,α′N ∩ Eα0,...,αN = ∅ (22)
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if αi 6= α′i for any 0 ≤ i ≤ N .
Since qSE = (QS, qE), and qSE ∈ SEβ0,...,βN ⊂ Sβ0,...,βN × Eβ0,...,βN , it
follows that QS ∈ Sβ0,...,βN and qE ∈ Eβ0,...,βN . Thus, the Bohmian config-
uration QS of the system S follows an approximately Newtonian trajectory
Xcl(N∆t) near to that associated with the sequence (Σβ0 , ...,ΣβN ), while the
configuration of the environment E becomes correlated to this trajectory and
thereby serves as a record of it. So, at last, we have that
|QS(N∆t)−Xcl(N∆t)| < δ,
qE(N∆t) ∈ Eβ0,...,βN
(23a)
(23b)
for all N such that N∆t is less than the time when ensemble spreading of
ρS(X) becomes appreciable, and for δ some suitably chosen small margin
of error. Moreover, if qSE = (QS, qE) lies in the support of a single branch
Cˆα0,...,αN |Ψ0〉, at later times it may be found in the support only of branches
Cˆβ0,...,βM |Ψ0〉 such that (α0, ..., αN) are the first N indices in (β0, ..., βM),
where N < M . If M∆t is less than the timescale on which ensemble spread-
ing of ρS(X) becomes appreciable, (β0, ..., βM) will represent the continu-
ation up to M∆t of the classical trajectory approximated by (α0, ..., αN).
This follows from (21) and the equivariance of the Bohmian configuration’s
dynamics.
6 Conclusions
The analysis of classicality advanced in the previous section extends the effec-
tive collapse mechanism originally developed by (Bohm, 1952b), as applied
to the context of a laboratory quantum measurement, to the context of a
classically evolving macroscopic body interacting with some environment. In
both cases, decoherence renders the total state a superposition of disjoint
packets, so that the configuration comes to be guided by only one of these
packets. 9
9Some have suggested that dBB theory does not require decoherence to solve the mea-
surement problem because the theory is already about objects with determinate positions
and momenta. There are two problems with this line of thinking. First, it presupposes
that decoherence is somehow optional in dBB theory. It isn’t: decoherence is a generic
consequence of unitary evolution, and thus happens in dBB theory whether or not the
empirical adequacy of dBB theory requires it. Second, the empirical adequacy of dBB
theory does rely on decoherence, since as Bohm showed in (Bohm, 1952b), decoherence
13
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Given this analysis, the position that dBB theory is specially equipped
to recover classical behavior must presuppose the very point that is at is-
sue in debates about the measurement problem: namely, that the Bohmian
mechanism for effectively collapsing a decohered superposition onto a single
component is the true mechanism employed in nature. Because advocates of
other interpretations provide their own mechanisms for the collapse or effec-
tive collapse of a decohered superposition, those who do not already submit
to the dBB interpretation are unlikely to be impressed by its account of
classical behavior. In particular, advocates of the Everett interpretation are
likely to regard the analysis given in Section 5, concerning the evolution of
the Bohmian configuration, as utterly superfluous to a quantum description
of classical behavior since they regard the structure of a unitarily evolving
quantum state as sufficient for this purpose; see (Brown and Wallace, 2005).
However, many are also hesitant to accept that the structure associated with
a unitarily evolving quantum state on its own is sufficient to save the ap-
pearances, not least because this supposition entails the existence of a vast,
ever-growing proliferation of worlds associated with the different branches of
the quantum state. Barring the objection that the Bohmian configuration
is superfluous, the fact that dBB theory is able to support an account of
classical behavior on its own terms should at least provide some reassurance
of its continuing viability in the nonrelativistic domain. However, it should
not be counted as an advantage of dBB theory over other interpretations.
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Evidence for causal mechanisms in social science: recommendations from 
Woodward’s manipulability theory of causation
Word count: 4866
Abstract: In a backlash against the prevalence of statistical methods, recently social 
scientists have focused more on studying causal mechanisms. They increasingly rely on a 
technique called process-tracing, which involves contrasting the observable implications of
several alternative mechanisms. Problematically, process-tracers do not commit to a 
fundamental notion of causation, and therefore arguably they cannot discern between mere 
correlation between the links of their purported mechanisms and genuine causation. In this 
paper, I argue that committing to Woodward's interventionist notion of causation would 
solve this problem: process-tracers should take into account evidence for possible 
interventions on the mechanisms they study.
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Evidence for causal mechanisms in social science: recommendations from 
Woodward’s manipulability theory of causation
1. Introduction
In a backlash against the pervasiveness of statistical methods (cf. King, Keohane, and 
Verba 1994), in the last decade certain social scientists have focused on finding the causal 
mechanisms behind observed correlations (Mahoney 2001, Tilly 2001, Hedström and 
Ylikoski 2010, Hall 2012). To provide evidence for such mechanisms, researchers 
increasingly rely on process-tracing, a method which involves contrasting the observable 
implications of several alternative mechanisms (Bennett and Checkel forthcoming, Brady 
and Collier 2010, George and Bennett 2005). 
The process-tracing methodology literature as of yet does not commit to any particular 
fundamental notion of causation. Process-tracing reacts to the statistical approach by 
arguing that finding a correlation between a potential cause and effect variable is not 
enough evidence for genuine causation. We should also investigate the intervening 
variables between the putative cause and effect. Process-tracing however does not solve the
problem it set out to solve, but rather push the problem one step back. What, after all, is 
their evidence that the link between these intervening variables are cases of genuine 
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causation? In this paper, I will show a way out of this problem. James Woodward’s 
manipulability theory of causation tells process-tracers how to find the evidence they need:
not only must process-tracers study the intervening variables, but also the intervention 
variables of each link in the causal chain. 
This paper is set up as follows. First, I analyse what process-tracing is and what it aims to 
do. Second, I set out the relevant aspects of Woodward’s theory, including my motivation 
for using his notion of causation rather than another. Third, I evaluate process-tracing in 
light of Woodward’s theory, conclude it indeed lacks evidence for genuine causation, and 
give recommendations for solving this problem. 
2. A philosophical reconstruction of process-tracing
Process-tracing is a mechanism-based method for analysing causal relationships. To be 
precise, the term refers to two techniques (cf. Bennett and Checkel forthcoming), bottom-
up and top-down process-tracing. Bottom-up process-tracing involves surveying a situation
of interest with as little preconceptions as possible, in order to then formulate a hypothesis 
about possible causal connections in that situation. For instance, a researcher may spend 
time in a post-conflict area in the process of nation-building, interview the population to 
get data on how secure people feel, and subsequently form a hypothesis about causal links 
between nation-building efforts and human security. Top-down process-tracing tests type-
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level causal hypotheses about the mechanism (the ‘process’) connecting an independent 
variable and a dependent variable using data collected in case studies. Bottom-up and top-
down process-tracing are occasionally mixed; a researcher may start with a bottom-up 
study to formulate hypotheses, and continue with a top-down study to see if these 
hypotheses are corroborated or refuted by the evidence available. In what follows, I will 
look at the second type of process-tracing, i.e. top-down process-tracing, because I wish to 
evaluate how process-tracers justify causal claims. 
First, let us consider top-down process-tracing more formally. The essence of top-down 
process-tracing is using a case study to contrast rival hypotheses about the causal 
connection between an independent variable X  and a dependent variable Y , that is, 
hypotheses which suggest rival causal mechanisms that have contradictory observable 
implications. Let us call the researcher’s own hypothesis HZ . HZ  holds that a causal
mechanism Z  exists that connects X  and Y , i.e. a set of variables Z i  such that
X→Z
1
→Z
2
→…→Y  (where  Z i→Z j  means that Z i  causes Z j ). Besides 
hypothesis HZ , process-tracers will also investigate any alternative hypotheses H A ,
HB , etc. that are postulated in the literature, that is, they also investigate the observable 
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implications of chains A  or B  of intermediate variables A1…Am  or B1…Bk
etc. 
Methodologists Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel argue that the observable 
implications of mechanisms are “the facts and sequences within a case that should be true 
if each of the alternative hypothesized explanations of the case is true. Which actors should
have known, said, and did what, and when? Who should have interacted with, worried 
about, or allied with whom?” (Bennett and Checkel forthcoming, 39) According to Sharon 
Crasnow, process-tracing hypotheses about causal mechanisms are therefore singular 
causal claims, whereas the evidence from case studies consists of general causal claims  
(Crasnow 2012). A philosophical account of process-tracing therefore needs to consider 
both singular and general causal claims, as well as the link between them. In this paper, I 
will focus on the general causal claims process-tracing makes. In my conclusion I will, 
however, indicate what implications Woodward’s theory has for the link between singular 
case study evidence and general hypotheses. 
3. Woodward’s manipulability theory of causation
Let me now turn to the relevant aspects of James Woodward’s manipulability theory of 
causation, before explicating how we can apply the theory to process-tracing. Woodward 
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argues that any successful description of a cause-effect relationship must refer to causal 
factors that can be manipulated to change the phenomenon under study. Specifically, a 
variable X  is a cause of a variable Y  if there exists some ‘intervention variable’
I  which we can use to change X , so that X will then in turn change Y  without
any interference of other variables linked to Y . In other words, using I  we can 
ascertain that X  made the change in Y  happen. 
I have chosen to look at what would happen if the process-tracer committed to Woodward’s
notion of causation, rather than others, because of two reasons. Firstly, Woodward’s theory 
provides an alternative to the probabilistic notions of causation that are taken for granted in
the statistical approaches that process-tracers criticize, such as the one in social science 
methodology bible King, Keohane, and Verba (1994). Secondly, Woodward’s notion is 
arguably more suited to studying causal mechanisms in social science than the energy-
transfer notions of causation developed for causal mechanisms in natural sciences like 
biology. Thirdly, Woodward’s notion has not been widely applied to the social sciences, 
and therefore this analysis may contribute to the literature in philosophy of causation as 
well as to philosophy of social science. 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -760-
Arguably, we could get similar results by accepting Judea Pearl’s manipulability 
framework for causation (Pearl 2000). Though there are formal differences between Pearl 
and Woodward’s notion of an intervention, I believe that my general conclusion in this 
paper will hold no matter whether the process-tracer commits to Pearl or Woodward’s 
theory.
3.1 Manipulability theory
Let me now outline Woodward’s theory. The focal point of Woodward’s work is his formal 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions for X  to be a (type-level) cause of Y , 
which form his manipulability theory:
A necessary and sufficient condition for X  to be a (type-level) direct cause of
Y  with respect to a variable set V  is that there be a possible intervention on
X  that will change Y  or the probability of Y  when one holds fixed at 
some value all other variables Z i  in V . (Woodward 2003, 59) 
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To illustrate the use of the variable set V , consider the following scenario: we are 
interested in a Scandinavian village, asking whether, for its villagers, eating citrus fruit (
X ) is a direct cause of an absence of scurvy ( Y ). To answer that question, we can’t 
just feed the villagers citrus fruit for a month to see what happens to their health. We need 
to take into account other variables that may influence this (lack of) scurvy. So, we 
investigate the villagers’ diet, and find out that they greatly enjoy eating liver; their liver 
consumption ( Z ) is very high. What will happen in our experiments to determine the 
effect of citrus consumption is the following. If we ignore the liver consumption, Z , of 
the villagers, we will find that no possible intervention on their citrus consumption, X , 
will change their developing scurvy or not, Y . Simply put, not eating citrus fruit won’t 
mean that the villagers get scurvy. However, if we keep fixed at 0 the variable Z  for 
these villagers, we will find out that there is an intervention on X , i.e. making the 
villagers eat citrus fruit, that will change Y , i.e. whether they develop scurvy. We find 
that if X=0 , i.e. the villagers don’t consume the fruit, then Y=1 , i.e. they develop 
the deficiency disease. If they do consume the fruit, i.e. X=1 , then they don’t develop 
the disease, i.e. Y=0 . 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -762-
The notion of a direct cause alone, however, is too basic for a complete theory of 
causation. Woodward calls our attention to the possibility of a variable X  which 
influences a variable Y  along some route but has no total effect on Y  because X
’s influence is always cancelled out by other factors (Woodward 2003, 50)1. In that case,
X  is not a direct cause of Y , but Woodward nevertheless wants to call X  a cause.
Therefore he introduces the notion of a contributing cause: 
A necessary and sufficient condition for X  to be a (type-level) contributing 
cause of Y  with respect to variable set V  is that:
(i) there be a directed path from X  to Y  such that each link in this path 
is a direct causal relationship; that is, a set of variables Z1 ,…,Zn  such 
that X  is a direct cause of Z1 , which in turn is a direct cause of Z2
1 This issue is closely related to the notion of ‘faithfulness’, employed amongst others by 
Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines. These ‘washing out’ cases are cases when faithfulness, 
defined as being able to read off all causal independence relations off probabilistic 
(conditional) independence, fails.
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, which is a direct cause of … Zn , which is a direct cause of Y ; and 
that 
(ii) there be some intervention on X  that will change Y  when all other 
variables in V  that are not on this path are fixed at some value.2 
If there is only one path P  from X  to Y , or if the only alternative path 
from X  to Y  besides P  contains no intermediate variables (i.e., is direct),
2 This second requirement is meant to sort out cases where transitivity of a causal relation 
fails. To illustrate, such a case, imagine that whilst having breakfast I spill coffee on my 
navy blazer ( C ), which causes me to wear a cream blazer instead ( B=c  rather than
B=n ). Now, it turns out that at my job interview for a fashion editor position that 
afternoon, wearing a blazer rather than not wearing a blazer (i.e. in this scenario B=c  
rather than B=0¿  causes me to get the job (J ) . However, despite requirement (i) 
being satisfied (after all, there is a directed path C→B→J ), we would hardly say that 
my spilling coffee at breakfast ( C ) causes me getting the job ( J ). The causal relation
is not transitive. This failure of transitivity is captured by requirement (ii): there is no 
intervention on my spilling coffee that will change whether I get the job. If I don’t spill the 
coffee, I will wear my navy blazer instead.
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then X  is a contributing cause of Y  as long as there is some intervention on
X  that will change the value of Y , for some values of the other variables in
V .  (Woodward 2003, 59)
As Woodward himself stresses, a direct cause is always a contributing cause, but a 
contributing cause is not always a direct cause. 
3.2 Interventions
The notion of an ‘intervention’ is a crucial part of Woodward’s argument. Note that there is
a difference between an intervention variable and a contributing cause variable; whereas a 
contributing cause variable is part of the situation one is trying to analyse, the intervention 
variable is the means by which one undertakes this analysis. Before I discuss Woodward’s 
rather technical definition of an intervention variable, I will introduce it with an example.
According to Woodward’s theory, introducing a microfinance institution in a country will 
be an intervention variable I  for investigating whether taking out microcredit loans (
X ) causes a reduction in household poverty ( Y ) if and only if the following things 
hold. First, the introduction of the microfinance institution has to increase the probability 
that a microcredit is taken out. Second, there must be no other source of microcredit loans 
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besides this microfinance institution (so that when we do not introduce the microfinance 
institution, no microcredits will be taken out). Third, and this is more difficult to ascertain 
in practice, the introduction of the microfinance institution should not reduce poverty in a 
way that is unrelated to microcredits. If it turns out, for instance, that opening a 
microsavings account also reduces households’ poverty, and such accounts are offered by 
the microfinance institution, the third demand will fail. We would not be able to tell 
whether the microcredit loan or the microsavings account made the difference. In general, 
overlooking other ways besides X  whereby I  may influence Y  clouds our 
judgement about the relation between X  and Y . Fourth and last, introducing the 
microfinance institution must be statistically independent of all variables that reduce 
poverty by other means than microcredit loans. For instance, if we can only introduce the 
microfinance institution in regions that have a stable government, this clouds our 
judgement: the stability of the government could itself cause an eventual reduction in 
households’ poverty. So, we must ascertain that there are no other ways in which I can 
influence Y ; if there were, that would mean that I  gives us a misguided picture of 
the connection between X  and Y . (To see the difference between the third and fourth
requirement, consider the following. Both the third and the fourth requirement are violated 
if there is a factor Z  causally connected to both I  and Y  but not to X . 
Requirement 3 only captures cases in which we have I→Z→Y , whereas for 
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requirement 4, the relation between I  and Z  is unknown. It may, for instance, just as
well be that I←Z→Y .)
This brings us to the four requirements in Woodward’s definition of an intervention for 
type-level causation:
“ I  is an intervention variable for X  with respect to Y  if and only if
I  meets the following conditions: 
(1) I  causes X .
(2) I  acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause X . That is, 
certain values of I  are such that when I  attains those values, X  
ceases to depend on the values of other variables that cause X  and 
instead depends only on the value taken by I . 
(3) Any directed path from I  to Y  goes through X . That is, I  does
not directly cause Y  and is not a cause of any causes of Y  that are 
distinct from X  except, of course, for those causes of Y , if any, that 
are built into the I−X−Y  connection itself; that is, except for
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(a) any causes of Y  that are effects of X  (i.e. variables that are 
causally between X  and Y ) and
(b) any causes of Y  that are between I  and X  and have no 
effect on Y  independently of X .
(4) I  is (statistically) independent of any variable Z  that causes Y and
that is on a directed path that does not go through X .” (Woodward 2003, 
98)
In short, I  is an intervention variable for X  with respect to Y  when we can use
I  to check whether X  is a (direct or contributing) cause of Y , i.e. when we can 
use I  to change X , where after X  will change Y  without interference from 
other variables causally related to Y . Using I , we will be able to ascertain that X
made the change in Y happen. 
Woodward claims that the intervention does not actually need to happen; we may devise a 
hypothetical experiment. What’s more, the intervention does not need to involve human 
action. A natural process can qualify as an intervention as well. In the microfinance case, it 
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may well be that there are two regions in the world that are similar in all crucial respects3 
except that one has microfinance institutions whereas the other does not. If we compared 
the two, taking into account all the requirements above, and found that in the country 
without microfinance institutions a larger proportion of households was below the poverty 
threshold than in the country with microfinance institutions, then this would corroborate 
the claim that there is a causal relation between taking out microcredits and reduction of 
the proportion of poor households. 
Summing up the above, Woodward makes a distinction between contributing causes X , 
intervention variables I  that we use to analyse whether a variable X  is in fact a 
cause, and intervening variables Z  that are the means by which a contributing cause
X  influences its effect Y . 
4. Process-tracing evaluated from the perspective of the manipulability theory of 
causation
3 I concede that this requires one to specify what ‘similar’ would mean in this context, 
bringing up such issues as external validity and the reference class problem. I will discuss 
this in more detail in section 4.1.1. 
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At first glance, Woodward’s notion of a contributing cause fits with the hypotheses in a 
top-down process-tracing study. In what follows I will argue that although the hypothesis
HZ  has structural similarities with Woodward’s notion, nevertheless the proposed 
methods for testing the hypotheses are quite different. In Woodward’s framework, we need 
to show  that all links of the chain connecting X  and Y  are cases of direct causation,
which means we need to show there exists some intervention on X  that will change
Y . In contrast, all the process-tracing method outlined by methodologists like Bennett 
and Checkel requires is that we observe the deductive implications of the intervening 
variables of the mechanism in a case study. 
To contrast the two approaches in more detail, consider a simple example. Imagine a social
scientist has the type-level causal hypothesis that ‘an economic recession, X , is a 
contributing cause of a drop in non-domestic violent crime, Y , via the intervening 
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variable of  a drop in participation in the night time economy, Z ’4. In this example, 
Woodward would urge the social scientist to answer the following questions: 
1) Is X  a direct cause of Z ? In other words, is there a possible intervention on
X  that will change Y  or the probability of Y  when one holds fixed all 
other variables in V  at some value? 
2) Is Z  a direct cause of Y ? In other words, is there a possible intervention on
Y  that will change Z  or the probability of Z  when one holds fixed all 
other variables in V  at some value?
(In practice, as we have seen, this scientist would also investigate the observational 
implications of alternative mechanisms, e.g. the hypothetical mechanism that X  causes
Y  by means of a rise in the number of people suffering from clinical depression, D . 
4 That is, a drop in spending at e.g. pubs and nightclubs. The intuition behind this proposed
mechanism is that if someone has less money to spend at pubs and nightclubs they will, all 
other things being equal, consume less alcohol, and therefore be less likely to partake in 
violent drunken behaviour, which is one of the main forms of non-domestic violence.
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For conciseness’ sake, I will not discuss the scientists’ study of this alternative mechanism; 
it will happen analogously to the study of her own proposed mechanism X→Z→Y .)
Using Woodward’s definition of an intervention variable (Woodward 2003, 98), we can 
now adapt our list of required information. To answer question 1, we need to know the 
following: 
1*) There exists a variable I❑X  which
(1) causes X ; 
(2) acts as a switch for X ;
(3) does not directly cause Z  and does not cause any causes of Z  
except those on the path IX→X→Z ;  
(4) is statistically independent of any variable A  not on the path
IX→X→Z  that causes Z . 
and analogously for question 2.
So, concretely, what information does our social scientist need to gather in order to answer 
to demands 1*) and 2*)? For conciseness’ sake, I will focus only on 1*) here, i.e. on 
finding IX . The social scientist must find a variable IX  which, firstly, causes the 
economic recession; secondly, acts as a switch for the economic recession (i.e. makes 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -772-
whether the recession occurs independent of any other variables); thirdly, does not directly 
or through a path not on IX→X→Z  cause the drop in participation in the night time 
economy;  fourthly, is statistically independent of any variable A  not on the path
IX→X→Z  that causes the drop in participation in the night time economy. Thus, to 
find IX , the social scientist needs to ask herself: could we have prevented the economic 
recession from happening, in a way that is in no way connected to the night time economy 
through a different route? And would people participate more in the night time economy if 
we prevented the recession in this way? 
We clearly see the connection between Woodward’s interventionist framework and the 
process-tracers’ method break down at this point. A process-tracer interested in the causal 
connection between X  and Y  who follows methodologists like George, Bennett, and
Checkel is not concerned with finding interventions. Rather, what she does is investigate 
whether there are observable implications of all three factors (economic recession, drop in 
participation in the night time economy, drop in total violence) present in some case study. 
So, she may ask the people living in e.g. the London borough of Hackney whether they go 
out more or less since the crisis (reasoning that if participation in the night time economy 
dropped, then these people would confirm they went out less); she may also ask them 
whether they have experienced violent behaviour (reasoning that if violent crime dropped, 
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then these people would say that they experienced violent behaviour less often). What she 
is not required to do, if we take methodological advice from George, Bennett, and Checkel 
seriously, is come up with an intervention variable. Thus, she will not prove that X , the 
economic recession, is a contributing cause to Y , the drop in total violence. 
On the other hand, whereas a process-tracer can get away with merely noting that the 
intervening variables in the mechanism are ‘instantiated’ in some case study, Woodward 
requires one to supplement this with evidence for intervention variables for each link of 
the mechanism. If we commit to Woodward’s framework, this spells trouble for process-
tracing methodologists like George, Bennett, and Checkel.
4.1 Woodwardian recommendations for process-tracers
Looking ahead, what advice would the Woodwardian philosopher give to a process-tracer? 
For both practical and ethical reasons, social scientists may wish to refrain from 
intervening in social science scenarios themselves. This however does not stand in the way 
of the Woodwardian process-tracer; as we have seen in section 2, an intervention does not 
actually need to involve human action. Therefore, one of the ways in which a process-
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tracer may find an intervention variable is by looking at two distinct case studies, which 
are as alike as possible, except in regards to independent variable X .
So, thinking back to our last example, the social scientist should look for a region in which 
the economic recession did not happen (or perhaps, practically speaking, in which the 
recession had less of an impact), and another region in which the recession did occur. We 
must make sure that the reason these two regions differ with regards to the impact of the 
economic recession is not itself affecting the participation in the night time economy, 
except through affecting the impact of the economic recession; as an extreme example, if 
the economic recession had less of an impact on a region because the region was mainly 
populated by Amish, we would expect the Amish beliefs to be the reason the region’s 
inhabitants do not participate in the night time economy, regardless of the economic 
recession. Thus, the process-tracer should study at least two cases, a ‘control case’ and an 
‘experimental case’, and justify that these two cases are sufficiently similar. 
4.1.1 Sufficiently similar? Causal homogeneity in process-tracing
This brings us to one issue with process-tracing highlighted in the introduction that 
deserves further study. There is a tension between the methodology of using singular case 
study evidence on the one hand, and the aim of making general causal claims on the other. 
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For the social sciences this tension is difficult to resolve: arguably, it requires a causal 
relevance assumption (cf. Hitchcock 1995) for the set of events generalized over. 
Christopher Hitchcock argues that singular causal claims (here produced in case study 
research) can only be used as evidence for a general causal claim if one can demonstrate 
that the causal relevance of the cause for the effect is the same from individual to 
individual. Applying this causal relevance criterion to social science, to move from 
singular case studies to general theories one needs a ‘homogeneity assumption’: the 
assumption that in both the target cases and the case under study, ceteris paribus the causal 
relevance of the cause for the effect is the same. 
Consider the following example (following Bakke 2013). Whilst process-tracing political 
scientist Kristin Bakke looks for evidence for the singular causal claim that the presence of
transnational insurgents in Chechnya during the Second Chechen War caused the 
radicalization of war tactics there, she wants to make the stronger claim that the presence 
of transnational insurgents in civil conflict more generally causes radicalization. Here, the 
homogeneity assumption is that in both the Second Chechen War and in all other civil 
conflicts, all other things being equal the causal relevance of transnational insurgents for 
the radicalization of war tactics would be the same. That is, the presence of transnational 
insurgents would raise the probability of radicalization by the same amount in all civil 
conflicts. This homogeneity assumption is difficult, if not impossible to defend. I do not 
have time to consider this assumption in more detail here, but note that it deserves further 
attention. 
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5. Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that process-tracers generally postulate causal hypotheses which
relate a cause X  and effect Y  by a path Z  consisting of intervening variables
Z
1
…Zn . They then find a case study in which both C  and E  are present, and 
investigate whether Z1…Zn  are also present. Woodward defines that X  is a 
contributing cause of Y  with respect to V  if and only if there was a set of 
intervening variables Z1 ,…,Zn  such that X  is a direct cause of Z1 , which in turn 
is a direct cause of Z2 , which is a direct cause of … Zn , which is a direct cause of
Y . As it stands, process-tracing does not establish the complete right hand side of this if
and only if statement. Process-tracers show that a set of intervening variables exists, but 
they do not show that each link of the chain is a relation of direct causation. If they commit
to Woodward’s notion of causation, process-tracers have to provide evidence that there is a 
possible intervention to show that the relations they hypothesize are genuinely causal. 
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Which forms of limitation of the autonomy of science are epistemologically acceptable 
(and politically desirable)? 
4878 words 
 
This paper will investigate whether constraints on possible forms of limitation of the 
autonomy of science can be derived from epistemological considerations. Proponents of the 
autonomy of science often link autonomy with virtues such as epistemic fecundity, capacity  
to generate technological innovations and capacity to produce neutral expertise. I will 
critically discuss several important epistemological assumptions underlying these links, in 
particular the “unpredictability argument”. This will allow me to spell out conditions to be 
met by any form of limitation of the autonomy of science to be epistemologically acceptable. 
These conditions can then be used as a framework to evaluate possible or existing forms of 
limitations of the autonomy of science. And it will turn out that the option of direct public 
participation (a lively option in philosophy of science today) might not be the best way to go 
to democratize the setting of research agenda.  
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1. Introduction. Pleas for a democratization of the setting of research agenda are often made, 
and rightly so, on political and moral grounds. In a nutshell, citizens, it is argued, are affected 
in their daily life by scientific breakthroughs (genetic tests, nanotechnologies,  GMO, etc.), 
and research is (at least partially) funded by their taxes, therefore, in a democratic society, 
they should have their say in the choices made about research priorities. In itself, this line of 
argument (which I will endorse here without further arguments) leaves open the issue of 
which political forms of limitation of the autonomy of science are preferable - a lively option 
being theses days in philosophy of science some form of direct public participation in the 
setting of research agenda (e.g. Kitcher 2001, 2011). My aim in this paper is to investigate 
whether constraints on possible forms of limitation of the autonomy of science can be derived 
from epistemological considerations.  
My starting point will be traditional, utilitarian lines of defense of the autonomy of 
science. In that perspective, autonomy (in the sense of self-governance) is first considered as a 
necessary condition for the epistemic and practical successes of science. In other words, when 
science is left free to define internally its priorities and epistemic aims, it produces more and 
better knowledge, directly or indirectly useful to society, via in particular technological 
innovation. Second, autonomy (in the sense of independence and self-regulation) is 
considered as a necessary condition for the epistemic authority of science. Only when 
protected from outside influences (commercial, political special interests), so the argument 
goes, can science deliver the neutral expertise necessary for the proper functioning of a 
democracy. Note that this link between autonomy and utility for society is at the core of the 
very influential view of scientific governance defended by Vanevar Bush in his well-know 
report published in 1945, Science, The Endless Frontier. In that document, Bush makes a case 
for a very broad societal utility of science:  “Scientific progress is one essential key to our 
security as a nation, to our better health, to more jobs, to a higher standard of living, and to 
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our cultural progress” (1945, 2). And the condition of that progress is, according to Bush, a 
complete autonomy of science: “scientific progress on a broad front results from the free 
interplay of free intellects, working on subjects of their own choice, in the manner dictated by 
their curiosity for exploration of the unknown. Freedom of inquiry must be preserved under 
any plan for government support of science” (1945, 12).1   
 This kind of utilitarian arguments in favor of scientific freedom associates (more or 
less implicitly) autonomy with various virtues such as epistemic fecundity, capacity to 
respond to societal practical needs and neutrality. I will first identify and critically discuss 
several important epistemological assumptions underlying these links, such as what I will call   
here the unpredictability argument and the diversity argument. I will distinguish in my  
discussion autonomy in the sense of self-governance as regards the setting of research agenda 
and autonomy in the sense of independence and self-regulation, in particular as regards the 
functioning and composition of scientific communities. This will allow me to spell out 
conditions to be met by any form of limitation of the autonomy of science to be 
epistemologically acceptable. These conditions can then be used as a framework to evaluate 
possible or existing forms of limitations of the autonomy of science. And it will turn out that 
the option of direct public participation might not be the best way to go to democratize the 
setting of research agenda.  
 
2. Autonomy and epistemic fecundity. “I didn’t start my research thinking that I will 
increase the storage capacity of hard drives. The final landscape is never visible from the 
starting point.” This statement made by the physicist Albert Fert (2007), winner of the 2007 
Noble Prize for his work on the giant magnetoresistance effect, expresses a very common 
belief, especially among scientists, about the unpredictable nature of the development and 
                                                        
1 For a more extended discussion of this link between autonomy and societal utility in Bush’s 
report, see for instance Stokes (1997).  
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results of a research program. Such retrospective observations feed a central argument often 
invoked in favor of the autonomy, which can be dubbed the unpredictability argument. A 
somewhat lyrical form of this argument was given by Polanyi in his classical essay “The 
Republic of Science” (1962). Science, says Polanyi (1962, 62), “can advance only by 
unpredictable steps, pursuing problems of its own, and the practical benefits of these advances 
will be incidental and hence doubly unpredictable. … Any attempt at guiding research 
towards a purpose other than its own is an attempt to deflect it from the advancement of 
science… You can kill or mutilate the advance of science, but you cannot shape it.” Therefore 
scientists must be free “to assess …  the depth of a problem and the importance of its 
prospective solution primarily by the standards of scientific merit accepted by the scientific 
community.”  But what exactly is behind this unpredictability argument? 
In Polanyi’s view, claims about the unpredictable nature of scientific development go 
hand in hand with a plea for an internal definition of research priorities. From this 
perspective, a problem is deemed important in light of considerations internal to a field of 
scientific inquiry, such as the potential impacts of its resolution on other epistemic issues 
central to the field, and not (at least not primarily) in light of external considerations, such as 
societal utility. The unpredictability argument thus boils down to the claim that because of the 
unpredictable nature of scientific development, choices of research priorities in a field must 
only be based on considerations internal to its own dynamic. And if one also buys into the 
idea that only scientists can master such considerations, then scientists must be left free to 
define research priorities. But it is easy to see that, as it is, the argument is incomplete. To 
work in favor of scientific autonomy, the argument must be enriched and reformulated in a 
comparative form, as follows:  
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A field of research is epistemically less productive when its objectives are defined 
externally than when they are defined internally because, in the latter case, unexpected 
fundamental discoveries and practical applications are more likely to happen.  
 
This claim immediately raises a simple, empirical question (but which is surprisingly rarely 
really addressed): is that the case? Does history of science, in particular, show us that a 
research program whose objectives are defined externally is systematically epistemically less 
fecund than a research program whose objectives are “disinterested”? After all, examples of 
finalized research programs having produced along the way unexpected fundamental 
discoveries are not so rare. For instance the motivations of the Nobel Prize’s winners Arno 
Penzias and Robert Wilson who discovered the 3 Kelvins cosmic microwave background 
were very practical and had to do at the beginning with improving the quality of transatlantic 
radio communication. But along the way, this research program led to this very fundamental 
discovery in cosmology. Industry research on the giant magnetoresistance effect in the 1990s 
is another telling example of research undertaken under considerable pressure to produce 
applicable results but which nevertheless produced, along the way, very fundamental  
knowledge (Wilholt 2006). Of course, an accumulation of examples that could reassure the 
epistemic pessimistic as regards finalized research will not be enough to invalidate the 
unpredictability argument, because of its comparative form. Recall that the argument states 
that a field of research is epistemically less productive when its aims are defined externally 
(i.e. not primarily according to considerations internal to its own dynamic). But the problem is 
that history of science does not offer any control group. It is just not possible to compare the 
fecundity of a field when it is left free to define its priority with the fecundity of the same 
field whose research agenda would be defined externally in order to respond to societal needs. 
Thus the debate cannot be closed empirically, other considerations are needed. 
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On the face of it, a promising way could be to draw on what I will call the diversity 
argument. In a nutshell, the argument is the following: 
- You cannot predict which line of research (problems + approaches) will turn out to be 
epistemically fecund or dead ends. 
-  Maximizing the fecundity of a scientific field thus requires maximizing the diversity 
of the lines of research (problems + approaches). 
- Leaving the scientists free to define their own research agenda is the best way to 
maximize the diversity of the lines of research.  
 
Clearly, the validity of this argument hinges on the third step, which brings us to 
considerations partaking of social epistemology. But as far as I know, social epistemology 
does not provide any good reasons to believe that scientists’ freedom of research promotes 
diversity of lines of research. And given the natural tendency in some fields to monoculture 
(see for instance the domination of the Big Bang model in cosmology), it seems that we may 
even reasonably doubt that it is the case2. So my first intermediate conclusion is the 
following: there is no good epistemological reasons to reject any form of externalization of 
setting of research agenda on the ground that it would diminish the epistemic fecundity of 
science (contra the traditional argument à la Polanyi). For all that, claiming that an 
externalization of the setting of research priorities might be epistemologically acceptable does 
not mean of course that any form of such externalization is epistemologically acceptable. On 
the contrary, my previous discussion of the link between autonomy and epistemic fecundity 
establishes that as regards the epistemic productivity of science, what matters is not that 
                                                        
2 Not everybody would agree though, see for instance Wilholt (2010, 176) for whom the 
alternative to free choice of projects would be the existence of central authorities who would 
organized diversity. But it is not clear why an externalization of the setting of research agenda 
would require that centralized authorities possess “complete and detailed global and local 
knowledge”.   
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research aims are defined internally, but that the setting of research priorities promotes a 
diversity of lines of research. Hence the first condition that must be met by any form of 
limitation of the autonomy of science: ensuring diversity of lines of research. 
 
3. Autonomy and accountability. Let us discuss now a second underlying assumption of the 
defense of the autonomy of science on utilitarian grounds, that is, the link between autonomy 
and accountability. The notion of accountability may refer to two distinct types of 
expectations. Firstly, one can expect from science that it actually delivers the anticipated 
societal benefits. In other words, to put it trivially, the funding bodies want results for their 
money. Secondly, expectations can be of a moral nature: scientists can be hold responsible, 
not only of course for the methods they use, but also for the potential negative impacts their 
results may have on the citizens’ lives3. I will focus here on the first kind of accountability, in 
terms of efficiency to provide the expected societal benefits. 
 In Bush’ views, recall that efficiency is linked to autonomy: autonomy is seen as a 
necessary condition for science to deliver the expected societal benefits. But is it the case that 
science is better able to produce what society expects in terms of applicable knowledge and 
innovations when it is autonomous? Note first that historically, Bush’s views started to be 
called into question on efficiency grounds. Funding bodies, such as the American federal 
government considered that the return in terms of technological innovations and economic 
productivity was insufficient. To oversimplify a complex story, American science was 
considered as too “selfish”: too many Noble Prizes and not enough technological innovations 
(Guston 2000, 138). Challenging the capacity of an autonomous science to actually deliver 
the expected gains in terms of technological innovations is certainly a good reason to question 
Bush’s views. But I will not discuss further here this delicate and complex issue of the 
                                                        
3 For a recent discussion of the various dimensions of the notion of scientific responsibility, 
see Douglas (forthcoming).    
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efficiency conditions of technological transfer. I would rather draw attention on another 
essential reason to reconsider the link made between autonomy and efficiency. My proposal is 
that we should look more closely at the nature of society’s expectations and take into account 
their evolution. For, as noticed by Neal Lane (1997), who was former director of the National 
Science Foundation: “It is not that science did not deliver in so many ways over so many 
years, but rather that different times require different types of accountability.”4 So what are 
today the types of societal expectations that science must respond to, and to what extent do 
they differ from the society’s expectations at the heyday of the Bush’s model? 
I will suggest that the significant feature of the evolution of society’s expectations is 
that they have become more specific, more targeted. First because of the increasing 
“scientifization” of politics (more and more political decisions call upon scientific expertize 
on precise issues such as the evolution of the climate or the dangerousness of GMO); second, 
society’s expectations in terms of technological benefits have also become more specific, 
more targeted. Technological solutions to particular problems are expected (such as how to 
store photo voltaic energy), and not technological innovation tout court, such as the next 
laser, which would not answer pre-existing needs. So my point is that an autonomous science 
might well be able to answer global, unspecific expectations (Bush’s global expectations - 
more jobs, better health, technological progress, etc.), but it is very likely less able to meet 
specific, targeted needs.  
My previous analysis of the assumptions underlying the unpredictability argument has 
shown that a limitation of the autonomy of science (in the form of an externalization of the 
definition of its research priorities) is epistemologically acceptable as long as it fulfills the 
condition of diversity of lines of research. The above analysis of the accountability of science 
in terms of efficiency shows that such a limitation is not only epistemologically acceptable 
                                                        
4 I borrow this quotation from Guston (2000, 1).  
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but also necessary. Since societal expectations toward science have become more targeted, an 
autonomous science whose research priorities are set internally will be less efficient in 
responding to these expectations.    
 
4. Autonomy and neutrality. Another line of utilitarian defense of the autonomy of science 
states that only when protected from outside influences (e.g. commercial, political special 
interests) can science deliver the neutral expertise necessary for the proper functioning of a 
democracy. Autonomy (here in the sense of independence and self-regulation) is thus 
considered as a necessary condition for the epistemic authority of science (as long as, of 
course, this self-regulation obeys proper basic methodological norms). The central issue is 
then the following: Is a self-governing scientific community more likely to function according 
to methodological canons that maximize neutrality and impartiality?  
Two kinds of considerations may be relevant here: empirical considerations, in that 
case historical, and considerations provided by social epistemology. Empirical considerations 
immediately suggest that the condition of self-regulation and independence is far from being 
enough to guaranty the neutrality of the results produced. Thanks in particular to feminist 
philosophical and historical studies of science, cases of ideological biases are now well 
documented in various disciplines. And those cases are not cases à la Lyssenko (that is, cases 
departing from basic methodolgical norms), but cases where a scientific community, largely 
independent from political power or interest groups, conforming to traditional canons of good 
science, nevertheless produces non neutral results, which are influenced by dominating 
ideologies in the broader society. Examples of such “good” but biased science can be found in 
particular in primatology, archeology, biology, etc.5 How is that possible? Let me just refer 
here to Helen Longino’s now well-known work, which offers a precise analysis of how 
                                                        
5   See for instance Keller and Longino (1996).   
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contextual values may influence the very content of scientific results via the adoption, in the 
process of empirical justification of hypothesis, of background assumptions. These 
background assumptions, when they are shared by all members of a scientific community, are 
invisible and thus avoid the process of mutual criticism at the core a social view of 
objectivity. Hence the possibility of “good” but biased science. I do not need here to go into 
more details, for I just want to emphasize one of the main consequences of Longino’s 
analyses in social epistemology, as regards the issue of how a scientific community should be 
organized in order to reduce the permeability of its results to contextual values. In a nutshell, 
the (general) idea is that a multiplication of different perspectives on a problem within a 
scientific community promotes the suppression of biases linked to individual preferences, to 
the extent that the heterogeneity of viewpoints promotes the identification and the 
intersubjective critic of the background assumptions involved in the process of empirical 
justification.  
 In light of this (rather unproblematic) contribution from social epistemology, our 
question “Is a self-governing scientific community more likely to function according to 
methodological canons that maximize neutrality and impartiality?” can be reformulated as 
follows : does autonomy favor heterogeneity of perspectives within a scientific community? 
This is admittedly a complex and delicate question. Let me just give here some hints for a 
negative answer. Scientific communities are not really spontaneously at the cutting edge as 
regards the social diversity of their composition… So counting on the internal social dynamic 
of scientific communities to maximize the heterogeneity of perspectives might seem a bit 
optimistic and even naïve. Therefore, an autonomous scientific community (i.e. not subject to 
an external control of its composition) might not ensure a very high degree of heterogeneity 
of perspectives, and thus might not maximize neutrality and impartiality. Some form of 
external control of the composition of scientific communities, as long as it encourages the 
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heterogeneity of perspectives, might do better on that terrain. In other words, a limitation of 
the autonomy of science, in the form of an external control of the diversity of the composition 
of a scientific community might be necessary to maximize the neutrality and the impartiality 
of the scientific results produced by these communities, and hence their epistemic authority6. 
  
Let me just take stoke here. As regards the link between autonomy and epistemic fecundity: 
the analysis of the validity of the epistemological arguments underlying a defence of freedom 
of research (in the sense of freedom of choices of research priorities) has established that an   
externalisation of the setting of research agenda is epistemologically acceptable as long as it 
fulfils the condition of diversity of research. Analysis of the accountability of science in terms 
of capacity to respond to societal needs has then established that such an externalization is not 
only epistemologically acceptable, but also desirable, because of the evolution of the nature of 
these needs (specific, targeted needs are unlikely to be better fulfilled by an autonomous 
science). As regards now the link between autonomy and neutrality, insights from social 
epistemology invites to challenge the idea that a self-regulating, self-organized scientific 
community is better able to produce neutral results: some form of external control of its 
composition might on the contrary better ensure a heterogeneity of perspectives on a given 
problem, thus enhancing the neutrality of the results and expertise produced.  
 
5. Evaluative framework. The two aforementioned conditions – condition of diversity of 
lines of research and condition of heterogeneity of perspectives – provide a framework to 
evaluate the epistemological acceptability of existing or possible forms of limitation of the 
autonomy of science. Consider first a form of external control of research priorities already in 
place and often decried by scientists, to wit, definition of research priorities in light of short-
                                                        
6 I borrow from Leuschner (2011) the example of the IPCC as a scientific community whose 
pluralistically organization is regulated by a political instance (in that case NATO).  
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term economic interests. In light of the previous analysis, is this form of limitation of the 
autonomy of science acceptable? The answer is straightforward: such a limitation does not 
fulfill the first condition of diversity of lines of research and therefore leads to an epistemic 
impoverishment of science. But note that the problem is not that the objectives assigned to 
science are defined externally; the problem is rather that these objectives correspond to a very 
limited subset of the vast collection of objectives assignable to science. In other words, this 
form of limitation of scientific autonomy should not be rejected on the ground that science 
should remain “free and disinterested”; it should rather be rejected on the ground that when it 
comes to the definition of research priorities, considerations of short-term economic 
profitability should be integrated into a larger collection of considerations, reflecting the 
diversity of interests, both practical and epistemic, of the whole society. 
 A possible way to realize this integration would be to involve citizens in the choices 
made on research priorities. This public participation option is indeed widely discussed today 
and has started to be implemented in scientific institutions, albeit in ways that remain largely 
anecdotal and purely advisory. In philosophy of science, the ideal of well-ordered science 
developed by Kitcher (2001, 2011) has become a reference on this matter. In a nutshell, well-
ordered science aims at promoting a collective good defined in a non objectivist way, by a 
process of deliberation involving tutored citizens. This form of direct public participation 
does indeed offer an alternative to a choice of research priorities in the interests of special 
groups (such as economic ones): in so far as deliberators are supposed to make evolve their 
preferences both in light of scientific expertise and in light of others’ preferences (hence the 
notion of “tutored” preferences), the outcomes of the deliberations are supposed to provide an 
adequate representation of the interests of the whole society. For all that, this 
representativeness does not guaranty that the option of public participation fulfills the two 
conditions of epistemological acceptability (condition of diversity of lines of research and 
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condition of heterogeneity of perspectives). As proponents of the autonomy of science would 
fear, citizens may have rather selective expectations toward science, with a bias toward 
practical expectations (better cellphones and cures of cancer). 
 But is this fear grounded? Answering this question would require empirical studies of 
actual processes of deliberation leading to “tutored” preferences in Kitcher’s sense. There 
exists a relatively large body of literature on consensus conferences and other forms of direct 
public participation, but these conferences often focus on a particular issue (for instance the 
societal acceptability of nanotechnology) and not (at least to my knowledge) on the much 
more general issue of what the research priorities should be at a national or supranational 
level. In any case, I take the crucial question here to be of a comparative nature: in light of the 
two conditions of epistemological acceptability, is public participation a form of limitation of 
the autonomy of science preferable to other forms, for instance to some form of control 
exercised by our elected bodies? My claim is that epistemological considerations do not favor 
the public participation option over other forms of democratic control. The conditions of 
diversity of lines of research and heterogeneity of perspectives can also be fulfilled by 
appropriate forms of control exercised by our elected representatives. One can very well 
conceived that some appropriate subset of our elected representatives get also “tutored” in 
Kitcher’s sense by scientific experts. Of course, proponents of the public participation option 
may immediately discard this option on the ground that this would be a far too optimistic 
view of the capacity of our elected representatives to come up with a large range of scientific 
priorities, both epistemic and practical, and not just with short-term, economically profitable 
priorities, under the influence of various powerful lobbyings7. But I think this prevention 
(which may be to a certain extent country-dependant) can be questioned and, in any case, 
                                                        
7 This seems to be Kitcher’s view, for it is striking that governements and elected bodies are 
completely absent from his picture of a democratized science, or when they are invoked, they 
are   immediately discarded in not very kind terms (2011, 24).  
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arguments are needed to establish that the public participation option is significantly less 
prone to biases towards short-term, practical expectations.   
 
6. Concluding remarks. A first conclusion of this paper was that some forms of limitation of 
the autonomy of science are not only epistemologically acceptable but also desirable. Forms 
of externalization of the setting of research agenda are epistemically acceptable in so far as 
they fulfill the condition of diversity of lines of research. And appropriate forms of external 
control of the diversity of the composition of a scientific community may allow to increase 
the degree of heterogeneity of perspectives on a given problem, thereby increasing the 
neutrality of the results produced (see the IPCC example in footnote 7). The next step was 
then to investigate whether some forms of limitation of the autonomy of science score better 
than others on these epistemological counts. My claim is that there is no good 
(epistemological) reason to choose public participation over other forms of democratic 
control, in particular via our elected representatives. I am very aware that this step has 
remained very sketchy: much more need to be said to evaluate the comparative merit of the 
various options of democratic control as regards their capacity to fulfill my two 
epistemological conditions. In any case, epistemological criteria need to be supplemented by 
other criteria, such as political representativity, in the sense of “acting for” a larger group ( 
Brown 2004, 86), and integrability within our existing, representative systems of democracy. 
And one can question whether the option of public participation scores well on those two 
counts. After all, we live in representative democracies where government and elected 
assemblies are those who are, in fine, responsible for the way public money is spent on 
research. How public participation à la Kitcher would articulate with them? 
Keeping this issue open, I will just conclude on a general note concerning the type of 
contributions philosophy of science can bring to the topic of the democratization of science. 
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In the same way as philosophical reflections on science benefit from taking into account how 
science actually works, a political philosophy of science should take into account how our 
democratic systems of decision actually work, as well as the specificities of existing practices 
in science policies. And given their variety from one country to another, not to the mention 
supranational levels, this naturalist turn will invite a certain degree of localism: rather than 
trying to come up with a general normative proposition on how to democratize science, 
political philosophy of science should try to elaborate “local” propositions, that is, 
propositions that take into account the specificities of the relevant institutional and political 
context and more broadly, the specificities of the relevant “political culture”8.  
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!
Richard Arthur (2006) and I (Savitt 2009) proposed that the present in 
(time-oriented) Minkowski spacetime should be thought of as a small 
causal diamond. That is, given two timelike separated events p and q, with 
p earlier than q, they suggested that the present (relative to those two 
events) is the set I+(p) ∩ I-(q). Mauro Dorato (2011) presents three 
criticisms of this proposal. I rebut all three and then offer two more 
plausible criticisms of the Arthur/Savitt proposal. I argue that these 
criticisms also fail.!
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1. Causal Diamonds!
!
At the end of the twentieth century, it looked as if one question at the intersection of 
physics and metaphysics had been settled. What is the present in Minkowski 
spacetime, M? The upshot of a series of well-known papers beginning in the 1960s 
seemed to prove that one had a very limited choice. The present, at or for a spacetime 
point e ∈ M could be either the whole spacetime M or just the point e itself. The choice 
is no wider if one allows the present to be deﬁned relative to a spacetime point e ∈ M 
and a timelike worldline γ containing e. !1
It might come as a surprise, then, that I (2009) suggested a third structure for the 
present (relative to e and γ) in M.  I then called these structures Alexandroff presents, 2
but now, to conform to the usage that seems to be standard in physics, I will call them 
causal diamonds. The ﬁrst order of business must be to deﬁne them. Even though the 
discussion below will mostly concern Minkowski spacetime M, it will be useful to deﬁne 
causal diamonds in a larger class of spacetimes that includes M.!
Consider relativistic spacetimes < M,g,↑ > that are strongly causal and possess a 
temporal orientation (as indicated by the arrow). Choose two points p,q on a timelike 
"2
  The papers from which these ideas emerged were by Howard Stein (1968, 1991) and 1
by Rob Clifton and Mark Hogarth (1995). I will refer to them as SCH. These papers were 
written in response to papers by Cornelis Rietdijk (1966, 1967), Hilary Putnam (1967),  
and Nicholas Maxwell (1985, 1988).  I will discuss the implications of the results in the 
SCH papers in more detail below.
 The same suggestion can be found in Arthur (2006), and a similar idea but to a 2
different purpose in Myrvold (2003, §2). All of us were clearly inspired by the discussion 
at the end of Stein (1991). One should note also that in the philosophical literature 
causal diamonds appeared explicitly in Winnie (1997), which in turn was indebted to 
Robb (1914, 1921, 1936). 
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worldline γ in M with p earlier than q. Then the set I+(p) ∩ I-(q) is a causal diamond.  In 3
these spacetimes causal diamonds are guaranteed to exist--for instance, by Theorem 
3.27 of Minguzzi and Sánchez (2008). Such spacetimes are free of closed timelike 
curves, and the topology these sets compose, which is known as the Alexandrov (or 
Alexandroff) topology, is Hausdorff, giving one what is generally thought to be a 
physically reasonable spacetime. !
Gibbons and Solodukhin (2007a,b) distinguish between small vs. large causal 
diamonds. Small causal diamonds have a proper time separation between the deﬁning 
end-points p and q that is small compared to the curvature scale of the ambient 
spacetime. Larger causal diamonds are those in which the later point q recedes to the 
future boundary I+ of an asymptotically de-Sitter spacetime. The cosmologists whose 
work we will sketch below employ large causal diamonds whereas Arthur and I 
proposed small causal diamonds (diamonds in which the proper time separation τ 
between the endpoints p and q is scaled to the human “specious” or psychological 
present) as (special) relativistic counterparts of the common sense present. But they are 
all causal diamonds nevertheless.!
!
2. Dorato contra Diamonds!
!
Arthur’s and my proposal was criticized in Dorato (2011). The aim of this paper is to 
evaluate these criticisms and then to add a few further thoughts of my own. In the 
course of this discussion a more detailed understanding of the proposal under ﬁre will 
emerge.!
Dorato crisply sums up his arguments on page 391 of his paper:!
"3
 The set I+(p) is the set of all points in M that can be reached from p by an everywhere future-3
directed, continuous timelike curve.  The set I-(q) is the set of all points in M from which a 
continuous, everywhere future-directed timelike curve can reach q. The set J+(p) is the set 
of all points in M that can be reached from p by an everywhere future-directed, continuous 
timelike or lightlike curve. Similarly for J-(q). Some physicists think of sets like J+(p) ∩ J-(q) 
as the causal diamonds.
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(i)  [Causal diamonds have] no important applications in physical 
theories; !
(ii)  it does not seem a plausible, strong and non-arbitrary explanation of 
the extendedness of our subjective present, and !
(iii)  It does not correctly pick out the events we intend to pick out when 
we use “now” in ordinary language, !
(iv)  these seem the only reasons to introduce it. 
I conclude that we should drop it.!
Let us examine these three criticisms, beginning with the ﬁrst. My counter-claim is 
that causal diamonds are well-deﬁned and well-motivated spacetime volumes that have 
proved, in surprising ways, increasingly handy in recent physics. Let me ﬁrst advert to 
authority. Gibbons and Solodukhin (2007a, 2) say that “Causal Diamonds, or 
Alexandrov open sets, play an increasingly important role in quantum gravity, for 
example in the approach via casual sets (Sorkin, 2003), in discussions of ‘holography’, 
and also of the probability of various observations in eternal inﬂation models (see 
Bousso et al., 2007, for a recent example and references to earlier work).” Consider, for 
instance, holography.!
!
Thomas Banks and William Fischler have been working for a decade or so on a 
generalization of string theory and quantum ﬁeld theory they call Holographic Space-
Time (HST). According to Banks in a recent overview of their work (2013, 2), “The basic 
geometrical object, for which HST provides a quantum avatar, is a causal diamond… A 
time-like trajectory can be viewed as a nested sequence of causal diamonds.” !
To give a simple, related example, let us look at ﬁgure 3 of Bousso (2002), a review 
article on the holographic principle:!
!
!
!
!
!
!
"4
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The caption of the illustration says this: “The four null hypersurfaces orthogonal to a 
spherical surface B. The two cones F1 and F3 have negative expansion and hence 
correspond to light sheets. The covariant entropy bound states that the entropy on each 
light sheet will not exceed the area of B. The other two families of light rays, F2 and F4, 
generate the skirts drawn in thin outline. Their cross-sectional area is increasing, so 
they are not light sheets. The entropy of the skirts is not related to the area of 
B.” (Bousso, 2002, 842) The two cones, F1 and F3, form a causal diamond. This is only 
one result of many in the investigation of the holographic principle, but it is one.!
The utility of causal diamonds depends on several of their features. First, the 
volume of a causal diamond is ﬁnite, and the area of its boundary is ﬁnite. Second, its 
boundary consists of null or lightlike surfaces. Third, the points in the diamond deﬁned 
by two points (say p and q) are all those points that can effect some point on a timelike 
curve extending from p to at q and can also be effected by some (other) point on that 
curve. Bousso imagines an experiment starting at p and ending at q. He claims (Bousso 
2000b, especially §2), following Susskind, that physics need take account of only the 
set of factors that can reciprocally inﬂuence the experiment. If so, then physics need 
consider only events in the causal diamond deﬁned by p and q.!
Bousso and Susskind (2011) use causal diamonds for two other purposes. First, 
they use the boundaries of causal diamonds to deﬁne an objective notion of 
decoherence. When a particle entangled with an apparatus at some event crosses the 
border of a diamond they deﬁne, then (in their view) irreversible decoherence occurs 
and (in their terms) the event happens. Thus they say in §3.3:!
Causal diamonds have deﬁnite histories, obtained by tracing over their 
boundary, which we treat as an observer-independent environment. This gets 
rid of superpositions of different macroscopic objects, such as bubbles of 
different vacua, without the need to appeal to actual observers inside the 
diamond. Each causal diamond history corresponds to a sequence of things 
that “happen”. And the global picture of the multiverse is just a representation 
of all the possible diamond histories in a single geometry: the many worlds of 
causal diamonds!!
In addition to providing objective decoherence, Bousso and Susskind, then, use 
causal diamonds as the many worlds out of which they construct the multiverse in their 
“multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics”.!
"5
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These are some (admittedly, speculative) ways in which causal diamonds have 
entered into physical theory. I must leave it to the reader to decide whether they are 
“important”. What I would like to emphasize is that causal diamonds are a natural 
structure to fasten on, since they contain all the spacetime events that can interact 
causally with events on a timelike  worldline γ between the two events, p and q, that 
deﬁne the diamond. !
Let me tackle next Dorato’s third criticism. Suppose I were to say, on some cold, 
rainy Vancouver morning, “The sun is surely shining now in Rome.” What I would have 
intended by this (as long as I am not explicitly thinking relativistically) is to pick out 
events in Rome that are happening at the same time as my utterance and to suppose 
that those events are part of a sunny day there. To be more pedantic, as far as our 
common sense, pre-relativistic way of conceiving time goes, my utterance occurs in 
some observer-independent hyperplane of simultaneous events, and it is meant to 
signify that the part of the hyperplane that includes Rome contains sunny events. !
As I point out (352), but as we all knew already, in the special theory of relativity 
there is no such distinguished set of simultaneous events. So Dorato is surely right 
when he says that causal diamonds, if proposed as a scientiﬁc successor concept to 
our common sense concept of the present, do “not correctly pick out the events we 
intend to pick out when we use ‘now’ in ordinary language.” It is true, however, that 
nothing in M does. Let me just repeat the nice quote from Mermin (2005, xii) that I used 
to make this point: “That no inherent meaning can be assigned to the simultaneity of 
distant events is the single most important lesson to be learned from relativity.”!
So one has to make a choice. Perhaps as far as the special theory goes (and the 
general theory, insofar as it is locally Minkowskian) there just is just nothing like a 
(common sense) present to be had in those spacetimes.  Alternatively, if one wishes to 4
see what elements of our pre-relativistic concept of time one can ﬁnd in relativistic 
spacetimes, one can seek some elements of or structures in Minkowski spacetime (or 
the more general class of spacetimes stipulated earlier) that more-or-less play the role 
that the common sense present did. If one does make such a proposal, one knows in 
advance that it will not encompass precisely the set of points intended when we use 
“now” in ordinary language. One looks for a “best ﬁt,” with the criteria of ﬁtness rather 
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loosely speciﬁed. That is the philosophical task--assuming that there is a philosophical 
enterprise here at all.!
But if that is the game that’s afoot, then the suggestion that each event is its own 
present--no more, no less--certainly has its difﬁculties. It is not able to assign a truth 
value to the example above (“The sun is surely shining now in Rome.”) spoken by me 
on the West Coast, although it works well for Dorato in Rome. On the other hand, any 
reasonably sized causal diamond deﬁned by two events on my world line, one marking 
the beginning and one the end of my utterance for instance, will include events in Rome 
and so will afford grounds for assigning a truth value to the example sentence. There 
will be many, many examples like it. Although the Arthur/Savitt proposal will indeed fail 
for some other cases (for, say, my musings about what is happening now on Mars), it 
will do the job in a host of routine situations. I submit that more in the way of 
correspondence with the common sense present cannot reasonably be asked for in 
these spacetimes and that therefore Dorato’s third criticism is simply beside the point.!
Also, if this is the game that’s afoot, then Dorato’s second criticism above is as wide 
of the mark as his third. Causal diamonds are not invoked to explain our having 
experiences of the present that are extended. Rather, our experience of the present as 
having some duration grounds the requirement (or, more moderately, suggests the 
possibility) that the relativistic counterpart of the present not be a mere point or an 
achronal set of points.!
In the penultimate paragraph of his paper Dorato says that “violations of achronality 
are admissible only for the psychological present, but not for the physical 
present,” (393) Viewed one way, this is an eminently sensible view. How could two 
events that are timelike separated, that are invariantly temporally ordered, both be 
present?  But viewed another way, this is the sort of categorical assertion that 
sometimes comes back to embarrass its author. We live with experienced presents in 
which a succession of events a second or two long do all seem present, however 
difﬁcult it may be to articulate this experience coherently. If we are to see what of our 
commonsense concept of time is afforded to us in relativistic spacetimes, then it is not 
unreasonable to seek a counterpart of our present that has duration--though, as noted 
above, it won’t be a perfect replica of our commonsense concept. It will be local rather 
than global, for instance, if Mermin’s understanding of Einstein is right.!
"7
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I conclude that Dorato’s three arguments fail. I should stress, however, that even if 
this claim right, the discussion so far does not show that the Arthur/Savitt proposal is 
correct. It shows only that certain purported objections are not really impediments to the 
proposal. There may be other objections to be considered.!
!
3. Region-Relative Becoming!
!
I spoke at the beginning of this paper of theorems that seem to show that the 
present for a given event in Minkowski spacetime could only be either the event itself or 
the whole of the spacetime. If that claim is correct, isn’t the Arthur/Savitt proposal 
straightforwardly ruled out?  My answer will be: no, I don’t think so. How could that be? 5
Well, theorems have conditions, and it may be possible to introduce causal diamond 
presents by (plausibly) denying one of the conditions of a key theorem. Although the 
SCH theorems are sufﬁciently complicated that a full discussion of them is not possible 
within the available space constraints, it is fortunate that a complete discussion of them 
is not required. A corollary that contains the material essential for my purpose here was 
extracted from the SCH results by Craig Callender (2000), and I will restrict my 
discussion to this corollary.!
Let me ﬁrst just state Callender’s “No Go” result. At issue is the deﬁnition of a binary 
relation R, which is intended to represent the relation of “having become”. That is, the 
goal is to deﬁne a speciﬁc binary relation B such that Bxy holds if and only if y has 
become with respect to x, where x and y are spacetime points. Stein had proposed (and 
the proposal seems eminently reasonable) that for such a relation at least all events y in 
or on the past light cone of an event x should have become as of or for x. Hence 
condition iii) in Callender’s No Go result:!
For any binary relation R on time-oriented Minkowski spacetime, if 
R is i) implicitly deﬁnable from time-oriented metrical relations, ii) 
transitive, iii) such that, if y ∈ J−(x), then Rxy, and iv) satisﬁes non-
uniqueness, then R is the universal relation U. (S592-S593) 
"8
 Neither Dorato (2011) nor I (2009) discuss this objection.5
Chicago, IL -803-
I ♥ ♦s! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !           July, 2014
Condition iv), non-uniqueness, is this:!
(NU)   (∃x)(∃y)(Bxy & Byx & ~(x=y))!
NU, according to Callender (S592), “merely says that at least one event in the 
universe shares its present with another event’s present.” Any reasonable 
representation of becoming should, on this understanding, satisfy condition iii. If two 
distinct points share a present, as they would in a causal diamond, then it seems that 
condition iv will be satisﬁed, and the becoming relation is forced to be the universal 
relation.  This looks to be a disastrous result for any account of the present other than 6
Stein’s view that each point event is its own present.!
Notice, however, that Callender’s gloss on NU contains a metaphysical assumption 
that, it seems to me, can be reasonably denied. Suppose, for example, that one wished 
to ﬁnd an analog for the psychological present in a relativistic spacetime and proposed 
that some small stretch of a timelike world line γ were the appropriate structure. Then it 
would turn out that--even given the standard Stein requirement on becoming that we 
ﬁnd in condition (iii) of the No Go result and even given the existence of pairs of distinct 
timelike separated events in that small segment of γ--there would not be two distinct 
points in that “thick” present that satisﬁed NU. Having mutually become (which is what 
NU postulates) is not the same relation as “sharing a present.” !
Similarly a causal diamond will contain (in addition to pairs of timelike separated 
events) pairs of spacelike separated events x and y such that neither Bxy nor Byx, but it 
will not contain events such that both Bxy and Byx, given the standard Stein condition 
above. The supposition that the present in a suitable class of relativistic spacetimes can 
be represented by a causal diamond does not, it seem to me, run afoul of the SCH 
theorems--unless one requires that events in (or “sharing”) a present have become with 
respect to each other. One need not suppose this, however, if one thinks of the present 
as a locus of becoming rather than as the “cutting edge” of what has become. Inside 
that present, events can be partially ordered with respect to becoming in the usual way. !
One might wish, however, in addition to the standard Stein deﬁnition, to deﬁne a 
notion of becoming relative to that present. More generally, one might wish to deﬁne 
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becoming relative to some portion or region of a spacetime, like a causal diamond D. 
The idea is that what has become relative to D would be all events that have become 
relative to any event in D, minus D itself. If we call those events B(D), then!
B(D) ≝ {y: (∃x) (x ∈ D & y ∉ D & y ∈ I-(x))}. !7
One might call this region-relative becoming. !
If the above defence of small causal diamonds as presents in relativistic spacetimes 
is successful, it might be argued that I have proved too much. Consider just Minkowski 
spacetime for the moment. Malament (1977) has shown that, given an inertial world line 
γ and an event e ∈ γ, one can also deﬁne the unique hyperplane ∑ orthogonal to γ at e. 
That hyperplane looks very much like the pre-relativistic present, at least as far as the 
“observer” represented by γ is concerned. B(∑) would then be the part of spacetime that 
has become relative to ∑, the past, while the rest of spacetime that is neither ∑ nor 
B(∑) is the future relative to ∑. Given the naturalness of these ideas, should one not say 
that ∑, rather than D, is the (counterpart of the) present for γ at e in M?!
Given the title of this paper, the reader should not be surprised to discover that I 
think not, but I do not have a knock-down argument for my view. What I can do is offer 
three considerations that I hope will incline the reader in its favor.!
Suppose that two “observers” represented by inertial world lines γ and γ′ intersect at 
some spacetime point e. Both agree as to what has become at e in Stein’s sense, I-(x) 
(or perhaps J-(x)). This is a natural and desirable feature of a relation of having become. 
When it comes to region-relative becoming, however, neither D nor ∑ will have this 
feature. Under reasonable assumptions, however, D will come very close. !
If the specious presents along γ and γ′ centered on an event e are roughly the same 
temporal length, then their two causal diamond presents (call them D and D′) nearly 
coincide. For each diamond there is a small ﬁnite volume of spacetime which will have 
become relative to one but not the other.   The temporal difference of two points in such 8
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regions (in proper time) will be at most of the order of the proper times of the two 
specious presents along γ and γ′.!
For a pair of hyperplanes ∑ and ∑′ orthogonal at e to γ and γ′ respectively, the case 
is quite different. There is an inﬁnite volume of spacetime that will have become with 
respect to each one but not the other, and there is no upper bound on the proper time 
difference between two points in these regions.  D, then, comes much closer than ∑ to 
satisfying one desideratum on a notion of the present in the way that it meshes with 
region-relative becoming.!
Secondly, the overlap of D and D′ can be used to explain our common sense 
intuition that at any given time we share a present. The hyperplanes ∑ and ∑′ have no 
such large overlap. In the standard presentations of relativity in 1 + 1-dimensional 
spacetimes, in fact, the only event they have in common is just the point of intersection 
e. !
Thirdly, if one focuses on ∑ rather than D in thinking about time in M, then it seems 
to me that one is willfully ignoring the lesson that one should learn from relativity.  Let 
me quote Mermin again: “That no inherent meaning can be assigned to the simultaneity 
of distant events is the single most important lesson to be learned from relativity.” There 
is no reason to choose this one hyperplane as opposed to the inﬁnity of others.!
The events in a causal diamond do have an inherent meaning, as thinkers from 
Alexandrov to Dorato have pointed out. Given an inertial world line containing the 
events p and q, the causal diamond deﬁned by p and q contains all the events that are 
“both a possible effect and a possible cause of events on the segment of the worldline 
[from p to q].” (Dorato 2011, 382) When it comes to understanding time, it might seem 
odd that the diamonds are local. But our experience is conﬁned to our local region of 
spacetime, and relativity robs us of justiﬁcation for extrapolating that experience along 
an arbitrary hyperplane. !
I think these last insights capture at least some of the thought behind my slogan: 
“Philosophy of time should aim at an integrated picture of the experiencing subject with 
its felt time in an experienced universe with its spatiotemporal structure.” (351) Dorato 
protested that the causal diamonds I proposed could not fulﬁll the expectations raised 
"11
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -806-
I ♥ ♦s! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !           July, 2014
by this slogan, and in this he is surely correct. But I did not think that the mere 
suggestion that one might usefully think of causal diamonds as successor concepts for 
the present in relativistic spacetimes would complete this program in one go. At best, 
and if successful, it would be a small ﬁrst step. It would locate the bits of spatiotemporal 
structure to be coordinated with the experiencing subjects and with their experiences as 
one small part of a complex whole that we wish to understand. 9
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Abstract
GRW theory offers precise laws for the collapse of the wave function. These
collapses are characterized by two new constants, λ and σ. Recent work has put
experimental upper bounds on the collapse rate, λ. Lower bounds on λ have been
more controversial since GRW begins to take on a many-worlds character for small
values of λ. Here I examine GRW in this odd region of parameter space where
collapse events act as natural disasters that destroy branches of the wave function
along with their occupants. Our continued survival provides evidence that we don’t
live in a universe like that. I offer a quantitative analysis of how such evidence can
be used to assess versions of GRW with small collapse rates in an effort to move
towards more principled and experimentally-informed lower bounds for λ.
1 Introduction
One central point of disagreement in the foundations of quantum mechanics is whether
the collapse of the wave function is a genuine physical process. If collapse is to be taken
seriously, we should seek to determine physical laws that might govern this process.
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory (GRW) offers possible precise laws which guarantee that
the wave function collapses during familiar quantum measurements. However, observers
and measurements have no special status in the theory, collapses happen all over the
place whether or not scientists are watching.
The laws of GRW include two new fundamental constants not present in textbook
discussions of quantum mechanics. One parameter, σ, characterizes the precision of the
collapse events and the other, λ, the rate at which collapses occur. If these parameters
are chosen properly, the theory appears to succeed in generating the correct probabilistic
predictions for experiments taken to be within the purview of non-relativistic quantum
mechanics. However, as more experiments are conducted we continue to shrink the
space of possible values for σ and λ. Potentially, the allowed region could shrink so
much it disappears and GRW could be ruled out. Alternatively, new experiments might
confirm GRW over its competitors. As of now, there seems to be a fair amount of
leeway as to what values we may assign to the parameters (figure 1). Focus on the
collapse rate λ. It is fairly well-understood how we can put experimental upper bounds
1
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on the collapse rate. If collapse events were too frequent, interference patterns would
be destroyed by particles collapsing mid-experiment, isolated systems would heat up,
photons would be spontaneously emitted by free particles, and in other varied ways the
experimental predictions of the theory would be corrupted (these constraints have been
reviewed recently in Adler, 2007; Feldmann & Tumulka, 2012; Bassi et al. , 2013).
Figure 1: Parameter diagram of GRW theory
from Feldmann & Tumulka (2012). ERR is
the “empirically refuted region.” PUR is the
“philosophically unsatisfactory region.” The points
labeled “GRW” and “Adler” indicate the values
suggested in Ghirardi et al. (1986) and Adler (2007)
respectively. It should be noted that Adler’s proposal
was made in the context of CSL, not GRW.
In this article, I would like to explore how we might put experimental lower bounds
on the collapse rate λ. The trend in the literature has been to dismiss low values of λ for
non-empirical reasons or for reasons that presuppose the failure of the many-worlds
interpretation. When λ is very small GRW becomes an odd theory. Macroscopic
objects are not prevented from entering superpositions and the theory takes on a
many-worlds character (§3). Such versions of GRW have been rejected as philosophically
unsatisfactory. Surely they are. But, there has been disagreement about exactly where
the problems arise. Feldmann & Tumulka (2012) give the criterion, “We regard a
parameter choice (σ, λ) as philosophically satisfactory if and only if the PO [primitive
ontology] agrees on the macroscopic scale with what humans normally think macroscopic
reality is like.” Bassi et al. (2010) impose the requirement that “any superposition
reaching the eye must be reduced before it is transformed into a perception in the
brain.”, building on a suggestion in Aicardi et al. (1991). Adler (2007) and Gisin &
Percival (1993) argue that the formation of a microscopic latent image in a detector
counts as a measurement even before this image is amplified to macroscopic scale. They
believe that the collapse rate must be high enough that even these latent images do not
enter superpositions.
I will argue that very small values of λ are not just philosophically problematic, they
are empirically unacceptable even if the many-worlds interpretation is viable. In doing
so, I hope to begin shifting the burden from philosophical considerations to empirical
ones and to lay the foundation for a principled and experimentally informed approach
to determining lower bounds on λ. Although the paper will focus on GRW throughout,
many of the lessons could be applied to mutatis mutandis other collapse theories.
2
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2 GRW Theory
In GRW theory, the evolution of the wave function is typically governed by the familiar
Schro¨dinger equation,
i~
d
dt
|Ψ(t)⟩ = Ĥ |Ψ(t)⟩ . (2.1)
At some instants, the evolution of the wave function is discontinuous and not in accord
with the Schro¨dinger equation. The wave function collapses. According GRW, collapse
is a real physical process governed by well-defined laws and occurring frequently, not
just during measurements. Humans and other observers play no spooky role, they are
just particularly intelligent and perceptive collections of particles.
When a collapse occurs, a randomly chosen particle has its position become extremely
well-localized. Collapses occur randomly at a rate of Nλ where N is the total number
of particles. That is, once a collapse occurs at T1 the probability that the next collapse,
at T2, will happen within time interval ∆t is given by
P (T2 − T1 < ∆t) = 1− e
−Nλ∆t . (2.2)
The collapse rate λ is one of two new constants of the theory, originally suggested to
be on the order of 10−16s−1 (Ghirardi et al. , 1986). The collapse localizes particle I
(randomly chosen) around location X, where X is chosen randomly with probability
density
ρI(x) = lim
t↗T
⟨Ψ(t)|ΛI(x) |Ψ(t)⟩ . (2.3)
“limt↗T ” denotes the limit as t approaches the time of collapse, T , from below. Λi(x)
is the collapse operator defined by
Λi(x) =
1
(2piσ2)
3/2
e−
(x̂i−x)
2
2σ2 , (2.4)
where x̂i is the position operator for particle i. The wave function after the collapse is
given by the pre-collapse wave function multiplied by a tightly peaked three-dimensional
Gaussian centered about X and normalized,
lim
t↘T
|Ψ(t)⟩ = lim
t↗T
ΛI(X)
1/2
|Ψ(t)⟩
⟨Ψ(t)|ΛI(X) |Ψ(t)⟩
1/2
. (2.5)
The second new constant in GRW, σ, appears in (2.4) and characterizes the width of
the Gaussian that localizes the particle. It was originally proposed to be on the order of
10−7m (Ghirardi et al. , 1986). In the remainder of the paper different values of λ will
be considered, but σ will be kept fixed at about 10−7m.
In the simplest version of GRW, GRW0, the wave function is all there is and its
evolution is determined by the Schro¨dinger equation (2.1) and the collapse process (2.2,
2.3, 2.5). In the limit where λ is taken to zero, collapse never occurs and GRW0 becomes
Everettian quantum mechanics (a.k.a. the many-worlds interpretation or S0). All there
is is the wave function and it always evolves in accordance with the Schro¨dinger equation.
Defenders of Everettian quantum mechanics tend to view GRW0 as the right way to
3
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think about GRW theory since they think that our experiences of reality can emerge
from patterns in wave functions. For Everettians and others who prefer GRW0 to the
alternatives below, this paper can be read as a discussion of GRW0 in the strange regime
where it approaches Everettian quantum mechanics.
For some, GRW0 is unsatisfactory (e.g., Allori et al. , 2008, §4.3; Maudlin, 2010).
According to GRW0 there are no objects in familiar three-dimensional space, just a wave
function in an abstract space: a vector in Hilbert space, a complex-valued function on
configuration space, or some other exotic beast. In GRWm, the universe contains a wave
function which obeys the above dynamics, but that’s not all there is, and, in some sense,
that’s not the important stuff. In particular, it’s not the stuff we’re made off. In addition
to the wave function, there also exists a distribution of matter in three-dimensional space
specified by a density,
m(x, t) = ⟨Ψ(t)| M̂(x) |Ψ(t)⟩ . (2.6)
Here M̂(x) is the mass density operator defined by
M̂(x) =
N∑
i=1
mi δ
3(x̂i − x) . (2.7)
In the limit as λ goes to zero, there is no collapse and GRWm becomes Sm, Schro¨dinger
evolution with a mass density (discussed in Allori et al. , 2011). Sm is a many-worlds
theory much like Everettian quantum mechanics, but where the universe contains a
distribution of mass in three-dimensional space in addition to the unitarily evolving wave
function. Some think that GRW0 and S0 are unsatisfactory because such laws would
not give rise to creatures with conscious experiences like ours, perceiving an apparently
three-dimensional world. Readers who think GRW0 is unsatisfactory can understand
this paper as a discussion of GRWm in the awkward bit of parameter space where it
approaches Sm. In the following sections, I will not differentiate between GRW0 and
GRWm. Read GRW in whichever way you think makes it the stronger theory. Read
MWI as S0 if you’re reading GRW as GRW0, as Sm if you’re reading GRW as GRWm.
There is a third version of GRW, GRWf. Here one supplements the wave function
with a primitive ontology of flashes. Taking λ to be small in this version of the theory
raises entirely different concerns from those faced by GRW0 and GRWm. The problem
for GRWf when λ is small is not that human lives are constantly ending, but that such
life may be absent altogether. Understanding the empirical adequacy of GRWf in this
region of parameter space would require a very different kind of analysis and for that
reason GRWf will not be discussed in the remainder of the article. A brief discussion of
GRWf in this regime can be found in Feldmann & Tumulka (2012, §4).
3 Branches and Stumps
GRW was originally formulated with the rate of collapse λ ≈ 10−16s−1. With this
rate, when a measurement occurs the wave function just starts to branch into a
superposition of outcomes when, with very high probability, the wave function collapses
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to a single definite outcome.1 This is how GRW solves the measurement problem: a
definite outcome is guaranteed by the rapid collapse of the wave function and the fact
that probabilities for collapsing to different outcomes are given by the Born rule is a
non-trivial2 consequence of the collapse process (2.2, 2.3, 2.5). If the rate of collapse
is taken to zero, then collapses never occur and GRW becomes MWI. In MWI, every
possible outcome of a quantum measurement actually occurs.
What if λ is chosen so that it is not quite zero, but is very small (λ ≪ 10−16s−1,
keeping σ ≈ 10−7m3)? In this regime collapses occur, but only very rarely. When a
collapse occurs, the results are catastrophic. After a spin measurement, the laboratory
enters into a superposition of a world in which the scientists record an up result and
another in which they record down. Later, if any of the particles that compose the
scientists or the measurement readout collapse, one of the worlds will be destroyed.
Imagine 15 minutes pass between the moment when the measurement occurred and the
time when collapse chooses a world to eliminate.4 In this time, the scientists in both
worlds can walk, think, and talk. After collapse, only one world remains. When a
collapse like this occurs, all of the inhabitants of the other world are instantaneously
and painlessly killed. Or, maybe the collapse doesn’t cause the other world to go out of
existence, but instead the tail of the Gaussian distorts the world and alters its evolution
so that it is inhospitable to human life.5 In this case, death is quick but perhaps not
instantaneous. Either way, in this region of parameter space collapses are not helpful
shifts which prevent macroscopic superpositions from forming, they’re colossal natural
disasters.
The way the universe (a.k.a. multiverse) evolves in each of these three regions of
parameter space is depicted in figure 2. With λ at or near zero, worlds branch every time
a measurement occurs and each outcome happens on some branch. For standard values
of λ, branching is prevented by the collapse of the wave function and each measurement
has a definite outcome. For small values of λ branching occurs before collapse is able to
prevent it; collapse events occur after branching. Living in such a universe is extremely
dangerous as entire worlds are constantly being obliterated. If you are lucky enough to
find yourself living a long life, you should be shocked. Repeated improbable occurrences
often indicate failure of a theory. This is no exception. The data you receive from your
survival provides strong empirical evidence against the theory.
1There has been some debate over whether the destruction of other branches is successful; see the
literature on the problem of tails. Here I assume that the problem can be solved. If it cannot, GRW is
not a viable solution to the measurement problem. In particular, I will assume that if collapse chooses
one part of the state and massively shrinks the rest, it is not merely improbable to find oneself in a part
of the state that was not fortunate enough to be the center of the collapse, it is impossible. There is no
life in those other parts after collapse.
2For a recent version of the story, see Goldstein et al. (2012, §6.5).
3This ensures that, in general, a single collapse will be sufficient to destroy branches in which the
measurement turned out differently.
4This would be typical if we choose λ to be on the order of 10−33s−1 and assume that there are
about 1030 fundamental particles brought into an entangled superposition by the experiment (using
(2.2)).
5See the brief discussion in Allori et al. (2011, §4).
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Figure 2: Plot of GRW evolution for a sequence of three measurements for different
values of λ.
4 The Rarity of Longevity
To judge the empirical adequacy of a given theory, I will focus on the likelihood of the
evidence given the theory, P (E|T ). If, for some evidence E and theories T1 and T2,
P (E|T1) > P (E|T2), then the evidence E confirms T1 over T2. If one updates on E by
Bayesian conditionalization, then for any theory T , the credence assigned to T after
gaining the evidence can be expressed in terms of the prior probabilities as Ppost(T ) =
P (T |E).6 It follows from the fact that P (E|T1) > P (E|T2) that, if one changes their
credences in response to E by Bayesian updating, the ratio of one’s credence in T1 to
their credence in T2 will rise,
Ppost(T1)
Ppost(T2)
=
P (E|T1)
P (E|T2)
P (T1)
P (T2)
>
P (T1)
P (T2)
(4.1)
Theories that are empirically equivalent will assign the evidence equal probability and
the data that comes in will not discern between them.
The theories to be compared are: versions of GRW with different parameter values,
6Although I expect that this straightforward account of theory confirmation applies to the cases
under discussion, one might reasonably be concerned. The situations considered involve self-locating
uncertainty (see Sebens & Carroll, 2014) and Bayesian conditionalization must be somehow modified to
handle such cases (see Arntzenius, 2003). Some modifications will vindicate the use of conditionalization
here, others will not. To avoid controversy, I focus primarily on the probability of the evidence given
the theory and not the posterior probabilities that result from updating on the evidence.
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e.g., GRWλ=10−16s−1 ; the many-worlds interpretation, MWI; and some unspecified
theory which gives the correct Born rule probabilities and guarantees survival, QM.7
The constraint that QM gives the Born rule probabilities is the constraint that: the
probability of seeing the outcome corresponding to eigenvalue Oi of the observable
operator Ô is given by
P (Oi|QM) = | ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2 . (4.2)
Throughout I’ll assume that the agent knows whatever is useful to know about the
universal wave function, Ψ, including | ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2 for all i. This allows us to focus on the
confirmation of alternate dynamical theories without worrying about how agents learn
about the universe’s wave function.
I will assume that MWI is capable of recovering the Born rule probabilities.8
Convenient Conjecture In MWI, after a measurement of the observable Ô has been
made and before outcome is observed, the probability one ought to assign to seeing
the outcome corresponding to eigenvalue Oi is given by P (Oi|MWI) = | ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2.
This is a highly controversial assumption, so let me clarify the spirit in which I am
introducing it. In order to put empirical lower bounds on λ we need to consider cases
where GRW becomes more and more like MWI. If we don’t have quantitative predictions
from MWI, it will not be possible to quantify the success of GRW in these bits of
parameter space. Later I’ll discuss how things change when the conjecture is removed
(§5).
In the notation used here, GRWλ=0 is MWI. So, when a measurement is made,
P (Oi|MWI) = P (Oi|GRWλ=0). Thus if we are assuming that the Convenient
Conjecture is true and thereby that MWI is empirically adequate, it follows that
GRWλ=0 is empirically adequate as well.
The question, then, is for what values of λ is GRW approximately empirically
equivalent to QM and when do the predictions of GRW and QM diverge? If the
predictions diverge significantly, GRW becomes empirically inadequate—the data we
actually have fits the predictions of QM. Let’s assume for the remainder of this section
that the rate of collapse λ is sufficiently small that whenever a measurement occurs we
can expect there to be copies of the experimenter who record each outcome. From the
Convenient Conjecture and the fact that the dynamics are the same in GRW and
MWI before collapse, it is reasonable to suppose that for these small values of λ the
probability of seeing each result is given by
P (Oi|GRWλ) = | ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2 . (4.3)
But, the observed experimental outcome is not the only data one has to update on.
The experimenter should also take into account the fact that she has survived for a
7What wonderful theory succeeds in recovering the Born rule, as is demanded of the theory I’ve called
“QM”? This will be a matter of disagreement. Let QM stand in for your favorite theory, whichever you
think recovers the right probabilities, be it MWI, GRW
λ=10−16s−1
, Bohmian mechanics, or something
else.
8For an extended defense of this conjecture, see Wallace (2012). See also Carroll & Sebens (2014);
Sebens & Carroll (2014).
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time ∆t beyond the moment when the measurement was performed. The probability
for surviving to ∆t can be calculated as
P (∆t|GRWλ&Oi) = 1− P (fatal collapse by ∆t|GRWλ&Oi)
= 1− P (death|collapse by ∆t&GRWλ&Oi)× P (collapse by ∆t|GRWλ&Oi) .
(4.4)
The probability of a collapse occurring by ∆t can be approximated using (2.2) along
with the simplifying assumption that there are NS particles whose collapse would cause
a jump to a single outcome: P (collapse by ∆t|GRWλ&Oi) = 1 − e
−NSλ∆t.9 The
probability of dying in the event of such a collapse is just the probability that the collapse
is centered around some branch other than one’s own: 1− | ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2.10 Inserting these
two expressions into (4.4) yields
P (∆t|GRWλ&Oi) = | ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2 + e−NSλ∆t − | ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2e−NSλ∆t . (4.5)
The probability of the total evidence can be assessed by combining (4.3) and (4.5),
P (Oi&∆t|GRWλ) = P (∆t|GRWλ&Oi)× P (Oi|GRWλ)
=
(
| ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2 + e−NSλ∆t − | ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2e−NSλ∆t
)
| ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2 . (4.6)
We can better understand this formula by considering a simple case. Imagine λ ≈
10−33s−1 and NS ≈ 10
30 so that the experimenter can expect to have approximately 15
minutes between measurement and collapse (as in footnote 4). In this time, she can form
expectations about what will happen and look around. Suppose she sees an outcome,
OA, with low Born rule probability, | ⟨OA|Ψ⟩ |
2 = 110 . She should be somewhat surprised
and also afraid. Now she knows that she only has a one in ten chance of survival. If she
makes it through the day, she should be surprised again. The probability assigned to
the total evidence (surviving and seeing that outcome) is 110 ×
1
10 =
1
100 , which follows
from (4.6) with ∆t≫ 1NSλ .
11
If λ is so small that no collapses are expected to occur within any reasonable
length of time ∆t and the Convenient Conjecture holds, the predictions of GRWλ
approximately match those of QM. However, as has been noted (Feldmann & Tumulka,
2012, §4), there would be little motivation for such a theory. It would be simpler to
9More realistically, NS would increase as a function of time.
10This is an optimistic estimate. In fact there will usually be many worlds corresponding to each
outcome and thus even when a collapse is centered on the right outcome Oi, one’s world might be
destroyed.
11What if instead she learns that she’s survived before she observes the outcome? Assume for
simplicity that there are just two possible outcomes, OA and OB . In this case her survival should
not be much of a surprise, the probability is 82%. The probability of OA is 10% and the chance of
survival given OA is 10%. The probability of the other outcome, OB , is 90% and the chance of survival
given OB is 90%. Thus the total chance of survival is
1
10
× 1
10
+ 9
10
× 9
10
= 82
100
. The probability she
should assign to OA given that she survived can be calculated by Bayes’ theorem as the probability of
survival conditional on OA,
1
10
, times the probability of OA,
1
10
, divided by the probability of survival,
82
100
. This yields 1
82
. The probability assigned to her total evidence is the probability of surviving times
the probability of seeing OA upon surviving,
82
100
× 1
82
= 1
100
.
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just set λ to zero and remove the collapses all together, yielding MWI. As λ grows it
becomes more likely that a collapse will have occurred within ∆t and the disagreement
between GRWλ and QM gets worse. QM predicts that you will be alive whereas GRWλ
assigns a certain probability to your death. For fixed λ, the larger ∆t is the larger the
disagreement between QM and GRWλ. However, once λ is sufficiently large the crucial
assumption that branching precedes collapse becomes invalid. In the next section I’ll
consider cases in which branching is prevented by collapse.
The fact that one’s own continued survival is used as evidence for assessing theories
is undeniably odd. Experimenters don’t typically keep track of the time elapsed since
the experiment was performed. But, epistemologists have contemplated cases much like
this where survival is relevant data. Consider the following much-discussed example
(Leslie, 1989; Swinburne, 1990):
Firing Squad Suppose that a dozen well-trained shooters are ordered to execute you
by firing 12 shots each. While blindfolded you hear 144 shots ring out but you
survive unscathed.
In such a scenario, your own survival provides evidence that the shooters intentionally
let you live over the alternative hypothesis that you got lucky because each of the 144
shots missed its intended target.
The situation here is similar to Firing Squad. The hypothesis that the squad
intentionally misses is like the hypothesis that QM is true and there are no cataclysmic
collapse events. The hypothesis that the shooters were attempting to kill you is like the
hypothesis that GRWλ is true for some troublesome small-but-not-too-small choice of λ
where worlds are constantly snuffed out quickly and without warning. However, there
is an important difference: In Firing Squad, the target will either survive or be killed.
In GRWλ with troublesome λ, there will be many versions of the experimenter that are
killed and always at least one that survives. A closer non-quantum analogy is:
Prison Poisoning On New Year’s Day you wake up in a nondescript prison cell, #27.
A coin was flipped. On New Year’s Eve, you were blindfolded and shipped either
to Alcatraz, if heads, or Arkham, if tails. Each prison contains 100 numbered cells
and you were randomly assigned to #27.12 While you slept in your cell the ball
dropped and the new year began with a randomly chosen 99 of the 100 cells in
Arkham being filled with deadly poison gas. Those in Alcatraz were safe. You
knew the plan all along.
In this case, you should initially think it equally likely that you ended up in either prison.
After surviving the night you should come to believe that you were probably shipped
to Alcatraz since being shipped to Arkham would have likely resulted in your death.
It was guaranteed that one of the prisoners in Arkham would survive, but it was not
likely to be the one in cell #27. Alcatraz is like MWI and Arkham is like GRW with
troublesome λ.13 The cells represent 100 possible results of a measurement and the gas
12For the closest analogy, imagine that each cell of the prison is occupied by a copy of you that
resulted from a 1-to-100 fission midday on New Year’s Eve.
13For an analogue of GRW with a normal collapse rate, consider a prison with a single cell, randomly
numbered and free of poison. In this case, the fission in footnote 12 should not be supposed.
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plays the role of collapse.14
Those who are attracted to the idea of quantum immortality may object to the
conclusions reached in this section. Consider a dangerous branching event from the
perspective of the many-worlds interpretation (a “quantum suicide” scenario). Suppose
you survive on one branch and die immediately, or quickly, on all others. It is tempting to
think you should expect survival with certainty. As Lewis (2004) put it, “The experience
of being dead should never be expected to any degree at all, because there is no such
experience.” If death is indeed immediate on all branches but one, the thought has some
plausibility. But if there is any delay, it should be rejected. In such a case, there is a
short period of time when there are multiple copies of you, each (effectively) causally
isolated from the others and able to assign a credence to being the one who will live.
Only one will survive. Surely rationality does not compel you to be maximally optimistic
in such a scenario.15 The situation in GRW with a troublesome collapse rate is just like
the delayed-death version of the above quantum suicide scenario and, as in that case,
survival should not receive probability one. If the collapse rate is raised so that the
agent never splits into multiple copies, there is no danger of death and survival can be
expected with certainty.
5 Averting Branching
If collapse occurs sufficiently soon after a measurement, branching can be averted. As
the other branches of the universe where the outcome was different are just beginning to
form, the collapse event occurs, ensuring that the macroscopic readout gives a definite
result and the experimenter sees a single outcome. The simplest way to implement this
feature of the theory is by imposing a cutoff characterizing the amount of time that
passes before branching occurs if there is no collapse. If a collapse happens within τ ,
branching is averted and a single outcome occurs. If collapse does not occur until after
τ , then there is a branching of worlds before the collapse, as in the previous section. Let
C<τ indicate that collapse occurs before the cutoff, C>τ indicate after. Including both
of these possibilities, the probability of the data given the theory can be expressed as
P (Oi&∆t|GRWλ) =
①︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (Oi&∆t|GRWλ&C>τ )×
②︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (C>τ |GRWλ)
+ P (Oi&∆t|GRWλ&C<τ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
③
×P (C<τ |GRWλ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
④
. (5.1)
The first piece, ①, is just as in (4.6) where it was assumed that branching preceded
collapse. The fourth piece, ④, is the probability that a collapse happens by τ . This
14Cases like Prison Poisoning and Firing Squad have a curious feature: one hypothesis cannot
be confirmed by the subject in the scenario. If the poison acts instantly, no course of experience
would support the Arkham hypothesis over Alcatraz. Similarly, if collapse kills instantly there are no
experiences one could have that would provide evidence for GRW with troublesome λ over QM (if the
Convenient Conjecture holds).
15The situation here is like that of the prisoner in Arkham if the period between the splitting event
(see footnote 12) and the deaths were made much shorter.
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follows directly from (2.2), ④ = 1− e−NSλτ . The second piece is simply the probability
that a collapse does not occur, ② = 1−④. The third piece, ③, is the probability that a
given outcome resulted from the GRW collapse process in a case where branching does
not occur. Here we have GRW working as intended and the probability should be in
approximate agreement with the Born rule provided λ is not so large as to push us into
the empirically refuted region of parameter space (figure 1), ③ ≈ | ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2. Inserting
these expressions in (5.1) and rearranging gives,
P (Oi&∆t|GRWλ) = | ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2 −
(
1− | ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2
)(
1− e−NSλ∆t
)
| ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2e−NSλτ ,
(5.2)
which limits to the Born rule probabilities as λ goes to zero or infinity.16 (5.2) is not
valid if λ is large enough that the probabilities in ③ deviate significantly from those
given by the Born rule. It cannot be extended in a simple and general manner as the
way in which ③ deviates from | ⟨Oi|Ψ⟩ |
2 will be depend on the particular experiment
under consideration.
To recap: If λ is so extremely small that you should not expect (relevant) collapses
to have occurred in your lifetime (figure 2.a), then GRWλ is empirically adequate if the
Convenient Conjecture holds. If λ is large enough that collapses must be considered
but small enough that branching typically precedes collapse (figure 2.c), then early death
is the norm and one’s continued survival provides strong evidence against the theory. If
λ is increased to around the initially proposed value of 10−16s−1 (figure 2.b), the theory
may again be empirically adequate as branching is prevented by collapse and the collapse
process ensures that the probabilities of various outcomes are given by the Born rule. If λ
is increased even further, so that λ > 10−8, the theory is again empirically inadequate as
collapses occur too frequently. Superpositions are destroyed mid-experiment and other
maladies ensue (see Feldmann & Tumulka, 2012; Bassi et al. , 2013).
What happens if the Convenient Conjecture is false and MWI gives different
probabilities from QM? Then, GRWλ=0 is empirically inadequate as GRWλ=0 is MWI.
This failure also rules out GRWλ for very small λ where collapses can be neglected.
For larger values of λ where collapse is rare but non-negligible, there are now two ways
in which the theory fails: the probabilities of the various outcomes are incorrect and
there is, in general, some probability that one would not have survived to ∆t. For still
larger values of λ that successfully avert branching, the theory again has a chance of
being empirically adequate since the probabilities of outcomes are now determined by
the collapse process and the MWI probabilities are irrelevant.
16In this simplified story, the probability of surviving to ∆t and seeing a certain outcome Oi
depends dramatically and discontinuously on whether collapse happens before or after branching. The
expressions for ① and ③ are quite different. A more careful analysis would ideally give a smooth
transition, but this would require wading into the murky territory of collapses that occur during
branching (as branching is gradual not instantaneous) and settling questions of personal identity there
(in particular, when exactly personal fission occurs and whether it can, in any relevant sense, partially
occur). It might be seen either as intriguing or disconcerting that we must answer questions of personal
identity to put precise lower bounds on λ.
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6 The Race: Decoherence vs. Collapse
For GRW to be tenable, there must be values of λ for which the theory is empirically
adequate. On the one hand, λmust be large enough that collapse practically never occurs
after the experimenter has branched into multiple copies. Otherwise, one’s continued
survival empirically refutes GRWλ, (5.2). On the other hand, λ must be small enough
that collapses do not spoil the results of experiments that have been performed. That
is, λ must lie below the experimentally refuted region of figure 1. But, are there any
values in this range? To answer this, we need to determine whether decoherence-induced
branching tends to occur before or after collapse.
We know that for values of λ near the originally suggested value, 10−16s−1, the
experiment readout and the experimenter are in a well-defined state corresponding to
a single outcome very soon after the measurement occurs. But, what is not clear is
which of two possibilities occurred immediately after the measurement (figure 3): (a)
the world briefly branched and then a collapse event destroyed some of the copies of the
experimenter, or (b) there was never a branching event because collapse prevented the
microscopic superposition from causing the experimenter to enter into a superposition.
Figure 3: Two potential close-ups of figure 2.b.
A proper analysis is warranted, but beyond the scope of this paper. Here is
a very rough calculation of how quickly collapse would have to occur to prevent
decoherence-induced branching: Decoherence is fast. A slow estimate might be 10−23s
for 1 gram of matter at room temperature in a superposition of two locations separated
by one centimeter (Zurek, 2003). To ensure a 95% probability of collapse by 10−23s, λ
would have to be at least 3 s−1 (from (2.2), assuming the number of particles is on the
scale of moles, N = 1023). But, experiments restrict λ to being at most 10−8s−1 (figure
1). This calculation suggests trouble. There may not be a safe region of parameter
space.
Let me highlight two of the most pernicious simplifications in this rough calculation:
First, it is assumed that the bit of matter starts in a superposition. In actuality, it
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would take time for the matter to enter a superposition and a collapse event could occur
in this interval, preventing the macroscopic superposition from forming. Second, when
decoherence occurs in this scenario one may doubt whether there is a branching of worlds
and in particular whether the experimenter branches. In GRW0, it’s tempting to say
there that the experimenter has branched as there are now two well-separated parts
of the wave function that will never again interact (non-negligibly), even if no future
collapses occur. In GRWm, it is easier to resist this conclusion as the mass-density of
the experimenter may be unaffected by the decoherence of this macroscopic object.
I’ll close by summarizing the key lessons of the analysis. First, to determine precise
experimental bounds on the parameters λ and σ in GRW, we must determine the
probabilities assigned to different outcomes in MWI (§4). This provides additional
motivation for that ongoing research program. Second, even if the Convenient
Conjecture holds and MWI is empirically adequate, some of the philosophically
unsatisfactory region of parameter space is also empirically refuted (§3, 4, & 5).
Surprisingly, it is not refuted by the outcomes we observe, but by the fact that we
live long enough to observe so many of them. Third, it is not clear how to draw a
principled border for the philosophically unsatisfactory region if our dissatisfaction is
purely “philosophical” (§1). But, with the realization that small values of the collapse
rate λ are empirically refuted, we now have a method to begin drawing principled lower
bounds on λ: determine whether the experimenter branches before or after collapse
(§5 & 6). Simple calculations suggest that the lower bound generated from empirical
considerations will be stronger than the bound generated from a distaste for long lasting
macroscopic superpositions, perhaps strong enough to rule out GRW entirely (§6). This
merits further study.
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You Can’t Go Home Again – or Can You? ‘Replication’ Indeterminacy and 
‘Location’ Incommensurability in Three Biological Re-Surveys 
 
Ayelet Shavit, Tel Hai College, Israel 
 
Abstract 
Reproducing empirical results and repeating experimental processes is fundamental to 
science, but is of grave concern to scientists. Revisiting the same location is necessary for 
tracking biological processes, yet I argue that ‘location’ and ‘replication’ contain a basic 
ambiguity. The analysis of the practical meanings of ‘replication’ and ‘location’ will strip 
of incommensurability from its common conflation with empirical equivalence, 
underdetermination and indeterminacy of reference. In particular, I argue that three 
biodiversity re-surveys, conducted by the research institutions of Harvard, Berkeley, and 
Hamaarag, all reveal incommensurability without indeterminacy in the smallest spatial 
scale, and indeterminacy without incommensurability in higher scales.  
 
Key words: replication, location, biodiversity, incommensurability, indeterminacy and 
empirical equivalence.  
 
Acknowledgment: I deeply thank the people who’s ideas and personal example inspired 
this work – Yemima Ben Menahem, Elihu Gerson and James Griesemer – and the 
organization that supported it: the Israeli Science Foundation (ISF grant no. 960/12).  
Chicago, IL -825-
1) Replication  
 Replication - "the set of technologies which transforms what counts as belief into what 
counts as knowledge" (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, 225), is fundamental to science. 
Repeatability of a scientific experiment and reproducibility of its results is a common 
scientific practice ever since Boyle (1660/1999)
1
 and Redi (1668/1909), and is widely 
accepted that one cannot fully explain a biological process nor empirically confirm a 
generalization without it (Shavit and Griesemer 2009; Shavit 2013). 
  Philosophers of science were traditionally more skeptical of the possibility and 
relevance of replication. Problems concerning replication were initially presented as 
epistemic absurdities, from Wittgenstein's 1953 rule-following paradox: "No course of 
action could be determined by a rule because every course of action could be made out to 
accord with the rule" (Ibid. I: 201); to Popper's note of the relativity of similarly, "But if 
repetition is thus based upon similarity...[it] means that anything can be made to a 
repetition of anything, as long as we adopt the appropriate point of view" (Popper 1959, 
422), to Collins's 1985/1992 experimental regress: "The problem is that, since 
experimentation is a skillful practice, it can never be clear whether a second experiment 
was conducted sufficiently enough to be considered as check on the results of a first. Some 
further test is needed to test the quality of the experiment - and so forth (Ibid. 2). Hacking 
(1983) concludes that the concern with replication is a philosophical pseudo-problem 
                                                             
1
 The challenge of replication may date back to Heraclitus’s metaphor of stepping into the 
same river twice (Hearclitus DK22B91, DK22B12 translation: Robinson 1987), yet such 
straightforward comparisons are clearly problematic (Hadot, 1995/2002.)  
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"…because, roughly speaking, no one ever repeats an experiment (Ibid. 231)".  
Given this long tradition of skepticism, it is apparently surprising to learn about the 
scientists’ widespread and genuine concern, or what Nature editors referred to as "the 
plague of non-reproducibility in science" (Hayden 2013): the fact, that widely-published 
research in many scientific fields is never replicated, and may not even be replicable nor 
become generalizable (in "Nature" see: Bissel 2013; Baker 2012; Gun 2014; Russell 2013; 
Sanderson 2012). The bulk of attention is focused on biomedical research, but owing to the 
overwhelming variability in scope, scale, data structure, and semantics for studying the 
dynamics of our environments, the problem of reliable replication is clearly applicable to 
ecological and biodiversity research (Michener and Jones 2011), as well as agriculture, 
molecular biology, bioinformatics and other biological disciplines (Shavit and Ellison 
(eds.) 2014 accepted for publication). Furthermore, in biological research, the spatial and 
temporal contexts – the location of a genome, cell, organism, population, habitat or 
ecosystem – as well as the researcher’s questions, methods, and available means of funding 
are constantly changing. Since biological research is contingent on the historical and social 
context in which it is being conducted, biologists are confronted with this key challenge: 
how do we both conceptualize and implement (operationalize) replication?  
The term ‘replication’ refers to wide-ranging practices: a) repeating the same exploration 
process (sampling, experimentation, and so on), and obtaining comparable results; b) 
reproducing the same result from the same analysis on the resultant data without a new 
exploration process (Cassey and Blackburn 2006); and c) retrieving the individual entity, a 
physical item (specimen, photo, blood tissue etc.) or a data record (stored in a field-journal, 
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excel spreadsheet, SQL database and so forth) for aggregating, comparing, and 
interoperating the data.
2
 In the section bellow, I will make the case for an unavoidable 
ambiguity that will prevent the repeatability of a biodiversity survey at the smallest spatial 
scale. The third section explains why that much ambiguity does not threaten the 
reproducibility of biodiversity data in higher spatial scales, as long as scientists are 
mindful of the serious problem of repeatability and therefore record the wider context and 
the history of their work, as they make this context easily and automatically retrievable.  
 
2) Location 
Ever since biodiversity (or "scientific natural history") became engulfed in a range of 
scientific disciplines (Kohler 2006, 2012; Strasser 2008), revisiting the same location was 
necessary for the scientific study of ecological systems sensu lato (Latour 1999 Ch. 2). 
Any explanation in ecology, biogeography, or biodiversity requires at the minimum, an 
identified location, a description of the distribution patterns of a population or species, and 
a comparison of location patterns for one or more spatial scales. Variables that correspond 
to changes in pattern, such as the location's average temperature, may therefore point to the 
process or processes that caused such a change in the distribution of organisms and groups 
of organisms (populations, species etc.). In response to a global climatic change (Lloyd 
2010) and a global crisis of species' extinction (Willson 1992, Ch.12), the biological 
                                                             
2
 “Interoperability is the ability of two or more systems or components to exchange 
information and to use the exchanged information.” IEEE (Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers) 1990, 42. 
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community was intensely engaged in meticulously tracing a species' location back to its 
geographical position (Tingley 2009), as they made sure that their information will be kept 
available and interoperable for others or for individual use in the future (Bowker 2005; 
Ellison et. al 2006).  
The inherent vagueness of 'location' is discussed in depth, although in very different 
contexts, in the philosophy of quantum physics (Barad 2007), in Science and Technology 
Study of maps (Black 1997; Gugerli 1998) and in eco-feminist studies of the politics of 
inscribing places (Shiva 2000; Code 2006). However, a study of the various non-
metaphorical meanings of ‘location’ on multiple scales is relatively new to the philosophy 
of biology (Shavit and Griesemer 2009, 2011ab).  
In order to clarify the concepts of ‘location’ and ‘replication’, in addition to literary 
analysis, three case studies involved a philosopher, who for at least three years participated 
in fieldwork, lab meetings, and workshops. The case studies involved the research 
institutions of Harvard Forest, Harvard University, the Museum of Vertebrate Zoology 
(MVZ), Berkeley and Hamaarag, and Israel’s Academy of Sciences – which have 
conducted rigorous repeated surveys to designated locations across New England, 
California, and Israel respectably. The concepts, working protocols, and conclusions of 
these case studies set national and international standards in biodiversity research (Shavit 
2013); hence the analysis of their use of ‘location’ and ‘repeated sample’ and their debates 
is expected to be highly relevant for science and the philosophy of science alike. 
The problem is that two concepts of space – exogenous and interactionist – are each 
committed to different epistemic values and standards of replication, and are both 
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necessary for a rigorous repetition of a survey to the same location. An “exogenous” 
concept of space assumes that organisms' impact their environment - through their 
physiology, metabolism, behavior, or sheer existence - can be safely ignored for 
successfully predicting their distribution (Hutchinson 1978, 159-60; Guisan and Thuiller 
2005). An alternative “interactionist” concept of space raises the assumption that 
organisms and their environments are mutually co-determined (Levins and Lewontin 1985, 
1-2).
3
  
Adopting a specific concept of space signifies a commitment; an actual expenditure 
of resources (Gerson 1998) to specific constitutive and contextual values, cognitive and 
social constrains (Longino 2004), and to generatively entrenched (Wimsatt 2007, Ch. 7) 
work procedures for coordinating the scientific work (Gerson 2007). An exogenous 
concept of space is committed to revealing general distribution patterns, hence values 
representative data. On the other hand, an interactionist concept of space presumes that 
one cannot typically ignore organism-environmental interactions, as sometimes they make 
a relevant casual difference in a species’ location, hence values comprehensive data on that 
particular location and species.  
                                                             
3
 Other philosophical traditions that explore the codetermination of organism and 
environment include the developmental systems theory (Oyama 1985/2000 ;Griffiths and 
Gray 1994), the scaffolding perspective (Griesemer 2014) and Sterelny’s (2001) 
environmental engineering approach.  The biological literature an interactionist concept of 
space reveals in niche construction (Odling-Smee et al. 2003), foundational-species 
(Ellison et. al 2010) and eco-engineer (Jones et al. 2007) models. 
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Given the goal of representativeness, an exogenous partition of space strives to 
locate a measuring device (e.g. climatic chamber, trap, camera, etc.) on a preselected 
random point that defines the longitude, latitude and angle of a regular shape (e.g. 
rectangle, hexagon, transact line, etc.) and deliberately attempts to ignore any hypothetical 
prior knowledge on the historical and biological context of the species, location and the 
studied field. On the other hand, an interactionist partition of space seeks to set that exact 
device in an irregular polygon to form according to a preselected, non-random 
environmental stratification (e.g. microhabitats, patch-type, participation gradient etc.) 
hypothesized to be relevant for understanding the dynamics of a particular biological 
system. The scientists in all three cases, who jointly wrote the research grant and/or agreed 
on the sampling method only days before venturing outdoors, were surprised to learn that 
these practices became mutually exclusive. It raises the question: what to do first? An 
exogenous protocol for identifying a location requires to randomly
4
 preselect longitude, 
latitude, depth/elevation and an angle for an individual's measuring device, and only after 
its point-location was established and entered for recording its microhabitat surroundings. 
An interactionist protocol requires the opposite: to firstly identify outdoors the location of 
a preselected microhabitat suspected of being casually relevant to the species and/or the 
environment, then set up the measuring device within/outside of the micro-habitat, and 
only then record its lat./long. coordinates.  
Since both concepts of space are necessary for rigorous biodiversity surveys, each 
                                                             
4
 Most sampling is haphazard, uniform or hierarchical rather than purely randomized 
(Shrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993).  
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concept however binds the researcher to different work practices for maintaining its 
standard, and since one cannot utilize both procedures for the same set of location data 
collected on the same spatial scale, ‘location’ ambiguity is inevitably created (Shavit and 
Griesemer 2009).  Furthermore, when performing an individual measurement in the 
smallest spatial scale of that study, a) the measurement device had to be typically relocated 
to different longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates when positioned according to different 
concepts of space (even in the uncommon incidents when the device maintained its 
lat./long. coordinates, its location was empirically different as its description as a 
‘location’);
5
 and b) a barrier for communication was clear, translation was lost, and 
decisions were based upon hierarchy
6
 or complete separation of the data
7
. On a later 
                                                             
5
 For example, there were two different maps of the Harvard Forest – with and without the 
location of each tree – which were deliberately kept separate. Choosing a location was 
made by randomly selecting a block on the blank map, yet when positioning a trap in the 
field, one repeatedly had to change its position because of the trees.  
6
 At the MVZ resurvey, the lead researcher in the field acknowledged the dissatisfaction of 
his colleague from his interactionist space. Observation on August 25, 2007. In the 
Harvard Forest, the lead researcher decided on the locations beforehand and the traps were 
constantly maintained - interview from May 27, 2010. In that sense, there were no 
independent revisits so it is unclear if there was replication or one very long survey.  
7
 The same applied to the Israeli resurveys: observation on May 16, 2005, June 6-7 2005 
and September 3, 2008, interviews on April 23, 2009 and July 6, 2009. At Harvard Forest, 
observations and interviews conducted on May 26-28, 2010; June 6-8, 2012, July 30, 2012.  
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reflection, the researchers did not say that the work procedures used by their colleagues 
required more time or effort
8
 or that the statements delivered by their collaborators were 
false, but rather: "it did not make any sense"
9
, or "he is smart, I simply could not 
understand why he was so stubborn on this issue"
10
, and often they only smiled gently and 
said: "I’m sorry, I could not do it the way they [or: he] wanted it".
11
 
This clear-cut empirical gap, however, within all these biodiversity studies, do not 
lead to any disagreements on the overall answer to the question on species location and 
species distribution, since that answer was provided by aggregating results across higher 
spatial scales – that is, the plot/s or transact/s that encompass multiple individual 
measurements – and it was easily agreed that there are incompatible ways to validate/select 
and analyze that aggregated data. Acknowledging the barrier at the individual trap made 
                                                             
8
 Although one can interpret what the MVZ scientist said: "it would have been a total 
waste of time" (August 25, 2007) as a strictly practical or heuristic criticism, I understood 
it as a criticism on meaning, a precursor to the follow-up sentence: “it just made no 
practical sense!” (Ibid.) 
9
 Interview with MVZ scientist March 23, 2007.  
10
 Interview with Israeli scientists on April 23, 2009. 
11
 Interview with Israeli scientists on July 6, 2009, February 9, 2010, and MVZ scientists 
on March 23, 2007 and August 25, 2007. For an exact citation: only one of the two Israelis 
used the word “sorry” and both MVZ scientists said “he” rather than “they”.  
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scientist frequently alternate between spatial scales as “the relevant smallest scale”.
12
 They 
juxtaposed different concepts of space rather than seek a single concept for all levels 
(Shavit and Greisemer 2009), which facilitated the emergence of a productive scientific 
discourse (Shavit 2013;
13
 Shavit and Ellison 2014, accepted for publication) and for 
different models to be recognized as useful alternatives (Shavit and Griesemer 2011b).  
The philosophical literature on the concepts of incommensurability (Kuhn 1962; 
Feyerabend 1962), underdetermination (Duhem 1969; Quine 1953) and indeterminacy of 
translation (Quine 1960, 1990) seems especially relevant in this case. For both 
incommensurability and indeterminacy of translation "the paradoxical situation stems from 
meaning variance – the same terms have different meanings in the seemingly incompatible 
theories" (Ben Menahem 2006, 11), yet only "incommensurability implies that from the 
perspective of one paradigm (theory), the alternative is not simply false, but makes no 
sense at all" (Ibid). Listening to biologists debate, frequently surveying the same location 
                                                             
12
 The relevant smallest spatial scale for the theoretical MVZ ecologist, was the average of 
a transact line with 50 traps, while for the collector, it was the individual trap on that line 
(September 4, 2006); the smallest relevant scale for the Hamaarag was a single trap for the 
hierarchical sampling and a patch-type with three such traps for the landscape sampling 
(February 7, 2009) and at Harvard Forest, the smallest relevant scale was the experimental 
block with multiple traps (June 8, 2012).   
13
 During a follow up symposiums on April 18, 2013 in Jerusalem (Israel), and on August 
8, 2014 in Minneapolis (Minnesota), museum collectors, experimental ecologists and 
bioinformatics discussed their mutual problems of replication.  
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creates the impression that this is indeed a clear case of incommensurability. 
 In the next section, I will employ these concepts for describing a basic problem of 
replication in a manner that makes the scientists’ disagreement more sensible than bizarre, 
which is presumably a better description.
14
 In addition, taking note of the routine details of 
the scientific practice would clarify a common philosophical conflation between 
incommensurability and empirical equivalence (Ben Menahem 1990, 2006) and should 
therefore assist in avoiding it. That is, philosophical involvement in the routine scientific 
work not only helps to better describe and understand science – the standard role for the 
philosophy of science – but may also illustrate the benefits of philosophy for science 
(Griesemer 2011), at least for some scientists and philosophers of science.    
3) Indeterminacy and Incommensurability 
Philosophical discourse is replete with conflation of ‘incommensurability’ with ‘empirical 
equivalence’ (Ben Menahem, 1990). Given the time and space constraints, I will not 
address the longstanding controversy over ‘incommensurability’, the more recent debates 
over its history (Agassi 2002; Oberheim 2005), or its compatibility with scientific realism 
or progress (Demir 2008; Davis 2013). 
Instead, I will rely on Ben Menahem’s (1990, 2006) successful disconnection of a 
particular conflation regarding ‘incommensurability’: its association with empirical 
equivalence between semantically non-equivalent theories, and, as a result, the conflation 
of ‘incommensurability’ with ‘indeterminacy of translation’ and the common phrase “no 
fact of the matter”. The blame could be placed on Kuhn's 1962/2005 explicit claim that 
                                                             
14
 To rationalize these assumptions, see Quine’s 1960 and Davidson’s 1984 "Principle of 
charity."  
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paradigms are incommensurable – i.e. not inter-translatable (Kuhn 1990) – and are 
therefore equivalent in the sense that there is “no fact of the matter” as to which paradigm 
to adopt (Ibid.194). However, as Ben Menahem (2006) had demonstrated, this conclusion 
does not follow, nor does it conform to other well-known examples of equivalence (for 
example Poincaré's argument for the empirical equivalence of different geometries (Ibid. 
Ch. 2). Briefly stated, incommensurability and indeterminacy are not closely related. 
Then what is ‘indeterminacy of translation’? "The thesis is then this: manuals for 
translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with 
the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another” (Quine 2004, 120). 
There is no barrier of communication. However, due to the lack of logical inference from 
observational to theoretical sentences – i.e. the underdetermination of theories – very 
different sentences can fit the same observation sentence rather than a one-to-one 
relationship between theory and data. That is, the ‘meaning’ of the data is not a determined 
entity that is somehow “captured in our minds” and is independent from its translation.  
In our case studies, a “repeatable survey to the same location” – i.e. the practical meaning 
in terms of a detailed protocol in recording the location of our measurement – was 
constantly translated. Such explicit discussions between adherents of the different concepts 
of ‘location’ – prioritizing different practices at different spatial scales – occurred when 
theoretical considerations of diverge statistical packages, based on drawing aggregated 
results from higher spatial scales, came to the forefront. Although the exogenous and 
interactionist concepts of space were evaluated differently by various researchers and 
cultural-research bodies, and unlike the breakdown of communication outdoors at the 
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single trap scale, in all of the three cases at the lab, researchers could agree on a manual of 
translating this concept into routine practices to ensure “valid replication” and “high 
quality data”.  
Quine distinguishes the indeterminacy of translation, which is manifested when different 
(and incompatible) sentences correlate to the same empirical data from the indeterminacy 
of reference (what he terms "ontological relativity"). A reference is indeterminate when the 
terms of the same sentence (or theory) could be correlated with the world in different ways 
(Quine, 1990). In this case, different empirical content may fit the same theatrical sentence, 
and there is no fact of the matter. In all of our case studies, such indeterminacy of reference 
have occurred, and researchers could easily agree on the truth value of sentences 
describing the survey results, as they were alternating between their incompatible 
interpretations. For example, researchers agreed on the number of organisms and species 
detected on a transact line, as they were alternating between models that hold incompatible 
assumptions on the causes of species detection on that transact. To test if a new survey of 
species' occupancy repeats the old survey well enough, one also has to model the variance 
in detection. Even if thirty Peromyscus maniculatus (deer mouse) were actually taken from 
Yosemite Valley in 2013 and 1913 - whether or not this truthful sentence implies that the 
deer mouse population did not change after spending a century in Yosemite, depends on 
the modeling of the variance of the collectors’ detection efforts, method era, or other 
parameters. Different environments – where the deer mouse population grows, declines, or 
unchanged– can correlate the same result, and researchers maintained their skepticism on 
the ontological interpretation of their models.  
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Such indeterminacy of reference is differentiated from indeterminacy of translation, as the 
former is involved with interpreting model results and the latter with outlining a protocol, 
yet they both relate to validation of survey repeatability and both are clearly different from 
the incommensurability of ‘location’ mentioned earlier.   
4) Conclusion 
In this article, I argued for a closer look at the seemingly mundane concepts of replication 
and location, by unfolding their divergent meanings, conceptual interties and impact on 
longstanding confusions in the philosophy of science. On that note, the common conflation 
between ‘incommensurability’ and ‘empirical equivalence’, ‘indeterminacy of translation’, 
‘indeterminacy of reference’, ‘incommensurability’, and ‘indeterminacy of reference’, 
were easily and forthrightly avoided when taking note of the very different behaviors and 
procedures biologists use in the context of their work when  re-surveying the same 
location. To clarify them and perhaps other controversial concepts, involvement in the 
scientific work seem to alleviate philosophical confusion. Observing the manner in which 
biologists use the terms ‘location’ and ‘replication’ revealed new distinctions on two 
different concepts of space – exogenous and interactionist – which adhere to different 
working standards without a common measurement, and to three different senses of 
replication – repeatability, reproducibility and retrieval – used differently at various stages 
of their work. Observing the scientists enabled the philosopher to raise new questions, find 
new conceptual distinctions and problematize the obvious. The benefits of this approach 
should not surprise us. After all, it has already been said that: " ‘To give a new concept’ 
can only mean to introduce a new deployment of a concept, a new practice" (Wittgenstein, 
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1978, 432).
 
The aim of such a dialog between a practically involved philosopher and 
reflective scientists is not to transform either of which, but to build disciplinary bridges 
while closely minding the gaps between them.  
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Psychiatric Progress and The Assumption of Diagnostic Discrimination 
Kathryn Tabb 
Abstract: The failure of psychiatry to validate its diagnostic constructs is 
often attributed to the prioritizing of reliability over validity in the structure 
and content of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). 
Here I argue that in fact what has retarded biomedical approaches to 
psychopathology is unwarranted optimism about diagnostic discrimination: the 
assumption that our diagnostic tests group patients together in ways that 
allow for relevant facts about mental disorder to be discovered. I consider 
the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) framework as a new paradigm for 
classifying objects of psychiatric research that solves some of the challenges 
brought on by this assumption.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The architects of the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1980), a 
task force of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), are often held to have sacrificed 
validity for reliability in constructing the manual’s categories (Sadler, Hulgus, and Agich 1994; 
Kendell and Jablensky 2003; Andreasen 2007). According to this view, the DSM went wrong 
when it adopted an operationalist stance focusing on atheoretical observational criteria, an 
ecumenical approach that made it easier to apply diagnoses consistently across practitioners and 
contexts. Without an understanding of etiology, the argument continues, the real contours of 
psychopathology have not been demarcated, and psychiatry has not been able to identify disease 
entities akin to those in the rest of medicine (Murphy 2006). This narrative implies that 
psychiatrists incorporated the operationalism of the DSM into their research methodology, and 
were accordingly inhibited or uninterested in the pursuit of causal explanations. The solution to 
psychiatry’s validity crisis, it has been suggested, is to refocus psychiatric research on causal 
mechanisms (Murphy 2006; Kendler 2011; Kendler et al. 2010).  
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 Here I argue that the DSM stands in the way of valid diagnostic categories not merely 
because it codifies test criteria that have not been validated, but also on account of its role in the 
research setting. Due to its widespread use in the framing of scientific hypotheses about mental 
disorder, the manual plays a central role in shaping the objects and methods of psychiatric 
inquiry. In particular, its diagnostic criteria are widely used to gather test populations for 
psychiatric studies. When the DSM is employed in this way, the implicit assumption is that the 
criteria for diagnosing clinical types can also successfully pick out populations about which 
relevant biomedical facts can be discovered. I will refer to this as the assumption of diagnostic 
discrimination. This assumption is only justified if there is reason to believe that patients meeting 
diagnostic criteria for a given disorder also share one or more experiential, neurological, genetic, 
or other abnormalities.  
 The first aim of this paper (constituting Section 2) is to make explicit the role of the 
assumption of diagnostic discrimination in psychiatric research, specifically when that research 
uses DSM criteria to gather test populations. I show that the assumption is implicitly rejected in 
the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project, a new classification tool for psychiatric 
researchers introduced by the National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH). My second aim is to 
argue a pessimistic view of diagnostic discrimination, on historical and methodological grounds 
(Section 3). Finally I consider possible rebuttals for three of my claims: that there are no a priori 
grounds for optimism about diagnostic discrimination; that an alternative classification method 
would mitigate its risks; and that the assumption is ultimately such a bad one for researchers to 
make.   
2. What is the assumption of diagnostic discrimination? 
While the absence of valid categories in psychiatry is often noted, there is little consensus about 
what the term “validity” means in the psychiatric context. Olbert (unpublished) has identified 
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fourteen distinct uses of the term in the literature, and suggests that there are significantly more 
in operation. The usage of the term in psychometrics, from which the psychiatric usage has been 
developed, is no less fraught; one study identified one hundred and twenty-two different subtypes 
of validity (Newton and Shaw 2013). The term was originally applied to psychological tests, and 
was used to calibrate how well a test measured what it was intended to measure. Validity was 
originally evaluated through the correlation of test scores with other criteria, such as alternative 
test outcomes. A list of criteria that could establish the validity of these inferences about 
psychiatric kinds was introduced in Robins and Guze (1970) and updated in Kendler (1980). 
Andreasen (1995) introduced a “second structural program for the validation of psychiatric 
diagnosis” which incorporated validators from neuroscience, genetics, and the biomedical 
sciences. Such validators range from characteristic course and family aggregation to genetic 
abnormalities and neural mechanisms. 
 Since diagnostic categories can be said to be measurement instruments in only a loosely 
analogous sense (Blashfield and Livesley 1991), psychiatrists tend to speak of validity instead as an 
attribute of the inferences made through diagnosis about purported disease entities. Here I follow 
psychiatrists themselves in employing the term “valid” to refer to psychiatric constructs that 
“approximate reality.” Under the dominant biomedical paradigm in psychiatry, a valid 
diagnostic construct is one that categorizes patients who all share the same underlying 
physiological dysfunction. Critics of the DSM point out that none of the manual’s categories have 
yet been validated in this sense, in so far as no account of a complete causal pathway to a mental 
disorder has been empirically demonstrated (Kapur et al. 2012).  
 My question here does not concern whether psychiatric kinds are valid, but rather whether 
the categories of the DSM, when used as instruments to collect test populations for research 
purposes, successfully congregate patients about whom relevant facts can be gathered. Optimists 
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about this question are often committed to what I term the assumption of diagnostic discrimination, 
that is, the assumption that our diagnostic tests1 group patients together in ways that allow for relevant facts about 
mental disorder to be discovered. For the purposes of this discussion, relevant facts are those about the 
underlying mechanisms causing the signs and symptoms with which patients present. They are 
the sorts of facts that psychiatric researchers working in the biomedical sciences hope to find: 
genetic signatures, neurological or cognitive dysfunctions, focal brain lesions, and so forth. 
Diagnostic discrimination may be a more or less justified assumption for those interested in other 
sorts of inferences, as I will consider briefly in section 5.1.  
 I borrow the term “diagnostic discrimination” from psychometrics, where it is defined as the 
statistical assessment of how a diagnostic test compares with a gold standard, measured by the 
test’s specificity, sensitivity, predictive value, and likelihood ratios (Knottnerus and Buntix 2009, 
4). Discrimination in this sense is inapplicable in psychiatry, which lacks any authoritative tests 
that would allow for the assessment of the sensitivity or specificity of the DSM’s categories. In my 
argument it is invoked as an aspirational term, signifying an ideal rather than a measure. I am 
interested in the particular epistemic stance that evinces optimism about whether our diagnostic 
categories effectively group together patients homogeneous for the real objects of interest for 
biomedical psychiatry. The extent the DSM’s criteria are discriminative for the purposes of 
biomedical research is, of course, an empirical question, and diagnostic discrimination will surely 
vary across the manual’s constructs. My aim is not primarily to offer any empirical assessments, 
but rather to raise some concerns about the warrant for prima facie optimism about 
discrimination.  
                                                
1By “tests” I refer to either the diagnostic criteria of the DSM itself or diagnostic screens based on 
these criteria.  Obviously diagnostic discrimination could be proposed about other diagnostic 
methods (e.g., the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual) but my focus here is on the DSM. 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -854-
Tabb 5 
 Unfortunately, careful attention to the problem of validity is entirely compatible with a naive 
commitment to diagnostic discrimination. Study designs that use DSM criteria to select research 
samples may assume that those samples will be homogeneous for certain sorts of pathogenic 
mechanisms.2 Even those profoundly dissatisfied with DSM categories may employ its criteria in 
order to locate latent constructs they hope to use to revise and perfect the manual. The DSM’s 
central role in the research context, specifically in guiding the selection of test populations and 
establishing targets for explanation, is not only entrenched by historical precedent but also held 
firm by the hand of the biomedical marketplace; funding bodies have traditionally preferred 
research that is directly pertinent to perceived clinical needs. This has led to a focus on the 
iterative validation of diagnostic constructs, especially the search for the causal mechanisms that 
can undergird new therapies.  
 In the following section I explore the role of diagnostic discrimination in the history of 
psychiatric research, and suggest that this history should lead us to be pessimistic about the 
assumption’s warrant. In my fourth section I will make the conceptual case against optimism 
about whether our diagnoses are discriminative, and consider an alternative tool for gathering 
test populations that does not rely on this risky assumption.  
3. The case for pessimism: a historical argument 
A valid taxonomy has historically been viewed as the first step in psychiatric research. Influential 
theorists of psychiatric validity have imagined a boot-strapping model, in which the first phase of 
achieving validity involves settling on a clinical description of diagnostic kinds (Kendell and 
                                                
2 Imagine a psychopharmaceutical study with a simple design in which drug response is tested in 
a clinical population of subjects sharing a diagnosis. If the assumption of diagnostic 
discrimination is in play, a 60% response rate will be interpreted as demonstrating that the drug 
is effective 60% of the time. Once the assumption is questioned, alternative hypotheses—such as 
that 60% of patients sharing a diagnosis share a specific underlying mechanism affected (with 
100% efficacy) by the drug—can be considered. 
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Jablensky 2003). Andreasen, for example, writes that only “once a reliable method is applied to 
define symptoms or delineate a potential diagnostic category or dimension of psychopathology” 
can “these variables then be validated by examining their relationship to external measures” 
(1995, 162). The DSMs have, historically, provided the independent variable for studies 
attempting to validate psychiatric kinds. 
 However, the origins of today’s diagnostic categories do not offer confidence that they will be 
discriminative in the relevant way. Despite the ideal of a scientifically objective system, 
psychiatric kinds are historically embedded concepts, traceable to different strata of the 
discipline’s past. The aim of the first edition of the DSM, published in 1952, was to collect 
statistical information. Throughout the history of the manual, ambitious task forces have 
attempted to revise the DSM’s categories on the basis of contemporary methods and knowledge, 
rather than in the terms of decades-old census projects and nineteenth-century theory. With 
somatic medicine as the benchmark, discriminative diagnoses were considered the ideal targets 
for validation by early advocates of the medical model in psychiatry (Klerman 1978); the 
architects of the DSM-III prioritized the construction of diagnostic categories based on “distilled 
clinical research experience” as the “first and crucial taxonomic step” (Feighner et al. 1972, 57) 
towards identifying valid constructs.  
 While Feighner et al. sought to reground psychiatric nosology on empirical foundations, their 
criteria (which formed the template for the DSM-III) were in fact an amalgam of data and 
received clinical intuition, with many of the basic taxonomic divisions being inherited 
unchallenged (Kendler 2009). Similarly, the main architects for the most recent revision, the 
DSM-5, announced the need to “transcend the limitations of the current DSM paradigm” so 
that the new DSM could provide research criteria “not constrained by the requirements of the 
neo-Kraepelinian categorical approach currently adopted” (Kupfer, First, and Regier 2008, xxii). 
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In the end, however, with some exceptions (such as the reconfiguration of subtypes of autism on a 
spectrum and the removal of subtypes for schizophrenia) the nosological structure remained 
relatively stable.  
 Since the DSM is primarily intended to serve a clinical population, it makes sense that latent 
constructs postulated but not demonstrated by biomedical researchers would be excluded. Until 
theories about underlying mechanisms can be correlated with signs and symptoms that present in 
the clinic (either behaviorally or as the result of testing), they are irrelevant to the task of 
diagnosing patients. As it stands, the biologization of psychiatric research has not led to the 
discovery of any laboratory markers for specific psychiatric conditions, and there remain no 
biological screens for psychopathology—only the checklists of the DSM itself, and the tests that 
are based on its operationalizations (Kapur 2012). Decades of research into psychiatric and 
behavioral genetics have failed to turn up genes specific to particular disorders (though the 
heritability of types of psychopathology has been demonstrated [Merikangas and Risch 2003]) or 
neurological markers (despite advances in our understanding of the neurological underpinnings 
of signs and symptoms [Gillihan and Parens 2011]). The pharmaceutical industry has capitalized 
on optimism about a one-to-one correspondence between diagnosis, condition, and treatment; 
notable here is the historic relabeling of treatments specific to symptoms (e.g., “tranquilizers”) as 
treatments specific to purported disease entities (e.g., “antipsychotics”). In spite of this, the 
heterogeneity of diagnostic profiles is matched by the heterogeneity of patient response to 
treatment. Nearly all psychopharmaceutical interventions are nonspecific, and none come close 
to working for all patients sharing a diagnosis, which would allow the DSM to be redrawn along 
the lines of what Radden has called “drug cartography” (2003).  
 All in all, neither the history of the manual nor the current state of the art in biomedical 
psychiatry can support the assumption of diagnostic discrimination. In the next section I argue 
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that the structure of the DSM also gives reasons for pessimism, drawing on criticisms made by a 
growing number of psychiatric researchers that their disappointing failure to validate the DSM’s 
constructs is due to the fact that there is nothing for them to validate. Or, to put these judgments 
about the ontology of psychiatric kinds in my own epistemological terms: the diagnostic tests for 
psychiatric constructs are not discriminative in the relevant sense, in so far as little of interest 
from the perspective of biomedicine can be discovered about patients sharing a diagnosis beyond 
the recognition that they all present with (some of) the very signs and symptoms that constitute 
their diagnosis.  
4. The case for pessimism: a conceptual argument 
The first thing to be noted about the DSM’s structure is that if etiopathogenic facts about mental 
disorders are forthcoming, they will not stand in simple causal relationships to the signs and 
symptoms that act as diagnostic criteria. As of its third edition the DSM’s categories have been 
polythetic, requiring patients to present with only n symptoms out of a longer list in order to meet 
the threshold for a given disorder. The diversity of patients within each class is increased further 
because screens for psychopathology tend to have low thresholds, since the cost of a false-
negative (abandoning a patient in need of care) is viewed as higher than a false-positive (giving 
unneeded treatment) (Ross 2014). This has allowed diagnostic criteria to cast wider nets, and for 
reliability to be improved. But as a result, the DSM’s criteria allow for incredible diversity. For 
example, the DSM-5 permits patients to be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder if they 
present with any one of 636,120 possible combinations of symptoms (Olbert et al., 2014). This 
may mean that patients sharing diagnosis have a range of underlying pathologies that cause these 
related but distinct manifestations. Relevant facts will explain this diversity either by revealing 
homogeneity beneath promiscuous clinical descriptions, or by ultimately arriving at disjunctive 
accounts of the mechanisms that undergird them. The likelihood of the former across psychiatric 
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diagnoses is doubtful, given the relative rarity of single causes underlying distinct clinical 
presentations in somatic medicine (Olbert, unpublished). In cases of the latter, the heterogeneity 
of conspecifics that make up DSM-derived research samples could hamper progress towards a 
discovery of these diverse mechanisms.  
 Some amount of symptomatic variation is frequently found among patients sharing a 
diagnosis in other types of disease, such as cancer or lupus, so heterogeneity on its own does not 
prove that the DSM’s diagnoses are not discriminative. But the lack of compelling confirmations 
of psychiatry’s taxonomic boundaries by genetics, epidemiology, neurophysiology, and other 
allied sciences is worrying, raising the question of whether the manual is useful for anything more 
than identifying phenotypic clusters (Meehl 1986). Turning to the DSM’s use in the research 
setting, initial hopes that “zones of rarity” among diagnoses would emerge through the discovery 
of underlying mechanisms have not yet been fulfilled (Kendell and Jablensky 2003). Taxometric 
and epidemiological studies reveal that the enormous heterogeneity in symptoms and course 
actually contain recognizable sub-types that appear more frequently than others; however, 
underlying differences in causal pathways or mechanisms that could explain these trends have 
not been found (Nandi, Beard, and Galea 2009).  
 Recently, a new round of critics has suggested that the heterogeneity of test populations 
collected on the basis of DSM diagnostic criteria undermines these sorts of discoveries in 
psychopathology. Some believe that the best response would be to do away with diagnostic 
constructs as targets for validation (Hyman and Fenton 2003; Merikangas and Risch 2003). 
Their view is that explanations that facilitate intervention and recovery are better found at other 
levels—for example, the level of the symptom, the gene, or the neural mechanism. Sanislow et al. 
have written that “dependence on conventional nosologies leaves the enterprise of understanding 
mechanisms of psychopathology in the awkward position of assuming the validity of single 
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disorders and organizing research accordingly” (Sanislow et al. 2010, 2). In fact, validity is not 
assumed in such cases—the soundness of inferences about the diagnostic construct is not taken 
for granted, but rather is the object of investigation. What Sanislow et al. are reacting to is the 
assumption of diagnostic discrimination—the assumption that populations delineated by DSM 
categories are ripe for validation according to current biomedical standards.  
 This line of criticism is a reaction to cases like that described by Steven Hyman who, as the 
director of the NIMH in the late 1990s, became aware of and increasingly frustrated by the lack 
of research into treatments for the cognitive deficits of schizophrenia, among the most difficult 
and damaging symptoms experienced by patients. Hyman describes realizing that the lack of 
interest in cognitive symptoms was due to the bottleneck put on research by the DSM’s 
diagnostic criteria, since cognitive deficits were not included in the manual. “Given the status of 
the DSM-IV criteria as the community consensus,” Hyman writes of that time, “the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) held that it could not, by itself, recognize the cognitive 
symptoms of schizophrenia as an indication for the development and approval of new 
treatments” (Hyman 2010, 157). Recently, the DSM-5 Task Force has justified the continued 
lack of inclusion of cognitive symptoms quite explicitly, on the grounds that “cognition may not 
be useful as a differential diagnosis tool.”3  
 Hyman’s worry is that a vicious cycle is produced by the role of the DSM in research, such 
that the exclusion of a symptom (like cognitive deficit) from the manual for clinical reasons leads 
to the suppression of precisely the kind of research that would make its saliency for psychiatric 
practice clear. With his colleagues at the NIMH, Hyman began to construct a classification 
system for research that would allow scientists to apply for funding from the Institute without 
structuring their studies around DSM categories. Under the Research Domain Criteria rubric, 
                                                
3 http://www.DSM5.org/ProposedRevision/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=411#. 
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psychiatric investigators present their experiments as targeting fundamental components of 
mental functioning (or “research domains”) that are drawn from allied sciences, instead of using 
DSM constructs. Research domains contribute one axis to the matrix that the NIMH has 
proposed for organizing psychiatric research, which is sub-divided into more specific 
“constructs”—for example, “reward valuation,” “performance monitoring,” or “attachment 
formation and maintenance.” The other axis is “units of analysis,” ranging from “genes” to 
“behavior.”4  
 By encouraging the funding of research that investigates certain research domains at certain 
units of analysis, the RDoC changes the targets of validation from “clinical endpoints that have 
remained unchanged for decades” (Hyman and Fenton 2003, 351) to any sort of phenomenon 
relevant to psychopathology that may be viewed either as an extreme on a spectrum of human 
variation or as a dysfunctional structure or process. What is at stake with this new approach is the 
longstanding contention that psychiatry’s scientific targets are best located through the same 
classificatory tools as those deployed in clinical practice. Rather than seeking to replace the DSM 
as a diagnostic manual, RDoC works as a classification protocol for researchers. It aims to 
encourage a profound shift in the way research samples are conceived of and assembled. In some 
cases, the translational approaches encouraged by the NIMH require the study of mechanisms 
that cut across traditional diagnostic categories. Now, instead of relying on DSM categories to 
gather research populations, RDoC researchers may gather whatever populations are pertinent 
to their domain of interest.  
 This method facilitates the roundabouts researchers have always used to precisify generic 
diagnostic screens to meet their own needs (Meehl 1986; Kutschenko 2011a). Test populations 
                                                
4 The matrix also includes a column for “paradigms,” which are not units of analysis but rather 
scientific methods, frameworks, or tasks that are of use in the study of a particular construct. 
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need not even manifest homogeneous psychopathological symptoms, and indeed one of the aims 
of RDoC is to allow for the inclusion of patients typically ignored in research because they fall 
into a “not otherwise specified” category, as well as patients who show signs of mental distress but 
are below the threshold for diagnosis. So, for example, a group researching fear circuitry (construct 
of interest: fear/acute threat; domain: negative valence systems; unit: circuits) might use as their test 
population patients seeking medical help for anxiety, regardless of whether they meet any specific 
diagnostic criteria.5  
 The RDoC project avoids the pitfall of prematurely assuming diagnostic discrimination, 
although, as I discuss in Section 5.3, it still relies on other types of discrimination that may be 
faulty. Of interest here is that in order to liberate psychiatric research from the constraints of an 
unhelpful taxonomy, the NIMH has placed its bets for discrimination of research targets beyond 
the pages of the DSM. Debates over which sorts of objects are most worthy of study may 
continue to be played out under the RDoC through the distribution of funding dollars, but these 
judgments will be constrained by current epistemological and methodological commitments 
rather than nosological tradition. In contrast, when the DSM is used to design experimental 
protocols and present them to funding bodies it can act as a bottleneck, restricting research that 
cross-cuts or challenges existing diagnostic boundaries and excluding innovative explanatory 
approaches. If the DSM’s categories are discriminative in the relevant sense, such a narrowing of 
focus is a boon to research. If not, the DSM is analogous to the lamppost in the tale of the man 
who makes the mistake of looking for his keys where the light is, instead of where he lost them.  
 
                                                
5 This example is borrowed from the NIMH’s online materials about the RDoC—see 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/nimh-research-domain-criteria-
rdoc.shtml#toc_studies for the full example. Accessed 6/18/14. 
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5. In defense of optimism 
I have argued that the DSM may retard progress in psychiatry not merely by codifying and 
enforcing diagnoses that may not be valid, but also by limiting the abilities of researchers to make 
original valid inferences about the nature of psychiatric disorder.6 This effect is due to the widely-
held but, I have argued, unjustified assumption in psychiatry that the manual’s categories are the 
appropriate grounds on which to draw test populations for research purposes. In this section I 
consider three possible objections to my argument. The first is that if warrant for belief in 
diagnostic discrimination cannot be found in the DSM’s history or biomedical psychiatry’s track 
record, it can be found in clinical practice. The second is that some assumptions about 
discrimination must be made, and that the bottlenecking effects that these assumptions have on 
progress are a necessary cost of doing science. The third is that by giving up on validating the 
DSM’s categories, psychiatry would lose track of its true targets, making the assumption of 
diagnostic discrimination a prerequisite for psychiatric research.  
5.1 The Clinical Case for Diagnostic Discrimination 
 It has been assumed that if clinicians are able to separate patients into discrete kinds based on 
their symptomology there is good reason to anticipate that scientific validators will ultimately 
reinforce these divisions (Robins and Guze 1970). However, it seems that many clinicians 
themselves do not believe that the DSM accurately taxonomizes their patients. Studies of the 
actual usage of the manual suggest that clinicians find it primarily helpful for securing treatment 
options, and mostly ignore its complex polythetic structure (First and Westen 2007). Practitioners 
engage in diagnostic “bracket creep” to tweak coverage benefits and duck the restrictions that 
                                                
6 There are, of course, countless other powerful bottlenecks on psychiatric progress, among them 
that the brain is far more complex than other medical objects and that explanations of 
psychopathology from a biomedical perspective may well always be (to a greater degree than 
elsewhere in medicine) incomplete without contributions from psychology, the social sciences, 
and even the humanities. 
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insurance companies put on their ability to utilize their expert judgment (Bowker and Star 1999). 
Ethnographic research reveals that diagnoses often follow after treatment, rather than guiding it 
(Whooley 2010, 461). If the manual’s ubiquity in clinical practice is due to its integral role in the 
larger machinery of industrial and corporate healthcare, rather than its accurate representation 
of clinical types, any argument for diagnostic discrimination on these grounds is unsound.  
 Further evidence that the manual’s diagnostic constructs do not accurately represent clinical 
concepts of disorder comes from the widespread alarm over the deprecation of the experience of 
the patient due to the DSM’s reductive approach to description (Andreasen 2007). The DSM’s 
operationalized descriptions neglect the fact that “in addition to manifesting the relatively direct 
consequences of neurobiological abnormalities,” patients “react to their abnormalities in all kinds 
of ways that may sometimes require the categories of meaning and experience in order to be 
understood or explained” (Sass, Parnas, and Zahavi 2011, 16). Some phenomenologically-
oriented clinicians and philosophers of psychiatry have suggested that these experiential aspects 
of mental illness that should themselves be targets for validation (Mishara and Schwartz 2010). 
Ipseity disturbance, for example, has been used to differentiate schizophrenia-spectrum disorders 
from other forms of psychosis (Henriksen and Parnas 2012; Parnas et al. 2005). Taken together, 
these criticisms suggest that the DSM categories do not reflect the clinical picture sufficiently to 
justify optimism about their utility in the research setting.  
5.2 The inevitability of diagnostic discrimination  
Another possible objection is that the assumption of discrimination is inevitable in psychiatric 
investigation, and that the DSM is not (uniquely) culpable. Studies dividing subjects into groups 
must be always depend on tests assumed to be discriminative for the construct in question. 
Strategies like RDoC, it could be argued, simply replace the diagnostic constructs of the DSM 
with other sorts of constructs, in this case the sub-categories of its proposed domains. The validity 
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of these constructs can surely also be challenged, and the organization of research methods and 
practices in accordance with them could also be restrictive.  
 My aim is not to dismiss the importance of discrimination in psychiatric research, nor to 
suggest that psychiatry can or should do without constructs altogether, but rather to challenge the 
assumption that the DSM’s criteria are discriminative for research purposes. While the RDoC 
also relies on constructs, its architects have emphasized that these constructs are, first, completely 
open to revision and, second, explicitly designed to be broad enough to include the major 
paradigms currently at play within psychiatric research today. If the NIMH does not fulfill its 
promise to amend and expand the matrix’s research domain criteria in accordance with shifts in 
the field, it could well end up with calcified categories that restrict research in the way that the 
DSM’s categories have.  
 Notably, RDoC does not limit the conceivable objects of psychiatric research, which are not 
the same as the loci on the matrix at which the research falls. Rather than taxonomizing objects 
for psychiatric investigation, RDoC arranges domains of functioning in which such objects are 
located, providing for each a consensus definition and orienting researchers towards the available 
measures or elements across the units of analysis that could be used as variables for gathering 
populations for studies.7 Accordingly, researchers have a significant amount of autonomy in the 
design of their research. As in all scientific research, their choice of construct and the tests they 
use to measure for it should be scrutinized closely by their peers.  
5.3 The value of diagnostic kinds for psychiatric research 
A final objection worth considering is whether giving up on diagnostic kinds is worth it—whether 
the gains to research productivity that would come from having discriminative targets have too 
high an epistemological or ethical cost. It can be argued that keeping psychiatry focused on 
                                                
7 http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-MH-11-005.html 
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diagnostic kinds is the best way to avoid the reduction of the mentally ill to their component 
parts, which neglects the phenomenological core of psychopathology (McLaren 2011; Walter 
2013). Thus there is a risk that the NIMH’s own assumptions about the proper targets for 
psychiatric explanation may be crippling, potentially becoming (in Hyman’s evocative term for 
the DSM) another “unintended epistemic prison” (Hyman 2010, 157).  
 The NIMH has made little secret of its preference for analysis at the level of brain circuits, 
based on the reasoning that it is at this level that science is most rapidly gaining insight into the 
underlying correlates of behavior (Insel et al. 2010). However, this approach has garnered 
accusations that the RDoC is “mindless” (Frances 2013), that is, symptomatic of “the profession’s 
intent to complete its abandonment of the mind as the localization and source of our suffering” 
(Greenberg 2013, 342). In response Bolton (2013) has argued that the NIMH’s claim that “all 
mental diseases are brain diseases” need not be reductionistic insofar as the brain can be seen as 
integrated into a complex network of causal relations that extend beyond the individual. Other 
advocates of the RDoC framework suggest it might give empirical grounding to 
psychotherapeutic as well as pharmotherapeutic approaches (Morris and Cuthbert 2012, 31). 
However, especially in light the NIMH’s increasingly enthusiastic pursuit of basic science even as 
“fundamental and important questions regarding health services, psychosocial treatments, 
conceptual issues, public health, and patient initiatives remain marginally funded” (Sadler 2013, 
29), it remains to be seen whether the NIMH will be truly ecumenical in the distribution of 
research dollars across the columns of their matrix.  
 The RDoC project’s purported reductionism differs in an important way from the epistemic 
bottleneck of the DSM, however, insofar as it increases the conceptual and methodological 
distance between the laboratory and the clinic rather than collapsing it. If the pretense is 
abandoned that psychiatry’s scientific and practical objects are one and the same, the fits and 
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starts of the NIMH’s descriptive project need not immediately impact clinical nosology, nor need 
its reductive approach be directly imported into clinical practice. Solomon has argued that while 
expert disagreement can be generative in science, the value of stable consensus is higher in 
medicine, where the loss of epistemological authority can be dangerous (Solomon 2014). Her 
claims are vindicated by the widely expressed view that even the minor modifications of 
diagnostic categories found in each new edition of the DSM can be greatly harmful to patients 
(Frances 2009). As Schaffner has suggested, clinical research might continue to make progress on 
refining our understanding of psychopathology at “higher levels of aggregation” while projects 
facilitated by the RDoC framework work to reveal the complex and diverse “many-many 
relations” that make validity such a challenge (Schaffner 2012, 184). However, if the DSM stops 
playing its role as an epistemic hub (Kutschenko 2011b), the integration of psychiatric knowledge 
into therapeutics will need to be re-imagined—a project well beyond the scope of this paper. 
6. Conclusion: Implications for Philosophy of Psychiatry  
Diverse metaphysical orientations about the nature of the kindhood of diagnostic kinds are 
compatible with the assumption of diagnostic discrimination. Debates among philosophers of 
psychiatry over psychiatric kinds have focused on appraising these possible metaphysical stances, 
and there has recently been much effort to resolve the metaphysical nature of psychiatric kinds 
(Kincaid and Sullivan 2014). Insofar as the objects of diagnostic tests can be seen as either 
theoretical constructs or real entities, both realists and instrumentalists can beg the question of 
whether the DSM’s diagnostic criteria are indeed discriminative. This project has distracted 
philosophers from the fact that optimism about the discrimination of the diagnostic criteria may 
not, in some or all cases, be warranted. We have no reason to doubt that diagnostic 
discrimination varies across the DSM’s categories, rendering as ill formed the question of 
whether psychiatric kinds are natural, human, practical, constructed, etc. Since psychiatrists are 
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increasingly pursuing piecemeal causal explanations about constructs below the level of the 
diagnostic construct, they should follow Kincaid (2008) in leaving the question of diagnostic 
kindhood behind. Instead, philosophers can investigate the ways in which psychiatry stabilizes its 
diverse objects of research across disciplinary boundaries in the absence of the DSM’s 
authoritative voice (Sullivan 2014).  
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Confirmation Measures and Sensitivity
November 3, 2014
Abstract
Stevens (1946) draws a useful distinction between ordinal scales, interval
scales, and ratio scales. Most recent discussions of confirmation measures
have proceeded on the ordinal level of analysis. In this paper, I give a more
quantitative analysis. In particular, I show that the requirement that our
desired confirmation measure be at least an interval measure naturally yields
necessary conditions that jointly entail the log-likelihood measure. Thus I
conclude that the log-likelihood measure is the only good candidate interval
measure.
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1 Introduction
Suppose our preferred confirmation measure, c, outputs the numbers c(H1, E) = 0.1,
c(H2, E) = 0.2, c(H3, E) = 0.3, c(H4, E) = 50 for hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4,
given evidence E. It is natural to want to say that H1 and H2 are confirmed to
roughly the same (low) degree by E, and that H4 is confirmed by E to a much
higher degree than either H1 or H2. We might also want to say that the difference in
confirmation conferred by E on H1 as opposed to on H2 is the same as the difference
in confirmation conferred by E on H2 as opposed to on H3. If we make any of the
preceding assertions, we are implicitly relying on the assumption that it is legitimate
to interpret the differences between the numbers outputted by measure c. In other
words, we are assuming that c is at least an interval measure in the terminology
of Stevens (1946). In this paper I will show how the preceding assumption, when
properly spelled out, places stringent requirements on c that considerably narrow
down the field of potential confirmation measures. In fact, I will show that only
the log-likelihood measure meets the requirements. My argument does not, however,
establish that the log-likelihood measure is an interval measure, nor that it is the
true measure of confirmation; the argument only shows that the log-likelihood is
the only candidate interval measure. This leaves it open that there is no adequate
confirmation measure that is an interval measure.
I start by laying out my background assumptions in Section 2. In Section 3, I
make the requirements on cmore precise. In Section 4, I show how these requirements
entail that c is the log-likelihood measure. In Section 5, I discuss the implications of
the argument and consider a couple of objections.
2 Background Assumptions
According to a criterion of confirmation universally agreed upon among Bayesians,
E confirms H just in case Pr(H|E) > Pr(H).1 Although this criterion suffices to
1Disconfirmation happens when the inequality sign is reversed, and when there is an equality
sign we have confirmation neutrality.
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answer the binary question of whether or not E confirms H, it does not answer the
quantitative question of whether E confirms H to a high degree, nor does it answer
the comparative question of which of two hypotheses is confirmed more by E.2 In
order to answer either of the preceding types of question, one needs a confirmation
measure that quantifies the degree to which E confirms (or disconfirms) H. The
following is a small sample of the measures that have been offered in the literature:
The plain ratio measure, r(H,E) = Pr(H|E)
Pr(H)
The log-ratio measure, lr(H,E) = log r(H,E)
The difference measure, d(H,E) = Pr(H|E)− Pr(H)
The log-likelihood measure, l(H,E) = log( Pr(E|H)
Pr(E|¬H)
)
The alternative difference measure, s(H,E) = Pr(H|E)− Pr(H|¬E)3
Since Bayesians analyze confirmation in terms of probability, and since the proba-
bility distribution over the algebra generated by H and E is determined by Pr(H|E),
Pr(H), and Pr(E), it has become standard to assume that any confirmation mea-
sure can be expressed as a function of Pr(H|E), Pr(H), and Pr(E). The preceding
assumption is essentially the requirement that Crupi et al. (2013) call “formality.”
A strong case can however be made for not allowing our measure of confirmation to
depend on Pr(E). As Atkinson (2009) points out, if we let c(H,E) be a function of
Pr(E), then c(H,E) can change even if we add to E a piece of irrelevant ”evidence”
E ′ that is probabilistically independent of H and E, and of their conjunction. To
see this, suppose that c(H,E) = f(Pr(H), P r(H|E), P r(E)). Let E ′ be any propo-
sition whatsoever that is independent of H, E, and H&E.4 Then c(H,E&E ′) =
f(Pr(H), P r(H|E&E ′), P r(E&E ′)) = f(Pr(H), P r(H|E), P r(E)Pr(E ′)). If f de-
pends on the third argument, we can find some probability function Pr such that
f(Pr(H), P r(H|E), P r(E)Pr(E ′)) 6= f(Pr(H), P r(H|E), P r(E)), and thus such
2Carnap (1962) was the first philosopher to draw the distinction between these three questions.
3This measure is also sometimes called the ”Joyce-Christensen measure,” after Joyce (1999) and
Christensen (1999).
4I am of course assuming here that H and E are fixed.
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that c(H,E&E ′) 6= c(H,E). However, this is clearly counterintuitive, since E ′ is
probabilistically independent of H and E and therefore should not have any impact
on the confirmation of H. So we conclude that f should not depend on Pr(E).
Since I find the preceding argument convincing, I will assume that the confirma-
tion measure we are looking for is of the following form: c(H,E) = f(Pr(H), P r(H|E)).
Since there is no a priori restriction on what credences an agent may have except
that these credences must lie somewhere in the interval [0, 1], I will assume that f is
defined on all of [0, 1] ∗ [0, 1]. Note that, as Huber (2008) points out, this is not the
same as assuming that any particular probability distribution Pr(∗) is continuous.
The preceding two assumptions are summed up in the following requirement:
Strong Formality (SF). Any confirmation measure is of the following form: c(H,E) =
f(Pr(H), P r(H|E)), where f is a function defined on all of [0, 1] ∗ [0, 1].
It should be noted that (SF) excludes some of the confirmation measures that
have been offered in the literature.5 I briefly address lingering objections to (SF) in
Section 5.
Finally, I will also adopt the following convention:
Confirmation Convention (CC).
c(H,E) :


> 0 if Pr(H|E) > Pr(H),
= 0 if Pr(H|E) = Pr(H),
< 0 if Pr(H|E) < Pr(H).
(CC) is sometimes taken to be part of the definition of what a confirmation
measure is (e.g. by Fitelson (2001)). Although I think it is a mistake to think of
(CC) in this way, I will adopt (CC) in this paper for convenience. (CC) has the role
of setting 0 as the number that signifies confirmation neutrality.
5In particular, the alternative difference measure.
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3 The Main Requirement on c
Suppose we witness a coin being flipped 10 times, and our task is to assign a credence
to the proposition that the coin comes up heads on the 11th flip. If we do not in
advance know anything about the coin’s bias, it is reasonable to guess that the coin
will come up heads with probability H/10 on the 11th flip, where H is the number
of times the coin comes up heads in the 10 initial flips.6 In making this guess, we
are setting our credence in the coin landing heads equal to the observed frequency
of heads. This move is reasonable since the law of large numbers guarantees that
the observed frequency of heads converges in probability to the coin’s actual bias.
The observed frequency of heads does not necessarily equal the coin’s bias after just
10 flips, however. In fact, statistics tells us that the confidence interval around the
observed frequency can be approximated by pˆ±z
√
1
n
pˆ(1− pˆ), where pˆ is the observed
frequency, n is the sample size (in this case, 10 coin flips), and z is determined by
our desired confidence level.
For example, suppose we witness 4 heads in 10 coin flips and we set our confidence
level to 95%. In that case, z = 1.96, pˆ = 0.4, and the calculated confidence interval
is approximately [0.1, 0.7]. Clearly, the confidence interval in this case is rather
large. Given our evidence, we can do no better than to estimate the coin’s bias as
0.4. However, we also need to realize that if the 10 flips were repeated, we would
probably end up with a slightly different value for pˆ: we should acknowledge that
credences are bound to vary with our varying evidence.
The above example illustrates one way that variability can sneak into our cre-
dences: if our credence is calibrated to frequency data, then our credence inherits
the variability intrinsic to the frequency data. However, even if we set our credence
by other means than frequency data, we must admit that rational credences are in-
trinsically somewhat variable. For example, if the sky looks ominous and I guess
that there is a 75% chance that it is going to rain (or perhaps my betting behavior
reveals that this is my credence that it is going to rain), I must concede that another
agent whose credence (or revealed credence) is 74% or 76% is just as rational as I
6This assumes 0 < H < 10.
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am: I do not have either the evidence nor the expertise to discriminate between these
credences. And even if I do have good evidence as well as expertise, I must admit
that I am almost never in a position where I have all the evidence, and had I been
provided with somewhat different evidence, I would have ended up with a somewhat
different credence.
The fact that our credences are variable is a fact of life that any rational agent
must face squarely. It is not hard to see that this fact also affects Bayesian confir-
mation theory. Bayesian confirmation measures are defined in terms of credences,
and are therefore infected by the variability inherent in credences. If Bayesian con-
firmation measures are necessarily affected by variable credences, I contend that we
should want a confirmation measure that is affected by such variability in a system-
atic and predictable way. We should want this even if we only care about the ordinal
properties of confirmation measures. Suppose, for instance, that our confirmation
measure is very sensitive to minor variations in the prior or the posterior. In that
case, if we find out that c(H,E) > c(H ′, E ′), we cannot necessarily be confident
that H truly is better confirmed by E than H ′ is by E ′ because a small variation in
our credence in H or H ′ might well flip the inequality sign so that we instead have
c(H,E) < c(H ′, E ′). In order to be confident that c(H,E) really is better confirmed
than c(H ′, E ′), we need to be assured that the inequality sign is stable. Now, we can
be assured that the inequality is stable as long as c(H,E)−c(H ′, E ′) is of “significant
size.” But in order for us to be able to determine that c(H,E) − c(H ′, E ′) is “of
significant size,” we need to be able to draw meaningful and robust conclusions from
this difference.
Thus, even if we are primarily interested in the ordinal ranking of evidence-
hypothesis pairs provided by c, we still want to be able to draw conclusions from the
difference c(H,E)−c(H ′, E ′). However, if c is very sensitive to small variations in the
priors or posteriors of H and H ′, then the quantity c(H,E)− c(H ′, E ′) is unstable:
it could easily have been different, since our priors or posteriors could easily have
been slightly different (for instance if we calibrated our priors to frequency data).
We are therefore only justified in interpreting the difference c(H,E)− c(H ′, E ′) if c
is relatively insensitive to small variations in the priors and posteriors.
6
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Suppose, moreover, that slight variations in small priors (or posteriors) have a
larger effect on c’s output than do slight variations in larger priors. Then we cannot
compare the quantity c(H,E)− c(H ′, E) to the quantity c(H ′′, E)− c(H ′, E) unless
our prior credences in H ′′ and H are approximately the same. In order for us to be
able to compare c(H,E)− c(H ′, E) to c(H ′′, E)− c(H ′, E) in cases where our prior
credences in H ′′ and H are very different, we need c to be uniformly insensitive to
small variations in the prior (and the posterior). We can sum up the preceding two
remarks as follows:
Main Requirement (MR). We are justified in interpreting and drawing conclu-
sions from the quantity c(H,E)− c(H ′, E ′) only if c is uniformly insensitive to small
variations in Pr(H) and Pr(H|E).
As it stands, (MR) is vague. What counts as a small variation in a credence?
Moreover, what does it mean, concretely, for c to be uniformly insensitive to such
variations? To get a better handle on these questions, let us formalize the important
quantities that occur in (MR). Following (SF), we are assuming that c is of the
form c(H,E) = f(Pr(H), P r(H|E)). For simplicity, let us put Pr(H) = x and
Pr(H|E) = y, so that c = f(x, y). According to (MR), we require that f be
uniformly insensitive to small variations in x and y. I will use v(p, ǫ) to capture the
notion of a small variation in the probability p, where ǫ is a parameter denoting the
size of the variation. Moreover, I will use ∆xǫ c(x, y) to denote the variation in c that
results from a variation of size ǫ about x. That is to say,
∆xǫ c(x, y) = f(v(x, ǫ), y)− f(x, y) (3.1)
Similarly, I will use ∆yǫ c(x, y) to denote the variation in c that results from a
variation of size ǫ about y. Thus,
∆yǫ c(x, y) = f(x, v(y, ǫ))− f(x, y) (3.2)
The next step is to get a better grip on (MR) by investigating the terms that
occur in (3.1) and (3.2). In sections 3.1 through 3.3, that is what I do.
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3.1 What is uniform insensitivity?
First, the demand that c be uniformly insensitive to variations in the prior and the
posterior now has an easy formal counterpart: it is simply the demand that for
different values x1,x2,y1, and y2 of x and y, we have ∆
x1
ǫ c(x1, y1) = ∆
x2
ǫ c(x2, y2) =
∆x2ǫ c(x2, y1) = etc. and ∆
y1
ǫ c(x1, y1) = ∆
y2
ǫ c(x2, y2) = ∆
y2
ǫ c(x1, y2) = etc. Thus, across
different values of x and y, a small variation in c will mean the same thing. More
importantly, this means we can consider ∆xǫ c(x, y) as purely a function of ǫ, and
likewise for ∆yǫ c(x, y). From now on, I will therefore write:
g(ǫ) := ∆xǫ c(x, y) (3.3)
h(ǫ) := ∆yǫ c(x, y) (3.4)
In order to figure out what the requirement that c be insensitive to small varia-
tions amounts to, we need to figure out how to quantify variations in credences. It
is to this question that I now turn.
3.2 What is a small variation in a credence?
Given a credence x, what counts as a small variation in x? This question turns out to
have a more subtle answer than one might expect. Using the notation from equations
3.1 and 3.2, what we are looking for is the form of the function v(x, ǫ). Perhaps the
most natural functional form to consider is the following one: v(x, ǫ) = x+ǫ. On this
model, a small (positive) variation in the probability x is modeled as the addition of
a (small) number to x. However, if we consider specific examples, we see that this
model is too crude. For example, supposing that x = 0.5, we might consider 0.05 a
small variation relative to x. But if we consider x = 0.00001 instead, then 0.05 is no
longer small relative to x; instead it is now several orders of magnitude bigger.
The above example shows that the additive model cannot be right. An easy fix is
to scale the size of the variation with the size of x. In other words, we might suggest
the following form for v: v(x, ǫ) = x + xǫ. This adjustment solves the problem
mentioned in the previous paragraph. According to the new v, a variation of size
8
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0.025 about 0.5 is “equal” to a variation of 0.0000005 about 0.00001. In contrast to
the previous additive model, v(x, ǫ) = x+xǫ is a “multiplicative” model of variability,
as we can see by instead writing it in the following form: v(x, ǫ) = x(1 + ǫ)
However, the multiplicative model, though much better than the additive model,
is still insufficient. One problem is purely mathematical. Since v(x, ǫ) is supposed
to correspond to a small positive shift in probability, we should require that 0 ≤
v(x, ǫ) ≤ 1, for all values of x and ǫ. However, x + xǫ can easily be larger than 1,
for example if x = 0.9 and ǫ = 0.2.7 The other problem is that v(x, ǫ) treats values
of x close to 0 very differently from values of x close to 1. For instance, a variation
where ǫ = 0.1 will be scaled to 0.001 when x = 0.01. But when x = 0.99, the same ǫ
will be scaled to just 0.099. This is very problematic, since for every hypothesis H in
which we have a credence of 0.99, there corresponds a hypothesis in which we have a
credence of 0.01, namely ¬H. But a small variation in our credence inH is necessarily
also a small variation in our credence in ¬H, simply because Pr(¬H) = 1−Pr(H):
H and ¬H should therefore be treated symmetrically by v. There is an easy fix to
both of the preceding problems: if we scale ǫ by x(1− x) instead, then first of all we
have 0 ≤ x+ ǫx(1− x) ≤ 1 , and thus 0 ≤ v(x, ǫ) ≤ 1. Second of all, H and ¬H are
now treated symmetrically. From the preceding considerations, we therefore end up
with the following as our functional form for v: v(x, ǫ) = x+ x(1− x)ǫ.
There is a completely different argument by which we can arrive at the same
functional form for v. As I mentioned in the example at the beginning of section 3,
credences are sometimes calibrated to frequency data. This is for example usually
the case if H is a medical hypothesis. Suppose H represents the hypothesis that
a person P has disease X, for instance. The rational prior credence in H (before
a medical examination has taken place) is then the frequency of observed cases of
X in the population from which P is drawn. The frequency of observed cases of
X can be modeled as the outcome of a binomial process having mean Pr(H) and
variance Pr(H)(1 − Pr(H)). Suppose we observe the frequency fr(Hˆ). Then the
estimated variance is V ar(H) ≈ fr(Hˆ)(1 − fr(Hˆ)). The variance is maximal at
fr(Hˆ) = 0.5 and decreases as fr(Hˆ) moves closer to 0 or to 1. Arguably, it makes a
7This is also a problem for the additive model
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lot of sense in this case for the variability in one’s credence to vary with the variance
of the frequency data. But that is exactly what v(x, ǫ) = x + x(1 − x)ǫ does: it
scales credence variability by data variance. Thus, according to v, a variation of size
V ar(X)ǫ about credence X is equal to a variation of size V ar(Y )ǫ about credence
Y .
From all the preceding considerations, I conclude that the following is the best
functional form for v:
v(x, ǫ) = x+ x(1− x)ǫ (3.5)
3.3 Uniform insensitivity to small variations in the prior and
posterior
The next step is to understand what insensitivity amounts to. To say that c is insen-
sitive to small variations in the prior or posterior is to say that such variations have
a small effect on confirmation: the most natural way to formalize this requirement
is in terms of continuity. Since g(ǫ) represents the change in confirmation resulting
from a change (by ǫ) in probability, a natural continuity requirement for c would be
that g and h should be continuous at 0.
However, continuity is too weak a requirement. Even if a function is continuous,
it is still possible for it to be very sensitive to small variations. For instance, the
function f(x) = 1000000x is continuous (everywhere), but is at the same time very
sensitive to small perturbations of x. Sensitivity to perturbations is most naturally
measured by looking at how the derivative behaves. Minimally, we should therefore
require that g and h be differentiable at 0. The next natural requirement would be to
demand that the derivative of both g and h be bounded by some “small” number. Of
course, pursuing such a requirement would require a discussion of what is to count
as a “small” number in this context. Since I do not actually need a requirement of
this sort in my argument in the next section, I will not pursue a discussion of these
issues here. The only upshot from this section is therefore that g and h should be
differentiable at 0.
10
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4 The Main Result
Let me summarize where we are. Our desire to be able to draw conclusions from
differences in confirmation, i.e. from expressions of the form c(H,E) − c(H ′, E ′),
led us to the requirement that c be uniformly insensitive to small variations in
Pr(H) and Pr(H|E). In sections 3.1 through 3.3, I made the various components of
this requirement more precise. Putting all these components together, we have the
following:
Formal Version of the Main Requirement (MR) 4.1. We are justified in
drawing conclusions from the difference c(H,E) − c(H ′, E ′) only if the following
conditions are all met:
1. f(v(x, ǫ), y)− f(x, y) = g(ǫ), where:
2. g(ǫ) does not depend on either x or y
3. g(ǫ) is differentiable at 0
4. v(x, ǫ) = x+ x(1− x)ǫ
5. f(x, v(y, ǫ)− f(x, y) = h(ǫ), where:
6. h(ǫ) does not depend on either x or y
7. h(ǫ) is differentiable at 0
Note that (5) - (7) are just (1) - (3) except that they hold for h instead of for
g. Note also that (MR) is essentially epistemic. It says that “we” (i.e. agents
11
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interested in confirmation) are only justified in drawing conclusions (of any kind)
from c(H,E) − c(H ′, E ′) if certain formal conditions are met. These conditions
ensure that c(H,E) behaves reasonably well. Together with (SF) and (CC), the
conditions in (MR) entail the log-likelihood measure, as I show next.
Main Result 4.1. If (MR) is true, (SF) is assumed, and (CC) is adopted as a
convention, then
c(H,E) = log
Pr(E|H)
Pr(E|¬H)
Where the identity is unique up to positive linear transformations with constant term
0.
Proof. Starting with (1) from (MR), we have,
f(v(x, ǫ), y)− f(x, y) = g(ǫ) (4.1)
If we divide each side by x(1− x)ǫ, we get:
f(v(x, ǫ), y)− f(x, y)
x(1− x)ǫ
=
g(ǫ)
x(1− x)ǫ
(4.2)
Next, we let ǫ→ 0:
lim
ǫ→0
f(v(x, ǫ), y)− f(x, y)
x(1− x)ǫ
= lim
ǫ→0
g(ǫ)
x(1− x)ǫ
(4.3)
Since g is differentiable at 0 (from part (3) of (MR)), the right hand side of the
above equation is just 1
x(1−x)
g′(0). Since the limit exists on the right hand side of the
equation, it must exit on the left side as well. But the left side is just ∂
∂x
f(x, y). We
therefore have,
∂
∂x
f(x, y) =
1
x(1− x)
g′(0) (4.4)
Next, we take the antiderivative of each side of (4.4) with respect to x. Since g
and hence g′(0) does not depend on x (from part (2) of (MR)), we have:
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f(x, y) = g′(0)(log x− log (1− x)) + C (4.5)
Here, C is a number that depends on y but not on x. If we perform the above
calculations again starting instead with f(x, v(y, ǫ))− f(x, y) = h(ǫ), we find that:
C = h′(0)(log y − log (1− y)) +K (4.6)
Here, K is just a constant, i.e. it depends on neither x nor y. We therefore have:
f(x, y) = g′(0)(log x− log (1− x)) + h′(0)(log y − log (1− y)) +K (4.7)
Now set x = y = 0.5. The second part of (CC) then entails that K = 0. Next,
set x = y. Then (CC) entails:
g′(0)(log x− log (1− x)) + h′(0)(log x− log (1− x) = 0 (4.8)
This in turn entails that g′(0) = −h′(0). Thus we have,
f(x, y) = −h′(0)(log x− log (1− x)) + h′(0)(log y − log (1− y)) (4.9)
= h′(0) log
y
1− y
∗
1− x
x
(4.10)
Remembering that x = Pr(H) and y = Pr(H|E), (4.9)-(4.10) together with (SF)
entail:
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c(H,E) = f(Pr(H), P r(H|E)) (4.11)
= h′(0) log
Pr(H|E)
1− Pr(H|E)
∗
1− Pr(H)
Pr(H)
(4.12)
= h′(0) log
Pr(H|E)
Pr(H)
∗
Pr(¬H)
Pr(¬H|E)
(4.13)
= h′(0) log
Pr(H|E) ∗ Pr(E)
Pr(H)
∗
Pr(¬H)
Pr(¬H|E) ∗ Pr(E)
(4.14)
= h′(0) log
Pr(E|H)
Pr(E|¬H)
(4.15)
Finally, (CC) entails that h′(0) must be a positive number. Thus c(H,E) = l, up
to positive linear transformations with constant term 0.
5 Discussion and Objections
In the previous section, I showed that (MR), (SF), and (CC) jointly entail the log-
likelihood confirmation measure, l. The proof entails l up to strictly positive linear
transformations with constant term 0. That is to say, if log Pr(E|H)
Pr(E|¬H)
is a legitimate
confirmation measure, then so is a ∗ log Pr(E|H)
Pr(E|¬H)
, for a > 0; the argument does
not establish that any particular logarithmic base is better than another. In Stevens
(1946)’s terminology, our measure is apparently ratio, meaning that we are justified in
interpreting both intervals and ratios between outputs of the measure. Analogously,
mass is also a ratio measure since it makes sense to say both that the difference
between 2kg and 4kg is the same as the difference between 4kg and 6kg, and that
4kg is twice as big as 2kg.
It therefore appears that my conclusion is stronger than what I set out to estab-
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lish: in the introduction, I said that the goal was to find a confirmation measure that
can be interpreted as an interval measure. But the proof in the previous section ap-
parently establishes that l is a ratio measure. However, contrary to the appearances,
I think it is illegitimate to interpret l as a ratio measure. The difference between
interval measures and ratio measures is that ratio measures have a non-arbitrary 0.
But in our case, it is (CC) that establishes our measure’s 0, and (CC) is (as the
name suggests) just a convention. We could just as easily have chosen a convention
such that 1 meant confirmation neutrality. Therefore, the 0 is arguably arbitrary,
and it is not legitimate to interpret our measure as anything more than an interval
measure.
The second thing to notice about my argument is that it does not actually estab-
lish that the log-likelihood measure is the true confirmation measure. This is because
(MR) merely gives necessary conditions, and no sufficient ones. Thus, what my ar-
gument shows is really a conditional statement: if there is any interval confirmation
measure, then that measure is l. The preceding conditional is, of course, equivalent
to the following disjunction: either there is no interval confirmation measure or the
only interval confirmation measure is l.
The third and final observation I will make about the argument is that it clearly
depends very much on the choice of v. In Section 3.2 I considered and rejected two
other measures of variability: the additive measure, v(x, ǫ) = x + ǫ; and the multi-
plicative measure, v(x, ǫ) = x+ xǫ. It is natural to ask what confirmation measures
we end up if we instead use these alternative measures of credence variability. The
answer, although I will not show this here, is that the additive measure yields the
difference confirmation measure, d, whereas the multiplicative measure yields the
log-ratio confirmation measure, lr. We can therefore see that d and lr “embody”
defective measures of credence variability: arguably, that is a strike against these
measures.
Next, I will consider a couple of objections to the argument. First, my argu-
ment is obviously only sound if the assumptions in (MR) are correct. However,
the assumptions in (MR) might remind the reader of assumptions made in Good
(1960, 1984) and Milne (1996). These assumptions have been criticized by Fitelson
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(2001, 2006) as being “strong and implausible” (2001, 28-29n43) and for having “no
intuitive connection to material desiderata for inductive logic” (2006, 7n13).
Why does my argument escape Fitelson’s criticisms? How is my argument dif-
ferent from the arguments made by Good and Milne? The answer is that, whereas
Good and Milne are not interested in the interval properties of their confirmation
measures, and the various mathematical assumptions they make therefore seem un-
motivated, all the properties listed in (MR) arise naturally out of our wish to have
a confirmation measure that is at least an interval measure.
Finally, one may object to some of the other background assumptions I make
in Section 1. In particular, Strong Formality may be accused of being too strong
since it excludes the alternative difference measure right off the bat. My reply to
this objection is as follows: the argument in Section 4 can be carried out without
Strong Formality, but the resulting analysis does not yield the alternative difference
measure, nor any other recognizable confirmation measure. Thus, even if one rejects
(SF), one cannot use the type of argument I have given in this paper to argue for the
alternative difference measure or other standard measures that depend non-trivially
on Pr(E).8
6 Conclusion
I have argued that there is a set of conditions that any confirmation measure must
meet in order to justifiably be interpreted as an interval measure. Furthermore, I
have shown that these necessary conditions, together with an additional plausible
assumption and a widely accepted convention, jointly entail the log-likelihood mea-
sure. My argument does not show that l is an interval measure, but it does show that
it is the only measure that stands the chance of being one. Nor does the argument
in this paper show that l is the “true” confirmation measure. However, to the extent
that we care about our measure’s being an interval measure, we should regard the
conclusion in this paper as favoring l as our preferred measure.
8Such as Carnap’s measure, c(H,E) = Pr(H&E)− Pr(H)P (E).
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Abstract 
I examine the adequacy of the causal graph-structural equations approach to causation for 
modeling biological mechanisms. I focus in particular on mechanisms with complex 
dynamics such as the PER biological clock mechanism in Drosophila. I show that a 
quantitative model of this mechanism that uses coupled differential equations – the well-
known Goldbeter model – cannot be adequately represented in the standard 
(interventionist) causal graph framework, even though this framework does permit causal 
cycles. The reason is that the model contains dynamical information about the mechanism 
that concerns causal properties but that does not correspond to variables that could be 
subject to independent interventions. Thus, a representation of the mechanisms as a causal 
structural model necessarily suppresses causally relevant information.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent decades have seen the advent of elaborate formal techniques for causal modeling 
(Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000; Pearl 2000). These techniques, which essentially 
link causality to manipulability, have been instrumental in taking philosophical debate 
about causation as well as about scientific explanation to a new level (e.g., Woodward 
2003, 2011; Woodward and Hitchcock 2003; Hitchcock and Woodward 2003; McKay 
Illari, Russo and Williamson 2011). Furthermore, this formal approach to causality has 
been productively applied in order to analyze causation in specific scientific disciplines. 
Originally developed mainly in the context of econometrics, it was recently also applied to 
various other sciences, e.g., neuroscience (Craver 2007, Weber 2008), genetics (Waters 
2007; Woodward 2010), evolutionary theory (Otsuka forthcoming), psychiatry (Woodward 
2008), or public health policy (Russo 2012), to name just a few.  
The basic tools of this approach are the formally definable concepts of directed 
acyclic graph (DAG), Bayesian network, and structural equation. In the standard approach, 
the causal interpretation of these formal concepts is provided by means of the concept of 
idealized intervention. The result are causal models that contain information about 
counterfactual dependencies between a set of variables as well as, in some cases, 
probability distributions defined over these variables. 
While the fruitfulness of this approach to causal modeling in scientific practice as 
well as for philosophical analysis is beyond doubt, there have not been many attempts to 
explore its limits in adequately representing causal systems. There has, of course, been 
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quite some debate concerning the question of whether a certain conception of mechanism 
is adequate for explaining biological phenomena (e.g., Bechtel 2005, 2013; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2010; Braillard 2010; Kuhlmann 2011; Waskan, 2011; Weber 2012; Dupré 
2013; Woodward 2013). This debate focused on the issue of whether the standard 
conceptions of mechanism can account for biological processes that feature complex 
dynamical behavior and/or spatial structures. However, none of this work has directly 
challenged the underlying interventionist theory of causation itself. In fact, there is a whole 
range of more recent studies that attempt to show that Bayesian networks are actually 
adequate for modeling complex biological mechanisms (Casini et al. 2011; Clarke, 
Leuridan and Williamson 2014; Gebharter 2014; Gebharter and Kaiser 2014; Gebharter 
and Schurz, this symposium; Casini and Williamson, this symposium).  
In part, this problem turns on the question of how narrowly the term “mechanism” 
should be understood (Woodward 2013). In this paper, I will not be concerned with this 
issue. Rather, I want to examine to what extent the contemporary interventionist approach 
to causality is apt for representing the causal properties of a certain kind of mechanism in 
the first place. 
A critical issue will be the extent in which causal models that basically contain 
causal difference-making information can account for the dynamics and for spatial features 
of mechanisms, as such features are absolutely crucial for the explanatory force of many 
mechanisms, in biology and elsewhere. Woodward (2013) has argued that spatio-temporal 
information can always be integrated with the causal difference-making information 
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contained in causal models. While this may be true in some sense, I will show that it 
glosses over a basic problem pertaining to the dynamics of certain kinds of causal system. 
I will closely examine an example from biology that involves a mechanistic model 
consisting of a system of coupled differential equations with complex dynamics. This 
model describes the operation of a biological clock. I will assume without further argument 
that this model captures the essential causal properties of the biological clock mechanism, 
at least with respect to certain explanatory goals.
1
 Then, I will show that formal causal 
models fail to correctly represent these causal properties. Specifically, I will argue that 
such a model will not be able to treat time derivatives as causally relevant variables. 
I shall proceed as follows. In Section 2, I shall briefly review the core notions used 
in the causal modeling literature, in particular the notions of causal graph, structural 
equations, and ideal intervention. In Section 3, I analyze a dynamical model of a biological 
clock mechanism and show that it has no adequate causal graph representation. In Section 
4, I consider some attempts from the current causal modeling literature to represent 
differential equations in structural causal models. I show that the results coming from these 
                                                      
1
 I am not assuming that there is just one correct way of representing a causal system. 
Thus, I accept the pluralist thesis according to which there is always a variety of different 
perspectives on the world none of which succeeds in providing a complete picture (Kellert, 
Longino and Waters 2006; Dupré 2013). In fact, I suggest that my arguments presented 
here could be used for actually defending such a strong form of scientific pluralism, but 
this would go beyond the scope of this paper.  
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attempts actually support my thesis. Section 5 summarizes and integrates my conclusions 
with regard to the limitations of causal modeling. 
 
2. Causal Modeling 
The formal concepts used in causal modeling include directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), 
structural equations and Bayesian Networks. In this paper, I shall focus on DAGs and 
structural equations and leave Bayesian networks aside, but it should be noted that any 
problem concerning DAGs will also affect causally interpreted structural equations as well 
as Bayesian networks because the latter two kinds of causal models contain DAGs.
2
  
A DAG is an ordered pair 〈V, E〉, where V is the set of variables and E is a set of 
directed edges. 
 
A DAG becomes a causal graph as soon as its edges are interpreted causally, about which I 
will say a little more below.  
Causal dependencies can also be represented by using so-called structural models 
(Pearl 2000). Such a model consists of an ordered triple 〈U, V, Q〉 where U is a set of 
exogenous variables, V a set of endogenous variables, and Q a set of structural equations. 
The structural equations give the value of each endogenous variable as a function of the 
                                                      
2
 I wish to thank Lorenzo Casini for pointing this out to me. 
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values of other variables in U and V. The variables may also be interpreted as nodes that 
are connected by causal arrows. But in contrast to pure causal graphs, the structural 
equations also provide quantitative information as to how much some dependent variables 
change per unit change of the independent variable.  
Pearl (2000, p. 160) gives the following “operational” definition of a structural 
equation: 
An equation y = βx + ε is said to be structural if it is to be interpreted as follows: In 
an ideal experiment where we control X to x and any other set Z of variables (not 
containing X or Y) to z, the value y of Y is given by βx + ε, where ε is not a 
function of the settings x and z. 
 
According to this definition, it is obvious that structural equations sensu Pearl are linear 
equations in the sense of not containing derivatives of the variables. As we shall see, this 
feature constitutes a major limitation when it comes to modeling systems with complex 
dynamics. 
 Pearl’s definition of a structural equation contains the idea of an “ideal 
experiment”. This notion has been elaborated in great detail by Woodward (2003, 94-99), 
who defines it in terms of the notion of ideal intervention. On this account, an (ideal) 
intervention on some variable X with respect to some variable Y changes Y by changing X 
without changing any other variable that is a cause of Y. 
In a nutshell, these are the basic concepts of causal modeling. Thus, when I speak 
about a “causal model” in what follows, I mean a model that is expressed by using either 
causal graphs or structural equations and that uses an interventionist criterion for 
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interpreting the graphs and equations causally. The goal of this paper (as well as the paper 
by Kaiser, this symposium) is to show that these concepts fail to fully account for certain 
causal explanations in biology.  
In the following section, I show what problems are created for causal models by 
complex dynamical information. Kaiser (this symposium) does the same for spatially 
complex mechanisms. Thus, while Kaiser’s paper is about space, this one is about time. 
 
3. It’s About Time: Modeling Dynamic Processes 
3.1. Classic Examples of Dynamic Models in Biology 
There is an important class of biological models that try to account for complex series of 
events in dynamical terms. A classic example is the Hodgkin-Huxley model of the action 
potential (see, e.g., Weber 2005, 2008). This model (henceforth HH model) shows how 
changes in membrane conductance generate a temporary membrane depolarization that can 
spread along an axonal membrane and thus form the basis of information processing by 
neurons. A more recent example is Goldbeter’s (1995) model of the circadian oscillations 
of the PER protein in Drosophila, which is the heart of a biological clock mechanism. 
There are many more such models, but for the purposes of this paper we shall concentrate 
on these two.  
 
3.2. Bechtel and Abrahamsen on Dynamic Mechanistic Explanation 
In a recent series of papers, Bill Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen have provided a very 
illuminating account of models and mechanisms in circadian clock research, including 
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Goldbeter’s model and the PER mechanism (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2010, Bechtel 
2013). Their account will prove to be useful for our analysis, which is why it will be 
briefly reviewed here. We take the gist of their account to be that circadian clock models 
provide what they call dynamic mechanistic explanations. According to Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen, such explanations differ from other kinds of mechanistic explanations in 
providing quantitative information about the behavior of the systems in question. Dynamic 
mechanistic explanations (may) contain sequential mechanistic models that describe a 
series of events in purely qualitative terms. Figure 1 shows such a sequential mechanistic 
model.  
 
Figure 1. The sequential mechanism of the Drosophila circadian clock gene period. After 
Hardin et al. (1990). 
 
An interesting feature of this sequential model according to Bechtel and Abrahamsen is the 
fact that it is possible to mentally rehearse the individual steps as well as their temporal 
arrangement.  
DNA.  
Figure 6. Hardin, Hall, and Rosbash’s (1990) mechanism for circadian oscillations in 
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But the most important claim made by Bechtel and Abrahamsen for our purposes is 
the following: The qualitative sequential model as shown in Figure 1 is incomplete. For 
what the model must show is that the circadian system is capable of generating stable 
oscillations. This is where the dynamical, quantitative model constructed by (Goldbeter 
1995) comes in. The model describes the change in cytoplasmic concentrations of PER 
mRNA (M) as well as the different phosphorylation states of cytoplasmic (P0, P1, P2) as 
well as nuclear (PN) PER protein with the help of differential equations. The model uses 
standard Michaelis-Menten enzyme kinetics where the Vi are maximal reaction rates and 
the Ki the so-called Michaelis constants for the different biochemical reactions involved 
(the Michaelis constant gives the substrate concentration at which the reaction rate is half 
the maximal rate). 
The structure of the dynamical model can be extracted from Figure 5. 
 
Figure 2. The structure of Goldbeter's dynamical model (after Goldbeter 1995). The 
concentration of per mRNA is represented by M, that of different forms of the PER protein 
by Pi. P0 is the unphosphorylated, P1 the monophosphorylated and P2 the biphosphorylated 
form. PN is for the nuclear PER protein, all the other concentrations are cytosolic. vs is the 
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maximal rate of mRNA synthesis, vm and Km are the maximum rate and Michaelis constant 
for the enzymatic degradation reaction of the mRNA. The Vi and Ki give the maximum 
rates and Michaelis constants for the kinases and phosphatases catalyzing reversible 
phosphorylation reactions. vd and Kd are the enzymatic parameters for the degradation 
reaction of fully phosphorylated PER. k1 is a rate constant for the transport of PER protein 
into the cell nucleus, k2 for the reverse transport. Feedback inhibition of per mRNA by 
nuclear PER is modeled by a Hill equation with a cooperativity of n and a repression 
threshold constant KI.  
 
Goldbeter wrote down the reaction rates for the different molecular species as follows: 
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Using numerical integration techniques, Goldbeter was able to show that for some 
parameter values there is indeed a limit cycle, in other words, a stable oscillation of the 
concentrations of mRNA and PER protein.  
Bechtel and Abrahamsen stress that without this quantitative model, the sequential 
model provides no explanation for the stability of the circadian behavior. Without 
introducing quantitative parameters, the sequential model could produce all kinds of 
behavior, only some of which generate a limit cycle. Thus, the dynamical model must 
complement the sequential model to obtain the full explanation. 
I will argue now that at best the sequential model sensu Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
can be represented as a causal model. The dynamical model cannot be so represented, even 
though it clearly represents a causal process (in an idealized and simplified way). Thus, I 
shall argue that the Goldbeter model is a case of a biological explanation that cannot be 
accounted for by causal graph models. 
 
3.3 The Sequential Model as a Structural Causal Model 
I shall first attempt to represent what Bechtel and Abrahamsen call the sequential model 
within this causal framework. There is an apparent difficulty in that the sequential model is 
cyclical whereas causal graphs are acyclical. However, this problem is not new and 
solutions have been proposed by several authors (Kistler 2013; Gebharter and Kaiser 2014; 
Clarke, Leuridan and Williamson 2014). Briefly, one way of doing this is by introducing a 
time index on some of the nodes of the causal graph structures. When a system comes to 
the end of a cycle, time has passed. This new state of the system should thus be represented 
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by a different node, a variable that represents the state of the system at a later time. This 
way, the cyclical path is broken up and “rolled out” in time and presents no problems for 
the causal modeler. 
 However, it should be clear that such a causal graph fails to fully explain the 
explanandum phenomenon, because essential dynamical information is missing. The graph 
would merely represent what Bechtel and Abrahamsen refer to as the sequential model. In 
the next section, I shall examine how the dynamical model could be represented. 
 
3.4 The Dynamical Model as A Structural Causal Model 
Could the same strategy that works for the sequential model also be used for representing 
Goldbeter’s dynamical model by using causal graphs? It could be suggested that the causal 
structure of the model is captured by the following time-indexed causal graph: 
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Figure 3. Proposed time-indexed DAG representing the causal dependencies in the 
Goldbeter model. 
 
It could be argued, perhaps, that this DAG contains all the causal relations posited by the 
Goldbeter model. A quantitative structural model could also be constructed, for example 
by writing down rules for updating the values of the salient variables from each discrete 
time point to the next.  
 However, it should be clear that such a causal structural model would not be the 
same as the Goldbeter model. Differential equations with continuous time are 
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mathematically clearly different from a model with discrete time points.
3
 Perhaps there is a 
discrete-time model that makes approximately the same prediction as Goldbeter’s model. 
In fact, numerical simulations of the equation system use pretty much this strategy. 
However, the following difficulty arises: In order to really explain the explanandum 
phenomenon, a model must incorporate temporal information, namely information about 
how rates of change affect the behavior of the system. Goldbeter’s differential equations 
contain precisely such information, and this information is crucial for the model’s 
explanatory force. In fact, I wish to maintain that rates of change are causally relevant, 
because they are important determinants for the behavior of the whole causal process. 
Thus, I will show now that the Goldbeter model contains causally relevant variables that 
cannot be represented in the causal graph framework. Furthermore, to the extent that the 
model is substituted by a discrete-time model that is (approximately) predictively 
equivalent, the same difficulty arises. 
 My main argument is that Goldbeter equations do not have the right manipulability 
properties that are required by structural causal models. I will show, first, that not all causal 
variables can be subject to ideal interventions as required by the causal graph theory. 
Second, I want to show that the equations do not satisfy the modularity requirement that is 
widely thought to be important in causal models. 
First, to see the problem with ideal interventions, consider for example equation 
(1a) of the Goldbeter model. Suppose we wished to intervene on M, the mRNA 
                                                      
3
 It is known that difference equations can have quite surprising properties, see May 
(1974). 
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concentration. This obviously cannot be done in a way that leaves the time derivative 
dM/dt unchanged (if I want to go faster on my bike, thus changing the value of v, I have to 
accelerate and thus change the value of dv/dt). The same problem occurs for all the other 
causally relevant variables in the model. Note also that a discrete model faces the exact 
same difficulty; the only difference is that the rates of change are defined over a time 
interval instead of a time point. Thus, these equations cannot be subject to the idealized 
interventions that define causal relations according to causal modelers.   
Second, to see the failure of modularity, consider for example equations (1b) and 
(1c). Let us examine what happens when we replace (1b) by the following equation (1b*): 
dP0/dt = p0, where p0 is some real number. This would not only wipe out the r.h.s. of (1b), 
it would also affect the equations that determine the value of P0. The reason is, once again, 
that dP0/dt and P0 cannot be manipulated independently of each other. The same problem 
occurs for the other M- and P-variables. Therefore, the system of equations fails to satisfy 
the condition of modularity sensu Woodward (2003, 48-49, 327-39), which can also be 
viewed as a kind of manipulability.
4
  
What features of the Goldbeter model are responsible for this lack of 
manipulability, including modularity? It seems to us that the main such feature is the fact 
                                                      
4
 The purpose of the modularity condition is normally to ensure that different equations 
represent different causal pathways or mechanisms. Perhaps it could be argued that, 
indeed, some causal mechanisms in the Goldbeter model overlap. For instance, there is a 
causal cycle between M and P0 as well as between P0 and P1 and these causal cycles share 
P0 as a common constituent (cf. Casini and Williamson unpublished). 
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that some causal variables that occur in the model affect their own rate of change, and that 
for these variables their rate of change is of crucial relevance – indeed causal relevance – 
for the behavior of the whole system. For example, the rate of change of mRNA (M) 
depends on its own concentration. This is due to a causal process that is mediated by 
RNA-degrading enzymes. Furthermore, the concentration of monophosphorylated protein 
P1 depends causally on the concentration of unphosphorylated protein P0, which in turn 
depends on P1. Both causal dependencies are mediated by kinases, thus they are causal 
processes.
5
  
In Goldbeter’s representation of these processes, not only the values of the 
variables at a given time point but also their rates of change are causally relevant. In other 
words, it matters not only that a variable X change its value from x1 to x2, which is the kind 
of information that can be encoded in causal graphs. It matters also how long it takes for a 
variable to change by some amount, including an infinitesimally small amount. This rate of 
change is a causally relevant property, but this causal relevance cannot be represented as a 
causal dependence in the causal framework because the rate of change cannot be 
                                                      
5
 An anonymous referee
 
suggested that these dependencies are not causal but constitutive 
or due to part-whole relations. While there might be some part-whole relations involved in 
the model (e.g., in the way in which different processes contribute to the overall rate of 
change of a variable), the dependencies we are talking about here, e.g., the dependence of 
the rate of change of M on the concentration M (equation 1a) are not of this kind. This 
dependence is due to an enzyme-directed biochemical reaction, which is clearly a causal 
processes.
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manipulated independently of all the other variables and equation as the standard causal 
theory requires it (see above; lack of independent manipulability and modularity). Rather, 
in these causal processes, concentrations and their rates of change are so intimately 
intertwined and integrated (cf. Mitchell 2009) that it is not possible to disentangle causal 
difference-making and dynamical information.   
Why can the differential equations in the Goldbeter model not be replaced by 
something more akin to the causal modeler's structural equations, e.g., difference equations 
with a discrete time variable? As I have argued, it seems the same difficulty would arise: as 
soon as the concentration variables and the time intervals are fixed, the rates of change are 
determined and therefore no longer independent.
6
 Furthermore, replacing the differential 
equations by standard structural equations would be like trying to do Newtonian mechanics 
without using calculus; what would be the point? 
A possible response by the causal modeler might be to deny that the differential 
equations are even contenders for representing causal dependencies. Differential equations 
contain functions of time and their derivatives and need to be integrated in order to predict 
or explain physical events. Surely, when we want to discuss the causal content of models 
such as Goldbeter’s we have to consider suitably integrated forms of equations.  
The problem with this reply is that systems of differential equations such as 
Goldbeter’s or HH can only be integrated numerically. The solutions of these equations 
that are available, showing the concentrations of various molecular species, have been 
obtained with the help of computer simulations. In these solutions, whatever causal 
                                                      
6
 This was pointed out to me by an anonymous referee. 
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difference-making information was represented in the differential equations (if any) is 
irretrievably lost. However, these simulations provide a different kind of information: They 
show under which parameter values certain kinds of behavior are stable. In the case of the 
Goldbeter model, the behavior that is of particular importance, for obvious reasons, is 
stable oscillatory behavior. It can be represented by a limit cycle in a plane defined by 
mRNA and total PER protein concentrations. The limit cycle gives the initial conditions 
for M and Pt (= total PER protein concentration) that generate a stable oscillation, which 
functions as the basic Zeitgeber for Drosophila’s biological clock. I would not refer to this 
kind of information as causal difference-making information but as stability information.  
Perhaps it could be argued that the integrated model provides some kind of causal 
difference-making information as well. In his original 1995 paper, Goldbeter showed that 
the rate of PER protein degradation has a strong effect on the period of the oscillations. 
The more rapidly the protein is degraded in the cell, the longer the period of the 
oscillations become. The reason is intuitively clear: The more rapidly the protein 
disappears, the longer it takes for protein synthesis to rise the concentration above the 
threshold where the repression of transcription by nuclear PER protein significantly slows 
down gene expression such that the concentration of PER starts to drop after a period of 
increase. However, as intuitively obvious as this may be, the exact effect of the rate of 
decay on the period of the oscillations can only be predicted by such a dynamical model, 
which, as I have shown, contains causal information that is highly integrated with 
temporal, dynamical information and thus not representable by standard causal models, 
because the independent manipulability and modularity requirements are not satisfied.  
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In the following section, I will consider some results from the causal modeling 
literature as to how systems of differential equations can be represented by structural 
causal models. As I will show, these results, while it is highly illuminating for the problem 
at hand, actually support my thesis about the limitations of causal modeling. 
 
4. Differential Equations and Causal Structural Models 
Attempts to describe at least the equilibrium states of systems of differential equations with 
structural causal models can be found in the causation literature, for example, Mooij, 
Janzing and Schölkopf (2013); henceforth abbreviated as “MJS”.
7
 MJS treat systems of 
ordinary first-order differential equations such as they feature in many scientific models, 
e.g., the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey dynamics or the coupled harmonic 
oscillator in mechanics. The systems described by such equations may be considered to 
contain causal cycles. For instance, in a predator-prey system the density of predators 
affects the density of prey, which causally feeds back to the predator density. This is the 
kind of causal cycle that we also find in our biological clock case examined in the previous 
section. Even though causal graphs (DAGs) are typically acyclic, this is not a constraint 
that would somehow be necessitated by the formalism. I have already mentioned possible 
approaches to modeling causal cycles in Section. MJS take a somewhat different approach: 
They show that the equilibrium solutions of systems of coupled differential equations that 
describe systems with some causal feed-back correspond to a structural causal model.  
                                                      
7
 I wish to thank an anonymous referee for calling this work to my attention. 
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 It is not possible here to reproduce the full treatment given by MJS. Basically, they 
consider dynamical systems represented by systems of coupled differential equations of the 
following form: 
 
�!(�) = �! �!"� ! , �! 0 = (�!)! ∀� ∈ ℐ 
 
where the indices ���(i) range over the set of parents of the variable Xi, each fi is a smooth 
function of X, and each (X0)i is an initial condition. Then, they provide an account of what 
it means to intervene on such a system, as intervention is part of the standard semantics of 
causal models. In a nutshell, an idealized intervention can be described as: 
 
�!(�) =
0, � ∈ �
�! �!"� ! , � ∈ ℐ ∖ �
 
�! 0 =
�! , � ∈ �
�!!
, � ∈ ℐ ∖ �
 
 
In such an intervention, some set of components I of the system are forced to take some 
target value, such that the first time derivative of the variable Xi takes the value zero (i.e., X 
remains constant), while the variable takes some fixed target value ξi.
8
 Thus, whatever 
                                                      
8
 Note how this intervention must fix the values for both the variables and their rate of 
change at the same time (cf. Section 3.4). This is exactly how the structural causal model 
obliterates information that is explanatorily relevant. 
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mechanism previously determined the value of the Xi, the intervention exogenously breaks 
this mechanism and sets the variables to a fixed value. This corresponds to the well-known 
breaking of directed edges by intervention variables in ordinary causal graphs.  
 What is interesting to note in the present context is that, according to the definition 
of an idealized intervention given by MJS, such an intervention changes not just one but 
two equations. This shows, once again, that such a system of equations is not modular in 
the sense discussed in the previous section. (It might be modular in the sense that it doesn’t 
change any further equations, though).   
 The idealized interventions obviously change the equilibrium states of the system. 
For example, a Lotka-Volterra system has a steady state in which the predator and prey 
populations show an undamped oscillation. If intervened upon in the manner shown above, 
such a system changes its equilibrium state. If, for example, the intervention sets the 
predator density in a Lotka-Volterra system to ξ2, the system’s new unique stable 
equilibrium state is (X
eq
1, X
eq
2)=(0, ξ2). In general, equilibrium states of systems of 
intervened differential equations can always be obtained by setting the rates of change of 
the variables to zero by an intervention. The resulting equilibrium is then described by 
some equilibrium equations. 
 Just as in ordinary causal graph representations, nodes and directed edges can be 
used to represent the outcome of possible interventions on the variables figuring in systems 
of differential equations. In the cases such as the ones considered here, there will be a set 
of equilibrium equations for each possible intervention of the kind introduced above. MJS 
show how such equilibrium equations can be derived in general, and that they form causal 
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structural models in accordance with the causal framework assumed. Thus, it seems that 
the causal graph framework with its standard interventionist semantics is able to deal with 
systems of differential equations. MJS suggest that this approach “sheds more light on the 
concept of causality as expressed within the framework of Structural Causal Models, 
especially for cyclic models.” 
 I wish to draw a different conclusion from MJS’s highly illuminating treatment. In 
my view, their approach to dynamical systems described by differential equations reveals 
precisely the limitations to the causal graph framework that I wish to expose in this paper. 
For it is clear that such an approach can only deal with stable equilibrium states of a 
system, i.e., such equilibrium states where there is no more change. This is a simple 
consequence from the kind of interventions introduced, where the first derivatives with 
respect to time of the variables considered are set to zero. Thus, the structural causal 
models represent static situations rather than dynamic processes. For some intents and 
purposes, this may be fine. But if it is accepted that the dynamical models examined here 
are representations of the causal properties of a system and that the rates by which 
variables change is such a property, this kind of causal property does not seem to be 
captured by ordinary causal structural models. 
 I wish to end this argument by disenabling a potential misinterpretation. My thesis 
of this paper should not be understood as a claim about causal discovery. None of the 
considerations presented here support the conclusion that a causal search procedure of the 
kind developed by Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2000) would be unable to identify all 
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the variables that values of which affect the behavior of the system.
9
 I am only claiming 
that the entities referred to by these variables have causal properties – in particular the rate 
of change – that cannot be given a causal interpretation by using the standard formalisms. 
  
6. Conclusions 
My intention in this paper has not been to argue that there exist forms of explanations in 
biology that are not causal. There clearly is a sense in which DNA sequence recognition by 
proteins (Kaiser, this symposium) as well as the biological clock mechanisms discussed 
here are causal processes. What I as well as Kaiser (this symposium) want to show is that 
these biological explanations contain causal information that is not reducible to causal 
difference-making information of the kind that can be expressed in the formal causal 
models available today. Biological explanations often contain causal information that is 
inextricably intertwined with, first, spatial information and, second, dynamical 
information. The spatio-temporal aspects represented in these explanations are not such 
that they could simply be integrated with the causal difference-making information to give 
the full picture. At least in the case of the dynamical information contained in systems of 
differential equations, there appears to be a deep incompatibility between the axioms of 
causation and the dynamical model. Just as the circadian clock mechanism cannot be 
                                                      
9
 For an illuminating discussion of this important issue in the context of systems of 
differential equations see Dash (2005). It should be noted that, just like in the Mooij, 
Janzing and Schölkopf (2013), time derivatives of variables are never treated as 
independent causes. 
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understood by looking at the level of individual molecules, complex spatially organized 
cohesive interactions in DNA-protein complexes (see Kaiser, this symposium) cannot in 
practice be expressed by causal graphs in a way that brings out the explanatory power and 
utility of these models.  
 My conclusion with respect to dynamical mechanistic models differs thus 
somewhat from Bechtel’s and Abrahamsen’s illuminating analysis: What they call the 
sequential and dynamical mechanisms, respectively, represent not two models that 
complement each other. Rather, in my view they represent incompatible perspectives on 
the same phenomenon of the kind that scientific pluralists have postulated (Kellert, 
Longino and Waters 2006). 
Thus, rather than just the need of supplementing causal graphs with spatio-temporal 
labels such as to fine-tune them, a close examination of biological explanations rather 
reveals some intrinsic limitations of a certain type of causal model. Perhaps a new theory 
of causation is needed in order to do (more) justice to such explanations, in biology as well 
as in other sciences that deal with complex dynamical processes. 
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Abstract
Boltzmannian statistical mechanics partitions the phase space into macro-
regions, and the largest of these is identified with equilibrium. What justifies
this identification? Common answers focus on Boltzmann’s combinatorial
argument, the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution, and maximum entropy con-
siderations. We argue that they fail and present a new answer. We char-
acterise equilibrium as the macrostate in which the system spends most of
its time and prove a new theorem establishing that equilibrium thus defined
corresponds to the largest macroregion. Our derivation is completely gen-
eral in that it does not rely on assumptions about the system’s dynamics or
internal interactions.
1 Introduction
Boltzmannian statistical mechanics (BSM) partitions the phase space of a system
into cells consisting of macroscopically indistinguishable microstates. These cells
correspond to the macrostates, and the largest cell is singled out as the equilibrium
macrostate. The connection is not conceptual: there is nothing in the concept of
equilibrium tying equilibrium to the largest cell. So what justifies the association
of equilibrium with the largest cell?
After introducing BSM (Section 2), we discuss three justificatory strategies
based on Boltzmann’s combinatorial argument, the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribu-
tion, and maximum entropy considerations, respectively. We argue all three fail
because they either suffer from internal difficulties or are restricted to systems with
negligible interparticle forces. This prompts the search for an alternative answer.
In analogy with the standard thermodynamic definition of equilibrium, we charac-
terise equilibrium as the macrostate in which the system spends most of its time.
1
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We then present a new mathematical theorem proving that such an equilibrium
macrostate indeed corresponds to the largest cell (Section 4). This result is com-
pletely general in that it does it is not based on any assumptions either about the
system’s dynamics or the nature of interactions within the system.
2 Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics
Let us briefly introduce BSM.1 Consider a system consisting of n particles which is
isolated from the environment and in a bounded container. The system’s state is
specified by a point x = (q, p) (the microstate) in its 6n-dimensional phase space Γ.
The system’s dynamics is determined by its classical Hamiltonian H(x). Energy is
preserved and therefore the motion is confined to the 6n − 1 dimensional energy
hypersurface ΓE defined by H(x) = E, where E is the energy value. The solutions
of the equations of motion are given by the phase flow φt on ΓE, where φt(x) is the
state into which x ∈ ΓE evolves after t time steps. ΣE is the Lebesgue-σ-algebra
and, intuitively speaking, consists of all subsets of ΓE of interest. Γ is endowed
with the Lebesgue measure µ, which is preserved under φt. This measure can be
restricted to a measure µE on ΓE which is preserved as well and is normalised, i.e.
µE(ΓE) = 1. (ΓE,ΣE, µE, φt) is a measure-preserving dynamical system.
Assume that the system can be characterised by a set {v1, ..., vk} of macro-
variables (k ∈ N). The vi assume values in Vi, and capital letters Vi denote the
values of vi. A particular set of values {V1, ..., Vk} defines a macrostate MV1,...,Vk .
We only write ‘M ’ rather than ‘MV1,...,Vk ’ if the specific Vi do not matter. A set of
macrostates is complete iff (if and only if) it contains all states a system can be in.
A crucial posit of BSM is supervenience: a system’s microstate uniquely de-
termines its macrostate. Every macrostate M is associated with a macroregion
ΓM consisting of all x ∈ ΓE for which the system is in M . For a complete set of
macrostates the ΓM form a partition of ΓE (they do not overlap and jointly cover
ΓE).
2
The Boltzmann entropy of a macrostate M is SB(M) := kB log[µ(ΓM)] (kB is
the Boltzmann constant). The Boltzmann entropy of a system at time t, SB(t), is
the entropy of the system’s macrostate at t: S
B
(t) := S
B
(Mx(t)), where x(t) is the
system’s microstate at t and Mx(t) is the macrostate supervening on x(t).
We denote the equilibrium macrostate by Meq and its macroregion by ΓMeq . A
crucial aspect of the standard presentation of BSM is that Γeq takes up most of
ΓME . To facilitate the discussion, we introduce the term of β-dominance: ΓMeq is
1For details see Frigg (2008, 103–21).
2For lack of space our focus is on the most common case where macrostates are defined
relative to ΓE . Our arguments generalise to cases when the macrostates are defined relative to
other subsets of Γ.
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β-dominant iff µ(ΓMeq) ≥ β for β ∈ [1/2, 1]. Often equilibrium is characterised as
a state where β is close to one but nothing in what follows depends on a particular
choice of β.
The characterisation of equilibrium as a β-dominant state goes back to Ehren-
fest and Ehrenfest (1912, 30). While different versions of BSM explain the approach
to equilibrium differently, β-dominance is a key factor in all of them. Those who
favour an explanation based on ergodic theory have to assume that ΓMeq takes
up the majority of ΓE because otherwise the system would not spend most of the
time in ΓMeq (e.g. Frigg and Werndl 2011, 2012). Those who see the approach
to equilibrium as the result of some sort of probabilistic dynamics assume that
ΓMeq takes up most of ΓE because they assign probabilities to macrostates that are
proportional to µ(ΓM) and equilibrium comes out of as the most likely state only
if the equilibrium macroregion is β-dominant (e.g. Boltzmann 1877). Proponents
of the typicality approach see dominance as the key ingredient in explaining the
approach to equilibrium and sometimes even seem to argue that systems approach
equilibrium because the equilibrium region takes up nearly all of phase space (e.g.
Goldstein and Lebowitz 2004).
We do not aim to adjudicate between these different approaches. Our question
is a more basic one: Why is the equilibrium state β-dominant?
3 Justificatory Strategies
A look at the literature reveals three justificatory strategies. In practice these are
often pursued side-by-side and seen as providing mutual support to each other. We
will assess each of them and argue that none of them is conclusive.
3.1 The Largest Number of Microstates and the Combina-
torial Argument
The leading idea of the first justificatory strategy is that equilibrium is the macrostate
that is compatible with the largest number of microstates. This strategy is exempli-
fied by Boltzmann’s (1877) combinatorial argument.3 The state of one particle is
determined by a point in its 6-dimensional state space Γµ, and the state of a system
of n identical particles is determined by n points in this space. Since the system is
confined to a finite container and has constant energy E, only a finite part of Γµ is
accessible. Boltzmann partitions the accessible part of Γµ into cells of equal size δω
whose dividing lines run parallel to the position and momentum axes. The result is
a finite partition Ω := {ω1, ..., ωm}, m ∈ N. The cell in which a particle’s state lies
3For details see Frigg (2008) and Uffink (2007).
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is its coarse-grained microstate. The coarse-grained microstate of the entire gas,
called an arrangement, is given by a specification of the coarse-grained microstate
of each of particle.
The system’s macro-properties depend only on how many particles there are in
each cell and not on which particles these are. A specification of the ‘occupation
number’ of each cell is known as a distribution D = (n1, n2, . . . , nm) where ni is the
number of particles whose state is in cell ωi. Since m and N are finite, there are
only finitely many distributions D1, . . . , Dk. Each distribution is compatible with
several arrangements, and the number G(D) of arrangements compatible with a
given distribution D = (n1, n2, . . . , nm) is
G(D) =
N !
n1!n2! . . . , nm!
. (1)
Every microstate x of ΓE is associated with exactly one distribution D(x). One
then defines the set ΓD of all x that are associated with a distribution D:
ΓD = {x ∈ ΓE : D(x) = D}. (2)
Since macro-properties are fixed by the distribution, distributions are associated
with macrostates. So we ask: which of the distributions is the equilibrium distribu-
tion? Now Boltzmann’s main idea enters the scene: equilibrium is the macrostate
that is compatible with the largest number of microstates. To determine the equi-
librium distribution, Boltzmann assumed that the energy ei of particle i depends
only on the cell in which it is located. Then the total energy is:
m∑
i=1
niei = E. (3)
He furthermore assumed that the number of cells in Ω is small compared to the
number of particles (allowing him to use Stirling’s formula). With the further
trivial assumption that
∑m
i=1 ni = N , Boltzmann shows that µE(ΓD) is maximal
when
ni = γe
λei , (4)
where γ and λ are parameters which depend on N and E. This is the discrete
version of the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. Thus the equilibrium macrostate
corresponds to the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution.4
4What (4) gives us is the distribution with the largest number of microstates (for the Lebesgue
measure) on the 6N -dimensional shell-like domain ΓES specified by the condition (3). It does not
give us the macroregion of maximal size (i.e., the distribution with the largest measure µE on the
6n− 1 dimensional ΓE). As Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest (1959, 30) stress, the (not further justified)
assumption is that the possible distributions and the proportion of the different distributions
would not change if macrostates were instead defined on ΓE .
4
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Its ingenuity notwithstanding, the combinatorial argument faces a number of
important problems. The first is that it only applies to systems of non-interacting
particles (Uffink 2007, 976-7). It provides a reasonable approximation for systems
with negligible interparticle forces, but any other system is beyond its scope. SM
ought to be a general theory of matter and so this is a serious limitation.
The second problem is the lack of a conceptual connection between equilibrium
in thermodynamics (TD) and the idea that the equilibrium macrostate is the one
that is compatible with the largest number of microstates. In TD equilibrium is
defined as the state to which isolated systems converge when left to themselves and
which they never leave once they have reached it. This has very little, if anything,
in common with the kind of considerations underlying the combinatorial argument.
This is a problem for anyone who sees BSM as a reductionist enterprise. While
the precise contours of the reduction of TD to SM remain controversial, we are
not aware of any contributors who maintain radical anti-reductionism. Thus the
disconnect between the two notions of equilibrium is a serious problem.
Two replies come to mind. The first points out that since ΓMeq is the largest
subset of ΓE, systems approach equilibrium and spend most of their time in ΓMeq .
This shows that the BSM definition of equilibrium is a good approximation to
the TD definition. This is not true in general. Whether a system spends most of
its time in the β-dominant ΓMeq depends on the dynamics. If, for instance, the
dynamics is the identity function, it is not true that a system out of equilibrium
approaches equilibrium and spends most of its time there. The second reply points
out that we know for independent reasons that the equilibrium distribution is the
Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. This argument will be discussed in the next
subsection, and our conclusion will be guarded.
Finally, the combinatorial argument (even if successful) shows that the equi-
librium macrostate is larger than any other macrostate. However, as Lavis (2005)
points out, this does not imply that the equilibrium is β-dominant for values of β
close to 1. There may be a large number of smaller macrostates who jointly take
up a large part of ΓE. So the combinatorial argument does in fact not show that
equilibrium is β-dominant.
3.2 The Maxwell-Boltzmann Distribution
According to the next justificatory strategy, a system is in equilibrium when its
particles approximately satisfy the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution (e.g., Penrose
1989). The Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution f(xµ) specifies the fraction of particles
in the gas whose 6-dimensional position and momentum coordinates xµ = (qµ, pµ)
lie in the infinitesimal interval (xµ, xµ + dxµ):
5
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f(xµ) =
χ
V
(qµ) (2πmkT )
−3/2
‖V ‖
exp
(
−
p 2µ
2mkBT
)
, (5)
where T is the temperature, ‖V ‖ is the volume of the container, and χ
V
(x) is 1 if
qµ is in the container and 0 otherwise.
This approach is misguided because the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution is in
fact the equilibrium distribution only for a limited class of systems, namely for
systems consisting of particles with negligible interparticle forces. For particles with
non-negligible interations different distributions correspond to equilibrium (Gupta
2002). Furthermore, for many simple models such as the Ising model (Baxter 1982)
or the Kac-ring (Lavis 2008) the equilibrium macrostate also does not correspond
to the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution.
This is no surprise given that the two main derivations of the distribution in
effect assume that particles are non-interacting. Boltzmann’s (1877) derivation is
based on equation (3), the assumption that the total energy is the sum of the energy
of the individual particles. This is true only if the particles are non-interacting,
i.e. for ideal gases. While many expect that the argument also goes through for
dilute gases (where this assumption holds approximately), the argument fails for
non-negligible interactions. In Maxwell’s 1860 derivation (see Uffink 2007) the non-
interaction assumption enters via the postulate that the probability distributions
in different spatial directions can be factorised, which is true only if there is no
interaction between particles.
For these reasons the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution is the equilibrium dis-
tribution only for a limited class of systems and cannot be taken as a general
definition of equilibrium.
3.3 Maximum Entropy
A third stragey justifies dominance by maximum entropy considerations along the
following lines:5 we know from TD that, if left to itself, a system approaches
equilibrium, and equilibrium is a maximum entropy state. Hence the Boltzmann
entropy of a macrostate SB is maximal in equilibrium. Since SB is a monotonic
function, the macrostate with the largest Boltzmann entropy is also the largest
macrostate, which is the desired conclusion.
There are serious problems with the understanding of TD in this argument as
well as with its implicit reductive claims. First, that a system, when left to itself,
reaches equilibrium where entropy is maximal is often taken to be a consequence of
5This strategy has been mentioned to us in conversation but it is hard to track down in print,
at least in pure form. Albert’s (2000) considerations concerning entropy seem to gesture in the
direction of the third strategy. See Winsberg (2004) for a detailed discussion of Albert’s approach.
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the Second Law of TD, but it is not. As Brown and Uffink pointed out (2001), that
systems tend to approach equilibrium has to be added as an independent postulate,
which they call the ‘Minus First Law’. But even if TD is amended with the Minus
First Law, the conclusion does not follow. TD does not attribute an entropy to
systems out of equilibrium. Thus, characterising the approach to equilibrium as a
process of entropy increase is meaningless from a TD point of view !
Even if all these issues could be resolved, there still would be a question why
the fact that the TD entropy reaches a maximum in equilibrium would imply
that the same holds for the Boltzmann entropy. To justify this inference, one
would have to assume that the TD entropy reduces to the Boltzmann entropy.
But it is far from clear that this is so. A connection between the TD entropy
and the Boltzmann entropy has been established only for ideal gases, where the
Sackur-Tatrode formula can be derived from BSM which shows that both entropies
have the same functional dependence on thermodynamic state variables. No such
results are known for systems with iteractions. Furthermore, there are well-known
differences between the TD and the Boltzmann entropy. Most importantly, the TD
entropy is extensive while the Boltzmann entropy is not (Ainsworth 2012). But an
extensive concept cannot reduce to a non-extensive concept (at least not without
further qualifications).
For these reasons we conclude that maximum entropy considerations cannot be
used to argue for the β-dominance of the equilibrium state.
4 Rethinking Equilibrium
The failure of standard justificatory strategies prompts the search for an alternative
answer. In this section we propose an alternative definition of equilibrium and
introduce a new mathematical theorem proving that the equilibrium state is β-
dominant.
The above strategies run into difficulties because there is no clear connection
between the TD definition of equilibrium and β-dominance. Our aim is to provide
the missing connection by taking as a point of departure the standard TD definition
of equilibrium and then exploiting supervenience to ‘translate’ this macro definition
into micro language.
The following is a typical TD textbook definition of equilibrium: ‘A thermo-
dynamic system is in equilibrium when none of its thermodynamic properties are
changing with time [...]’ (Reiss 1996, 3) In more detail: equilibrium is the state to
which an isolated system converges when left to its own and which it never leaves
once it has been reached (Callender 2001; Uffink 2001). Equilibrium in TD is
unique in the sense thatf the system always converges toward the same equilibrium
state. This leads to the following definition (the qualification ‘strict’ will become
7
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clear later):
Definition 1: Strict TD Equilibrium. Consider an isolated system S
whose macrostates are specified in terms of the macro-variables {v1, ..., vk}.
Assume the S is in state MV1,...,Vk at some initial time t0. If there is
a macrostate MV ∗
1
,...,V ∗
k
satisfying the following condition, then it is the
equilibrium state of S: For all initial states MV1,...,Vk there exists a time
t∗ such that vi(t) = V
∗
i for all all t ≥ t
∗, i = 1, ..., k. We then write
Meq := MV ∗
1
,...,V ∗
k
.6
Note that this definition incorporates the Minus First Law of TD.
Rephrasing Definition 1 in the framework of BSM leads to the following defini-
tion:
Definition 2: Strict BSM Equilibrium. Consider the same system S
as above, now described as the measure-preserving dynamical system
(ΓE,ΣE, µE, φt), and let M(x) be the macrostate that supervenes on
microstate x ∈ Γ. Let ΓMV1,...,Vk := {x ∈ ΓE : M(x) = MV1,...,Vk} be
the set of all microstates on which MV1,...,Vk supervenes. If there is a
macrostate MV ∗
1
,...,V ∗
k
satisfying the following condition, then it is the
strict BSM equilibrium state of S: For all initial states x ∈ ΓE there
exists a time t∗ such that MV1,...,Vk(φt(x)) = MV ∗1 ,...,V ∗k for all t ≥ t
∗,
i = 1, ..., k. We then write Meq := MV ∗
1
,...,V ∗
k
.
Before reflecting on this definition, we want to add a brief comment about
reductionism. Reductive eliminativists may feel that a definition of equilibrium in
SM that is based on ‘top down translation’ of its namesake in TD undermines the
prospect of a reduction of TD to SM. They would argue that equilibrium has to be
defined in purely mechanical terms, and must then be shown to line up with the
TD definition of equilibrium.7
This point of view is not the only game in town and reduction can be had even
if equilibrium is defined ‘top down’ (as in the above definition). First, whether
the above definition undercuts a reduction depends on one’s concept of reduction.
For someone with a broadly Nagelian perspective there is no problem: the above
definition provides a bridge law, which allows the derivation of the requisite macro
regularities from the laws of the micro theory. And a similar argument can be
made in the framework of New Wave Reductionism. Second, equilibrium is a
macro concept: when describing a system as being in equilibrium, we look at it in
6If one wants to avoid the t∗-dependence on the initial state, one can instead demand that
there exists a time t∗ such that vi(t) = V
∗
i for all initial states MV1,...,Vk and all t ≥ t
∗, i = 1, ..., k.
7For a discussion see Dizadji-Bahmani et al. 2010.
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terms of macro properties. From a micro point of view there are only molecules
bouncing around. They always bounce – there is no such thing as a relaxation of
particle motion to an immutable state. Hence a definition of equilibrium in macro
terms is no heresy.
Definition 2 is too rigid for two reasons. The first reason is Poincare´ recurrence:
as long as the ‘M’ in SM refers to a mechanical theory that conserves phase volume
(and there is widespread consensus that this is the case),8 any attempt to justify
an approach to strict equilibrium in mechanical terms is doomed to failure. The
system will at some point return arbitrarily close to its initial condition, violating
strict equilibrium (Frigg 2008; Uffink 2007). The second reason is that such a
justification is not only unattainable but also undesirable. Experimental results
show that equilibrium is not the immutable state that classical TD presents us with
because systems exhibit fluctuations away from equilibrium (Wang et al. 2002).
Thus strict equilibrium is actually unphysical.
Consequently, strict definitions of equilibrium are undesirable both for theoret-
ical and experimental reasons. So let us relax the condition that a system has to
remain in equilibrium for all t ≥ t∗ by the weaker condition that it has has to be
in equilibrium most of the time:
Definition 3: BSM α-Equilibrium. Consider the same system as in
Definition 2. Let fM,x(t) be the fraction of time of the interval [t0, t0+t]
in which the system’s state is inM when starting in initial state x at t0,
and let α be a real number in [0.5, 1]. If there is a macrostate MV ∗
1
,...,V ∗
k
satisfying the following condition, then it is the α-equilibrium state of
S: For all initial states x ∈ ΓE, fMV ∗
1
,...,V ∗
k
,x(t) ≥ α in the limit t→∞.
We then write Mα-eq := MV ∗
1
,...,V ∗
k
.
An obvious question concerns the value of α. Often the assumption seems to be
that α is close to one. This is reasonable but not the only possible choice. But
for our purposes nothing hangs on a particular choice of α and so we leave it open
what the best choice would be.
One last step is needed to arrive at the definition of equilibrium suitable for
BSM. It has been pointed out variously that in SM, unlike in TD, we should not
expect every initial condition to approach equilibrium (see, for instance, Callender
2001). Indeed, it is reasonable to allow for a set of very small measure ε for which
the system does not approach equilibrium:
Definition 4: BSM α-ε-Equilibrium. Let S and fM,x(t) be as above. Let
α be a real number in [0.5, 1] and let 1 > ε ≥ 0 be a small real number,
and let Y be a subset of ΓE such that µE(Y ) ≥ 1 − ε. If there is a
8Hamiltonian Mechanics falls within this class, but the class is much wider.
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macrostate MV ∗
1
,...,V ∗
k
satisfying the following condition, then it is the
α-ε-equilibrium state of S: For all initial states x ∈ Y fMV ∗
1
,...,V ∗
k
,x(t) ≥ α
in the limit t→∞. We then write Mα-ε-eq := MV ∗
1
,...,V ∗
k
.
Let us introduce the characteristic function of ΓM , 1M(x): 1M(x) = 1 for
x ∈ ΓM and 0 otherwise. Definition 4 implies that for all x ∈ Y :
9
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
1Mα-ε-eq(φt(x))dt ≥ α. (6)
An important assumption in this characterisation of equilibrium is that µE (and
not some other measure) is the relevant measure. It is often argued that µE can be
interpreted as a probability or typicality measure (Frigg and Hoefer 2013; Werndl
2013). The condition then says that the system’s state spends more than a fraction
α of its time in equilibrium with probability 1− ε, or that typical initial conditions
lie on trajectories which spend more than α of their time in equilibrium.
We contend that the relevant notion of equilibrium in BSM is α-ε-equilibrium.
The central question then becomes: why is the α-ε-equilibrium state β-dominant?
Definition 4 in no way prejudges this question: it says nothing about the size of
ΓMα-eq nor does it in an obvious sense imply anything about it.
That ΓMα-eq is β-prevalent follows from the following theorem, which we prove
in the Appendix:
Equilibrium Theorem: If ΓMα-ε-eq is an α-ε-equilibrium of system S, then
µ(ΓMα-ε-eq) ≥ α(1− ε).
We emphasise that the theorem is completely general in that no dynamical
assumption is made (in particular it is not assumed that the system is ergodic). So
the theorem also applies to strongly interacting systems such as solids and liquids.
The Equilibrium Theorem is the centre piece of our account. It shows in full
generality that if the system S has an α-ǫ-equilibrium, then the equilibrium state
is β-dominant for β ≥ α(1 − ε).10 This provides the sought-after justification of
the β-dominance of the equilibrium state.
The Equilibrium Theorem makes the conditional claim that if there is an α-
ǫ-equilibrium, then µ(ΓMα-ε-eq) ≥ α(1 − ε). As with all conditionals, the crucial
and often vexing question is whether, and under what conditions, the antecedent
holds. Some systems do not have equilibria. For instance, if the dynamics is
given by the identity function then no approach to equilibrium takes place, and
the antecedent of the conditional is wrong. By contrast, epsilon-ergodicity allows
9This shows that Defintion 4 is closely related to Lavis’ (2005, 255) characterisation of TD-
likeness.
10It is assumed that ε is small enough so that α(1− ε) ≥ 0.5.
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for an equilibrium state to exist (Frigg and Werndl 2011). This raises the question
under which circumstances the antecedent is true, which is an important question
for future research.
5 Conclusion
Boltzmannian statistical mechanics partitions the phase space of a system into cells
of macroscopically indistinguishable microstates. These cells are associated with
the system’s macrostates, and the largest cell is identified with equilibrium. What
justifies the association of equilibrium with the largest cell? We discussed three
broad justificatory strategies that can be found in the literature: that equilibrium
is the macrostate compatible with the largest number of microstates, that equilib-
rium corresponds to the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution and that most states are
characterised by that distribution, and that equilibrium is the maximum entropy
state. We argued that none of them is successful. This prompted the search for
an alternative answer. We characterised equilibrium as the macrostate in which
the system spends most of its time and presented a new mathematical theorem
proving that such an equilibrium state indeed corresponds to the largest cell. This
result is completely general in that it is not based on any assumptions either about
the system’s dynamics or the nature of interactions within the system. It therefore
provides the first fully general justification of the claim that the equilibrium state
takes up most of the accessible part of the system’s phase space.
11
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Appendix: Proof of the Equilibrium Theorem
The proof appeals to the ergodic decomposition theorem (cf. Petersen 1983, 81),
stating that for a dynamical system (ΓE,ΣE, µE, φt) the set ΓE is the disjoint union
of sets Xω, each equipped with a σ-algebra ΣXω and a probability measure µω, and
φt acts ergodically on each (Xω,ΣXω , µω). The indexing set is also a probability
space (Ω,ΣΩ, P ), and for any square integrable function f it holds that:∫
ΓE
fdµE =
∫
Ω
∫
Xω
fdµωdP. (7)
Application of the ergodic decomposition theorem for f = 1Mα-ε-eq(x) yields:
µE(ΓMα-ε-eq) =
∫
ΓE
1Mα-ε-eq(x)dµE =
∫
Ω
∫
Xω
1Mα-ε-eq(x)dµωdP. (8)
For an ergodic system (Xω,ΣXω , µω, φt) the long-run time average equals the phase
average. Hence for almost all x ∈ Xω:
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
1Mα-ε-eq(φt(x))dt =
∫
Xω
1Mα-ε-eq(x)dµω = µω(ΓMα-ε-eq ∩Xω). (9)
From requirement (6) and because φt acts ergodically on each (Xω,ΣXω , µω), for
almost all x ∈ Xω, Xω ⊆ Y :
α ≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
1Mα-ε-eq(φt(x))dt =
∫
Xω
1Mα-ε-eq(x)dµω. (10)
Let us first consider the case ε = 0, i.e. µE(Y ) = 1. Here from equation (8):
µE(ΓMα-ε-eq) ≥
∫
Ω
αdP = α. (11)
Hence if ǫ ≥ 0, it follows from equation (8) that:
µE(ΓMα-ε-eq) ≥ α(1− ε). (12)
12
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Evidential Critieria of Homology for Comparative Psychology 
 
Abstract: While the homology concept has taken on importance in thinking about the nature 
of psychological kinds (e.g. Griffiths 1997), no one has shown how comparative 
psychological and behavioral evidence can distinguish between competing homology claims. 
I adapt the operational criteria of homology to accomplish this. I consider two competing 
homology claims that compare human anger with putative aggression systems of nonhuman 
animals, and demonstrate the effectiveness of these criteria in adjudicating between these 
claims.  
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1. Introduction 
Many emotion researchers and theorists have suggested that anger is an innate 
adaptation that may be shared with nonhuman animals (e.g. Ekman 1999; Sell, Tooby, and 
Cosmides 2009). This raises the question of which behaviors might be manifestations of 
anger in non-human animals. Given the tight link between anger and aggression in humans, 
some aggression researchers propose that innate patterns of aggression in nonhuman animals 
are manifestations of anger. In other words, they propose that the system responsible for 
these phenomena is homologous with human anger, meaning that these complex traits are 
derived from a common ancestral trait. 
As plausible as this may sound, there have been two incommensurate proposals along 
these lines, and there has been little progress in adjudicating between them. According to the 
ethological hypothesis, a repertoire of confrontational behaviors observed in “resident”, 
territory-holding, rats reflects “an underlying emotional state” that is a primitive version of 
anger (Blanchard and Blanchard 1984, 17 see also; Blanchard and Blanchard 1988; 
Blanchard and Blanchard 2003). This behavioral repertoire is set in opposition to avoidance 
behaviors observed in intruder rats, which reflect fear. Moreover, the hypothesis holds that 
these two distinct emotional systems provide the best way of understanding angry aggression 
and fearful aggression in humans. Another proposal, the neurophysiological hypothesis is 
that human experiences of anger “emerge” from a pan-mammalian brain system that 
produces defensive behaviors that are elicited when areas within the ventral hypothalamus 
(among other areas) are electrically stimulated (Panksepp and Biven 2012; Panksepp 1998; 
Panksepp and Zellner 2004). These behaviors are set in opposition to predatory behaviors, 
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which are neurally dissociable from the defensive behaviors. In other words, this hypothesis 
holds that there are two neural systems for aggression, and that one of them, the defensive 
aggression system, provides the primary neural substrate for human anger and is the 
proximate cause of “the feeling states and behavioral acts” (Panksepp, 1998, p. 14) 
distinctive of human anger. Moreover, the proponents of this hypothesis claim that we can 
best understand certain types of human aggression, impulsive and instrumental forms of 
aggression, in terms of the neural systems for defense and predation, respectively. 
Importantly, these hypotheses are incompatible. Within the neurophysiological 
tradition, the neural dissociation between predatory and defensive aggression is the main 
reason to consider them fundamental, distinct categories of aggression. However, 
confrontation and avoidance behaviors do not exhibit this kind of clean neural dissociation 
(Siegel 2004, chap. 1). Moreover, the kinds of defensive aggression in rats produced by 
electrical brain stimulation is distinct from the aggression observed in ethological research in 
the sense that it lacks features that are diagnostic of these forms of aggression (e.g. Kruk 
1991). In other words, the aggression phenomena identified by these different research 
programs are behaviorally distinct and distinct neural mechanisms are responsible for them. 
As a result, they make incompatible inferences about what anger is and, more specifically, 
about which aggression phenomena are its manifestations. The bimodal classification 
schemes for aggression (defensive versus predatory and confrontational versus avoidant) that 
distinguish these respective phenomena are incommensurate.   
While proponents of these hypotheses aim to identify homologies, there has been 
little progress in adjudicating between them. There are two reasons for this. One is the target 
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problem: they have not carefully identified the human psychological trait that is the target of 
comparison. Another is the evidence problem: it is unclear how cross-species comparisons 
support homology claims. More specifically, it remains obscure how comparative evidence 
can play a role in adjudicating competing homology claims. While the issues pertaining to 
the target problem have received a good deal of attention in philosophy of biology, the 
evidence problem has been neither raised nor resolved. In this paper, I show a way forward 
by developing evidential criteria of homology and an evidential constraint on homology 
claims. I then apply these criteria to the case of human anger and animal aggression to make 
it clear how hypothesis testing can proceed. 
In the following section, I say more about homology thinking. Homology thinking is 
a historical mode of thinking that explains similarities by appealing to common descent. To 
understand what kind of evidence supports homology, I point out a range of hypotheses with 
which it competes and set out the kind of evidence that favors homology over and above 
them. The operational criteria of homology (Remane 1971) can be understood as identifying 
similarities that provide evidence for homology over and above these competing hypotheses. 
When the criteria are used in this way, I refer to them as the evidential criteria of homology. 
In section 2, I briefly address the target problem. Then I show how the evidential criteria of 
homology apply to the case of human anger and the aggression systems of nonhuman 
animals. A straightforward application of the criteria provides stronger support for the 
ethological hypothesis. Basic human anger has several similarities with the confrontational 
behaviors of resident rats, which provide some evidence that these traits are a product of 
common ancestry. On the other hand, there is currently no evidence that the defensive 
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aggression system uniquely corresponds with human anger. The similarities identified by the 
neurophysiological hypothesis hold not only with anger but also with other human emotions, 
such as fear. I conclude by highlighting the value of cross-species comparison for specifying 
psychological kinds. 
 
2. Homology and its Competitors 
Though the concept of homology is crucial to evolutionary thinking, it was conceived 
in the service of biological taxonomy prior to Darwin's time. Owen (1846) thought of 
homology as the sameness of an organ or structure in different organisms under every form 
and function. A common example of homology is the skeletal anatomy of the vertebrate 
forelimbs. The radius and ulna are bone structures that are common to bats, chimps, giraffes 
and manatees even though their forms and functions are dramatically different among these 
animals (see Figure 1). They can be more or less dense, thicker or thinner, longer or shorter, 
(though their spatial relationship to other bones of the forearms are preserved) and they can 
contribute to the different functions of swimming, flying, running and grasping in different 
organisms. So the radius and ulna are the same traits that occur in different animals, even 
though they have widely varying forms and functions within these various animals.  
Now that evolutionary thinking has been integrated into biological systematics, one 
prominent idea about homology is that homology is a causal-historical concept (see 
Ereshefsky 2012 for a clarification and defense of this claim). Specifically, a homology 
refers to traits of various animals that derive from a trait of a common ancestor. In this way, 
shared ancestry is the common cause of each homologue, and this common cause explains 
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similarities between the homologous traits. In the words of one biologist (with some help 
from Darwin), homology is “…grounded in ‘descent, with modification,’ a process that 
belongs to the past.” (Rieppel 2005, 24)  
 
Figure 1. The bones of some mammalian forelimbs. The radius (green) and ulna (red) 
are the same kind of bone, which takes on different forms and functions in different 
animals. 
As a causal-historical concept, we can identify and refer to a homology without 
having or requiring detailed knowledge of the developmental and hereditary mechanisms that 
give rise to it, just as we can refer to a disease entity, such as measles or chicken pox, without 
knowing about its underlying causes (Putnam 1969). Nonetheless, we learn more about each 
homology as we learn more about its underlying causes, just as we learn more about chicken 
pox as we learn more about the virus that causes it. 
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Given the causal-historical nature of homology, there is a vast range of evidence that 
could bear on whether or not one trait is homologous to another. Some of the best evidence 
pertaining to homology comes from cladistics. If one has an independently established 
phylogenetic tree, one can look at the distribution of a candidate homology, or character, on 
that tree. If, for instance, the existence of a homology is more parsimonious than convergent 
evolution on one or more occasion, then there is a strong reason to think that a trait is 
homologous.  
Nevertheless, before we can even look at the distribution of a character on a 
phylogenetic tree, we need to know how to identify the character in each taxon, which 
becomes a tricky matter when dealing with behavioral and psychological characters. For 
instance, knowing that humans have anger, that rats have a confrontation system, and that 
cats have a defensive aggression system does not determine which of these capacities are the 
same trait or character.  
One way of addressing this problem is to use the operational criteria of homology. 
These criteria need not function as a definition of homology but instead we can use them to 
establish a consistent set of methods for ascertaining homologies and by extension, identical 
traits. The criteria of homology attempt to identify particular kinds of similarity, the kinds 
that are best explained by common history over and above a range of competing hypotheses. 
For any given similarity across clades, there are several hypotheses in competition with 
homology. One is that the similarity is only by chance. Another more probable possibility is 
that convergent evolution explains the correspondence. When a similarity is explained purely 
by convergent evolution, we have a clear case of analogy. Still another possibility in the 
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behavioral domain is that similarity is explained by plastic developmental processes, 
particularly learning. In the clearest cases of plasticity, similarity can be explained entirely by 
convergent learning or development, perhaps shaped largely by task demands or shared 
developmental mechanisms.
1
 The main competition is thus between hypotheses of homology, 
analogy, and developmental plasticity. Insofar as they function as evidence, the criteria of 
homology should help pick out similarites between traits that are explained by common 
ancestry and not convergent evolution or plastic developmental processes. 
The most prominent criteria for homology were developed by Adolf Remane (1971) 
and can be deployed for this purpose. Consider first the criterion of position. The criterion 
applies to the radius and ulna because even with different forms and functions across 
different organisms, they retain their relative position to other bones of vertebrate forelimbs 
(humerus and the bones of the wrist). It would be highly unlikely for these characters to have 
evolved de novo in each of the different animals that possess it and yet to have the same 
relative position to other structures. Moreover, there is no shared function across the different 
animals which possess this character that would explain the correspondence. While 
corresponding position sounds like a spatial property, it is actually topological, and can 
include corresponding positions in temporal sequence or corresponding positions across 
cognitive architectures (e.g. “boxologies”). 
The criterion of special quality concerns “…shared features [that] cannot be 
explained by the role of a part in the life of the organism. The fact that in the vertebrate eye 
the blood supply to the retina lies between the retina and the source of light is a famous 
                                               
1 See Brown (2013) for a detailed discussion of the difficulties (e.g. due to the plasticity and transformability of 
behavior) in applying the criteria of homology to behavior. 
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example of a ‘special quality’.” (Griffiths 2007, 648) The more complex a shared quality is, 
the less likely that they would have evolved independently. The location of blood supply to 
the vertebrate retina is both complex and non-essential (and even slightly counterproductive) 
given the functional role of the retina (what it is used for in the organism), so it identifies a 
correspondence that provides strong evidence that the various instances of this character 
derive from common descent. 
Finally, the criterion of intermediate forms allows identification of homologous 
forms, A and C, because of the existence of one or more transitional states, B1...Bn, between 
the two forms. In many cases, the homology between transitional forms, say between A and 
B1 or between B1 and B2, is determined by applying the other two criteria. For instance, there 
are transition states between the bones of the mammalian inner ear and the bones of the 
reptilian jaw. We know this because the bones of the reptilian jaw share the same position 
(relative to other bones of the jaw) as the bones of several intermediate forms, some of which 
share the same position as the bones of the mammalian inner ear. 
For my purposes, an important constraint on homology claims derives from the fact 
that some homologies are nested within other homologies. For instance, the class of tetrapod 
forelimbs is nested within the class of paired appendages. Thus, the forelimbs of reptiles, 
amphibians, mammals and avians are members of the homology class of tetrapod forelimbs, 
but they are also members of the more inclusive homology class of paired appendages, which 
also includes the pectoral fins of sharks and teleosts. While pectoral fins are homologous 
with instances of tetrapod forelimbs as paired appendages, the similarities between pectoral 
fins and tetrapod forelimbs do not provide evidence for homology at the less inclusive level 
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of tetrapod forelimbs. Inclusion in this more specific class is indicated by bone structures that 
are absent in pectoral fins. These structures are due to modifications that occured subsequent 
to the divergence of tetrapods from teleosts, and that is why teleost pectoral fins are not 
included in this homology class.  
As a result, some similarities only indicate inclusion in a broader homology class (e.g. 
paired appendages), whereas other similarities indicate inclusion in narrower homology 
classes (e.g. tetrapod forelimbs). In other words, some similarities (e.g. those between 
pectoral fins and forelimbs) only provide evidence for inclusion in broader homology classes 
(e.g. paired appendages rather than tetrapod forelimbs). It follows that, when evaluating 
similarities between traits, it is sometimes necessary to consider which homology class a 
similarity indicates.  
From these considerations, we can derive an evidential constraint on homology 
claims. To see this, consider the correspondences between a human forelimb and a feline 
hind limb. The criterion of position is satisfied, because there are similarities between the 
parts (e.g. between humerus and femur). There are relations of homology between these 
traits. They are homologous as mammalian extremities and tetrapod extremities. 
Nevertheless, if we were to specify the homology class as one that includes human forelimbs 
but excludes human hind limbs, the similarity in question does not provide evidence for 
homology at this level.
2
 This is because there are no similarities between the human forelimb 
and cat hind limb that are not also shared between the human forelimb and hind limb. Thus, 
to provide evidence for relations of homology at the level of some homology class G (in this 
                                               
2 For similar reasons, we also do not have evidence here for a relation of homology that would include feline 
hindlimbs but not feline forelimbs. 
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case, the homology class that includes forelimbs but excludes hindlimbs) as opposed to the 
more inclusive class, H (in this case, homology classes that includes forelimbs and 
hindlimbs), requires that some similarities between relata are not shared by traits in the more 
inclusive class, H. I call this an “evidential constraint” on homology claims. 
While the examples so far deal straightforwardly with morphology or body structure, 
all three of Remane’s criteria have also been applied to behavioral and psychological traits by 
ethologists (for overviews, see Ereshefsky 2007; Wenzel 1992). I suspect that what seems 
obvious concerning morphology might be easily confused concerning behavior or 
psychology. As a result, one could find evidence that psychological traits are homologous, 
but misidentify the homology class that this evidence supports. One way of doing so is to 
violate the evidential constraint above. I will argue that the neurophysiological hypothesis is 
an instance of this mistake. As yet, there is no evidence that the defensive aggression system 
identified by neurophysiological research is a member of the homology class that includes 
anger but excludes other human emotions. This is because the hypothesis does not identify 
any similarities that are not shared with other human emotions. I spell out the details of this 
argument in the following section. 
In summary, homology is a causal-historical concept, and homology thinking is a way 
of providing historical explanations for observed similarities between biological traits (or 
characters). The evidential criteria for homology can isolate evidence pertaining to this kind 
of historical explanation. In the following section, I show how the evidential criteria can 
discriminate between the two hypotheses laid out in section 2. 
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3. Which Kinds of Aggression are Manifestations of Anger? 
Before I apply the criteria to the two comparative hypotheses, I will first say 
something about the target problem, the problem of specifying the psychological trait that is 
the target of comparison. For the sake of space, I assume that the appropriate target of the 
ethological and neurophysiological hypotheses is basic human anger, the cluster of 
properties associated with involuntary facial expressions of human anger (Ekman 1999; 
Griffiths 1997). To briefly defend this choice, this is the most closely studied set of “anger” 
phenomena the structure of which is likely explained by inheritance, therefore it is the most 
plausible target for homology claims. This is because homology claims identify traits across 
taxa that are inherited from a common ancestor. One might say that inheritance is one of the 
causal homeostatic mechanisms that preserve the structure of homologous traits across 
lineages (cf. Assis and Brigandt 2009; Brigandt 2009). Thus, if there is something like anger 
in non-human animals, then it is most likely to correspond with phenomena in humans that 
are explainable by inheritance, namely basic human anger.  
Now we are in a position to evaluate the two hypotheses. Recall that the two 
hypotheses focus on different sets of phenomena. The ethological hypothesis focuses on 
patterns of confrontational behavior of territory-holding, “resident” rats, whereas the 
neurophysiological hypothesis focuses on patterns of defensive behavior elicited by electrical 
brain stimulation. The ethological hypothesis lumps its phenomena together according to 
contrasting motives of behavior (confrontation versus defense), whereas the 
neurophysiological hypothesis lumps its phenomena together according to dissociable neural 
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substrates of behavior (regions of the hypothalamus that elicit defense behavior versus 
distinct regions that elicit predation behavior).  
First, consider the ethological hypothesis. The strongest pieces of evidence for 
homology is a special quality that is shared by rats and stumptail macaques. Adams and 
Shoel (1981) note that dominant macaques and resident rats both implement strategies aimed 
at accessing the back and biting it. In macaques, this behavior seems arbitrary with respect to 
the (probable) function of inflicting non-lethal damage on the subordinate. Macaques have a 
much larger repertoire of bodily movements than rats, many of which could serve the 
function of inflicting non-lethal harm (pushing, kicking, scratching, slapping, holding etc.). 
Thus, back-biting is a special quality, and the best explanation of this behavior may appeal to 
products of common ancestry. In other words, the reason that the attacks of both rats and 
macaques are aimed at biting the neck and back may be that they share a common ancestor 
with a corresponding aggressive strategy and perhaps similar motivational mechanisms for 
negotiating intraspecific conflict.
3
 There is some evidence that human anger includes an 
impulse to approach and attack, but no one has demonstrated that the impulse is pan-cultural 
or species-typical.
4
 
While Adams and Schoel did observe several facial expressions of subordinate 
macaques, they did not note any facial expressions that uniquely accompanied the attacks of 
a dominant macaque. However, in more ecologically valid studies of macaque behavior, 
macaques with higher dominance status do display facial expressions toward lower ranking 
                                               
3 Adams and Schoel argue for homology by considering similarity in the dynamic of attack and submission 
across both species. 
4 See e.g. Carver and Harmon-Jones (2009); Baron (1971); Berkowitz et al (1981); and Pedersen et al (2011).  
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macaques in aggressive encounters, expressions that resemble anger expressions in humans 
(Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1974).
5
 Chevalier-Skolnikoff (1973) argues that two of these 
expressions are similar (utilizing homologous action units) across macaques, chimps, and 
humans. Some confirmation of these comparisons has been attained by comparison using a 
facial action coding system to quantify chimpanzee facial expressions (Parr et al. 2007). 
Thus, there is continuity across the intermediates for some components of putative 
aggression systems across the common ancestors of these species.  
Now consider the neurophysiological hypothesis. The problem is that the case for 
homology is incomplete. First, there is some evidence for correspondence that has continuity 
across intermediates: stimulation of the hypothalamus of cats, possums, rats and marmoset 
monkeys leads to similar forms of attack (Roberts, Steinberg, and Means 1967; Bergquist 
1970; Panksepp 1971; Woodworth 1971; cited in Lipp and Hunsperger 1978).
6
 However, 
ethical and practical considerations make it nearly impossible to obtain evidence concerning 
the effects of hypothalamus stimulation in humans. It remains uncertain whether it would 
leads to attack or to any of the other concomitants of human anger (e.g. experiences of anger, 
facial expressions of anger, or physiological changes associated with anger, as distinct from 
fear). Nor have any of these studies observed distinctive facial expressions that indicate 
continuity with human anger.
7
  
                                               
5 Chevalier-Skolnikoff calls these expressions “stare”, “round-mouthed stare” and “open-mouthed stare”. 
6 Delgado (1968) produced aggressive behaviors with electrical stimulation of the thalamus and cerebellum of 
chimpanzees and macaques. However, these brain structures are notably absent from the neurophysiological 
hypothesis and its descriptions of brain structures involved in aggression. Moreover, Delgado and colleagues 
did evaluate facial expressions. However, these facial expressions were not analyzed.  
7 It is compelling that in macaques, stimulation only results in attack under certain conditions (Alexander and 
Perachio 1973), some of which depend on whether the electrical stimulation occurs in the presence of a higher 
or lower ranking conspecific (attack being more likely in the latter case). Neverthless, one cannot conclude from 
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There is some evidence that amygdala stimulation can produce feelings of anger (e.g. 
Hitchcock and Cairns 1973). This evidence is even bolstered by the fact that stimulation of 
the medial amygdala in cats can potentiate defensive behaviors elicited by electrical 
stimulation of the hypothalamus (e.g. Shaikh, Steinberg, and Siegel 1993). However, several 
other emotional experiences beside anger have also been reported as a result of amygdala 
stimulation in humans, including anxiety, guilt, embarrassment, jealousy, and a “desire for 
flight or escape” (which is more strongly associated with human fear, see Frijda, Kuipers, 
and ter Schure 1989). It seems that current evidence does not support a distinct localization 
of anger-like and fear-like feelings or behaviors within the HAA or in the other brain 
structures that make up the defensive aggression system (in cats or otherwise). Thus, the 
evidence from brain stimulation does not reveal a unique correspondence with human anger; 
one that is not also shared with other human emotions.  
Second, consider the criterion of position. As with the offensive attack observed in 
ethological work, physiological arousal and threat signals do occur prior to defensive attacks 
elicited by electrical brain stimulation. However, no evidence has been presented that either 
the signals or physiological arousal involved in these attacks are homologous with these 
                                                                                                                                                 
this that this form of aggression is of a piece with the aggressive syndrome which includes angry facial 
expression. It is quite possible that there are several forms of impulsive aggression that an animal might inflict 
only upon lower ranking conspecifics, including pain induced aggression, fear induced aggression or perhaps 
even disgust induced aggression. Neither is it obvious that any of these forms of aggression are of the same kind 
as angry aggression. By contrast, the work of Adams and Schoel (1981), and Chevalier-Skolnikoff (1973) 
describes a certain kind of offensive or dominance-related aggression with which angry facial expressions are 
associated. The same is not true of aggression elicited by electrical brain stimulation. The connection with 
angry facial expressions has not been made, nor has the behavioral syndrome been carefully circumscribed in 
ecologically valid conditions in most of the organisms in which it has been observed. Leyhausen (1979) has 
done this work concerning defensive aggression in cats, but he distinguishes this form of aggression from an 
offensive form of aggression that includes a back-biting attack. I suspect that this latter form of aggression is 
more comparable to the confrontation system in rats (cf. Blanchard and Blanchard 1984). 
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components of human anger as opposed to human fear. Moreover, it seems unlikely that any 
such evidence will materialize.  
This becomes apparent when we look closely at the work of Siegel and others on the 
HAA, which is cited as support for the neurophysiological hypothesis (Panksepp 1998, 
2012). In fact, Siegel does not advocate the neurophysiological hypothesis, and in many 
cases makes claims that constitute evidence against it. In several places (including Siegel 
2004) Siegel compares defensive behaviors with a disorder known as Episodic Discontrol, 
which is marked by “...decreased impulse control – a characteristic common to defensive 
behavior – and altered perceptual states following stimuli evoking anger, fear or rage.” 
(Siegel and Victoroff 2009, 213 emphasis mine) Indeed, many of the similarities that are 
noted between defensive behaviors and these forms of human aggression are characteristics 
of affectively driven behavior in general. Impulsivity is a characteristic of many kinds of 
emotion expression (see e.g. Frijda 1986), including fear, anger, sadness, and joy. Thus, the 
position criterion is not satisfied in a way that provides evidence for a homology between the 
defensive aggression system and anger that is not also shared between human anger and 
human fear.  
By contrast, manifestations of the confrontation and avoidance systems in rats can be 
distinguished by quantifiable differences in the facial expressions of residents and intruders 
(Defensor et al. 2012), just as manifestations of anger and fear in humans can be 
distinguished by their distinctive facial expressions (e.g. Ekman and Friesen 1971). 
Moreover, resident and intruder rats have distinct forms of attack with distinct target sites. 
Thus, it is possible to distinguish within rats at least two different patterns of impulsive 
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behaviors accompanied by distinct facial expressions. Moreover, some of the similarities 
between confrontation behaviors and angry behaviors in humans are not shared with fearful 
behaviors in humans or avoidance behaviors in rats. In other words, human anger and the 
confrontation system in rats do not violate the evidential constraint on homology claims 
(relativized to a homology class that only includes the emotion of anger) because they satisfy 
the evidential criteria of homology in ways that are not also satisfied by other emotions like 
fear. A related virtue of the ethological hypothesis is that it can distinguish angry aggression 
from the widely acknowledged category of fear-induced aggression (see esp. Moyer 1976). 
The same cannot be said for the neurophysiological hypothesis. I suspect that at least some of 
the phenomena identified by the neurophysiological hypothesis reflect behavioral outcomes 
of fear, rather than (or perhaps in addition to) anger.  
In sum, the case for homology between the defensive aggression system and anger 
(with respect to a category that includes anger but not other human emotions) may be similar 
to the case for homology between the cat hind limb and the human forelimb (with respect to 
a category that includes human forelimbs but not human hind limbs). The similarities so far 
observed do not evince a homology relation that excludes other emotions (especially fear), 
whereas the case for homology between the offensive attack system and anger does evince 
such a relation. 
 
4. Conclusion 
I have argued that the available evidence supports a homology between human anger 
and the confrontational attack system and not between human anger and the defensive 
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aggression system. However, this case study has larger implications for the scientific study of 
psychological kinds. The lesson is this: homology thinking can provide independent criteria 
for evaluating substantive disagreements on – and for eliminating confusion about – the 
nature of psychological kinds. In absence of homology thinking, it is difficult to see how 
further knowledge about the defensive aggression system or the offensive attack system 
would serve to determine which aggression systems in non-human animals are most like 
human anger. Indeed, this is probably one of the reasons why there has been little productive 
discussion between the advocates of the two hypotheses. Homology thinking in this case 
provides a set of independent theoretical constraints for identifying corresponding traits 
across taxa. In the service of this demonstration, I further developed some of the methods of 
homology thinking (Ereshefsky, 2007, 2012) as it applies to psychological kinds. This 
account helps to specify what kind of evidence supports homology claims, namely, 
identification of unique correspondences at the appropriate level between traits; 
correspondences that provide evidence for common ancestry as opposed to common selective 
pressures (whether developmental or ancestral). 
Though counterintuitive from some perspectives, the concept of homology helps to 
clarify what counts as evidence for claims of trait identity. Note that identical traits can have 
different states. For example, a human arm and whale fin are identical traits, because they are 
both instances of the tetrapod forelimb. Nevertheless, they are different states of that trait, 
because they represent different forms that this trait can take. Homology thinking allows the 
identification of traits that take shape in dramatically different states; it enables us to identify 
evolved characters that walk in the guise of dramatically different forms and functions. 
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Anger is one such character. 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -950-
 
 
References 
Adams, David B. 1981. “Motor Patterns and Motivational Systems of Social Behavior in 
Male Rats and Stumptail macaques—Are They Homologous.” Aggressive Behavior. 
Alexander, M., and A. A. Perachio. 1973. “The Influence of Target Sex and Dominance on 
Evoked Attack in Rhesus Monkeys.” American Journal of Physical Anthropology 38: 
543–548. 
Assis, Leandro C. S., and Ingo Brigandt. 2009. “Homology: Homeostatic Property Cluster 
Kinds in Systematics and Evolution.” Evolutionary Biology 36 (2) (March 19): 248–
255. doi:10.1007/s11692-009-9054-y. 
Baron, Robert A. 1971. “Magnitude of Victim’s Pain Cues and Level of Prior Anger Arousal 
as Determinants of Adult Aggressive Behavior.” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 17 (3): 236–243. doi:10.1037/h0030595. 
Bergquist, E. H. 1970. “Output Pathways of Hypothalamic Mechanisms for Sexual, 
Aggressive and Other Motivated Behaviors in Oppossum.” Journal of Comparative and 
Physiology and Psychology 70: 389–398. 
Berkowitz, Leonard, S T Cochran, and M C Embree. 1981. “Physical Pain and the Goal of 
Aversively Stimulated Aggression.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40 
(4) (April): 687–700. 
Blanchard, D. Caroline, and Robert J. Blanchard. 1984. “Affect and Aggression: An Animal 
Model Applied to Human Behavior.” In Advances in the Study of Aggression, edited by 
Robert J Blanchard and D Caroline Blanchard, 1:1–62. 
———. 1988. “Ethoexperimental Approaches to the Biology of Emotion.” Annual Review of 
Psychology. 
Blanchard, D.Caroline, and Robert J Blanchard. 2003. “What Can Animal Aggression 
Research Tell Us about Human Aggression?” Hormones and Behavior 44 (3) 
(September): 171–177. doi:10.1016/S0018-506X(03)00133-8. 
Brigandt, Ingo. 2009. “Natural Kinds in Evolution and Systematics: Metaphysical and 
Epistemological Considerations.” Acta Biotheoretica 57 (1-2) (July): 77–97. 
doi:10.1007/s10441-008-9056-7. 
Brown, Rachael L. 2013. “Identifying Behavioral Novelty.” Biological Theory (December 
5). doi:10.1007/s13752-013-0150-y. 
Chicago, IL -951-
 
 
Carver, Charles S, and Eddie Harmon-jones. 2009. “Anger Is an Approach-Related Affect : 
Evidence and Implications.” Psychological Bulletin 135 (2): 183–204. 
doi:10.1037/a0013965. 
Chevalier-Skolnikoff, S. 1974. “The Ontogeny of Communication in the Stumptail Macaque 
(Macaca Arctoides).” 
Chevalier-Skolnikoff, S. 1973. “Facial Expression of Emotion in Nonhuman Primates.” In … 
and Facial Expression: A Century of …, 11–89. 
Defensor, Erwin B, Michael J Corley, Robert J Blanchard, and D Caroline Blanchard. 2012. 
“Facial Expressions of Mice in Aggressive and Fearful Contexts.” Physiology & 
Behavior 107 (5) (December 5): 680–5. doi:10.1016/j.physbeh.2012.03.024. 
Delgado, Jose M. R. 1968. “Offensive-Defensive Behaviour in Free Monkeys and 
Chimpanzees Induced by Radio Stimulation of the Brain.” In Aggressive Behavior, 
edited by S. Garattini and E. B. Sigg, 109–119. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Ekman, Paul. 1999. “Basic Emotions.” In The Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, edited 
by Tim Dalgleish and Mick Power, 45–60. Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Ekman, Paul, and WV Friesen. 1971. “Constants across Cultures in the Face and Emotion.” 
Journal of Personality and Social …. 
Ereshefsky, Marc. 2007. “Psychological Categories as Homologies: Lessons from Ethology.” 
Biology & Philosophy 22 (5) (September 29): 659–674. doi:10.1007/s10539-007-9091-
9. 
Frijda, Nico H. 1986. The Emotions. Edited by Knight Dunlap. The Emotions. Vol. 1. Studies 
in Emotion and Social Interaction. Cambridge University Press. 
doi:10.1093/0199253048.001.0001. 
Frijda, Nico H., Peter Kuipers, and Elisabeth ter Schure. 1989. “Relations among Emotion, 
Appraisal, and Emotional Action Readiness.” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 57 (2): 212–228. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.57.2.212. 
Griffiths, Paul E. 1997. What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological 
Categories. Vol. 1997. University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2007. “The Phenomena of Homology.” Biology & Philosophy 22 (5) (October 10): 
643–658. doi:10.1007/s10539-007-9090-x. 
Hitchcock, E, and V Cairns. 1973. “Amygdalotomy.” Postgraduate Medical Journal 49 
(578) (December): 894–904. 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -952-
 
 
Kruk, M R. 1991. “Ethology and Pharmacology of Hypothalamic Aggression in the Rat.” 
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 15 (4) (January): 527–38. 
Leyhausen, Paul. 1979. Cat Behavior: The Predatory and Social Behavior of Domestic and 
Wild Cats. Translated by Batrbara A. Tonkin. 1St Editio. Taylor & Francis / Garland 
STPM Press. 
Lipp, H. P., and R. W. Hunsperger. 1978. “Threat, Attack and Flight Elicited by Electrical 
Stimulation of the Ventromedial Hypothalamus of the Marmoset Monkey.” Brain, 
Behavior and Evolution 15: 260–293. 
Moyer, KE. 1976. “The Psychobiology of Aggression.” 
Owen, R. 1846. Lectures on the Comparative Anatomy and Physiology of the Vertebrate 
Animals. Vol. 2. Printed for Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans. 
Panksepp, Jaak. 1971. “Aggression Elicited by Electrical Stimulation of the Hypothalamus in 
Albino Rats.” Physiology & Behavior 6 (4) (April): 321–9. doi:10.1016/0031-
9384(71)90163-6. 
———. 1998. Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. 1st 
ed. Oxford University Press, USA. 
Panksepp, Jaak, and Lucy Biven. 2012. The Archaeology of Mind: Neuroevolutionary 
Origins of Human Emotions. W. W. Norton & Company. 
Panksepp, Jaak, and MR Margaret R Zellner. 2004. “Towards A Neurobiologically Based 
Unified Theory of Aggression.” REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE … 17 (2): 37–61. 
Parr, LA, BM Waller, SJ Vick, and KA Bard. 2007. “Classifying Chimpanzee Facial 
Expressions Using Muscle Action.” Emotion (Washington, DC) 7 (1): 172–181. 
doi:10.1037/1528-3542.7.1.172.Classifying. 
Pedersen, William C, Thomas F Denson, R Justin Goss, Eduardo a Vasquez, Nicholas J 
Kelley, and Norman Miller. 2011. “The Impact of Rumination on Aggressive Thoughts, 
Feelings, Arousal, and Behaviour.” The British Journal of Social Psychology / the 
British Psychological Society 50 (Pt 2) (June): 281–301. 
doi:10.1348/014466610X515696. 
Putnam, Hilary. 1969. “Brains and Behaviour.” In Analysis, edited by Ned Block, 30:1–19. 
Mind, Language and Reality. Blackwell. 
Remane, Adolph. 1971. “Die Grundlagen Des Natürlichen Systems: Der Vergleichenden 
Anatomie Und Der Phylogenetik.” 
Chicago, IL -953-
 
 
Rieppel, Olivier. 2005. “Modules, Kinds, and Homology.” Journal of Experimental Zoology. 
Part B, Molecular and Developmental Evolution 304 (1) (January 15): 18–27. 
doi:10.1002/jez.b.21025. 
Roberts, W. W., M. L. Steinberg, and L. W. Means. 1967. “Hypothalamic Mechanisms for 
Sexual, Aggressive and Other Motivational Behaviors in the Oppossum Didelphis 
Virginiana.” Journal of Comparative Physiology and Psychology 64: 1–15. 
Sell, Aaron, John Tooby, and Leda Cosmides. 2009. “Formidability and the Logic of Human 
Anger.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 106 (35) (September 1): 15073–8. doi:10.1073/pnas.0904312106. 
Shaikh, M B, a Steinberg, and a Siegel. 1993. “Evidence That Substance P Is Utilized in 
Medial Amygdaloid Facilitation of Defensive Rage Behavior in the Cat.” Brain 
Research 625 (2) (October 22): 283–94. 
Siegel, Allan. 2004. Neurobiology of Aggression and Rage. 1st ed. Informa Healthcare. 
Siegel, Allan, and Jeff Victoroff. 2009. “Understanding Human Aggression: New Insights 
from Neuroscience.” International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 32 (4): 209–15. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijlp.2009.06.001. 
Wenzel, JW. 1992. “Behavioral Homology and Phylogeny.” Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics 23 (1992): 361–381. 
Woodworth, C H. 1971. “Attack Elicited in Rats by Electrical Stimulation of the Lateral 
Hypothalamus.” Physiology & Behavior 6 (4) (April): 345–53. 
 
 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -954-
1 
 
 
 
Are Systems Neuroscience Explanations Mechanistic? 
Carlos Zednik 
czednik@uos.de 
Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück 
49069 Osnabrück, Germany 
 
Paper to be presented at: Philosophy of Science Association 24th Biennial Meeting (Chicago, IL), 
November 2014 
 
Abstract 
Whereas most branches of neuroscience are thought to provide mechanistic explanations, 
systems neuroscience is not. Two reasons are traditionally cited in support of this conclusion. 
First, systems neuroscientists rarely, if ever, rely on the dual strategies of decomposition and 
localization. Second, they typically emphasize organizational properties over the properties of 
individual components. In this paper, I argue that neither reason is conclusive: researchers 
might rely on alternative strategies for mechanism discovery, and focusing on organization is 
often appropriate and consistent with the norms of mechanistic explanation. Thus, many 
explanations in systems neuroscience can also be viewed as mechanistic explanations. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a widespread consensus in philosophy of science that neuroscientists provide 
mechanistic explanations. That is, they seek the discovery and description of the mechanisms 
responsible for the behavioral and neurological phenomena being explained. This consensus is 
supported by a growing philosophical literature on past and present examples from various 
branches of neuroscience, including molecular (Craver 2007; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 
2000), cognitive (Bechtel 2008; Kaplan and Craver 2011), and computational neuroscience 
(Kaplan 2011). In contrast, one area that has received relatively little philosophical attention is 
systems neuroscience: the study of networks at various levels of brain organization. Do systems 
neuroscientists, like their colleagues in other branches of the discipline, seek the discovery and 
description of mechanisms? Answering this question is important for gaining an improved 
understanding of this exciting and increasingly influential area of research, but also for 
determining whether the various branches of neuroscience are unified by a common set of 
epistemic practices and explanatory norms. 
Three research traditions can be distinguished within contemporary systems 
neuroscience. The first seeks the identification and description of networks at various levels of 
brain organization. The second seeks to reproduce the brain’s behavioral dynamics and 
information-processing capacities through artificial neural network simulations. The third 
tradition specializes in the development of concise mathematical descriptions of the holistic 
behavior of biological as well as artificial brain networks. Several philosophical commentators 
have recently denied that systems neuroscientists in either one of these research traditions 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -956-
3 
 
provide mechanistic explanations. To a large extent, this denial is motivated by the observation 
that systems neuroscientists rarely invoke the heuristic strategies of decomposition and 
localization that are traditionally associated with mechanistic explanation (Bechtel and 
Richardson 1993; Silberstein and Chemero 2012; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 2001). 
Moreover, the fact that systems neuroscientists often emphasize brain networks’ global 
organization rather than their detailed composition is often considered to be evidence that 
these researchers have abandoned the mechanistic approach (Silberstein and Chemero 2012). 
If these commentators are correct, systems neuroscientists are quite unlike their colleagues in 
other branches of the discipline: they do not provide mechanistic explanations.  
In what follows, I briefly introduce the three main research traditions within systems 
neuroscience (Section 2), and present the main reasons for thinking that researchers working 
within these traditions have abandoned mechanistic explanation (Section 3). Subsequently, I 
argue that these reasons are inconclusive (Section 4). For one, systems neuroscientists who 
eschew the strategies of decomposition and localization may appeal to alternative strategies 
for discovering mechanisms. For another, focusing on mechanistic organization rather than 
composition should not be viewed as a departure from mechanistic explanation. Indeed, such a 
focus is appropriate when a mechanism’s organization is the principal determinant of that 
mechanism’s behavior. Insofar as the discipline of systems neuroscience specializes in 
describing the organization of large network mechanisms in the brain, and insofar as the 
concept of organization remains poorly understood in philosophy of science, philosophers have 
much to gain from an improved understanding of mechanistic explanation in this increasingly 
important branch of neuroscientific research. 
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2. Three Research Traditions 
Systems neuroscience is motivated by the observation that the brain is a complex system of 
networks of different kinds and at different levels of organization, as well as the observation 
that these networks are involved in the production of a wide range of behavioral and 
neurological phenomena. Within systems neuroscience, three conceptually distinct but 
mutually beneficial research traditions can be distinguished. Whereas the network tradition 
concerns the identification, description and topological analysis of brain networks, the 
simulation tradition specializes in the design of artificial neural network models to simulate the 
biological brain’s behavioral dynamics and information-processing capacities. Both of these 
traditions are linked to the complexity tradition, the aim of which is to develop concise 
mathematical descriptions of the behavioral dynamics or information-processing capacities of 
artificial as well as biological brain networks. 
The network tradition in systems neuroscience aims to identify and describe brain 
networks of different kinds and at different levels of organization. Thus, networks have been 
identified at the level of individual neurons within a population, at the level of neural 
populations (e.g. cortical columns) within a cortical region, and at the level of the brain as 
whole: networks of cortical regions. At each one of these levels, researchers in the network 
tradition must first determine how to identify a network’s elements. Sometimes this choice is 
principled, as when biological principles are used to individuate nerve cells or cortical regions. 
At other times the choice is highly pragmatic, as when the network elements are chosen to 
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correspond with voxels in fMRI data or with the placement of electrodes in electrophysiological 
studies. After having identified a particular set of elements in this way, researchers in the 
network tradition must choose which kind of connections to pay attention to. Thus, networks 
might be defined over anatomical links such as synapses, but might also be defined over causal 
or functional links, typically operationalized as correlated activity over time. Once these choices 
have been made, brain networks can be identified via a variety of mapping and imaging 
techniques. These range from invasive methods such as histological studies of nerve cells and 
synaptic connections, to non-invasive methods such as structural, functional and diffusion MRI, 
among others (for a detailed overview of these methods, and of the network tradition in 
systems neuroscience as a whole, see: Sporns 2011).  
Once brain networks have been identified, researchers in the network tradition typically 
represent and study these networks by invoking the mathematical framework of graph theory. 
A graph theoretical representation of a brain network characterizes the network’s elements as 
nodes in a graph, and the anatomical, functional or causal links between these elements as 
(possibly weighted and/or directional) connections between individual nodes. Such graph 
theoretical representations facilitate the study of a network’s global and local organization or 
topology. Thus, large-scale brain networks of all kinds have been shown to exhibit small-world 
topologies, that is, a high-degree of local clustering with short average path-lengths (Bassett 
and Bullmore 2006). Similarly, researchers have demonstrated the existence of hub nodes of 
relatively high degree, network motifs (small sub-graphs that are repeated throughout a 
network), and modules, i.e. densely interconnected communities of nodes with relatively sparse 
links to nodes in other communities (Sporns, Honey, and Kötter 2007; Sporns and Kötter 2004; 
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Meunier, Lambiotte, and Bullmore 2010). To date, these and other graph theoretic concepts 
have been used to understand the topology of brain networks in C. elegans (White et al. 1986; 
Izquierdo and Beer 2013), as well as cats and macaque monkeys (Sporns and Kötter 2004), and 
are likely to prove instrumental in the eventual success of the Human Connectome Project 
(Sporns, Tononi, and Kötter 2005) and other human brain mapping initiatives. 
 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of model-development in the network tradition. 
The left pathway represents the development of structural network models; the right 
pathway represents the development of functional network models. Reprinted from 
Bullmore & Sporns (2009). 
 
Whereas the network tradition seeks the description and topological analysis of brain 
networks, the simulation tradition aims to develop artificial neural network models to 
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reproduce the brain’s behavioral dynamics or information-processing capacities. Thus, the 
primary purpose of these models is to understand the parameters under which brain networks 
might produce oscillations, synchronized firing patterns, and robustness to perturbation, as well 
as to understand when such networks are particularly good or bad at processing and 
integrating information. Although the relevant parameters are often local—determining e.g. 
the way in which individual network elements transform inputs to outputs—perhaps the most 
interesting research in this tradition seeks to understand the influence of topological 
parameters. Thus for example, Perez et al. (2011) have explored the extent to which random, 
small-world and scale-free networks exhibit local and global patterns of synchronization. 
Similarly, Tononi & Sporns (2003) have studied the relationship between the degree of 
modularity in a network and the degree of information integration—the ease by which 
information can be transmitted between any two network elements. In general, whereas the 
network tradition in systems neuroscience seeks to describe the kinds of networks that actually 
exist in the brain, the simulation tradition seeks to understand what these kinds of networks 
can do. 
The third main research tradition within the discipline of systems neuroscience can be 
termed the complexity tradition. Building on decades of research in the discipline of complexity 
science, this tradition within systems neuroscience aims to develop concise mathematical 
models of behavior and information-processing in biological and artificial networks. These 
models are typically developed using the mathematical concepts and methods of dynamical 
systems theory and information theory. Whereas the former can be used to concisely 
characterize a network’s behavior over time, the latter shows how information is processed and 
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integrated. One of the key features of these models is their relative simplicity. Whereas a 
particular network may consist of myriad reciprocally and non-linearly connected elements, its 
behavioral dynamics is often quite simple, exhibiting periodic oscillation or stability over time, 
and its information-processing efficient. The complexity tradition in systems neuroscience seeks 
to mathematically characterize these simple behaviors, which are often also characterized as 
the “emergent” properties of brain networks.  
 Although most research projects in systems neuroscience can be associated with either 
one of these three research traditions, it is not uncommon to see researchers combine the 
methods and results of two or more of them. Thus, researchers working in the simulation 
tradition increasingly seek to replace highly unrealistic artificial neural network models with 
“biologically inspired” network models that are rooted in the findings of the network tradition. 
Similarly, although many of the mathematical models developed in the complexity tradition 
were originally developed to characterize the global behavior of artificial neural networks, 
some of these models are proving themselves to be exceedingly useful for understanding the 
behavioral dynamics or information-processing of the biological brain. Notably, these combined 
research efforts are likely to be particularly influential in the future, since they apply the 
analytic power of computer simulations and mathematical analyses to increasingly accurate 
and biologically plausible models of the brain. 
 
3. Abandoning Mechanistic Explanation 
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To what extent do researchers working within these three research traditions provide 
mechanistic explanations of behavioral and neurological phenomena? Mechanistic explanations 
center on descriptions or models of the mechanisms responsible for the phenomena being 
explained. Although there have been many different formulations of what constitutes a 
mechanism, the basic idea is that of an organized system of parts (or “entities”) and operations 
(or “activities”) whose changing properties over time exhibit a phenomenon of explanatory 
interest (Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2010; Craver 2007). Notably, although most early contributions to the literature 
emphasize the characteristically diagrammatic nature of mechanistic explanations, many recent 
treatments acknowledge the possibility and prevalence of mathematical mechanism-
descriptions. Thus, Kaplan & Craver (2011) have recently proposed a model-mechanism-
mapping constraint (3M) intended to capture the requirements all mechanistic models must 
satisfy for them to be used in mechanistic explanations: 
“3M: In successful explanatory models…(a) the variables in the model correspond to 
components, activities, properties, and organizational features of the target mechanism 
that produces, maintains, or underlies the phenomenon, and (b) the (perhaps 
mathematical) dependencies posited among these variables in the model correspond to 
the (perhaps quantifiable) causal relations among the components of the target 
mechanism.” (Kaplan and Craver 2011, 611) 
 
 Before a mechanism can be described, it must be discovered: Researchers in 
neuroscience do not typically know in advance what the component parts and operations of a 
brain mechanism might be. According to Bechtel & Richardson’s (1993) celebrated account of 
mechanism discovery, neuroscientists typically rely on the heuristic strategies of decomposition 
and localization to identify a mechanism’s component parts and operations, and thus, to 
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develop a description or model of that mechanism. That is, they analyze the target 
phenomenon into a series or complex of relatively simple operations, break apart the physical 
system from which that phenomenon arises into a collection of smaller parts, and then study in 
detail the behavior of individual parts in order to link those parts to particular operations. 
Because of their perceived importance to mechanistic explanation in several disciplines, 
decomposition and localization are now often considered to be “the sine qua non of 
mechanistic explanation” (Silberstein and Chemero 2012, 3). 
It is generally agreed that brain networks are mechanisms in the above sense. For one, 
they can clearly be viewed as organized systems of parts and operations. For another, insofar as 
many brain networks can be associated with particular behavioral or neurological processes, 
they can be said to exhibit various phenomena of explanatory interest. But although brain 
networks are mechanisms, some commentators have questioned whether the researchers who 
study these networks seek mechanistic explanations, as opposed to other kinds of explanations. 
Their questioning usually centers on the models being developed in systems neuroscience: 
what kinds of models these are, what kinds of properties they describe, and how these models 
are developed. 
Unlike their colleagues in other branches of neuroscience, systems neuroscientists 
rarely invoke the heuristic strategies of decomposition and localization. This can be observed in 
all three of the research traditions introduced above. In the complexity tradition, researchers 
do not attempt to describe a brain network’s component parts and operations at all, but just 
seek to describe its overall behavior. Thus, the mathematical models being developed in this 
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tradition are often phenomenological models rather than mechanistic models: they accurately 
describe the phenomenon being explained, without representing the causal structures and 
processes responsible therefore (Mauk 2000; Weiskopf 2011). 
In the simulation tradition, the brain’s behavioral dynamics and information-processing 
capacities are reproduced by way of artificial neural network models. Although these models 
can be construed as mechanistic models because they describe a network’s component 
elements and connections, they are not usually developed via the heuristic strategies of 
decomposition and localization. In this tradition, the phenomenon being modeled is rarely 
analyzed into a series of localizable operations, and it is rare to see systems neuroscientists 
characterize the contributions of individual parts to the network mechanism’s overall behavior. 
Thus, in Bechtel & Richardson’s assessment, the simulation tradition 
“emphasizes systems whose dynamic behavior corresponds to the activity we want to 
explain, but in which the components of the system do not perform recognizable 
subtasks of the overall task…The overall architecture of the system—and especially the 
way components are connected—is what explains cognitive capacities, and not the 
specific tasks performed by the components. We have abandoned decomposition and 
localization.” (Bechtel and Richardson 1993, 222–223) 
  
Thus, rather than describe the contributions of a network’s individual elements and 
connections by deploying the strategies of decomposition and localization, researchers in the 
simulation tradition focus on the contribution of the network’s organization to its overall 
behavior. 
Researchers working in the network tradition within systems neuroscience similarly 
focus on overall organization rather than individual components. Although developing a 
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network model of a biological brain network involves physically decomposing the brain or brain 
area being studied to determine the individual elements of the model, researchers rarely seek 
to describe in detail the structural features of these elements. Indeed, more often than not 
such network elements correspond to spatially-defined voxels or segments, rather than 
biologically-defined cortical structures that might plausibly be viewed as a mechanism’s 
“working parts” (Craver 2007). In addition, it can be hard to interpret the connections between 
the elements of such a network model as a mechanism’s component operations. Although 
some studies have begun to identify causal interactions between brain structures, far more is 
known about the brain’s structural and statistical connectivity. Thus, although it may be known 
that a brain network’s elements are structurally linked and/or statistically interrelated, it 
remains generally unclear exactly how these individual elements interact, and thus, unclear 
how they each contribute to the behavioral or neurological phenomena of explanatory interest. 
In each one of the three research traditions, the focus on overall behavior and 
organization rather than detailed composition is often by necessity, rather than by choice. It 
has long been known (and current research in the network tradition has confirmed) that brain 
networks at all levels of organization often feature massively reciprocal and non-linear 
interactions (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 2001; Sporns 2011). In such systems, the behavior 
of any individual component is at all times influencing, but also being influenced by, the 
behavior of the rest of the system. Thus, although it may be possible to physically individuate 
neurons, neural populations, and cortical regions, it can be difficult (or indeed, computationally 
intractable) to describe their individual contribution to the behavior of the system as a whole. 
What researchers in the simulation and complexity traditions of systems neuroscience have 
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shown, in contrast, is that a network’s behavior can often be more usefully predicted and 
understood by focusing on holistic organizational properties instead. Thus, in Silberstein & 
Chemero’s words, 
“rather than viewing the neurons, cell groups or brain regions as the basic unit of 
explanation, it is brain multiscale networks and their large-scale, distributed and non-
local connections or interactions that are the basic unit of explanation.” (Silberstein and 
Chemero 2012, 5)  
 
To summarize: Unlike their colleagues in other branches of neuroscience, systems 
neuroscientists do not invoke the heuristic strategies of decomposition and localization to 
discover and describe mechanisms, and indeed, are frequently prevented from doing so due to 
the characteristic complexity of brain networks. Because their focus is placed squarely on 
network organization rather than detailed composition, there are good reasons to be skeptical 
about systems neuroscientists’ commitment to mechanistic explanation. 
 
4. Mechanistic Explanation in Systems Neuroscience 
The previous section described reasons for believing that systems neuroscientists have 
abandoned mechanistic explanation. This section argues that these reasons rely on an 
unnecessarily narrow conception of mechanistic explanation. Mechanistic explanation need not 
invoke the heuristic strategies of decomposition and localization, and need not be focused on 
component parts and operations. Indeed, when a particular mechanism’s behavior is largely 
determined by its overall organization, emphasizing this organization is appropriate and 
consistent with the norms of mechanistic explanation. 
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 Consider first the suggestion that systems neuroscientists have abandoned mechanistic 
explanation just because they eschew the heuristic strategies of decomposition and 
localization. Taken at face value, this suggestion concerns the epistemic practices researchers 
invoke during the process of model development. Thus construed, however, it is wrong to 
assume that decomposition and localization are “the sine qua non of mechanistic explanation” 
as Silberstein & Chemero suggest. According to the conception of scientific discovery embraced 
by Bechtel & Richardson (1993), decomposition and localization greatly facilitate mechanism 
discovery by allowing researchers to quickly (albeit fallibly) traverse a conceptual space of 
“how-possibly” mechanistic models, with the goal of eventually identifying a “how-actually” 
model of the mechanism. However, decomposition and localization are not the only heuristic 
strategies that can be used for this purpose: there are a wide range of strategies to choose 
from.  
 Zednik (in press) has recently explored some alternative strategies for mechanism 
discovery. To cite just one example, consider the way researchers in evolutionary robotics 
invoke evolutionary algorithms to develop simulated mechanisms for minimally cognitive tasks 
(Harvey et al. 2005; Beer 2003). Because the simulated mechanisms that emerge from such 
evolutionary algorithms are relatively unconstrained by the ingenuity and design preferences of 
human researchers, many of them are characterized by features often seen as obstacles to 
mechanistic explanation: reciprocal non-linear interactions, a close integration of brain, body, 
and environment, and high sensitivity to temporal detail. Although it remains to be seen to 
what extent the discovery of such mechanisms in simulation can be used to make concrete 
inferences about analogous real-world mechanisms (for discussion see Webb (2009) and 
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responses to this target article), the evolution and analysis of these simulated mechanisms can 
surely be viewed as a heuristic strategy that helps to identify areas of the space of possible 
mechanistic models that merit further exploration. Thus, the approach adopted by evolutionary 
roboticists can be understood as a proof of concept that there exist heuristic strategies for 
mechanism discovery beyond decomposition and localization. 
 Considered as heuristic strategies, therefore, decomposition and localization are not in 
fact essential for mechanistic explanation. As a consequence, the mere fact that systems 
neuroscientists rarely invoke these heuristic strategies does not by itself show that they have 
abandoned mechanistic explanation. That said, an alternative way of understanding the claim 
that decomposition and localization are “the sine qua non of mechanistic explanation” concerns 
not the heuristic strategies themselves, but the result of applying these strategies: descriptions 
of the component parts and operations of mechanisms. Are such componential descriptions, as 
opposed to descriptions that mainly or exclusively describe a mechanism’s organization, 
essential for mechanistic explanation? 
 Recall that mechanisms are organized systems of parts and operations that exhibit a 
particular phenomenon of explanatory interest, and that mechanistic explanations center on 
descriptions or models of such mechanisms. Moreover, recall that according to Kaplan & 
Craver’s 3M constraint, models that figure in mechanistic explanations contain variables that 
“correspond to components, activities, properties, and organizational features of the target 
mechanism”, the dependencies between which “correspond to the (perhaps quantifiable) 
causal relations among the components of the target mechanism” (Kaplan and Craver 2011, 
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611). Notably, the second part of the 3M constraint is indicative of one of the most important 
norms of mechanistic explanation, viz. that such explanations should demonstrate how a target 
phenomenon “is situated in the causal structure of the world” (Craver 2013, 135). Exactly what 
such a demonstration would amount to is of course controversial, but one common measure of 
success is that a mechanistic model should render the represented mechanism amenable to 
interventions of manipulation and control (Woodward 2003; Craver 2007). That is, the model 
should represent (just) those properties of the mechanism that, when lesioned, activated, or 
otherwise influenced, effect predictable changes in the mechanism’s behavior. Notably, 
although this norm is usually understood in terms of interventions on individual component 
parts or operations, it is also satisfied by models that facilitate interventions on the 
mechanism’s overall organization. 
 Recall that many of the artificial and biological networks studied by systems 
neuroscientists consist of a large number of elements with reciprocal non-linear interactions. In 
these networks, organizational properties are frequently the primary determinants of overall 
behavior (Sporns 2011; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 2001). Indeed, these properties can often 
be thought of as order parameters, the modification of which predicts changes in the network’s 
overall behavioral dynamics and information processing capacities. Thus for example, Tononi & 
Sporns (2003) measure the effect varying degrees of modularity have on the degree of 
information integration within a network, presenting their results as a continuous function in 
which information integration is highest for networks with intermediate degrees of modularity, 
and lower for completely modular and completely homogeneous networks. Such studies reveal 
that network models can emphasize organizational properties instead of properties of 
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individual component parts and operations, while still rendering the relevant network 
mechanism amenable to interventions of manipulation and control. Insofar as this is one of the 
principal norms of mechanistic explanation, models that describe brain networks in ways that 
satisfy this norm should be considered mechanistic. Therefore, systems neuroscience 
explanations that center on such models can after all be viewed as mechanistic explanations. 
 How far can this line of reasoning be pushed? Although the network models being 
developed in the network and simulation traditions emphasize topological properties, they still 
provide some (admittedly not very detailed) insight into the individual component parts and 
operations of network mechanisms. Therefore, these models satisfy both parts of the 3M 
constraint, while additionally facilitating interventions of manipulation and control. But now 
compare these models to the models developed in the complexity tradition, the aim of which is 
to provide concise mathematical descriptions of brain networks’ behavioral dynamics and 
information-processing capacities. As was discussed previously, such descriptions often amount 
to phenomenological models, i.e. models that describe the phenomena being explained 
without representing the causal structures and processes—and a fortiori, the mechanisms—
responsible therefore. But not all models in the complexity tradition are pure 
phenomenological models. Indeed, some of the most interesting models in this tradition link 
variables that describe a network’s global behavior to parameters that represent its topology. 
Although these models do not represent the relevant network mechanism’s individual parts 
and operations, they do represent its organization in a way that renders it amenable for 
interventions of manipulation and control. Are these models mechanistic as well? 
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Whereas the network models developed in the network and simulation traditions are 
quite clearly mechanistic, and the systems neuroscientists in the network and simulation 
traditions can therefore be thought to provide mechanistic explanations, it is not so clear what 
to make of non-phenomenological models in the complexity tradition. On one hand, these 
models fail to describe what is often viewed as essential for mechanistic explanation: the 
relevant mechanism’s component parts and operations. On the other hand, they do at least 
describe the mechanism’s organization, and researchers often exploit this fact for the purposes 
of manipulation and control. Therefore, whether or not these models are mechanistic models 
depends on how these competing considerations are weighed against one another. Perhaps the 
following additional consideration can be used to break the tie in favor of the latter: Insofar as 
mechanistic models should just represent those properties that significantly contribute to a 
mechanism’s behavior, and insofar as in brain networks these properties are often 
predominantly organizational, it seems that even those models in the complexity tradition that 
exclude compositional details entirely should be construed mechanistically. 
 
5. Conclusion: Toward an Account of Mechanistic Organization 
The preceding sections aimed to show that systems neuroscience—spanning the network, 
simulation, and complexity traditions—can often be thought to provide mechanistic 
explanations of behavioral and neurological phenomena. Although systems neuroscientists only 
rarely invoke the heuristic strategies of decomposition and localization, these strategies are not 
essential for mechanistic explanation. Moreover, and most importantly, although systems 
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neuroscientists typically emphasize organizational properties over and above the properties of 
individual component parts and operations, these properties can often be used for the 
purposes of manipulation and control. Thus, although they might pay far less attention to 
individual component parts and operations, systems neuroscientists seem to embrace many of 
the same explanatory methods and norms as their colleagues in other branches of 
neuroscience. 
 In closing, it is worth reflecting on the further philosophical significance of this 
mechanistic construal of systems neuroscience. Because systems neuroscientists specialize in 
characterizing the organization of a particular family of mechanisms—brain networks—their 
work is likely to be particularly beneficial to philosophers of science seeking an improved 
understanding of mechanistic organization. Although the concept of organization has long been 
included in philosophical definitions of “mechanism”, it remains poorly understood, and 
indeed, its importance underestimated. Thus for example, one particularly influential treatment 
of mechanistic explanation presupposes that mechanisms are organized linearly, from “set up 
to termination conditions” (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000). In contrast, Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen (2010) have demonstrated that many mechanisms in neuroscience and biology are 
organized cyclically, and Levy & Bechtel (2013) have sought to explore the role of motif-like 
organizational building blocks in mechanisms in the life sciences. Insofar as systems 
neuroscientists have revealed many canonical forms of mechanistic organization in the brain—
as well as many ways of studying this organization—it stands to reason that philosophers of 
science have much to gain from paying increased attention to this exciting and increasingly 
influential area of research. 
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Abstract
Forster presented some interesting examples having to do with distinguishing
the direction of causal influence between two variables, which he argued are coun-
terexamples to the likelihood theory of evidence (LTE). In this paper, we refute
Forster’s arguments by carefully examining one of the alleged counterexamples.
We argue that the example is not convincing as it relies on dubious intuitions that
likelihoodists have forcefully criticized. More importantly, we show that contrary to
Forster’s contention, the consilience-based methodology he favored is accountable
within the framework of the LTE.
1 Introduction
Forster (2006) presented some putative counterexamples to what he called a/the likeli-
hood theory of evidence (LTE):
“The Likelihood Theory of Evidence (LTE): The observed data are relevant
to the comparison of simple hypotheses (or models) only via the likelihoods
of the simple hypotheses being compared (or the likelihood functions of the
models under comparison).” (321)
1
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The LTE entails that if the likelihood of one hypothesis relative to a given body of data
— i.e., the probability of obtaining the data given the hypothesis — is the same as that
of another hypothesis, then the hypotheses cannot be distinguished based on the data
alone. Forster challenged this consequence with examples in which the data, he argued,
favor one hypothesis over another even though the two have the same likelihood.
For those concerned with causal inference, Forster’s examples are particularly interest-
ing because they have to do with distinguishing the direction of causal influence between
two random variables. Forster contended that his examples demonstrate a distinctive
methodology based on Whewell’s notion of “consilience of inductions” (Whewell 1858;
Forster 1988), which cannot be captured by a likelihoodist or Bayesian philosophy of
science that subscribes to the LTE.
Our purpose in this paper is twofold, one critical and one positive. First, in section
2, we argue that Forster’s challenge to the LTE is based on denying a basic, well-argued
thesis of likelihoodism. The thesis is that the evidential bearing of a body of data on a
given statistical hypothesis is essentially relative, depending on the alternative against
which the hypothesis is assessed. The apparent force of Forster’s counterexamples, we
argue, relies upon embracing an intuition that likelihoodists (e.g., Hacking 1965; Royall
1997; Sober 2008) have forcefully criticized — the intuition that a statistical hypothesis,
taken alone, can be rejected or shown to be false by data. At best, therefore, Forster’s
argument begs an important question against the likelihoodist.
Second, and more importantly, we aim to vindicate Forster’s preferred methodology
using likelihoods. We show in section 3 that there is a systematic connection between
likelihood and the kind of consilience Forster emphasized. Forster is right that consid-
erations of consilience are evidentially relevant. However, such relevance, we contend, is
2
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reflected in likelihoods.
Due to the space limit, we will focus on Forster’s example featuring discrete variables,
but our points extend straightforwardly to his example with continuous variables, as we
will briefly comment in section 4.
2 On Forster’s challenge to the LTE
For the likelihoodist, a thesis of fundamental importance is what Royall (1997) called
the “relativity of evidence”. A body of data constitutes evidence for or against a statis-
tical hypothesis only relative to some alternative hypothesis. For example, getting ten
heads straight in tossing a coin is not evidence against the coin being fair simpliciter. It
disconfirms the fair-coin hypothesis in reference to some alternative hypothesis, e.g., the
hypothesis that the coin is a trick coin with heads on both sides, or that the coin is so
biased towards one side that the chance of landing head in each flip is 0.9. But when
compared to certain other alternatives, e.g., the hypothesis that the coin is a trick coin
with tails on both sides, the observations favor the fair-coin hypothesis. The evidential
bearing of the data on the fair-coin hypothesis is thus relative to the alternative being
considered; evidential statements are essentially contrastive in form.
Detailed and compelling arguments for this view were elegantly presented by, among
others, Royall (1997, 65-68) and Sober (2008, 48-52), and we shall not repeat them
here. Suffice it to say that objections to the likelihood account of evidence that rely
on denying the relativity of evidence begs an important question. We will argue that
Forster’s challenge ends up question-begging in this way.
It is not obvious that Forster ran afoul of the relativity of evidence. His counterexam-
ples apparently pit a hypothesis against another. Here is the first version of the example
3
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we will focus on in this paper. Suppose that two variables X and Y are related by a
simple law: Y = X + U , where X is a variable taking positive integer values, and U
is an unobserved variable — error term — taking one of two values: 0.5 or -0.5, with
equal probability. Suppose also that data are generated by twenty independent trials,
with X = 4 in each trial. As it happens, in ten of the twenty trials, Y is observed to be
equal to 3.5 (i.e., the values of U in those trials are -0.5), and in the other ten trials, Y
is observed to be equal to 4.5 (i.e., the values of U in those trials are 0.5).
Let us use Xi, Yi, etc. to model the ith trial. Consider now two hypotheses. One is the
true hypothesis, which Forster referred to as Hypothesis A: Yi = Xi + Ui (i = 1, ..., 20),
and the error terms Ui’s are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) such that
P (Ui = −0.5) = P (Ui = 0.5) = 1/2.
The other hypothesis is referred to as Hypothesis B (for Backwards): Xi = Yi + Vi
(i = 1, ..., 20), and the error terms Vi’s are i.i.d. such that P (Vi = −0.5) = P (Vi = 0.5) =
1/2.1
In the first version of the example, Forster considered these two hypotheses as such,
and treated the exogenous variable in each hypothesis as non-random or given. Specifi-
cally, in A, Xi’s are not treated as random variables, but Yi’s are (because Ui’s are); in
B, Yi’s are not treated as random variables, but Xi’s are (because Vi’s are). For these
hypotheses, as Forster pointed out, only conditional likelihoods are well defined. For A,
the conditional likelihood is the probability of obtaining the observed values of Yi under
hypothesis A, given the values of Xi, which is (1/2)
20; for B, the conditional likelihood
is the probability of obtaining the observed values of Xi under hypothesis B, given the
1Forster used the same symbol U to denote the error terms in both hypotheses, which is potentially
misleading. To avoid confusions, we use V to denote the error term postulated by the backwards
hypothesis.
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values of Yi, which is also (1/2)
20.
According to Forster (2006),
“The example is already a counterexample to LTE in the following sense: We
are told that either A or B is true, and we can tell from the data that A is
true and B is false. But there is nothing in the likelihoods that distinguishes
between them.” (328, original emphasis)
We will return to Forster’s claim that one can tell from the data that A is true and B
is false. For now let us focus on a more basic problem with this version of the example.
The problem is that the two hypotheses concern different random variables: the random
variable in A is Y (or more accurately, 〈Y1, ..., Y20〉), and the random variable in B is X
(or 〈X1, ..., X20〉). However, a presupposition of LTE is that the hypotheses in question
concern a common set of random variables: the hypotheses imply probability distributions
over these variables, and the data are observations of their values. Royall, for example,
made it explicit in his influential formulation of the law of likelihood:
“If hypothesis A implies that the probability that a random variable X takes
the value x is pA(x), while hypothesis B implies that the probability is pB(x),
then the observation X = x is evidence supporting A over B if and only if
pA(x) > pB(x) ... .” (Royall 1997, 3)
2
Clearly the present version of the example does not satisfy the presupposition. Thus, for
likelihoodists like Royall, it does not make sense to talk about the evidential support of
A versus B.
2Royall seemed to attribute this formulation to Hacking (1965), but as far as we can see, Hacking did
not formulate his law of likelihood in precisely these terms.
5
Chicago, IL -981-
To be fair, Forster was quick to acknowledge that a subscriber to LTE could eas-
ily respond to this version of the example by denying that LTE should apply to such
“incomplete” hypotheses. He put the subscriber’s complaint in the following terms:
“They might insist that the example violates the principle of total evidence
because the likelihoods are not relative to the full data, even though there are
no data “hidden from view”, or withheld in any way.” (Forster 2006, 328)
This, in our view, is a misdiagnosis on behalf of the the friends of LTE. The principle
of total evidence is about what evidence to take into account, but the LTE is about
the evidential bearing of given evidence on the comparison of hypotheses. It is perfectly
sensible to ask whether a certain part of the data supports one hypothesis against another
(though one should take total evidence into account, if possible, when updating beliefs
or judgements). In the present case, for example, there is no problem comparing, based
on conditional likelihoods, hypothesis A with, say, A∗: Yi = Xi + Ui, i = 1, ..., 20, and
P (Ui = −0.5) = 1/4 and P (Ui = 0.5) = 3/4. A and A
∗ are as “incomplete” as A and
B are, but they are about the same random variables, and hence are comparable given
the data. By contrast, A and B as such are incomparable3 because they concern entirely
different random variables.
Why are hypotheses incomparable if they are about different random variables? This
is connected to the thesis of evidential relativity. To see the matter clearly, it helps to
consider a simpler case. Suppose two coins are each flipped independently for twenty
times. Of the first coin, all of the twenty flips turn up heads; of the second coin, half
of the flips turn up heads and half turn up tails. Consider two hypotheses: (1) the first
3By “incomparable” we mean only that the hypotheses are not subject to evidential comparison.
They may still be comparable in terms of rational credences or someone’s personal credences.
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coin is fair, and (2) the second coin is fair. The observations on the first coin — call
them D1 — are irrelevant to hypothesis (2) (in the absence of any background knowledge
or assumption linking the two coins). So it does not make sense to say that D1 provide
evidence for or against (1) versus (2). Similarly, we cannot say that D2, the data on the
second coin, provide evidence for or against (2) versus (1).
However, it may be tempting to think that the degree to which D2 support (2) is
greater than the degree to which D1 support (1). After all, it seems intuitive that (1)
fits D1 very poorly while (2) fits D2 rather well. If so, it would be fair to say that (1)
and (2) are comparable after all, given the combined data D = 〈D1, D2〉. But according
to the relativity of evidence, there is no such thing as the degree to which D2 support
(2) simpliciter or that to which D1 support (1) simpliciter. D1 confirm or disconfirm (1)
only in contrast to some other hypothesis concerning the outcomes of flipping coin 1, and
D2 confirm or disconfirm (2) only in contrast to some other hypothesis concerning the
outcomes of flipping coin 2. Hence, it does not make sense to say that D2 support (2)
better than D1 support (1).
Therefore, from the likelihoodist point of view, the basic problem with the present
‘counterexample’ is not so much a violation of the principle of total evidence as a jux-
taposition of incomparable hypotheses, and the incomparability is closely related to the
relativity of evidence. Forster’s neglect of this point signals his denial of the relativity of
evidence.
In any case, Forster did develop the example into one with comparable hypotheses.
Treat both X ′
i
s and Y ′
i
s as random variables. To A add the assumption that Xi and Ui
are statistically independent, and that P (Xi = xi) = 1, where xi is the observed value of
X on the ith trial. To B add the assumption that Yi and Vi are statistically independent,
7
Chicago, IL -983-
and that P (Yi = yi) = 1, where yi is the observed value of Y on the ith trial. That
is, the marginal distributions are specified in an ad hoc way to the effect that whatever
values the hypothesized exogenous variables actually take, the (constructed) hypotheses
entail that they take those values with probability 1. Such marginals are objectionable
and useless in practice for a number of reasons, but we will leave them aside. Following
Forster, call the resulting hypotheses A′ and B′. They have the same likelihood.4
L(A′) =
∏
i
PA′(Xi = xi, Yi = yi)
=
∏
i
PA′(Yi = yi|Xi = xi)PA′(Xi = xi) = (1/2)
20
L(B′) =
∏
i
PB′(Xi = xi, Yi = yi)
=
∏
i
PB′(Xi = xi|Yi = yi)PB′(Yi = yi) = (1/2)
20
According to Forster, this constitutes a counterexample to the LTE because despite the
equality of likelihoods, one can tell from the data that B′ is false and A′ is true. Here is
his argument. B′ entails that Vi and Yi are independent (for every i):
P (Vi = 0.5|Yi = 3.5) = P (Vi = 0.5|Yi = 4.5) = 1/2
or equivalently, P (Xi = 4|Yi = 3.5) = P (Xi = 5|Yi = 4.5) = 1/2. Call this consequence
B′
1
. However, from the data we see that the relative frequency of X = 4 in the trials in
which Y = 3.5 is 1, and the relative frequency of X = 5 in the trials in which Y = 4.5 is
0. Hence the data show that B′
1
is false, and so B′ is false.
Formulated this way, the argument is clearly not contrastive, and seems akin to the
probabilistic modus tollens that has been resolutely refuted by likelihoodists (Sober 2008,
51-53). It is not impossible, just very improbable, to obtain the data as they are even if
4Throughout the paper, we use upper case letters to denote variables and the corresponding lower
case letters to denote values of the variables.
8
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 24th Biennial Mtg -984-
B′
1
is true. A more charitable reading is that Forster did not literally mean that B′
1
is
shown to be false, but that the data overwhelmingly disconfirm B′
1
relative to Not-B′
1
.
However, Not-B′
1
is a complex class of hypotheses. Relative to some members in the class,
the data are evidence against B′
1
, but relative to others, e.g. that P (Xi = 4|Yi = 3.5) =
0 6= P (Xi = 5|Yi = 4.5) = 1, the data are arguably evidence for B
′
1
. In the absence of a
well-grounded prior over these members, it is hard to make sense of the sweeping claim
that the data seriously disconfirm B′-1 in favor of its logical negation.
Therefore, if we take the relativity of evidence seriously, the right way to state Forster’s
intuition is that the data provide evidence againstB′-1 in reference to the given alternative
A′. More accurately, the data disconfirm B′
1
relative to A′
1
: P (Xi = 4|Yi = 3.5) = 1 6=
P (Xi = 5|Yi = 4.5) = 0, which is entailed by A
′. Indeed, the evidence against B′
1
versus
A′
1
is overwhelming, judging either intuitively or by a formal measure such as likelihood
ratio.
But the fact that the data constitute weighty evidence against B′
1
versus A′
1
does
not entail that the data are weighty evidence against B′ versus A′. A′
1
and B′
1
are
just parts of what A′ and B′ have to say about the data at hand; they are about the
conditional probability of Xi given Yi. But A
′ and B′ also have implications for the
marginal probability of Yi. A
′ entails A′
2
: P (Yi = 3.5) = P (Yi = 4.5) = 1/2 (for every i),
whereas B′ entails B′
2
: P (Yi = yi) = 1, where yi is the actual observed value of Yi. How
do the data bear on A′
2
versus B′
2
?
Essentially the same question was addressed very early on in Royall (1997)’s elaborate
defense of likelihoodism. Shortly after he described the law of likelihood, he considered
and refuted a putative counterexample (13-15). Suppose an ordinary-looking deck of 52
cards is well-shuﬄed. We turn over the top card and find it to be the ace of diamonds.
9
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According to the law of likelihood, the observation supports the hypothesis that it is
a trick deck consisting of 52 aces of diamonds against the hypothesis that the deck is
ordinary. This may sound counterintuitive; intuitively the trick-deck hypothesis is not
rendered more probable or believable than the ordinary-deck hypothesis based on the
observation. But the evidential judgment is perfectly consistent with the intuition, for
the question of credence is different from that of evidence. Even though the observation
supports the trick-deck hypothesis against the ordinary-deck hypothesis, the former, in
ordinary circumstances, is much less credible prior to the observation and may well end
up less credible overall despite the positive evidence.
By the same token, for every trial in Forster’s example, the observation of Yi = yi
supports the hypothesis that P (Yi = yi) = 1 against the hypothesis that P (Yi = 3.5) =
P (Yi = 4.5) = 1/2, and overall the data favor B
′
2
over A′
2
. Again, this evidential judgment
should not be conflated with the judgment that the data render B′
2
more credible than
A′
2
. In normal circumstances, there are a number of reasons to regard B′
2
as much less
plausible than A′
2
, prior to considering the evidence, and the evidential support may well
be insufficient to overcome the initial implausibility.
The upshot is that the data are evidence for A′
1
versus B′
1
, but also constitute evidence
against A′
2
versus B′
2
. There is no compelling reason to think that the data alone favor
the conjunction of A′
1
and A′
2
over that of B′
1
and B′
2
(or the other way around). The
LTE, we conclude, is not threatened by the example.
3 Likelihood and consilience
Forster’s positive insight, however, is not to be ignored. As he put it, Hypothesis B′
suffers from a lack of “consilience”. Given B′, the probability distribution of the error
10
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term V can be measured or estimated under two conditions: when Y = 3.5 and when
Y = 4.5, but the two estimates do not “jump together”: the empirical distribution of V
estimated from the group of Y = 3.5 is very different from that of V estimated from the
group of Y = 4.5. In contrast, Hypothesis A′ does not have this problem (though in this
case it does not display interesting consilience due to the lack of variation in X). We
agree with Forster that this kind of consilience or lack thereof is evidentially significant,
but we submit that the contrast is reflected in the comparison of likelihoods.
To show this, it helps to consider yet another version of the example Forster discussed.
This version specifies the two hypotheses in the standard and perhaps most natural
way, which assumes that Xi’s and Yi’s are i.i.d. Under the i.i.d assumption, the best
fitting marginal of X is P (X = 4) = 1. Add this marginal of X, together with the
i.i.d assumption and that of the independence between X and U , to A, and call the
resulting hypothesis A′′. Similarly, the best fitting marginal of Y is P (Y = 3.5) = P (Y =
4.5) = 1/2. Add this marginal of Y , together with the i.i.d assumption and that of the
independence between Y and V , to B, and call the resulting hypothesis B′′. In this
example, A′′ happens to be the same as A′, so L(A′′) = (1/2)20. But B′′ is different from
B′, and has a much lower likelihood:
L(B′′) =
∏
i
PB′′(Xi = xi, Yi = yi)
=
∏
i
PB′′(Xi = xi|Yi = yi)PB′′(Yi = yi) = (1/2)
40
The difference in likelihoods accords well with the intuition that the data favor A′′ over
B′′. But there is a “mystery” according to Forster. The likelihoods seem to differ just
because of the difference in the parts contributed by the added marginals, but why should
that matter? Intuitively, “the generation of the independent or exogenous variable [is]
an inessential part of the causal hypothesis.”
11
Chicago, IL -987-
We share the latter intuition. In particular, we are sympathetic with the view that a
defining feature of a causal relationship is that the relationship remains invariant under
suitable interventions of an exogenous cause that change its marginal distribution (Wood-
ward 2003). But it does not follow that marginals are irrelevant in causal inference. They
are especially relevant to the kind of problems under discussion: distinguishing the di-
rection of causal influence. In the present case, for example, X is hypothesized as the
cause in only one of the hypotheses; in the other hypothesis it is modeled as the effect.
The marginal distribution of X is relevant to judging, for example, how well the other
hypothesis, by treating X as endogenous, fits the observations on X, compared to the
former hypothesis that treats X as exogenous.
The right explanation in our view of the difference between the likelihoods actually
agrees nicely with Foster’s consideration of consilience. Notice that the lack of consilience
under B highlighted by Forster corresponds to the statistical dependence of V on Y as
shown in the data. A convenient measure of statistical dependence between random
variables is known as mutual information (Cover and Thomas 1991, 18). The mutual
information between two random variables Z and W is defined as:
I(Z,W ) = E log
P (Z,W )
P (Z)P (W )
= E(logP (Z,W )− logP (Z)− logP (W ))
where E(·) denotes the expectation (with respect to P (Z,W )). The mutual information is
a way to measure the difference between the joint distribution P (Z,W ) and the product
of the marginals P (Z)P (W ), and hence a way to measure the statistical dependence
between Z and W . It is non-negative and is equal to zero just in case Z and W are
independent.
Given i.i.d samples from the joint distribution P (Z,W ), we can use the following
sample approximation of the mutual information, by replacing the expectation with the
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sample mean, and P with the corresponding empirical distribution Pˆ (where probabilities
are estimated by sample frequencies):
Iˆ(Z,W ) =
1
n
∑
i
(log Pˆ (zi, wi)− log Pˆ (zi)− log Pˆ (wi))
where n is the sample size. This provides a measure of dependence as shown in the
samples. Accordingly, in Forster’s example, Iˆ(X,U) and Iˆ(Y, V ) can be regarded as
plausible measures of the lack of consilience in A′′ and B′′, respectively.
Some calculations are in order. Given the data in Forster’s example, the empirical
joint distribution of X and Y puts half of the mass on 〈X = 4, Y = 3.5〉 and half of
the mass on 〈X = 4, Y = 4.5〉. It follows that the empirical joint distribution of X
and U = Y − X puts half of the mass on 〈X = 4, U = −0.5〉 and half of the mass on
〈X = 4, U = 0.5〉; and the empirical joint distribution of Y and V = X − Y puts half of
the mass on 〈Y = 3.5, U = −0.5〉 and half of the mass on 〈Y = 4.5, U = 0.5〉. From these
it is easy to calculate, taking 2 as the base of the logarithm to simplify the numbers, that
Iˆ(X,U) = 0 and Iˆ(Y, V ) = 1. These, we repeat, are plausible measures of the lack of
consilience in Forster’s sense.
Consider now the log-likelihoods of A′′ and B′′, taking again 2 as the base of the
logarithm: l(A′′) = −20 and l(B′′) = −40. The difference between them per datum is
20/20 = 1, which is precisely the difference between Iˆ(Y, V ) and Iˆ(X,U).
This is not a numerical accident. The log-likelihood of A′′ can be written as:
l(A′′) =
∑
i
logPA′′(xi, yi) =
∑
i
logPA′′(xi, ui) =
∑
i
(logPA′′(xi) + logPA′′(ui))
Because for each i, 〈Xi = xi, Yi = yi〉 and 〈Xi = xi, Ui = ui = yi − xi〉 are descriptions of
the same event. Since the marginals in A′′ are specified as the corresponding empirical
13
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distributions — PA′′(X) = Pˆ (X) and PA′′(U) = Pˆ (U) — we have
l(A′′) =
∑
i
(log Pˆ (xi) + log Pˆ (ui))
=
∑
i
log Pˆ (xi, ui)−
∑
i
(log Pˆ (xi, ui)− log Pˆ (xi)− log Pˆ (ui))
=
∑
i
log Pˆ (xi, ui)− nIˆ(X,U)
Similarly,
l(B′′) =
∑
i
log Pˆ (yi, vi)− nIˆ(Y, V )
Note further that for every i, Pˆ (xi, ui) = Pˆ (yi, vi) = Pˆ (xi, yi). Hence,
l(A′′)− l(B′′) = n(Iˆ(Y, V )− Iˆ(X,U))
Therefore, there is here a systematic connection between the comparison of likelihoods
and the comparison of how hypotheses fare in terms of “consilience of inductions” high-
lighted by Forster. The evidential significance of consilience, or at least one plausible
interpretation of it, is not beyond the grip of the LTE.
4 Conclusion
Whether or not the LTE can survive other challenges, Forster’s examples, we conclude,
are not convincing counterexamples. We have only examined one of his examples in this
paper, but the other example, set up in linear models with continuous variables, employs
parallel devices and arguments, to which our points in section 2, mutatis mutandis, carry
over. The apparent force of his examples hinges on an (implicit) denial of the basic tenet
of likelihoodism, i.e., the thesis of the relativity of evidence. Since the denial is based on
no argument but dubious intuitions that have been forcefully criticized by likelihoodists,
Forster’s criticism is at best question begging.
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More interestingly, we showed a way to vindicate Forster’s preferred consilience-based
methodology within the framework of the LTE, by establishing a systematic connection
between likelihood and (one plausible interpretation of) consilience. The connection holds
much more generally for such causal models than we can show in this paper (Hyva¨rinen
and Smith 2013; Zhang et al. forthcoming). In particular, Hyva¨rinen and Smith (2013,
115) presented a similar result on linear models, which is applicable to Forster’s example
with continuous variables. Whether similar connections exist in contexts other than this
sort of causal inference problems is worth exploring.
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